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THE  
HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND  
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

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
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## DEMOCRACY AND DISCIPLINE.

L. P. JACKS.

### I.

THE protest against the increase of State control uttered by Mr Herbert Spencer a generation ago has not arrested the progress of legislation in the direction he deplored. The State has continued to extend its authority over the individual. Our wages, our property, our bodies, our minds, even our characters, have become and are becoming more fully subject to State control. A complete list of the legislation of the last thirty years which affects us in all these respects would astonish many persons who have watched the process only in its piecemeal application. Nor is there any sign that the tendency has reached its limit. All the signs point the other way. We are only at the beginning.<sup>1</sup>

In what follows I shall not presume to pass judgment on the process itself. It is obviously too late in the day to raise the general question whether the State ought to control the individual. The State does control the individual; and

<sup>1</sup> A suggestion of what may be in store for us is afforded by the new gospel of Eugenics. State control of the breeding of the community would seem to be the necessary sequel to State control of education, of economic well-being, etc. How can the State effectively deal with these latter, if, as some say, the population is becoming degenerate through uncontrolled breeding? Economic Socialism is a small enterprise compared to the Eugenic Socialism which follows in its train.



controls him over an ever-widening area of his activity. Almost equally futile for our present purpose is the theoretical question of the degree to which this process ought to extend, or the limit at which it must stop. Mr Spencer laid down a low limit; theorists of the opposite school lay down a high one or none at all; but the State goes on its way with little attention paid to either class of speculations. The amount of State control is being decided, now as always, not on the grand lines of a general theory, but by presumed necessities which arise in the detail of an ever-changing social situation. And these necessities are impelling the State in one direction—that of expanding the area of control. The constitutional change in the *seat of authority*—from the king to the nobles, from the nobles to the people—is apparently complete for the time being, and a new process is in operation: that of *extending the authority so transferred*.

Considering only the facts as they are—the extent of State control already existing and the greater extent in prospect—we are immediately confronted with a serious question, a question too seldom asked, or perhaps one ought to say, too frequently left unanswered. *Will the discipline of the people bear the strain?* Are we assured in advance of a deepening spirit of obedience in the citizens adequate to the demand of an ever-extending authority? To be sure, the authority is theoretically the creation of the people; but are the people morally strong enough to carry the burden they are placing on their own backs? We all know how a man may draw up a code of rules for his own conduct, an elaborate time-table regulating the employment of every hour, or what not, and find in the upshot that he lacks the assiduity and self-control to carry his programme into effect. He may repeat the experiment with a severer set of rules, and again discover the inadequacy of his moral resources, until at length he loses confidence in himself and learns to treat his own regulations with contempt. May not a community do the same thing with a like result?



The State, then, is embarking on courses which make larger and larger demands on the spirit of social discipline, and may even be said to presuppose in the people an unlimited fund of goodwill towards the law. And is it not disconcerting that this demand should arise at a moment when many collateral causes are at work which impair the habit of obedience and weaken respect for authority? The period of growing State control is also a period in which men generally are showing themselves more and more impatient of control in every other form. "Discipline" is an unpopular word, and, must we not add, an unpopular thing.

Social discipline is a quality composed of many elements. The basis is moral—the willingness to forgo private interest for the greater good of others. This moral element is enforced by religious sanctions, and its growth among Western nations is intertwined with that of Christianity. Historical sentiment also has a part in the composition—the reverence for institutions for which our fathers suffered and which have stood the test of time. Another element, different in quality from these, but equally essential to the effectiveness of social discipline, is "drill"—the habit of alacrity in response to the word of command, intelligence in the interpretation of an order, rapidity in the execution of it, attention, alertness, thoroughness, punctuality—all the qualities which make the well-trained soldier "smart." The social discipline of the British is strongest on its moral, religious, and historical side. Its weakness is the lack of "drill."

To the cultivation of this composite quality, of which an ever-increasing fund is demanded by every complicated system of State control, little systematic attention has been paid. What we have of it in our own country has been partly knocked into us by the stern exigencies of our history, not least by the incessant wars in which we have been engaged; for though our soldiers are few, our battles are many. Religion, also, has been deeply at work.

This neglect may be set down to three causes.

In the first place, the instinct of obedience to law is strong in the British people, through the causes named above, so that social reforms may be carried a long way without encountering any lack of it. History has shown over and over again how great a strain it can endure. Many instances could be quoted from the legislation of the last hundred years to prove that large classes of the community will accept a law without serious recalcitrancy when it has been carried over their heads and when they are honestly persuaded that an injury is inflicted on their private interests. The British have seldom sought to render obnoxious laws of none effect by conspiracy among the threatened classes. These have accepted the laws and obeyed them. And this long continuance of goodwill towards the law, often under trying conditions, has led many of us to assume that it will continue under all conditions and for ever. But there are limits to its powers of endurance; and the limit being reached, recourse will certainly be had to means which a people ill-disposed for discipline can always invent, and which have been invented abundantly in America, for evading or defeating the will of the State. This would be the greatest calamity. Any legislation which overtaxes the instinct of obedience is sure to fail, and, by failing, to breed in the people a disregard for the law, or perhaps a contempt for it, than which nothing could be more fatal to the prospect of further reforms.

A second reason lies in the fact that the more complicated forms of State control are of comparatively recent growth. We are living upon social instincts adapted to a more simple form of social structure than that which now prevails, and have not had time to realise the insufficiency of old habits to new conditions. The change in the trend of legislation from Individualism to Collectivism has been rapid, if not sudden—I follow Professor A. V. Dicey<sup>1</sup> in regarding it as accomplished—and as yet we are scarcely awake to the new type of our

<sup>1</sup> *Law and Opinion in England.*



civic duties and to the vast increase of their prospective range. A picturesque phrase recently dropped by Mr Lloyd George suggests the problem. He spoke of the nation as "mobilised" by the Insurance Act for a campaign against sickness. Well, the nation could hardly be mobilised for a better purpose. But so far the British nation has never been mobilised for anything not even for war. We have never yet been taught the elaborate drill, the complicated and exacting manœuvres, involved in national mobilisation for particular social reforms. Nor have the higher elements of our public spirit ever before been tested by requirements so severe. Further enterprises of the same kind are in prospect, and what we have now most seriously to consider is, whether the civic quality of our people, developed as it has been under a very different régime, is equal to the demands of these repeated mobilisations. As Mr Chesterton would say, the question is not whether the new laws are good enough for the citizens, but whether the citizens are good enough for the new laws.

The third and, I think, the most potent cause of indifference is the blind faith which many of us still retain in the abstract theory of democracy.<sup>1</sup> The argument, simply stated, comes to this: the laws which the people have to obey are laws which the people themselves have made. How then can they refuse obedience? Government in a democratic country is government by consent. The will which the laws embody is our own. What need therefore of any *further* goodwill towards the law? To assume that we shall turn recalcitrant against our own enactments is to imply that we are irrational.

The argument is familiar and, if allowed, closes the question. It brings me at once to the heart of my subject, and deserves the fullest consideration that can be given within the limits of this article. The notion that automatic discipline

<sup>1</sup> An inheritance from the days of the Philosophic Radicals, whose teaching was marked by an enormous over-estimate of the value of legislation as a means of attaining human well-being.

follows from the principle of democracy I believe to be an illusion. Under no form of government is discipline more precarious, on the one hand,<sup>1</sup> nor more necessary on the other.

## II.

That obedience is not automatically furnished under popular government is sufficiently evidenced by current events. There could hardly be a form of government theoretically more "popular" than that which obtains in the United States; but, unless I am much mistaken, it is precisely the absence of automatic obedience which now troubles the American Commonwealth. And, in our own country, the growing unrest with which obedience is rendered, and the undisguised language with which disobedience is threatened, suggest a wide discrepancy between the theory of democracy and the actual condition of the British State. Mr Bonar Law evidently regards the theory as fictitious when applied to the acts of the party now in power. Reverence for representative institutions does not prevent the Conservative Leader from openly assuring the men of Ulster that he will support them in resisting Home Rule, if imposed by the Imperial Parliament. It does not prevent the Passive Resistance of Dr Clifford and his friends. It does not prevent the great Medical Associations from refusing to take their part in working the Insurance Act. It does not prevent a great body of women from avowing the profession and following the practice of rebels. No doubt these recalcitrant groups would all defend their conduct on the ground that their disobedience to democracy as-it-is springs from a spirit of obedience to democracy as-it-ought-to-be. But that plea being allowed, the guarantee of discipline, assumed to be involved in the principle of popular government, comes to a swift end. If it is per-

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps more than a coincidence that the victory won by the democratic principle in curtailing the power of the House of Lords should synchronise so closely with the refusal of Ulstermen to submit to the authority of the existing Parliament. The two things are, in fact, definitely connected by leading politicians.



missible for a group or party to refuse allegiance to particular laws because it judges them unconstitutional, this affirms the right of the group to act as a judiciary outside the constitution for deciding which laws are, and which are not, constitutional. If the members of a great profession may combine to resist an Act which seems to them unfair in the interests of their class, what is to prevent any class, say working men, from combining for the same object? If Nonconformists may defy the law on the ground that conscience is offended, any law might be broken on the same ground, since there is hardly one of them but offends the conscience of somebody? If women may violate laws made exclusively by men, what, in the possible hereafter, is to prevent extremists on the other side from violating future laws on the ground that women have had a part in making them? What, in short, is to prevent the principles involved in all such action from coming home to roost at moments when they are least expected, and in forms which are least welcome to their authors? Shall we say that a democratic State must arm itself with coercive powers adequate to suppress such recalcitrancy? But this would be to confess once more that the theory of automatic obedience is an illusion. A government of the people, by the people, for the people, which at the same time has continually to enlarge its powers of coercing the people, is surely a contradiction in terms.

The truth is, of course, that while in one sense the popular will controls the machinery of the State, in another, and perhaps deeper sense, the machinery of the State controls the popular will. Modern men, we are told, are becoming the slaves of machines; and whatever truth this saying may hold could not be better illustrated than by a reference to the machinery of the State. To assume, as is so often done, that social discipline requires nothing more than the submission of an existing minority to an existing majority is to overlook the essential conditions under which obedience has to be rendered. We are all required to submit to a vast system of government

with the creation of which we have had nothing to do. The State as it exists at a given moment is no mere reflection of the will of the community then alive. It embodies the accumulated wills of countless buried generations. It may be compared to a vast machine in which each age adds something to the complication of its parts, to the delicacy of its adjustments, to the impulse which urges it forward on a predetermined path; and if it is true on the one hand that the people are continually winning a larger control over the working of the mechanism, it is equally true on the other that the mechanism itself grows with each new addition more difficult to control, more masterful in its tendencies, more irresistible in its momentum—and also, more liable to total breakdown on any shock to its working parts. Theoretically, no doubt, “a sovereign people” might take the entire State to pieces to-day, and reconstitute it to-morrow: practically, it can do nothing of the kind. The will of the people, as this exists at a given moment, is dominated by the bigness of the State, by its implacable momentum,<sup>1</sup> by the power of its engines, and, above all, by the ever-increasing complications of its mechanism. As the State develops in all these respects, interference becomes attended with greater difficulty and greater risk; until at last the leviathan may defy us to tamper with any essential of its working. Society is not a thing that can be dry-docked for repairs; its way is in the deep; and our very lives depend on our ability to keep it going from hour to hour. This should be steadfastly borne in mind by those who believe in government of the people, by the people, for the people. We talk to our constituents of the revolutionary changes we would effect if we were in power; but when these same constituents send us to take our place in the engine-room or on the bridge, we begin to change our tune.

<sup>1</sup> What is here called the “momentum” of the State has been enormously increased in recent years by the growth of “Imperialism.” It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the weight of four hundred million human lives has been added to the moving mass.



We soon discover that any departure from the rules which are inherent in the structure of the mechanism—a lever pulled too far, a word of command misinterpreted or disobeyed, even an unguarded expression at a critical moment—may send the whole construction to the bottom of the great deep.

Thus it is that the vast social mechanisms which have come into being, through the action or sufferance of the past, have to be treated less and less as facile instruments which the will of the people can use at discretion, and more and more as powers which put the people under discipline, thereby provoking recalcitrancy. It is the simpler forms of social structure which are most amenable to popular control; the more complicated develop an authority of their own and become a law unto themselves. To describe democratic progress exclusively in terms of the growing power of the people is, therefore, to overlook one half of the truth. To complete the truth we must remember how the momentum of the State, as it develops through the ages, becomes more and more independent of the social will of the hour. What civilisation has now to fear is not so much deliberately planned revolution as disaster. Such is the complication of the machine and the stringency of the conditions under which it acts, that a sudden blow on any working part, or an unexpected breakdown of discipline in the crew—the one caused by the other—may produce conditions which are beyond the reach of remedy.

### III.

Let us be more precise. I have spoken of the irresistible tendencies of the modern State. What are they? For the sake of the argument I will accept the answer in the form most commonly given.

The main tendency, we are told, is towards State ownership of capital and State regulation of labour—Socialism, if you will.<sup>1</sup> The wealth which accrues from the uses of capital,

<sup>1</sup> I would again point out, for I think it is usually forgotten, that economic Socialism is by no means the most radical, nor the final, form of State control.

now inequitably divided, and often falling in largest share to those who have done least to create it, will hereafter be equitably divided, among all who have laboured in its production, by its sole possessor—the State.

The question before us has nothing directly to do with the economic soundness of such a system. This, though disputable, will be taken for granted. Our concern is with another problem, ultimately connected with the economic, no doubt, which may be stated thus: Would this system automatically satisfy the demands of a people who had imposed it on themselves; or should we find that the result would satisfy its authors only on condition that they were prepared to put themselves under severe self-restraint, to practise the virtues indicated by the term “social discipline”—virtues without which law cannot prevail, but which at the same time law cannot create?

At first sight it may not be apparent that any high degree of moral restraint would be required of the great majority who would presumptively benefit by such a system. The toilers would receive, in one form or another, a larger share in the product of their toil; and surely there is no need of discipline to ensure their ready acceptance of so favourable an arrangement.

But human nature is hard to satisfy. We might all conceivably be vastly better off than we are without feeling that we were as well off as we ought to be. When does a man recognise that he is receiving an adequate return for his labour? A great singer, one would think, ought to be contented if he gets fifty pounds for singing a song. But he does not think so. He asks a hundred, and refuses the engagement if he cannot get it. What then is an adequate return for services rendered to the community? In a word, what is “a satisfactory wage”?

Are wages made satisfactory by the mere circumstance that they are paid by the State, by the community, and not by a private individual? Obviously not. A State may do



its best to reward the labours of its citizens, but it by no means follows that the citizens will believe that the best is being done. The citizens may still grumble and kick. The present Government, elected by popular vote, claims to be doing its best for the community by making us pay such and such taxes. Half of the citizens do not believe the claim, and are profoundly dissatisfied. Would the State, always represented for the time being by the party in power, find us easier to satisfy if, in addition to fixing the taxes we have to pay, it fixed the wages we have to receive? A State, however organised—imperfectly, like the British or American nation at the present moment; perfectly, as the Socialist promises—may, like any private employer, find itself in “restricted circumstances.” There may be a succession of bad seasons, a falling off in skill, a new microbe, a devastating pestilence, an epidemic of lethargy, an arrest of inventive faculty, a declining birth-rate, or a foreign war. Any one of these causes might impair the power of the State to reward its members for their services to the common good; the scale of reward might be reduced to meagre proportions; the common fund might run exceedingly low. Is it not obvious that only a highly disciplined community would accept a situation so unpleasant, and so different from what is usually promised?

What then, I must ask again, is a satisfactory wage? Shall we say it is the maximum attainable under existing conditions, be they good or bad? But who is to judge when the maximum is attained? Can we say in advance that when the State is organised as we desire, the people will be in such perfect sympathy with their executive that they will, under all circumstances, accept as the just maximum whatever measure of reward the State allots them? But this perfect sympathy between the individual and the State is only another name for that perfect social discipline grounded on self-restraint which no community yet possesses; and its introduction at this point of the discussion only serves to strengthen the plea to which the whole argument leads up.

Or can we say that a democratic people will always be satisfied on proof given in the national balance-sheet that all the profits of collective effort, be they small or great, have been equitably distributed? But what about the *losses*? Will there never be an adverse balance? Would not this have to be divided also? Will there be no declining industries? If hats begin to go out of fashion, will the hatmaker be content to bear the consequences himself, or will the State require the coatmaker to help him in bearing them? Will the coatmaker be "satisfied" with the arrangement? If a decline takes place in Protestant opinions and a revival in Catholic, will the Catholics be content that some portion of the collective wealth should be applied in providing a minimum wage for the impoverished clergy of the Protestant persuasion? I am far from suggesting that such things are impossible. Human nature is capable of disinterestedness greater than this. I would only point out that such a system of bearing one another's burdens presupposes once more a disciplined self-subordination in all ranks of the community in strange contrast to our present attitude of mind.

And here I would say in passing that one of the gravest defects in current social idealism is that it turns the imagination too much on that more attractive side of the picture which has to do with the sharing of profit, and too little on the other side—the sharing of loss. Social idealists would certainly inspire greater confidence and win a firmer hold on sober minds if they would speak to us more faithfully and more urgently on the just distribution, in the ideal community, of adversity, hardship, sacrifice, and misfortune, reminding us *all* without any exception that it is precisely here that our social mettle will be put to the test. No form of human society will ever be exempt from these losses, since the causes which determine the ebb and flow of collective prosperity are only in part under human control. Assuming reform to succeed to the uttermost in transferring to the whole community the burden which now falls excessively on the part, the essential char-



acter of that burden would not be changed. It would still remain the primal doom of toil, the sentence passed on the father of all flesh ; and though the transfer from part to whole might ease the weight for many, it would still be heavy enough for all to put a strain on the forbearance and fortitude of every citizen in the State. It is nothing to the purpose to tell the rich that they will be made to bear the burdens of the poor ; for this is apt to be interpreted by the poor as meaning that hereafter they will have no burdens to bear, and by the rich as meaning that hereafter they will have nothing else to do than bear the burden of somebody else. Both interpretations are false ; the truth being that hereafter we should all bear one another's burdens as well as share one another's good hap. A little more emphasis on this would have the advantage of throwing into clear relief the moral preparation which is needed for the new order ; a truth much obscured by the habit of dwelling on the "profits" to be shared. Sharing in the profits will awake no man's recalcitrancy ; morally speaking, it will go of itself. But sharing in the losses will put our obedience to the test.

This brings us to the source of the confusion which besets current discussion of "a satisfactory wage." Too often a satisfactory wage is taken to mean a reward deemed to be adequate by just and benevolent lookers-on, or by a committee of experts, or by a popularly elected tribunal. But obviously the only wage that will satisfy a man is not what somebody else, however fair-minded or benevolent, judges adequate, but what he so judges himself. And what is that ? A hint towards the answer is furnished by the recent coal strike. When the Government laid down the principle of a *minimum* wage it was immediately made plain that what the workers were after was not the just *minimum* according to the Government standard, but the possible *maximum* according to their own. And that distinction exists in every case. As workers we seek satisfaction in terms of possible maxima ; constituted authority offers us satisfaction in terms of just minima. The two points of view may never coincide. A "living wage"—a wage

deemed by others to be adequate to their notion of his reasonable needs—will not of necessity give satisfaction to a single man. No undisciplined man will be satisfied with £5 a week so long as in his judgment there exists the faintest possibility of raising it to £5, 10s. £5 may be the just minimum according to the external standard, but unless it is also the possible maximum according to his own judgment it will not satisfy him, and perhaps not even then. And the same holds true if, instead of being £5 a week, his wage is £5000 a year.

Our question then remains unanswered, and must for ever so remain, save in the most abstract and tautologous terms. A satisfactory wage is a wage that satisfies. Such a conclusion, indeed, would be valueless save for the light which it throws on our general theme. It shows that the quest for a social system which will so distribute wealth as to give us automatically all we want, or all we think we ought to have, is vain. Representative government, however broad its basis, however wide its functions, cannot “represent” a community of men who set no bounds to their desires. It cannot “represent” the unrestrained demand for the possible maximum; but it can represent the disciplined acceptance of a just minimum. This holds true of Socialism as of every other system that could be devised. Socialism in essence is not so much a promise of satisfaction as a call for self-restraint. Far from satisfying us automatically by giving us all we want, or all we think we ought to have, the chief function of a socialistic State would be precisely that of imposing just limits on our desires. Are we ready for these limitations? No covetous community could bear the socialistic yoke for a day. In promoting Socialism, we are really evoking a system of authority which will put restraints on *all* classes precisely at that point where hitherto *no* class has shown itself willing to put restraints upon itself. Once more, therefore, the question is not whether the system is good enough for the people, but whether the people are good enough for the system. And that is a question of discipline.



## IV.

Complete coincidence between the will of the people and the will of the Legislature which represents the people has, of course, never existed, and perhaps never will exist. Representative government must not be taken *au pied de la lettre*. Fictions and anomalies are plentiful, so plentiful indeed that to the mind of Carlyle the whole system was little better than a "sham." We need not endorse so extravagant a verdict; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that divergence between the popular will and the will of the popularly elected Government must always exist in some degree. And an interesting and difficult question arises in view of the foregoing discussion. Is the divergence increasing or diminishing under the pressure of present tendencies? The answer to that question will obviously affect our plea for discipline.

Two significant features, with intimate mutual relations, are to be noted.

(1) There is a tendency on the part of Government to group the citizens in classes for the reception of particular benefits or the bearing of particular burdens. I am far from endorsing the current outcry against class legislation, but I wish to point out that it contains an element of truth. Legislation affecting employment is an instance of what is meant: it groups the citizens according to status as employer or employed. There is a growing body of legislation which affects employers and employed as such: sometimes seeming to oppose, sometimes to conciliate, their respective interests. One measure is called "The *Workmen's* Compensation Act"; another, "The *Employers' Liability Act*," and so on. But it is in regard to taxation that the "grouping" tendency is most apparent. A graduated Income-tax and graduated Death Duties group the citizens according to wealth: taxes on land, on beer, on tea, on tobacco, group them according to vocation, trade, or habit.

Now the principle or principles (for there are many) on which the Legislature groups the citizens for the imposition of duties or the reception of benefits is *not* the principle on which they are grouped for representation in Parliament. I am represented in Parliament as a householder in the City of Oxford; but I find that the basis on which I am so represented has little to do—and as time goes on, less and less to do—with the basis on which I am taxed and governed. A principle of differential treatment is undoubtedly at work, and though philosophers may see behind this a principle of unity, the point still remains to be noted that neither of these principles is co-ordinated with the system of representation.

As an historical growth, the existing relation between taxation and representation is respectable, and perhaps necessary. Were it the invention of a single brain we should be astonished at the astuteness of its author. It is the practical solution of a paradox. For, on the one hand, a democratic State has to guard itself against “representing” the will of the natural man, which is to pay no taxes at all; on the other hand, he must be persuaded that the Government which taxes him also “represents” his will. Both these ends are attained together by the existing system. As bearer of taxation, the citizen is placed in a number of classes, not only different in composition, but often opposed in interest—landlord and tenant, employer and employed, brewer, tea-drinker, etc.: as voter, he is placed in another class—householder in a particular locality—which is not coterminous with the sum of the former, nor, it may be, with any one of them. Thus, by allowing his vote as a householder in a particular locality, the State satisfies the citizen’s demands for representation on the general principles, or pooled issues, of party policy; while, at the same time, it scatters the voting pressure which might thwart their concrete application in a particular tax. Inasmuch as the citizen does not vote in the classes in which he is placed for purposes of taxation, he is unable to use his vote in the way which would most effectively hinder the imposition of a



given tax, viz., by combining with all his fellows throughout the country in concentrating their votes at the threatened point. No doubt, as sharer in the general benefits of taxation, the citizen has his consolations; but here also he has, on the whole, to take what is given him. Whether as paying taxes or receiving their benefits, he is split up into a number of different personalities, which often put him at variance with himself; and in practice these are so played off one against another that the line of connection between the will of the citizen and the action of the State is often exceedingly difficult to trace. *Divide et impera.*

There are obvious reasons for this arrangement which need not be here discussed. It is also true that the discrepancy between the principle on which the citizen is represented and the principle on which he is taxed is no new thing. It is almost as old as Parliament itself; though we may note in passing that at the origin of Parliament some attempt was made to co-ordinate the two principles by requiring representatives to be of two classes only, burgesses and knights of the shire; thus identifying the groups taxed with the groups represented—the burgesses as bearing the taxes on trade, and the knights of the shire the taxes on land.<sup>1</sup> This was a rough-and-ready method of obtaining a system of taxation by consent; but it has long since been lost sight of in the general pooling of political issues rendered necessary by the growing complications of social structure. We have, I say, long been familiar with this and have grown accustomed to the circuitous routes and bewildering intermediaries which intervene between the act of paying the piper and the act of calling the tune. The question we have now to consider is, whether the circuitousness of the route and the number of the intermediaries are increasing or the reverse. And in view of the growing tendency to govern the citizens in groups, by differential treatment, while the basis of representation remains

<sup>1</sup> See some excellent remarks on this subject in Lord Hugh Cecil's *Conservatism* in the "Home University Library," p. 155 seq.

unchanged, it seems to me that they are on the increase. The relation of the will of the ruled to the will of the ruler is growing more abstract, more general, more indirect. The maxim "No taxation without representation" has to be taken with a larger and larger grain of salt.

(2) Corresponding to this tendency in legislation, and not altogether uncaused by it, we may note a disposition among the citizens themselves to form "groups" for the advancement or defence of particular interests—interests which, it must be confessed, are often pursued by the parties concerned in a purely sectional spirit and with little reference to the total good of the State. Such combinations are now become numerous, and they are so well known, and so well advertised by their words and actions, that a detailed list is hardly needed. At present they are so little in harmony with one another that each, if left to itself, would act as a check on all the rest. This is a safeguard, but its value is largely offset by the ease with which the different sections may be combined and handled, behind the back of the people, and behind their own backs, by the wire-pulling politician.

These groups have realised that *as groups* they have no direct representative voice in the legislation by which their interests are controlled; in other words, that the Government does not represent them. The formation of the Labour Party is to be interpreted in this way. In principle it carries us back to the edict of Edward I. which enjoined the constituencies to send to Parliament, not anybody who could win their suffrages—virtually the modern custom—but members of the *classes* legislation was most likely to affect. The Labour Party arose in like manner as soon as the labourers perceived that, though their voting power outnumbered that of any other single class, yet labour *as such* was unrepresented in the making of the laws. But if this held true of labour, it is true, in some degree at least, of almost every interest which we may choose to isolate for legislative purposes. The profession of medicine *as such* is unrepresented; yet legislation has recently been passed which



most of the members of that profession regard as highly injurious to their interests. The Church might raise the same grievance when Bills for disestablishment are in the air. Except for the presence of Bishops in the House of Lords the Church has no direct voice in the passing of those Bills into law. Nonconformity has its turn when an obnoxious Education Bill is brought forward by a Conservative Government. And what shall we say to the great class of employers, of capitalists? No doubt if we study the *personnel* of the House of Commons we shall find that a very large proportion of its members are employers of labour. In that sense it is true that employers are over-represented. But as a *class* they are not represented at all. Not a single member sits in the House of Commons as a duly accredited representative of Capital in the same sense as Mr Ramsay MacDonald sits as a duly accredited representative of Labour. Not one has been formally elected as a capitalist, by capitalists, to look after the interests of Capital. We may indeed say that, the *personnel* of the House of Commons being what it is, the interests of Capital may well be trusted to look after themselves. So indeed they may, as things now are. But things are changing. Capital is a threatened interest, and such is the intricacy of the political machine that at any moment a combination of interests might be brought to bear against Capital by which its power would be crushed. Such a result may be desirable, and from the socialist point of view is desirable; but we could hardly expect the capitalists to treat the result as an instance of government by consent. Possibly before this can happen we shall see the rise in the country of a definite capitalist or employers' party; and such a result would only be the logical counterpart to what has already taken place in regard to Labour. And looking further ahead we may imagine that, as the process goes on of restricting particular interests for the good of the community, the members of each group so affected, realising that as a group they are unrepresented, will follow the momentous example of the Labour Party. "It is as

classes the law deals with us. As classes therefore we claim to deal with the law." Such is likely to be the cry; and though eminent thinkers like Sir Henry Jones are in their right when they rebuke these groups for bad citizenship in setting the partial interests of their class above the total interests of the State, yet justice requires that we shall not overlook the other side. The reply is readily forthcoming that the prime author of the trouble is the State itself, which is here reaping the inevitable fruit of its own actions. For, if the State directs its attention to particular vocations and trades, or classifies its citizens for purposes of taxation on the basis of their interest or their wealth, threatening one group and making promises to another, encouraging small holders and discouraging large ones, punishing beer and rewarding or protecting wheat, what more natural than that the community should organise itself on the basis on which it is treated by the Legislature, for self-protection in the one case, for self-advancement in the other?

## V.

Putting together the various considerations so far adduced, I am led to the conclusion that authority is slowly extending its claims behind the mask of representative institutions. Much of the current "unrest"—whether the "unrest" of Labour, or the "unrest" of Mr Bonar Law—is unquestionably due to a dim, or clear, perception of this fact. We are not moving towards the ideal of democracy as automatically translating the will of the people into law. We are moving rather towards a type of society which confers greater authority on the one side and requires more thorough obedience from the other. As the complexity of the social structure increases, the process of pooling single issues under general mandates will, of necessity, become more marked, the divergence between the abstract commission and the concrete application will become wider, and a larger latitude in translating general opinions into particular laws will have to be conceded to the



reigning Government.<sup>1</sup> And the counterpart to this will be a wider field for recalcitrancy among such of the citizens as are lacking in goodwill towards the law—recalcitrancy based on the plea, true so far as it goes, that the acts of the Government fail to represent the will of the governed. Is our social discipline adequate to bear the strain?

One point, however, remains to be emphasised, without which nothing that could be said about the growing need of social discipline is of the least significance. I have spoken of this quality hitherto as though its presence were required only in those who have to obey the laws. It is required yet more in those who make them. If Parliaments are to have the confidence of the people whom they serve—and without that all government by Parliament is impossible—they must be composed of men trained in habits of self-subordination to the public good. It cannot be too much considered that democracy as it now exists, if in one aspect the freest, is in another aspect the severest form of government; less than any other form does it permit the natural man to do as he likes; and a community composed of individuals who have no other ideal than doing as they like, will not only refuse to be governed but fail to produce men who are capable of governing. It was in an age of tyrants that the saying went forth that only those were fit to rule who had learnt to obey. I cannot imagine any saying with a more urgent application to modern Parliaments. This is not the place to discuss the fitness of particular classes to furnish legislators for the community; but one thing may be said without distinction of them all—that the school of lawlessness, of indiscipline, or even

<sup>1</sup> The principle of the dependence of law on public opinion, so forcibly presented by Professor Dicey in the work already mentioned, does not seem to me in conflict with this view. Allowing that every law reflects some powerful current of contemporary opinion, it does not follow that every powerful current of opinion is reflected in law. Again, much of the law under which we live at a given moment represents opinion which no longer exists, or exists in a greatly weakened form. The Act of Uniformity may be cited as an instance. It is still in force; but it can hardly be claimed to reflect existing public opinion.

of individual self-assertion or self-indulgence, is a school which can produce no lawgivers for a democratic State. Worse even than the school of masterless men, is the school of intrigue against the State. Of this we know something in our own country. They know more of it in America. There, in the heart of a democracy theoretically the freest the world has ever known, has arisen a sinister and ingenious contrivance known as "the machine." The machine is too complex for any brief description; but reduced to its lowest terms it may be defined as a great engine of social disobedience contrived by men with the inventive brains of Edison, and controlled by men with the strategical brains of Napoleon. It is to "the machine" that the people have lost the power which Colonel Roosevelt wishes to restore to them; and it is through this machine, whose innermost spring is the spirit of disobedience, that the men are now mainly chosen who are to fill the offices of Government. The history of "the machine" serves to show that when the spirit of social discipline has fallen below a certain level, and the spirit of disobedience infected the rulers as well as the ruled, democracy sinks into a state of helplessness in which the will of the people cannot express itself further, and cannot give full effect to the laws in which it has expressed itself already. Let those who believe that democracy has an inherent power of coercing recalcitrant members study American politics in being. They will find that recalcitrancy holds the field; that threatened interests have learnt how to make themselves more powerful than the Government that threatens them.

## VI.

The whole discussion leads up to a conclusion simple in form, but difficult in application. The central problem of democracy is the problem of educating the citizen. This, indeed, is a commonplace; but there is reason to think that the kind of education required by the citizen, whether as subject or legislator, to qualify him for the new part he has to



play, has not been sufficiently considered. What he needs is not merely instruction in political science. He does need that; but he needs something else far more; something without which all the political science in the world will carry him but a little way. *He must learn to obey*: and the lesson will be all the more difficult for him to learn because hitherto democracy has been too closely associated with the spirit which prompts him to seek escape from authority. Of all modern democratic governments with scarcely one exception it may be said that they were conceived in disobedience and born in rebellion. Their watchword has ever been "liberty"; but "liberty" interpreted in a sense which has obscured its sterner implications. But now that democracy has taken up the task of social reform those sterner implications are coming into view. None but a thoroughly disciplined community can effectually deal, through its Government, with social reform. The idea, too prevalent in certain quarters, that the restraints of social reform will fall exclusively on the rich, the idle, the privileged, is a fond illusion. Every man of us will be put under restraints such as we have never dreamed of; such as few men have ever asked themselves whether they were willing, or even able, to bear. It is well that we should all realise this truth—for it is irrefutable—as we listen to the daring programmes and the glowing promises of political orators. Mr Beveridge, defining the platform of the Third Party at Chicago the other day, said that in essence it was "social brotherhood against savage industrialism," and was to include among other things the regulation of monopolies, the establishment of scientific protection, old age pensions, the reform of the land laws, a minimum wage, State insurance, and regulation of the labour of women and children. Admirable! But are the American people ready? This programme, translated into action, means that the American citizen, poor as well as rich, must stand at attention "with the last button on his tunic," and must be ready with "*Adsum*" the instant his name is called. As Mr Lloyd George would say, the

nation will be "mobilised." Need it be said that a finely disciplined citizenship is essential to the success of such a programme.

Will it succeed in our own country, where the greater part of it has already become law? We must wait and see. So far the spirit of goodwill towards the law—our greatest national asset—has proved itself sufficiently strong to bear a great strain. But there is an ominous restlessness, and many illusions are in the air. To be more precise, I venture to think that if the leaders of the various "groups" now in existence would impress their respective followers with the truth that their social discipline is in arrear of their social aspirations, the darkest cloud which now hangs over the future of democracy might begin to disappear.

To win political power is one thing; to retain it, when won, is another. In these times any lawless horde sufficiently numerous, any group of wire-pullers sufficiently astute, can thwart or wreck a democratic Government. But power so won is doomed to be immediately thwarted or wrecked by its own methods. It may issue commands: few will obey. It may create "social systems": they will be disregarded. "Many things are mighty, but man is mightier than them all"; and never is the might of human wit more manifest than when it turns to works of disobedience. So when the saying goes forth that "the people are going to rule," the question instantly arises—"For how long?" And the answer is that they will rule for precisely so long as the spirit of obedience keeps them in power.

To this principle, then, we return; and the present writer humbly commends it to the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL as worthy of meditation. American or British, it touches us nearly, and applies with equal force to the promises of Colonel Roosevelt and to the accomplished deeds of Mr Lloyd George.

L. P. JACKS.



## A NATION AT SCHOOL.

FRANK ILSLEY PARADISE,

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THE startling reappearance of Mr Roosevelt in the political arena a few months ago came out of conditions and produced results which mark a turning-point in American history. From a distance the primary campaign must have sounded like the unseemly brawling of two contestants for position and power, who, having broken the bond of affectionate friendship and disregarded the restraints of propriety, were emulous to surpass each other in the vocabulary of vituperation. The very audacity of Mr Roosevelt's act disarmed his friends and gathered his foes into a determined, compact phalanx. It seemed to those who had followed and loved him that by one throw he had gambled away the rich accumulation of a life of strenuous service. Every degrading motive that human ingenuity could invent was ascribed to him. He was pictured as a paranoiac; a drunkard; a liar; a tyrant, lusting for power.

Seemingly alone, he faced a maddened nation and defied the great vested powers which control the destinies of government and people. He is said to have remarked that he had lost nearly all the friendships he held dear. The campaign will be long remembered. It was not wanting in ugly and grotesque features, but, as it was pursued with that amazing energy which makes Mr Roosevelt a marvel among men, there slowly emerged to the public view the outlines of a

philosophy of government which was destined to give a new significance to the definition of democracy. Democracy was meant to be, he said, the rule of the people, by the people and for the people; and, invoking thus the sacred name of Lincoln, he appealed to the people to arouse themselves to the duties and privileges of self-government. However one may look upon this Homeric struggle, it remains magnificent. "Our task as Americans is to strive for industrial and social justice achieved through the genuine rule of the people," said Mr Roosevelt. "This is our end and our purpose." "In the long fight for righteousness the watchword for all of us is, Spend and be spent. It is of little matter whether any one man fails or succeeds; but the cause shall not fail, for it is the cause of mankind."

In the turbulence of political strife, especially in the breaking down of old loyalties or the recasting of old alignments, it is well for us to know that such words as these found quick response in the hearts of the people. State after State flocked to his banner; and upon the Convention floor in Chicago was fought the first battle in the new struggle for human liberty.

Our aim is to try to indicate the main currents of this movement, which is so portentous to the destiny of a great republic. It would be a simple matter to draw a parallel between the situation in America and the world-wide struggle of the common people for participation in the affairs of their own governments. But the issue in America presents itself upon so large a stage, embraces so many elements of civilisation, enlists so many and such diverse interests, that it may justly be regarded as a world-struggle and its settlement as a matter of universal concern.

The crisis in the political situation of America, after years of agitation and growing discontent, means really that popular government has been tested and found wanting in the great business of informing society upon a large scale with the spirit of economic and social justice. Our minds must not be con-



fused by personalities, nor by party shibboleths, nor yet by possible successes or failures in the conflict. The one issue at stake is the right and capacity of the people as a whole to rule themselves in the interests of justice for all. In such a movement of outreaching and unrest, Carlyle's impetuous words come back to one as a sure prophecy of the essential condition of a successful democratic society. "One wide and widest outline," he writes, "ought really, in all ways, to be becoming clear to us; this, namely: That a 'Splendour of God,' in one form or other, will have to unfold itself from the heart of these our industrial ages; or they will never get themselves 'organised'; but continue chaotic, distressed, distracted evermore, and have to perish in frantic suicidal dissolution."

To unfold the "Splendour of God" in the development of a great nation, to "organise" the forces of righteousness in an age of material expansion, is a mighty enterprise. How difficult and yet how inspiring a task it is can be realised only as we consider the component elements of American society, with its intellectual, ethical, and social limitations. Only then can we know how splendid a leap of faith is that which discovers in the collective body qualities of wisdom, expansion, and restraint, which are not clearly revealed in individual natures. "To spend and be spent" in such a cause is a high service to humanity.

Since the Civil War America has been known as the "Land of Opportunity." We need not accept Dickens' dreary picture of the country or the people to realise that, on the whole, and in spite of the clear voices of its intellectual and spiritual prophets, the republic of his time had gone but a little way upon the road of its development. The very immensity of the continent and the isolation of its parts from one another; the exhaustless riches of land and water; the amazing energy and versatility of the people; the absorption of all classes in the business of material advancement, combined to glorify personal success, and to breed a race of individualists who turned to the government for protection

in the exploitation of natural resources which, in a true democracy, are public possessions. The boastful patriotism which made Americans the scourge of the world, was little else than a noisy appreciation of unexampled opportunities for personal gain, which came from this land of abounding riches. The material achievements of the last half of the nineteenth century must forever read like a wonder tale, but the historian of the future will trace within this extraordinary story of physical advancement the inevitable march of events which was leading towards the present critical hour. He will picture the waves upon waves of immigration which have flooded the land, have submerged the cities, and created the most heterogeneous nation the world has ever known. But even more will he dwell upon the birth and the growth of a deep and ever-widening sense of dissatisfaction with the limitations of individualistic life. The most remarkable event in recent American history is the expansion of social sympathy, with all its institutional implications, and the rise of social idealism. Wealth has its discipline as well as poverty. "Wealth and poverty," says Socrates: "the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent." This great lesson America is painfully learning. Schools, colleges, libraries, and churches, and all institutions of idealistic life, have wrought their good work, have been honourable outlets for the enlarging streams of individual wealth, and have trained up generations of young men and women who have seen visions of the "Splendour of God" in this republic, and have counted it high privilege to "spend and be spent" for their fellow-men.

No estimate of American life to-day would be sound that did not place a strong emphasis upon the worth and influence of these spiritualising forces. If as yet they have not dominated political parties or crystallised into institutions, they have nevertheless worked mightily to change the temper of the people and to fill the hearts of thousands with the unrest and



dissatisfaction of uncompleted life. The spirit of buoyant self-complacency is yielding to a national mood of self-analysis and reflection. The old order is being challenged and the old standards of value weighed. America is beginning to think of itself less as a land of opportunity and more and more as a land of purpose.

Looking backward again, it is clearly seen that the eager absorption of the people in material things has blinded their eyes to the direction in which the nation was tending. That direction can no longer be hidden behind the words and forms of democratic society. Insidiously and persistently the instruments of social division and inequality have grown in power and dominion. Republican in name and structure, the government has fostered and protected economic slavery under the ægis of freedom. While glorifying the idea of individual liberty, it has exploited the welfare of the masses for the enrichment of the few. Its great and complicated mechanism of law-making has safeguarded property and done but little for the better estate of the toiler. It has ruled by representatives who have represented not the nation as a whole, but the privileged beneficiaries of unequal law and taxation. It has had a drunken orgy of prosperity, in which mountains of wealth have been accumulated in the hands of a plutocracy, in which natural resources have been wantonly wasted, in which the necessities of life have been artificially over-valued, and in which the hearts of millions of workers have been filled with distrust and hatred. It has failed, as Mazzini believed the Italian Revolution had failed, in that it missed the spiritual power which made early Christianity triumphant.

The sober morning light is now breaking over this wonderful land. It will bring forth children unto righteousness, but only through the travail of its soul. We must not be deceived by the awful picture of howling thousands met to choose their ruler. For beneath the noise and tumult the efficacy of a democratic system to meet the economic and spiritual

needs of mankind is being weighed and measured. Great human forces are gathered in convention, forces which are to decide the future destinies of millions. What is to be the issue? That is the question of the hour.

We must look a moment at this gathering of superheated men, for it shows us in action the two generally antagonistic movements in American life. We have already referred to the developing altruistic spirit which has permeated every phase of the social system. In recent years this spirit, which began in a humanistic sentiment and hardly developed beyond the limits of kindness, has become so infused with exact knowledge of social conditions, has become so organised and co-ordinated, that it has assumed the dignity of a scientific pursuit. From the effects of the economic system which leap to the eye, it has followed ruthlessly back upon the track of causation, until the very framework of our social structure has been laid bare to the common people. The old catch-words of society and religion, which have shielded like a curtain the selfish intents of men's hearts, have been torn aside, and the public eye has been permitted to see the body of the nation in its true form. Behind the shibboleth of democracy has been revealed the pernicious working of laws, customs, institutions, which by their very nature tend to segregate the people into two antagonistic camps. To the popularisation of the science of economics, therefore, must be largely ascribed the responsibility for the spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction among the masses.

The vital questions of the structure and the tendencies of the social order are discussed upon hundreds of popular platforms, and a growing literature of sociology is eagerly read by multitudes of men. There is no more impressive phenomenon in American life than this serious attention to problems of public welfare on the part of the working classes. It is in such circles that earnest consideration is given to the great ideas of self-government; and it is among such citizens that the spirit of distrust in a theoretical democracy—based upon



the privileges of feudalism without its corresponding sense of obligation—is most prevalent. From the academies flow streams of scientific knowledge which fertilise the roots of dissatisfaction with the present, and of anticipation of a better future, which are planted deep in this hospitable soil. The evils of this anomalous system might have been gradually mitigated under other governmental conditions; but, concurrently with the growth of the altruistic spirit and the rising consciousness of the collective power of the masses, there has developed a bitter and outraged public feeling against the privileged class.

America has led the world in scientific production. It has yet to learn the meaning of equitable distribution and of discriminating consumption. As a nation it has held aloft a high theory of collective life. It must yet learn through bitter experience the way of adjustment of economic conditions to the ideals for which it stands among the nations. And it is just because there is no appeal to any authority above the judgment of the people that the situation is filled with dramatic possibilities.

The significance of the Chicago Convention, then, is that it was the opening skirmish in what is destined to be a prolonged and bitter conflict. There met face to face during that week of struggle representatives of the two mighty forces of governmental theory which are contending for mastery. On the one hand was the party of establishment. Its constituents are called "Stand Patters," but would doubtless prefer to be known as the party of Constitutionalists. This element draws to itself the conservative forces of the country. It refers constantly to the prosperity of the past and present. Economically its eye is fixed upon the statistics of production rather than upon distribution. It sees wealth in the bulk, as the nation's great asset, and as the primary object of legislation. It reverences law and order, inasmuch as law and order are the safeguards of property. It believes in government by representation, and distrusts both the capacity

and the wisdom of the people to govern themselves. It upholds the Constitution, as though that sacred document were written on tables of stone, and in that glorious endeavour employs methods which have scandalised the nation. Without the seriousness and serenity of an institutional aristocracy, it possesses the same inability to recognise that elasticity and expansion are the very life of the democratic system. "Crude and even visionary as it may be," says Professor Giddings, "this perennial faith in progress is the motive power of moral life."

The other element belongs to a new order. It is organised unrest. It is called the party of Progression, but in any other time and place it would be called the party of revolution. By its very nature it belongs to the future. It gathers together the idealists, the dreamers, the workers for social betterment. It aims to make government the servant of man, and its watchword is Social Justice. But altogether the most significant feature of its programme is the extraordinary confidence it reposes in the wisdom and judgment of the collective body of men. To be sure, so discriminating a critic as Matthew Arnold has defined Democracy as "a force in which the concert of a great number of men makes up for the weakness of each man taken by himself," but America has never yet practised such a democracy as that. We still choose our "rulers" and our law-makers in theory, but in this new movement of primary nominations, the burden of government is shifted as never before, upon so vast a scale, to the shoulders of the people. The steady march of the proletariat into the control of national affairs is not to be gainsaid, but here is revealed a startling faith in the integrity of the human heart that must lead either to anarchy or to a new revelation of inherent powers in the popular will.

For good or evil—and in spite of the cynical contempt of political and financial leaders—this idealistic movement towards actual self-rule possesses the future. The main question in America is, therefore, not who shall be the next occupant of



the White House, but what basis exists for so exalted an estimate of the capacity of an heterogeneous people, dwelling upon a wide continent, of differing interests and grades of civilisation, to perform this prodigious task of wise and beneficent self-government ? In a way, and to a limited extent, the question answers itself. The desire suggests the capacity. The only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy. Yet this is an astonishing venture of faith. However clearly such a believer in democracy sees the selfishness of the human heart, or the perversity of the human will, he yet discovers in man a quality which makes the well-being of the whole the dominating passion of his soul ; or which makes his private fortune one with the fortune of the nation. To the practical politician this seems a weak and sentimental attitude, but the amazing fact is that, in actual test before the people, it has proved itself to be the attitude of true statesmanship. These same practical men claim that it is but a passing mood, and will quickly yield to the discipline of party organisation or to the selfish instinct for personal advancement. This moral cynicism is their strongest weapon. But at least moral passion and heroic daring are not of the past ; and this may be the beginning of a new era in the experiment of popular government, and a new step in the forward march of civilisation.

Now it is evident to the most casual observer that America is passing through a school of wholesome discipline. The old individualism is disappearing ; the former standards of excellence no longer satisfy ; suspicion as to the value of possessions is creeping into men's minds. A quarter of a century has wrought great changes, and the changes are spiritualising the social body.

What has wrought this revolution ? It cannot be ascribed to the churches, for, on the whole, organised religion is allied to the established order, and is hesitating and confused amid the tumult of contending forces. The two great influences in play appear to be a recognition of the limitations of material prosperity, and an ever-widening knowledge of and sympathy for

the ills of the human lot. It is the working of the spirit of democracy—that restless, outreaching passion for fulness of life. The working classes are imbued with this spirit. It possesses the immigrant almost at the moment of landing. He leaps into a position of self-conscious worth ; and claims, if not for himself, at least for his children, the opportunities of a democratic order. It is a wonderful transformation which takes place in this untutored soul—this quick rise from the attitude of servility to that of hope and expectation. And on every side he touches helping hands. His changed condition is everlastingly pressed upon him. He hears much of human rights. He quickly becomes conscious of the obstacles to his advancement. He learns easily of the enormous power of concerted action. In short, long before he casts off the accents and customs of his native land, he becomes an empire-builder, and deep down in his soul is planted the idea of social justice.

Now it is just this splendid vision of a possible future that contains the element of disaster. Without experience or schooling or training in citizenship, without the strong restraining hand of authoritative religion, this new citizen sets out upon the most difficult of tasks, and essays to practise the most delicate of arts. His ears are filled with the din of denunciation, but he hears far too little of the privilege and the responsibility of citizenship. He has a long road to travel, but his progress is often amazingly rapid. He is learning discipline, independence, and the larger selfhood of collective life. He is being taught the meaning of self-subordination to the common good of his guild or labour organisation. Now the question of the hour is: Shall he be governed in national affairs by a class of superior attainments, of larger experience, of greater possession ; or is it the very genius of democracy that he shall learn the art of government by the practice of it ?

The answer is beset with difficulties. The first is concerned with the problem of unifying by the bond of a high moral purpose the many groups which make up the social body. America is called the “great melting-pot,” and it is



true that the mingling of races and nations in this land of opportunity awakes a quite unexampled sense of destiny. But the conversion of the individual mind into the social mind is a mighty undertaking. The dominant classes in America do not, as a whole, lead the way: the influence of organised religion is as yet wholly out of proportion to its great resources, for we have yet to learn from Coleridge that the Church is the whole nation viewed in its religious aspect. The organisations of labour or of mutual benefit have not as yet reached beyond the development of the class unit. It is from this point of view that the influence of Mr Roosevelt's propaganda must be studied. It is national, and more than national, in its appeal to elementary instincts of justice and right dealing. It possesses the quality of romanticism, which appeals to the chivalrous-hearted. It overrides class barriers, and ennobles the place of the humblest person by its moral purpose. It gathers the many activities for social betterment into a positive progressive movement, and synthesises the scattered forces of righteousness. In all this heat and struggle a mighty nation is learning the severe discipline of the schoolroom.

One other aspect of this democratic movement must be considered. Not only are the people being called upon to choose between the general principles of good and evil, not only are they being taught the larger unity of a national life, but they are made the final judges of great technical questions of economics and governmental policy, which can only be wisely determined by trained minds. Never before has universal education held so great an opportunity, never has its need pressed so hard upon a people's destiny. It is true that democracy, by its genius and its structure, releases unexpected forces and develops unexpected powers; but more than that, it makes the heaviest demands for wide and efficient education in all directions and among all classes. For its own salvation the State will be driven to extend its educational boundaries until it no longer has a horizontal division between

the trained and the untrained. The character of universities will more and more undergo such changes as will enable them to educate for efficiency and not for adornment. In giving voice to the new spirit in democracy, Mr Roosevelt is not only creating new popular demands for educational advantages, but he is laying a heavy burden upon the State to preserve its integrity by the enlarged equipment of the people. There will be no step backward. The people will surrender no right they have once acquired. But the new developments in American life have served to throw into stronger light the anomaly of a democratic form of government, dedicated to the rights of man and committed to the great principle of equal opportunity for all, which yet fosters and upholds those forms of special interests and social institutions which are commonly associated with the system of feudalism.

In tracing the development of democracy Lecky generalised in words which are even truer to-day than when he wrote them a generation ago, and which gather new and richer significance in the great issues of American political life. "No one at least can question the extent to which legislation has of late years been modified in favour of the lower classes, the sympathy and even deference that has been shown to their wants, the rapid obliteration of the lines of class divisions, and the ever-increasing tendency to amalgamation based upon political equality and upon enlarged sympathy.

"It is thus that amid the transformation or dissolution of intellectual dogmas the great moral principles of Christianity continually reappear, acquiring new power in the lapse of ages, and influencing the type of each succeeding civilisation."

We cannot have gone so far in our study of American conditions without being brought face to face with the supreme question of national well-being: to what end are all these social forces tending? That it is well for a people to be trained in the habits of self-government; to be unified by a growing national consciousness; to be enriched by wide social knowledge and sympathy; to seek after the prosperity and happi-



ness of all—no one will deny. To make the environment of life beautiful, wholesome, and inspiring is to go far towards the humanisation of society, but it is not enough in itself to make a people great. This engrossment in the business of living or of government leaves, or may leave, quite untouched the higher reaches of the collective soul. "The difficulty for democracy is how to find and keep high ideals," says Mr Arnold, with his unerring insight. The exercise of high social quality generates indeed a purifying and ennobling influence, but it may well be doubted if a free people can persistently progress without the mighty sanctions of a deep religious faith. America has many churches but no national religion: it has many institutions of benevolence, many high aspirations, but it has no common and compelling assurance in the eternal order. It is this sense of the eternal that a free society needs more than all things else. So insistent are the claims of life, here and now, that little heed can be given to things of the spirit. So hotly do we reap and gather into barns, that the transitoriness of all such efforts is forgotten. More than it needs prosperity, or social reform, or primary nominations, America needs the feeling of God. "To work for the good of the race is excellent enough," says a modern writer, "but the work will gain in vigour and enthusiasm when it is no longer the service of a race of summer flies who are to perish in a few moments, but devotion to enduring human beings with the infinite possibilities of infinite worlds."

The detachment of the churches from actual life, their obtuseness to their real function in an elastic and developing social order, their dulness of vision, and their selfish exclusiveness, have robbed them of an inspiring opportunity to guide the nation onward.

Yet already signs are appearing of a coming renaissance of religious faith upon a national scale. If such a happy event is consummated, it must be through the rebirth of the true idea of a Catholic Church. Such a Church must be so authoritative and inspiring that it will dominate the land, like a beacon light

set high upon a hill. It must be so hospitable that the nations of the earth shall bring their treasures into it. Its message must be something other than the teaching of parochial virtues, and its business more ennobling than the activities of petty benevolence. It must deal directly with the great problems of society and government, yet it must have the detachment of the Hebrew prophets from all secondary motives, and it must be strong in its mission to proclaim the law of God. It must dare to engage in a larger enterprise than that of alleviating the suffering caused by unjust and inhuman economic conditions. It must attack the source of evil, hearing across the centuries the bold words of sturdy Augustine: "Thou givest bread to the hungry, but better were it that none hungered and thou hadst none to give to. Thou clothest the naked: oh, that all men were clothed and that this need existed not! For if thou hast done a kindness to the wretched, perhaps thou wishest him to be subject to thee. He was in need. Thou didst bestow: thou seemest to thyself greater because thou didst bestow than he upon whom it was bestowed. Wish him to be thine equal."

The poor mockery of religion, which kills its prophets and honours its paid servants who have power to lull the public conscience, is receiving a well-merited contempt. Should Christianity survive at all as a living force, it will be because once again the priest receives his authority from God, and, vested in the symbols of his unearthly office, proclaims to rulers and people the fiats of the eternal law. Then will every village church become a localised centre of good-will, and the motive of its many activities for the fellowship of men will be the undying assurance of the gracious and universal fatherhood of God.

FRANK ILSLEY PARADISE.

GRACE CHURCH RECTORY,  
WEST MEDFORD.



## A PLEA FOR THE HIGHER SOCIALISM.

A. J. FRASER BLAIR,

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A GREAT many respectable and prosperous people imagine that Socialism is nothing but a violent expropriation of the Haves for the benefits of the Havenots. It is probable that a considerable number of the so-called Socialists are themselves influenced by this view; but I doubt very much whether it commends itself to thoughtful Socialists, and I am satisfied that no such programme ought to be, or ever will be, carried out.

It would be rash, perhaps, to assert that the day of violence is over; but violence as a remedy, whether for international or domestic evils, is certainly more distrusted than it was. People are beginning to realise that violence inevitably leads to violence, and revolution to reaction. The violent expropriation of the rich, whether by "predatory" legislation or at the immediate hands of the mob, can only result, after further disorder, in the reinstatement of the Haves in their unhealthy predominance, leaving the Havenots worse off than before.

The aim of the thoughtful Socialist must be, then, to reach his ideal of a more equal distribution of wealth by other means than by legislative or popular confiscation. In other words, he must educate not only the Havenots but the Haves. He must open their eyes to the injustice of which they are the victims equally with the Havenots. He must awaken their consciences, so that a millionaire, for example, will come to

feel as much ashamed of himself as a man who has been warned off the Turf. This is a difficult and may seem a hopeless task, but it is easy and hopeful compared to the objective of the violent revolutionary. Nor should we be justified in regarding the moral enlightenment of the very rich as impossible.

“ Far back, by creeks and inlets making,  
Comes silent, flooding in, the main.”

And the education of the Haves has already progressed so far as to produce, in the more thoughtful among them, an easily recognisable malaise. There is felt to be something indecent in the extravagance of a Bradley Martin, or of the gentleman who flooded the courtyard of the Savoy a few years ago, and entertained a fashionable party in a gondola floating on this artificial lake. That is a healthy sign. If this irresponsible prodigality is able to inflict a shock even upon the idle and thoughtless rich, their education has evidently begun.

The attitude of the thoughtful Socialist towards the wealthy is, and ought to be, one of perfect friendliness—remembering that they, whether they have inherited riches, or have come by them partly as the result of their own efforts, are as much the effect as the cause of the present evil and unjust conditions. Wrong ideas about social problems, economic problems, moral problems, have been drilled into their very being. In a sense, therefore, the rich have had no better chance than the poor. Even though they turn a deaf ear to our representations, they are more to be pitied than condemned.

We have no desire to tax great fortunes out of existence. It is right that the very rich should pay more in proportion to the State which mounts guard over their vast possessions than the very poor or the moderately rich; but even this great principle—now embodied in recent financial legislation—we have no desire to push to extremes. Let the rich keep their wealth—if it does them any good—if they feel no qualms of conscience—if they prefer it to the goodwill of their fellow-men. The last is the final and most searching test of



all. If there are men and women—and undoubtedly there are—who love money to such an extent that nothing else matters—why, money they will have, in spite of everything, and we do not grudge it them. But such people are, we hope and believe, exceptional. The majority are human enough to desire the good opinion of their fellows; and if it is increasingly borne in upon them that they cannot—as in the past—be wealthy and well thought of—they will prefer the latter alternative. When it becomes as disreputable to be a millionaire as to be known to have robbed a bank, the main attraction of immense wealth will have disappeared.

Naturally, the creation of such an atmosphere is, and must be, a matter of some difficulty. But, as I have pointed out, the atmosphere has already begun to form. The rich are showing many signs of uneasiness, not merely from the fear that they may be despoiled—although that fear is certainly not absent—but from a dim consciousness that there is no moral excuse for the position they occupy. We have only to take advantage of the opening thus presented to us. We have only to turn the limelight upon those dim workings of a nascent conscience, and throw upon the screen the stark reflection of the truth, to complete, for many a dollar-sick plutocrat, the conversion whose first stirrings have already begun.

It must, of course, be confessed that the majority remain untroubled by any qualms. So far as they are concerned, it will be necessary to focus public opinion upon them, till they shrink as if under a burning-glass. That is to say, we must educate the general public as well as the small body of the plutocrats. I do not know if this will not prove the harder task of the two. Plutocracy, like every other institution, exists by general consent. There are hundreds of thousands of worthy people who are not wealthy themselves, but have a vague idea that the cause of law and order, peace, security, and even religion itself, is bound up with the maintenance of a system under which a whole nation can be

exploited for increasing the possessions of the fabulously rich. It is a queer kind of altruism, but there it is.

At the root of the evil lies a mistaken conception of wealth, which is the result of the false ideas implanted in the minds of the young, whether rich or poor. The child of the rich man has often a better chance of escaping this evil than the child of the poor man. Accustomed to the incidents of wealth and luxury from his cradle, he is in a position to appraise them at their true value, which is—next to nothing. The child of poverty, on the other hand, chafes under the petty miseries of his lot, and eagerly clutches at the hope, instilled into him by struggling and disappointed parents, of some day escaping from these and all other unhappinesses by grabbing for his own share a larger portion of the world's wealth than has fallen to themselves. For the most part, however, both rich and poor are trained to regard life as a huge lucky-bag, or bran-pie, towards which every individual must fight his way against all comers, and from which he must carry away as much as his arms will hold. Those who secure the largest armfuls become millionaires, titled dignitaries, heroes—the out-and-out successes of the arena. Those whose grasping and retaining faculty is less comprehensive, but who still get a substantial share, are looked upon as prosperous and admirable, even if they fall short of brilliancy. But nothing save contempt, tinged, or not tinged, with pity, is to be felt for those who bring away little or nothing for themselves from the bran-pie, still more for those who cannot or will not struggle to reach it at all.

The English boy of the upper or middle classes listens to many a sermon on the text, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth." But the advice given by their fathers to most lads who have their own way to make in life amounts to nothing but this: "Make money—honestly if you can—but make money." It may not be expressed in quite these sordid terms. The youth may simply be told to "get on," but the moral is equally clear—"get on"—or "get out"!



I am not concerned with the materialism of this teaching. Its pathetic futility is even more clamant. It is all wrong, and ninety-nine out of the hundred of the parents who thus poison the minds of their offspring know in their hearts that it is wrong—and that “getting on,” or making money, is dust and ashes in the mouth compared to love, health, or the stern joys of service. Why, knowing this, they should still do homage to this threadbare delusion is a mystery which I do not pretend to explain; but so long as our youth are bred up in this belief, so long must the reformer appeal in vain to the manhood of the race.

The first thing we have to do is to rid the minds of the young of the idea that the world is a gigantic bran-pie, and that it is their duty to struggle for the biggest possible drawing from it. Pending a reasonable distribution of wealth—which must come about in time—it will be necessary for most of us to secure enough to support ourselves; but beyond that we should consecrate our energies to the commonweal. We must look upon wealth and luxury as a social cancer, brought about by conditions defiant of natural laws, and leading to decay and death in the body politic from two causes—hypertrophy in certain of its members, atrophy in others. Drive that thought home to the minds and consciences of the rising generation, and you will create an atmosphere in which the plutocrat will find it impossible to exist. No one will lay violent hands on the millionaire, but his position in society will become like that of the “bookie,” the publican, or worse. He will be shunned and avoided—no “nice” person will care to be seen in his company. With such a public opinion playing upon a class which is already uneasy as to the sureness of its moral foothold, there will be no need for drastic legislation. The plutocracy will wither. It will not require to be cut down.

The idea may be regarded, of course, as a semi-religious one, and its realisation must depend very largely on the general attitude of civilised humanity towards the Cross. If

the tendency is to evade that phenomenon, or trifle with it, and if there is no reason to hope for any change in this respect, then doubtless all these aspirations are a dream. But if—as I firmly believe—the dynamic of Christianity is more pervasive and irresistible to-day than it ever was before; if its moral atmosphere permeates the scheme of things to such an extent as to render it almost impossible for any human being to escape its influence,—is the hope so fantastic as it may seem? I do not suggest that the course of social and economic justice is necessarily bound up with the triumph of Christianity, but I cannot help seeing that the moral enlightenment which must precede any permanent social reform is more likely to come through Christianity than by any other channel—the Christianity of Jesus as distinct from the Christianity of the Churches—the purest and most perfect Socialism ever known. It is doubtful whether, apart from this influence, the average man is capable of grasping the essential folly of mere money-making and self-indulgence as the main objects of life, and it is certainly significant that the dawn of a social conscience, which is evident on every side to-day, coincides with the peaceful penetration of Christian ideas to the heart of every civilised community.

But, with or without Christianity, education is the true alternative to spoliation as a remedy for the gigantic evil which we call our existing society. And, fortunately, the leaven is already at work. We may help it; or we may hinder it, especially by encouraging violent assaults upon the property of the Haves, or by organised attacks upon the health and comfort of the community, such as the recent coal-mining, railway, and shipping strikes. But these things can only retard momentarily the triumph of the true Socialism; they cannot quench the time spirit, which moves steadfastly towards a higher goal—with us, as individuals, or without us.

Such, I venture to claim, is the aim and object of the higher Socialism, which must in time dominate and destroy the lower, or predatory and rapacious, Socialism, materialistic



in its essence, short-sighted and futile in its policy. This is the Socialism of the future. It scorns compulsion, physical or otherwise. No one need be a penny the poorer for its teachings—unless and until his eyes are opened by those teachings to the folly and grossness of a selfish ambition, and he is induced of his own free will to part with a portion of the scrip or bullion which have probably cost him, in health and happiness, so much more than they are worth. Should he, as may very well happen, prefer to keep them, no true socialist will say him nay. We can only shrug our shoulders in such a case, over the proverbial difficulty of accounting for individual tastes.

In the endeavour to inculcate a just view of life, as in other matters, it will be necessary to begin at the beginning. We must teach our children these truths, so that they may have a chance of translating them into experience. As for ourselves and our contemporaries, we doubt whether any active enlightenment is possible. The poison has entered too deeply into our systems to be purged by any means that would not involve our own individual elimination. We have been brought up to believe so implicitly in the “bran-pie” theory of existence, that we are bound to go on believing in it, or acting as though we believed in it. That is our misfortune, and cannot be helped. But it will be our fault if our children do not start with greater advantages in this respect than we have ourselves enjoyed. We admit in theory that the worship of wealth is morally wrong. Let us also admit that it is intellectually foolish. If it is the one, it must also be the other.

A. J. FRASER BLAIR.

CALCUTTA.

## THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION.

THE HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL.

THE decay of traditional religious beliefs, bitterly bewailed by upholders of the Churches, welcomed with joy by those who regard the old creeds as mere superstition, is an undeniable fact. Yet when the dogmas have been rejected, the question of the place of religion in life is by no means decided. The dogmas have been valued, not so much on their own account, as because they were believed to facilitate a certain attitude towards the world, an habitual direction of our thoughts, a life in the whole, free from the finiteness of self and providing an escape from the tyranny of desire and daily cares. Such a life in the whole is possible without dogma, and ought not to perish through the indifference of those to whom the beliefs of former ages are no longer credible. Acts inspired by religion have some quality of infinity in them: they seem done in obedience to a command, and though they may achieve great ends, yet it is no clear knowledge of these ends that makes them seem imperative. The beliefs which underlie such acts are often so deep and so instinctive as to remain unknown to those whose lives are built upon them. Indeed, it may be not belief but feeling that makes religion: a feeling which, when brought into the sphere of belief, may involve the conviction that this or that is good, but may, if it remains untouched by intellect, be only a feeling and yet be dominant in action. It is the quality of infinity that makes religion, the selfless, untrammelled life in the whole which frees men



from the prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts. This liberation from the prison is given by religion, but only by a religion without fettering dogmas; and dogmas become fettering as soon as assent to them becomes unnatural.

The soul of man is a strange mixture of God and brute, a battle-ground of two natures, the one particular, finite, self-centred, the other universal, infinite, and impartial. The finite life, which man shares with the brutes, is tied to the body, and views the world from the standpoint of the *here* and *now*. All those loves and hatreds which are based upon some service to the self belong to the finite life. The love of man and woman, and the love of parents and children, when they do not go beyond the promptings of instinct, are still part of the animal nature: they do not pass into the infinite life until they overcome instinct and cease to be subservient only to the purposes of the finite self. The hatred of enemies and the love of allies in battle are part of what man shares with other gregarious animals: they view the universe as grouped about one point, the single struggling self. Thus the finite part of our life contains all that makes the individual man essentially separate from other men and from the rest of the universe, all those thoughts and desires that cannot, in their nature, be shared by the inhabitant of a different body, all the distortions that make error, and all the insistent claims that lead to strife.

The infinite part of our life does not see the world from one point of view: it shines impartially, like the diffused light on a cloudy sea. Distant ages and remote regions of space are as real to it as what is present and near. In thought, it rises above the life of the senses, seeking always what is general and open to all men. In desire and will, it aims simply at the good, without regarding the good as mine or yours. In feeling, it gives love to all, not only to those who further the purposes of self. Unlike the finite life, it is impartial: its impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling. Unlike the nature which

man shares with the brutes, it has a life without barriers, embracing in its survey the whole universe of existence and essence; nothing in it is essentially private, but its thoughts and desires are such as all may share, since none depend upon the exclusiveness of *here* and *now* and *me*. Thus the infinite nature is the principle of union in the world, as the finite nature is the principle of division. Between the infinite nature in one man and the infinite nature in another, there can be no essential conflict: if its embodiments are incomplete, they supplement each other; its division among different men is accidental to its character, and the infinite in all constitutes one universal nature. There is thus a union of all the infinite natures of different men in a sense in which there is no union of all the finite natures. In proportion as the infinite grows strong in us, we live more completely the life of that one universal nature which embraces what is infinite in each of us.

The finite self, impelled by the desire for self-preservation, builds prison-walls round the infinite part of our nature, and endeavours to restrain it from that free life in the whole which constitutes its being. The finite self aims at dominion: it sees the world in concentric circles round the *here* and *now*, and itself as the God of that wished-for heaven. The universal soul mocks at this vision, but the finite self hopes always to make it true, and thus to quiet its troublesome critic. In many men, the finite self remains always the gaoler of the universal soul; in others, there is a rare and momentary escape; in a few, the prison-walls are demolished wholly, and the universal soul remains free through life. It is the escape from prison that gives to some moments and some thoughts a quality of infinity, like light breaking through from some greater world beyond. Sudden beauty in the midst of strife, uncalculating love, or the night-wind in the trees, seem to suggest the possibility of a life free from the conflicts and pettinesses of our everyday world, a life where there is peace which no misfortune can disturb. The things which have this



quality of infinity seem to give an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of our daily life. A life dominated by this insight, we feel, would be a life free from struggle, a life in harmony with the whole, outside the prison-walls built by the instinctive desires of the finite self.

It is this experience of sudden wisdom which is the source of what is essential in religion. Mysticism interprets this experience as a contact with a deeper, truer, more unified world than that of our common beliefs. Behind a thin veil, it sees the glory of God, dimly as a rule, sometimes with dazzling brightness. All the evils of our daily world it regards as merely shadows on the veil, illusions, nothings, which vanish from the sight of those who see the splendour beyond. But in this interpretation mysticism diminishes the value of the experience upon which it is based. The quality of infinity, which we feel, is not to be accounted for by the perception of new objects, other than those that at most times seem finite; it is to be accounted for, rather, by a different way of regarding the same objects, a contemplation more impersonal, more vast, more filled with love, than the fragmentary, disquiet consideration we give to things when we view them as means to help or hinder our own purposes. It is not in some other world that that beauty and that peace are to be found; it is in this actual everyday world, in the midst of action and the business of life. But it is in the everyday world as viewed by the universal soul, and in the midst of action and business inspired by its vision. The evils and the smallnesses are not illusions, but the universal soul finds within itself a love to which imperfections are no barrier, and thus unifies the world by the unity of its own contemplation.

The transition from the life of the finite self to the infinite life in the whole requires a moment of absolute self-surrender, when all personal will seems to cease, and the soul feels itself in passive submission to the universe. After passionate struggle for some particular good, there comes some inward or outward necessity to abandon the pursuit of the object which has

absorbed all our desire, and no other desire is ready to replace the one that has been relinquished. Hence arises a state of suspension of the will, when the soul no longer seeks to impose itself upon the world, but is open to every impression that comes to it from the world. It is at such a time that the contemplative vision first comes into being, bringing with it universal love and universal worship. From universal worship comes joy, from universal love comes a new desire, and thence the birth of that seeking after universal good which constitutes the will of our infinite nature. Thus from the moment of self-surrender, which to the finite self appears like death, a new life begins, with a larger vision, a new happiness, and wider hopes.

The self-surrender in which the infinite life is born may be made easier to some men by belief in an all-wise God to whom submission is a duty. But it is not in its essence dependent upon this belief or upon any other. The religions of the past, it is true, have all depended to a greater or less degree upon dogma, upon some theory as to the nature and the purpose of the universe. But the decay of traditional beliefs has made every religion that rests on dogma precarious, and even impossible, to many whose nature is strongly religious. Hence those who cannot accept the creeds of the past, and yet believe that a religious outlook requires dogma, lose what is infinite in life, and become limited in their thoughts to everyday matters; they lose consciousness of the life of the whole, they lose that inexplicable sense of union which gives rise to compassion and the unhesitating service of humanity. They do not see in beauty the adumbration of a glory which a richer vision would see in every common thing, or in love a gateway to that transfigured world in which our union with the universe is fulfilled. Thus their outlook is impoverished, and their life is rendered smaller even in its finite parts. For right action they are thrown back upon bare morality; and bare morality is very inadequate as a motive for those who hunger and thirst after the infinite. Thus it has become a



matter of the first importance to preserve religion without any dependence upon dogmas to which an intellectually honest assent grows daily more difficult.

There are in Christianity three elements which it is desirable to preserve if possible: worship, acquiescence, and love. Worship is given by Christianity to God; acquiescence is given to the inevitable because it is the will of God; love is enjoined towards my neighbours, my enemies, and, in fact, towards all men. The love which Christianity enjoins, and indeed any love which is to be universal and yet strong, seems in some way dependent upon worship and acquiescence. Yet these, in the form in which they appear in Christianity, depend upon belief in God, and are therefore no longer possible to those who cannot entertain this belief. Something, in worship, must be lost when we lose belief in the existence of supreme goodness and power combined. But much can be preserved, and what can be preserved seems sufficient to constitute a very strong religious life. Acquiescence, also, is rendered more difficult by loss of belief in God, since it takes away the assurance that apparent evil in the constitution of the world is really good. But it is not rendered impossible; and in consequence of its greater difficulty it becomes, when achieved, nobler, deeper, more filled by self-surrender than any acquiescence which Christianity produces. In some ways, therefore, the religion which has no dogma is greater and more religious than one which rests upon the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled in the outer world.

1. *Worship*.—Worship is not easily defined, because it grows and changes as the worshipper grows. In crude religions it may be inspired by fear alone, and given to whatever is powerful. This element lingers in the worship of God, which may consist largely of fear and be given largely from respect for power. But the element of fear tends more and more to be banished by love, and in all the best worship fear is wholly absent. As soon as the worship inspired by fear has been surpassed, worship brings joy in the contemplation

of what is worshipped. But joy alone does not constitute worship: there must be also some reverence and sense of mystery not easy to define. These three things, contemplation with joy, reverence, and sense of mystery, seem essential to constitute any of the higher forms of worship.

Within worship in this very wide sense there are varieties which it is important to distinguish. There is a selective worship, which demands that its object shall be good, and admits an opposite attitude towards a bad object; and there is an impartial worship, which can be given to whatever exists, regardless of its goodness or badness. Besides this division, there is another, equally important. There is a worship which can only be given to an actually existing object, and another worship which can be given to what merely has its place in the world of ideals; these two kinds may be distinguished as worship of the actual and worship of the ideal. The two are combined in worship of God, since God is conceived as both actual and the complete embodiment of the ideal.

Worship of God is selective, since it depends upon God's goodness. So is all worship of great men or great deeds, and of everything of which the worship depends upon some pre-eminent quality which calls forth our admiration. Worship of this sort, though it can be given to much of what exists in the actual world, cannot be given unreservedly and so as to produce a religious attitude towards the universe as a whole, except by those who believe in an omnipotent Creator or in a pantheistic all-pervading spiritual unity. For those in whom there is no such belief, the selective worship finds its full object only in the ideal good which creative contemplation imagines. The ideal good forms an essential part of the religious life, since it supplies the motive to action by giving content to the desire for universal good which forms a part of universal love. Without the knowledge and worship of the ideal good, the love of man is blind, not knowing in what direction to seek the welfare of those whom it loves. Every embodiment of good in the actual world is imperfect, if only



by its brevity. Only the ideal good can satisfy fully our hunger for perfection. Only the ideal good demands no surrender to power, no sacrifice of aspiration to possibility, and no slavery of thought to fact. Only the vision of the ideal good gives infinity to our pursuit, in action, of those fragments of good which the world permits us to create, but the worship of the ideal good, though it brings with it the joy that springs from the contemplation of what is perfect, brings with it also the pain that results from the imperfection of the actual world. When this worship stands alone, it produces a sense of exile in a world of shadows, of infinite solitude amid alien forces. Thus this worship, though necessary to all religious action, does not alone suffice, since it does not produce that sense of union with the actual world which compels us to descend from the world of contemplation and seek, with however little success, to realise what is possible of the good here on earth.

For this purpose we need the kind of worship which is only given to what exists. Such worship, where there is belief in God, can be selective, since God exists and is completely good. Where there is not belief in God, such worship may be selective in regard to great men and great deeds, but towards such objects selective worship is always hampered by their imperfection and their limitation of duration and extent. The worship which can be given to whatever exists must not be selective, it must not involve any judgment as to the goodness of what is worshipped, but must be a direct impartial emotion. Such a worship is given by the contemplative vision, which finds mystery and joy in all that exists, and brings with it love to all that has life. This impartial worship has been thought, wrongly, to require belief in God, since it has been thought to involve the judgment that whatever exists is good. In fact, however, it involves no judgment whatever; hence it cannot be intellectually mistaken, and cannot be in any way dependent upon dogma. Thus the combination of this worship with the ideal good gives a faith wholly independent

of beliefs as to the nature of the actual world, and therefore not assailable by the arguments which have destroyed the tenets of traditional religion.

Religion, therefore, results from the combination of two different kinds of worship—the selective, which is given to the good on account of its goodness, and the impartial, which is given to everything that exists. The former is the source of the belief in theism, the latter of the belief in pantheism, but in neither case is such a belief necessary for the worship which gives rise to it. The object of the selective worship is the ideal good, which belongs to the world of universals. Owing to oblivion of the world of universals, men have supposed that the ideal good could not have being or be worshipped unless it formed part of the actual world; hence they have believed that without God this worship could not survive. But the study of the world of universals shows that this was an error: the object of this worship need not exist, though it will be an essential part of the worship to wish it to exist as fully as possible. The object of the impartial worship, on the other hand, is whatever exists; in this case, though the object is known to exist, it is not known to be good, but it is an essential part of the worship to wish that it may be as good as possible. Pantheism, from the contemplative joy of impartial worship, and from the unity of its outlook on the universe, infers, mistakenly, that such worship involves the belief that the universe is good and is one. This belief is no more necessary to the impartial worship than the belief in God is to the selective worship. The two worships subsist side by side, without any dogma: the one involving the goodness but not the existence of its object, the other involving the existence but not the goodness of its object. Religious action is a continual endeavour to bridge the gulf between the objects of these two worships, by making more good exist and more of existence good. Only in the complete union of the two could the soul find permanent rest.

2. *Acquiescence*.—Although, in a world where much evil



exists and much good does not exist, no religion which is true can give permanent rest or free the soul from the need for action, yet religion can give acquiescence in evil which it is not within our power to cure. Christianity effects this by the belief that, since the apparent evil is in accordance with the will of God, it cannot really be evil. This view, however, demands a falsification of our standard of good and evil, since much that exists is evil to any unbiassed consideration. Moreover, if pursued to a conclusion, it destroys all motive to action, since the reason given for acquiescence, namely, that whatever happens must be for the best, is a reason which renders our efforts after the best superfluous. If, to avoid this consequence, we limit either the omnipotence or the goodness of God, acquiescence can no longer be urged on the same ground, since what happens may be either not in accordance with the will of God, or not good in spite of being in accordance with His will. For these reasons, though Christianity is in fact often effective both in causing acquiescence and in providing a religious motive for action, yet this effectiveness is due to a confusion of thought, and tends to cease as men grow more clear-sighted.

The problem we have to deal with is more difficult than the Christian's problem. We have to learn to acquiesce in the inevitable without judging that the inevitable must be good, to keep the feeling which prompts Christians to say, "Thy will be done," while yet admitting that what is done may be evil.

Acquiescence, whatever our religion may be, must always require a large element of moral discipline. But this discipline may be made easier, and more visibly worth the pain which it involves, by religious considerations. There are two different though closely related kinds of acquiescence, the one in our private griefs, the other in the fundamental evils of the world. Acquiescence in our private griefs comes in the moment of submission which brings about the birth of the impartial will. Our private life, when it absorbs our thoughts and wishes, becomes a prison, from which, in times of grief, there is no

escape but by submission. By submission our thoughts are freed, and our will is led to new aims which, before, had been hidden by the personal goods which had been uselessly desired. A large contemplation, or the growth of universal love, will produce a certain shame of absorption in our own life; hence the will is led away from protest against the inevitable, towards the pursuit of more general goods which are not wholly unattainable. Thus acquiescence in private griefs is an essential element in the growth of universal love and the impartial will.

Acquiescence does not consist in judging that things are not bad when in fact they are so. It consists in freedom from anger and indignation and preoccupied regret. Anger and indignation against those who cause our griefs will not be felt if universal love is strong; preoccupied regret will be avoided where the desire of contemplative freedom exists. The man to whom a large contemplation has become habitual will not readily allow himself to be long turned aside from the thoughts which give breadth to his life: in the absence of such thoughts he will feel something small and unworthy, a bondage of the infinite to the finite. In this way both contemplation and universal love will promote acquiescence so far as our own sorrows are concerned.

It is possible, however, to emerge from private protest, not into complete acquiescence, but into a Promethean indignation against the universe. Contemplation may only universalise our griefs; it may show us all life as a tragedy, so full of pain as to make us wish that consciousness could vanish wholly from the world. The belief that this would be desirable if it were possible is one which cannot be refuted, though it also cannot be shown to be true. But even this belief is not incompatible with acquiescence. What is incompatible is indignation, and a preoccupation with evils which makes goods invisible or only partially visible. Indignation seems scarcely possible in regard to evils for which no one is responsible; those who feel indignation in regard to



the fundamental evils of the universe feel it against God or the Devil or an imaginatively personified Fate. When it is realised that the fundamental evils are due to the blind empire of matter, and are the wholly necessary effects of forces which have no consciousness and are therefore neither good nor bad in themselves, indignation becomes absurd, like Xerxes chastising the Hellespont. Thus the realisation of necessity is the liberation from indignation. This alone, however, will not prevent an undue preoccupation with evil. It is obvious that some things that exist are good, some bad, and we have no means of knowing whether the good or the bad preponderate. In action, it is essential to have knowledge of good and evil; thus in all the matters subject to our will, the question what is good and what bad must be borne in mind. But in matters which lie outside our power, the question of good or bad, though knowledge about it, like all knowledge, is worth acquiring, has not that fundamental religious importance which has been assigned to it in discussions of theism and optimism. The dualism of good and bad, when it is too strongly present to our minds, prevents impartial contemplation and interferes with universal love and worship. There is, in fact, something finite and unduly human about the practice of emphasising good and bad in regard to matters with which action is not concerned. Thus acquiescence in fundamental evils, like acquiescence in personal griefs, is furthered by the impartiality of contemplation and universal love and worship, and must already exist to some extent before these become possible. Acquiescence is at once a cause and an effect of faith, in much the same way when faith dispenses with dogma as when it rests upon a belief in God. In so far as acquiescence is a cause of faith, it rests upon moral discipline, a suppression of self and its demands, which is necessary to any life in harmony with the universe, and to any emergence from the finite into the infinite. This discipline is more severe in the absence of all optimistic dogma, but in proportion as it is more severe its outcome is greater, more

unshakable, more capable of so enlarging the bounds of self as to make it welcome with love whatever of good or evil may come before it.

3. *Love*.—Love is of two kinds, the selective earthly love, which is given to what is delightful, beautiful, or good, and the impartial heavenly love, which is given to all indifferently. The earthly love is balanced by an opposing hatred : to friends are opposed foes ; to saints, sinners ; to God, the Devil. Thus this love introduces disunion into the world, with hostile camps and a doubtful warfare. But the heavenly love does not demand that its object shall be delightful, beautiful, or good ; it can be given to everything that has life, to the best and the worst, to the greatest and to the least. It is not merely compassion, since it does not merely wish to relieve misfortune, but finds joy in what it loves, and is given to the fortunate as well as to the unfortunate. Though it includes benevolence, it is greater than benevolence : it is contemplative as well as active, and can be given where there is no possibility of benefiting the object. It is love, contemplative in origin, but becoming active wherever action is possible ; and it is a kind of love to which there is no opposing hatred.

To the divine love, the division of the world into good and bad, though it remains true, seems lacking in depth ; it seems finite and limited in comparison with the boundlessness of love. The division into two hostile camps seems unreal ; what is felt to be real is the oneness of the world in love.

It is in the birth of divine love that the life of feeling begins for the universal soul. What contemplation is to the intellect of the universal soul, divine love is to its emotions. More than anything else, divine love frees the soul from its prison and breaks down the walls of self that prevent its union with the world. Where it is strong, duties become easy, and all service is filled with joy. Sorrow, it is true, remains, perhaps deeper and wider than before, since the lives of most human beings are largely tragic. But the bitterness of personal defeat is avoided, and aims become so wide that



no complete overthrow of all hopes is possible. The loves of the natural life survive, but harmonised with universal love, and no longer setting up walls of division between the loved and the unloved. And above all, through the bond of universal love the soul escapes from the separate loneliness in which it is born, and from which no permanent deliverance is possible while it remains within the walls of its prison.

Christianity enjoins love of God and love of man as the two great commandments. Love of God differs, however, from love of man, since we cannot benefit God, while we cannot regard man as wholly good. Thus love of God is more contemplative and full of worship, while love of man is more active and full of service. In a religion which is not theistic, love of God is replaced by worship of the ideal good. As in Christianity, this worship is quite as necessary as love of man, since without it love of man is left without guidance in its wish to create the good in human lives. The worship of good is indeed the greater of the two commandments, since it leads us to know that love of man is good, and this knowledge helps us to feel the love of man. Moreover, it makes us conscious of what human life might be, and of the gulf between what it might be and what it is; hence springs an infinite compassion, which is a large part of love of man, and is apt to cause the whole. Acquiescence, also, greatly furthers love of man, since in its absence anger and indignation and strife come between the soul and the world, preventing the union in which love of man has its birth. The three elements of religion, namely worship, acquiescence, and love, are intimately interconnected; each helps to produce the others, and all three together form a unity in which it is impossible to say which comes first, which last. All three can exist without dogma, in a form which is capable of dominating life and of giving infinity to action and thought and feeling; and life in the infinite, which is the combination of the three, contains all that is essential to religion, in spite of its absence of dogmatic beliefs.

Religion derives its power from the sense of union with the universe which it is able to give. Formerly, union was achieved by assimilating the universe to our own conception of the good; union with God was easy since God was love. But the decay of traditional beliefs has made this way of union no longer one which can be relied upon: we must find a mode of union which asks nothing of the world and depends only upon ourselves. Such a mode of union is possible through impartial worship and universal love, which ignore the difference of good and bad and are given to all alike. In order to free religion from all dependence upon dogma, it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards. Every such demand is an endeavour to impose self upon the world. From this endeavour the religion which can survive the decay of dogma must be freed. And in being freed from this endeavour, religion is freed from an element extraneous to its spirit and not compatible with its unhampered development. Religion seeks union with the universe by subordination of the demands of self; but this subordination is not complete if it depends upon a belief that the universe satisfies some at least of the demands of self. Hence for the sake of religion itself, as well as because such a belief appears unfounded, it is important to discover a form of union with the universe which is independent of all beliefs as to the nature of the universe. By life in the infinite, such a form of union is rendered possible; and to those who achieve it, it gives nearly all, and in some ways more than all, that has been given by the religions of the past.

The essence of religion, then, lies in subordination of the finite part of our life to the infinite part. Of the two natures in man, the particular or animal being lives in instinct, and seeks the welfare of the body and its descendants, while the universal or divine being seeks union with the universe, and desires freedom from all that impedes its seeking. The animal being is neither good nor bad in itself; it is good or bad solely



as it helps or hinders the divine being in its search for union with the world. In union with the world the soul finds its freedom. There are three kinds of union : union in thought, union in feeling, union in will. Union in thought is knowledge, union in feeling is love, union in will is service. There are three kinds of disunion : error, hatred, and strife. What promotes disunion is insistent instinct, which is of the animal part of man ; what promotes union is the combination of knowledge, love, and consequent service which is wisdom, the supreme good of man.

The life of instinct views the world as a means for the ends of instinct ; thus it makes the world of less account than self. It confines knowledge to what is useful, love to allies in conflict of rival instincts, service to those with whom there is some instinctive tie. The world in which it finds a home is a narrow world, surrounded by alien and probably hostile forces ; it is prisoned in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that ultimate surrender is inevitable.

The life of wisdom seeks an impartial end, in which there is no rivalry, no essential enmity. The union which it seeks has no boundaries : it wishes to know all, to love all, and to serve all. Thus it finds its home everywhere : no lines of circumvallation bar its progress. In knowledge it makes no division of useful and useless, in love it makes no division of friend and foe, in service it makes no division of deserving and undeserving.

The animal part of man, knowing that the individual life is brief and impotent, is appalled by the fact of death, and, unwilling to admit the hopelessness of the struggle, it postulates a prolongation in which its failures shall be turned into triumphs. The divine part of man, feeling the individual to be but of small account, thinks little of death, and finds its hopes independent of personal continuance.

The animal part of man, being filled with the importance of its own desires, finds it intolerable to suppose that the universe is less aware of this importance ; a blank indifference

to its hopes and fears is too painful to contemplate, and is therefore not regarded as admissible. The divine part of man does not demand that the world shall conform to a pattern: it accepts the world, and finds in wisdom a union which demands nothing of the world. Its energy is not checked by what seems hostile, but interpenetrates it and becomes one with it. It is not the strength of our ideals, but their weakness, that makes us dread the admission that they are ours, not the world's. We with our ideals must stand alone, and conquer, inwardly, the world's indifference. It is instinct, not wisdom, that finds this difficult and shivers at the solitude it seems to entail. Wisdom does not feel this solitude, because it can achieve union even with what seems most alien. The insistent demand that our ideals shall be already realised in the world is the last prison from which wisdom must be freed. Every demand is a prison, and wisdom is only free when it asks nothing.

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# MODERNISM AND THE PROTESTANT<sup>1</sup> CONSCIOUSNESS.<sup>2</sup>

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IT is no easy task to foretell the future in store for Modernism and to define the part which it is called upon to play in the Catholicism of to-morrow. But already we may note its leading characteristics and estimate the worth of some of its religious affirmations. Above all, we may sift and standardise the teaching which it is prepared to impart, and the lessons which living Protestantism may gather from the broad and daring experiment upon which the leaders and sponsors of this spiritual movement have embarked.

The field is wide, and the present essay lays no claim to be exhaustive: its aim is confined to advancing some remarks suggested by the last works of Tyrrell, whom one may unhesitatingly style the most profound and most penetrating interpreter of religious Modernism.

Treated solely from a religious point of view, the trend of Modernism is essentially different from that of the Reformed churches. Nothing could be falser than to question Tyrrell's good faith when contending against the popular notion that

<sup>1</sup> An article on "Modernism and the Catholic Consciousness," by a Catholic writer, will appear in January.—EDITOR.

<sup>2</sup> The four principal works of Tyrrell are quoted in this essay under roman numerals:—I. *A Much-Abused Letter*, 1906; II. *Through Scylla and Charybdis, or the Old Theology and the New*, 1907; III. *Medievalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier*, 1908; IV. *Christianity at the Cross-Roads*, 1909.

Modernism is a Protestant movement in the Roman Church, converging to the same point as Liberal Protestantism.<sup>1</sup>

The sincerity of the author is above all suspicion. Nay, further, in his repeated assertions that Modernism is the descendant of the Catholic faith, Tyrrell is undoubtedly correct. He is not the dupe of an illusion when he claims his right and privilege to draw upon the original tradition of the Fathers, and when he protests his unswerving allegiance to his Church. The Christian faith which he professes is genuinely Catholic in its attitude, and the religious substance of his personal creed is identical with that of the collective conscience of his brethren. This certainty remains to the end the centre of gravity of all Tyrrell's ideas, and, however severe the judgments delivered by him on the Rome of to-day, he continues invariably faithful to this ideal.

The reverse side of this appreciation appears in the manner in which Modernism understands and characterises Protestantism. Tyrrell's consciousness of his debt to the latter does not prevent him from enunciating stern reserves and severe and formidable criticism. "Profoundly as I venerate the great truths and principles for which Protestantism stands, I am somewhat chilled by its inhumanity, its naked severity, its relentless rationality. If it feeds one half, perhaps the better half, of the soul, it starves the other. The religion of all men must be the religion of the whole man—Catholic in depth as well as in extension."<sup>2</sup>

No doubt it would be interesting to gather up the judgments formulated by Tyrrell on the different tendencies of Protestantism, but in our opinion it is more profitable to leave these differences aside, and to concentrate our attention upon questions of principle. In taking our stand upon this ground it will be easy for us to extract from Tyrrell's works

<sup>1</sup> IV, xx.: "To suppose, then, that such Modernism is a movement away from the Church and is converging towards Liberal Protestantism is to betray a complete ignorance of its meaning—as complete as that of the Encyclical *Pascendi*."

<sup>2</sup> III., p. 186; cf. II., p. 30.



some leading ideas, which will bring back to our minds certain truths too often misconceived.

## I.

"The mind of the Protestant is individualist. It is true that he is subject to the pressure of time and circumstances, but he reduces this pressure to the strict minimum ; his passion for independence tends to make a solitary of him. Should he succeed in understanding the necessity of association, his success will be due rather to his intelligence than to his heart : association is to him an engine of commerce when it is not an engine of war. His private house is always more beautiful than the churches where he meets his brethren. For the Catholic, on the other hand, the church where he meets his brethren is his real home, his centre, his hearth : in Calabria, in the villages destroyed by earthquake two years ago, the churches everywhere were almost rebuilt in a few months : I admit that this is partly due to superstition, but superstition would have been powerless had there not been, underneath, the profound instinct that man is not complete in his isolation."<sup>1</sup>

Modernism remains essentially Catholic by its declared war upon Protestant individualism. To the Modernist Protestantism is enfeebled, mutilated, and impoverished by its patent egoism and pride. By the energy with which it insists upon the duties and the privileges of spiritual solidarity, by its enthusiasm in exalting and practising religious brotherhood, by the eloquence which it employs to develop the idea of a quick and internal faith, by the strength which it acquires in its devotion to the collective soul of the Church, Modernism is a fit and worthy master from whom the Protestants may learn valuable lessons. In Tyrrell's school we shall find the best correctives to the fatal propensity we have for throwing up trenches round our proper self and disregarding the sacred law which presides over human association.

It is good for the Protestant consciousness to be incessantly

<sup>1</sup> M. Paul Sabatier, *Les Modernistes*, 1910, pp. 25-26.

recalled to these great elementary truths: rationalism and mysticism are both inclined, each after its fashion, to isolate the man, to tear him from his surrounding company, to suppress or to ignore the normal conditions of human development, to parcel it into lots which would in the end dissolve all religious community and result in anarchy or sectarian fanaticism. Tyrrell makes a double stand against the rationalist individualism of the Protestant and the ultramontane monopoly, which embodies religious truth in an individual and centres it in the Pope: "My consistent aim from first to last has been to defend the Catholic principle, '*securus judicat orbis terrarum*,' against every sort of individualism, whether that which makes each man's private judgment its own rule, or that which imposes the private judgment of one upon all the rest."<sup>1</sup> "Modernism does not believe in the religious independence of every isolated individual; nor does it believe in the absolute subjection of all to the private will and judgment of a privileged individual who can impose theological definitions upon the rest under pain of eternal damnation."<sup>2</sup>

Let us, then, respectfully bring together and endeavour to apply the wise advice of the most religious Modernist: "Variety without unity may be almost as great an ill as unity without variety; . . . where general agreement is not the goal of individual effort, where diversity is accepted as final and satisfactory, there can be no progress, but only an aimless analysis and disintegration. It is for that reason that we need an institutional Church within whose boundary walls all these varieties of individual experience and reflection are pressed together and forced to seek a synthesis sooner or later. . . ."<sup>3</sup> You see that, like the musical or any other artistic or spiritual capacity, that of religion needs the educational influence of a widespread and permanent Society for its development and progress; that it needs its schools, its teachers, its great masters, its laymen and its experts, its traditions and rules and principles and criteria."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> III., p. 38.<sup>2</sup> III., p. 116.<sup>3</sup> III., pp. 29, 30.<sup>4</sup> I., pp. 60, 61.



Who would dare deny that there is, in Protestantism, a schismatic element, a natural disposition of isolating oneself purposely or unconsciously from one's brothers, to break contact with the living forces circulating in the social body of the Church?

By dint of glorifying the Church invisible we make of this Church a pure abstraction, and religious society ceases to have a serious hold upon those who are but inadequate members of it. Let us not hesitate, for our healing, to have recourse to the antidote approved by the Modernism of Tyrrell. For him, "the one thing needful is," beyond doubt, "communion with the invisible Church (*i.e.* with God as presented to us in Christ and in all Christ-like men past, present, and future; with all those who, whatever their professed creed, in any way or degree suffer and forsake themselves for God's cause and God's will)";<sup>1</sup> but he is careful not to omit, on that account, "communion with the visible Church, with those, namely, who *profess* to be Christ-like";<sup>2</sup> indeed, he is of opinion that this free and voluntary devotion to the community of believers is "a condition of more fruitful communion with the invisible . . . a depth, height, width, and fulness added to our inner life by our conscious and sympathetic association with a great world-wide cause or work such as that of Catholicism; something analogous to the spiritual expansion produced in us by an intelligent, self-sacrificing, and active participation in the life of our State or country."<sup>3</sup>

In voicing his convictions upon the character of solidarity in the Christian religion in space and time, in following its effects and its action through the ages, Tyrrell went back to Newman's fundamental theory, his idea of development or tradition, which he interprets in its most spiritual meaning, and which he leads on to its essentially religious significance. The most independent and zealous Protestantism may unreservedly appropriate the pregnant conception

<sup>1</sup> I., pp. 62, 63.

<sup>2</sup> I., p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> I., p. 63.

evolved by the Modernist from the essay of the famous Cardinal.<sup>1</sup>

Tyrrell's evolution is not a hypothesis borrowed from Darwin, but an explanation suggested to him by the facts; imposed upon him, not by speculation, but by history.

"Tradition is the faith that lives in the whole Church, and is handed down from generation to generation, of which the entire body, and not a mere handful of officials, is the depository and organ of transmission. Of this rule and law the Holy Spirit diffused in the hearts of all the faithful is the author; the episcopate merely the servant, the witness, the interpreter."<sup>2</sup> "The revelation which he committed to them was that of the Father's divine life as faithfully imaged in his own life, and to be as faithfully imaged in that of his Church."<sup>3</sup>

This revelation is a principle which never ceases to evolve and never ceases to become new: "Modernism is aware that each new period binds the Church to a new work of adaptation."<sup>4</sup> "... the Catholic Christian Idea contains, within itself, the power continually to revise its categories and to shape its embodiment to its growth, and that such a transformation or revolution would be within the orderly process of its life—merely a step forward to a fuller and better self-consciousness from a confused and instinctive self-consciousness."<sup>5</sup>

Such is the first lesson we derive from Catholic Modernism in its highest and purest religious manifestation. It puts us on our guard against the errors and the excesses of an unbridled individualism, it reminds us of the narrow dependence existing in our relations with one another, it quickens in us our sense of the blessing and the privileges of Christian solidarity. This truth is not unknown to the Protestant form of Christianity.

If conviction be necessary, it is sufficient to recall the ideas

<sup>1</sup> *Essay on the Development of the Christian Faith.*

<sup>2</sup> III., pp. 55, 56.

<sup>3</sup> III., p. 64.

<sup>4</sup> III. (translated into English from the French edition), p. 189.

<sup>5</sup> IV., p. xx.



of Luther and Calvin about the motherhood of the Church, to go back to the principles of Schleiermacher and Ritschl on the essential characteristics of religious association, to quote the names of Secrétan and Fallot, who restored to strength and honour the principle of solidarity and set themselves to the development of its consequences ; and, apart from these names, do we not see, in what is perhaps improperly called social Christianity, side by side with efforts of disputable value, the attempt to remedy spiritual atomism, which is one of the dangers of Protestantism ? We have not had to wait for Tyrrell and his friends to seize and appreciate this highly important element of the Christian faith, and these reproaches launched by Catholics against Protestantism are only founded on a certain measure of truth. But it is no less true that their polemic warns us of a reef on which we are too often exposed to shipwreck. It is becoming, then, to thank them for the service rendered us and to profit by the teaching contained in their words and their example.

To this lesson we must immediately add a second which follows from the first, confirming and completing it.

If it is true that collective life envelops and enriches individual life, if the individual is unable to grow and become strong except in the bosom of the spiritual association to which he belongs, if a firm and narrow solidarity embraces the series of generations which succeed one another on the stage of history, if thus there is founded a living and present tradition, real at every moment and pregnant to all time, this evolutionist explanation must also be applied to the revelation of the Gospel, taken from its infancy and followed in its complete development. We touch here on one of the weakest points, or rather on one of the gravest errors, in Protestant doctrine.

Modernist criticism is here at one with ultramontane polemic, and I find it difficult to dispute the justice of either. "Our old theologians confined Christian revelation to the limits of the Apostolic age : this revelation, they said, ceased

after the composition of the sacred writings. . . . It follows that knowledge and Christian piety must engage in a continual pilgrimage towards the golden age lying behind us; this conscious and deliberate return constitutes all our progress; for the future we must live on the income of our spiritual heritage.”<sup>1</sup> Without putting such a gulf between the first and following centuries, Liberal Protestantism also finds the essence of Christianity in primitive Christianity: this is the point of view of Harnack, who confounds the Christian religion with the Gospel of Christ, reduced to its simplest terms.

Modernism does away with this conception, which appears to it narrow, mechanical, and singularly poor. The whole of Loisy’s book, *The Gospel and the Church*, is a serried argument against Harnack’s theory.

The principle of Protestant orthodoxy, which confines Christian truth, stereotyped once for all, to Holy Scripture, is energetically contested by Tyrrell: “He [the Modernist] does not view the essence of Christianity as consisting of one or two simple principles given from the first and abiding unchanged beneath a bewildering mass of meaningless and mischievous encrustations. Its essence is continually being built up by the expansion and application of these normative principles, by their combination with all that is good and true in the process of human development. . . . So far he agrees with the Medievalist against the Protestant. But he does not believe that the process stopped with the thirteenth century, and is, therefore, truer to the Catholic principle.”<sup>2</sup>

Let us try to show how Tyrrell applies this conception to the living centre of evangelical history and the Christian faith, the person of Jesus Christ. Here again he takes up the theory of Newman and Moehler, but he broadens and spiritualises it. For them the Catholic tradition is “Christ himself, reincarnate from generation to generation in the historical

<sup>1</sup> P. Sabatier, *Les Modernistes*, p. xxxvii.

<sup>2</sup> III., pp. 148, 149.



Church, which is his body, continuing through the ages a perpetual ministry of mediation and revelation.”<sup>1</sup>

Whilst the critical school, represented among the Protestants by Harnack, Bousset, and a host of philosophers who take refuge behind history, maintain that there is between the Jesus of history and the Christ of Catholicism a break in continuity and a yawning gulf, Tyrrell thinks that it “is not between Jesus and Catholicism, but between Jesus and Liberal Protestantism that no bridge, but only a great gulf, is fixed.”<sup>2</sup> “No doubt the expression or form is more ample and complex in Catholicism than in the Gospel, but its main and central features are the same.”<sup>3</sup>

We shall not attempt to reproduce and examine in detail the arguments by which the great Irish Modernist establishes and justifies his thesis. We believe that, in spite of the respect he professes for criticism and history, in spite of the absolute liberty he claims for science and independent research, he has been the victim of numerous and grievous illusions.

But this is not the crucial question. What we want to know is whether religious faith can remain fettered to the personality of the terrestrial Jesus, whose image criticism endeavours to reconstruct by interrogating the documents of the past and drawing on the sources which it regards as the safest and most authentic. By collecting some scanty words of the Apostle Paul, by submitting the Synoptic Gospels to a series of severe and detailed sortings, by bringing history and criticism into play, we arrive at a solution which will always remain approximative, and even under the most favourable circumstances we shall never reach a certainty unanimously shared and absolutely unassailable.

Is it allowable to crown the remnant of these critical operations with the name of the historical Jesus? Above all,

<sup>1</sup> See the luminous exposition of this theory in the posthumous work of Auguste Sabatier, *Les religions d'autorité et la religion de l'Esprit*, 1904, pp. 123-129.

<sup>2</sup> IV., p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> IV., p. 65.

is it allowable to transform a problem into an article of faith?<sup>1</sup> Will the religious consciousness of the believer remain cabined within the narrow limits prescribed for it by history? Will this consciousness be liable to all the changes of a science which is never constant, destined to suicide so soon as it can find no further word to say? These are extremely weighty questions, vigorously debated at the present hour, and upon them Modernism is in a position to throw some light.

The nerve of the argument lies in the effort made by Tyrrell to escape from the constraint of an orthodoxy in bondage to the letter of the Bible, or from an inquiry directed solely towards the past. To accomplish this work of emancipation he takes a resolute stand upon the ground of "Christian mysticism." "S. Paul is a true interpreter when he identifies Christ with the Spirit; when he speaks of the indwelling of the Spirit as the indwelling of Christ. So mastered and enslaved by the Spirit was Jesus, that His life was simply the life of the Spirit: His words the words of the Spirit . . . the personality, the 'I,' that speaks and acts in Jesus, is the Spirit, though it speaks and acts through the limitations of a human organism. It is the Spirit made man. The Word which enlightens every man is made flesh; what works within us stands before us, to be seen and heard and handled. In Him we have seen the Father—not in his fulness, but so far as God is inclusively the ideal image of man; so far as God reveals man to himself in a Divine Humanity. He comes, so to say, and lives our life Himself.

"Thus it was that, for Christianity, Jesus and the Spirit became interchangeable terms; that the birth of the Spirit in man's soul became a birth and indwelling of Jesus . . . but all the instructions, precepts, and exhortations of the Christian religion fall short of their purpose if they but make a man an obedient imitator of Christ, as it were of the first founder and example of a new religious system; if they do not evoke that

<sup>1</sup> Strauss has already put the question in this form in his last work on *The Old and the New Faith*.



Spirit which was incarnate in Jesus, and therefore *is* Jesus. Jesus was not merely a revealed ideal of human personality, but a forceful, living, self-communicating ideal; a fire spreading itself from soul to soul. It is only personality that works on personality. We can take precepts and instruction impersonally; we can obey and follow them and build them into the structure of our mental and moral habits. But we can sometimes apprehend the whole spirit and personality of a man through his words and acts and manner. We can feel him as an overwhelming personal influence; we can catch the concrete living spirit from the broken letters and words in which it utters itself. We can feel him living in us as a masterful force. We know his way and his will in a manner that no instruction could ever impart.

“This it is that distinguishes Christianity from the following of a teacher or prophet. It teaches the precepts of Christ as a means to a birth of Christ in the soul—to the constitution of a divine personality within us; of a spirit that shall supersede all law and precept, as itself the source and the end of all law. Jesus Himself was the great sacrament and effectual symbol of the Divine Life and Spirit. He worked on His disciples, not doctrinally as a teacher of the understanding, but with all the force of a divine and mysterious personal ascendancy, transmitted through every word and gesture. He was not a prophet speaking in the name of the Spirit, but the Spirit itself in human form. He spoke as only conscience can speak. Men heard and obeyed, they knew not why. He entered into their souls and possessed them and shaped them to His own image and likeness. When He left them externally, He was still with them internally.”<sup>1</sup>

“Those for whom He is a living, indwelling spirit, a fire kindling from soul to soul down the long centuries, who see the expression of that Spirit not merely in the mortal life and thoughts of the Galilean carpenter, but in those of His followers who have been possessed by the spiritual and eternal personality

<sup>1</sup> IV., pp. 262, 265.

of Jesus, have no such trouble in the face of criticism.<sup>1</sup> . . . To fill us with this Spirit was the mission of Jesus; not to teach us metaphysics or science or history or ethics or economics.

"This idea of Jesus as the Divine indwelling and saving Spirit seems to me the very essence of Christianity. Faith in Christ has never meant merely faith in a teacher and his doctrine, but an apprehension of His personality as revealing itself within us.<sup>2</sup> . . . Through the mystical body, animated by the Spirit, we are brought into immediate contact with the ever-present Christ. We hear Him in its Gospel, we touch and handle Him in its sacraments. He lives on in the Church, not metaphorically but actually. He finds a growing medium of self-utterance ever complementing and correcting that of his mortal individuality.<sup>3</sup>

"Illusion though it be to some, it is a great thought, a stimulating belief, that breaks down the barriers of time and place; makes Jesus present to every soul, not only imaginatively but effectively; lends His human form and face and voice and name to 'the light which lighteth every man,' to the Spirit that reveals itself in the first glimmerings of conscience."<sup>4</sup>

The idea dominating and inspiring all the developments we have just read is that of *a tradition of spiritual life*, not only transmitted from Jesus to his disciples from the beginning, but recreated in their souls by spreading through the centuries the consciousness of Jesus continually assimilable and assimilated by our consciousness, quickening them as a living principle, penetrating them with a force always new, kindling everywhere an individual glow of light and heat.

According to Tyrrell, this truth constitutes the essential and inalienable basis of the Catholic idea of tradition. But the efforts of Modernism seek to eliminate from the Roman conception the elements of magic and superstition: it deals with a tradition entirely spiritual, developing according to the

<sup>1</sup> IV., p. 269.

<sup>2</sup> IV., p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> IV., p. 275.

<sup>4</sup> IV., p. 276.



laws of psychology and history. It is true the mystery does not disappear, but this mystery is that of life itself, spreading by intimate contagion, unanalysable and inexplicable. In this spiritual progression the old antithesis between the natural and the supernatural, created by the rationalism of the schools, disappears and has no meaning. The Gospel and the sacraments are not superfluous, but their activity is otherwise defined; they are the valuable aids of the Spirit, the vehicles and agents of the divine, which bring down to us the stream of inexhaustible revelation; their activity is moral and religious, exercised not by virtue of any occult power or any vague transcendent substance, but in the free play of life, in the blossoming of the faculties of the soul, wakened, vivified, and enriched by the breath of the Spirit. Let us not be afraid to understand of Christ that which we dare to affirm of the religion which bears his name. If he remains for us not only the founder but the centre of this religion, it is on the condition that we do not carry it back towards the few years which he spent upon the earth, and confine his power within the limits of his country and his period.

Jesus of Nazareth can only be the groundwork of our faith if we consider him in the totality of his manifestations, or, putting it another way, if we grasp him in the present and continued experience of his life and his work. This experience finds reality only in the consciousness of those who embrace Christ as an actual living reality, by acknowledging the oneness of his action with the action of the Spirit of God. It is not sufficient to say that Jesus of Nazareth is not the complete Christ, that the Christ of to-day is infinitely greater than the Christ of other days, that he is the Christ increased by all that he has been in the external history of the world, in the transformation of ideas and peoples, in the social evolution towards justice and brotherhood, the Christ enriched by all that he has been in the world of the invisible, in the souls of his believers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. H. Monnier, *La mission historique de Jésus*, 1906, p. xxix.

He is Lord and Saviour only in so far as he rises and lives again in the hearts of those who enter the current of spiritual life, of which he is the exhaustless spring and the perpetual giver. For the believer, for the simple, humble follower the figure of the historical Jesus is not the end towards which he looks, nor the goal of his efforts: it is only a means, it serves to awaken, to set free, to enthrone the divine Spirit, the spirit of sanctity and love, which, proceeding from Christ, has passed into the consciences and hearts of men, is incarnate in his true disciples, and continues to live in what Scripture calls the body of the Lord, that is to say, the Church. Note how this manner of understanding Christ and of practising the Christian faith frees and strengthens us before the most independent research and even the most quixotic hypotheses of science.

Even if criticism should succeed in fathoming the tradition of the Gospel more profoundly than it has hitherto done, the one thing needful would be quite beyond its reach. To initiate us into the spiritual communion of Christ, to awaken an emancipating and vivifying experience in our souls, to make the Kingdom of the Lord, who is the Spirit, triumph in us, requires no formidable and complicated apparatus of history or dogma: a word, a gesture, a look from the Saviour is sufficient. The call addressed to a disciple, the parable related to the people, the view of the cross on Calvary may decide the crisis in the soul, assure the glorious victory, and realise the experience which draws from the apostle his cry of eternal gratitude: "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; the old things are passed away, behold all things are made new."

Understood in this light, the point of view which has found in Tyrrell such an illuminating interpreter and so eloquent a defender breaks off at once from the old orthodox conception and from the programme of the critical school. The former isolates the Apostolic age from the development of succeeding centuries and marks for divine action and revelation limits which are incompatible with the liberty and



sovereignty of the Spirit. The latter tends to substitute the historical knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth for the religious understanding of his person and his work; the ultimate consequence of this claim would be the elimination of the teaching of Christ from the domain of Christian dogma and the substitution of a chapter on the history of Jesus.

However, we must remember what was said in connection with the first lesson taught us by Modernism. The two extremes proscribed by Tyrrell's Modernism no longer exist in their pure state, and no longer form a coherent and consecutive whole. Besides that, the path indicated and followed by the eminent Modernist is not new: Protestant theology has made this pilgrimage over and over again, with gropings and inconsequences, but often with satisfaction and success. Prominent mention may be made of the illustrious reformer of Protestant theology at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The "mysticism" of Tyrrell is singularly like that of Schleiermacher; there is the same idea of religious evolution in which the primitive factor and permanent agent is Christ, not Jesus of Nazareth imprisoned in the bonds of the past, but Christ identical with the Spirit immanent in the Christian conscience, working in the heart of a new creation, finding realisation and embodiment in the Church, constituting a tradition of spiritual life, which shall finally embrace entire humanity and transform it into the image of God become all in all. Schleiermacher's successors have not always remained loyal to these evolutionist premisses, but even his most ardent opponents have been unable to escape his influence.

French Protestant theology has not been slow to admit the influence of Schleiermacher. The outline traced by Auguste Sabatier in the second part of his posthumous work, *Les religions d'autorité et la religion de l'Esprit*, recalls the general point of view of the great German theologian and presents many analogies to the programme developed by Tyrrell. But it is permissible to believe that the religious thought of modern Protestantism could not but gain in richness and in

depth if it were to launch out resolutely upon the way suggested and pursued by the eminent author of *Medievalism*.

## II.

We ask permission to appropriate two more lessons which Protestant theology will find in Tyrrell's works, and which it would be unwise and culpable to neglect: one has to do with the idea of religious authority, the other with the relation existing between revelation and theology, or between faith and dogma. Upon both points the Catholic teacher has nothing absolutely new to tell us, but his deep and penetrating language will stamp experience already acquired, attempts imperfectly carried out, truths often half seen but not yet mastered or realised, with the seal of his authority, his knowledge, and his religious life.

Between *the Catholic and the Protestant idea of authority*, conceived in their principle and developed in their consequences, exist blank opposition and flat contradiction. What is the Modernist view on this question? Modernism waives the violent alternative which the ultramontane or the Protestant would impose upon it. It refuses to choose between submission to the dictatorial power of the Papacy and the absolute edict of the individual.<sup>1</sup>

It maintains the necessity of religious authority, but defines this authority in a spiritual, inward, and moral sense.

"But whereas we are under the jurisdiction of the State whether we will or no, we are under that of the Church only by our free choice. I am bound to obey her officers only as I obey my physician after I have freely put myself into his hands to be cured by him. He has no right to domineer over me. He can only say, 'Unless you obey me you will die.' The rule he has over me is imposed by myself. So too the rule which the Church has over me derives from my own conscience, from my own free act. All she can say to me is, 'If you love me, keep my commandments.' If I do

<sup>1</sup> Cf. III., pp. 36-40.



not keep her commandments she can say, 'You do not love me'; but she cannot coerce or threaten me. She can tell me I am in danger of hell, but she cannot send me there. Her duty is to try and make me love her once more. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

The spiritual character of spiritual authority once established, our next duty is to determine the organ and the seat of this authority. Tyrrell protests with equal energy against what he calls "the individualism of anarchy and that of a dictatorship,"<sup>2</sup> the former represented by "Liberal Protestantism," the latter personified by the Papacy. In confronting these two extremes he maintains "the Catholic and social conception of authority":—" . . . the oneness which Christ desired for his Church and which was to be the note of her truth and authority was an 'agreement of individual minds'—'That they all may be one . . . so that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.'"<sup>3</sup>

"The faith of the Church is not that of each individual, be he Pope or layman. In each the Christian spirit manifests itself in some new and particular aspect never twice the same. No one can say, 'I am tradition,' 'I am Christianity.' It is by the social interchange and comparison of these ceaseless and varying manifestations that a corporate mind is formed and developed which serves as a standard to waken, guide, and stimulate the development of each several soul. Here is the advantage of an institutional Church, within whose limits the experiences of multitudes and generations are brought together and unified for the general good."<sup>4</sup> "For your 'bishops in union with the Pope,' I would put, 'the Pope as united with the bishops and the bishops as united with the Church.'"<sup>5</sup> "However it is taken for granted that none of these representatives of the collective conscience of the Church is armed with an official, juridical or constraining power. As interpreters of the principles of spiritual Catholicism they express the mute impenetrable life which circulates in the

<sup>1</sup> III., p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> III., p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> III., pp. 94, 95.

<sup>4</sup> III., pp. 131, 132.

<sup>5</sup> III., p. 133.

whole organism, and lend a voice to the eternal truths, to the divine instincts irresistibly at work in the soul of all the people of God.”<sup>1</sup>

The “consensus [of the personal experience of Christians] is a criterion of faith, but not of theology.”<sup>2</sup> “It is only the perfectly spontaneous agreement of spirit with spirit that lends value to a consensus.”<sup>3</sup>

“. . . If it is the result of listlessness, or of imitativeness, or of governmental pressure, or of the fear of eternal damnation, it is worthless.

“A general consensus of the faithful can only obtain in regard to matters where all may be experts; matters within the potential experience of each; matters which interest and affect their daily spiritual life—the life of Faith in virtue of which they are called ‘the faithful.’”<sup>4</sup>

It must be admitted that the idea of religious authority developed in the preceding pages is exposed to numerous and severe criticisms. Whether the Catholic standpoint be adopted, or the base of operations be taken in the Gospel or in the conscience, a series of questions arise to which the religious Modernism of Tyrrell can give no precise or conclusive answer. It is, however, no less true that on several points of real importance the lines indicated by our author deserve the concentrated attention of the Protestant Christian. On the one hand he insists on the spiritual and moral, inward and religious character of authority; he removes all legal and juridical ideas, thus voicing the formal condemnation of the literalism of our old theology, which petrified the canon of the Old and New Testaments, forbidding all interference. On the other hand he takes up and applies the principles enunciated above; he puts us on our guard against the excesses of individualism; he unmasks the danger of an unbridled and uncontrolled subjectivism; he safeguards the law of solidarity and extols its advantages. In both directions he opens up a

<sup>1</sup> III., pp. 85–87.

<sup>2</sup> III., p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> III., p. 82.

<sup>4</sup> III., p. 82.



luminous perspective for evangelical faith and Protestant theology, and supplies them with useful and valuable lessons.

It remains but to say a last word on a problem indicated in the preceding remarks on the idea of religious authority. In defining this idea Tyrrell insists on *the difference to be made between revelation and theology, between faith and dogma.*

### III.

In principle almost all Protestants profess the independence of religious faith, the essential difference between the substance of Christian revelation, the object of faith, and the formula of dogmatic theology, the fruit of reflection and science.<sup>1</sup> It would seem then that in this respect Modernism has nothing to teach us.

And yet the old leaven of orthodox or liberal rationalism is still fermenting in many minds, and the truth which in theory is admitted is far from having triumphed in practice. The energy and perseverance brought by Tyrrell to the exposition of this pretended commonplace will still be found salutary.

There is much to gain by reading the developments of an idea which assumes manifold forms under his pen, and which he is able to present in its interesting and varied aspects.<sup>2</sup>

“ . . . no man has ever yet been saved or lost by theology since the world began : men have been lost for desiring and, as far as was in their power, procuring the excommunication, the temporal and spiritual perdition of their neighbours ; for destroying with their theology the souls for whom Christ died. . . . I believe firmly in the necessity and utility of theology ; but of a living theology that continually proceeds from and returns to that experience of which it is the ever-tentative and perfectible analysis. . . . What I deny is a theology that draws ideas from ideas instead of from experience ; that gives

<sup>1</sup> On “revelation” see II., pp. 264–307, and also the chapter entitled “Theologism,” II., pp. 308–354.

<sup>2</sup> See especially 200 *seqq.* The whole chapter : “The Rights and Limits of Theology.”

us shadows of shadows instead of shadows of reality; that wanders further and further from facts along the path of curious and unverified deductions; that makes itself the tyrant instead of the servant of religious life; that imposes its conclusions as divinely revealed and ‘under pain of eternal damnation.’”<sup>1</sup>

“What we preach to the poor is not theology but revelation—the inspired and simple expression of those experiences which theology translates into the technical language of philosophical systems.”<sup>2</sup>

“. . . when we preach to the people what Christ preached—the coming of God’s Kingdom, the baptism of repentance and a new life—we feed them with bread; when we preach scholasticism we feed them with words and wind.”<sup>3</sup>

“It is, as I am weary of repeating, the confusion of faith with orthodoxy, of revelation with theology. It is the notion of the Church as an organ of intellectual enlightenment; as a schoolmistress commissioned to teach us by rote a divinely revealed metaphysics and physics and ethics and sociology and economics and politics and history. You say that the Church has at least an indirect mission in these matters; and so do I. But you mean that she holds some revealed statements and premisses in these several sciences with which the rest must be squared. I mean that she is guardian of that spirit of truth and truthfulness; of patience and self-abnegation, and of all those affective dispositions of the heart with which science must be pursued for the glory of God in the good of mankind. I mean that her mission is to the heart and not to the head; that the Gospel is primarily power and strength and inspiration for the will; that it convinces by ideals, not by ideas; by the revelation of a coming kingdom and a new life set before the imaginative vision and kindling a fire of enthusiasm.”<sup>4</sup>

Tyrrell attaches such importance to the distinction between religious revelation and dogmatic formula, between faith and

<sup>1</sup> III., pp. 46, 47.

<sup>2</sup> III., p. 156.

<sup>3</sup> III., p. 157.

<sup>4</sup> III., pp. 175, 176.



theology, he proclaims this truth with such full conviction, that he concludes from this theoretical affirmation all the practical consequences implied and involved. It is common knowledge that the position taken up by him in this respect was the point of departure whence the protests and attacks of the Roman hierarchy descended upon his head. To clothe his thought with a more intelligible form he fell back upon a fiction which was long regarded as a reality. He supposes a professor of anthropology, who has broken with the doctrines of Rome, writing to him to submit his doubts and consult him upon the course to pursue. In a confidential letter Tyrrell dissuades his correspondent from a religious break with the Church, and in support of this invitation to remain within the pale of Catholicism he has recourse to the premisses we have just explained: he takes pains to distinguish "between faith in the Christian revelation, in Christ as a person, in the Church as a living corporation; and theology, which strives to translate revelation from the imaginative language of prophecy into the conceptual language of contemporary scientific thought; which strives to define Christ and to define the Church so as to satisfy the exigencies of our understanding and bring it into harmony with the deeper intuitions of faith."<sup>1</sup>

The positive conclusion which ensues from this fundamental distinction is logically without a flaw. "Let it be granted, for argument's sake, that things are quite as bad as you say, and that the intellectual defence of Catholicism breaks down on every side as far as you are concerned; or that at least your mental confusion is so hopeless that you dare not commit yourself to any affirmation one way or the other—does it straightway follow you should separate yourself from the communion of the Church? Yes, if theological 'intellectualism' be right; if faith mean mental assent to a system of conceptions of the understanding; if Catholicism be primarily a theology or at most a system of practical observances regulated by that theology. No, if Catholicism be primarily

<sup>1</sup> I., p. 29.

a life, and the Church a spiritual organism in whose life we participate, and if theology be but an attempt of that life to formulate and understand itself—an attempt which may fail wholly or in part without affecting the value and reality of the said life.”<sup>1</sup>

It is certain that Tyrrell does not answer all the questions that one can put, nor does he remove all the difficulties contained in the problem of the relation of revelation to dogma, of faith to theology. But in drawing upon the religious Modernism of Tyrrell for some lessons which might apply to our Protestant theology, I have not been so simple as to believe that the illustrious disciple of Newman could set before us a new programme, or give us a watchword which we must blindly follow and transmit to our Church without the slightest alteration. Those who have had the patience to weigh the notes we have made with the help of the last works of the great Modernist, will have been able to convince themselves that we do not intend to make of him an infallible teacher; his theology is not the last word in religious science, nor is it to serve us as supreme rule. But each of these books, which are the expression of a sincere and burning soul in quest of light and religious life, is rich in pregnant impulses, in solemn and urgent appeals, in suggestive and healthful thoughts; each of them is fitted to stimulate our reflection, nourish our faith, awaken and sharpen our conscience, and, to the same extent, vivify and deepen our theology. The severity which appears in some of his judgments on our Church does not prevent us from tendering to this valiant religious mind, to the man who was a glorious martyr in the cause of liberty and faith, the tribute of our profound admiration and our enduring gratitude.

P. LOBSTEIN.

STRASBOURG.

<sup>1</sup> I., pp. 51, 52.



## A NATIVE FIJIAN ON THE DECLINE OF HIS RACE.

Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by A. M. HOCART.<sup>1</sup>

THE following essay came to my notice accidentally. I took a copy, which I translate as closely as possible, attempting to render every word, even the so-called expletives, which are really most important, as qualifying and colouring the whole sentence. English, of course, is compelled to be more precise and must use different words to render the same in different contexts. I have kept the original brackets, but otherwise modified the stops.

The essay seems worth publishing both for theoretic and practical reasons.

For theoretic, because it shows the interaction of two given cultures: the European which we know well, and the Fijian which we may still hope to know. Because it shows religion moulded by social organisation; for as the rise of chiefs promoted ghosts to be gods, so now British rule is shaping the spiritual world into a colonial government. The reader should bear in mind that the writer is well acquainted with colonial administration.

For practical, because it shows exactly how an intelligent Fijian may conceive Christianity. That is a point we need to

<sup>1</sup> Mr A. M. Hocart was a member of the Percy Sladen Trust expedition which went to the Solomon Islands in 1908. Since then he has been in charge of the Government school at Lakemba in eastern Fiji, where he has gained an intimate acquaintance with the Fijian language and with Fijian modes of thought.

know badly, for most missionaries see the bare surface. It also contains hints how the best intentions of a government may be misconstrued, and suspicion engendered on one side, impatience and reproaches of ingratitude on the other, which a more intimate knowledge of native thought might remove.

#### ARGUMENT.

The decline of native population is due to our abandoning the native deities who are God's deputies in earthly matters. God is concerned only with matters spiritual and will not hearken to our prayers for earthly benefits. A return to our native deities is our only salvation.

#### THE ESSAY.

Concerning this great matter, to wit the continual decline of us natives at this time, it is a great and weighty matter. For my part I am ill at ease on that account; I eat ill and sleep ill through my continual pondering of this matter day after day. Three full months has my soul been tossed about<sup>1</sup> as I pondered this great matter, and in those three months there were three nights when my pondering of this matter in my bed lasted even till day, and something then emerged in my mind, and these my reflections touch<sup>2</sup> upon religion<sup>3</sup> and touch upon the law, and the things that my mind saw stand here written below.

When this emerged from my mind, it was perfectly plain to me that the people of quality<sup>4</sup> and the common folk will judge me at large: they will say that I am one of the foolishhest men.<sup>5</sup> But I deem it inexpedient that we should continue to take no thought of it, or continue to follow one single path year after year; but the right course is that we adopt some other methods and try them, in case we might

<sup>1</sup> *Vei tu yaki*: "standing all about."

<sup>2</sup> *Lakova*: lit. go to.

<sup>3</sup> *Lotu*, which means Christianity, church, chapel, service, prayers, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *Turanga*: usually translated "chiefs."

<sup>5</sup> *Lialia* means mad, stupid, ignorant, foolish, silly, etc.



thereby leastwise be able to multiply. Well, the point at which I shall begin is the Beginning when the World was first made, and thus it stands :

The first thing to be kept foremost in mind is this : “ What kind of God is Jehovah ? A God of the spirit<sup>1</sup> or a god of the flesh ? ” (Let each of you think over the proper term.<sup>2</sup>)

Turn to the Creation of the World :—When God created the World, whether there was anything created along with it or not ? Was the very first thing to be created Adam and Eve ? Yes ; we are told so in the Bible (Genesis).

Well, if the very first thing that lived in the world is Adam, whence did he come, he who came to tell Eve to eat the fruit ? From this fact it is plain that there is a Prince whom God created first to be Prince of the World, perchance it is he who is called the Vu God (Noble Vu).<sup>3</sup> With him abides the power given to him by Jehovah, the Great God of *Spirit* who dwells in Heaven, that is, the second heaven, the dwelling-place of Spirits. I think, sir, this may be he whom the God of Spirit appointed to be leader of the World, that we might be subject to him, we men who live in the bodily life. The power which originated from the Great House,<sup>4</sup> from the Vu God, the channels of transmission<sup>5</sup> thereof to the life in the body are the nobly born (Lords of the body).<sup>6</sup> That is why the anger of chiefs has virtue (*mana*), etc., etc.

It may be that some of us will say : “ If what you here say is true, Mr What’s-your-name, why is it not written in the Bible ? ” Consider this : It is written in the Bible that there were only two children of Adam, to wit Cain and Abel. But whence did the woman come who was Cain’s wife ? (Some wise men say that the couple were brother and sister ; Adam had

<sup>1</sup> *Kalou yalo* : properly this means ghost, lit. soul, spirit ; but the author uses the words in a new sense, as opposed to *Kalou yango*, or god of the flesh.

<sup>2</sup> My copy has *kena idha*, which I amend to *kena idhavu*.

<sup>3</sup> *Kalou Vu* is really “ ancestor ghost ” ; but the author uses *kalou* in the new sense of God, and *Vu* for Fijian deities. Noble Vu = *Vu Turanga*.

<sup>4</sup> *I.e.* the Chief’s House.

<sup>5</sup> *Indenandewa*.

<sup>6</sup> *I.e.* the native chiefs are the vicars on earth of the Vu Spirit.

a child, a daughter, who is not set down in the Bible.) Now if it is not set down in the Bible that Adam had a daughter, it is possible that some Prince of the World, Vu Spirit, is not set down. With him is authority<sup>1</sup> and might, because Jehovah has given him to be the ruler of men, to be the Vu of men. Here are the words from a passage in the Bible: "God is glorified when he hideth things; kings and men are glorified because they inquire diligently into things or devise things." For this reason it is right that you censure me not for these my reflections.

I believe, sir, that there is in truth a Prince whom God created with the world before the creation of man (the name we give him, I suppose, is Vu God, or God whose words come true<sup>2</sup> in matters pertaining to the body only); his authority does not extend in the least to the soul; impossible.

Why? Because they are different in kind; the body is one and the soul another; as for him, he is not a devil or enemy of religion, he is merely God Vu; the power of the Spirit God with which he was anointed, abides with him. It was only in his wilfulness<sup>3</sup> that he went and told Eve to sleep with Adam. Turn to the words of the book of the Spirit God, which says: "That which is hard unto men is easy unto God," and the passage which says: "For he desireth not that one should perish." (Is this plain?) Yes.

Well, if he desireth not that anyone should perish, and all things are easy to him, wherefore was not flattery bound fast once for all in the time of Adam, that men might be pure who were to be born from his stock? I think it is easy for the God of Spirit to bind the Flatterer (Devil), but one difficulty is that he has already made a pact with the Vu of the World, namely that he should be sovereign of the life in the flesh. It lies with Jehovah to decide a thing; the

<sup>1</sup> *Sau*: that is the title of the highest chief and of his office.

<sup>2</sup> *Mana*.

<sup>3</sup> *Vakasausauya*: it applies to a chief who orders people about without respect for their comfort. I do not know what supposed incident he here alludes to.



objection is that the will of the God of Spirit might fall into contempt if his decision were reversed in order after all to settle a matter which concerns the body; and since he has confined himself to matters of the spirit, it is hard for his will to extend as far as the body, since there exists a sovereign of the flesh whom he has already appointed.<sup>1</sup>

The proof of it is that he was enabled thereby to give a human body to its contents in order that he<sup>2</sup> might die, that thereby the souls of all men should be justified<sup>3</sup> to the Spirit God (Jehovah) at the time when the life of the flesh ceases. I suppose, sir, this is plain.

Let me proceed.

*The Devil or Enemy of Religion.*

How many great devils are there? I think only two. One began even with Adam's disobedience; the second those who had lately been expelled from Heaven. It is these then in truth that are the enemies of Religion; distinct from the God who is leader of men, he has dignity and might;<sup>4</sup> he is a god whose word has virtue<sup>5</sup> and is fulfilled in the life according to the flesh. We hear our fathers say that his words were fulfilled and came true in the days when he was worshipped. But when the missionaries came who brought Christianity, they proceeded to call everything devil work,<sup>6</sup> and thence the names of "devil" and of "Vu God" have in a way been bound together, to wit the god of us Fijians. Jehovah has given us this group of islands as our possession, and the several branches of the race, or groups of families, are severally gathered together under their several Vu Gods, the leaders of the various families in things of the flesh. As for

<sup>1</sup> It is here that the civil service betrays itself as the original.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. man.

<sup>3</sup> *Ndondonu*: straight back.

<sup>4</sup> *Sa turanga ka nggangga*.

<sup>5</sup> *Mana*.

<sup>6</sup> How the early missionaries translated *kalou* god instead of ghost, and branded spirits and ghosts as devils (*tevoro*), and some evil consequences thereof, are set forth in a paper "On the Meaning of the Word *kalou*, and the Origin of Fijian Temples," to be published shortly in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*.

the Christian Religion, it has come to Fiji, that is the worship addressed to the great leader of spirits, God of Spirits, Jehovah, that we may pray to him to keep our souls when the life in the flesh is at an end.

It seems to me as though the introducers of Christianity were slightly wrong in so far as they have turned into devils the Vu Gods of the various parts of Fiji; and since the Vu Gods have suddenly been abandoned in Fiji, it is as though we changed the decision of the Great God, Jehovah, since that very Vu God is a great leader of the Fijians. That is why it seems to me a possible cause of the *Decline of Population* lies in the rule of the Church henceforth to treat altogether as devil work the ghosts,<sup>1</sup> and the manner of worshipping the Vu Gods of the Fijians, who are their leaders in the life in the flesh, whom the Great God gave, and chose, and sent hither to be man's leader. But now that the Vu Gods whom Jehovah gave us have been to a certain extent rudely set aside,<sup>2</sup> and we go to pray directly to the God of Spirit for things concerning the flesh (life in the flesh), it appears as if the leader of men resents it and he sets himself to crush our little children and women with child. Consider this:

If you have a daughter, and she loves a youth and is loved of him, and you dislike this match, but in the end they none the less follow their mutual love and elope forthwith and go to be married, how is it generally with the first and the second child of such a union, does it live or does it die? The children of Fijians so married are as a rule already smitten<sup>3</sup> from their

<sup>1</sup> *Tevoro ndina*. *Tevoro*, the Tahitian form of our word "devil," was intended by the early missionaries to mean devil, but it has come to be commonly used of ghosts; in fact, *tevoru ndina* (true devils) means ghosts proper, souls of the dead. I take this to be its present meaning, as "true devils" would hardly make sense.

<sup>2</sup> It is hard to render *mbiu koto*, lit. set aside lying. *Koto* softens or depreciates a word, making it "low lying": *vinaka* is "good"; *vinaka koto* is "more or less good." In this case my linguistic authority explained that it was used "in order that the gods might appear respected, that they might not appear despised." It makes the setting aside less downright.

<sup>3</sup> *Mbuta*: lit. cooked.



mother's womb. Wherefore? Does the woman's father make witchcraft? No. Why then does the child die thus?

Simply that your Vu sees your anger and carries out his crushing even in its mother's womb; that is the only reason of the child's death.<sup>1</sup> Or what do you think in the matter? Is it by the power of the devil that such wonders are wrought?<sup>2</sup> No, that is only the power that originates from the God of Spirit, who has granted to the Prince of men, Vu God, that his will and his power should come to pass in the earthly life. The word of the Spirit God in the Bible says: "Whosoever rejecteth the Lord, rejecteth the elect of God." From this passage I conclude that Fiji erred when he who is our Vu God was set aside,<sup>3</sup> to whom Jehovah granted to be our head; now in so far as the worship of the Vu (Gods of the Flesh) is set aside, the will of Jehovah is opposed.

### *The Creation of the World.*

This matter Jehovah has decided once for all, and he has not given the same things to the various countries to be their fabrics, or their food, and the same skin has not been given to all men; the skin is different, the customs are different, the fabrics are different which are found in every country. Is it so, sir, or not? Yes, it is so (it is most true).

Since it is evident that the portions which Jehovah, the Spirit God, has severally assigned to the various parts of the world are different, it is right then that the various races of mankind severally follow the several customs assigned to them by Jehovah. If a man or country sets aside the custom born with him from his mother's womb to be his custom inasmuch as it is the custom given him by Jehovah, that man appears absurd and stupid in our sight. Why? For what reason but that he has set aside the custom born with him in order to

<sup>1</sup> Fijian religion is therefore not amoral, but on the contrary is closely interwoven with the moral code. Native religions should be removed with far more caution and science than has hitherto been usual.

<sup>2</sup> *Mana.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ko kaya* shows that it is singular. The author is vague on the point of numbers; sometimes as if there were only one *kalou vu*, sometimes as if there were many.

get himself foreign ways, ways which the Great God did not give him to be his custom.

Well, how is Fiji? Do we abide by our customs which Jehovah gave us? Do we still follow our Vu Gods whom Jehovah gave to be our leaders or not? No, we have come to follow imported maxims, maxims let fall by the various destitute lands that keep entering into Fiji, to wit those lands that surely have no Vu Gods, or have plants to their Vu Gods, and are not like Fiji, a land beloved of Jehovah, who gave them their land and its Vu Gods to return oracles and tell his vessel<sup>1</sup> what must be done to burn down a village, or what must be done to save the country. Now, the words of power<sup>2</sup> or the words of truth of the Vu God are due to Jehovah having given him the sovereignty of the body; I think it were hard for the Vu God's words to have power, if Jehovah had not previously approved of him as Vu God of the Fijians.

It is not clear to me, sir, whether there are at all Vu Gods in all countries or not? If any has not, then it is a weak and destitute land, and not like Fiji; from this fact it is plain that Fiji is indeed a land in favour at the Great House; a leader has forthwith been sent us to return oracles through his vessel, and to set forth what must be done, and what must not be done, that the country may prosper.

But now that Fiji has by the introducers of Christianity been placed on the same level as various foreign lands,<sup>3</sup> that our Vu Gods have come to be lightly set aside as a thing of nought, or have received the name of devil, that is the only cause that has brought about the increase of disease. If you look at the quarterly report, you will see that there are few deaths of old and middle-aged men, and that there are many and numerous deaths from children up to young men, that is even we who have just deserted quite the way of our people and are led astray by the words of foreigners to this effect:

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* the priest who is the vessel (*wangga*) of the spirit.

<sup>2</sup> *Mana*.

<sup>3</sup> The sequel shows that we are included in these foreign lands, though the home reader might find it hard to believe that savages pity us and despise us.



“Other times have come, chiefs are no use; money alone is chief.”<sup>1</sup> Because this our generation is straying from our right path, therefore the deaths that come from the sins of the country become many, (1) because the Vu Gods are set aside, (2) because the temporal chiefs are set aside or despised, that is the transmitters of power from the Vu God who shows it forth in the light of the flesh, because, I say, we of this generation are thus gone wrong in these two points; for that reason alone do men flow like water to the grave with hairs that are not grey. Alas! Fiji! Alas! Fiji is gone astray, and the road to the salvation of its people is obstructed by the laws of the Church and the State.<sup>2</sup> Alas! you, our countrymen, if perchance you know, or have found the path which my thoughts have explored and join exertions to attain it, then will Fiji increase.

A word of the Spirit God in his Holy Bible runs thus: “The earnest prayer of the faithful bringeth things to pass.” How is it? Is it true? Yes, it is true. Why then does not Fiji increase?

Christianity has now been many years in Fiji, and many scores of Fijians have passed away in their faith, and they have often made this petition in our prayer meetings: “Lord, here is Fiji lying before the glory of Thy face; we the inhabitants (the natives) are declining; oh! cause us to increase that we may become many.”

Well, how is it? Does God hear that prayer? Yes, he hears it. Why then does he not bring it to pass?

I think it is hard for the Spirit God (Jehovah) to fulfil this prayer because it belongs to another class. He is God of

<sup>1</sup> Is the native so very stupid when he is slow to accept our ways? In justice to ourselves, he sees most of our faults and few of our virtues; but is the reproach he here casts at us altogether unfounded?

<sup>2</sup> Christianity is not obligatory, but natives have an idea it is, because heathen revivals, being connected with nationalism, have had to be put down. It is a question, however, whether this connection is not itself due to an idea that heathendom is illegal. There seems to be a belief that the white man is suppressing heathendom because he knows it would be the salvation of Fiji. Hence suppression keeps it alive, while publicity might discredit it by proving its failure to arrest the decline, and would give confidence in the Government.

Spirit; the petition is to increase the life of the flesh. It is impossible that Jehovah should handle the body directly since he abides as God of Spirit, and impossible that his will should apply immediately to the body, since there already is a kind<sup>1</sup> of sovereign of the flesh, to wit the Vu God, Vu of men. If only the Vu God who has been granted to us<sup>2</sup> Fijians had been placed at our head and we then paid homage to the God of Spirit together, we men who live in the flesh and the might of the God of men who live in the flesh, then would the answer to our prayer on behalf of earthly life in the flesh come from the Great House from the God of Spirit in Heaven in less than the twinkling of an eye.

(I am Jehovah, I am a God of Spirit.) The proof of my supposition stands thus :

I observe that there appear to be two kinds of answers to prayers coming from Heaven to us men who abide in the life of the flesh. I think and believe that there are really two kinds of answers to prayers.

I have already said above that Jehovah hears all prayers. As for the answer in matters pertaining to the spirit, most rapid is the answer to matters pertaining to the spirit, the proof thereof goes on every Sunday, the conversions of the people when the Holy Ghost of the Spirit God is hot in their souls. But petitions addressed to the Spirit God concerning the flesh, that we may increase to be many, are delayed and not fulfilled. What is the reason? Because it is not possible for Jehovah to go past him who is already appointed leader of the life in the flesh, and that is precisely why it is hard for him to assist in the increase of the life of the flesh since he is Spirit God, and moreover his decision as Spirit God has passed, inasmuch as there is a sovereign of men already appointed by him, to wit the Vu of the Fijians or Vu God:<sup>3</sup> if the Vu

<sup>1</sup> *Sa ndua toka* : *toka* is a softening word like *koto*.

<sup>2</sup> *Soli toka* : my informant explains that *toka* shows that it is given as a present (*ka ni iloloma*), not once for all.

<sup>3</sup> *I.e.* He has exercised His will once for all in appointing His deputy.



God had been worshipped first, and then we went together to Jehovah (Spirit God), the answer to our prayer would come from Heaven in less than . . .<sup>1</sup>

Is this plain, sir? Consider this also: Jehovah, he is Spirit God and remains hidden and does not deliver oracles to us: that is why men are emboldened to do evil. But if we worshipped him first whom he has sent hither as leader of men, to wit the Vu God, who returns oracles through his vessel, then would our present evildoers and thieves be continually revealed to us, and our evil deeds be a disgrace and a fearful thing in the sight of us men in the earthly life, and the wages thereof would be revealed to us, which would come to pass even in the earthly life. I believe that this is verily the purpose of the Spirit God, being twofold: to have a deputy in things to be done in the bodily life to be his interpreter to us earthly men, to wit the existing Vu God, who will tell us what must be done for the land to prosper, and what not. As for his deputy in matters pertaining to the soul of man, the Holy Ghost is established,<sup>2</sup> the same gives instruction in matters pertaining to the soul. In the boldness with which men handle evil because they think that the Spirit God does not give oracles, lies one part of the decline. But if the Vu God, who reveals in oracles the wages of evil works, were worshipped first, our hands would fear to lay hold of evil. Or what, sir, do you think?

Consider this:

There stood Mbau, and there stood Namata or Nakelo, and in both those villages there was a born chief who was known<sup>3</sup> at the Great House to Ratu Dhakombau. Well, what about the inhabitants of both these villages, Namata and Nakelo: could they disregard their true Chiefs who are

<sup>1</sup> My text has *rui*, which no one can explain.

<sup>2</sup> *Voli*: "It is not weak, it goes about." *Toka voli* is applied to coconuts: "if one is planted in the place of another and flourishes like its predecessor, it is said: *sa toka voli*."

<sup>3</sup> *Kilai tiko*: related? To know each other and to be related are one and the same to Fijians.

well known personally to Ratu Dhakombau<sup>1</sup> and go direct to the Great House?<sup>2</sup> Would those Namata or Nakelo men be acceptable, if they set aside their chiefs? Do you imagine<sup>3</sup> that Ratu Dhakombau would attend to them in a joyful spirit, if he, who was their sovereign, was absent? No. Why? For what reason but that their official visit from their town to Mbau was incorrect?

Is this true, reverend sirs? Yes, it is most true. Well, if it is so, how can Jehovah (Spirit God) hear, or how fulfil the prayer on behalf of Fiji that it may increase, if we set him aside, who is our sovereign in the life of the flesh and whom God created with the World, to wit the Vu God? He will indeed hear the prayer, but it is hard for him to accomplish what is necessary that the life in the flesh may increase and become plentiful so long as the gods of the flesh, Lords of men, to wit the existing Vu Gods of Fiji, are set aside, and petitions are addressed direct to the God of Spirit that the life in the flesh may increase and be plentiful. Impossible. From this fact, which demonstrates the various points I have set forth above, I know by this my reasoning that if Fiji returned to its proper constitutions according to the customs with which we were endowed, then would Fiji be justified, and it would be impossible that it should decline or infant deaths be many. But if the various countries of the world do not follow this path and yet are justified, no wonder since they have no Vu Gods. But for Fiji, it is a small land which Jehovah loves exceedingly; the proof of this is that when our respective districts in Fiji were created, they were created each with its own Vu. And if the Vu were placed at our head and we then went up together to our goal, to the Great God, to wit the Spirit God (Jehovah), there would be no still births and Fiji would then be indeed a people increasing

<sup>1</sup> *Kilai tu vei R. Dh.*: "whatever the place he may be in." *E. kilai tu mai vei R. Dh.*: he remains in one place, and R. Dh. knows where he is. The second is clearer: R. Dh. knows he is a chief and knows his rank.

<sup>2</sup> Namata and Nakelo were vassal to Mbau.

<sup>3</sup> *Mbeka*.



rapidly, since our conforming to our native customs would combine with progress in cleanly living at the present time.<sup>1</sup> Now, in the past, when the ancients only worshipped Vu Gods and there was no commandment about cleanly living, yet they kept increasing. Then if the Vu Gods were worshipped in Fiji (the deputy of the Spirit God in matters pertaining to the life in the flesh), and this were also combined with the precept of cleanly living, I think the villages would then be full of men. Or what, sir, is your conclusion?

I have mentioned in the above discussion that some parts of the World are weak countries; the reason is that perhaps they have not a single Vu God; blessed and strong is a land when there is a deputy of the Spirit God who gave him to be his deputy, to speak oracles through his medium. (How was it, sir, of old? Did they prophesy, and tell the things to do?)

If this is right, then it is plain how far removed we are from certain big countries. How wretched they are and weak, whose medicines are constantly being imported and brought here in bottles!<sup>2</sup> Not so Fiji. If a disease begins to pain, you simply go and pull up a kava plant for some medium of the Vu God; then he arises and prophesies and says: "So and so, go out, stretch out thy hand to the right; the first leaf thou touchest, go and strain it: the patient will thereby recover." When this is carried out, it is wont to be most effective.<sup>3</sup> And what makes it effective? The power of the devil? No, that it is merely the power of the Spirit God who conferred it upon him; had not such been the intention of Jehovah, it were impossible for that medicine to be effective, or his words would have no power.

<sup>1</sup> The endeavours of the Government to introduce more sanitary conditions of life have borne good fruit. Cleanly living seems to be the aspect of civilisation which the naturally clean Fijian appreciates most.

<sup>2</sup> Whites pity Fijians, but they find reasons to pity us. That is what white men generally fail to realise; they put down to laziness or stupidity their reluctance to assimilate our civilisation, whereas it arises from a different point of view; and that point of view is not always wrong or devoid of common sense. Is Fijian medicine more absurd than our patent medicines, or as expensive?

<sup>3</sup> *Mana*.

Or what is your opinion, reverend sirs, of this my argument? I do believe if the Vu Gods are properly worshipped, they will be able to go on prophesying to us what must be done to save the country, or what must be done to make Fijians wealthy, thus: "Do this, you will attain your end if it is done thus; you will go about the world and do it by power to achieve money." (Even as is commonly done in circuses.)<sup>1</sup> Or thus: "You go and wait for me at such and such a place. I will convey thither a ship for you to tour to America." A mere shoot of a banana tree may become our vessel to America if he so pleases.

I think, sir, my demonstration will suffice concerning our fathers who introduced Christianity; and they must not be angry with me on that account, or imagine that I am one ignorant of the Spirit God (Jehovah).

If any one of them is of this mind, he must be wrong; as for me, I simply do my duty in saying what appears in my mind when I think of my country and my friends who are its inhabitants; for since it wants only a few years to the extinction of the people, it is right that I reveal what has appeared in my soul, for it may be God's will to reveal in my soul this matter. Now it is not expedient for me to suppress what has been revealed to me, and if I do not declare what has appeared from forth my soul, I have sinned thereby in the eyes of the Spirit God: I shall be questioned regarding it on the day of judgment of souls: nor is it fitting that one of the missionaries should be angry with me by reason of my words; it is right that they should consider everything that I have here said, and judge accordingly. It is no use being ashamed to change the rules of the Church, if the country and its inhabitants will thereby be saved.

<sup>1</sup> Fijians believe there is spiritualism (*luve ni nai*) in circuses; it is no use denying it, they won't believe you. They seem to suspect the white man forbids *luve ni nai* so as to reserve the monopoly to himself.



## THE PESSIMISM OF BERGSON.

J. W. SCOTT, M.A.

BERGSON's system of thought is subtle in its details; but the aim and essence of his metaphysical gospel is capable of very simple statement. The cause of our helplessness to solve the problems of the universe lies, he believes, in our manner of approaching them. In metaphysical speculation we have been too much the unconscious victims of self-sophistication. We need to penetrate the thick veil of habit and prejudice and artifice through which we usually see the world. We need to recover the power to see things directly. Could we do this, we should find half our problems disappear; for the world is really simpler than we have made it to look. To restore to us our direct vision of reality by removing the accumulated deposit of habit from our view, is what Bergson takes to be the task of the metaphysician; an enterprise in which he himself but leads the way, and which can be completed only by generations of thinkers. He takes up one or two of the most baffling aspects of the universe and tries to reveal them as they would appear to a wholly unsophisticated vision. The process of detecting the obstructions and cutting them away may often lead his thought into windings which are subtle and difficult to follow, but the general end is clear. It is to remove the problematic character from reality by gaining an "intuitive" view of it. This is what has been called Bergson's "intuitive method."

The first world-problem with which Bergson sought to

deal was Free Will. One may say, putting it roughly, that the obstacle which he sought to remove, there, was *space*. Criticism of the idea of space is one of Bergson's most significant undertakings. To follow into all its ramifications the damage done to our view of the world by the trespassing of this idea where it has no right to be, is one of the main objects of his philosophy. And this is the aspect of his teaching whose implications we wish to bring to light. We hold that to thrust "space" out of the question, where the ultimate nature of things is under discussion, is to involve oneself in a pessimistic view of the world.<sup>1</sup>

First of all, what is the "space" referred to? and how do two such disconnected things as space and the freedom of the human will get close enough together to generate confusion between them? We do not need to attempt to settle what space is, *i.e.* the actual space which stretches out before us as we look, and in which we see objects side by side. We are concerned here only with Bergson's idea of it; and he understands it in a very wide and interesting sense. For him, to be side by side is to be in space. Wherever things appear side by side, there space appears. And his great thesis is that we often see things thus when they are not really so. In particular, we sometimes see our own experiences side by side when we are meditating on our past life. As we reflect, we see which experience came first, which second, which third. When we remember a number of them all at once, we see them, so to speak, in a row. In other words, although we know that they are in the inner world and in time, we see them as though they were in the external world and in

<sup>1</sup> We do not believe that this criticism, if true, will be found pointless. Bergson is, indeed, too perfect a thinker ever to profess to hold a brief for optimism, or even give a reader any excuse for saying that he makes such a profession. But it is hard to believe that there are not convinced optimists amongst his disciples, and it is certain that there are many seekers for religious peace amongst his vast audience. To all of these, if it be a fact that his philosophy falls short of true optimism, the fact is of importance. Nothing is here said, however, to imply that this fact is the only important one for them in Bergson's philosophy, or even that it is the most important.



space. This is the error. All our usual dealings are with the external world, our habits of noticing and judging are formed there, we carry these habits with us when we turn to the inner life and so, there, miss-see what we see. If we want to know what our inner life is—and freedom is a character of that life—we must get back to it. We must really turn within. And if we are to do that, we must leave space outside.

The contention that we habitually see our inner life in space and that it is not really so, forms the thesis of Bergson's first great work, *Les données immédiates de la conscience*. We must endeavour to grasp the real meaning of this contention, and see its consequences.

If we take "Man" to mean consciousness, and consciousness to mean consciousness of a series of events which follow one another, we can raise the question of the origin of man in the following form: is it possible for any mere series of events to generate a consciousness of themselves? This is the question which Thomas Hill Green raised and answered in the negative. Because, he held, between a mere series and the consciousness of it there is an irreducible difference in kind. To be conscious of a series of events implies that they are all present to a mind at once; that is, they are made something more than a series by coming into consciousness. If they remained a mere succession there could be no consciousness. Each one would disappear as it passed. To be conscious of them, each must somehow be preserved to take its place along with the others and be related to them. If I hear the strokes of a bell and am able to say there were five, then plainly my consciousness has in some way stretched itself over the series, grasped them together and so counted them. This led Green to ascribe to consciousness a character other than that of being a simple succession in time, to call it "eternal" and to regard a history of it as a contradiction in terms.

Now, there enters into consciousness, as thus represented, the very thing which Bergson calls "space." He has laid

hold, quite independently, of the very feature of consciousness which, for Green, was its distinctive character, viz. its power of holding its past experiences side by side. Only, for Bergson, this is a defect. It is a falsification of the true nature of our inner life, induced through our habit of dealing so much with outward things. In a brilliant analysis of different kinds of inner experience he shows how our direct consciousness of them becomes qualified by spatial ideas derived from what we know of their outward causes. From this invasion of the external arises the alleged "intensity" of inner states, which psychophysics regards as a measurable quantity. I know, for instance, that one weight is heavier than another. Straightway the sense of effort in lifting the one appears to me so many times more intense than that involved in lifting the other. But really there is no quantity involved in the inner state. In putting forth what I call "more" effort, I have no direct sense of increased quantity. All that is really perceived (and it is the same with every inner state) is a qualitative difference. One *kind* of sensation is associated with the heavy weight, and another kind with the light one. There are, indeed, cases where a mental state is spoken of in quantitative terms, and where no measurable external cause seems present to bear the blame of the deception. For instance, emotions like hope or joy or sorrow are spoken of as greater or less. The question how quantitative ideas come to trespass here leads us deeper. There is quantity, but it is of something else than the emotion. We find that the sorrow called greater, or the joy called deeper, or the desire called more intense, acquire these titles because they seem to spread over a greater area of our personality. They engross us more. The process whereby an obscure desire becomes a deep passion is simply the series of steps by which, from being isolated and comparatively foreign to the inner life, it gradually permeates the whole of the elements of the personality, "tinging them with its own colour" until the individual's whole outlook seems to have changed radically. The feeling of hope, the æsthetic feelings, and all the others,



can be seen to be the same. "What makes hope such an intense pleasure is the fact that the future . . . appears to us . . . under a multitude of forms, all equally attractive and equally possible." Again, the degree of depth of the feeling of Beauty corresponds "to the larger or smaller number of elementary psychic phenomena which we dimly discern in the fundamental emotion." In all these "deep-seated" mental states, the so-called growing intensity is at root no quantity, but "a qualitative progress and an increasing complexity indistinctly perceived." The same is the case with pleasure and pain. And if we go back for a moment to the "superficial" states already considered (*e.g.* the effort sensations of lifting heavier and heavier weights), we shall find that the changes of quality which took place in them can ultimately be analysed into the same thing. The sensation of so-called greater intensity is really a sensation spread over wider area—one involving in itself a greater number of uniquely-toned qualitative points. Now, in all these cases there *is* quantity. We can count the points. We can enumerate the "elementary psychic phenomena" which make up the fundamental state. There is quantity *of them*. But the quantity is not the emotion. The emotion is a qualitative colouring which indicates that quantity. It is not itself a thing which can be measured. It has not degrees. To sum up: what is called a growing degree of intensity in any psychic state is not a series of changes in the quantity of a certain quality. It is a series of changing qualities.

But to speak of this series of changing qualities as the widening of an "area," as a "progress," as having "complexity," and of its complexity as "increasing," is to apply quantitative terms to it. What, then, distinguishes it from quantity? The answer takes us to the roots of the whole theory. This qualitative complex is not amenable to number. There are two kinds of multiplicity, one of which is strictly numerable, the other not. This is a multiplicity of the former kind; and it is taken to be one of the latter, while being in truth but the sign thereof. Number implies space. It is

strictly applicable only to things which are ranged side by side, and about which you can say nothing except that they are side by side. Call the roll of a battalion, and every man you name intelligently has his individuality for you, his own distinct character and interests and history. Count the men, and have no interest except in enumerating them: you by implication reduce each to a mere moment in space. So far as he is merely counted, he has no character but this: that he is side by side with the rest. It follows that there are some things which cannot, by their very nature, be represented by a number. There are, in fact, two kinds of multiplicity. The members of the one can be counted, because they are in juxtaposition. The members of the other cannot be counted, because they penetrate each other's individuality. The units which make up the number 100 are each simply one. Each stands beside the others and none disturbs its neighbour. But in any hundred men, one may always stand for more than one and another for less. Their qualities overflow and they influence one another's being. Now, the multiplicity which makes up our inner states is of this interpenetrating kind. It is not a multiplicity of juxtaposition. It is a multiplicity of fusion. This makes it strictly non-quantitative. You may add a new member to such a qualitative whole. You may, *e.g.*, insert a strange note at the end of a symphony or a groan at the end of a speech. But you are not thereby making the whole one member bigger. These quantitative terms are simply not applicable, if you mean to describe the change. They would be applicable only if the addition left the rest unaltered like the addition of an extra bead to a string. Where the new arrival profoundly alters the character of the whole, what has happened is not simply that a quantity has become greater. A new qualitative character has been substituted for the old. If we persist in talking of the qualitative change in terms of mere quantity, we are not rendering the change as it really is. We are translating it into a symbolical language.

We are now in a position to remove the obstacle which



obscures the free-will problem. All quantities or magnitudes are at bottom quantities or magnitudes of space. But our inner life is not quantitative. It does not exist in space. It simply endures through time. It is qualitative. To understand it, therefore, we must keep "space" out of it. Now, when people ask whether the inward acts and decisions of our will are free, they introduce space. They are, in fact, raising a question suggested to them by a quantitative or spatialised version of the inner life. Led away by their familiarity with physical things, they see their own inner life as made up of elements existing side by side. Let us try to see how such questions arise. It will make clearer the difference between the "multiplicity of fusion" which mind is, and the "multiplicity of juxtaposition" which it is not.

To adapt one of Bergson's own illustrations: Suppose a person following up a path to a spot where it divides, the one road going to the left towards  $x$ , the other to the right towards  $y$ . Suppose he has decided to take to the left. Looking back, is it true to say that in the circumstances he could have decided to go to the right? This is the question of free will as it has usually presented itself to common sense and philosophic thought. Now, this question implies that it is possible to think of the thing being repeated. When we ask the question, we mean, could the thing turn out differently *if it were done again*? Now, the idea of repetition contains the notion of space. Wherever a thing verily repeats itself, there you are able to say that "there has been no change." And only in space is there, strictly speaking, no change. Space is the static element in the universe.

The meaning is certainly subtle, but it is important, and, at bottom, quite clear. The doctrine is that the notions of repetition and of space are mutually involved. Think of the physical world as a concourse of atoms, and the effect of the passage of time upon it. The atom is solid, stable. It lasts on unchanged for ever. Time, as Bergson says, "does not bite into it." Dealing with what we call changing physical

objects—weathering hills or ageing suns—we are compelled to say, in the last resort, that time does not “bite into” them either. True, they crumble and disperse. But every particle takes its course according to unalterable mechanical law. Sufficient knowledge of its initial position and nature could have predicted its whole subsequent course. The atom not only always is the same thing. It always *does* the same thing. All that is, then, in the physical universe is the reign of mechanical law; and that always is. All that the physical universe can ever come to be, it really is already. It is all there, given, ready-made. The passing of time appears to change it. But there is no real change. And on this view the “break-up of the atom,” could it be proved, would no more be a real change than the break-up of an ice-floe, unless the law of its proceeding were wholly different from that which reigns throughout the rest of the physical sphere. Now, it is only expressing this changelessness another way, when you say of all physical movements whatever, that you can imagine them turned back. You can think of them “as they were.” Restore the atoms of the physical system to the places in which they were at a given time in the past, and, so far as physical things are concerned, all will be again exactly as though no change had been. In the physical sphere there never has been any permanent, fundamental, irreversible alteration. Irreversibility is not a characteristic of matter. Of no past state can you say that by its very nature it is past for ever. It could always, at least conceivably, be again.

Whence *has* the material world this reversible character? It has it in virtue of its spatiality. It is because the atoms are side by side that they can be placed side by side again. Take away this character and all becomes different. Let the atom be no more by itself, let its character be derived from the various contexts in which it has been placed, let it, in a word, have a memory, and it will never be able to be restored where it was, as it was. It will bear the marks of where it has been. Its reversibility, then, is due to its spatial character. And



when you speak of the mind as returning to "do a thing over again," you are giving it a spatial character too. You are expecting its thoughts, images, wishes, volitions to occur again, as though they were isolated elements which could come in any order without being affected thereby. But they are not isolated. They do not exist side by side. To use Bergson's phrase, they *interpenetrate*. They give each other the character they bear, and, in consequence, are different things in different contexts. To develop another illustration of Bergson's: suppose I make a movement—rise from my seat, say, to open the window. Let me again make the movement—rise from my seat, this time to get a book. We might, with the associationist psychology, treat the conscious act as a sort of psychical atom, and say that here we have the same act associated first with one end and then with another. But that is a mistake. The conscious movement is not in each case the same. In each case the end in view infuses itself into it and colours it, as can easily be demonstrated. Let me forget, once on my feet, what I rose for. I stand, hesitating, in a bodily and mental attitude in which the end is prefigured; I only need to keep this attitude for a little, sink myself into it, so to speak, and I will recover the idea of opening the window. Let me have risen in the attitude to do the other thing, and again I only need to sink into *it*, to regain the other idea. Thus the conscious movement is different with every different end with which it is associated. Now, this is the case with all the mental life. Its parts are not side by side. They interpenetrate in exactly the way spatial substances do not and cannot do. The one, in a sense, can become the other, and any one may become the whole. This means that mind cannot be turned back to do a thing over again. The body may be taken back to the parting of the ways. It may go back further, to the beginning of the journey. It is even conceivable that all the atoms of the universe should resume the positions they occupied at that point of time. But that body was the vehicle of a mind. And mind has a memory. Which circumstance

forbids repetition. The mind will act now having a certain past behind it, whereas formerly it acted having a different past behind it. In each case the past inevitably fuses into the present and characterises it. The mind is therefore a different thing now from what it was before. To expect it to be still the same is to expect it to cease to be mind. To ask, therefore, what mind would do, placed in the same condition a second time, is like asking the properties of a circular square. No answer is conceivable. You cannot say that it "could have done something else," nor can you say that it "could not have done something else." The "could have" has simply no application to the matter.

We believe that the foregoing exposition sketches not unfairly the main line of thought whereby Bergson makes out the thesis that the idea of space is the source of the confusion in the question of free will. Led away in our psychological studies by our practical needs, we arbitrarily break up the mind into disconnected parts by means of distinctions which are spatial; and so we become confronted with an unanswerable question which need never have arisen had we avoided psychologising in this artificial way. Bergson has thus carried out the promise of the closing words of his first chapter in *Time and Free Will*,<sup>1</sup> where he said that, "instead of seeking to solve the question," he would endeavour to "show the mistake of those who ask it." It remains to inquire at what cost he has thus given the problem its final quietus. At first sight, to say the least of it, it seems a suspicious answer to a question so long and anxiously debated to say simply that there is no problem. We thought that there was a problem. And, in fact, rather than hear that all our strength was wasted upon nothing, that there was no answer to the question and no question to answer, some of us might have preferred to accept the wrong solution, and at least "see of the travail of our souls," whether "satisfied"

<sup>1</sup> The English title of *Les données immédiates*.



or not. In a word, when the plain man is told that neither statement is true, neither that he "could have helped" his last mistake, nor that he "could *not* have helped" it, we can fancy him demanding, "What, then, *is* true? for there is some mystery here!" And here we may put our criticism in a word. To that, we maintain, Bergson has in the long-run only one answer: "Nothing; hold your peace." And if this is so, it is pessimism.

To say that, on Bergson's showing, "nothing" is true about the self is not, we believe, to represent the matter essentially unjustly. The question is: after you have learnt to see the self *not* through the distorting mists of space, what is it that you see? This self, about which we have asked so long the pointless question whether it is free or not—what is it, after the obstructions which impeded our vision and caused the questions to arise are taken away? If we are to take Bergson's philosophy in its true spirit, and words in their plain meanings, we must answer that the self is a thing which essentially cannot be known.

What *is* "knowing"? We do not need, here, to go into the whole psychology of cognition. "Knowing" any matter is obviously different from guessing it; different from having some private opinion about it; different from any construction of pure imagination which we may weave around the matter. A full account of "knowing" would have to show how it is distinguished from all these. But there is a distinction more elementary than any of these, which is all we need to take account of now. To know, whatever more it implies, implies this at least: that the knower distinguish the thing he knows from himself. There can be no knowing without that. The plain man begins, as Bergson says, with the external world. There he finds himself in the presence of conditions to which he must accommodate himself; and it is there that he first finds objects to know. From the first, therefore, the most obvious characteristic of the object of knowledge is that it and he are

different. It is not he; it is something which he has to find out how to deal with. Now, in thus beginning with things in space, the individual is not simply corrupting his knowing faculty and forfeiting his power to know deeper things. *Whatever* is to be known, whether it belong to the lower or the higher reaches of reality, whether it be of the external or the inner world, must retain this character of distinction from the knowing self. It is ridiculous to say that a person could "know" unless there were something distinguishable from himself *to* know. Whether he thinks of the material or the spiritual aspect of reality, whether it be nature that he tries to know or his own body or the pain in his finger or the thoughts of his own mind, the object must appear as somewhat over against him. To know it, apart from this distinction, would be to know it without its *being* anything. *Whatever* more it is, it must *be* something distinguishable from himself. This is the most elementary possible condition of knowledge. Apart from it, "knowing" is a meaningless word.

Why do we insist on this primary condition of knowledge? Because Bergson teaches that, when dealing with a self, you can really "know" it only when this distinction has disappeared. One of the main characteristics of that "qualitative multiplicity" or "multiplicity of fusion" which is the nature of the spiritual for Bergson, is just that it is incapable of being really grasped until the distinction between yourself and it has gone.

It is one way of expressing the main business of *Time and Free Will* to say that it seeks to exhibit the inherent absurdity of all those deterministic speculations which profess to predict a person's future actions, given a sufficient knowledge of his present and past. We shall look at this argument, because in the course of it Bergson has occasion to detail to us the manner in which alone the self can be really known.<sup>1</sup> The refutation of determinism turns on the absurdity of the conditions which that doctrine supposes. When we say that

<sup>1</sup> *Time and Free Will*, chapter iii., especially pp. 183-198.



*if* we knew the character and circumstances without knowing the act we could infer the act from them, our "if" denotes an absurdity. When the self has come to the scratch, as it were, and chosen  $x$  in preference to  $y$ , we must admit on looking back that, for us to have "known" the self choosing, we should have had to know the choice it was going to make too. We should have had to know it in the way in which a novelist, for instance, knows the character of his hero when creating a story. Were the novelist in the position of the reader, did he not always know the issue of a situation beforehand, he would not fully know his hero. But Bergson proceeds to point out that this knowledge from above, so to call it, is not the only kind of knowledge we may have of another's soul, nor is it the truest. At best, what we get in this way is but a symbolical, external representation of states which are inward, a translation of them into terms of space and quantity. There is a more excellent way. "When I myself pass through a certain psychic state, I know exactly the intensity of this state and its importance in relation to the others, not by measurement or comparison, but because the intensity of, *e.g.*, a deep-seated feeling *is* nothing else than the feeling itself. On the other hand, if I try to give *you* an account of this psychic state, I shall be unable to make you realise its intensity except by some definite sign of a mathematical kind: I shall have to measure its importance, compare it with what goes before and what follows—in short, determine the part which it plays in the final act. And I shall say that it is more or less intense, more or less important, according as the final act is explained by it or apart from it. "On the other hand, *for my own consciousness*, which perceived this inner state, there was *no need* of a comparison of this kind. The intensity was given to it as an inexpressible quality of the state itself. In other words, the intensity of a psychic state is not given to consciousness as a special sign accompanying this state and denoting its power, like an exponent in algebra; we

have shown above that it expresses rather its shade, its characteristic colouring, and that, if it is a question of a feeling, for example, its intensity consists in being felt. Hence we have to distinguish two ways of assimilating the conscious states of other people: the one dynamic, which consists in experiencing them oneself; the other static, which consists in substituting for the consciousness of these states their image, or, rather, their intellectual symbol—their idea.” Therefore, if we have two people, Paul and Peter, of whom the former is going to predict, from his knowledge of the other, what he will do at a certain time in the future, there are only two courses open to him when he is going to equip himself with the requisite knowledge. “Either, like a novelist who knows whither he is conducting his characters, Paul must already know Peter’s final act . . . or he must make up his mind to pass through these different states [of Peter’s mind, as he draws near the moment of action] not in imagination but in reality. . . . We find ourselves compelled, therefore, to alter radically the idea which we had formed of Paul: he is not, as we had thought at first, a spectator whose eyes pierce the future, but an actor who plays Peter’s part in advance. And notice that you cannot exempt him from any detail of this part. For the most commonplace events have their importance in a life story; and even supposing that they have not, you cannot decide that they are insignificant except [by viewing them] in relation to the final act which, by hypothesis, is not given. Neither have you the right to cut short—were it only by a second—the different states of consciousness through which Paul is going to pass before Peter; for the effects of the same feeling, for example, go on accumulating at every moment of duration, and the sum total of these effects could not be realised all at once unless one knew the importance of the feeling, taken in its totality, in relation to the final act, which is the very thing that is supposed to remain unknown. But *if* Peter and Paul have experienced the same feelings in the same order, *if* their minds have the same history, how will you distinguish one from the other?



Will it be by the body in which they dwell? They would then always differ in some respect. Will it be by the place they occupy in time? In that case they would no longer be present at the same events; now, by hypothesis they have the same past and the same present, having the same experience. You must now make up your mind about it: Peter and Paul *are one and the same person*, whom you call Peter when he acts and Paul when you recapitulate his history. The more complete you made the sum of conditions which, when known, would have enabled you to predict Peter's future action, the closer became your grasp of his existence, and the nearer you came to living his life over again."<sup>1</sup> The end of it is that, so far as regards prediction, this way of knowing the self is as impotent as the other. Paul hasn't grasped Peter sufficiently fully to be able to predict, until he has "reached the very moment when, the action taking place, there was no longer anything to be foreseen."

Now, there can be no mistaking that this is, for Bergson, the only kind of knowledge which would give us the self in its reality. All other is static, quantitative, symbolical. If this is so, all we have to say is that it is a knowledge which cannot be. If the self is to be truly known only thus, it sinks into utter darkness. We are not here really told anything about the self, or taught to know its character in any plain sense of knowing. The most we are told is to do an impossible thing—to take ourselves out of our own personal centre and enter into some other. "Is it another's mind or spirit you would know? Then realise that 'you' cannot know it. Cease to try; be silent; seek to slip quietly out of your own personality altogether; at point after point, fusing with the other and ceasing to be yourself at all: until at length, indistinguishable from him in every thought and mood and feature, you *are* just he." An impossible command; for it was *you* who were to make yourself he; and by the time you do it, nay, in exact proportion as you succeed in doing it, "you" are no more. This is no revelation of the self. It is

<sup>1</sup> *Time and Free Will*, pp. 183–198. I have italicised some words.

but the news that all is hidden. And it were futile to urge that we have only been discussing the self or mind of another, that your own self is in a different position, and that you can know it. You cannot. You can only *be* it. To try to know it, is only to begin the old task with the same result. You try fusing yourself with *yourself*, now, instead of with another person. In proportion as you succeed, you who wanted to know are not there to know; and there survives only the being who was to have been known.

That this is mysticism does not primarily interest us. It is pessimism. It is the collapse of the self in order that something else may be; and that is the very nerve of all pessimism. Why, for instance—to illustrate by a convenient example—should an “intellectualist” view of the world be called pessimistic? Why should it be pessimism to believe in a universe of “atoms and void” where all is given and nothing is new? Not, surely, because the self has been “given” so much; rather the reverse, that what *is* given is “all,” whereas there should have been more. In one word, here is a world wherein a self cannot fully *be*. The human soul, that little bundle of aspirations and hopes, finds no harbour here, no scope. And the world is the more pessimistic a place, the more bitterly incompatible with such tendencies you see it to be. The soul is capacity for all things, occupation, intercourse, rest, hope, love; and when it ingenuously begins to *be* that resting, working, communing, loving being which it thinks it is, and finds itself up against a “huge, dead, immeasurable steam engine” of a world, then the pessimistic aspect of the situation is its having to shrink and give up living. This is always so. “The soul must consent to cease to be”—whatever pessimistic version of things you take up, that is the pessimism of it. Now, on Bergson’s account of the matter, the whole higher world is like that. You can only know it by slipping out of yourself into it. Literally, the soul that would enter there must consent to cease to be. It must be prepared to let only that higher world itself be.



Which utter self-effacement, if it were even humility, might be something; but it is not. Humility is a dying to live; but this is a dying to remain dead.

“But that which survives, after the self has given itself up, is not a dead, static universe in which all is ever the same; it is a universe of eternal change which is perpetually creating itself anew.” It makes no difference. Where the only progress we can have into the higher things is a progressive loss of selfhood, it matters nothing by what or whom our personality is being stolen from us. If once the distinction has gone which gives the self its being and the object its being, each in untarnished integrity, we have pessimism. Either we let the self succumb that the object may be, or else we let the object vanish, leaving the self to feed on itself till it consumes its whole substance and dies. In either case, we have regress instead of progress, we move towards nothingness instead of towards completeness; which is the soul of all pessimism.

If we would reach a genuinely optimistic view of the world we must part with Bergson at the very first turning. We must settle our accounts with that “space” which makes our thoughts expressible and translatable into action, in different fashion. Instead of trying to outdo or get round or escape “externality,” we must accept it, welcome it, and reach the higher life, so to speak, by going straight through it and carrying it with us. For good or ill, self-externality is part of the world with which we are called upon to deal. The universe, the ultimately real, has externality in it,—at least thus far, that it can turn an aspect of space to us, it can present a mechanical-material front, and otherwise conduct itself towards us with sufficient aloofness and hostility. We should recognise this and accept it. We must let the world speak out its “everlasting no” to us to the full; let it frankly be as “external” and hostile to us as it is; and then, when its last denial is done, awake to find ourselves beyond it all—nay, find ourselves embracing this externality, these negations, as not an evil but

a necessity of that worthy life where opposition and struggle have broken at length into peace and full-throated song. To accept the negative aspect of the universe without stint, is the only optimism. And it requires us to reverse Bergson's tendency to eliminate "space" from the higher real. Instead of trying to think the things of mind without it, we must ask whether there may not be found a legitimate place even there for this "obvious mark of the external world," and whether in our effort to thrust out the spatial from our conception of spirit we have not thrust out spirit itself.

We hold, then, that Bergson gives the inquiring mind a fundamentally pessimistic lead, when he offers refuge from the mathematical version of the world in an intuition out of which "space" or externality has been driven. It is the fate and the glory of human life to be a restless search for rest. If the distinction between the self and the real which it would find is obliterated, then it is the rest of annihilation that we are all after. And this is pessimism.

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## QUINTILIAN.

A STUDY IN ANCIENT AND MODERN METHODS  
OF EDUCATION, ETHICAL AND INTELLECTUAL.

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IT may be of interest at the present time, when the questions are being discussed of the relative powers of environment and heredity, to refresh our memories as to the precepts and beliefs of the greatest of Roman professors of education on the subject. It may also be of interest to examine his ideas of religion, and to recall to mind his list of virtues as compared with those insisted upon by orthodox Christianity, as well as with those esteemed by the modern world generally.

Before considering the great Roman's precepts for an ideal education, it may be well to consider the circumstances of his time and the influences against which his pupils would have to strive.

In literature, the grand style of the Augustan age had passed and gone: and to the authors of the Golden age those of the Silver age had succeeded, whose vice was exaggeration in style and in passion: an instance of which is the well-known passage in the Prologue to the *Pharsalia*, in which Lucan prays the young Nero, since death must come to all, even to such sublime characters as Nero, to choose what part of the Heavens he would take as his due quarters; only that monster of iniquity must pray remember that he is so weighty a character that he must pray not disturb the balance of the sky! We must remember, too, that the seeds of the malady

which was germinating in the body politic of the Roman Empire had been sown, and literature always decays with a decaying people. It is doubtful which of the malign factors operative in the fall of the great world-power was the strongest. Some have found the cause in the decay of agriculture and the massing of the people in the towns, where they degenerated physically and morally: others in the over-taxation which increased and worked its evil way like a cancer into the Empire: others in the free doles of food and money administered to the Roman poor, whereby their independence was sapped: others in the vicious luxury of the upper classes of Rome and the frightful example thus given to the simpler parts of the nation: others in the natural process of decay which they contend must set in to every nation as to every individual—and against this it is vain to contend: others again deem that all these causes united to effect the ruin of the mistress of the world: and one is tempted to hope that readers of Roman history (who are unfortunately mainly employed in reflecting on which of these causes is likely to commend itself to the examiner) may sometimes ask themselves whether any of these causes could be operative in any changes which may seem coming over the character of a nation which rules over a much larger portion of the earth's surface than did even Imperial Rome in all its glory.

Quintilian's view was a perfectly simple and decided view: Education is the remedy: all depends on Education: and it is the explanation of the Education which he wished to see adopted which forms the subject of this paper.

Quintilian is the most important of the group of the school of writers who ushered in a reaction in literature against the bombast and tinsel of the rhetoricians, such as Lucan in verse and Seneca in prose. His style, even as his thoughts, is dignified and restrained. If some of his predecessors may be taxed with an exaggeration of exuberance, they would have taxed him with an exaggeration of moderation. His words are well weighed and his sentences are harmonious and im-



pressive ; but they are not such as lend themselves to ready quotation like the flashes of wit of the rhetoricians. Quintilian was a Spaniard educated at Rome : he afterwards returned to his native country as a teacher of rhetoric. In Spain Quintilian made the acquaintance of Galba, the future Emperor, who took him to Rome. Galba then appointed him as public professor of rhetoric with a salary from the privy purse. He retained his post for about twenty years, and he was allowed to practise in the law courts simultaneously with his professorship. He gained (unlike modern teachers) so much wealth that his fortune passed into a proverb. When he turned from the Bar and from public teaching, he devoted the evening of his life to the composition of his great masterpiece, the *Institutio Oratoria*, which sets forth in detail the ends and aims of his life-work, and the methods of his teaching. We have to remember that the training described by Quintilian is the training necessary to produce an orator : but this must not be taken as invalidating the authority of his remarks on Education in general, for it must be remembered that with the Romans the Bar was *the* career : while the power of speaking ably and to the point was deemed necessary for the general, the statesman, and the ordinary citizen as well. I wish Quintilian could have had the training of some of our after-dinner speakers and of our curates.

In the first book Quintilian discusses the preliminary training necessary before the pupil is to enter on any specialised course of professional study ; and it is with his remarks on the early stage of the pupil's career that we shall be chiefly engaged in this paper. We should particularly notice that throughout his work Quintilian uses the word "orator" very much in the same sense as our word "gentleman" ; simply because the spoken word was so necessary to the education of a Roman gentleman.

In the first place, then, says Quintilian, our perfect gentleman must be educated to be perfectly good—must possess all intellectual and moral virtues. To attain this goal is an

impossibility, but by aiming at the loftiest we attain to the lofty, and it must be remembered that our first and foremost aim must be to form *character*. There is a certain class of teachers who call themselves philosophers—(these answered in some respect to the clergy of modern times, being practically the confessors and spiritual advisers of great houses). These have had the temerity to claim that there can be no teaching of moral conduct away from their training. “Not at all,” says Quintilian; “the teacher of youth is as much called upon to enforce morality and a high standard of ethics as the philosopher: we have to teach our youth to become first and foremost good citizens: they have to take on them the responsibility of managing business, public and private, of taking their part in politics and in municipal life, in originating laws, sitting on tribunals; and as such I claim that we have to make our future orators or gentlemen *sages* in the true sense of the word, and not in the slang philosophical parlance, whereby each philosopher understood the youth who had had his training from his own philosopher.” We remember that in modern times some sects talk of our “converted brethren” as distinguished from all the rest. It seems that the philosophers used to style their young men “*sapientes*,” much in the same sense as the mistress of a boarding-school talks of the young ladies whom she turns out at the age of eighteen to learn Bridge as “finished,” implying that they have learnt everything needful, including the way to get gracefully into a carriage.

These philosophical teachers appeared to the better educated in Rome to affect the demeanour of a Mr Stiggins or a Mr Chadband; and as the most perfect among us can claim some redeeming vice, it is allowable to suppose that the great Quintilian was not sorry to see all the philosophers expelled from Rome at the bidding of Domitian.

Now, before laying down rules for the education of youth, Quintilian asserts that all the precepts and rules of training are worthless unless the pupil be fitted to receive them in



virtue of his "ingenium." This word "ingenium" is hardly rendered in English by "cleverness": it means a combination of wit and of a penchant for a particular subject which prompts a pupil to its mastery.

Quintilian's first recommendation, then, would be: "Do not waste time upon dullards: Heaven-born teachers are too rare to waste; and the dullard will be more happy and useful at the plough-tail than at the study-table." Hence we may infer that Quintilian would not approve of teaching the sons of agricultural labourers the number of rivers in Siberia; especially as these same country boys are too often found to be quite ignorant of the name and properties of any plant or animal in their parish, and would be useless at any country pursuit.

Next, if the pupil be intended for a profession (as we should say), see that he have a good voice, a strong constitution, perseverance, and a good manner; if these gifts of nature be present in the pupil even in a small degree, they may be improved by skilful teaching; if, however, they be totally absent, no one can create them.

These qualifications being granted, let the father look to it that he conceive high hopes of his son: the higher the hopes of the father, the more promising the career of the son.

Those teachers are utterly wrong who have assumed that most pupils are incapable of understanding what their teacher wishes them to learn: a good teacher will find most pupils prompt in thought and retentive in memory: activity and astuteness are as natural to mankind as flying to birds: and this mental activity justifies the thought that intellect is a special gift from Heaven to man. Real dullards are as rare as freaks in the animal world: in most pupils you catch the promise of different ambitions, which would come to their fulfilment if the teacher only did his duty. In any case, Education can work wonders, and this should be an article of faith with the father of the pupil in question. It is remarkable how in the mind of Quintilian the father seems the all-

important figure, notwithstanding the remarkably high position held by Roman ladies in Roman family life. The first thing to be looked to in the training of our youth, says Quintilian, is to secure for the boy a good *nurse*: that she should be of spotless character is self-evident: but it is important, too, that she should speak correctly and with a good accent: the more glaring are such faults, the more firmly do they implant themselves in the memory of youth. It should be a maxim with teachers that good passes more easily into bad than bad into good: and this holds good for all stages of instruction. Next, the parents of my ideal pupil will be as learned as possible, mother and father alike: the Gracchi got their eloquence from the graceful conversation of their learned mother Cornelia; and, conversely, daughters partake of the learning of their fathers, as did Laelius' bewitching daughter in the erudition of Laelius. I gather from this precept that were Quintilian to come amongst us to-day he would applaud the attitude of the Scottish parent who takes pains to aid his boy in his tasks, more than that of the ordinary English parent of one of our public-school boys, whose holiday joke it is to ask his hopeful "what sort of nonsense they have been teaching him at school?" The pupil is not to be allowed to run about with rough slaves: the slaves specially charged with his Education (*pædagogi*) are to be either really well educated, or frankly ignorant; there is no worse comrade for a rising intellectual youth than a conceited smatterer. The smatterer, from sheer jealousy, prevents the pupil from paying due deference to the learned; his half knowledge renders him swaggering and sometimes actually barbarous. The greatest general in the world (Alexander the Great) never got rid of certain clumsy tricks learnt from rough servants in his boyhood. I imagine, then, that Quintilian would not take as his ideal mother the wife of a golf widower, or a suffragette—though these may have a useful sphere of their own. Quintilian's precepts on learning the parent tongue and other languages are remarkable. At this time it was the fashion to learn and to speak Greek in



the better educated circles of Rome ; just as it was the fashion till lately to speak French among the aristocracy of St Petersburg. Quintilian recommends that his pupil should begin by learning Greek ; for he will learn Latin by his mere environment : besides, Greece was the intellectual parent of Rome, so that it seems natural that Greek should be mastered first. At the same time, the pupil should not continue too long to speak Greek exclusively, as is the case in many Roman families, for so foreign sounds will infallibly be imported into the Latin—yes, and Greek idioms will intrude as well. We can imagine Quintilian saying of French and German that unless you learn them quite young you will never get a good accent, and there is no danger of the pupils not learning English. I wonder whether the Greek *bonnes* employed in great Roman households displayed the same avidity to learn Latin at the expense of their little charges as our modern foreign *bonnes* do in the case of English !

One school of pædagogy of Quintilian's time laid it down that it is useless to try and teach anything to children under seven years of age. Our author does not agree with them : he says that those who lay this down as a maxim seem to show rather sympathy with the teacher than with the taught. As soon as children begin to talk they begin to think : and as soon as they begin to think there is room for some kind of guidance as to how and what they should think. At each stage of the pupil's intellectual life ascertain which taste is developing and pay attention to it. Of course, the teacher must watch with the greatest care not to disgust the pupil when quite young, for first impressions remain through life, and in many the taste for literature has been crushed out in early youth. But Quintilian is very strong upon one point : it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of having the best possible teacher for the early years of a pupil ; the great Philip went not astray in judgment when he committed the education of the young Alexander to none less than to the "master of those who know, Aristotle" !

The alphabet should not be committed to memory by the scholar without the shape of the letters. If you teach the alphabet by rote first and the form of the letters afterwards, you will find that the pupil's thoughts are always harking back to the memory lesson: let the scholar then learn the names and the forms at once, just as he does in the case of human beings. It is good to give children toys which may lead them to think, such as letters cut in ivory—in fact, any toy which may excite their curiosity and which they enjoy handling. Writing is best taught by having words and sentences graven into a slate and the pupil made to follow the form of letters with a *stylus*. If you let the pupil try to form letters when there are no lines hollowed out to keep his stylus in the right place, he may get into a scrawly way of writing. We all know how beautifully and neatly the Romans formed their capitals, and I imagine that this process must have contributed to this end. Hence I gather that Quintilian would have added to the staff of all our public schools a much-needed writing-master. Syllables must be learnt accurately, and it appears that Quintilian recommended that the art of reading should be taught by mastering the picture of syllables rather than merely by the picture of letters. When a child begins to write copy-book sentences there is no need that these sentences should be trashy and nonsensical: what is committed to the memory in youth will be understood and reflected on in mature years. Learning by heart should be practised at an early age, and the words of wisdom uttered by sages, and passages of fine poetry, even if but half apprehended when learnt, will bear fruit and tend to form character in the child's riper years. It is even not a bad thing to make the child pronounce clearly and intelligibly words hard to utter, and to make up sentences for this purpose, for in after-life it will be found that a speaker, to be impressive, must enunciate the hardest words clearly and with a pure accent. I do not think Quintilian would have approved of the dropping of final *g* by our smart set and their toadies, of the Oxford drawl, or of the



Cockney clipping. The fine tradition of careful pronunciation of a majestic language seems to have perpetuated itself in Spain, where many Spaniards have of set purpose refrained from learning foreign languages, from the fear of importing foreign sounds into their pure Castilian. I only wish that this were the motive which prevents the British youth from trying the daring experiment of learning the proper pronunciation of foreign tongues !

The time arrives when young Lucius, the Roman Master Johnny, is to be packed off to school. The question immediately presents itself, which has been so much discussed in our own day, What type of school shall we choose : home teaching, or a public school ? There are two opinions on this difficult point, says Quintilian. The first is that of parents who maintain that morals must suffer if we send our sons to public schools, and I only wish, says he, that there were no reason for this opinion. The enemies of public schools also maintain that a pupil is more likely to profit from the undivided attention of one single teacher, than from the necessarily less undivided attention which he must receive at a public school. In modern times the dilemma would be rather between a day school and a boarding school ; but it must be remembered that in classical times it was much easier to find a teacher who could teach the simple ancient curriculum than it would be in modern times, where the same man would have to teach scraps of science, Ollendorf, boiled-down history, physical geography—in fact, the rudiments of everything known and unknown. Quintilian decides unhesitatingly for a public-school education, and gives his reasons. There are temptations offered alike to boys brought up in families and in public schools, and we must count on the self-respect and training of each separate pupil to guarantee him from the effects of contact with evil influences. You cannot count on the integrity of your private tutor. There will certainly be slaves in the house whose conversation will not be edifying. It is well to have a family friend or a dependant on whom we can rely to be a constant

companion for our young hopeful. The position of this gentleman would probably seem to the English schoolboy to resemble that of Mr Barlow in *Sandford and Merton*, and would be unlike that of an improved *pion* in a French Lycée.

Besides this, he asks, "Are not Roman parents the natural enemies of their children?"—and in answering this question he casts a lurid light on the contemporary society at Rome. "We dignify," he says, "the enervating education given to our youth with the name of 'indulgence'—it shatters the mental and bodily vigour of our children. If the child crawls in purple, what will he clamour for when grown? We train children's palates before they can digest. Their growing years are passed in litters [we should say motor-cars]; we applaud all their precocious sayings, and when they utter the most atrocious effronteries we smile approvingly. What they hear at home is their standard of right and wrong: it were truer to say that these shocking ways, which we have taught them, are introduced by them to their school rather than caught in and from its atmosphere."

In any case, I prefer, says Quintilian, the publicity of a public school to the retirement of home training. Any teacher of high ambition prefers a large audience, and the larger his audience, even of boys, the stronger is the spur to his efforts. As a rule, you can only get second-rate and spiritless teachers to undertake the post of private tutor. But assume that the parent get an Admirable Crichton for his money, how can you expect a tutor to spend a whole day with his pupil without ennui? And you may be sure that the feeling is reciprocal: a good tutor will need time for his studies, and he will not find much with a private pupil: the pupil, too, ought to wish for solitude when studying. We all know that for serious study solitude and freedom from disturbance are absolutely necessary. Here I may be permitted to remark that if the Roman schoolmaster could pay a tour of inspection to our great secondary schools, he would, I am sure, impress



upon the authorities of the school the absolute necessity of providing for the really studious pupils quiet studies or retreats in which they might cultivate that most precious of all mental habits, the power of undistracted concentration. For the rest, I think that we may gather that he would also lay it down that you cannot get such good results from pupils who come from vulgar and illiterate families as from those whose surroundings have been such as to lead them to mental activity and a serious attitude towards all knowledge. He would not find, thank goodness, many families among us whose practices resemble those of the smart set in Rome: but he would find an extraordinary number of families whose main topic of conversation was Bridge, dress, petty cash, etc., and some whose thoughts ran chiefly on the turf, or the music-hall; and the minds of pupils issuing from these surroundings he would deem to be an unfruitful soil.

Quintilian adds that the public-school master should try to win the affection of his pupils; that he should take care that his classes be not too large, and that he should take especial care with those pupils whose brains are likely to be the most useful for the world in general. Now, says Quintilian, I wish to add a few general ideas. The boy who would shine in a profession (Quintilian, is, of course, chiefly thinking of the Bar) will have in after-life to meet all kinds of persons with all kinds of ideas. Let him then accustom himself from the first to associate freely with his fellows, and not to mope in solitude: for the essence of self-progress is comparison of self with others. Let the pupil see to it that he form friendships at school: such friendships last till old age, and, believe it, friendships based on common intellectual tastes are the most delightful, and indeed may be said to be consecrated as by religion. Besides, a boy must learn common sense—by which expression I think he means the sense of his duty as a member of the community, consisting in self-restraint, tact, affability, unselfishness. This social sense can be learnt in communities only: and nature itself prompts all beings, even animals, to

congregate; mind acts upon mind; public opinion cancels obvious idiosyncrasies: still, private originality will contribute its effects to the composition of the whole mass. Further, the rivalry of school life is a good preparation for the rivalry of real life, and ambition, which is often used as a term of blame, may be the parent not merely of success, but of virtue.

If Quintilian's judgment were applied to the circumstances of our modern schools, it is plain that he would prefer our large boarding schools to our day schools, for it is in our large public schools that the special educational advantages on which he dwells are to be acquired. It is equally certain that he would endeavour to create in these schools a more intellectual atmosphere than, unfortunately, seems to be found in them at present. Quintilian next dwells on the necessity—perhaps too much disregarded with us—of the very careful individual attention to each pupil by the master, who is, above all things, to distrust shallowness and precocity. The teacher must have sympathy and tact, and be especially careful with sensitive boys, who may be made or marred by unsympathetic teachers. He dwells on the necessity of amusement for the pupil, but never is the taste for such amusements to supersede that for the love of study, the pursuit of which must be continuous, so as to become a habit: and, above all things, the spirit of the school must be the fostering of self-control. Is corporal punishment to be allowed? "No," says Quintilian: first, because it is the punishment for slaves—and it must be remembered that the Roman state depended on the proud caste-distinction between bond and free: next, because if a boy cannot be corrected by reproof, flogging will merely make him reckless: and lastly, because if the master know his boys properly, their respect for him will render corporal punishment wholly unnecessary. The present system in Rome seems to be that boys are not trained to do right, but are punished when they do wrong. It may serve as a comment on the above to remark that at



Winchester School, fifty years ago, it was felt as a disgrace not to have been flogged in public.

When the boy has learnt to read and write (and it must be remembered that by this time he will have committed much to heart) he must pass into the hands of the teacher of *Grammar*. Now Quintilian means by Grammar something very different from our acceptance of the term. Fortunately for the Romans, they had not to learn the Latin, no, nor yet the Greek Grammar, else, as Heine remarks, they might not have had time to conquer the world. So that practically his directions as to the learning of Grammar resolve themselves into the proper methods of learning the mother-tongue. The first point—to which he has already referred—is the supreme importance of reading with understanding, with due emphasis, and with a pure accent: the second is the early development of the critical faculty; *i.e.* to awaken the judgment of the pupil as to what is the best work of the poet under study, and what again seems unworthy of his pen. We should be inclined to agree with the advisability of cultivating his judgment, but should rather do so by causing him to appreciate for himself the difference between prose and poetry, and the spirit of different authors of prose and poetry alike. The pupil is also to learn the sense in which different authors use their words: and thus he will come to see for himself one of the causes of the changes which occur in language. The teacher of Grammar must also be what Quintilian calls a musician: *i.e.* he must understand metres and rhythm; so that we see the Roman schoolmaster believed in the teaching of the technique of poetry even to learners, and also in the teaching of a rhythmical style in prose. Not only so, but the master who expounded the poetry lessons must fully explain the allusions of the poets; for instance, he must know something of astronomy to explain the numerous allusions in the poets to the heavenly bodies, and he must know something of philosophy to explain allusions made by the poets to physical and moral sciences.

I take it that Quintilian's precept to modern teachers would be : Make your boys read much more of the literature of their own country than they do ; and let them not be content with scrappy extracts : let them read works as a whole, or, if they cannot manage this, let them have the whole presented to them by the teacher, and let them fully understand the place of each extract in the entire work. I think he would also exclude from the company of his model authors many of the French decadent school, and most of their feeble English imitators—and I am sure he would be glad that the Romans had not hit upon the art of novel-writing, if, *i.e.*, it was to produce such as many of those which enjoy such a wide circulation among us, and owe so much of their accessibility to our numerous public libraries ; and he would rejoice that he was dead before Marie Corelli was the *prima donna* of English literature.

I have noticed that Quintilian deems the two great epic poets of ancient times the authors most likely to conduce to the formation of the intellect and the character of the pupil. He feels no doubt that the boy's thoughts and his ambition will be stimulated by the thrilling narrative of stirring scenes in which personal ambition urges noble men to more than heroic deeds : he feels, too, that the story itself is enthralling and its interest rarely flags : he suspects, again, that many of the fine lines which urge to manly virtue and endeavour after what is noblest may cling to the pupil's mind, and though dimly apprehended at first, may flash with their inward meaning on his intelligence, as that intelligence ripens, and may kindle and foster in his mind the love of glory, and of virtue as the path to glory. I may be excused for dwelling upon the stress which Quintilian lays upon the appeals which he makes to the *ambition* of the pupil, because an education solely guided by spiritual maxims might lay weight upon other influences as more potent : but as we are aware, in modern times, the dogmatic teaching of religion is not as powerful as it once was ; and I venture to think that if



ambition can be appealed to, side by side with unselfishness, this appeal will awake a responsive chord in the ordinary English schoolboy. I think, therefore, that our Roman school-master, if transferred even into our century, in which motors and gramophones supply the excitement granted to the ancient world by "the long triumph which stretches many a mile," would recommend the learning by heart, at an early age, of some of the finest passages of Homer and Virgil, after the situation had been vividly described to the pupils. He would learn from the bard of Greece such inspiring lines as αἶεν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων, and from the gentle poet of Mantua he would catch some of the notes of sympathy with suffering humanity embodied in what Father Newman calls "those pathetic half lines" known to scholars. He would also make his pupil commit to memory passages from Milton, and some of the descriptive passages in Shakespeare; and, I take it, would make them learn much of the more interesting episodes in Sir Walter Scott's poetry. I am taking these as types: what I mean to insist on is that the poetry learnt at this age should be simple and inspiring, and should not require the pupil mentally to project himself into the character or thoughts of any other person.

Next, says Quintilian, comes Tragedy in importance; this is the stage when the reflective powers begin to ripen and the appreciation of traits in other characters becomes possible. It must, however, be remembered that the ancient Greek Tragedies contained definitely moral lessons, and that these lessons were explained and insisted on by the chorus for the benefit first of the spectators, and secondly for that of the world, so that Quintilian would fully appreciate the teaching conveyed by such noble problem plays as *Hamlet* and *Lear*, while he would keep his pupil far away from such so-called "problem plays" as delight the eyes and ears of too many moderns. Next comes Lyric poetry: which, however, needs to be carefully chosen as to its spirit and its lessons. Quintilian seems rather averse to the comedians, partly from

the fact that they inculcated a lax morality, partly, too, because they tempt to imitation, and he adds sententiously, "*Imitatio in mores transit.*"

He recommends the study of ancient Latin authors, though, as he says, most of them were stronger in genius than in art. The reasons for this are instructive: first and foremost, they are useful as supplying a fine literary vocabulary; and in the next place, they were more happy in arranging the matter of their writings so as to impart instruction by orderly sequence and not by clever phrase-making alone.

Quintilian's lesson for us to-day, then, would be—Receive gratefully the large heritage of language which you have received from your literary predecessors, and study it by progressive stages, and employ its vocabulary when occasion requires. If an old word existed in English—say in Elizabethan times—hold by that word, or re-introduce it, rather than some modern catchword spawned by slang or perverted from Cockney French.

But he adds that "*sanctitas certe et virilitas ab his petenda.*" The word "*sanctitas*" in Latin denotes at once reverence and dignity, and "*virilitas*" denotes at once health and strength. Could any critic have employed words more apposite to denote the qualities that mark Elizabethan poetry and to employ and to counteract the qualities of irresponsibility and of decadence which seem to mark some of the poets of our age?

Very remarkable is the importance attributed by our Roman schoolmaster to the study of Music: a very long dissertation is devoted to the necessity of a training in music for the man of culture. The ancients regarded music as divine, and the master musician (I don't mean the modern music-master) as a prophet and a teacher. So great a sage as Plato thought that no one could be a satisfactory politician without a due knowledge of music, and indeed I am tempted to wish that this test might be applied in modern times, for the result would be that there would be considerably fewer



politicians and more political rest (unless indeed the pianola and gramophone may be reckoned as music). Quintilian seems to think that it was from the expressive tones of music that the tones and modulations of the voice of the speakers of his day were borrowed, and he dwells again and again upon the different ways in which musical instruments affect our emotions and our characters. At the present day pupils learning the piano may be capable of raising emotions, but it cannot be said that our music affects our national character. "Poets," Quintilian lays it down, "cannot be appreciated without a knowledge of music"—in this he was probably thinking of the *recitative* in which poetry was read out: a custom dating from the earliest dawn of poetry; a custom, too, linking the idea of poet to that of musician.

As poetry is assumed to have such an enormous influence upon character, it is clear that we ought to be very careful of the kind of music to which we habituate our scholars. What they hear in the theatres in Rome is calculated to deprave their taste: it is essentially effeminate and lowering to character: pupils ought to be taught to take delight in the strains in which our manly ancestors sung the praises of the heroes of old. And what is more, they ought to be taught the principles on which music rests. If Quintilian could pay us a visit at the present day, I think he would be startled to find that music at our public schools is regarded as "an extra," to be paid for as such: that the music-master is looked on as rather a greater nuisance than the French teacher: and that the study of music—meaning the piano—is assigned to girls; and that an unspoken convention requires them not to know too much about it, that is, if they wish to suit their tastes to those of their male audience. I think he would also open his eyes in astonishment could he see our music-halls packed and our organ recitals given to almost empty houses. But, you see, there is no Latin word for many of our modern relaxations, such as *Bridge*: the expression "*Pons Asinorum*" was of later invention.

There is quite a modern note in Quintilian's remarks on the teaching of Geometry and of Astronomy; we insensibly gather from these that there is nothing unordained or fortuitous—the laws of nature are invariable.

Physical training is not to be neglected: but Quintilian, who is thinking mainly, as we have seen, of the training best suited to a public man, expressly lays down that he wishes the pupil to be drilled so as to exhibit his personality in the most graceful form: he is to learn to stand elegantly, not to slouch when he gesticulates (and who among Latin nations does not do so?)—to gesticulate effectively: to make the boy's emotions apparent in eye and movement and posture; in short, to invest his personality with every charm.

Quintilian gives a chapter of advice to the teacher, which is remarkable for common-sense views not always attended to. The ideal teacher must have endless patience and self-restraint, and must be prepared to remember that the responsibility which is taken from the parent is transferred to him. Young men, then, should not rush into the profession of teaching because they have nothing else to do, but they must resolve to be of pure life: austere without sternness: affable without undue familiarity: clear thinkers, and tolerant of monotony and routine. The teacher is, above all, to keep in mind that the *spoken* word is more potent than the written one: and especially the words which fall from a teacher whom his pupils both love and reverence. He must remember to tell them some new point every day that the pupils may carry away with them: for no written pages appeal to the heart and memory as the spoken word. I am glad to cite Quintilian's authority for the weight of the spoken word, because I am afraid that in modern teaching institutions there is a tendency to map out courses of study for the benefit of the pupils, which courses are admirable in themselves but do not impress the intellect of the student so much as the spoken word. Every step must be clearly understood before the next step is essayed. We ought not to try to teach the habit of research



until we have formed the groundwork on which research may build.

As we have seen that Quintilian repeatedly dwells upon virtue in every form as the one indispensable quality in the youth whose training he is describing, it is of interest to inquire how far he supposed virtue to be the fruit of religion, and also what were the qualities which in his eyes represented virtue. He expressly lays it down that though by nature some may be inclined to good and some to evil, yet a virtuous life can be assured by right training. In other words, environment is a more powerful factor than heredity. Character before all else is to be formed, and all that is of good repute (*honestum*) and upright (*iustum*) is to be taught to our pupil. Mankind is not by nature inclined to virtue. The savage is given to excess: can he therefore be a teacher of self-denial (*abstinentia*)? He fears pain and death, and is full of superstitions: can he teach fortitude? He understands not the meaning of laws, whether such laws be natural or conventional: can he therefore ever become law-abiding? No! he must carefully study all the main treatises which have been composed on virtue, so that his whole life may be in conformity with his knowledge of lofty precepts, whether resting on divine or human authority. He does not definitely state his opinions as to the actual existence of the gods, but he says that the ordinary eulogies pronounced on the pristine gods and heroes are merely uttered for empty display. But he adds that the eulogies of Capitoline Jove are well-founded (*non dubia*), from which I think that we may gather that he really believed that the Romans were a specially favoured race, and that it was the part of a good man to thank the national deities of Rome for the benefits which they had conferred on her. He states in another passage that, in the case of the gods, we must first and foremost venerate their majesty, and afterwards render thanks to them for the special powers which each divinity has excited for the benefit of the human race. We are to revere alike those who were created as immortal, and those who obtained

by their merits the gift of immortality. We should revere the memory of the traditional Numa, because he insisted that the worship of the gods was a duty. There is in Quintilian no symptom of mysticism ; no anxious inquiries, as in Seneca, as to the origin and reason of evil, and misgivings as to whether the presence of evil does not invalidate the idea of the omnipotence of the deity : Quintilian's thought seems rather to be that it is probable that the tutelary deities of Rome do exist, and in any case it is good that the youth of Rome should learn to think so : but that whencesoever born, virtue is to be man's highest aim, and conscience his director, and the chief virtues to be aimed at are constantia, fortitudo, iustitia.

H. A. STRONG.

BLAIRGOWRIE.



## THE GNOSTIC REDEEMER.

EDWYN BEVAN,

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WE may, I suppose, say that the questions raised by the study of Gnosticism and the things akin to it in the ancient world are those which at the present day probe most searchingly into the fabric of Christian belief. Probably many theologians even to-day hardly realise the weight of the difficulties which are bearing upon them from that quarter. Gnosticism is a field into which they have never thrown more than perfunctory glances. And there is a good deal to deter anyone from doing more than this. For the field is not an exhilarating one. To wander among the febrile fancies and unwholesome imaginings which sprang up in such rank abundance at a certain period of human history is undoubtedly depressing for a healthy-minded man.

It is a remarkable testimony to the neglect in which all that class of things was left till recently that for the principal document for non-Christian Gnosticism, the little collection of writings which go under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*, there exists no tolerable modern edition. In the sixteenth century, when there were still scholars who believed that it enshrined a sublime truth, the little book was had in honour; when the belief in its religious authority faded, it was thrown aside, and the old text printed in 1574 has never been improved upon.

And now this deserted field finds itself once more the

centre of new interest, though interest of a very different kind. The movement which is covered by the words Anthropology, Comparative Religion, combined perhaps with that branch of Psychology which concerns itself with religious phenomena, has created an eagerness to lay hold of all that is most eccentric, obscure, and subterranean in belief and practice. These students have none of the naïve faith of the theosophist in a secret revelation underlying the superstitions which they treat; it is rather that they find in them psychological laws or historical connections which set the higher and more reputable religions in a new light. It is not that they wish to raise crude superstitions to the level of the higher religions, but rather that they wish to show large elements in the higher religions to be of the nature of crude superstition. It is for this reason that the new study of all those strata of ancient religion which lay below the daylight world of the old classical scholar—of magic and Orphism, of mystery cults and Gnosticism—forces questions upon the Christian theologian with which he is bound to grapple.

Christian Gnosticism, it is now recognised on all hands, was not a wanton perversion, a wanton sophistication, of a clearly articulated orthodox theology, but an attempt made by men, who had received the Church's teaching when its intellectual expression was still more or less wavering and tentative, to combine that teaching with conceptions and aspirations prevalent in the Gentile world whence they had come. And we have to reckon to-day with the assertion that attempts of this sort did not begin with Simon Magus, or whoever was the first Christian Gnostic. It is asserted by the dominant school of *Religionsgeschichte* that already in the Apostolic Age the infiltration of pagan belief and practice into the original Gospel had begun.

Beside the sacramental system, Christology is the department where the influence of pagan conceptions is most often alleged. It is asserted that already in those passages of the New Testament which speak of a Divine Being who for our



sakes, though he was rich, became poor, of One who, being in the form of God, took upon him the form of a servant, of One who, being the express image of God and upholding all things by the word of his power, made cleansing for sins and became a little lower than the angels through the suffering of death, of the Logos, the only-begotten God, who became flesh—it is asserted that here we have the apostolic generation drawing upon the same body of pagan belief as the Gnostics drew upon later, when they constructed their Syzygies and Æons.

A great deal in Gnosticism presents close resemblances to what is found outside the circle of Christianity and Judaism. In so far the Gnostic schools are special forms of a type of belief and practice which had become largely diffused throughout the Hellenistic world about the time of the Christian era. It is this type of belief and practice which has been illuminated in recent years by such workers as Dieterich, Reitzenstein, Usener, Cumont, Bousset, and others. Reitzenstein terms the floating body of beliefs “Hellenistic theology.” It is one of the products of the mixture of Hellenic and Oriental traditions which took place after the conquests of Alexander. Elements seem to have an Egyptian origin, others a Babylonian, others a Persian; there are obvious affinities with the belief and practice of the older mystic sects of the Greek world, Orphic and Pythagorean; and everywhere one traces the effect of the great Greek philosophic schools, the influence of the thought of Plato, the influence of the Stoics. Some form or other of this “Hellenistic theology” had probably become the *Weltanschauung* of most of those who had any living religion in the world of Greek culture—cruder and more superstitious forms of it in the lower strata of society, more refined and Hellenised forms among the educated, the Syrian Greek Stoic Posidonius being probably the cardinal personality through whom much Oriental tradition reached the Western world in a Greek guise. All forms of this “Hellenistic theology” had apparently certain common ideas. There was first the fundamental conviction that the world accessible to

the senses, this material world, was evil—or at any rate very inferior to the transcendent world of light. There was next the conviction that in the soul of man somehow or other an element from that Divine world had got mixed up in the material sphere. And lastly, there was the conviction that by some means or other the Divine element could free itself and win its way back to the sphere whence it came. Of course endless variations were possible upon this common theme. The evil of the world might be described under various aspects. There might be various theories of the constitution of the superior world, all sorts of complications in transcendental topography. Various explanations might be given as to how this abnormal state of things had come about—a Divine element imprisoned in a world to which it did not belong. There might be all sorts of ways of redemption—magical formulæ, baptisms, sacraments, abstinences, interior exercises, intellectual illumination.

The ancient Hellenist does not seem to have thought of the evil of the world quite as the modern pessimist is apt to do. Probably anyone nowadays talking of the evil of the world would be thinking primarily of the injustice of the actual state of things, the imparity of the distribution of good things with desert, the pains of poverty and disease and oppression. In Hellenistic theology this aspect of things is not prominent. By the evil of the world they seem to have thought firstly of the transitoriness of material things. They wanted to reach something abiding and unchangeable. The contrast of *γένεσις*, Becoming, with that which is *ἀγένητον* and eternal—this runs through all their language. How far this is due to the influence of Plato, and how far the Platonic tradition is itself only one expression of a wider feeling in the ancient world, is a question which might be discussed by those whose knowledge in this field is fuller than mine. Secondly, the evil of the world seems specially connected with sensual passion: there is the persistent contrast of *πάθος*, and especially *ἐπιθυμία*, with that which is *ἀπαθές* and *ἀπροσδεές*, without passion and



without needs. It has always appeared to me that the New Paganism which has sounded its note in modern literature, the cry to abandon the "pale Galilean" for something more full-blooded, more flushed with sensual enjoyment, in so far as it glorifies ungoverned impulse and vehement passion, is curiously unlike the real temper of the old pagan world. Even in the great days of Attic literature, ungoverned impulse and vehement passion were things looked upon with dread and disgust, and as the ancient world grew older it seems to have felt more poignantly the weariness and burden of its lusts. Probably the glorification of these things in the modern world is just an indication that in the modern world they have grown tamer. We can afford to pat the beautiful tiger upon the head, which to the ancient world was too fierce and terrible a destroyer, too enormous in its ravages, to appear as other than the chief embodiment of evil. Thirdly, the evil of the world seems to have been connected about the time of the Christian era with the domination of the stars. Men were "in bondage under the elements of the world." The astrological beliefs which from Babylonia had penetrated Hellenistic society had represented the lives of men as determined by an iron necessity from without, by *είμαρμένη*, the influences of the heavenly bodies. It was not everyone who had the confidence of the Stoic that if his life was governed by a resistless Law, that Law was at any rate a Divine Reason to which he could joyfully assent. To large masses of men the world, this earth at any rate, was governed by powers either indifferent to their good or actively malignant. Such a conception made the world appear a prison-house from which the human soul cried to be delivered. And the Hellenistic theology averred that the prison-house had limits, that there was a sphere above the realm of the stars, if only the soul could find its way thither. And surely it might, if there was something in the soul itself which had come thence and belonged to that sphere by natural right.

This general view of the world is common to such non-

Christian thought as is represented by the mystical Hermetic writings, possibly in part pre-Christian, and to the Gnosticism which claimed to be Christian. But in this Gnosticism the scheme of things includes a prominent figure, a *Sotēr*: there is not only a way of redemption; there is a Redeemer. Now in so far as this Redeemer is identified with the Man who taught by the Lake of Galilee, there is no question whether we have a Christian or pagan doctrine; but the question may be raised whether primitive Christianity and Gnosticism fitted to Jesus of Nazareth the conception of a Redeemer older than Christianity, a conception which existed originally apart from him, or whether it was the Christian belief in Jesus which induced the Gnostics to introduce the figure of a Redeemer into a scheme which had originally been framed without him.

It may seem that an attempt to prove that the Christian Christ was new would be a vain attempt to prove a negative. For it is merely some few scraps which we have of the beliefs of that various Hellenistic world, and who can say what conceptions may not have been cherished among sects and conventicles of whom all record has perished? I think we must admit that we cannot prove anything in this field in the fashion of a mathematical proposition. Nor do I think that Jesus would disappear if some anticipation of Catholic Christology were discovered in a pre-Christian papyrus. Yet when it is asserted that, as a matter of fact, the Christian belief in the Redeemer was an element taken over from current Hellenistic theology, I think we may rightly ask for proof of it.

There are, of course, considerable variations between the doctrines of one sect and those of another as to the person of the Redeemer. They agree that in Jesus a pre-existent heavenly Being was present upon earth, but as to the manner of his corporeal manifestation they show a variety of speculations. All alike, I think, regard Jesus Christ as a compound, even more so than the Catholic Church, whose doctrine of two distinct Natures coexisting in one Person presents the modern theologian with terms which rather seem to require



an explanation than to afford one. With the Gnostics the human nature of Jesus is either a mere illusion, the Docetic view, or so detached from the Divine that we have really two persons. Where the latter view is held, the man Jesus is regarded as having been originally distinct from the heavenly Christ. Because he was the wisest and purest and most righteous of men, the heavenly Christ descending entered into him—at his baptism in the ordinary theory—and the compound Jesus Christ came to be. In the *Pistis Sophia* the coalescence of the two is put at an earlier moment in the life of Jesus. His mother Mary narrates: "When thou wast small, before the Spirit had come upon thee, whilst thou wast with Joseph in a vineyard, the Spirit descended from on high and came to me into the house, having thy likeness, and I had not known him, but thought that it was thou." Mary goes on to relate how the Spirit asked, "Where is Jesus my Brother?" and how she tied the stranger to the bed while she went to seek her son. When Jesus is brought, the exact resemblance of the two figures is seen. The Stranger is set free; whereupon "he embraced thee and kissed thee, and thou didst kiss him, and ye became one" (*P.S.*, 61, p. 78). According to Carpocrates, Jesus was the son of Joseph and Mary, a man distinguished from other men only by his greater strength of mind and will, in virtue of which a special spirit of power had been sent down into him from the Father (*Iren.*, i. 25, 1).

On the other, the Docetic, hypothesis, the man Jesus did not really exist at all, but was only a shadow, an illusive appearance (*ἐν σχήματι καὶ ἰδέᾳ μόνῃ*, *Epiph.*, 23, 1), the sole reality being the heavenly Christ. And between these two views there seem to have been other theories of the compound Jesus Christ which gave him an earthly nature of a kind, though not a really human one. His body was real, but did not consist of ordinary matter: it was, according to a Valentinian teaching, "a body framed by an occult art, to have the accidents of matter, visibility, palpability, impressibility, but not real materiality" (*Iren.*, i. 6, 1).

All these theories had the great point in common that they separated the idea of suffering from a Divine Being—an association of ideas peculiarly repugnant to the Hellenistic mind. On the Docetic hypothesis, the Passion of Jesus was an appearance only, like all the rest of his visible life: on the other theory the suffering was real, but it was only the man Jesus, and not the heavenly Christ, who was the sufferer. For as the two had once existed in separation, so they were again separated before the death upon the Cross. For instance, in the system of the heretic Justinus, the heavenly Being, here curiously called Baruch, leaves the body of Jesus upon the cross; and crying out to Edem, that is, to material Nature, “Woman, behold thy Son” (Γύναι, ἀπέχεις σου τὸν υἱόν), reascends to the Supreme (Hipp., 5. 4, § 26). A trace of the same idea is found in the Gospel of Peter, where the cry upon the cross is given as, “My strength, my strength, why hast thou left me?” In Clement’s Excerpts from Theodotus, the theory is modified by saying that the Spirit who descended upon Jesus did not separate from him at the Passion, but contracted Himself, so that death might take effect (οὐκ ἰδίᾳ γενομένου ἀλλὰ συσταλεντος, ἵνα καὶ ἐνεργήσῃ ὁ θάνατος). Otherwise death would have prevailed over the Sotēr, which is absurd, ὅπερ ἄτοπον (Exc. 61). A peculiar theory of Valentinus seems to have been that the sufferer was not Jesus, but Simon of Cyrene, crucified in his place by a divinely ordered confusion.

It is important in this connection to notice that the idea of Jesus Christ being a composite Being does not stop simply with the separation of the Jesus from the Christus. There seems to have been a desire to find in him a bringing together of all the elements of the Universe, as it were the Pauline idea, ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ χριστῷ, turned inside out. The Heavenly Person is indeed in some schools simple, either the Father himself, as in the sect of Simon, or an emanation from the Father; but occasionally we find him represented as the product of a plurality of heavenly Powers,



Æons (Epiph., 35, 1), or even of the whole body of Æons, the Pleroma, κοινὸς τοῦ πληρώματος καρπός (Hipp., 6. 2, § 32), or in another phrase πλήρης τῶν πληρῶν (*id.*, 5. 2, § 16). When we come to the lower elements in Jesus Christ, we find more than simple manhood. Where, as among the Ophite sect of Hippolytus, there is a triple division of the Universe into νοερά, ψυχικά, and χοϊκά, Nous, Soul, and Earthy Matter, all three are found combined in Jesus Christ, and the text πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα εὐδόκησε κατοικῆσαι ἐν αὐτῷ σωματικῶς is applied to this fact. It comes to very much the same thing where the body of Jesus is explained to have been not of ordinary matter but itself, in whole or part, psychic or spiritual (Hipp., 6. 2, § 35). And here we get an interesting connection between the constitution of Jesus and the descent of the heavenly Christ. The Gnostics, in agreement with Hellenistic theology generally, thought of the earth as being separated from the upper world of light by a series of intermediate spheres. There are usually seven of these, as the conception is taken over, as a matter of fact, from the Babylonian star-lore, which attached especial importance to the sun, the moon, and the five planets, and thought that each of these heavenly bodies was fixed upon a sphere of its own, whilst the spheres revolved, one outside the other, around the earth. It was these seven which determined by their influences all that happened within them: of this shut-in *kosmos* they were the *kosmokratores*. Their influences had come, as we have seen, to be felt as a crushing iron necessity, and here upon earth was the Divine imprisoned spark, which belonged by right to the transcendent world beyond all the Seven Spheres, to the Eighth Region, the Ogdoad. The Seven Spheres thus appeared as barriers between the soul and its true home: there were gates indeed in the barriers, but they were guarded by the demonic lord of the sphere, who did not easily allow any to pass. Through all these spheres, the Divine Being, who descended from the world of light to deliver the imprisoned element of Divinity, was bound to make his way; and the problem how he passed

exercised the Gnostic's imagination. And one common theory was apparently that he passed by a deception; it was by assimilating himself to the kosmokratores, by taking on their likeness, that he concealed from them who he was (Iren., i. 23, 3; Epiph., 21, 2, etc.). Connected, perhaps, with this idea was the doctrine that the body in which he tabernacled was actually composed of elements which he had taken from each sphere in his descent (Apelles, Tert., 6).

The heavenly Christ had not descended in order to die (that, for such a one, was impossible), but in order to reascend, and in his reascent to open the way for the imprisoned divinity in men. He had once more to pass the gates of the spheres. And where it was believed that in descending he had taken elements from the several spheres to form his body, it was taught that in reascending he had laid each of those elements aside in its proper sphere (Hipp., 7, 10, where four elements take place of seven spheres). The world-rulers who would bar his passage were overpowered or stricken with terror, and the way was open for the redeemed.

Now what strikes one in this Gnostic account of the descent and reascension of the Redeemer is that it is just a *reduplication of the Hellenistic story of the soul*. Already, wherever the Divine spark burned in the souls of men, a heavenly thing had come down somehow through those intervening spheres into this place of darkness: redemption consisted in its return. But in those fragments which we have of Hellenistic theology, unmodified by the influence of Christian faith in a human Person, there is no Redeemer; he is absent from the doctrine of Posidonius; he is absent from the Hermetic writings. And why is he needed? for the possession of knowledge is enough to enable the soul to regain its heavenly home, whether by knowledge be understood intellectual enlightenment in the higher Platonic sense, or knowledge of magical formulæ and mystic practices in the baser superstitious acceptance. Among the Christian Gnostics again we find elaborate systems of magical lore: by



learning the names of the demonic creatures who would oppose the soul on its upward way, the passwords which were appropriate to each gate, the soul could have power over all its adversaries. But this magical apparatus seems something sufficient in itself, if it really works, without a Redeemer. Salvation by such *gnōsis* and salvation by Christ present the appearance of two alternative schemes which have been imperfectly joined together.

But the parallel between the descent and return of the Christ and the descent and return of the soul is still closer in its details. For just as the Christ formed his body of elements taken from each sphere and gave those elements back at his reascension, so the soul, according to a doctrine which was current about the Christian era, took from the different spheres at its descent that sum of passions which constituted its bodily temperament, and discharged them again on its upward way (Corpus Hermet., i. 24 f.; Servius, ad *Æn.*, vi. 714). Again, just as the Redeemer passed the gates by concealing himself from the world-rulers, so we get the idea sometimes stated that the soul escapes them by being hidden. For instance, in the teaching of some of the Valentinians (Iren., i. 21, 5; Epiph., i. 36, 2) a chrism of oil and water together with certain occult formulæ rendered the soul invisible to the world-rulers: so, too, according to a Cainite sect, the higher Wisdom, in drawing to the upper world the souls which belong to her, hid them from the Maker of this world (Epiph., 38, 1). In the Acts of Thomas, although the original Gnosticism has been revised in a Catholic sense, we still find this idea unchanged. St Thomas in his last prayer offers the petition: "May the spiritual powers not perceive me and the world-rulers not conspire against me and the toll-keepers not oppress me; may the lower and the higher beings not withstand me, but flee and hide themselves because thy victorious power surroundeth me!" (Act. Thom., p. 91, Bonnet). Here the idea that the soul eludes the eyes of the gate-keepers is combined with the alternative idea that they are intimidated and

paralysed by a superior power. Both ideas are found in descriptions of the descent and return of the Redeemer.

What functions can the Christ have in such a scheme? Well, in the first place, he may be the bringer of that *gnōsis* which enables the soul to rise. In so far he is less to be described as a Redeemer or Sotēr, than as an Enlightener and Revealer. Among the pagan mystery sects, just as universally among the Christian Gnostic, the occult tradition was regarded as having been delivered originally by Divine inspiration, not seldom by a god himself—by Orpheus, for instance, or by the Egyptian Thoth, who, in the Hellenistic amalgam represented by the Hermetic collection, appears reduplicated as Hermes and as Tat. The author of the first document in that collection, supposed by Reitzenstein to have been the founder of a special sect, describes himself as having been taught by the Supreme Mind himself in personal form as Poimandres. “Having thus spoken unto me, Poimandres returned to the company of the Powers. And I having given thanks and blessing to the Father of all things was dismissed by him, empowered and taught the nature of the universe and the transcendent vision. And I began to preach to men the goodliness of piety and knowledge (*gnōsis*), saying, ‘O people, men born of the ground, that have given yourselves over to drunkenness and sleep and to ignorance of God, be sober, cease from your heaviness, held as ye are in the spell of sleep without reason.’ And they, when they heard me, came to me of one accord. And I spake, saying: ‘Wherefore, O men born of the ground, have ye given yourselves over to death, when ye have the power to inherit immortality? Repent, ye that have gone in the way of error and had part in ignorance. Be quit of that light which is darkness, leave corruption behind you and inherit immortality.’ And some of them mocked and departed, having given themselves over to the way of death, but some besought me to teach them, throwing themselves at my feet. And I caused them to stand up and became the guide of the



race, teaching them the words (which I had heard), how and in what manner they might be saved." Compare with this the Gnostic hymn given by Hippolytus: after describing the human race wandering in the maze, it goes on:—

"And Jesus said: 'Behold, O Father,  
 The striving with evil things upon earth,  
 How it wandereth wide from thy spirit,  
 And seeketh to flee from the bitter Chaos,  
 And knoweth not how it may pass through.  
 For which things' sake, send me, O Father;  
 I will descend bringing the seals [*i.e.* the secret words of power],  
 I will make my way through all the Æons,  
 I will open all mysteries,  
 I will reveal the forms of the gods;  
 And the hidden things concerning the holy way,  
 Calling it *gnōsis*, will I deliver.'" (5. 1, § 10.)

So far as Jesus appears in the Gnostic systems as the revealer of *gnōsis*, we may admit that he stands in the same category with the Divine or inspired revealers to whom the mystic sects generally ascribed the origin of their traditions. In this function, however, he is merely prophet, not Redeemer: the important thing is the message, not the Person of the messenger. With the Church it was Jesus himself who was important. And in the Gnostic sects, the Christ has generally other work to do. And this work we may sum up by saying that it is to do actually what the Divine element ought of its own nature to do, but does not do, in its fallen imprisoned state, through want of power. The Light in man ought to triumph over the world-rulers of this darkness: the heavenly Christ does triumph. The Light ought to rise to its true home in the world of light: the Christ does rise, overcoming all obstructions. His history is, as we saw, the old story of the soul reduplicated: only, whereas the old story of the soul was an ideal which had to be realised, the history of the Christ is an accomplishment. One might almost say that the work of Redemption is to bring power to the fallen Divine element in man by a process of sympathetic magic. The Christ does something, and behold the fallen divinity in the

soul is enabled to do it too. "From his appearance," it is said in the Valentinian doctrine as stated by Irenæus, the fallen divinity, personified as Achamoth, "received power" (δύναμιν λαβοῦσαν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιφανείας αὐτοῦ). In the *Pistis Sophia* power resides in the stream of light which bursts into the dark world, and in that light the strength of the fallen divinity is renewed (ch. 65 77). Just as the rôle of Christ had been the ideal of the soul realised, so now the soul becomes assimilated to Christ in his achievement. The assimilation is represented in certain sects as identification. The man joined with the Logos becomes Logos himself, γίνεται μετὰ τοῦ Λόγου λόγος (Hipp., 5. 3, § 21). "I am Christ," another says, "since I have come down from above through the names of the 365 archons" (Epiph., 26, 9).

In connection with this close parallel between the Sotēr and the soul, we can understand the ambiguity which attaches to such a parable as that contained in the celebrated "Hymn of the Soul." It is ordinarily taken, and I think rightly taken, as the story of the soul; Preuschen and Liechtenhan, on the other hand, maintain that it is the story of the Redeemer. A good case can be made out for either theory, if certain details are pressed. It is that very ambiguity which, for our purposes, is instructive.

These facts seem, I think, to point to the figure of the personal Redeemer not being an original part of the Hellenistic theology. We can understand that men brought up in the conceptions of that theology and coming upon a set of people for whom the fulness of God dwelt in one human Person bodily, whose whole hope for life and everything that came after hung upon him, might try to find a place for such a supreme Person in their systems, and might find it as the Gnostics did. And while so much in their theories can be shown to have been taken over from current paganism, no real parallel in current paganism has been discovered to the belief, which they shared with the primitive Church, of the Divine One taking upon him for the love of men the form of



a servant, coming into the sphere of darkness in order to redeem. We cannot, of course, prove a negative, but it is noteworthy that there is no Redeemer, as was pointed out, in the Hermetic literature or the system of Posidonius. We have, of course, the conception of Divine Beings who, long ago, delivered to men the arts of life or occult wisdom; we have inspired prophets and revealers: we have myths of gods who had been slain and entered into immortality: we have myths of gods who fought with the monsters of darkness and overcame them. The just craving of the anthropologist to establish connections must, however, it appears to me, have risen to a degree which destroys the finer instinct of discrimination before he can suppose that by making any combination of elements taken from these one could create the Christian idea of the Saviour. For if Divine self-sacrifice is the whole point and meaning of the story as a whole, we do not prove much, even if we succeed in showing that details of the story are found separately elsewhere. The nearest pagan parallels to the Christian idea seem to me to be found, not in the current Hellenistic doctrines, but in the old myth of Prometheus and in the Indian idea that Krishna becomes reincarnate in each successive age to save the failing cause of righteousness. The myth of Prometheus was, however, at the Christian era a bit of traditional mythology, which does not seem to have held any dominating position in popular thought; and no serious historian, so far as I know, has supposed that an Indian doctrine is likely to have reached or influenced the first generation of Jesus' disciples. Nor need one insist upon the glaring differences between the conception of the Divine self-sacrifice in the old polytheistic setting and the conception based upon the Hebrew faith in the One God. But if it was the clinging of the Christian community to Jesus which caused the Sotēr to hold a prominent place in the Gnostic version of current Hellenistic theology, and not a previous belief in a Divine Saviour which caused the first generation of disciples to invest Jesus with that character, then one can hardly agree

with Pfeiderer's view of the hymns of gratitude and praise to Jesus poured out in the apocryphal Acts of John and Thomas. "The religious interest," he says, "in popular Gnosticism concentrated itself wholly upon the one figure of the God and Saviour Christ, whose exaltation above all powers whether above the heavens, in the heavens, on the earth, or below the earth, is emphasised in the strongest possible fashion. With the historic Jesus of Nazareth He has indeed little in common but the name. . . . He is for the Gnostic nothing else than the 'Saviour-God' of the mystery-cults" (*Primitive Christianity*, iii. pp. 186, 187). Pfeiderer does not specify what Saviour-God of the mystery-cults there was of whom it might be said that "though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor." That the way the Gnostic worked out his conception of the Saviour involved a large borrowing from Hellenistic theology, the facts referred to in this paper, I think, are enough to show; but for the central point of devotion to One who embodied a supreme act of Divine love and voluntary humiliation there is, I believe, no Hellenistic parallel. May one not rather use the words of Preuschen? "This does not signify, as might at first appear, that the Christian has lapsed into the Pagan; it signifies rather that the victory of Christianity over Paganism has begun."

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# THE DÆMON ENVIRONMENT OF THE PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN.

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ONE of the most striking results of the conquests of Alexander the Great was the turning of men's minds from the state to the individual. The long wars of the Macedonian despotisms, incessant and purposeless, intensified the natural craving of man for order, for inward peace, for unity in the world without and in his own soul. The last hundred and fifty years of the Roman Republic were at once a period of rationalism and individualism and of lawlessness and civil war. The Macedonian period had seen the rise of Stoicism and Epicureanism; the Roman Empire was to see the restoration of religion.

The contemporaries of Augustus realised the political value of religion. The propositions were freely made that "the whole belief in immortal gods was invented by wise persons in the interest of the state"; that "the myths of Hades, though pure inventions, contribute to make men upright"; and that "it is for the good of states that men should be deceived in religion."<sup>1</sup>

But serious people, free from the cynicism and shallowness which characterise such judgments, came, on looking over the history of their own times, to another conclusion on this connection between religion and morals, different in tone and

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *N.D.*, i. 42, 118; Diod. Sic., i. 2; Varro *ap. Aug.*, *C.D.*, iv. 27, vi. 5.

in consequences. They argued the other way. Greek speculators had moved away from polytheism, from ritual and ceremony, and finally from all belief in Deity as an effective thing at all—and the result was conspicuous in the disorder of national and individual life. Working backward, however, from the union of good morals with traditional belief, and the clear effect of atheistic and sceptical philosophy upon character, men now began to surmise that truth lay rather with the beliefs of their fathers than with the disastrous speculations which human experience, in spite of logic, had by now hopelessly discredited.

It was impossible, however, to go back at once to the old days when there was no philosophy, nor did it seem necessary. There had been fine and impressive utterances upon the nature of the divine, which had rooted themselves in the hearts of men. The goodness, the grandeur, and the unity of the Supreme and Ultimate God had offered too strong a ground of hope and consolation to be discarded, and in the story of the revival of paganism the emphasis on Providence is one of the constant features.

Eclecticism was the prevailing fashion. Men drew freely upon all the schools of thought for material with which to piece out the data of experience, conceding points in one place for which they meant to recoup themselves elsewhere. Thus, when it became clear that the logic of the philosophers forced men step by step to negate every quality which they had once associated with divinity—and this, as they realised, in the interest of God's absoluteness, a matter closely bound up with his value to them; when it was evident that this process ended in a God of whom nothing whatever could be predicated, not even being, a God "away beyond existence" (*ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων*), between whom and the universe intercommunication was logically quite impossible in any way whatever; it was also obvious that, unless they could recover elsewhere what they had here given away, all was over with religion.



Homer<sup>1</sup> had spoken of two jars on the threshold of Zeus, one full of good and the other of evil, out of which God gave men their destinies, good, bad, and mingled. But a later age shrank from attributing evil to God. "We must not accept Homer or any other poet who makes such a mistake," said Plato.<sup>2</sup> God and evil were mutually exclusive terms; and, if they were not, the Supreme was in any case beyond the thought of man's destiny, good or evil.

Yet good and evil were in the world. The order, the law, and the beauty of the Universe, of sun and star, of the earth and its seasons, implied Mind and Providence. In Nature too and its power of self-reproduction there lurked, as Eastern religions taught, a divine power. All was law, unity, Cosmos. And Stoic pantheism would not serve to explain it. That a God should submit to change, and extend himself through land and sea, winds and animals, and "the strange experiences of both animals and plants," that he should make and unmake, would prove him poorer than the child in Homer's simile, building sand-castles, and knocking them down to build them up again. So said Plutarch. But if God is not in the Universe, whence come all these manifestations of mind?

Evil was in the world—pain, hunger and bereavement, cruelty and lust, abundant evidence for them all. Even in the sphere of religion there was evil—foul rites, obscene legends, human sacrifices, *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*. Whence came evil? Stoic pantheism involved that God was the author of sin, the inspiring and operative agent in every deed of shame. The very idea was revolting to the religious mind.

Once more it was remarked that the consensus of mankind was in favour of belief in gods. Such a consensus could not be accidental; it was attributed to Nature, and it was taken therefore as reliable evidence for the matter concerned.

Further still, when the Stoic said that the gods care for mankind, and "sometimes even for individuals," once again

<sup>1</sup> *Il.*, xxiv. 527.

<sup>2</sup> *Rep.*, ii. 379D.

there was the evidence of men. Marcus Aurelius thanked the gods, as many must in every age, for his "good grandsires, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, kinsmen, friends, good almost every one"; but when he goes further and thanks them "for help vouchsafed in dreams, more particularly for relief from blood-spitting and dizziness," he suggests a special providence of a type very familiar in the literature and monuments of his day.

A presumption might then fairly be granted in favour of divine interest in the Universe, and of relations between the world and the divine; and yet the Supreme could not be conceived as susceptible of any relations whatever. The common solution of the difficulty is perhaps nowhere given with such clear vigour—certainly nowhere with such wealth of phrase—as in the book of Apuleius on the God of Socrates, written perhaps about 190 A.D.

Plato, he says<sup>1</sup>—for he classed himself as a Platonist,—Plato groups the gods in three categories. Of the celestial gods some we can see—sun, moon, and stars: and on these he digresses with characteristic rhetoric. Others the mind alone can grasp—incorporeal natures, animate, with neither beginning nor end, eternal before and after, exempt from contagion of body; in perfect intellect possessing supreme beatitude; good, but not by participation in any external good, but of themselves. Their Father, Lord and Author of all things, free from every nexus of suffering or doing—him Plato, with celestial eloquence and language commensurate with the immortal gods, has declared to be, in virtue of the ineffable immensity of his incredible majesty, beyond the poverty of human speech or definition; while even to the sages themselves, when by force of soul they have removed themselves from the body, the conception of God comes, in a flash in the darkness, in a flash only and is gone. He is probably thinking of mystical experiences.

"To whom then shall I recite prayers? to whom tender

<sup>1</sup> What follows is epitomised from his *de deo Socratis*.



vows? to whom slay victims? On whom shall I call, to help the wretched, to favour the good, to counter the evil? . . . Shall I swear by Jove the Stone (*per Iovem lapidem*) after the most ancient manner of Rome? Yet if Plato's thought be true that never God and man can meet, the stone will hear me more easily than Jove.

"Nay! not so far (for Plato shall answer, the thought is his, if mine the voice), not so far, he saith, do I pronounce the gods to be sejunct and alienate from us, as to think that not even our prayers can reach them. Not from the care of human affairs, but from contact, have I removed them. But there are certain mediary divine powers, between æther above and earth beneath, situate in that mid space of air, by whom our desires and our deserts reach the gods. These the Greeks call dæmons, carriers between human and heavenly, hence of prayers, thence of gifts; back and forth they fare, hence with petition, thence with sufficiency, interpreters and bringers of salvation."

To cut short this rhetoric, we may turn to Plutarch, who sets forth substantially the same view in quieter language. "It is one Reason that makes all things a cosmos, one Providence that cares for them with ancillary powers appointed to all things, while among different nations different honours and names are given to them as customs vary." Stoics raise the question whether there are many universes or one, as if many universes would require many Zeuses; but he asks, why should there not be in each universe a guide and ruler with mind and reason, such as he in our universe whom we call lord and father of all; and all of them subject to the destiny and providence of which Zeus is lord, all of them receiving from him the beginnings and seeds and principles (*λόγους*) of all things achieved in each of their spheres, all of them responsible to Zeus?"<sup>1</sup> Why not?

"Are not all things," Celsus asks the Christians,<sup>2</sup> "ruled

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *de def. or.*, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Origen *adv. Celsum*, vii. 68; v. 41; v. 25.

according to the will of God? Is not all Providence from him? Whatever there is in the whole scheme of things, whether the work of God, or of angels, or other dæmons, or heroes, all these have their law from the greatest God." "I do not think it makes any difference whether you call Zeus the Most High, or Zeus, or Adonai, or Sabaoth, or Amûn like the Egyptians, or Papaïos like the Scythians." "Probably all things are allotted to various rulers (ἐπόπταις) and distributed into provinces and so governed. Thus among the various nations things would be done rightly, if done as those rulers would have them."

The Stoics and others suggested that these deputy gods might be natural laws, or even natural objects, wine and grain and the like. But, says Plutarch, "we must not turn the gods as it were into queen-bees, nor keep them shut up in the prison-house of matter, as the Stoics do, when they change the gods into conditions of the atmosphere, fire, water, etc., and thus beget them with the universe and burn them up with it." This was a reference to the Stoic doctrine of the final conflagration of the world and its re-creation, which should both periodically recur throughout eternity—and in which, as Plutarch elsewhere says, the Stoic's gods were to "melt like wax or tin." Meanwhile the Stoics "nail the gods down" like statues to matter—yes, and fuse them with it and rivet them to it.<sup>1</sup>

Under the Supreme is a hierarchy of gods, and beneath them and above men is an intermediary order, for, as Apuleius says, it would have fitted ill with the majesty of the celestial gods that one of them should paint a dream for Hannibal or turn prophecy into verse for the Sibyl. It is not their function to come down to such detail; all that is assigned to the dæmons.<sup>2</sup> The dæmons, it is agreed, are of mingled nature—"not so brute as the terrene, nor so light as the ætherial"; like clouds they keep a mid distance between earth and sky. They are of the purest liquid of air, the

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *de def. or.*, 29, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Apul., *de deo Socr.*, ch. 7.



serene element, and thus scarcely visible to men, save of their own choice; they are of a matter so infinitely fine, "as by its rarity to transmit the rays of our sight, by its splendour to turn them back, by its subtlety to frustrate them." They share immortality with the gods above and passion with men below.<sup>1</sup> Plutarch says the same, and alleges it can be proved on the testimony of wise and ancient witnesses, though he is less clear that the dæmons are eternal. If, he says, the atmosphere were abolished between the earth and the moon, the void would destroy the unity of the universe; and in precisely the same way "those who do not leave us the race of dæmons destroy all intercourse between gods and men, by abolishing what Plato called the interpretive and ancillary nature—or else they compel us to make confusion and disorder of everything, by bringing God in among mortal passions and mortal affairs, fetching him down for our needs, as they say the witches in Thessaly do with the moon."<sup>2</sup>

The intermediary position of dæmons has interesting results. Some dæmons have by their virtue risen into the ranks of the gods—Isis, Osiris, Herakles, and Dionysos, for example.<sup>3</sup> And similarly the souls of good men, "when set free from re-birth (*γένεσις*) and at rest from the body," may become dæmons;<sup>4</sup> and as old athletes enjoy watching and encouraging young ones, so the dæmons, who through worth of soul are done with the contests of life, do not despise what they have left behind, but are kindly-minded to such as strive for the same goal—especially when they see them close upon their hope, struggling and all but touching it. As, in the case of a wreck, landsmen will run out into the waves to help the sailors they can reach, so the dæmons help us as the waves of life break over us.<sup>5</sup> The expression will cover not only this life, but the whole circle of many lives, however long. But

<sup>1</sup> Apul., *de deo Socr.*, 11, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Plut., *de def. or.*, 13.

<sup>3</sup> Plut., *de Iside*, 27.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *Romulus*, 28; *de def. or.*, 10.

<sup>5</sup> Plut., *de gen. Socr.*, 24.

why, asks the Christian Tatian, should they be more effectual (δραστικώτεροι) after death?

The fact is, we are told, that there is little difference between a dæmon and a human soul. A dæmon, says Apuleius, may be a human spirit that has earned its discharge from life and abjured the body—just like the Lares and Lemures of Roman belief. Conversely, the human spirit may be a dæmon for the present in a body.<sup>1</sup> Hence the ready communication between men and the powers above them; hence prayer and revelation. “There is nothing unreasonable in it,” says Plutarch, “or marvellous, if souls meeting souls make on them impressions of the future (φαντασίας τοῦ μέλλοντος),” for even men with men communicate by many other methods than speech.<sup>2</sup> The body indeed dulls this faculty, and some souls only shake off its influence in dreams, or even at the approach of death. But sometimes the body is thrown by some cause or other into such a condition as to allow the soul to see. This condition is called “enthusiasm”—it is caused, for instance, by “the enthusiastic spirit” which the earth sends up as an exhalation at Delphi; and the Egyptians again blend a potion, called *kyphi*, in a very mystic way with sixteen drugs—sixteen being the square of a square carries some remarkable properties or suggestions—and this potion when inhaled calms the mind and reduces anxiety, and “that part of us which receives impressions (φανταστικόν) and is susceptible of dreams, it rubs down and cleans like a mirror.” So cleaned and set free, the soul is open to receive what will come to it. Perhaps the vapour “by heat and diffusion opens pores (πόρους) that can take such impressions.” “The words of the dæmons are borne through all things, but they only sound for those who have the unruffled nature and the quiet soul.”<sup>3</sup>

The dæmons have wings, says Tertullian; they are every-

<sup>1</sup> Apul., *de deo Socr.*, 15; cf. Plut., *de def. or.*, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Plut., *de def. or.*, 38—40 for the whole subject.

<sup>3</sup> Plut., *de gen. Socr.*, 20.



where in a single moment ; the whole world is as one place to them ; and all that is done all over the world, it is as easy for them to know as to report. Dwelling in the air, among stars and clouds, they learn readily what the weather will be, and can promise rain, which is coming in any case. When sorcerers call up ghosts and make what seem the souls of the dead appear ; when they cause even goats and tables to divine—it is the work of dæmons. Yet it was curious that Cybele left her priest in Carthage in ignorance of the death of Marcus Aurelius for a week.<sup>1</sup>

Plutarch lays great stress on the oracles. The theory of the “enthusiastic spirit” or exhalation—with its strange blend, as it seems to us, of spiritual and material—was liable, he says, to be attacked on the ground that it took divination out of the sphere of the gods and of reason.<sup>2</sup> But he rejoins that there are double causes for everything—the ancients derived all things from Zeus ; moderns, natural philosophers (*φυσικοί*), wander away from “the fair and divine cause” and make everything depend on bodies, impacts, changes and mixtures—and both err in degree. Thus in the oracle there may be the exhalation from the earth, but Earth is a goddess, and so is the Sun who gives her this power ; “and then we leave dæmons installed as lords and warders and guardians” of the oracles. If Apollo was a god, there were many on the border-line between gods and dæmons who had oracles of their own—Asclepios, Amphiaraus, Trophonius, etc. Clear proof of the truth that gods and dæmons exist, and care for men and give them oracles, is to be seen in the great shrines. Men were “in anguish and fear lest Delphi should lose its glory of three thousand years,” but Delphi has not failed. On the contrary, though hard to believe and much tested, the Pythian priestess has never been convicted of error ; and she has filled the oracle with offerings and gifts from barbarians and Greeks and adorned it with beautiful buildings.<sup>3</sup> This was not man’s

<sup>1</sup> Tertullian, *Apol.*, 23–25.

<sup>2</sup> Plut., *de def. or.*, 48.

<sup>3</sup> Plut., *de Pyth. orac.*, 29.

doing; "the god came and inspired the oracle with his divinity."

Pausanias, writing about 170 A.D., tells how men consulted the oracle of Trophonius; and then he says, "I did it myself." What he learnt in his strange adventure in the pit, he does not say. But a remark let fall in his eighth book is significant.<sup>1</sup> He had seen many strange things, and now he says: "When I began this work, I used to look on these Greek stories as little better than foolishness; but now that I have got as far as Arcadia, my opinion about them is this. I believe the Greeks, who were accounted wise, spoke of old in riddles and not straight out; so I judge this story of Cronos [swallowing a foal instead of his child] is a piece of Greek philosophy. In matters concerning the divine I will hold by what has been said"—by tradition, in fact.

Tertullian gives a list of places where there were temples in which men slept to obtain dreams of revelation.<sup>2</sup> Miss Mary Hamilton, in her book on *Incubation*, shows how the practice still survives in the Greek islands. Thus, in Ceos, where once men slept in the shrine of Artemis, to-day they sleep in the church of St Artemidos.<sup>3</sup> Strabo says the practice was an essential feature of Judaism, and he compares Moses to Amphiaraus, Trophonius, and Orpheus, etc.<sup>4</sup> But the most famous of these shrines was that of Æsculapius (Asklepios) at Epidauros—a god whose miracles are recorded in wonderful inscriptions and in the orations (as wonderful) of Ælius Aristides. Celsus,<sup>5</sup> in his attack on Christianity, brings up the oracles given by gods and dæmons and fulfilled, as evidence to the truth of traditional religion. But he goes further; for, "let a man go to the shrine of Trophonius, or Amphiaraus, or Mopsus, and there he may see the gods in the likeness of men, no feigned forms but clear to see, not slipping by them once, like him who deceived those people [the Christians], but ever associating with those who will."

<sup>1</sup> Paus., viii. 8, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Tert., *de anima*, 46.

<sup>3</sup> *Incubation*, p. 174.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, c. 761-2.

<sup>5</sup> *adv. Celsum*, vii. 35; iii. 24.



"Multitudes, Greeks and barbarians, testify that they have often seen, and still do see, Æsculapius—not a phantom of him but himself, healing men, doing them good, and foretelling the future."

Here it may be suggested that there is some caution needed. Is Æsculapius a god or a dæmon? Hardly a god, in the strict sense, if he consents to be visible to the eye of flesh—but then there is no strict sense in this region.

Explanations may be offered of various kind—sleight-of-hand, hypnotism, sheer credulity. A curious illustration will be found in Lucian's pamphlet called *Alexander*, where he shows how a man of that name founded a new oracle at Abonoteichos in Cappadocia—and with the aid of a tame snake, and his native gifts of cunning and impudence, drove a roaring trade in prophecy. As for the miracles of Jesus, says Celsus, ordinary quacks on the streets will do greater for an obol or two—"driving devils out of men, blowing away diseases, calling up the souls of heroes, and displaying sumptuous banquets which are not there."<sup>1</sup> Tertullian admits all these operations—they are done by the aid of dæmons: "it is no great thing for him to cheat the outer eyes, who finds it quite easy to blind the sight of the soul within."<sup>2</sup> Marcus Aurelius records with gratitude that Diognetus taught him to neglect such miracles.<sup>3</sup> Lucian, in his *Philopseudes*, draws a wonderful group of people revelling in the wildest displays of the supernatural; and the strange thing is that, as one reads the literature of the age, the parody loses its extravagance, for one thing after another is paralleled by sober writers.

But now we must turn to another aspect of the subject. Plutarch quotes with approval a couplet from Menander, omitting the lines which follow, as they did not suit his purpose:—

"By each man standeth from his natal hour  
A daimon, his kind mystagogue through life."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *adv. Celsum*, i. 68.      <sup>2</sup> *Tert., de anima*, 57.      <sup>3</sup> *Marcus Aur.*, i. 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Plut., de tranq. animi*, 15; *cf. Tert., de anima*, 57.

Aristotle was also quoted by Isidore the Gnostic as an authority for the belief.<sup>1</sup> "Our ancestors," says Seneca, "gave every individual man or woman a Genius or a Juno."<sup>2</sup> The genius or dæmon is not merely Greek and Latin. It appears in Persia as the *fravashi*, the spiritual counterpart; in Egypt as the *Ka*; in the Syrian Gnostic's *Hymn of the Soul* it is represented as a robe exactly reproducing the likeness of the man:—

"Two in number we stood, but only one in appearance";

and it is quite likely that Peter's "angel" and "the angels" of the little children in the New Testament are nothing else. "Zeus," says Epictetus, "has placed by every man a guardian, every man's dæmon, to whom he has committed the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived. For to what better and more careful guardian could he have entrusted each of us? When, then, you have shut the doors, and made darkness within, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not; God is within and your dæmon is within, and what need of light have they to see what you are doing?"<sup>3</sup> The dæmon when our life is done, Apuleius says, carries his *custodia* to our trial, and by his report goes our doom.<sup>4</sup> This dæmon-guardian can of course give word in dreams and omens, and more, he can appear in person. The Pythagoreans, Apuleius says, used to wonder if any man said he had never seen a dæmon. An Egyptian priest in Rome went to the Iseum outside the city walls, on the Campus Martius,—the only "pure place" he could find in or about the city,—and there he sought to see the dæmon of Plotinus; but he saw more than he dreamed of—for when it came it was a god and not a dæmon. So great a man was Plotinus.<sup>5</sup> Plutarch doubted such appearances, as he did an

<sup>1</sup> Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, vi. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Sen., *Ep.*, 110, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Epict., *D.*, i. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Apul., *de deo Socr.*, 16.

<sup>5</sup> Porphyry, *vita Plotin.*, 10.



Egyptian theory that the spirit of a god could have a child by a human woman.<sup>1</sup>

Empedocles, however, Plutarch says, held that we each have two dæmons. The Egyptians said that the human body is assigned, part by part, to six-and-thirty gods or daemons of the air; and they knew their names, too—Chnumen, Chnachu-men, Knat, Sikat, Rhamanor, etc.; and, by calling on the dæmon concerned, they said they could cure any part that was sick.<sup>2</sup> Basilides, the Gnostic, is credited with describing man as a sort of Wooden Horse, with a whole army of different spirits within him.<sup>3</sup> Plutarch uses the same figure in taunting the Stoics with turning the virtues into personal beings—they made a man “a paradise or a Wooden Horse.”<sup>4</sup>

It is not strange, then, to find a series of significant words like theolept, nympholept, lymphatic, enthusiasm, dæmoniac, theophorete, and the like, all testifying to the power that dæmons, nymphs, Pans, gods, and other beings had of seizing upon and occupying human beings. “Unclean spirits hover over waters,” says Tertullian, “as shady fountains know, and hidden streams, and the public baths, and water-pipes in houses, cisterns and wells.”<sup>5</sup> They could give men disease; they might remain and ensure lasting madness. And again, it was possible that all sin and uncleanness was the work of dæmons inhabiting a man, for a legion could hardly be idle inside an individual. Was every act the result of a spiritual impulse from a good or bad dæmon? Was marriage essentially a dæmonic thing? Whence came the beginnings of life? Here we touch a great question on which folklore has yet much to teach us.

But we have come now to the question of evil, for every candid person owned that dæmons were to blame for a great

<sup>1</sup> Plut., *Numa*, 4. It is very curious to think of this passage as being written perhaps in the same week as the early chapters of St Luke.

<sup>2</sup> *adv. Celsum*, viii. 58.

<sup>3</sup> *ap. Clem. Alex., Strom.*, ii. 113.

<sup>4</sup> Plut., *adv. Sto.*, 45.

<sup>5</sup> Tert., *de Bapt.*, 5.

deal of mischief. Celsus<sup>1</sup> himself has a warning against magic and the dæmons connected with it:—"One must be on one's guard not to get entangled in these matters through over-occupation in them, and so through love of the body and by turning away from better things to be overcome by forgetfulness, for perhaps we should not disbelieve the wise who say that, of the dæmons who pervade the earth, the greater part are entangled in re-birth (*γένεσις*)—fused and riveted to it—and being bound to blood and smoke and chanting, etc., they can do no more than heal the body and foretell the future." Again, there were strange and revolting religious rites, in which the eating of raw flesh, Plutarch says, the rending asunder of animals, fasting, and the narration of obscene legends were a part. These could not be attributed to gods, but were the institution of evil dæmons. Human sacrifices, he says, could not have been welcome to the gods, nor would kings and generals have been willing to sacrifice their own children unless they had been appeasing the anger of ugly, ill-tempered, and vengeful dæmons, who would bring war or pestilence otherwise. Ill tales of the gods—rape, suffering, wandering, servitude—are not true of gods, but of dæmons who usurped their names.<sup>2</sup> And yet, Plutarch has apologies for animal-worship in Egypt, and for the traditional obscene image of Osiris which still stood; and in general he offers no means of telling which were the rites ordained by a god, and which by a bad dæmon. Christians pointed this out with some emphasis. None the less, philosophic paganism found God acquitted of sin at once by his remoteness from human contact and by the energies of evil dæmons. Whence comes the evil that makes dæmons evil, is not explained. God was good, and that God should be good was the chief concern of religious philosophers.

The system of ideas here set forth was consistent. It

<sup>1</sup> *adv. Celsum*, viii. 60. Cf. Tertullian on sacrifices, *Apol.*, 22. "What else," asks Clement of Alexandria, "would cats ask for if they could speak?" (*Clem. Alex., Protr.*, 41).

<sup>2</sup> *Plut., de def. or.*, 14, 15, 21.



rested on ancient tradition and on philosophy—on association and reflection. It was confirmed every day by oracle, theolepsy, trance, and mystery, while, more and more as time went on, the subtlest and the most religious of Greek thinkers showed how inevitable it was on the side of thought. Yet complaints were heard from various quarters that the dæmon theory and the religion that rested on it were cruel—men knew of human sacrifices that recurred; that they were unclean—the hierodules and the Galli of the temples are only part of the proof of this charge; and that they paralysed the human mind. Lucretius and the Christian apologists have the same criticisms to make here, and all the evidence shows their justice. The system did dwarf the intellect of men; it worked out in cruelty, lust, and paralysis. But it broke down; and here it is worth remembering that it did not yield to the attack of philosophy or science, but to the ideas and the personality of Jesus of Nazareth.

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## THE FUTURE OF JUDAISM IN ENGLAND.

M. J. LANDA.

THAT eternal mystery, the Jewish community, is at the present moment providing an interesting puzzle to onlookers, who, it may at once be added, include no small proportion of of its own members. These partial spectators in the camp are the most puzzled of all. They are the Moderns—the highly Anglicised section which daily finds itself less in sympathy with the old Law and the traditional point of view—to them an intensely narrow point of view, smacking of mediævalism. Judaism in the midst of twentieth-century civilisation, in lands of freedom, is regarded as hopelessly out-of-date, as unable to withstand the onrush of unrestrained progressive thought. The ancient faith is, indeed, in the melting-pot. But it is not bubbling. It is but beginning to seethe, and ingredients are still being cast into the cauldron. That it should have defied the forces of dissolution until now may be a matter of surprise, but only to outward seeming has there been little change. Disintegration has proceeded with some rapidity in various countries—in America most of all—but in England actual solidarity and a still stronger semblance of unity have been secured by the domination of the Chief Rabbi.

With the death of Dr Adler, the holder of the office, in July of last year, the true state of affairs was revealed. Nor did it come unexpectedly. The troubled undercurrents had already manifested themselves at the surface, and the clamour



for recognition by the new force had provoked bickering which sorely troubled the Chief Rabbi. The question of the future religious government of Anglo-Jewry was thrust, almost blatantly, upon Dr Adler's notice by minister and layman alike, and there is good reason to believe that, had he recovered from the illness which proved fatal, he would at last have receded from his somewhat stubborn attitude and would have consented to discuss the problem of his successor. But his almost sudden death left a legacy of difficulty to the community and precipitated a crisis which most people had been anxious to avoid.

The trouble is largely, but not entirely, religious. The desire for a revision of ritual has been growing for years, but the power invested in the office of Chief Rabbi renders "reform" impossible. There is the Reformed Synagogue in Upper Berkeley Street, W., for those who desire modifications of observance and Prayer-Book revision, and there is a synagogue with a similar ritual in Manchester, and another in Bradford. A year or so ago it was rumoured that Birmingham was anxious to establish a Reformed Synagogue, but nothing has been done, and it is doubtful whether the Reform communities in Manchester and Bradford are flourishing: that at Bradford is certainly not. Outside London, the new spirit is not particularly strong, but in the metropolis it is persistent and clamant—so much so that the service in Upper Berkeley Street is not deemed sufficiently advanced by a number of its adherents who are agitating for further alterations.

Upper Berkeley Street presents an interesting study in Jewish religious unrest. The bitterness that followed the original severance over seventy years ago has vanished, although the decree of excommunication officially pronounced at the time has not been formally withdrawn. There has nevertheless been a *rapprochement* between that congregation and the orthodox community. There is good-fellowship between the ministers of the two sections, they sit on an equality in the conference of ministers called into

being a few years ago with Dr Adler as the first president, and to some extent the Reformed Synagogue came under the influence of the late Chief Rabbi. The services drawn up by him for special occasions were used in Upper Berkeley Street, and one of the last public acts of Dr Adler was the presentation of its senior minister, the Rev. Morris Joseph, to His Majesty at a levee.

Whether that friendship with orthodoxy was viewed with suspicion by the more ardent reformers cannot be said, but exactly ten years ago the desire for further advance led to the establishment, by Mr Claude Montefiore, of the Jewish Religious Union, which now has its own synagogue, in Hill Street, N.W., and its own special ritual. At the outset, the Union appealed to both Orthodox and Reform, and several important members of the United Synagogue—the official orthodox section—and two or three of its ministers identified themselves with the movement. The strong opposition of the Chief Rabbi and also of the late Lord Swaythling—whose daughter, the Hon. Lily Montagu, was one of the pioneers of the Union—led, however, to the withdrawal of the ministers, and the offer of the Upper Berkeley Street Synagogue for the Saturday afternoon services of the new body was refused. The Union established itself as a separate section, holding services in the West End at the Hotel Great Central, and in the East End at a school. Three years ago, the Union took an important step forward. The East End services were discontinued, and it was decided to establish a new synagogue in the West End, with a ritual on the lines of the most advanced “Liberal” Jews of America and the Continent. The Chief Rabbi denounced the new move even more strongly than the original step, and the prominent members of the United Synagogue, including the two gentlemen, Mr A. H. Jessel, K.C., and Mr Felix Davis, who are now its vice-presidents, severed their connection with the Union. They could not follow Mr Montefiore in his new interpretation of the Bible and in his plans for ritual revision.



Mr Montefiore, nevertheless, proceeded undisturbed, with the Hon. Lily Montagu, despite the public protests of her father, and Mr Israel Abrahams, Reader in Rabbinic at Cambridge University, as his principal lieutenants. Dr Stephen Wise, of the Free Synagogue, New York, and Dr Emil Hirsch, of Chicago—probably the two most advanced Jewish reformers of the day—visited London as missionaries, and the Liberal Jewish Synagogue has now been open for about a year, with Rabbi Israel Mattuck, of the United States, as Minister. The service differs considerably from that of the orthodox synagogues, and also from that at Upper Berkeley Street; but the Union appears to be attracting a number of those who are entirely out of sympathy with the ancient ritual and no longer hold the Hebrew language sacred.

The new synagogue represents a definite schism. It is outside the general community to such an extent that negotiations for burial rights in a Jewish cemetery have been broken off, and they are being sought elsewhere. Mr Montefiore is one of the most popular and lovable personalities in the Anglo-Jewish community, and he could no doubt have made a much more powerful appeal to his many admirers had he cared to dissemble his religious fervour. But he will not have the slightest semblance of make-believe. His opinions have caused the utmost pain to numbers of his friends, among whom the late Chief Rabbi was one of the staunchest; but he stands before them, fearlessly outspoken to an extent that has filled the community with dismay. He has boldly proclaimed the opinion that the time has come when Jews should change their attitude toward Jesus and regard Him as one of their Prophets. While he claims to express but his own view, he is, however, recognised as the spokesman of the Union, and his temerity is regarded by the strictly orthodox as indicating an absolute breaking-away from Judaism.

To what extent the Union has drawn upon the membership of the United Synagogue is not yet known, but its progress is being closely watched by those who are sincerely anxious to

modify the ritual in the direction in which they consider it will best meet modern needs. Naturally, the appointment of a new Chief Rabbi is claimed as a favourable opportunity for the demand of Reform. Only the Chief Rabbi can make the concessions: he is all-powerful by the constitution of the United Synagogue, a body established in 1870 by Act of Parliament under a scheme of the Charity Commissioners, and by a deed of foundation and trust drawn up in 1871. Those two documents, however, declare, unequivocally, that the form of worship shall be the orthodox Polish or German ritual, and both the would-be Reformers and the Orthodox realise the difficulty of making any alteration. The consent of the Chief Rabbi would make it comparatively easy, but his consent is virtually impossible of attainment.

That is the crux of the present situation when the Anglo-Jewish community is about to elect a successor to Dr Adler. A Rabbi who would show any sympathy with "Reform" would not be regarded as a Rabbi by the Orthodox, who constitute the great majority. Hence the orthodoxy of the new ecclesiastical head of Anglo-Jewry will have to be beyond all suspicion. The would-be Reformers know this, but a few are prepared to defy the position. This has led to suspicion on the part of many of the Orthodox. On the whole, however, the situation is accepted, though not with the best of grace. The keenest of the Reformers feel that a great opportunity is being lost. They hold the view that they have been quiescent too long, and that, if they do not assert themselves now, their hopes might as well be buried. Frankly, they cannot understand the contention that Judaism, as a religion, is, like its God, "one and indivisible."

In these days of different forms of Christianity, of variations in every form of religious and secular faith, they believe that two great parties in Judaism are logical. The friendship that exists between the Orthodox and the Reformed Synagogues in London is looked upon as proof that the two need not be antagonistic. And they have no patience with the



assertion that the form of Jewish observance has been fixed for all time, and that no means exist, or can be devised, to secure any alteration.

Against these contentions, the Orthodox present an uncompromising hostility. Friendship between the two parties in England, they maintain, is only possible where one is small, or, at any rate, not aggressive. A large Reform community would be a serious menace to Orthodoxy, if only by reason of the fact that modern Reform is restless. In America there is open competition between the Reform Ministers in the introduction of innovations. The ancient ritual has been metamorphosed out of all resemblance and keeping with Judaism; it is much more akin to Christianity in its concepts, its appearance, and its practice. Men and women sit together in the synagogues, the former without hats; the use of the Tallith (praying shawl) and the phylacteries which the Orthodox wear on the left arm and forehead for morning prayer has been abolished; the Sabbath has been changed from Saturday to Sunday, or rather it has been wiped out, for the Sunday is not regarded as the historic Sabbath; the dietary laws have been modified to an extent that amounts to abandonment; the festivals have been whittled down; marriage with non-Jews is countenanced by some Ministers; non-Jewish ministers are permitted to appear in the pulpits; the weekly reading of the Torah (Pentateuch) has been discontinued; little or no Hebrew is used in the service, and there is a growing desire to quote the New Testament, and to look upon Jesus as one of the Jewish prophets. All this is considered as worse than apostasy by the Orthodox, who declare bluntly that such a form of "loyalty" to Judaism is worse than avowed acceptance of Christianity, inasmuch as it is hypocritical adherence to a form of Christianity, to something which is certainly not the religion of Israel. The majority of the Orthodox refuse to believe that there is anything spiritual or religious in such "advance." They look upon it as a desire to cast off all practices which stamp Jews as different from Christians, and

as selfishness which cannot make any sacrifices for faith and tradition.

Hitherto, there has been tacit peace between the parties in England, due to the desires of the new Reformers having been kept under restraint. But activity will lead to a serious breach, for many of the would-be Reformers are leaders of the community, and their continuance as members of organisations for the safeguarding of orthodox practice will be strongly resented. The difficulty of the position is increased by the keen anxiety of the Reformers to remain within the United Synagogue. It would be a simple solution of the problem if they seceded from this organisation and joined the Reformed Synagogue or the Jewish Religious Union, or founded new houses of worship of their own. This, as a matter of fact, is the only way in which the problem will be solved. The Reformers will be compelled to abandon their demands, or leave the United Synagogue. There is no middle course, despite the endeavour to find one.

The reason for this endeavour is not easily intelligible. It is obviously due to a belief that there is a considerable body of opinion, at present unexpressed, which will follow a determined lead, providing a means of securing its programme is found. But a large section is unquestionably indifferent—some indifferent to religion itself, others apathetic to an extent that makes revolt appear needless. What the Reformers are learning, but have yet failed to grasp fully, is that Anglo-Jewry is not the separate entity they have assumed. It is bound up with Jewry the world over. They know that, but have imagined the tie to be sentimental. They have been brought face to face with the knowledge, however, that Judaism is not merely a religion—it is a Law. To their query as to whether any means exist by which Jewish laws can be altered, they receive the answer that it would be necessary to convene a conference of the leading Rabbis of the world. This would be impossible. The orthodox Rabbis would not agree to the inclusion of the American Reform Rabbis, who, for some



strange reason, cling to the old term although they have discarded Rabbinical teaching. To such a conference England would send but few representatives, for the great majority of the Jewish Ministers in this country do not hold the Rabbinical diploma. Not one of the Ministers who favour Reform would be admitted to the conference, which would be composed entirely of orthodox Rabbis, most of them old-fashioned and not in sympathy with modern ideas. Their decisions would be known beforehand; in fact, they certainly would not agree to meet for discussion of modifications of ritual and observance. This is not mere conjecture. Some time before Dr Adler died, a conference of orthodox foreign Rabbis in England met at Leeds and passed resolutions so startling as to excite laughter, even among the Orthodox. They condemned, among other things, the practice of married women wearing their own hair instead of a wig, as is the custom in Russia and Austrian Poland, and men and women dancing together. More recently, a conference of Rabbis from different countries met at Kattowitz, near the borders of Russia, Germany, and Austria, and here suspicion was excited among the various sections who doubted the strength of one another's Orthodoxy.

Reformers in England are entirely out of sympathy with these Rabbis. They do not understand their point of view, and regard them as men belonging to another era, which, in the case of many of them, is undoubtedly true. The Russian or Galician Rabbi, who knows nothing of the great world, whose knowledge of things mundane is confined to his tiny local ghetto, is inclined to assume that his long coat and his ear-locks are based on Sinaitic laws. He and the Reformer are each an insoluble mystery to one another, with divergences of character irreconcilable, accentuated by differences of language and national custom. There is as great a gulf between the Russian or Galician ghetto fanatic and the London West End Jew as there is between the Christian of Peckham and the Christian of the Macedonian mountains. The modern Jew

knows he is bound by tradition to regard all suffering Jews as having first claim on his sympathy, and, on the whole, he lives worthily up to the tradition. To that extent he is imbued with the spirit of historic consciousness, but beyond this manifestation the call of the past has no message for him.

He does not understand why his brethren in persecuting lands—men suffering also from economic pressure and an almost complete lack of modern education—should be his religious legislators, whilst he himself has no voice in the selection of his prayers, or in the determination of customs and practices which, to him, are out-of-date and meaningless. It is a state of mind easily intelligible. It makes the modern Jew—it would not be wrong to term him the Modernist Jew—feel that the bonds of brotherhood are shackles. He admits, candidly, that it is necessary for some sort of unity to exist between Jews the world over, but he maintains that this tie can no longer be arbitrary and artificial. But with the deeply ingrained faith in the Talmudical dictum that it is necessary to make a fence round the law, the old-fashioned Jew asserts that the tie cannot continue on a merely sentimental, or upon a voluntary, basis. He attaches the utmost importance to forms and symbols. The trouble for the Modernist Jew, however, is that the forms are irritating and the symbols without significance.

The prayers have no meaning, inasmuch as they are in Hebrew, a language which the vast majority of Jews learn to read, without, however, understanding a word of it! Consequently, there is a demand for the introduction of more English into the service. The service itself is deemed too long: the Modernists demand that it should be shortened, and made more attractive by the introduction of the organ and the reading of the Pentateuch in a triennial instead of an annual cycle. The reading of the Pentateuch in Hebrew is looked upon as an archaic interlude in the Sabbath service. The incidence of the festivals is disturbing to business, wherefore it is suggested they should be shortened by the abolition



of the "Second Days" of Passover, Pentecost, New Year, and Tabernacles. In Palestine only one day is kept, and it is urged that, owing to the perfection of the modern calendar, it is no longer necessary to observe two days to make sure of the actual one. The isolation of the women in a gallery in the synagogue is also considered inexcusable; it is held to be a relic of the Oriental belief that women are inferior creatures.

To concede all these demands would be to transform the United Synagogue into a Reform body. That would be against its constitution and would put an end to Jewish solidarity in England. There would be schism with attendant bitterness and suspicion. The Orthodox would regard the United Synagogue as outside the pale. The probability of the United Synagogue putting itself into this absurd position need not be taken into account. It will not happen. Nor is it likely that any one of the demands will be pursued. The Orthodox meet each one with a *non possumus*, and any Chief Rabbi would be bound to do the same. Each suggested reform is regarded as the thin end of the wedge. The preservation of Hebrew is held to be vital. It is certainly the strongest link, and its study as a living language is recommended as the antidote to the present irritation which it induces. There is not much sympathy with the desire for shorter services. Two to three hours each Saturday is deemed little enough, and the request for more attractiveness is met with the retort that the synagogue is not a theatre. The other items in the programme are fatal to Orthodoxy, any weakening of which would assuredly pave the way to disruption. Orthodoxy, in short, is the price of that unity which brings prestige and commands respect for the Jewish community in England, and those who framed the constitution of the United Synagogue and drew up the deed of foundation and trust defining the powers of the Chief Rabbi seem to have been gifted with wise prescience. The forty years that have passed since the United Synagogue was established have been the years of the consolidation of Anglo-Jewry. The community

has gained respect because it has deserved it, because it has not wasted its substance on religious strife, but has, on the contrary, devoted its energies to secure the efficiency of its organisations for charitable endeavour and social welfare. These organisations have won the admiration of onlookers; the poor Jews have been no trouble and no cost to the country, and the Anglo-Jewish community, from the lowliest to the highest, has progressed on English lines. It has educated itself in accordance with the English code, written and unwritten, and has identified itself thoroughly with the national life. In fine, the English Jews have completely proved the wisdom of the law of England, which does not regard them as a separate nationality or a distinct caste, but as members of a dissenting religious denomination.

This is no accidental result. The Jew hates religious dissension, notwithstanding his fondness for disputation. "All Israel are brethren," is the sentiment that expresses his religion in its highest form. It transcends petty differences and enables him to present an unbroken front to the world.

In the case of the English Rabbinate problem, the religious differences have not appeared on the surface. They are probably unsuspected by not a few Jews. The communal diversity of opinion, however, has resulted in painful bickering over personalities. When Dr Adler died, his critics vied with his admirers in paying tributes to his memory. His loudest detractors were among those who declared with some vehemence that there was no man living who could worthily take up his mantle. Congregations that had never contributed a penny to the Chief Rabbi's salary, or had repudiated his authority, showered advice on the United Synagogue as to the choice of a successor. And the United Synagogue, the "patron of the living," so to speak, has not tactfully grappled with the situation. It decided to give all synagogues contributing to the Chief Rabbi's Fund a voice in the selection, but what it gave with one hand it withdrew with the other. The franchise scheme for the electing body of delegates from



the synagogues has aroused the greatest indignation. The United Synagogue apportioned to itself—that is, to its constituent synagogues and its honorary officers—the majority of the votes. It has taken 314 out of a total of 431. The total may be larger, for synagogues are being admitted to the franchise on payment of a guinea; but the United Synagogue holds an overwhelming preponderance of votes, which, moreover, lie in the hands of a very few people. The policy of “one delegate, one vote” has not been adopted. The votes have been distributed among the synagogues in proportion to their contributions. Most of the delegates will have one vote each, a few will have twenty, and one or two thirty. Further, the delegates have a free hand to cast their votes as they please—against the wishes of the congregants who have elected them, if they choose. The nine honorary officers have seventy-two votes, and they and six or seven London delegates thus control the election.

Consequently the idea of election is distasteful to a considerable section. Already, as a protest against the apportionment of a beggarly twenty-eight votes, the Federation of (East End) Synagogues, which has a larger membership than the United Synagogue, has seceded from the conference, and there is grave danger of the new Chief Rabbi not being accepted by some of the congregations. Some dissatisfaction exists with the selected candidates, Dr M. Hyamson, the head of the Ecclesiastical Court (Beth Din), which is at present performing the functions of the office of Chief Rabbi; and Dr J. Hertz and Dr B. Drachman, of New York. Dr Hyamson, although born in Russia, has been brought up and educated in England; his degree is LL.D. of the University of London, and he has been in the Anglo-Jewish Ministry about twenty-seven years. Dr Hertz, who recently visited England, is a Hungarian who has been educated in America and has held a position in Johannesburg. Dr Drachman was born in America, but educated in Germany.

A noisy section of the community declares that these men

are not good enough. They are clamouring for postponement of the election, which is to take place after Dr Drachman has visited England this autumn, and they ask that emissaries should be sent to Russia and Austria to discover a Rabbi of great learning. They overlook the fact that, if any truly great and outstanding Rabbi existed anywhere, his renown would be world-wide and he would not need to be sought. They frankly demand the appointment of a foreigner; but the majority in the community, including the leaders, are strongly opposed to a Continental Rabbi, whose English pronunciation would be bad, and in whom respect for British law and custom might be lacking. This is a serious point. Continental Rabbis, as a rule, are not distinguished for flexibility. Many have sneered at Anglo-Jewish education and learning and at its orthodoxy; and they appear incapable of understanding the excellent relations that exist here between the Jews and the Gentiles, and the intense desire to co-ordinate ancient Jewish law with modern English law and practice. Continental Rabbis are all more or less environed by anti-Semitism, which, to some extent, converts each European Jewish community into an *imperium in imperio*, with laws or customs differing from those of the country. In England, the Chief Rabbi and the Ecclesiastical Court have steadfastly maintained the supremacy of the law of the land, which does not, for instance, recognise a Rabbinical divorce. Dr Adler's evidence on this matter before the Divorce Commission, and his desire to secure the assistance of the Government in putting an end to the practices of a few foreign Rabbis in England who grant divorce, was fiercely denounced by a section of the foreigners in England and by Rabbis on the Continent. The Anglo-Jewish community is utterly indifferent to Continental criticism, regarding it in the same way as ordinary Englishmen do foreign opinion of customs which they do not understand. The selection of a foreign Chief Rabbi would be held to endanger the pleasant relations existing with the general community. Those relations are based on



conformity to English law and custom, which would certainly not be appreciated by Rabbis whose learning is confined to the Talmud and whose knowledge of the world is restricted by the limitations imposed upon Jews in Continental countries.

English Jews will never consent to the appointment of such a Chief Rabbi. They have not built up an honoured position in this country for the purpose of handing it over to a section in which the ghetto spirit is making itself unpleasantly conspicuous. The contention that there is a precedent for the selection of a foreigner in the appointment of Dr Nathan Adler, the father of the late Dr Hermann Adler, in 1845, is preposterous. The community has grown enormously in the sixty-seven years that have passed, and it is much more Anglicised and critical. It is, indeed, a totally different community.

Scholarship is indubitably the first essential qualification of a Chief Rabbi. The duties of the position imperatively demand it, and it is the strongest assurance of orthodoxy. But in addition to Talmudical scholarship—for, no matter how well educated a man may be, he is not a scholar in Jewish estimation unless he is steeped in a knowledge of the Talmud—it will be much more necessary for the new incumbent, even more than it was in the case of Dr Adler, to possess a knowledge of English character, Anglo-Jewish character, and Jewish character.

The position as it stands at the present juncture is not dignified. Election is repugnant to the minds of the majority, and the events which led to the final selection of three gentlemen—the announcement of the vacancy, with a request for applications, has placed all the candidates in a difficult and invidious position. The result has been an outburst of irritation accompanied by virulent criticism of the United Synagogue, the Conference, the Selection Committee, and the three Rabbis chosen. At the time of writing there is no indication of an endeavour to obviate election. In any case, the new Chief Rabbi, whoever he will be, will have to contend with added difficulties. But the Jewish power

of recuperation is bound to assert itself; and, providing no rash experiment is made, Anglo-Jewry will settle down to a continuance of calm existence and maintain its excellent relations with the general community.

So much may confidently be asserted, if there is no further bungling. The controversy that has been waged since the death of Dr Adler has not been without valuable lessons to both the Orthodox and the would-be Reformers. The chief lesson is that reform within the United Synagogue is impossible; and the United Synagogue in some sense embraces the whole region of the sway of the Chief Rabbi—the British Empire. Outside the United Synagogue his influence is more implied than actual. Within the United Synagogue he can prevent reforms, but outside he cannot. Where introduced, however, they would not be countenanced. There would be no excommunication—that power has been taken away from the Chief Rabbi—but the new ecclesiastical head would not visit any synagogue where reforms would be introduced, and he would practically regard them as he would the Upper Berkeley Street Synagogue. Those who devised the scheme of the United Synagogue intended that the institution should afford a permanent check to Reform in the United Kingdom, and it has not falsified their hopes. It is the power in Anglo-Jewry because it represents the great middle section.

Had the United Synagogue not been founded, there would have been a lack of unity and no consolidation. Synagogal autonomy, for which some people have been clamouring during the present crisis, would have led to modifications of ritual, and the Reformed Synagogue would have benefited and would have extended. Those who ardently desire Reform cannot hope to achieve their aim by a *coup d'état*, or a less swift revolution. They will meet with the same check when the next vacancy occurs in the Rabbinate. They must proceed by the normal process of evolution—that is, by joining the Reformed Synagogue, and by establishing others of a



similar character. There is nothing to prevent them. And if there is any real strength in the cry for Reform, it will succeed. Side by side with the orthodox community there will grow up a community of Reform Jews who will still be within the pale and will combine with their brethren, as the Berkeley Street members do now, in movements of social welfare and charitable activity. The United Synagogue enabled the newer Jewish settlers to oust the old Spanish and Portuguese community in England from premier position. That older body, once the Hebrew aristocracy of England, which played a great and noble part in the struggle for Jewish emancipation in the United Kingdom, and for better conditions for the persecuted race in other lands, has now but two synagogues in London and one in Manchester, with its own Chief Rabbi and its own ritual—orthodox, but slightly different from the greater German and Polish section. If Reform in England is possessed of the strength, it will establish itself in due course as the premier section of the community.

The Orthodox regard the prospect with equanimity. They point to the fact that the one Reformed Synagogue in London and the two others in the provinces have made no progress. That, in the past, may have been due to the influx from the Continent. But with that influx having fallen to small proportions, and with Anglicisation proceeding rapidly, the future may be different. Prophecy, however, is futile. If any conclusions are to be drawn from present indications, they are that among the would-be reformers there is only a very small body sufficiently fervent and fortified by learning and knowledge of the spirit of Jewish history to care with any intensity. The majority of the would-be reformers are indifferentists. Some will drift away from Judaism—out of it entirely, perhaps—by the avenue of intermarriage. The others will remain within the orthodox fold and observe just so much of the ancient faith as suits them.

M. J. LANDA.

## SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 5.

### FRENCH CATHOLICS AND SOCIAL WORK.

THE STORY OF A RENAISSANCE.

HENRY V. ARKELL.

THERE are unmistakable signs that the powerful Radical party which for twelve years has dominated the political life of France is losing its hold over the country, and that its work is done. What that work was is now manifest. As long as it was a question of attacking the Church, it was united and strong ; as soon, however, as it became necessary to proceed to legislation of any other sort, it showed incoherence and incapacity. The writer, who has passed the last twenty years in Paris as a newspaper correspondent, is of opinion that the moment is ripe for a retrospect that will determine whether, even in the great work it had at heart, Radicalism has not proved a failure. For one of the most remarkable signs of the times is the progress made by the Roman Catholic Church in France since the separation.

When M. Waldeck-Rousseau founded the *bloc*, his idea was to punish the Assumptionists and the Jesuits for the part they had played in the Dreyfus affair. He saw that a vast number of unauthorised religious congregations, by their wealth and influence, were a danger to the State. To aim at them, he introduced his Associations Bill, in which it was provided



that every association that did not submit its statutes, the list of its members, and the nature of its property to Parliament, and obtain the authorisation of Parliament, was an illegal association, and therefore to be suppressed. The eminent statesman disavowed any desire to touch the congregations that were recognised by the State as of "public utility." M. Combes, who succeeded him, put the Associations Law into operation in a way which shortened the days of Waldeck-Rousseau, whose last words in the Senate were words of reproach.

M. Combes, in fact, caused the Chamber of Deputies to reject all the demands for authorisation, without any exceptions whatever. At a single coup the non-authorised congregations were swept away altogether. The next step was to include the authorised congregations in the same drastic measure. This meant the abolition of the Christian Brothers, and the dispersal of the Church school-teachers. In 1904 it became the law that no member of a religious congregation could be engaged in the work of education, and especially of primary education. Thus it was that very soon M. Combes was able to declare in Parliament that he had closed 20,000 Church schools. In reality, the actual number was 16,000.

Severe as were these blows to the Church, the Radical Government had by no means finished its task. The rupture of diplomatic relations with the Holy See was effected with a  *brusquerie*  that indicated open war. Not only did the French Ambassador to the Vatican leave Rome without observing the usual diplomatic courtesies, but the situation of Mgr. Montagnini, who was left in charge of current affairs after the departure of the Nuncio from Paris, was made intolerable. Eventually, M. Clemenceau had Mgr. Montagnini conveyed across the frontier as an "undesirable." The Concordat, the celebrated treaty concluded between Napoleon and Pius VII. on July 15, 1801, which as a bilateral contract could not be abrogated by one of the parties only, was treated by the French Government as though it had no existence. Finally, M.

Aristide Briand's Separation Bill, adopted in July 1905, brought matters to a supreme crisis.

The Catholics were told in this Bill that if they wished to retain possession of the Church property they must form themselves into *associations cultuelles*. Probably, if the Pope had not interfered, those parish boards would have been accepted. The alternative was so appalling that many were of the opinion that no other course was open than submission. Pius X., however, was firmly persuaded that the *association cultuelle*, subject as it would be to civil authority, could only lead to servitude and schism, and the Pontiff's attitude settled the point once and for all. The *non possumus* of Rome had the effect of irritating the Radical camp. The bishops' palaces, the seminaries, and the presbyteries were seized. Pious foundations, valued at £20,000,000, were confiscated, and divided among the 36,000 communes. Careful inventories were taken in all the churches and chapels throughout the land, so that not even the most trifling object might be in the possession of the clergy. To shut up the churches was found to be an impossible task, so the clergy were allowed to have the use of them. At first it was attempted to prohibit any priest performing any religious function without having first asked permission of the civil authority. It was no uncommon thing, in M. Clemenceau's time, for the police to draw up *procès-verbal* against a priest for saying Mass, but public opinion in the end made its voice heard.

In 1906, then, the French Church found itself absolutely denuded of everything. No congregations, no schools, no funds, no salaries, no church buildings, no church treasurers, no seminaries, no residences for the clergy, no rank, no position. In exchange, however, there was the gift of Liberty. The hundred years under the Concordat were a century of bondage. Napoleon had, for purposes of his own, added the Organic Articles to the Concordat. They were, he said, the logical interpretation of the Concordat. By these Articles, it was forbidden for French bishops to meet together, whether in



council or otherwise. So minute were the details in all that concerned what the clergy might or might not do, that even the colour of the stockings they wore was specified. Prelates and parish priests were simply high officials, and had very little contact with the people. Rome was powerless to refuse the nominees of the French Government when dioceses were to be filled up, and hence the French bishops came to be regarded as "prefects in purple." Even the nomination of a *curé*, or parish priest, required the permission of Government.

The separation created a completely different situation. To the wonder of Parisians, a council of eighty-six French archbishops and bishops was seen to be held in a stately château belonging to the Énard family adjoining the Bois de Boulogne. For the first time the voice of Catholic France was heard in tones of energy and independence. That was six years ago. Since then, many prelates have passed away, their places being filled up by the Holy See. The Episcopate has been renewed in quite another form. His Holiness wants apostolic men, and canonical chapters never fail to send to Rome the best names they can select. The bishops are free to appoint as parish priests the members of their clergy who have given signal proofs of earnest living. Their own lives are shorn of the glittering externals of the past. They are content to reside in plain and unpretentious buildings, for which they pay rent like ordinary citizens, and their *mot d'ordre* is contact with the people. The custom of holding a diocesan congress every year is gaining ground. The bishop fills the chair, and he is supported by laymen distinguished in literature and the arts, in commerce and industry and agriculture. The Bishop of Orleans has set the example of joining in the "popular banquets" that are held once a month in the parishes of his diocese, where, at two francs a head, the farmers and the countrymen may share with "Monseigneur" the humble *pot-au-feu*, and greet him as "one of ours."

The question of the schools was of pressing importance. Although primary education is obligatory in France, the law

of 1882 allows the existence of the Church school, or *école libre*, as well as that of the State school, or *école laïque*. By suppressing the teaching congregations, M. Combes evidently thought that French children who attended the *écoles libres* would be forced into the *écoles laïques*. The bishops undoubtedly were dreadfully harassed to find a solution. For a time a number of Church schools were kept on by the disbanded teachers, who after all had their diplomas, and were qualified as individuals to teach. In the meanwhile, training colleges were started, and gradually new Church schools sprang up, until at this moment there is fair prospect of lost ground being recovered. Nevertheless a vast number of Catholic children are obliged to frequent the State schools, against which there would be no insuperable objection but for the fact that the neutrality promised by Jules Ferry is more honoured in the breach than in the observance. It grew to be the fashion to teach in many of the State schools that belief in God and in a future life was a superstition of the Dark Ages, and that religion and reason were contradictory terms. Hence, in 1910, the French bishops published a collective letter condemning some of the text-books that were used in the State schools, and calling on Christian parents to protect the faith of their children. The answer to that appeal was the creation of associations of *pères de famille*, pledged to watch over the kind of instruction given in the State schools, and to take action accordingly. There are about 400,000 French fathers who take part in this movement, a truly formidable result. As a consequence, although Government threatened repressive measures, and introduced two Bills to that effect to Parliament, two years have been allowed to pass without further action being taken, a proof that the Catholic party has grown strong enough to show effective resistance.

It was confidently anticipated by the adversaries of the Roman Catholic Church that few young men would be found disposed to become candidates for Orders once the Separation



was a *fait accompli*. Undoubtedly there was reason for this conjecture, for vocations had fallen to a very low ebb in the two or three years that preceded the abolition of the Concordat. But here again there was a great surprise. Last year, for example, the candidates for the priesthood seeking admission into the Grand Seminary more than doubled the contingents of previous years. Strange to say, these vocations are not confined to youths, but include these of already-formed men, men of culture and ability, who, whether from disappointments, or from disgust of the world, prefer to devote themselves to the ecclesiastical career. As far as may be judged, there is no longer any real inquietude in episcopal minds on the point of priestly recruits.

The fact remains that in the past few years 450,000 Parisians have been won over to the Church, who before lived without any kind of religion. Mgr. Fagès, one of Cardinal Amette's indefatigable Vicars-General, is the head of an organisation that has constructed in the last few years no fewer than fifty-four places of worship, in and around Paris, of which twenty-four form new parishes. As soon as a new church is opened, it is crowded. The proofs afforded of this are so many, that the fact is unquestionable. The Diocesan Committee, aware that country peasants are constantly flocking to Paris in the hope of doing better there than in their cottages, has had the idea of writing to provincial curés to inform the ecclesiastical authority of Paris every time any of their parishioners migrate to the capital. They are thus prevented from becoming isolated and lost in the perils of a great city. Parochial committees are formed in every parish, gathering the men together in a common purpose. These committees are said to be a great success.

It requires a considerable amount of courage for a priest to show himself in certain low districts in and around Paris. A new commune called Pavillons-sous-Bois was erected five years ago. The Municipal Council took as its programme, "Ni gendarme ni curé chez nous." The inhabitants were wild,

unruly people, who never set foot in a church or place of worship of any sort. The Archbishop of Paris sent for the Abbé Alfonsi, a young Corsican priest, and charged him with the mission of evangelising Pavillons-sous-Bois. That was in 1908. The abbé hired a tumble-down house, and said Mass in his dining-room. The landlord drove him away. The abbé went elsewhere. The Municipality immediately changed the names of the streets around the temporary chapel for titles notoriously odious to Catholics. The revolutionaries swore they would have the abbé's "skin," but already a nucleus of well-meaning people were interested in his work. At last he opened his new church. A mob of apaches, headed by one of the Bonnot gang, surrounded the building while the inaugural ceremony was going on, and kept up a discordant din of yells and cries, finishing up with the "Internationale" and "À bas la calotte!" He has now a congregation of five thousand practical Christians. Among the parochial *œuvres* of the intrepid abbé are technical schools *d'apprentissage*, free registry-offices for working people seeking situations, a dispensary, conferences of St Vincent of Paul for assisting the poor and destitute, a corps of young men whose duty it is to escort and protect young girls from insult and outrage to and from work. Only those who know the perils of Paris can imagine what this means. It has been found that one man is sufficient to protect a railway compartment full of work-girls from molestation.

One of the worst neighbourhoods in Paris is that of Clichy, for long years abandoned and neglected. The curé and his vicaires are now doing wonders in this vast parish of working people. The Church is made the centre of social action which gradually is forming a Nouveau Clichy. The registry-offices are opened every day to all citizens, without distinction and without payment. Every Tuesday morning a doctor of the Faculté de Médecine de Paris gives free consultations. Every Tuesday afternoon a properly-qualified surgeon-dentist offers his services. A Mutual Benefit Society groups together the



families of Nouveau Clichy, and has been approved by Government. There is a Cercle d'études for youths. Professor Faribault conducts gratuitously Cours Industriels de Dessin Mécanique. There are Salles de Jeux, including a billiard-room, for working men and youths to pass their evenings. Every two months a theatrical performance is given by the Assemblée familiale d'éducation populaire par le théâtre. The plays that have already been performed include the *Jeanne d'Arc* of Barbier, with music and choruses by Gounod; *la Passion*; *Gringoire*; *Michel Strogoff*; *les Oberlé*, etc. The *Action Sociale* is the parochial newspaper. The Colonie de Vacances Ouvrières is to give poor families a few days in the country or at the seaside every summer. The Atelier Coopératif de Couture is to provide poor dressmakers with work in the ateliers or at their own homes, the system being carried out on co-operative lines. There is a bureau for gratuitous legal advice, given by a number of barristers belonging to the Paris Court of Appeal. Thus the poor people are protected from grasping landlords, and are made acquainted with the rights accorded them by the law in cases of labour accidents. Lectures are regularly given on religious, social, or economic problems. There is a free library containing 3000 volumes, attached to which is a reading-room, where workmen find pen, ink, and paper to write their letters. The Conference of St Vincent of Paul gives private aid to necessitous families of the parish. The Salle de Mobilier et de Vestiaire enables poor parishioners to purchase furniture, kitchen utensils, and garments at practically cost price. The Fourneau du Midi is the mid-day meal provided for the school children whose parents are out at work. The Villa du Nouveau Clichy is a big château in Brittany, turned into a convalescent home and place of rest for the sick and old people in the parish.

In enumerating the many social enterprises undertaken at Clichy, the purpose here is to point out what can be done, and what is intended to be done, throughout industrial France. Clichy perhaps has made more headway than other parishes,

but they are quickly following up. Of course the social action of the clergy is inalienably associated in their minds with spiritual action. Sooner or later they are persuaded that they will get the men to come to church. It is slow work, but there is promise of success. In the diocese of Orleans, for example, some village curés have made interesting experiments. As a rule, in the small communes, not more than eight or ten men would put their foot in a church on Sundays, and then they would stand near the doors, indifferent and unconcerned. The curés solved the problem by reserving a number of special benches near the sanctuary, and good-naturedly inviting the farm-labourers and wood-cutters to take their places there. Then they printed some very simple manuals, so that the men might follow the service without trouble.

Soon it was found that they took pleasure in joining in the Gregorian Chant of the Kyrie, the Gloria, and the Credo, and in singing the popular Christian hymns in the vernacular. To form these men into parish groups was but a step. Short and practical sermons on Essential Truths became the rule. The eight or ten men had grown into one or two hundred. They sang so lustily that the ordinary choir was no longer necessary. Once every month there was a special celebration for men only. A better feeling was seen in the communes, the cabarets were less frequented, the children were sent to catechism more regularly, and the parish priest was no longer an object of insult.

The Church will gain the hearts of the French people the day it is able to give them cheap and wholesome dwellings. The subject is one that is under the serious consideration of Government and Parliament, but it is of such vast extent that legislators seem afraid to deal with it. Mgr. Touchet, Bishop of Orleans, in a pastoral letter published last year, said: "The question of workmen's dwellings will shortly form part of our plan of operations. It is a national shame to allow these nests of fever and tuberculosis, for which so dear a rent is paid, to exist. When will the towns and cities that devote so much



money in the erection of school-palaces comprehend that it is not enough to give light and air to children in school-hours, if for the rest of the twenty-four hours they are to be shut up in pestilential holes. When will the State Savings Banks be authorised by the law to lend money at three per cent. to the Sociétés d'habitations ouvrières à bon marché? Here then is a useful and honourable campaign waiting to be taken up by our men's associations." This is sowing the right kind of seed, and the Catholic Social Congress just held at Limoges has adopted the Bishop's advice.

Thus everywhere is seen the growth of a new spirit in France. The revolutionary Labour Confederation is powerless to conduct a general strike, because Catholic men belonging to anti-socialistic syndicates form a stronger body. The progress of anti-militarism, anti-patriotism and neo-Malthusianism is stopped. There is an awakening of public opinion that demands wholesome government and the impartial vindication of the laws. The Reign of Terror established by the Jacobinism of the last decade is over. "The stars of heaven are extinguished," said M. René Viviani on a memorable occasion. They never shone more brilliantly than they do now.

H. V. ARKELL.

PARIS.

## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the “*Hibbert Journal*.” Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### POLYTHEISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1912, p. 926.)

THE Rev. N. E. Egerton Swann, on p. 926 of the July *Hibbert*, says that I have “testified to a belief” in a “curious polytheism” which I seem to “claim as supported by religious experience”; and further, that, “following the late Professor James,” I am “seeking to revive Pagan and Gnostic modes of thought.” Of all this I am myself unconscious.

The sentence he is referring to is the conclusion of my article “Balfour and Bergson” in the January *Hibbert*; but in his criticism there is misunderstanding and unconscious misrepresentation. First of all, admission of the possibility of the existence of intelligences higher than man is not equivalent to polytheism, unless as a matter of nomenclature it is proposed to call all such beings “gods”: a nomenclature which I have never contemplated and would deprecate as confusing. The unity of plan and design, or whatever terms are better and more appropriate—the unity, let us say, running throughout the visible Universe, including varieties of matter, modes of vibration, everything that can be explored—is to every scientific man conspicuous, and in so far as science is theistic at all, its suggestions are strongly monotheistic.

So if religious “believers in general” are “directly conscious of the Supreme Being,” we may doubt whether they have any adequate notion of the magnitude of their claim, but have nothing else to say about it. As a matter of fact, I was not speaking in terms of religious experience at all, but merely of the outcome of my own first-hand exploration of part of the scientific domain. Nor was I consciously following Professor James; though, inasmuch as he has had partially similar experiences, he may naturally have been led to somewhat similar results. I have not made a sufficient study of his position—if indeed he has clearly expressed it—to know exactly what it is.

If the terms “Pagan” and “Gnostic” apply to ideas generated by psychic exploration, I may regret the ill-sounding adjectives, but am otherwise helpless in the matter. I fail to recognise “Pagan” as



appropriate, but as to the other epithet, it must be confessed that a gradual removal of the *a* from the word *agnostic* is part of the legitimate province of science; though the quest is an ambitious one, and mistakes are readily possible.

In matters of religious experience I defer to Mr Swann's authority, but, whether the sentence criticised is well worded or not—and certainly it could be improved,—I should have thought that the form of theological expression on which I did incidentally venture at p. 297 of the same *Hibbert* article was a sufficiently explicit recognition of an Immanent and Transcendent Unity.

OLIVER LODGE.

### DOGMA, SCIENCE, AND PRAGMATISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1912, p. 924.)

I AM not sure how far the contrast drawn by Mr Patterson Muir between the method of science and that of theology is intended to imply that theological dogmas should be treated precisely as scientific hypotheses. His scorn for all permanence and absoluteness claimed by dogma, however, seems to show that some such inference is intended. On this point, then, I want to ask one question which appears to me to go to the root of the matter. Mr Patterson Muir is a pragmatist, and consequently believes that every truth is discovered or made with a special purpose. What, then, is the purpose of religious truth? To me (speaking also as a pragmatist) the answer seems plain. Its purpose is to provide me with a hypothesis on which I may base the whole conduct of my life and my hope of union with the Eternal. My religion must be something to which I can give my whole being, on which I can rest the whole end and aim of my life. The religious hypothesis therefore exists in order to claim a permanence and an objectivity which the scientific hypothesis does not claim. The question, "Does an electron exist?" is quite unimportant and even meaningless for the man of science. He only postulated the electron in order to be able to manipulate better a certain portion of experience—and for that purpose the existence of the electron does not much matter. The question, "Does God exist?" does matter vitally to the man of religion, for on the answer to that question depends his whole aim and conduct in life.

Again, because the religious hypothesis claims my whole life, it must be verifiable in *all* experience. The idea of dogma as an alien tyranny imposed on life is simply due to a narrow view of religious experience. The real dogmatic tyranny results from assuming with William James that religious experience is a specific psychological phenomenon of consciousness. For he who cultivates this consciousness most, will be the most religious man; and religion, unless safeguarded by dogma, will become the esoteric possession of the few, a tyranny in principle more severe than any the Inquisition ever contemplated. This most unpragmatic result is also due

to a false assimilation of religion to science. Science exalts the expert, because it exists primarily for the scientific. Christianity exalts the babe, because it exists primarily not for the saint but for the sinner. Science can be run by professors. It is the van-boy in the East End who ought to run the Church. He, at least, is the most important person to be considered.

Lastly, the religious hypothesis, because it exists to bring into relation with the Eternal, must itself claim an eternal truth. But the content of that truth is not specifically intellectual. Rather it is the spiritual food which sustains the faithful in all ages, and by fulfilling that function is daily verified in the lives of men. No one felt more keenly than the early fathers that there was a risk in giving that truth philosophical expression. Nevertheless, that risk had to be run, and their action was justified by the result. The philosophic propositions of the creeds do not, as philosophy, even claim to be eternal; but the eternity of the spiritual truth contained in them is so vitally important that it would be mere folly to tinker them at intervals in order to meet the demands of each new school of human thought.

I have tried in a few words to sketch how difference of purpose must cause difference of method in science and theology. Surely the fact that in the past theology has made nonsense of science, is no reason for saying that science should now perform that office for theology.

O. C. QUICK.

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### INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1912, p. 861.)

THERE is another way of understanding "the *locus classicus* of prophetic study" in 2 Peter i. 20, *πᾶσα προφητεία γραφῆς ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως οὐ γίνεται*, which interprets the words literally, is in accord with the phrases which precede and follow, and confirms the teaching which Mr Ffrench draws from them. If we render the words, "No prophecy of Scripture comes to be of its own interpretation," or, more diffusely, "It is a mark of every prophecy of Scripture that it shows that it does not carry its own interpretation with it," we have a key to the purpose and the use of prophecy. The passage, if not from the pen of St Peter, is written by one who thought of himself as having been with the Lord on the holy mount and having seen the glory of the Transfiguration. And from this vision, he says, "we have the prophetic word more firm"; the prophecy has been confirmed by its fulfilment; it is not history written in advance, it is a key to the meaning of the present. Even now, while the vision has been granted to a few, believers have prophecy but as a faint light in a murky place; it is not sunlight, it is not even the light of the morning-star, it but turns the eyes in the direction of the star and the sun when they shall appear.



It was in this way, we are taught, that the prophets spoke for their own time, and thus for the future as well. And the last verse of the chapter gives us the reason (we must attempt to translate *ἠνέχθη* and *φερόμενοι* alike): "For at no time was a *prophecy* brought on by man's will; but as they were brought on by Holy Spirit *men* spake from God." The men could speak "the great principles of the divine order," in words simple or rhetorical, plain or mysterious; and thus, to quote Mr Ffrench, "it is likely that these principles would go on unfolding themselves in various ways, and that the words in which they were first revealed would go on having new accomplishments." He was no mean prophet himself who after a vision of Christ could thus write of prophecies of Scripture.

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### "CONFORMITY AND VERACITY, 1662 AND 1912."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1912, p. 816.)

As one who grappled for many years with difficulties such as are now besetting many of the clergy, and came at last to a definite conclusion, I beg permission to say a few words on the paper by the Rev. E. W. Lummis. It appears to me that this writer underestimates the ethical value of veracity. "After all," he says, "verbal veracity is the lowest stage of truth." This may be so, if the truth is merely verbal; but the controversies now agitating the churches go far beyond the verbal, they concern fundamental doctrines. The nature of Christ, the authority of the Bible, and the destiny of man after death, are amongst the questions on which the clergy are not agreed. Mere modes of expression would not greatly agitate the minds of thoughtful men; nothing short of uncertainty on vital truth would have created the present religious unrest.

Mr Lummis goes on to ask, "Is religion concerned with this (verbal veracity)? Her interest lies in wisdom, power, and holiness." True, but if the present controversies are more than verbal, these interests are very deeply involved. "Wisdom, power, and holiness" cannot exist in vital connection with unverity. A clergyman does not necessarily commit himself to a belief in the petrification of Lot's wife or the dividing of the Red Sea, when he publicly reads the lessons enshrining these legends. He merely recites the narratives, and leaves to the faithful the task of extracting such edification as they can find in them. But the case is widely different when he ceremonially turns to the East, and leads the congregation in the declaration of their fundamental beliefs.

"I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." Many clergymen doubtless accept the scientific theory of the indestructibility of matter. How then can they *ex animo* declare their belief that God brought into existence that which must have always been?

"Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary." Here again we have no mere collocation of words, but a statement of fundamental importance. Yet we know that the dogma of the Virgin Birth is widely disputed in the churches. Similar comments are suggested on the remaining declarations of the Creed. A very emphatic remark may be made upon the clause announcing belief in "the Resurrection of the body." There is probably not a single cleric in the realm who accepts this statement as truth in any natural sense of the words.

Taking the Apostles' Creed as a whole, it will hardly be disputed that large numbers of the clergy refuse belief in one or more of its affirmations. No merely verbal alterations would meet their case.

Take also the Ante-communion Service. What can be more definite than the declaration introducing the Ten Commandments? "God spake these words and said—" This assertion is either true or false. Many clerical students of the Higher Criticism believe that it is false. How then can they honestly declare that they accept it as true? In the Commandments themselves there are erroneous statements which the celebrant has to announce as the truth of God. Does the modern Christian believe that God is "jealous"? Does he hold the crude conception that God punishes people because their grandfathers hate him? Does he believe that the Deity made the heavens and the earth in six days, or that the seventh day is holy because he rested on it, or that the ancient Babylonian superstition that the seventh day is taboo ought to be maintained by enlightened Englishmen, or that children who honour their parents will live longer than other people, or that our neighbour's house is more important than our neighbour's wife? There are in truth large numbers of clerics who regard the Ten Words as crude and barbaric, as altogether unsuited to be set forth as the standard of morals in the twentieth century.

Veracity is not a mere question of words. It is essential to "wisdom, power, and holiness." Unveracity is the very reverse of "wisdom." It is destructive of all moral "power." It is absolutely inconsistent with "holiness," if that word is to connote high ethical qualities. For men to habitually say the thing that they do not believe is to debauch their consciences. Even Dr Sanday declares that he repeats a creed "not as an individual, but as a member of the Church." What would men have said of Darwin or Huxley, if he had thus publicly falsified his own convictions?

Worst of all is the effect of clerical unveracity upon the laity. They look to their professional teachers for guidance, and it is cruel to deceive them. If it is to be "like priest, like people," the future of the Church is not encouraging.

C. CALLAWAY.



# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

PHILOSOPHICAL science has sustained three heavy losses since I wrote last. The deaths of Shadworth H. Hodgson, of Alfred Fouillée, and of Henri Poincaré followed one another in quick succession, and in each case a vigorous and independent mind has been removed from our midst. Who that ever knew him could help respecting Shadworth Hodgson, whose solitary life, after the sad loss of his wife and child in 1858, three years after his marriage, was dedicated with singular zeal and devotion to the pursuit of philosophy? Of his chief work, *The Metaphysic of Experience*, published in 1898, Adamson is reported to have said that it seemed to him the most important English contribution to the speculation of our time, and certain is it that its value will become increasingly apparent as the years pass by. It is, one may say, the most complete embodiment we possess of the English tradition that began with Locke. Philosophy, as Hodgson conceived it, was rather a method than a system—a method by which the whole field of experience could be surveyed, and a rationale of existent reality be sought. Method in philosophy consisted, so he contended, in the analysis of experience without assumptions either as to its origin or nature. And in the logical order, the question of nature preceded the question of genesis—we must first determine what experience is known as before we ask how it arises. Proceeding in this way, we reach the fundamental antithesis of content and process—two aspects of consciousness essentially distinguishable, but yet in fact inseparable. The searching criticism to which Hodgson submitted such conceptions as those of substance, power, force, agency, subject, and the like—all too readily hypostatized as entities—is in every respect admirable, and a permanent service to clear thinking. As outcome of that criticism, he concluded that consciousness is not itself an agent. The real condition of the *occurrence* of consciousness, as a process, was to be sought in material changes. On the other hand, the *character* of the contents of consciousness, as known,

could not thus be explained; they were *sui generis*, data which can only be described as revelations. Involved in our experience Hodgson found the conception of the nature of an "unseen world"—a world of existent consciousness, wherein our aspirations and ideals are realised. This idea of God was, however, a practical conviction, a moral belief, and afforded us no theoretical insight concerning reality. A sympathetic account of Shadworth Hodgson's life and work, by Dr H. Wildon Carr, is contained in the new volume (vol. xii.) of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912). To some extent Poincaré, in what has been called his "Socratic exposition of the limitations of the human outlook on the universe," may be represented as confirming, from his own point of view, much of Hodgson's position. But Hodgson would not have subscribed to many of the dicta of *La science et l'hypothèse*, such, for example, as that deduction can never give us new truth, that the existence of external bodies means for science a set of persistent relations—relations which are the same for everybody, or that experiment is the sole source of truth. Poincaré's best work, as a philosopher, consisted not so much in his defence of scientific naturalism as in his strenuous attempt to co-ordinate the entire domain of mathematics and physics in one system of ideas. No line of thought could well have presented a stronger contrast to that pursued by Shadworth Hodgson than the theory of *idées-forces*, as expounded by Fouillée. According to this theory, a fundamental unity subsists between the mental and the physical—every "idea" is at the same time a "force" working for its own realisation. On the basis of the inseparability of motion and idea, Fouillée developed a system of monism, which, in his view, avoided the abstractions of materialism on the one hand and of idealism on the other. Whether the conception of *idées-forces* will bear the weight he put upon it is, I take it, more than questionable, but the application of the conception, in his hands, to the fields of psychology, ethics, and sociology certainly led to some important and interesting results.

A useful addition to our philosophical literature has been made by Mr Fred Rothwell's translation of *Historical Studies in Philosophy*, by Professor Émile Boutroux (London: Macmillan, 1912). Socrates, Aristotle, Jacob Boehme, Descartes, and Kant are the subjects dealt with, and the *Studies* will prove distinctly helpful to the understanding of these thinkers. Socrates, says Boutroux, "was the first to make science an integral element of morals; the first to bring action, which appears as individual, within the compass of true knowledge, which is universal." The central idea of Aristotelianism, according to Boutroux, is that science (ἐπιστήμη) has two modes or degrees, in conformity with the general distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. Science in potency has the universal for its object, but it is not so with science in act, which has for its object the perfectly determined individual. A lucid account of Aristotle's scientific treatises is given, the necessity of which for the interpretation of his philosophical theories cannot be too emphatically insisted on. In dealing with Kant,



Boutroux lays stress upon the supreme importance of reason in the critical analysis of knowledge and morality—a consideration strangely ignored by some recent expositors of Kantianism in this country. Three short essays by Professor Boutroux have also been translated and put together in a small volume, under the title *The Beyond that is Within, and other Addresses* (London: Duckworth, 1912), by Mr Jonathan Nield. The first, which gives its name to the book, discusses the notion of the “Subliminal Self,” and tries to establish the reality of an “inner beyond” in human life as the condition of action, volition, and perception. Writing, in the second essay, on “Morality and Religion,” Boutroux argues that, whilst each of these has a separate sphere, religion creates the material requisite for the critical work of morality. The Clarendon Press has issued a very skilful translation of the first section of the third book of Hegel’s larger *Logik* by Professor H. S. Macran (*Hegel’s Doctrine of Formal Logic*, Oxford, 1912). The translator has prefixed an admirable introduction, dealing with Hegel’s philosophy generally. For Hegel, it is contended, the world of existence contains nothing that the man of science would not admit. “There are no mysterious metaphysical entities lurking in corners like the popular *soul*, or withdrawn into infinite remoteness, like the popular *God*.” But beyond the existent *as existent*, there remains the question as to the *significance* of things, as to their *value*, and in this respect the philosophy of Hegel furnishes an explanation which natural science is, from the necessity of the case, powerless to yield. A translation due to the patient labours, we are told, of Father Signini, of Rosmini’s *Teodicea* (*Theodicy: Essays on Divine Providence*, 3 vols., London: Longmans, 1912) has just appeared, and it ought to interest a wider circle than the students of Catholic metaphysics. Rosmini is here engaged in the task of vindicating the equity and goodness of God in the distribution of good and evil in the world, and he brings to bear upon his problem a great deal of subtlety and acumen. Passing to a very different author, we would extend a cordial welcome to the second edition of Sir Frederick Pollock’s valuable work, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1912). The most considerable changes, so far as the exposition of Spinoza’s philosophy is concerned, are in the chapter on the *Tractatus Politicus*, where the writer has tried to do better justice to Hobbes, in reference to Spinoza’s modification of Hobbes’ doctrine.

Several important works dealing with Greek philosophy call for mention. There is some valuable material in Mr F. Macdonald Cornford’s book, *From Religion to Philosophy* (London: Arnold, 1912), in which an attempt is made to show that there is a real continuity between the earliest rational speculation and the religious representations that lay behind it. In exceedingly interesting chapters, Mr Cornford analyses the notion of *Moirai*, Destiny, indicates its persistence through the course of Greek science, and attempts to account for its origin as a projection, or extension, of *Nomos*, in the sense of constitutional order—a projection or extension from the tribal group to the elemental grouping of the cosmos. So, too, the

author traces back the idea of *φύσις*, the primary substance of things, to an age actually older than religion itself. Mr Cornford helps us, no doubt, to see "philosophy in the making," but whether he does not minimise the difference between the early cosmological speculations and the mythological fancies that preceded them will be a disputed question. Professor Julius Baumann's little treatise, *Neues zu Sokrates, Aristoteles, Euripides* (Leipzig: Veit, 1912), is a scholarly piece of work. The most valuable part of it is a translation of the second book of Aristotle's *Physics*, the book that deals with the four causes, the translation being interspersed with an explanatory commentary which is distinctly elucidating. Under the title *Platonica* (London: Grant Richards, 1911), Mr Herbert Richards has collected in one volume the critical notes on the Platonic writings he has been contributing to the *Classical Review* and the *Classical Quarterly* since 1893. Mr Richards holds that the *Letters*, or at all events the important ones, are spurious. In an article in *Mind* for July, Professor A. E. Taylor contests this view, so far as the seventh Epistle is concerned. The question turns upon the estimate one forms of a remarkable passage in that letter (342a-344d), which professes to justify the contention that "philosophy" cannot be profitably communicated by books, but only by direct and long-continued intercourse of mind with mind in the common pursuit of truth. It has generally been thought that the passage in question is altogether too unintelligible to be ascribed to Plato, and Mr Richards goes to the extent of pronouncing it to be "nonsense." Professor Taylor gives, however, a translation of the whole passage, with the object of demonstrating that the thesis it supports is in principle sound, and that good Platonic authority can be adduced for its argumentation. If the letter be, as he urges, genuine, it throws undoubtedly a flood of light on Plato's early career, particularly on the nature of his relations with Socrates.

Two well-known periodicals have recently issued special supplements, both of them of unusual interest. The current number of the *Kantstudien* (xvii. 3) is a *Festheft zu Hermann Cohens 70. Geburtstag*, and the articles in it enable one vividly to realise the great significance of Cohen's work. His colleague, Professor Paul Natorp, writes on "Kant und die Marburger Schule," and brings out quite clearly the nature of the reconstruction of the Kantian system which the Marburg school, headed by Cohen, has attempted. "We connect," he says, "Plato with Kant, and from the conjunction important and deep-going points of agreement emerge even in respect to details, on which lately from different sides stress has been laid." The first edition of Cohen's work, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, appeared in 1871. Since then, he and his followers have doubtless in various ways moved nearer to the position of Hegel. But Natorp expends considerable pains to show that an impassable gulf still divides the two systems. Like Hegel, the thinkers of Marburg reject the Kantian antithesis of sense and thought; like Hegel, they refuse to regard knowledge as a construction or product, constituted of elements which themselves lie outside the sphere of knowledge. Nevertheless, they



repudiate the Hegelian conception of an Absolute, in which is realised the *final* achievement of the spirit. They maintain, on the contrary, that the development of knowledge is an infinite process, and can never culminate in a summed-up whole. Dr Ernst Cassirer's article on "Hermann Cohen und die Erneuerung der Kantischen Philosophie" is also full of suggestive reflection. Cassirer maintains that the "reine Logik," the problems of which have been worked out with such laborious thoroughness by Husserl, and likewise the recent investigations which have gradually broken away from the domain of the psychologist and have been grouped together as belonging to a new science, *Gegenstandstheorie*, owe their initiation to the line of thought mapped out by Cohen for the first time in his Kantian book of 1871. Cassirer emphasises also the insight and thoroughness displayed by Cohen in his treatment of the notion of worth or value. The other special number to which I referred comes to us from the office of the *Rev. de Métaphysique*. Rousseau was born on 28th June 1712, and the second centenary of his birth has been made an occasion for devoting a whole issue of the periodical mentioned to his philosophy. The opening article, "Remarques sur la Philosophie de Rousseau," is by Professor Boutroux, who discusses Rousseau's philosophy of history, and the three phases he distinguishes in human development. These phases can be, Boutroux thinks, symbolically characterised as those of innocence, sin, and redemption. Professor Höffding writes on "Rousseau et la Religion," and describes Rousseau's religion as being a Christianity without dogmas and without miracles. A further article by M. Parodi deals with the religious conceptions of Rousseau, and dwells on two complementary aspects of his religious philosophy. On the one hand, basing religion on the intuition of the moral consciousness, on the *lumen naturale*, Rousseau makes it an intimately personal thing; and, on the other hand, recognising it as a necessary condition of social order, he claims it to be an essential requisite for the collective life of the community. Dr Bernard Bosanquet contributes an able and appreciative study of "Les idées politiques de Rousseau," in which he discusses the conception of the *contrat social*, and finds its essence in the doctrine that "will, not force, is the basis of the state." There are other noteworthy contributions—one by Lévy-Bruhl on the quarrel between Hume and Rousseau, another by Delbos on Rousseau and Kant, and another by Benrubi on Goethe and Schiller, as continuing the movement of the *Aufklärung*.

Some acute criticism of *Creative Evolution* is to be found in an article by Professor A. W. Moore on "Bergson and Pragmatism" (*Phil. R.*, July 1912). Dealing with the action of spirit on matter, Professor Moore points out that matter, as treated by Bergson, is by turns a prior condition of, and then identical with, the condensation of real duration into images. How, again, he asks, can life cut living beings out of matter, if matter be nothing but the reverse movement of life? As such a movement, it would have to reverse this movement of cutting out living beings. Yet, on the contrary, according to Bergson, it aids and abets it, not only so far as to

secure a *modus vivendi*, but to the extent of real organisation. There is a similar oscillation, so it is contended, in the treatment of instinct and intelligence. After claiming that instinct, which works only with living organs, is much closer to the nature of life and real duration than intelligence which fashions its tools from inert matter, Bergson goes on to insist that it is the function of consciousness, and especially of human consciousness, to introduce into matter indetermination and choice, which are of the very essence of spirit. But choice involves the anticipatory idea of several actions, and this is *intellectual* consciousness. In the current number of *Logos* (iii. 1), Count Keyserling discusses "Das Wesen der Intuition und ihre Rolle in der Philosophie." He argues that intuition is not, as such, capable of expression, and that consequently philosophy has no alternative but to fall back on concepts. The problem of philosophy, however, now is to find better and more adequate conceptual embodiments for our intuitions than have hitherto been found, and this task is not an impossible one. Professor J. S. Mackenzie's "Notes on the Problem of Time" (*Mind*, July 1912) do not refer expressly to Bergson, but they bear very directly upon Bergson's main position. In marked opposition to Bergson's view, Professor Mackenzie can only think of time as one of the eternal forms that are contained in the life of the Absolute Spirit. Time, in which all things pass, may, it seems to him, itself be timeless, in the sense that it does not pass. It may be an essentially unchanging order in the abiding whole of reality. And whilst an inseparable aspect of the life of the Absolute, time may wrongly be regarded as including within it the Absolute. Time, in other words, is in the Absolute, not the Absolute in time.

The place of honour in the July number of *Mind* is given to an extremely bold and original piece of constructive argument by Professor S. Alexander, "On Relations; and in particular the Cognitive Relation." A relation he describes as the whole situation into which the terms which stand in relation enter, so far as the situation concerns the relation. The situation may be one of events, as in the causal relation, or of things which are simultaneous, as the points of a line. No relations, not even those of difference, identity, and the like, are rightly regarded as the work of the mind; in all cases relations are constituted by objective situations. Further, a relation is not internal to the things it relates in the sense of being a quality of them, although it is internal in the sense that it cannot exist independently of them. And in so far as things enter into the relation and become its terms, it is not external to them. To separate the world into terms *and* their relations is to be guilty of abstraction. The world consists of things *in* their relations. Now, the relation of knowing an object subsists when a thing called the subject, which possesses the quality of consciousness, finds itself in the presence of an object, not itself. We have, then, in fact, the relation of togetherness between knowing subject and known object, and in a broad general sense any two individuals whatever in a relation of togetherness may each be said to "know" the other. In the narrower sense, however,



"knowing" is only possible where one of the members of the relation is a mind. This relation is experienced by the subject as an "enjoyment," whilst the object is "contemplated." The contrast between "enjoyed" and "contemplated" is exhibited most forcibly in the causal relation, and what is learnt from it may be extended to all knowing. For in every causal relation the patient is not aware of the effect, but enjoys the effect, and to the state of enjoyment the *cause* is revealed as whatever object it is. Very different is the position taken by Professor Frank Thilly, who discusses "The Relation of Consciousness and Object in Sense-Perception" in the *Phil. R.* for July. After examining various realist theories—not, however, Alexander's—the author concludes that we are forced to recognise that much which appears in the perceptual situation belongs to the mental realm, and is read into the object, sometimes truly, sometimes not. This, he argues, does not mean that the mind alters the object, or that it creates the object out of nothing, or that the object creates a picture of itself in the mind. It means only that a conscious organism perceives a real object in a certain way, according to the mental and physical factors involved.

Professor A. Meinong returns to the subject of one of his earliest books in a weighty article, "Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie" (*Logos*, iii. 1). He contends that the refusal to recognise impersonal values is the result of a mistaken "Psychologismus," and that on sound psychological principles the attempt will not be made to base all values on the appreciation of conscious subjects. Two valuable psychological studies, which have, however, a wide philosophical bearing, have been published by Professor W. Brown—one in the July number of *The Sociological R.* on "Emotions and Morals," and the other in the July number of *The Quest* on "The Logic of the Emotions." In the latter an attempt is made to show how feeling or emotion may not only confuse and hinder thought, but may also take the place of abstract thought and exhibit a logic of its own. Dr Brown is, however, too much inclined, it seems to me, to ignore the consideration that after all what is working in such "emotional logic" is psychologically a process of thinking, and is not generically different from what we call "thinking" in intellectual operations. I should like to call attention also to Mrs Sophie Bryant's address on "The Many-sidedness of Moral Education" (*Inter. J. Eth.*, July 1912). Mrs Bryant discusses, in a pleasant and lucid way, the transformation of wayward impulse into a steady purpose; the evolution of altruism side by side with egoism in wholesome social life, and the training to dutifulness, conscience, and voluntary submission, within limits, to the social will.

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## THEOLOGY.

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POPULARISERS are with us this quarter.

In *L'Évolution du dogme catholique* (the full title adds in smaller type, "simpliciter et innocue"!), Count D'Alviella proposes to study, for the benefit of the French non-theological public, what he calls "les modalités" of the process by means of which the system of Catholic dogma has attained its present shape and size. Our object, he remarks, is not to demonstrate the error of the Church, but to recover and restate "the successive elements, and the social forces which have contributed to the formation and preservation of the Catholic faith which is their resultant." The first volume, with a rather superfluous preface by M. Salomon Reinach, is entitled *Les Origines*. It is a large, lucid book, dealing with the first stage of the evolution, in five main sections: Jesus, the primitive apostolic tradition, Paulinism, the post-apostolic tradition of the Synoptic Gospels, and the Fourth Gospel. The guide whom Count D'Alviella has chiefly followed over this well-worn route is M. Loisy, though M. Loisy is not always radical enough for his follower. "We cannot assert," says the author (p. 253), "that we possess to-day a single word of Jesus that is authentic, that was really uttered by him." The result is that the impetus to the formation of Catholic dogma is found in the apostolic and Pauline speculations which seized upon such simple anti-legal messages as Jesus may be supposed to have uttered. The first volume closes with the enunciation of two laws which are to form the guiding principles of the succeeding studies: one is the external law, that the evolution of Catholic dogma followed the general march of civilisation, from east to west; the other is the internal law, that Catholic dogma is a compromise between the faith of the simple folk and the knowledge of the intellectuals, "between the concrete tradition and the abstract speculation, between the national messianism of the Jews and the rationalistic, Stoic ethic, between religion and theology, *between feeling and reason*. Christian dogma is an amalgam, or rather a juxtaposition of these two contradictory and incompatible elements" (p. 337). In a much smaller and less pretentious book, Mr A. W. F. Blunt (*Faith and the New Testament*: Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark) explains to general readers the relation of Christianity to the New Testament and the Church; neither of the latter is infallible, private inquiry is necessary, but the safe theory, as advocated by the Church of England, is "a creed based on Scripture, developed on that basis by the living Church, and apprehended by the free act of faith of each individual." The Church must develop its doctrine, and reinterpret it; Mr Blunt and Count D'Alviella are agreed on this. But "a Christian Church has no moral right to propound new doctrines, which cannot be supported out of the New Testament, as necessary articles of faith," on



penalty of being adjudged unapostolic and therefore uncatholic; and again, private judgment must be checked by the consideration that "the collective inspiration of a great society like the Christian Church, an inspiration that lasts through the centuries, has a claim to our allegiance which could not easily be overestimated." The latter consideration is the theme of Mr T. R. Glover's Swarthmore Lecture on *The Nature and Purpose of a Christian Society* (London: Headley Brothers), a finely phrased statement upon the need of the experience of the historic Church as a make-weight to the doctrine of the inner Light. "The solidarity of the Christian Church throughout the ages, and the unity of its experience, in spite of the want of unity in its opinions and organisations, tell immensely in the experience of the individual Christian."

A similar group of books lies before us, which is devoted to the popular exposition of the Old Testament. This forms the subject of several papers in *Scripture Teaching in Secondary Schools*,<sup>1</sup> notably those by Professor Kennett, Dr Foakes-Jackson, and Mr N. P. Wood, dealing with the methods of teaching. A good example of it, in practice, is given by Dr A. H. M'Neile's *Deuteronomy: Its Place in Revelation* (Longmans, Green), to which Canon Driver contributes a preface. Dr M'Neile states the critical and religious view of Deuteronomy with moderation and effectiveness. It is still necessary to reiterate the critical principles, he confesses, since the Mosaic authorship continues to be advocated in some quarters, in face of evidence. He has in mind, particularly, Mr J. S. Griffiths' volume on *The Problem of Deuteronomy*, issued last year by the S.P.C.K. The same society has just published the translation of a similar book by M. Naville on *The Discovery of the Law under King Josiah*, in which he suggests that the well-known Egyptian practice of depositing a copy of sacred texts in the walls of temples explains the origin of Deuteronomy, which was buried in the walls of Solomon's temple and "found" by Hilkiah; also that, as Hilkiah could not read it, the Book of the Law must have been written in Babylonian cuneiform script. Dr G. A. Cooke (*The Interpreter*, July, pp. 380-385) points out that the latter conjecture is "merely ingenious guesswork." Nothing is said in the Old Testament story about undecipherable characters; Hilkiah must have known at least the subject of the Book of the Law before he could call it by that name, and there is no evidence that Shaphan could read cuneiform.

In this connection a popular volume by Professor A. S. Isaacs, of New York, may be mentioned, *What is Judaism?* (Putnam's Sons, New York and London). It is a vigorous plea for the religious significance of Judaism in modern times. Professor Isaacs writes with a special view to the Jews in America, but he insists that Judaism is of cosmopolitan importance, as a factor in the coming religion which is to consecrate the brotherhood of men. Its three working principles are: (a) belief in a God "whose attributes are unity, incorporeality, eternity, and omnipotence";

<sup>1</sup> Edited by N. P. Wood, with a preface by Professor Burkitt. Cambridge: at the University Press.

(b) faith in the reality of Revelation, involving the immutability of the Law of Moses; and (c), as a corollary, faith in future reward and punishment for those who keep or disobey that Law. The last-named principle is not elaborated theologically by Professor Isaacs, but it forms the thesis of a popular statement upon *Universalism* (London: Elliot Stock). The author in his sketch puts forward Scriptural and philosophical pleas for his doctrine, and concludes with a brief historical *résumé*; like Origen, he believes that not only all human beings, but even Lucifer and his fallen angels, will be included in the final restoration. This reassuring doctrine, he admits, was not held by the Old Testament prophets, nor was it even recognised by the primitive apostles, who were then within the shadow of Mosaism, but it is an inference from the truly Christian principle of the love of God.

A similar attempt to popularise the criticism of the New Testament is seen in Dr J. M. Wilson's *Origin and Aim of the Acts of the Apostles* (Macmillan), six sermons on the religious and historical significance of the book. It is premature, however, to tell a popular audience that one "result of the exhaustive study that has been so long lavished on this book" is the settlement of its date at the end of A.D. 62. This is to follow Harnack too eagerly, and to say that "it may be doubted whether the question of date will ever be seriously raised again" is to speak inadvisedly. Dr Wilson also commits himself to the position that the Western reading of Acts xv. represents Luke's original draft, *i.e.* that the decree of the Jerusalem Council said nothing about "things strangled," but simply enjoined the three great moral laws against idolatry, murder, and fornication. Father Six, S.J., in an essay on "*Das Aposteldekret (Acts xv. 28-29): Seine Entstehung und Geltung in den ersten vier Jahrhunderten*" (Innsbruck), also doubts the authenticity of *πνικτοῦ* in the Lucan text, but declines to eliminate a prohibition of forbidden foods from the decree. In the *Biblische Zeitschrift* (pp. 155-167) Professor Valentin Weber repeats the argument against the identity of Gal. ii. 1-10 and Acts xv.; if the latter narrative is to be taken as authentic, he argues, Gal. ii. 1-10 must refer to Acts xi. 25. The article follows one by Herr Dubowy upon "Paulus und Gallio" (pp. 143 f.) apropos of the Delphic inscription. Herr Dubowy infers from the latter that Paul's encounter with Gallio at Corinth probably took place between the spring of 52 and the autumn of 53 A.D., which determines 34 A.D. as the date of his conversion, and 51 A.D. as the year of the Jerusalem Council. M. Goguel contributes a lucid essay on Pauline chronology to the *Revue de l'histoire des religions* (pp. 285-339), in which he arrives at a different result. He dates the first visit of Paul to Corinth between the spring of 50 and the autumn of 51 A.D., and infers that the resultant scheme places Paul's conversion about 29-30 A.D., the Jerusalem conference at the end of 43 or the beginning of 44, and the Roman captivity between 60 and 62. A great deal depends upon whether the inscription is taken to presuppose some time during which Gallio had been proconsul, or not. M. Goguel thinks it must have been written



towards the close, rather than at the beginning, of the proconsulate, since Gallio probably negotiated the privileges accorded by Claudius to the people of Delphi. Thus, while the inscription corroborates the synchronism of Gallio's proconsulate and Paul's stay at Corinth—M. Goguel declines to follow Loisy's scepticism upon the historicity of the latter narrative—it still leaves the exact bearing of the inscription upon the chronology of Acts an open question, within certain limits. Another interesting study on Acts is Professor Pahncke's essay on "Der Stephanismus der Apostelgeschichte" (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1912, pp. 1-38), which deduces from Acts vi.-viii. 3 that Stephen represented a movement in primitive Christianity differing from the Petrine standpoint towards Judaism as well as from the Pauline. Judaism, to Stephen, meant a post-Mosaic unprophetic declension from the "living words" of God; it was a bastard Mosaism, with its ritual and ceremonial preoccupations. The original apostles, who did not share this radical view, were left untouched by the subsequent persecution. Even Paul did not admit that the Law led to "life," whereas Stephen was a thoroughgoing Mosaist, with Hellenistic sympathies, who regarded Christianity as the means of reinstating the "living words" in the Sinai law.

So far as Paul's epistles are concerned, there has been a slight revival of interest in the Epistle to the Ephesians. M. Coppieters (*Revue Biblique*, pp. 361-390), in a careful article upon "Les récentes attaques contre l'authenticité de l'épître aux Ephésiens," argues against the present writer and others that neither the style nor the contents of the epistle justify the slightest hesitation about accepting its Pauline authorship. The opposite view is put by Professor Wendland in his *Urchristlichen Literaturformen*, pp. 295 f., and it is argued by Herr Freitag (in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, pp. 91-94) that the absence of greetings and the name of the amanuensis form a proof of unauthenticity. The same critical standpoint seems to underlie the edition by Dr M. Dibelius just published in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*, although the plan of the latter series precludes any detailed discussion. On a more general scale, Rev. J. O. Bevan, in *St Paul in the Light of To-day* (London: Allenson), approaches his subject as one who "has found it indispensable to lay aside the involved philosophy of the schools, traditional views of inspiration, Western ideas of the genesis and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and the like, and to adopt a naturalistic standpoint, i.e. regarding the men of St Paul's day and the world in which they dwelt as governed by spiritual forces from within and without, in much the same manner as the men and things of the present epoch, and, also, interpreting divine action as normal and subjective rather than as supra-normal and objective." Mr E. P. Berg's *St Paul's Misconceptions* (London: A. H. Stockwell) is thrown into the form of a story, in which Apollos plays an important part. As the title indicates, the author strongly objects to Paul's "dark doctrines" as a sad perversion of the pure gospel of love preached by Jesus; he makes Apollos denounce "Paul's fanciful,

erroneous, misleading, and exaggerated estimate of Jesus Christ." In *A Layman's Philosophy* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner), Mr Alexander Davis doubts whether even the sanction of Christ is necessary to the ethical development of mankind. His pungent pages inculcate a moral scheme devoid of Christianity and even religion; "perhaps," he argues, "the ethics of Greek philosophy, and those later reflected in Horace, may be considered to stand singularly free from such ideal revenge and meekness as indicated in Biblical teachings, and in modern practical application stand nearer the modern ideal, and well suited to modern sociology and modern application."

Dom E. C. Butler's *Sancti Benedicti Regula Monachorum* (Freiburg: Herder) is only popular in the sense that it is a scholarly Latin reprint of the regulations; but Mr S. Harvey Gem applies Anglo-Saxon history to modern religion and theology in his pleasant study of *An Anglo-Saxon Abbot* (Edinburgh: Clark), which describes in popular style the life and doctrines of Aelfric of Eynsham. The book is dedicated "to all readers who desire the promotion of Christian education, temperance reform, and general military training for home defence," three points which are deduced from the theology and practice of Aelfric and his age. The third point is stated from the Socialist attitude by Mr W. E. Wallis in his comprehensive volume on *Socialism as it is* (New York: Macmillan), which is devoted to a vigorous, detailed survey of the Socialist movement as it affects Germany, America, and Great Britain especially. Mr Wallis illustrates his argument with copious and apt quotations.

JAMES MOFFATT.



## REVIEWS

*The Life of William Robertson Smith and Lectures and Essays of William Robertson Smith.*—By John Sutherland Black and George Chrystal.—London: A. & C. Black, 1912.—Pp. 638 and 622.

EIGHTEEN years have passed since the death of Robertson Smith—time enough for the gradual fading of the memories associated with him, and for the cooling of that enthusiastic admiration with which he was regarded by those who enjoyed his companionship or felt the influence of his work. But he still lives in the minds of those who recognise how much their studies owe to him, and enthusiasm scarcely burns less dimly when his pioneering work is found to maintain its value in a way that is not always granted to those who are conspicuous in directing new movements, or when continued research justifies, in an unexpected manner, some conclusions of greater or less importance which at first seemed unable to stand the test. He was an intellectual giant—also a theological one—one of the few of this country who have permanently impressed themselves upon Continental scholars as master-minds in their field. It is even premature, perhaps, to seek to estimate the part he holds in the history of the transition of modern thought; the tendencies he helped to shape are leading along paths the goal of which it is impossible to foresee, and his successors, who have not his wonderfully comprehensive grasp of a multitude of diverse data, are pursuing inquiries upon somewhat detached lines, and have not reached that synthesis from which Smith's influence could be more justly determined. The man who, by his personality and writings, belongs to a new stage in the criticism of the Bible and in the comparative study of religions, has yet to stimulate others to work for that co-ordination of experience and knowledge which made him what he was; and, though it may seem paradoxical, it is clear to the present reviewer, at least, that Smith's outstanding merits will be recognised more distinctly in the future than they have been even in the past.

Of the two to whom we are indebted for these careful volumes, enriched with several striking photographs, Dr John Sutherland Black was Smith's lifelong friend, associated with him as fellow-student, and on the staff of the 9th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; while, after 1894, he edited with Professor Cheyne the *Encyclopædia Biblica* which Smith had planned—a task the execution of which has been largely responsible for the delay in the publication of these volumes. Lapse of time has, however,

allowed a treatment of the famous Free Church controversy, with which Smith's name is most frequently associated, more impartial and in a more historic spirit than would have been possible had the biography appeared a decade or so ago; and another advantage of the delay has been to allow the opportunity of consulting Dr Carnegie Simpson's sympathetic biography of Principal Rainy, the great figure who stands out so conspicuously during the Case, and whose change of attitude has been so differently regarded. To the history of the Free Church proceedings a very considerable amount of space is given; but the lengthy account will be valued for its historical interest, for the material which is here collected and made conveniently accessible, and for the care taken to illustrate Smith's masterly and incisive treatment of controversial questions which, though they can hardly recur in the same form, may, nevertheless, reappear in a new context, should a struggle for certain principles ever arise. At all events, the biography hangs around the years of ceaseless controversy, and the writers—Dr Black with characteristic modesty keeps himself in the background—perform an invaluable service by bringing out the genetic connection in the stages of Smith's development in a way that adds greatly to the interest of the two volumes, and is exceedingly suggestive for the psychological study of the dynamic aspects of thought.

William Robertson Smith was born in 1846. He was a true son of the manse, and his early years represent him deeply religious, argumentative and critical, alert and inquiring, and—characteristically enough—an adept in Paulinism at the age of fifteen. On proceeding to Aberdeen (1861) he distinguished himself in philosophy, mathematics, and physical science, no less than in theology. At Edinburgh (1866–70) a budding Hebraist, he deepened his other studies, and in visits to the Continent gained his first insight into current German theology and criticism. His earlier scientific papers (1868–70) include an investigation on “stream-lines” which is regarded as a classical exposition of the subject, and of this and other papers (in vol. ii.) Professor Hobson observes that they show an ability to produce further useful contributions to mathematical and physical science. It is instructive to notice that his philosophical and metaphysical treatment of scientific subjects is as characteristic as his profundity in his theological essays (vol. ii.). His philosophical, psychological, scientific, biblical, and theological studies seem to have built up a firmly welded and closely interconnected body of thought, which gave him skill and confidence in pursuing and justifying his advances, and in his incisive rebuttal of counter-criticism. His theological essays already reveal that combination of ideas which made him a veritable problem to the orthodox and the unorthodox alike. He reached intellectual maturity at an early age, and those who will compare his earliest with his latest work will find that they are mutually illustrative.

He was only twenty-four years of age when he was elected to the Hebrew chair at Aberdeen, and from the outset he entered upon those larger activities which extended to his death. His “old-fashioned



evangelicalism," which always characterised his sermons, allowed the impression that he was not sincere, and Dr Bonar thought that his references to Jesus in one of them were "too expressly orthodox" to be the genuine expression of his belief (i. 124 *seq.*). But Smith was always antagonistic to rationalism and rationalistic types of research, as also to the "so-called liberal progressive theologians" (i. 223), while, insistent upon the true spirit of the Protestantism of the Reformation, he justified the advances which he was steadily making. A lecture in 1871 shows pretty clearly that his ideas, inconsistent though they might seem, formed "organic members in a single system of thought," and this "system" directed his attitude to the "extreme views" which he rejected (ii. 257). In 1874 he commenced to contribute to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and the years of study now gave greater fullness to his standpoint. Both volumes illustrate that receptivity which has made him famous. His friend, J. F. McLennan, had aroused his anthropological interests; his constant alertness to Continental movements of thought is reflected in his articles, essays, and reviews; while as one of the Revisers of the Old Testament he came into close contact with other scholars, and made his first acquaintance of the university which was later to welcome him. His article "Bible" (1875) marks the beginning of a new stage in his career, but the unceasing controversies which grew out of the article did not restrain his other activities. A visit to Hejāz (1880) produced a most valuable series of letters, which are now reprinted for the first time (ii. 484-597), while in the same year a small monograph on "Animal Worship and Animal Tribes among the Arabs and in the Old Testament" (ii. 455-483) may justly be described as epoch-making. It was the first scientific application of anthropological research to the Old Testament; it introduced his first convictions of the significance of totemism, for which he was to become renowned; and the uncompromising treatment of the biblical evidence was not calculated to allay his opponents. Together with his article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* on "Hebrew Literature," it brought the opposition to a head, and he lost his chair.

Previous to this he had given his famous lectures on *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (1881), famous because, although liberal opinion was ready to hear new views, no popular, comprehensive or synthetic account of the new stage in Old Testament criticism existed. For those who were not professed students, the minuteness of Kuenen and the brilliance of Wellhausen required a prepared soil, and Robertson Smith, more than any other, interpreted the new stage in a way that the ordinary individual could understand. It was not subversive of faith, but it required a preliminary handling of those presuppositions in the light of which we look at striking movements. The individualistic scholarship of Wellhausen had to be placed in a context. Robertson Smith had grown up gradually assimilating and adjusting the new ideas with his own ideas; what he had to give was *himself*—no mere interpretation of a Continental hypothesis, but a new stage in his own attitude to the Old Testament which allowed

him to combine in one whole his demand for the exercise of rational criticism and his fusion of evangelical and dogmatic Protestantism. The book was a work of genius, an instant success, and it still remains the best introductory book of its kind. His *Prophets of Israel* (1882) belongs to the modern way of regarding the Hebrew seers, but it reflects the same total attitude which consistently severed biblical from other religions (i. 457 *seq.*). Meanwhile, as editor of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, he not only contributed a remarkable series of admirable articles, but so enlisted the best scholarship of the day, that the newer tendencies in the development of thought became disseminated and popularised. At Cambridge, as Professor of Arabic (1883), and University Librarian (1886), he entered a fresh sphere of active and strenuous life; these were the years of his ripest work, unhappily impeded by ill-health and suffering, until in 1894 he died. In his *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (1885) he had made an important contribution to Semitic sociology, with special reference to totemism, and the significance of his interest in this most remarkable of all rudimentary cults, though indicated in his article "Sacrifice" and in lectures on that subject, first became more clearly recognised in his epoch-making *Religion of the Semites* (1888-89).

In the *Religion of the Semites*, Robertson Smith gave what he hoped might be "a fairly adequate analysis of the first principles of Semitic worship"; he did more than this, he laid the foundation-stone of the modern comparative study of religions. The subject, as he himself recognised, had "a direct and important bearing on the great problem of the origins of the spiritual religion of the Bible"; more than this, it raised very serious problems which he scarcely realised. To the present reviewer the book is *the* book, bringing with all its wealth of material, discussion, and suggestion, that problem of supernaturalism which this or some subsequent generation must boldly face, and that problem of Robertson Smith himself, to whose perplexing antinomy the biographers more than once refer (i. 527, 537, 570 *seq.*). Recent biological research has familiarised us with the concept of the "pure line." It is, briefly, descent from a single "parent," with numerous greater or less variations, but a constant reproduction of the average character of the "pure line" to which both the "parent" and every "individual" alike belong: there is a consistent reappearance of certain essential features by the side of persistent divergences of a greater or less significance. Now, when we survey Smith's life and life-work, and view together his extremely prominent advances step by step, and his persisting "inconsistency," it seems as though one can best compare his spiritual and intellectual development to the growth of a tree, to the resemblance and difference between successive stages in evolution, or to what one may call the concept of a "pure line." The problem Smith himself presents is perhaps one which, if understood, would throw more light upon the evolution of religious and other thought than all the rapidly perishing customs of savages whose whole way of thinking is so remote from ours. Robertson Smith's great work is characteristic of his life. His earlier studies seem



to converge here as surely as the part he took in inaugurating a new stage in Old Testament criticism was an indispensable preliminary to any attempt to deal with the Semitic religions by the comparative method. If his "ancestor" in comparative religion, old John Spencer, two hundred years before him, was too much in advance of his age, Robertson Smith appeared at a time when the movements in the relevant fields needed a firm and bold hand. Restricting himself to a field of which he had an unrivalled acquaintance, he turned his earlier rigorous training to that method of comparison which sees the differences underlying resemblances, and similarity amid disparity. He emphasised, in the first place, that religion was part of the social order, thus implicitly condemning the futility of that method which, in accordance with modern conditions, would sever the religious from other aspects of life and thought. Excessive specialism tends to overlook the features which link each group as a whole, and it is instructive to notice the recent tendency which insists upon the importance of studying the social aspects of the group, as though it had forgotten that any debt due to Smith is due to one who passed from *Kinship and Marriage* to the *Religion of the Semites*.

He also emphasises the fact that men were born into the thought of their environment and grew up in it—as he did—whence it follows that the individual, however distinctive, is—like Smith—the creature of his environment even though he mould and direct it. Moreover, there is an instinctive feeling for the preservation and welfare of the group; it is fundamental, and it is once more instructive that recent tendencies are emphasising the significance of the "collective" feeling and thinking in rudimentary groups. Finally, we have to regard the group not merely as a number of kinsmen with common aims, but men linked together by certain common ideas focussed upon some non-human being—a god or (as in totemism) an animal. Our non-religious ideas of *esprit de corps* were intertwined with a system of belief which controlled all important aspects of life—it was mystical, supernatural, or whatever term we may give it; and, if in the Semitic religions it involves gods, in the most rudimentary of cults (in totemism) the "link" is an animal. Thus there arose his famous theory of a primitive totemism, wherein he found the origin of the sacramental or mystical sacrifices in the higher religions. Working with the anthropological knowledge of his time, Smith recognises a close relationship between the rudest and the highest forms of religion, he sees the lowly origin of higher features, the potentiality of the lower, but across the scale of evolution he draws a line severing the biblical from the non-biblical. The significance of the evolutionary theory he hardly realised. From a critical point of view, the weakness of his theory lies partly in the difficulties occasioned by newer evidence and by later specialistic inquiries since he wrote, partly in the lack of unanimity regarding both the sociological data and the meaning to be attached to such terms as Religion, Supernatural, etc. His well-known speculation touching the sacramental eating of the totem has been brilliantly confirmed from Central Australia, but it is

disputed whether the evidence points to a magical ceremony (*e.g.* Frazer, *Totemism and Enogamy*, iv. 231), or is a profound example of religion on a very low level (*e.g.* F. B. Jevons, *Introd. and Study of Comp. Rel.*, pp. 197 *seq.*). In fact, the most recent researches (*e.g.* Durkheim) are enough to warn us that with increase of evidence there is need for completer and newer hypothesis ere more can be said upon Smith's theory of totemism. Speaking entirely for himself, the present reviewer believes it is fundamentally correct, but needs restatement to conform to more recent work.

From first to last Robertson Smith was convinced of the vital difference between biblical religion and all others; the problem he was to be occupied with in later years, he had already been pondering in 1870, when Dr Bonar criticised his *Christology* (i. 125), and seven years later Principal Tulloch perceived that his work had "larger consequences" than he imagined (i. 221 *seq.*). But the antinomy lay not in him; it represents the opinion of those who cannot see as he saw. He himself apparently could hardly understand the opposition he aroused among those who could not make the adjustment—or, shall we say, the "creative evolution"?—of which he was capable, even as he could not foresee that outcome of his progressive tendencies which others foresaw. Progressive movements bring new benefits and new difficulties, but the whole history of evolution is a development of consciousness able to cope with the problems of the environment. The significant fact is the appearance of a man, against whom no charge of obscurantism can be brought, who possessed a system of thought in which an evangelical and elaborately theological type of Christianity was combined with an unrivalled knowledge and an ability to make profound advances. It is, after all, what he has taught us to find in the groups whose religious and other institutions we study: a system adapted to practical life, fundamentally theological, and not merely philosophical or ethical or mystical. His whole standpoint was as genuine as that which impels others to be perplexed at it or to oppose it, and standpoints of this nature are to be analysed and studied critically. Men of his stamp are a self-revelation as surely as are those who, with the *insouciance* of a certain anonymous critic (i. 572), could say that Smith "was at heart unspotted from the world of reason." This charming self-revelation, this delightful exhibition of conscious intellectual superiority, which can be easily illustrated at the present day, shows the futility of talking of "reason" if we have not the patience to consider calmly and critically the significance of widely differing standpoints. Such men as Robertson Smith are wasted if we suppose that their value lies simply in the features which we can understand and appreciate.

Robertson Smith is an inspiration and a stimulus, and these volumes reveal the whole life of the man who played so prominent a part in reshaping tendencies of thought. He gave back to his environment tenfold what he had received, and he has left it for others to continue to toil for that comprehensive synthesis of thought which allows the environment, as it allowed him, to make judicious progress and to repudiate the extravagances of one-sided, detached, and too specialistic minds. The futility of any



scheme of reconstruction to suit a particular individual or clique is obvious ; Smith was able to shape profound changes in his subjects because he got down to the level of the environment in which he had grown up. With his theological, scientific, artistic, and other sympathies, with his familiarity with many sides of life, and with those many little touches of human nature which make him one with ourselves, this brilliant genius was an eminently sane man, and what he did in those studies upon which he had specialised knowledge was to illustrate the value of that breadth of view which makes the difference between a coherent environment and one which, like that of to-day, has no balance.

The best estimate of Robertson Smith's life and work will be written when this age of transition is past. Revolutionary in his tendencies, he pointed to an evolution of Protestantism—a "reversion to type," as it were—which should weave into one system a theology in harmony with the state of knowledge and answering to the needs of practical life. This was his own system, and it may be, as thought progresses, the system of a larger environment ; in any case, an age of disequilibrium can only be transitory. We lay down these volumes with a keen sense of the impossibility of doing adequate justice to their contents, and with the heartiest thanks to Dr Black and Mr Chrystal for the light they have thrown upon one who, by his life and by his work, stimulates more critical and more humanistic inquiries into those subjects which he so brilliantly furthered, and who inspires a confidence that the recognition of difficult problems is a call to tackle them as freely as he did.

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*Outlines of Liberal Judaism for the Use of Parents and Teachers.*—By Claude G. Montefiore. — London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. — Pp. xiv + 355.

MR MONTEFIORE, the well-known leader of liberal Jewish thought in England, has attempted in the present volume, and carried out with no little success, some important pioneer work, which might be of interest to others besides those for whom the book was intended in the first instance. For the same kind of problems and difficulties confront the liberal movement in every religion.

Most, if not all, liberal-minded people who retain a living interest in religion, though more or less alienated from the official presentations of the historic religions, have been born into, and brought up under the influence of, one or other of the historic religions, and even felt, for a time, persuaded of its absolute truth, in so far as they understood it at all. Their "liberalisation" has often taken the form, in appearance at least, of a gradual disbelief in this or that dogma, and a gradual neglect of this or that religious rite. In most cases the alienation has not been

complete. Feeling that the doctrines and practices which they disapprove are really unimportant or unessential, or merely temporary incidents in the history of the particular religion, they continue to be members of their religious fraternity. To their more conservative brothers in faith their attitude appears to be chiefly characterised by its negative deviations from the official view of that church or religious community; in so far as it is credited at all with anything positive, this is apt to be regarded as a remainder obtained by a process of subtraction. Subtract so much dogma and ritual from "orthodoxy," and you get "liberalism"; conversely, if you add so much to liberalism you obtain "orthodoxy." In other words, liberalism in religion appears to be the residuum of orthodoxy when the latter has been submitted to a process of shrinkage. Now, this kind of shrinkage may easily be associated with that casting off of irksome restraints and that proneness to unchartered freedom which sometimes follow the liberation of youth from parental control, especially when parental authority has been exercised too well but not wisely. Now, if there be any truth in this suggestion, liberal religion, with its seeming poverty of positive teaching, would appear to be ill-suited to the needs of the young. For it does not allow for shrinkage. Teach (so it may be argued) all that conservatism teaches, and then, when the period of storm and stress has passed, enough may yet survive to make the man or woman a respectable "liberal"; but if you begin at once by teaching "liberalism," they may not retain sufficient to continue to be even merely nominal members of the religious community into which they were born.

There is yet another difficulty. The liberal form of a religion is rather critical and "philosophical" in its outlook, and therefore apparently unsuited to those who have not, or not yet, attained to a certain maturity of thought. That the liberalism of many religious liberals is in large measure the outcome of philosophic reflection, is undeniable. But this fact may only have been necessitated by the historical circumstance that these men and women had to fight their way to their ultimate position from the different sort of position into which they were born. The question is, Is abstract philosophic reflection inseparable from liberal religion as such?

If, for either or both of the above reasons, liberal religion cannot be taught to the young, then clearly it has no future.

Such are the principal problems which Mr Montefiore attacks in the book under review, though only with special reference to liberal Judaism. Firstly, he maintains, and shows in great detail, that liberal Judaism is as rich in positive teaching as conservative Judaism; and that it differs from the latter not only negatively—that is to say, by rejecting certain orthodox doctrines and practices—but also positively—that is to say, by affirming certain liberal doctrines which are not taught or not sufficiently emphasised by orthodox Judaism. Secondly, he shows that liberal Judaism is not a religion for philosophical Jews only, but that it can also be taught effectively to the young and to the unphilosophical. And



he gives ample information as to what should be taught, and how it should be taught.

The charge of being a religion of negations is made so readily and with so much specious plausibility against any liberal religion that it cannot be condemned too frequently or too strongly as an utter misapprehension of the true significance of the liberal movement. It is, unfortunately, quite possible to use "liberalism" as a cloak for a life of indolent negations and positive self-indulgence. What is there that is not liable to abuse? Even charity may be made to cover a multitude of sins. But liberalism at its best, and in its inmost meaning, is something very positive. It involves negations, no doubt. But these very negations are only the symptoms or consequences of the birth of a new spirit and the development of a new outlook whose affirmations involve the negation of what is incompatible with them.

Moreover, the "negative" appearance of liberal Judaism was partly due to official orthodoxy. It took some little time to convince officialdom that, whatever may be right in religion, to quarrel over it is wrong. The rise of a seemingly new "sect" caused some alarm and was met with considerable opposition. The consequence was that the exponents of the new movement were more or less compelled to emphasise negations, to make clear what it was that they did *not* approve in orthodox or even in so-called "reformed" Judaism. But now that wiser counsels have prevailed, liberal Judaism is free to pursue its peaceful, positive development.

Mr Montefiore's views on Judaism and on the Bible are already known to readers of his *Hibbert Lectures* and his *Synoptic Gospels*. It is therefore unnecessary to describe them. The extent to which the present, and, in some respects, more detailed, restatement of his views may be made accessible to the young people for whom it is intended will, of course, depend in large measure on the intelligence and sympathy of the parents and teachers who use the *Outlines*. Those who have had much to do with children know that special gifts are required in order to handle them successfully. Mr Montefiore himself does not feel that he has these gifts, and accordingly does not venture to address himself directly to the young. But parents and teachers of ordinary intelligence and sympathetic insight should experience very little difficulty in utilising, each in his own fashion, the material which Mr Montefiore has prepared for their use. Mr Montefiore has evidently been most anxious to give all the needful help. Perhaps too much so. For the prefaces to each chapter grow somewhat tedious, and the frequent consultation with friends has not been all to the good. Most of the prefaces and friendly criticisms might well be omitted from the next edition. However, the *Outlines* contains so much that is sure to be suggestive and helpful that it seems ungrateful to dwell on its defects at all.

A. WOLF.

*Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic.*—By Henri Bergson.—Authorised Translation by Cloudesley Brereton, L. ès L. (Paris), M.A. (Cantab.), and Fred. Rothwell, B.A. (Lond.).—Macmillan & Co., 1911.

BERGSON cannot altogether disclaim responsibility for the vagaries of his admirers. The pragmatist discovers in his works a large body of sceptical criticism directed against the reflective intelligence. He can easily ignore the intellectualist assumptions, so much less emphasised, which underlie the attack. The syndicalist, bent upon fishing in troubled waters, finds Bergson's doctrine of "teleology without design," "purposiveness without foresight," ready to his hand. What better watchword could be found for a malcontent violence, roused by a grievance, and inspired only by the blindest of hopes—the hope, devoutly optimistic, that out of utter disorder the unforeseeable purposiveness of natural forces may be trusted to evolve conditions more satisfactory than have ever yet been known to prevail? In all Bergson's writings there are counter-tendencies, assumed to be inseparable, even while they are recognised as being, at least in semblance, extremely divergent. Those of his readers who are possessed by a mission can all too easily develop in isolation positions which in the master's writings are employed to neutralise one another. The present work, as I shall try to show, is an excellent illustration both of the striking merits and of many doubtfully praiseworthy features in Bergson's thinking.

Bergson is lucid in detail, illusive when ultimate issues are raised. Extremely positive on certain points, he is correspondingly non-committal upon others no less fundamental. As a thinker, he is of the same general type as Schopenhauer, who perhaps for that very reason has so profoundly influenced his whole philosophy. The criticism passed upon Schopenhauer by the late Professor Wallace may be applied almost word for word to Bergson's writings: "He is lucid, or rather, luminous, but it is the lucidity which a forcible intuition, backed up by a wealth of imaginative faculty, seems to shed around it. . . . Such a pictorial luminosity is more likely to attract the mass of those familiar with the 'feel' of ideas, than to persuade the classes who have in some measure penetrated these ideas. . . . Schopenhauer's similes afford a clear and striking picture of what he wants you to think, but really contain no solution of the difficulties involved in the the thought itself. But for the majority of readers a word which suggests a palpable image, and helps them to picture out in detail what the writer is driving at, is all the demonstration that is held needful." Bergson's strength, like that of Schopenhauer, would seem to consist in the force and felicity with which he develops genuinely new and highly suggestive lines of thought. Fundamental to both is the artistic temperament, which delights to analyse a concrete vision, seen in imaginative anticipation. Neither ever really employs the tentative, hypothetical, synthetic



procedure of the truly disinterested and genuinely comprehensive thinker. Their entire argumentation, spite of all apparent impartiality, is predetermined by the conclusions ultimately reached. For that very reason it has a seemingly cumulative and massive force. No recalcitrant facts, though these may exist in plenty, no objections such as cannot be triumphantly transformed into friendly allies, are allowed to disturb the full and uninterrupted flow of the argument under way. The outcome is a body of reasoning, extremely persuasive, which may exercise an almost hypnotic influence upon those who come under its spell, but whose cogency weakens as the reader frees himself from its immediate influence, and awakens to consciousness of the manifold difficulties which it is called upon to meet. In other words, the method of exposition is the direct antithesis of that employed by such a writer as John Stuart Mill, who at every step is careful to aid the reader in reviewing all the various considerations which are in any way relevant to the inquiry in hand. To read Bergson is not to co-operate in independent inquiry, but to follow up a path which has been artificially freed from all entanglements, and from which only such enticing vistas down alluring bypaths are allowed to the traveller as would seem to open out Pisgah views of the final goal to which he is being safely and expeditiously conducted.

There is a further characteristic to which Bergson's writing owes its compelling power. Though his fundamental assumptions determine everything that is said, they make only occasional and extremely illusive appearance in the explicit text. Thus his *Matière et Mémoire* is pervaded by the tacit assumption of a Platonic doctrine of the mind's omniscience. Nowhere is argument, in any degree adequate, offered in support of so tremendous a presupposition. It lingers modestly in the background, only sufficiently in evidence to afford suggestive perspectives upon possible conclusions of a pleasing and novel character. A similar assumption underlies the concluding chapter of the work before us. In discussing the problem of realism and idealism in the field of art, Bergson reconciles them in the following easy and high-handed fashion. Reality in itself is, he contends (pp. 150 ff.), *completely individualised and absolutely satisfying*. "Between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own consciousness a veil is interposed: a veil that is opaque for the common herd—thin, almost transparent, for the artist and the poet. . . . We move amidst generalities and symbols, . . . fascinated by action, tempted by it for our own greater good, on to the field it has selected; we live in a zone midway between things and ourselves, externally to things, externally also to ourselves." "Art is only a more direct vision of reality. But this purity of perception implies a break with utilitarian convention, an innate and specially localised disinterestedness of sense or consciousness, in short, a certain immateriality of life, which is what has always been called idealism. So that we may say, without in any way playing upon the meaning of the words, that realism is in the work when idealism is in the soul, and that it is only through ideality that we can resume contact with

reality" (p. 157). This may, possibly, be excellent teaching, but it is to be honestly obtained only by prior establishment of the presupposed view of ultimate reality. Bergson makes, however, not the least attempt at proof. It is introduced as "probably true" (p. 150), without argument or further comment of any kind. At most a connection is suggested with his general view of practical life as necessitating the employment of distorting concepts, and of "intuition" as the gateway to beauty as well as to the fullness of genuine knowledge. This is largely, no doubt, an application of Schopenhauer's interpretation of music to art in general. It is the weakest and least satisfactory part of the present work. Here, as in Bergson's other writings, there is a hesitating alternation between a view of "intuition" which would regard it as including and transcending intellect, and one which would reduce it to something little higher than vital feeling (*cf.* pp. 153-7)—exactly the Schopenhauerean oscillation between a Platonic and a volitional theory of art.

Bergson frequently seems to regard both individual action and social life as tending only to the perversion of man's natural excellence. The necessities of action involve the ignoring of those finer shades of difference which constitute the individuality of the objects dealt with. Society similarly trenches upon our own individuality, overlaying and suppressing our native qualities. It is from this standpoint that Bergson denounces vanity—"the one failing that is essentially laughable"—as the offspring of social life. But in eulogising modesty, he has perforce to recognise that it is an acquired virtue, and is a more genuine expression of truly socialised character. "[Vanity], the outcome of social life, . . . is even more natural, more universally innate than egoism; for egoism may be conquered by nature, whereas only by reflection do we get the better of vanity. . . . True modesty can be nothing but a meditation on vanity. It springs from the sight of the illusions of others, and the dread of being similarly deceived. It is a sort of scientific circumspection in regard to what we shall say and think of ourselves. It is made up of improvements and after-touches. In short, it is always an acquired virtue" (p. 173). Excellent teaching! But how is this to be reconciled with the contention that reality, in ourselves no less than in outward nature, is absolutely satisfying? Here, too, Bergson alternates in the most arbitrary fashion between the anti-social individualism of Rousseau and Tolstoi, and a doctrine more in harmony with the spirit of social comedy. The same radical indecision appears in his view of the relation of thought to language. At times (*cf.* p. 156) he would seem to assert that the realities which cannot be expressed through any words are not only deeper—that may indeed be true—but are more *significant* than those which can be discovered by the understanding. He speaks of *le mot banal et social*. "Art," he tells us (p. 157), "has no other object than to brush aside the symbols that are useful in practical life, the conventionally and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that conceals reality from us, in order to bring us face to face with reality itself." But if thought and language are in their very



essence social perversions, by what means will the vision be attained? Are we not bordering upon the worship of barbarism? *Sancta simplicitas! Ignoratio docta!*

But Bergson's main analysis of the comic is not open to any such easy criticism. It excellently illustrates, and goes far to confirm, his vitalistic interpretation of human activities. Tension and elasticity are the two complementary forces that life sets in play. What society demands from each of us is attention constantly alert, ready to mould itself upon the actual situation. Rigidity, automatism, distraction, are all forms of unsociability, and are the inexhaustible source of comic effects. Immediately the individual ceases to mould his actions upon the detail of the ever-changing present, and instead, allows himself to be guided by the easy automatism of contracted habits, he is in danger of falling pray to the comic spirit. This is the source of the comic sublimities of Don Quixote, no less than of the nursery joys of Jack-in-the-box. All rigidity of character or of mind, even of body, is suspect to society, because it is the sign of an activity which is resting upon its past, and which inclines to break away from the common centre about which society gravitates, which, in short, is or tends to be an eccentricity. The more profound and systematic the distraction, the higher the comedy. Society intervenes to check and punish it through laughter, which is a social gesture of rebuke. Comedy, thus strictly viewed, falls outside the realm of pure art. It pursues a useful and practical end, that of perfecting the general social life. Yet at the same time it participates in some degree in the æsthetic. For the comic only arises when society and the individual are freed from preoccupation with the conditions of their conservation, and begin to treat themselves like works of art. Such is the general thesis which Bergson seeks to follow out in all its applications, from the buffoon to Don Quixote, from the vaudeville to Molière. In its highest forms a point is reached at which the general problems of the nature and function of art, of its relation to practical life and to the intellect, loom up before us.

This work at once suggests comparison with Meredith's *Essay on Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit*. In all essentials their doctrine is profoundly at one. Both teach that only through unceasing criticism, freely and impartially exercised by pure comedy, can the fabric of human society be kept sweet and clean, or the individual life be preserved in health and beneficence. There is just this difference that acts in Meredith's favour, and makes his analysis the wiser and sounder of the two. He is studying comedy entirely for its own sake, with a fine enthusiasm for the detail of his theme, whereas Bergson approaches it from the standpoint of a universal philosophy, and is chiefly interested in viewing its phenomenon as the illustration of general principles.

Meredith also agrees with Bergson in the critical attitude which he adopts towards humour. This appears in Bergson by implication rather than by explicit statement. The objection which Bergson's critics have

almost invariably made to the present work is its failure to take account of the laughter which is admiring and appreciative, appealing to feeling as well as to intellect. For in the above statement of Bergson's analysis of the comic situation, I omitted all mention of one essential element upon which he lays considerable stress. In order to completion of the comic effect, unsociability in the comic character has to be combined with insensibility in the spectator. Bergson even goes so far as to assert that "laughter has no greater foe than emotion"; "its appeal is to the intellect pure and simple." Comedy is essentially critical, demanding the adoption of the impersonal standpoint of the social group. To those to whom humour is the chief source of laughter—and these abound in England and America—such dicta are likely to prove a stumbling-block and an offence. That they should do so is perhaps, however, a measure of the value of the neglected source of spiritual discipline to which Meredith and Bergson alike strive, wisely and persuasively, to recall their readers.

Humour is individualistic, frequently capricious and sentimental, at times even unsocial. The comic spirit, on the other hand, is an expression of the collective mind, and for that reason is always disciplining itself by impersonal standards. It strives unceasingly to maintain itself in delicate adjustment to the complex and ever-changing requirements of the wider life of the social group. Humour is metaphysical. It delights in the contrast between man's infinite significance and the pettiness of untoward fate. From the height of its speculations all merely social and human differences, however vital, tend to vanish, or at least to be dwarfed. Humour is also emotional, and, consequently, has the tendency to over-estimate its favoured objects. It is exclusive and intensive. It has not the urbane considerate spirit of pure comedy. "The comic poet," as Meredith says, "is in the narrow field, or enclosed square, of the society he depicts; and he addresses the still narrower enclosure of men's intellects, with reference to the operation of the social world upon their characters. . . . To understand his work and value it, you must have a sober liking of your kind and sober estimate of our civilised qualities. . . . Men's future upon earth does not attract it, their honesty and shapeliness in the present does." The limitation of Bergson's analysis to social comedy is not, therefore, in itself necessarily a defect. He may, indeed, be criticised for failing to define the laughter of comedy in its distinction from that of humour, and for adopting a title too wide to express his purpose (though that is to some extent discounted by the sub-title); but there are sufficiently good reasons for independent treatment of the more purely intellectual type of laughter. Humour and comedy may go their own separate ways; only after rigorous independent development can they be safely allowed to interact. Only those minds that have subjected themselves to the discipline of the strictly comic, and, on rising to the sublimer field, can retain the insight thus acquired, may, with impunity, freely admit the element of humour into their interpretation of the comedy



of life. It is a high mark of the truly catholic genius that it can combine both in supreme degree. Byron has humour, but none of the discipline of the social spirit. Carlyle, wildly humorous, in dyspeptic and self-willed fashion, is an easy victim of the comic lash. Browning, by insisting upon the stage settings of a world philosophy, blurs, spite of his realism, the richer suggestiveness of the minor interludes of our social life. For the perfect reconciliation of the two forms of laughter, we look to Cervantes and to Shakespeare, or, in humbler fields, to such as Charles Lamb.

The above criticism might, indeed, more justly have come from Bergson's fellow-countrymen. There is little danger in Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic countries that humour will not exercise its due influence. In its latent sentimentality and individualism, in its readiness to sacrifice intelligence for the sake of emotion, in its constant appeal to prejudice in attacking opponents, in its frequent incapacity to adopt a self-critical attitude—in all these respects the spirit of humour calls for the disciplinary tutelage of that severely impersonal and divinely social art of which Molière remains the supreme master. "There has been fun in Bagdad. But there never will be civilisation where Comedy is not possible."

Translating Bergson is an ungrateful task. To pass from his French to even so competent a translation as this before us, is to gain a fresh realisation of the dependence of argument upon felicities of speech. To be adequately rendered, it would require to be creatively rewritten. That has hardly been achieved by the present translators. "Quelle profondeur de comique que celle du romanesque et de l'esprit de chimère!" This, apropos of Don Quixote, is translated (p. 13): "How profound is the comic element in the over-romantic, Utopian bent of mind!" Good, but still inadequate! At times, as when (p. 133) they translate *s'insinuer* by "worming its way into," they show a lack of right feeling for the value of words. Though verbally correct, that rendering is out of harmony with the spirit of the passage. "The after-taste bitter" (p. 200) is a mistranslation. The statement designed is that bitterness or brackishness is a masked but none the less essential *constituent* in the gaiety of laughter; it is a "froth with a saline base." An even more serious error is committed by the assertion that "the substance [of laughter] is scanty." That runs counter to Bergson's appreciation of the value of comedy. Bergson is claiming that in even the smallest measure of laughter the salt of criticism may still be discerned. The metaphor, that is being worked out, might easily indeed be made to justify the translation, but in Bergson's skilful phrasing this obvious danger is circumvented.

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*The Psychology of the Christian Soul.*—By George Steven, M.A., Edinburgh.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911.—Pp. viii + 304.

WHEN the task was laid upon me of giving some account of Mr Steven's book, I shrank from it for a time, because, while I do not agree with much that Mr Steven says, I have found his work interesting and, within the limits laid down by the author, a successful achievement.

"The writer believes that the spirit of man is in some way supernatural, and that Christianity is an educative process by which that spirit may be so trained as to hate and fear sin, or when it has yielded to sin may be delivered and purified." This thought the author works out in a systematic way. He begins with the religion of Christ as an educative process, and discusses the development of the soul through education, and in relation to the unconscious. Two chapters treat of the enslaving of the soul through sin, and the liberation of the soul through conversion. The sixth chapter considers the soul "in the mass movement of a revival," and the book concludes with two chapters upon the capture of the soul by God, and the soul in the presence of God.

Mr Steven is in touch with recent psychological investigations, but the attentive reader of *The Psychology of the Christian Soul* will be haunted by the feeling that the heart of the author is really concerned with vindicating, as against all others, a particular theological standpoint, a standpoint not far removed from the latitude of Edinburgh. He wavers between a philosophy of religion and the empirical treatment of his subject. It would unduly complicate this notice if we attempted to follow out the problems which Mr Steven suggests in the philosophy of religion. There is one matter, however, which demands more consideration than it has received.

If Christianity is an educative process, and if, as Mr Steven says, it is the personality of Christ that is the main agent in this education, how is it that through all these pages we catch scarcely a glimpse of the young Semite who for a time haunted the precincts of the Temple at Jerusalem? The name Jesus does not occur as a separate heading in the index. This, however, was prepared, not by Mr Steven, but by the Rev. William Johnstone. It does not satisfy me, however, that I have to turn to the heading, "Christ Jesus." I want the man who lived as a man among men. There is a saying of Rudyard Kipling which contains more Christian teaching than volumes of professed theology: "The fool seeks to ingratiate himself with Princes and Ministers, and courts and cabinets leave him to perish miserably. The wise man makes allies among the police and hansoms, so that his friends spring up from the round-house and the cab-rank, and even his offences become triumphant processions." Jesus, literally, and not as matter of theological contrivance, made himself of no account, and was frequently found in the least respectable but not therefore the worst company. He ate and drank with persons who were outside the bounds of respectable society. He did not love them in any professional sense. He did more; he liked them. He saw in them quite proper subjects for the



kingdom of heaven. Mr Steven speaks as if it required select spirits to understand the charm of life at the level of narrow means. Jesus indeed said, "Blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of God." But the same standpoint is found in the Latin poets, who were somewhat before the time of Jesus. Horace, who is the prophet of the wisdom of both worlds, could teach the Roman Empire officially that military discipline must so prepare the Roman youths that they could treat poverty as a friend. It was Jesus who actually saw his own friends in the poor. He personified the enemy of poverty in Mammon, or, as we might say to-day, comfort. The love of comfort is a vice which to-day ravages the respectable classes in England, as drink ravages the classes below respectability. Yet the former vice is an artificial one. Mr Steven, in his survey of the soul, never takes note of this inclination. It is not Christian, it is not even natural, for man to set the worship of comfort above all the infinite charm of human friendship.

St Francis was mean to look upon and small of stature, and was deemed thereby a vile beggar by those who knew him not. Like other beggars, including the Apostles, he sometimes went begging with a companion. On one journey he went with a companion of finer presence than his own, who therefore was received more handsomely. At the end of the day each set the alms that he had begged upon a fine broad stone near a fountain. Brother Masseo was discontented, but St Francis was moved to praise poverty. "I will that we pray unto God that He make us love with all our heart the treasure of holy poverty which is so noble that God Himself became a servant to it." St Francis thereupon continued his journey towards France, and, very properly, went to church. He was a beggar: he was little. He was dingy, and, I am afraid, not very clean. Yet he went to church. Now to finish this little digression. I am of the opinion that if St Francis had come to any church in Nottingham, where this review is being written, or even in Edinburgh, he would either have received the cold shoulder by being put in a back seat, or he would have been made a fuss over, which is infinitely more objectionable to a real saint. Anyway, his appearance would have been conspicuous among the congregation. To this rule there are one or two exceptions: the Salvation Army, the High Church Anglican, the Roman Catholic, would not be surprised at the presence of such persons. I feel the more freedom in mentioning this fact because, in the instructions about doctrine which Mr Steven has blended with his psychology, there is sufficient protection against the errors which are found in various forms among the three religious bodies to which reference has been made.

There is another circumstance to which Mr Steven scarcely does justice. The most formidable agents in spreading religions are persons who follow the example of St Francis, rather than persons who are great preachers. The medical missionaries who have entered into the life of India and lived among the people as one of themselves, or even the young American who begged as a Christian mendicant from south to north of India, have said

their say at wayside khans among other pilgrims, and have disclosed a method which may explain to us how Mohammedan wanderers have already gained over some fifty millions of converts in the Africa which is being opened up, and how in some places, as—so I am informed—in Zanzibar, the native Christians are going over to the Mohammedans.

Mr Steven, therefore, in limiting the field of his inquiry, necessarily overlooks some of the features of the Christian religion which are prominent in a survey of the whole Christian world, features which cannot be left out if we are to consider the whole educational value of Christianity.

To return, however, to the psychology with which the book is mainly concerned: I do not think Mr Steven has been entirely successful in applying current theories to the explanation of theological facts. In particular, the temptation which alcohol exercises upon many persons is unfortunately chosen as a type of temptation, because, after all, the great majority of persons are not subject to this somewhat abnormal temptation. For myself, the characteristic flavour of alcohol is more distasteful than the sense of exhilaration which accompanies it is pleasant; and I am conscious of no particular virtue in rarely tasting alcohol, and that in very small portions. Mr Steven has burked the all-important subject of the relation of religion to certain universal appetites, which may be excessive, moderate, or scarcely strong enough. For instance, by the institution of marriage on one hand, and of asceticism on the other, Christianity has dealt (with a wisdom not found in any other religion except the Jewish) with what is the most solemn part of human life. Our birth and our death alike come to us unchosen. But to light the torch of life afresh involves a moral responsibility so great that the mere thought of it almost staggers the parent who sees the future unrolling itself in the life of children. The celibate who lives his unmarried life in honour of the ideal set up by the Church, has some right even to be considered a spiritual parent.

It is probable that J. S. Mill lived a life of absolute purity in this respect. At any rate, he came as near to being an intellectual saint as any person of the nineteenth century. It has been my good fortune to spend much time in trying to convey to others something of the lofty spirit which is to be found in Mill's writings, and I do not understand the confidence with which we are told (p. 146) that Mill could not receive the spiritual truth which lay at the heart of Wordsworth's poetry, and that "the light that was in him was here at least darkness." If Mr Steven's book goes to a second edition, I hope he will see his way clear to excise this most unfortunate passage.

But to return from this digression: the early maturity of man and woman is in some respects the most beautiful period of life, and this by a dispensation that is much older than that of Sinai. Instead of dwelling upon this topic myself, I will refer to an essay by an anonymous writer, in which the beauty and temptations of adolescence are described with great insight.<sup>1</sup> Mr Steven commits himself to the surprising statement that

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Buff*, c. v., "The Divine Brethren."



"all this ideal and idyllic side of adolescence is the characteristic of the youth of a Christian land. There is little of it in the youth of the heathen, and little of it among those of our own youth who are brought up apart from Christian teaching." Mr Steven libels human nature. The Jew, the Arab, the Hindu, the Chinese, the Japanese, shall represent the rest of the human race. When we are told that there is little that is ideal and idyllic in adolescence among these other nations, the whole of their poetry and art rises up in protest. I have known young men who in their natural nobility of character fell no whit short of our British standards, and who would be included under the name of heathen by the author.

Because it inconveniences Mr Steven as a theologian, the whole mass of ascertained facts in this field is put on one side. He refuses to face the circumstance that character rarely changes much after the twenty-sixth year, and the consequent fact that persons past forty rarely undergo conversion. I do not know whether Mr Steven is writing from the standpoint of middle life. I do not think this can be the case, or else he would scarcely speak of "the long, level, dull road of middle life." I have found middle life tragic, varied: I hope to find it long. Only the other day I was in the company of one of the wisest men in England. We raised the question what we had done to deserve that we should be living in a time so interesting as the present. To us the divine purpose seemed more richly manifest in the world than ever before. Mr Steven seems to think that the preacher alone utters the voice of God. "Those who can give them insight into the meaning of life, who can reconcile the ways of God to men, are those who alone can give them help" (p. 175). Is there then no such thing as the direct intuition of God? Are there no divine graces shed directly upon the heart? Mr Steven says no, or at least he quotes, with approval, a saying of Luther: "We must continually maintain that God communicates His Spirit or grace to no one but by His word" (p. 279). But perhaps I am under a misapprehension. For Mr Steven does not confine himself to the sense of the term "word" as it is employed by Luther. When Luther said, in his commentary upon Gal. iv. 6, "The Holy Ghost is sent by the Word into the heart of the believers," Luther meant the Gospel as preached by Lutherans. For in another place in the same commentary Luther speaks somewhat adversely of the Anabaptists, to the following effect: "These perverse and devilish spirits extol and magnify their cursed doctrine, calling it the word of God, and so under the colour of God's name they deceive many." I take it, therefore, that, by the word of God, controversialists of Luther's day understood their own doctrine. To speak plainly, I find it difficult to understand how Mr Steven can draw the inference from Luther that "Truth must always be our first concern" (p. 280). And the student of psychology cannot safely submit to the laws laid down by Luther.

How can Mr Steven make such a statement as the following? "We should err profoundly if we thought that men rose into the presence of God independently of the Church" (p. 283). I am content to err with Pusey,

who held that Socrates was inspired. Or again: "The whole complicated fabric of our mental life has been the creation of the Christian community." This last statement is indeed difficult to understand. No psychologist, as far as I know, would accept it. Did the Christian community create those parts of our mental fabric which we have in common with the animals? Mr Steven has been successful within the limits which he has laid down. But those limits render it impossible always to follow him.

FRANK GRANGER.

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*The Philocalia of Origen.* A compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St Gregory of Nazianzus and St Basil of Cæsarea.—Translated into English by the Rev. George Lewis, M.A., of Balliol College, Oxford, M.A., University of London, Rector of Icomb, Gloucestershire, late Vicar of Dodderhill, Droitwich; Author of *A Life of Joseph Hall, Bishop of Exeter and Norwich, An Oxford Parish Priest*; Translator of S. Basil's *De Spiritu Sancto*, S. Jerome's *Dogmatic Treatises*, etc.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911.

IT was a happy suggestion of the Bishop of Gloucester that Mr Lewis should undertake a translation of Origen's *Philocalia*; and the thanks of theological students are due to Mr Lewis for the care and skill with which he has executed his task. The wide learning, the vast labours, the critical judgment, and the noble character of Origen give him a pre-eminent place among early Christian theologians; and though the substitution of ecclesiastical dogma for the spirit of Christ caused him to be rejected as a heretic and reviled as "impious," his transcendent merits have lifted him above the spite of parties, and, notwithstanding the transience of some of his speculations, have made him a permanent figure in the history of Christian doctrine. The vast bulk even of his surviving work is apt to deter the student; and the preservation of so much of it only in a Latin translation, which is confessedly not always faithful, necessarily detracts somewhat from its value. For these reasons the selection which presents within a reasonable compass and in their authentic form many of Origen's characteristic views is particularly welcome; and while the critic must still refer to the Greek, readers who desire to obtain without much effort a general survey of Origen's thought and method will gladly resort to the English translation, which has been made from the critical text published in 1893 by Dr J. Armitage Robinson, at that time Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.

Of the twenty-seven chapters of the *Philocalia*, no fewer than fifteen are devoted to questions connected with the Scriptures (in the translation, 77



pages out of 237). Several of the objections brought against Christianity are dealt with in other chapters, and the problems of free will, predestination, and the nature and cause of evil are discussed at considerable length, and viewed from the side both of philosophy and of Scripture.

It is not an easy task to translate Origen's Greek into clear and idiomatic English, and it is frequently necessary to change the structure of the sentence, and to refrain from a strictly verbal rendering. In such cases Mr Lewis often presents the meaning very happily, and the translation, so far as I have been able to test it, seems to have been carefully and judiciously made. It is on the whole extremely readable, though the frequent recurrence of the split infinitive (as in "strive to every way preserve piety") somewhat mars the purity of the English.

With a view to a second edition, I may venture to make a few suggestions. *Καταβεβηκέναι*, used of the Son of God (p. 16), is surely literal, "has come down," and not "humbled Himself." On the same page, "the Divine teaching" (*διδασκαλίας*) would be better than "Divine revelation," for these are not strictly synonymous. Four different words are translated "Creator." It might be better always to retain "Demiurge" in the text, since it has a distinctly Gnostic reference. I doubt whether it is correct to make Origen say that the Creator is immanent in plants (p. 33), for *τοῦ τεχνικοῦ* denotes rather "the creative skill." In the phrase "through faith in Jesus Christ" (p. 48) it would be better, with our Revisers, to put a comma after "faith," the object of faith not being properly indicated by *ἐν*. Dr Robinson gives the whole clause without a stop, and is therefore not responsible for the comma after "God." The first clause of Chapter X. (p. 51) can hardly be correct, and the word "fair" suggests the sense of "reasonable," which would reduce the clause to nonsense. We may translate, "If at any time in reading the Scripture you stumble at a thought which, though beautiful, is a stone of stumbling." This sense is clearer in the text of Lommatsch, who places a comma at *καλῶ*, and inserts *δέ* after *λίθω*. These are omitted in Dr Robinson's text. It is difficult to understand the sentence (p. 55), "There is, then, within us a multitude of faculties amongst which we have been, as it were, souls and bodies, divided by lot." I think it ought to be, "There is, then, within us a multitude of faculties in possession respectively of our souls and bodies." On p. 65 I doubt the rendering "hold down the truth." In spite of high authorities, I question this rendering of *κατέχουσιν* even in Romans i. 18. It seems clear that Origen, at all events, understood it in the sense of "hold"; for he admits that the statement which he quotes is true, and his point is that the conspicuous knowledge and eloquent exposition of Greek writers are in strong contrast with the poverty of their lives. In the title of Chapter XVIII. (p. 86), "blame the simple faith of the man of Christians" must be due to some accidental error. The meaning is, "blame the want of reflection in the faith of the mob, under Christianity." The philosophers objected to the faith of poor, uninstructed Christians that it was mere ignorant credulity. Does *σύμβολον* (p. 105) denote a sacrament? Is not

the reference to the *traditio symboli*, the communication of the creed to the catechumen some little time before baptism? The *προνοούμενοι*, on p. 114, are "purveyors" rather than "inspectors." In the title of Chapter XXI. (p. 137), the statement that it is taken "from the third book on Principles" is omitted, and the useful enumeration of passages is not in the Greek, and should be in square brackets. In the same title, "solution" would be a better translation of *λύσις* than "explanation." Our word "phantasy" is hardly a proper rendering of *φαντασία*, which, in philosophy, denotes a mental representation or conception. At all events, Rufinus's explanation, which has no equivalent in the Greek, ought not to be inserted in the text. In the same connection, I think "impulse" gives the force of *ὁρμή* better than "instinct." In treating of choice between alternatives (p. 147), "preferences" would be a better rendering of *προαιρέσεις* than "purposes." On page 212, Origen's emphatic "is saved" is much more suggestive than "we uphold." The meaning is that the passage which is quoted is saved from being rendered futile by determinism. The first clause in paragraph 5 page 219, seems to me to be mistranslated. The meaning is that it would be foolish for those who are involved in the supposed ills of life to lay stress on them as really evil, and at the same time to boast of them; for this would make the Apostle glory in what was evil—a thing that cannot be supposed. Though *ὄνομα* undoubtedly means a name, the use of the latter on p. 224 rather obscures the meaning. "Expressions" or "terms" would be clearer; and I think "conciseness of the expressions" would be truer to the sense than "their limited connotation." Throughout p. 225, "just," being a technical Gnostic word, should be retained, instead of being used interchangeably with "righteous."

I have noticed a few misprints. On the first page of the "Translator's Preface," "thirteen" should be "thirteenth"; in note 1, p. 87, "Aleu." should be "Alex." In the middle of p. 169, one "it" should be deleted. On p. 203, line 11, the first "what" should be deleted, the sentence being unintelligible as it stands.

It would be helpful if the numbers of the chapters were printed at the head of each page; and for those who possess Lommatzsch, but have not Dr Robinson's edition, it would be convenient for purposes of reference if the pages of the former were given in the margin. The volume is provided with a fairly good index. It might, however, be enlarged with advantage, and the addition of an index of Scripture passages referred to would add to the utility of the work. Under the words "nature" or "revelation," neither of which occurs in the index, there might be a reference to p. 33, where there is an interesting anticipation of the argument of Butler's *Analogy*, though it is no doubt very briefly illustrated.

These few suggestions are made in no carping spirit, but in the hope that they may be of some slight service in improving a work which is already excellent.

JAMES DRUMMOND.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## THE CIVIC UNIVERSITY.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED TO THE CITIZENS  
OF BRISTOL.

VISCOUNT HALDANE.

YOUR University has done me the honour of choosing me for its Chancellor. I have asked leave to express in person before you, the citizens of Bristol, my gratitude for this high distinction. Such title as I possess to it is that I have cared for the cause of University Education in the great cities of the kingdom. I have believed in this cause and have striven for it. And it is with a sense of real pleasure that I find myself privileged to be closely associated with the new University life of your community.

Of this new life I wish to say something to you on the present occasion. It is a characteristic development of our time that the great cities of England should have asked for, and in rapid succession obtained, the concession of their own Universities. In Scotland, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen have for centuries possessed such Universities, to the great profit of themselves and the Scottish nation. Dundee has recently followed their example by entering into fellowship with St Andrews. In Ireland, Dublin has lately got a second teaching University, and Belfast has secured a University of her own. In England the progress has recently been rapid—

London made her foundation of a teaching University under the Act of 1898. Birmingham followed suit, and was herself quickly followed by Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, and Sheffield, and then by Bristol. Newcastle has recognised the example of Dundee by entering into partnership with Durham.

There were not wanting those who took a gloomy view of the new development. The standard of University life and of University degrees must, they said, inevitably be ruined. The level of Oxford and Cambridge could never be reached, and these old Universities might even be damaged. To this it was replied that no one aimed at an imitation of Oxford and Cambridge. These Universities possessed an historical tradition of their own which was a great asset to the country. No wise person would wish to alter their special atmosphere. They could, after all, provide for only a limited number of students; what had to be provided for elsewhere was the very much larger number whom they did not reach. It was pointed out that Germany possessed a greater number of Universities in proportion to her population than we did, and that there were certainly no grounds for saying that their number had either lowered the standard of University education in that country, or that Berlin or Munich or Leipzig or Breslau afforded the least indication that a University could not flourish exceedingly in a great city. Moreover, experience had shown that the very competition of Universities tended to bring about a stingless rivalry in keeping standards high. These arguments prevailed with Governments and Parliaments. But the victory was not won without a struggle. What was probably the final battle was fought out in the end of 1902 before a very impressive tribunal, in the form of a Special Committee of the Privy Council. I make no apology for referring to this battle of the experts, for by some chance even historians of education in this country seem to know little of it. Liverpool had by 1902 awakened to the sense of her necessities, and, stimulated by the success of Mr Chamberlain's effort for Birmingham,



had petitioned for a University Charter. She possessed a University College. She was sure she could develop this greatly in both money and men if the city felt that it was considered worthy to have a University of its own, instead of a College federated with those of Manchester and Leeds under the Examining Board at Manchester, which then possessed the title of the Victoria University. She complained that the federal system was subordinating education to examination, instead of putting examination in its proper place as a means to the end of testing teaching—that teaching which ought to be the supreme object of the existence of a University. Manchester, a little half-heartedly, concurred in the Liverpool view; Leeds opposed strongly, and was backed up by a mixed but powerful assemblage of witnesses, which included some opponents of what were nicknamed Lilliputian Universities, and by some advocates of external examination. The petition of Liverpool was referred by the Crown to a Committee of the Privy Council, and eminent lawyers argued the case for and against it and called their witnesses. The Committee was presided over by the distinguished statesman who was then President of the Council, the late Duke of Devonshire, and he had as his colleagues Lord Rosebery, the ex-Prime Minister, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who was then Secretary for Scotland, Lord James of Hereford, and one whom we in Bristol know well, and hold in admiration and affection, Sir Edward Fry. The hearing occupied three days: the 17th, 18th, and 19th of December 1902. The Committee after deliberation reported, and an Order in Council, dated the 10th of February 1903, gave effect to the report. It was pronounced that Liverpool and Manchester had made out their case for the grant of University Charters. It was added that the step of granting the Charters involved issues of great moment which should be kept in view, and for the solution of which due preparations should be made, especially in respect to those points upon which, having regard to the great importance of the matter, and the effects of any

changes upon the future of higher education in the North of England, co-operation was expedient between Universities of a common type and with cognate aims.

The date of this Order in Council is, I think, a memorable one. It gave State recognition to a new policy, but for which we might not have been assembled here to-night. The principle was accepted that the number of the English Universities was to be increased, and their headquarters were to be in cities. The conditions were that the chief responsibility was to be entrusted to the cities themselves, and that the cities should be large enough and keen enough to ensure that the requisite local resources for the maintenance and development of the Universities should be forthcoming. It is about the Civic University which has thus been born that I have come to speak to you. Such a University presupposes for its existence not only sympathy but enthusiasm on the part of the citizens. Without such enthusiasm it cannot grow or become a source of credit and advantage, moral, intellectual, or material, to the city. But such experience as we have had shows the city, by taking thought in this fashion, in process of adding a cubit to its stature. The other thing needful is that the education given should be of the very highest type practicable. It must not be merely technical or designed as a means to material ends. That is a narrow aim which in the end defeats its own accomplishment. The appeals to the King in Council, on the great occasion to which I have alluded, breathed a wholly different spirit. It was then declared that the great communities of the kingdom would be content with nothing short of the highest. They had, of course, to make a beginning ; they could not accomplish everything at once—University institutions can only obtain their full stature as the result of long growth. But the mediæval cities of Italy, cities such as Bologna, had set to the world a great example. They found a home, as students of books such as that of Dr Rashdall on the Universities of the Middle Ages know, for guilds of students, who established



themselves there to the great fame and profit of the city. They became conscious of their own individuality, and they assisted in giving to the world University teaching and University work of the highest kind. What, to go still further back, did not Athens owe to the fact that the highest learning was developed and put by the people themselves in the highest place among Athenian institutions? Such ancient cities are a model for us; they influenced not only their own countrymen but the whole world for good. The chance has come to us in England to accomplish something of the same kind, and with us, as with them, it is to the enthusiasm and resources of our great urban communities, never, when once convinced, wanting in faith, that we have to look.

There was a time when men of business, accustomed to see closely to profit and loss, used to think that the work of a University was worth effort and expenditure only in so far as it produced aptitude for industrial and commercial production. Traces of this view are still apparent in the foundation deeds of some of the older University Colleges of our municipalities. But this idea is now discredited, and the part played by science and by general learning in the production alike of the captain of industry and of the extension of invention is far greater than was the case even a few years ago. Applied science is in its best form only possible on a wide foundation of general science. And the fruitful scientific spirit is developed to-day on a basis of high intellectual training, the training which only the atmosphere of the fully developed University can completely provide. What is true of science in the narrower sense is also true of learning generally. It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind that the fullest capacity can, as a general rule, be obtained. There are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognise that the best specialist can be produced only after a long training in general learning. The grasp of principle which makes detail easy can

only come when innate capacity has been evoked and moulded by high training. Our engineers, our lawyers, our doctors, our administrators, our inventors, cannot keep in front in the race, or hold their own amid the rivalry of talent, unless their minds have been so widely trained that the new problems with which the ever-increasing complications and specialisations of modern conditions confront them, present nothing more formidable than new applications of first principles which have been thoroughly assimilated. Without having reached this level they cannot maintain their feet. The competition is not merely with their fellow-countrymen ; it is with the trained minds of other countries. These other countries are, some of them, advancing at least as rapidly as we are. An enlightened policy in education is the order of the day over most of the civilised world, and if we are to hold our own, even in the making of money, we dare not fall behind or lag in the endeavour to increase our efforts. I see no sign that we Britons are diminishing one whit in our really great capacity. In many respects, notably in certain of our public institutions, we are advancing so rapidly that we continue to lead the way, and our production of wealth is not falling off. Moreover, I do not believe that we are really losing what is equally necessary—that spirit of respect to the laws which we have made for ourselves that has been one of our chief glories. But we have more than ever before to see to it that we keep at least abreast in science, and science means far more now than technical training, or the mere application of special knowledge to industry. It rests on a foundation of general culture which is vital to the maintenance of its standards, and it can develop only if the population has the fullest chance of an intellectual and moral training which goes deeper than mere science strictly so called. It is the power of the highly-trained mind that is required, and the full development of this trained mind can only be given by the highly organised Universities.

This brings me to my next point. It is said that it is only the comparatively few that can attain to this level. That is



quite true. And it is neither requisite nor possible that everyone should be trained up to it. If we had all the Universities in the world concentrated in England, we should find that it was only a limited percentage of the population which would be fitted by natural aptitude to take full advantage of them. What is really essential is that everyone should have a chance, and that there should be the nearest possible approach to equality of educational opportunity. Without this the sense of injustice will never be eliminated, and we shall in addition fail to secure for our national endeavours the help of our best brains. There is sitting at the present time an important Royal Commission. The Civil Service, which is the permanent element in the government of the country, has been recruited in various ways. The prevailing but not the only test has been examination. The civil servants are, however, divided into higher and lower divisions. The lower division, which is much the larger, does the great bulk of the routine and less difficult work. Its members enter by competitive examination at the age of about eighteen. They spend but a short time, as a rule, in the secondary school, which they leave early to prepare for the examination. The higher division, which is much smaller, consists of those who succeed in a competitive examination, passed when they are about twenty-two. For the most part they have started at a University, the object being to secure candidates who have had the benefit of a full University training, and, if possible, such as have taken honours. After appointment they do work which is, some of it, of a highly responsible character, requiring both general education and the capacity of taking the initiative and of managing men. In my opinion this is a most valuable type of public servant. I was the head, for over six years, of a great administrative department, and I formed the opinion that this class of men, with a broad general foundation of education of the higher type, was essential in the interests of the State, and, after all, the consideration to be placed foremost. But the mode of selection has given rise to dissatisfaction. It is felt, and felt

rightly, that a very large class is shut out from any chance of entry, and that the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have had an undue advantage. They continue to fill a very large proportion of the vacancies. The fact that this is because Oxford and Cambridge until now have proved to be the best training places for the candidates is not altogether an answer to the complaint. Education quite as good for the purpose might be given elsewhere. But such education, to be sufficient, must be of a high order. After a good deal of observation, both while I was at the Bar and while I was in charge of an administrative department, I have come to the conclusion that, as a general rule, the most stimulating and useful preparation for the general work of the higher Civil Service is a literary training, and that of this a classical education is for most men the best form, though not exclusively so. No doubt men vary, and science or modern literature may develop the mind, in the case of those who have aptitude for them, better than Latin or Greek literature. But, as Goethe said long ago, the object of education ought to be rather to form tastes than simply to communicate knowledge. The pedant is not of much use in the conduct of public affairs. For the formation of tastes and of the intellectual habits and aptitudes which the love of learning produces, the atmosphere of a highly organised University life is a tremendous power, and we cannot do without it. And, therefore, while I am not without sympathy with the complaint of democracy that the entrance to the higher positions in the Civil Service is by far too much the monopoly of a class, I reply that a highly educated official is essential for a particular kind of work which the State needs. The remedy must not be to displace the class which alone furnishes the supply. Democracy is apt in its earlier stages to be unduly jealous, and to try to drag things down to a level which, because it is the general level, is in danger of being too low to provide the highest talent. The remedy for what is a real grievance appears to me to be that democracy should



add a new plank to its platform, and insist on equality of opportunity in education as something that should be within the reach of every youth and maiden. That more than a comparatively small minority will prove capable of taking advantage of the highest education is unlikely. We are not all born with the same capacity. But that many will seize on a new opportunity who are at present shut out, is to my mind certain. And if democracy will abandon the suggestion that the highest work can be done without the highest educational preparation for it, I shall be the most whole-hearted supporter of the inauguration of a new democratic campaign. There are those who possess the inborn initiative and capacity which can do without the ordinary educational avenues. They have existed at all times and they exist to-day. They must be taken into account and provision made for them by special promotion. But these are nature's aristocrats, and the number of true aristocrats is always very small. We have to legislate for the ordinary man and woman, and we cannot do more than make provision for that equality of opportunity in the higher education of which I have spoken.

Elementary education is now the right of all, and since the passing of the Education Act of 1902, an Act the immense advantages of which have always appeared to me to outweigh certain awkward blemishes which have still to be got rid of, the clever boy or girl can generally, by means of a scholarship or a free place, get to the secondary school. But the chances for the poor scholar to get from the secondary school to the University, although they exist, are still far too few. The Labour leaders are quite right when they complain that the prizes of the State are in reality far too much reserved for the upper classes. Where they are wrong, I think, is in the remedy they propose. The State will suffer badly if the level of its civil servants is lowered, and it will be lowered if the qualifications for all positions are lowered to the educational equipment possessed by a youth who has ceased his studies at eighteen. The true remedy is to break down the class barrier

by making provision for enabling the youth of eighteen to go on, if he is fit to do so, and to qualify himself more highly. Now here is where the Civic University has a great part to play. It is idle to say, as is sometimes said, that Oxford and Cambridge include the democracy. Theoretically they do, but not one child of the people out of a thousand has a real chance of becoming an undergraduate there. More accessible Universities are required, and these new Universities, I am careful to add, will only successfully compete with Oxford and Cambridge in serving the requirements of the State if they keep their level very high. A University to be a true University must be a place where the spirit is more important than the letter. In the elementary schools, and to a great extent even in the secondary schools, the teacher is in a position of authority. What he says is accepted by the pupil as truth without inquiry. But in a true University, where the problems are higher and more difficult, the professor as well as his student is making his voyage of discovery. Both must avoid dogmatic slumber or even supineness. They must in all reality investigate—and be content to investigate. This inevitable feature of the higher work, even where it is primarily educational, has always been recognised by those whose names we reverence most. Lessing meant it when he declared almost passionately that if the Almighty were to offer him the truth in one hand and the search after the truth in the other, he would choose the hand that held the search after truth. It is this that Goethe had in mind when he said what I have already quoted about the real object of education being to form tastes and not to impart knowledge. Of course, knowledge must be imparted. But it comes fully to those and to those alone who are able to realise its necessity and to desire it with all their souls for its own sake, and not as a means to any end. As Aristotle long ago declared, the foundation of wisdom is the awakening of the sense of wonder. The spirit of the University is thus the co-operation of professor and student in a common endeavour to learn.



The former is further on than the latter and can impart to him stimulation and guidance. But they are both searchers after truth, and the dominance of the letter over the spirit, which is of necessity more present in the school, ought to be remote from both. A University is a place where the most valuable advantage the student has is contact with an inspiring personality. That is why nothing short of the best level among the professors is enough for success. The professor must inspire. His labour must be one of love if he is to succeed. And if he is a great teacher he will have moulded the lives and tastes of the best of his students for the rest of their existence.

Here, then, is a new object of ambition for you, the citizens of Bristol. You have it in your power now, if you so choose, to make it possible for the son or daughter of every poor man in this city, be he high or be he low, to attain to this splendid advantage in life. Only few can be chosen; that results from the fact that the order of nature does not permit us to be born equal. But the many may and ought to be called, even if the few are chosen. Let us turn to the practical application to the affairs of your city of this great gospel of educational opportunity. Those who believe in democracy have not yet awakened to its significance. When they do they may come to think that here lies the most direct path to the attainment of their end.

Your elementary schools are excellent, and are still improving; all children must go to them. When they leave they are apt to forget what they have learned. The working classes are growing more keen about keeping their children on at the schools instead of taking them away to earn money. They endure a heavy burden to do this, and I sometimes think that one of the reasons for the growth of a discontent which has somewhat of the divine in it, is a sense of the growing burden of the indirect cost of education. Any rise in wages is balanced and more than balanced by the rise in standards of living, and this is true not only of England but of

most other highly civilised countries. Even, however, if the child stays on to fourteen, it leaves school only to forget much. I used, when I was at the War Office, to be struck by the comparatively large percentage of soldiers who could not read or write. The Education Acts had been in force since 1870, and the fact at first sight seemed difficult to understand. The explanation was that the young soldiers had learned to read and write, but had left school and forgotten, so that we had to educate them over again.

Now in Bristol you have a good proportion of excellent secondary schools. The boy or girl can in many cases get there from the elementary school. But not in all cases, nor in enough of cases. And when I turn to the further chance of the University, the same thing is true, and true in a more marked form. There are chances offered to clever young men and women of reaching your University. But there are not enough of such chances for the establishment of anything like the standard of equality in educational opportunity. It is the attainment of this standard, this high and true ideal, that I wish to-night to commend to the citizens of Bristol without distinction of rank or occupation. The inhabitants of this great city are all of them directly interested in it. To possess in Bristol a real system of graduated education, within the reach of all who are endowed by nature with the talent to take advantage of it, would make Bristol the first city in the Empire as regards education, for it would have what the other cities do not now possess. And it would mean much for this city as regards other things. The experience of our own nation, and perhaps still more that of other countries, has shown the power of expansion and influence which a complete system of education can give. The most important result is not money-making. But even in money-making, in these days when science and organisation are becoming dominating influences in commercial undertakings, success seems certain to depend more and more, as time advances, on their possession. And therefore I appeal to all of you, to workmen and



employers, to the man who can just manage to educate his children and to the wealthiest alike, to concern yourselves in a great civic cause. Do not let yourselves be influenced by the criticism that is sometimes made even to-day by those whose ideas about University influence are entirely derived from the contemplation of the older Universities. No one is more keenly conscious than I am that there has grown up around Oxford and Cambridge an atmosphere which it is impossible to reproduce elsewhere. It has been the growth of the tradition of centuries. It has developed the finest qualities in scholarship. But, as a detached observer, I must add that this atmosphere and the habits which it has developed in us have hindered as well as helped.

When Francis Bacon wrote his *Advancement of Learning*, and was laying the foundations of his great discoveries in inductive logic and scientific method, he turned sharply on the teaching of the English Universities. At one of them, Cambridge, he had been a distinguished student. Yet his biographers tell us that while he was "commorant" at the University at the age of sixteen, he "first fell into dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle, not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would ever ascribe all high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way, which seemed to him only strong for disputations and barren of the production of works for the life of man." It was not that he disliked the University system; on the contrary, in the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon says: "We highly approve of the education of youth in colleges, and not wholly in private houses or schools, for in colleges there is not only a greater emulation of youth among their equals, but the teachers have a venerable aspect and gravity, which greatly conduces towards insinuating a modest behaviour, and the forming of tender minds from the first, according to such example, and besides these there are many other advantages of a collegiate education." From various passages in the *Advancement* we gather that his condemnation arose from the unintelligent fashion in which the Dons

of his time taught abstract rules to those who had not yet gathered what he calls, quoting Cicero rather oddly, “‘*Sylva*’ and ‘*Supellex*,’ and then Matter and Fecundity.” To begin with these rules is, he declares, as though one were “to paint or measure the wind.”

Now in the *Advancement of Learning* my great predecessor in the office of Lord Chancellor was hardly just to Aristotle. We have at last learned to understand Aristotle’s words because we have been at pains to understand his thoughts. Aristotle’s logical methods were not what Bacon took them to be. They were far more searching and much nearer to the truth about the processes of acquiring knowledge. But it is one of the great reproaches against the English Universities that they dragged the name of Aristotle down into the mud. Their verbal scholarship left little to be desired. But they stretched Greek thought, that of Plato hardly less than that of Aristotle, on the rack of their own provincial ideas, until the vitality had disappeared out of it. It was not until less than fifty years ago that any decent exposition of the philosophy of Aristotle was produced at an English University. In September 1866, the late T. H. Green, a great thinker, wrote an article on the subject in the *North British Review*, in which he made a new departure for Oxford, and raised the study of Aristotle to a higher plane by showing that his metaphysics and his logic must be read as one whole, and in the light which modern idealism had cast on them. It was not through Locke and Berkeley and Hume alone that Aristotle and Plato could be made intelligible. The study of other modern thinkers was an essential preliminary. When we consider that the first edition of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared in 1781, it is not creditable to the English Universities that, in a subject of which their teachers were never tired of discoursing, they should have remained for eighty-five years in ignorance of the only method of penetrating its real meaning. And they had the less excuse because during this time the work was being rapidly completed



on the Continent. Had the Dons been acquainted with modern languages instead of with dead tongues exclusively, they could hardly have failed to be conscious of the work which well-known foreign commentators, such as Schwegler and Carl Prantl and Zeller, were erecting on the foundation first laid by Kant. What is true of Greek thought is also in a measure true of modern science. The awakening has come to the old Universities late. They are now doing very fine work, but they ought to have been able to develop it much sooner. Some stimulus has been wanting. Had their students lived under a national system where there were many Universities, and where the scholar was free to move from one to another to seek the professor of his choice, instead of being tied up in his academic domicile of origin, the teachers would have been stimulated, and things would probably have moved far more rapidly under the development of the rivalry of talent. But the dominant atmosphere was that, not of the laity, as in Germany, but of the Church, and the result was somnolence. There was lacking the alertness which comes from the supervision of the keen mind and practical instinct of the nation's great men of business. The latter may not know much of literature or science or philosophy, though among them there will always be those who do know. But they recognise quality when they see it, and they are jealous lest the institutions for which they are responsible should be outdistanced in foreign countries. If the new English Universities can keep their level high, they may be able to develop a certain advantage over the older English Universities. When I compare the state of things in Oxford and Cambridge with that in the Universities of Germany, I am impressed with one point in particular in which the latter seem to me superior. In Germany the student is free to go from time to time, in the course of his undergraduate career, to study under a professor of his own choice in another University. This freedom, of course, implies that much responsibility for the shaping of his own academic

career is placed on the shoulders of the student. But it stimulates his intelligence and tends to save him from getting into a rut. The English tutorial system does not afford the same opportunities for bringing him into stimulating contact with the greatest academic personalities of his day. This matters less, as it seems to me, to the student of exceptional keenness and ability than it does to the merely average undergraduate. And it is perhaps the reason why the typical average undergraduate in England, as one sees him after he leaves the University, appears to bear the marks of a training which has been social rather than intellectual, and to be somewhat lacking in awareness of his own limitations.

It is to the production by the Civic University of the quality of alertness in the average as well as in the exceptional student that I look with hope for the future. There will be many mistakes of detail made in the government of the new University. But that government is likely to compensate for such shortcomings by its vigour and keenness. What is requisite for the sustaining of that vigour and keenness is that the city should be proud of its University, and should feel that it is its own child in whose future the citizens are profoundly concerned, and whose glory will lend support and strength to the renown of the parents. I can see no limit to what may be the development of the Civic University within the next hundred years. I look to its becoming the dominant and shaping power in our system of national education. We have got into all sorts of difficulties, religious and otherwise, from beginning too low down. We could not help ourselves; we had no University system, spread over the country, to lay hold of and shape into one whole the teachers and the taught alike. In the elementary schools rigid rule and abstract principle are apt to become ends in themselves instead of means to ends. In a system which is merely a vast assemblage of schools in which children must be taught according to a common scheme, the "either or" of the abstract understanding is far more difficult to escape from



than it is in the University, where freedom to teacher and student alike in the shaping of educational ideals is of the essence of University life. In the latter the religious difficulty tends to disappear. We see how it has disappeared to-day even at Oxford and Cambridge, where the Church once dominated. And we see that the attainment of freedom and elasticity in regions of religion has not made Oxford and Cambridge really less religious. Now, if the community would be in earnest in setting educational ideals at the top, and in letting its educational system be permeated from the upper stratum downwards, I should have much hope that the controversy about the lower schools, would disappear in the pursuit of larger ends. But this implies that the Universities should take a large part in shaping the spirit and endeavour of the secondary and elementary schools, and, as a condition of this, that the entire organisation of education should be shaped by Parliament into a comprehensive and connected system. In 1908, by passing the Scotch Education Act of that year, Parliament took a step in this direction for Scotland. But in England the work has yet to be done, and it may well be that the new University spirit in our great cities will compel its commencement.

For there is already a new University spirit in these cities. A distinguished friend of mine, who has occasion to know England well, remarked to me recently that when he goes on official visits to the North he finds Universities becoming increasingly prominent in all municipal functions of a public character. These new Universities stand, and are put forward more and more naturally as standing, for the highest life of the places where they have taken root. Yet these new Universities are only in their infancy. What they may become and what influence they may wield we cannot foresee. What we do know is that they have made a profound appeal to what is best and most characteristic in the communities in which they flourish. They are supported by these communities with far less aid from the State than is the case abroad. And

this is the source of their strength. By degrees the principle of learning for learning's sake will become their accepted foundation. It is of the nature of the case that certain sides of this new academic life should have most support, the sides which furnish the supply of what business men feel to be most required. But they are rapidly outgrowing the stage in which the technological departments were almost exclusively predominant. Their faculties of art are still weak, but as the demand for an art training grows, as grow it must, for the sake of such vocations as teaching and theology, of administration and of law and other learned callings, this kind of faculty will develop. The example of Germany shows how literature and philosophy may flourish in a University which has the busiest civic surroundings, and there is no reason why that example should not be followed in this country. Time and the growth of enlightenment are what is requisite.

One characteristic feature they possess, and I think to their advantage. In Germany the Technical Colleges have been sharply divided from the University and given a separate existence. This is partly due to the division and separation in character of the great secondary schools in Germany. The resulting separation of the Technical College from the University has been deplored by some of the most distinguished authorities on German Education, notably by the late Professor Paulsen. If this be a thing to be avoided, we have avoided it. We have made our start by treating education as a single and indivisible whole—and by trying to keep the different kinds of students in one organisation. How powerful this tendency is we may see by the example of Cambridge, which has yielded to it, and has gone to an extent in extending the ambit of its activities to technical training which would be looked on askance by many University authorities in Germany. We have done even more, for we have developed in connection with our new Universities a system of evening teaching for a separate class of student, which has enabled them to bring their influence to



bear on those who during the day are engaged in earning their livelihood by manual or other work. That the tendency to recognise this kind of instruction as legitimate for the British University is increasing appears when we look at such cases as those of Glasgow and Manchester, where the great Technical Colleges of these cities are being brought into the closest relation with their Universities. I believe this to be entirely right, and I am glad that you in Bristol took the same course at the beginning when you brought the Merchant Venturers' College, with its evening teaching, into your new University organisation. There is no reason why a step of this kind should debar you from setting before yourselves compliance with the great test that the education given to all those who can take advantage of it should be of the highest academic type. And there is this of gain, that you give a direct interest in the University of the city to its working-class citizens, and encourage them to take advantage of the great instrument for their own advancement which lies to hand.

Specialisation in each city University there will be and ought to be. *Non omnia possumus omnes*. In one place the distinctive strength will be in chemistry—general and applied—for, exist without each other they cannot. In another, as in Sheffield, it will be the metallurgy of iron and steel—and it is not unimportant in this connection that Sheffield is the chief centre for the manufacture of the national guns and steel plates, an industry in which we dare not dispense with high science. In another place, as in the case of the Imperial College in London, we should have the great training place in the metallurgy of the precious metals for the students of a people which leads the world in their production. Some Universities will be strong in engineering, civil and mechanical or, it may be, marine. But the one thing requisite is that the broad foundations of the highest general knowledge should be there in each University, and that all specialisation should rest on these foundations. You cannot, without danger of

partial starvation, separate science from literature and philosophy. Each grows best in the presence of the others.

Another essential feature is adequate provision for the post-graduate student—that is, the student who, having taken his degree, has in him the passion for excellence sufficiently strong to desire to continue in the University as a place of research, and of the still higher learning which is inseparable from research. Such students may not be numerous, but when they are present they leaven the whole lump, and by their presence give a distinction to the University and to the professors under whom they work which could not be possible in their absence.

Finally, it is one of the characteristic features of the new Universities that they are freely opened to women as well as to men. This is an advance which it is difficult to overrate, and in days to come its influence for good may prove to be very great.

I have endeavoured, how imperfectly I know, as the Chancellor of your new University, to place before you as citizens of Bristol some account of the aims and aspirations of those who are now working among you, and working, not as a foreign body imported from without, but as a new development of the civic community. Your University is now bone of your bone and flesh of your flesh. What you are concerned to see is that it grows, and grows in no slavish way. Now the idea of such a place of learning has become much enlarged in our own time. Not only is the class to which it appeals wider, but its conception of its work is wider. It aims at producing the *esprit de corps* among its pupils. The Union and the Common Room are growing up. Then there are other features, to one of which I refer with something of paternal affection. The Officers' Training Corps differs widely from the old Volunteer or Cadet Corps, which used to be all that our Universities contributed to the defence of their country. Five years ago, when I was at the War Office, we came to see that it was waste of splendid material to aim at



the production of nothing higher than this from among University students, and that what we needed most was to get from them a Reserve of educated men who had had sufficient training as officers to be available in the event of war. We appealed to the Universities, new and old, but not until we had carefully prepared our plans. The Officers' Training Corps of the modern University is wholly different from the old University Volunteer Corps. And the reason is twofold. It has now been shaped for the accomplishment of a definite end, the training for the duties of command in great emergency of educated young men who will, even in time of peace, put their obligations to their country before their love of ease and amusement. The second reason is that this training is given, not as of yore under the drill sergeant, not even under the ordinary officer, but under the direction and supervision of the picked brains of the British Army—the new General Staff. Such training, based on the best scientific methods, therefore takes its place naturally within the sphere of work of the University, and expands and completes the work of that University.

I have referred to the Union and to the Officers' Training Corps as signs of the times, as indications of the way in which the conception of University life is being widened. Other indications there are of the extended scope which is visible in several directions of the meaning of academic life and training. But it is enough to say that this life and training have no limits set for them except the insistence that the work must be educational, mentally and spiritually, and educational in a high sense. The test of University work is, after all, like that of literature—size and level. I have faith that this truth has now been realised, and that among the Civic Universities, the centres be it observed of guidance and the higher teaching for the districts which are assigned to and surround them, the duty of maintaining a high level is one which will be seen to jealously. The professors have a deep responsibility in this respect, and the general body of citizens have a responsibility

hardly less. Nothing is more encouraging than the way in which co-operation in the joint endeavour has been visible up to now in the proceedings of the governing bodies, and there is no reason to anticipate that the future will be less encouraging.

This is what I wish to say in conclusion. Do not let us be discouraged by apparent slowness in progress. It is only when a long tract of time has been covered that the full character of the movement forward that has taken place within it can be seen. Much has been done within the short period since the University of Bristol came into existence. Much remains to be done. But if the great city becomes more and more proud of its University, and more and more conscious of the nature of the young life that has been born to it, then there will not be wanting the conditions that are requisite for growth to full maturity. The day may come when the citizen of Bristol will be able to look back on his life as made up of distinct phases which have this in common, that he owes all of them to his native place. He may as now look to the city as the place of his birth, the place where he lived with his parents, and with which his earliest associations are connected. He may look to it as the place where he grew up from youth to manhood, and where, by virtue of the strength that was in him, he made conquest for himself of wealth and reputation. He may look to it as the arena in which he threw himself into an honourable rivalry for success in public life, and in the endeavour to do the utmost that within him lay to benefit his fellow human beings. And, last but not least, he may look to it as the home of the University which gave him his great impulses, which moulded his soul, and imparted to him not only the knowledge that was the source of strength, but the most glorious inspirations of his youth.

If you, in whose hands rests the making of the future, accomplish the task of rendering this and perhaps even more than this possible in your own city, you will have deserved well of the nation of which you form a part.

HALDANE.



## MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

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THE institution of marriage has had a history as long as that of the human race. Such an age-long institution has necessarily many features of interest; many and diverse aspects from which it can be regarded: some of which are transient and concern antiquarians chiefly; others permanent and worthy of careful consideration by each successive age.

It is with one only of these permanent features of marriage that I propose now to deal: a feature characteristic of it in every period of its history and at every stage of its development: a feature also big with meaning in the day, and amid the movements, in which we live. That feature is that ideas of marriage and of the duties attached to those ideas, supply a very true and clear standard by which to gauge the moral level of any people at any time. The thermometer is not a more accurate measure of the heat, or the barometer of the weight of the surrounding atmosphere, than marriage is of the lowness or the height of the contemporary moral condition both of individuals and communities. As a man's view of marriage is, and a woman's, so also is their general moral condition. Where low views of marriage are prevalent, the collective state of morals is low and tends to fall: where high views prevail, morals are high and tend to mount.

Every page of social history affords evidence of this fact. In the earliest stages of human development, when man was

most akin to the brutes, marriage, in so far as it existed at all, was a brutish thing. It was loose, sensual, promiscuous; what in the moral reversions of modern times is miscalled "free." Men had generally many wives; and women sometimes several husbands. The entire relation was a physical relation, a physical indulgence, a bodily lust. It had few acknowledged rights; scarcely any acknowledged duties. Its bonds were easily broken. Any whim could loose them. It recognised no obligations towards children except such as are recognised by beasts and birds—chiefly the obligation to feed them until they are able to feed themselves. It did away with superfluous children; not, indeed, in the modern fashion, by preventing their birth or killing them before they were born; but by murdering them afterwards as soon as they grew burdensome. Such are the characteristics of brutish marriage, whether in olden days of savagery or later days of luxury. In this low state of the moralities of marriage child-culture is little more than chattel-culture; because conscience has no share in it, and God never enters its reckonings.

At a subsequent stage, the stage of law, the marriage bonds were tightened; and out of the tightening of these bonds the family grew. And here we note that the connection between views of marriage and views of family life is an indissoluble connection. Low, or merely legal views of marriage go together with low, or merely legal views of family life: while high and sacred views of marriage are inseparable from high and sacred views of parenthood. The conception of the family was originally a legal conception: because the conception of marriage from which it sprung was a legal conception also. Matrimony, at this era, had risen above the range of mere sensual lust, but it had not yet ascended the heights of the moral realm. It was the creature of law; although not always of law alone. Religious rites were at times associated with it. But it was still a thinly disguised, when it was not an actually open, bargain of purchase and sale. The wife became the property of her husband. She had no



legal existence of her own. Neither had the children so long as the father lived. He could make merchandise of them. The *patria potestas* also conferred on him the *jus vitæ necisque*, the power of life and death. Yet, after all, there was a stronger nexus, a tighter bond in marriage in the age of its legalism than in that of its barbarism. The relations of husband and wife, of father to children—even of mother also—began to mean something. The family became a clearly defined reality. It, and not the individual, was the unit of tribal life. From it peoples, nations, and empires came to their birth. But its foundation rested on law, not on love. And, as in all ages, when marriage is mainly a legal contract, a thinly disguised barter of the body for material considerations, so in the Roman age it was generally accompanied by concubinage. In ancient times, however, the concubinage was avowedly practised: in modern times it is more secretly indulged. Then, a married man might legally have several wives. Now, he can have only one legal wife at a time: but betrayals and the White Slave Traffic, streets and salons, provide the rest. This is a condition of things more degrading than concubinage: a reversion to brutish immoralities grosser than those of barbaric ages, and infinitely more contemptible, because practised by persons who dwell in a light unseen by savages. Yet whenever, and by whomsoever, marriage is regarded merely as a legal contract, or a cloke for wantonness, or a matter of social convenience, or a money arrangement, and not as the fruit of true mutual affection and a bond before God, these lewd results perpetually tend to occur and recur, as the history of marriage everywhere testifies.

That history as told in the Bible runs closely parallel with the same history among peoples outside the Jewish race. With only one difference; but that a stupendous difference. From the beginning of their history the Jews had set before them a most ennobling ideal of marriage: an ideal unknown to savage tribes, or any other early civilisations besides themselves. The Bible opens with a sweet and beautiful ideal of

marriage: one husband and one wife, given to each other by God, complementary elements in one undivided life; the woman as much a part of the man's whole as is his rib of his body; the psychical and spiritual relation more close than the physical relation of bone to bone and flesh to flesh; a relation of mutual society, help, and comfort; a most pure and meet relation of body, soul, and spirit; a relation without sin, and in which nakedness, not even the nakedness of innermost thought, would be a shame. Whether this portion of the prologue to the Book of Genesis be inspired history or inspired ideal I do not know; nor does the question affect my present theme. But one thing is certain, that of all the contents of the Old Testament Scriptures, few are of greater civilising value than this. If the Jews had followed the guidance of this marriage star from the beginning, their whole history would have been purified and exalted to a degree surpassing human imagination.

But, as our Lord has told us, through the hardness of their hearts they forsook the divine ideal, and fell below it miserably. The hardness of their hearts made them impenetrable to its truth, its beauty, its elevating power. They were polygamists like the contemporary Gentiles. They had concubines. As the story of the sacrifice of Isaac testifies, the father of the family exercised the *patria potestas*. In course of time the Jews fell a prey to the abominations of their heathen neighbours. They offered their sons and daughters to demons. Their adulteries were not only sensual but religious. They forsook Jehovah, their spiritual Husband, and joined themselves to Baal-peor. And the results were terrible. There were jealousies in the harem, factions in the family, brutalities in morals, hypocrisies in religion; Assyrian and Babylonian deportations; Egyptian, Greek, and Roman conquests; and finally, national ruin, dispersion, and desolation. Polygamy has a place in the Old Testament, but always a place of darkness, even when good men practised it; never of the light of God's approval.



Still, all through the Old Testament ages the primary ideal of marriage was there: a glorious beacon light and tower of hope. Amid the thunders and lightnings of Sinai it was defended and buttressed by the seventh commandment: the breach of which was declared in the Mosaic code to be both a crime against the commonweal and a sin against God; a sin incurring the divine displeasure, and a crime involving the penalty of death. The faithfulness and strength of a true husband's love for his one wife are used by the prophets as illustrations of the faithfulness and strength of the love of God. These laws and teachings gradually created a conscience in the community favourable to monogamy and conjugal fidelity. And although the Scribes and Pharisees were sometimes secret adulterers (St John viii. 7), yet in public they maintained the Mosaic standard—a proof both of their own hypocrisy, and of the popular appreciation of the inspired ideal of marriage. It is the penetration of this ideal throughout the Old Testament which lifts its teachings on marriage high above all contemporary teachings. The practices of the Jews were often no better than those of the heathen. The difference between Jews and heathens lay in the fact that the ethical codes and religious ideals of the heathen did not condemn these practices, sometimes even approved them; whereas the Sinaitic code and the religious writings of the Jews severely condemned them. The Old Testament records, but never commends, either polygamy or concubinage. Its annals prove their injury, and its ideals are their foe.

In the New Testament the divine ideals of marriage attain their zenith. In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord teaches that even dalliance with the thought of conjugal infidelity is essentially sin and adultery before God. He tells us that although Moses allowed divorce, he did not approve it. It was a temporary adaptation to the stony-heartedness of the time: not an example to be copied, but a process to be deplored. It is doubtful whether our Lord Himself ever sanctioned divorce, seeing that there are variations in the texts from

which His supposed sanction is deduced (St Matt. v. 32, xix. 9). But it is beyond all doubt that if He sanctioned it at all, it was for one delinquency, and for one only : that delinquency being conjugal unfaithfulness. In the Gospel of St Mark (x. 2-12), which is the first in order of date of all the Gospels, even this exception is not mentioned. Commenting on the Mosaic bill of divorcement, our Saviour said : " For the hardness of your heart Moses wrote you this precept, but from the beginning it was not so. . . ." From the beginning, in His blessed purpose, God joined the male to the female : " What, therefore, God hath joined together let not man put asunder." In the Apostolic teachings the same note rings clear : " Let not the wife depart from her husband, and let not the husband put away his wife " (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11). Nay, the New Testament rings out a note hitherto unheard. Marriage is a great mystery, *i.e.* a divine secret, withheld before, but now revealed. It is a mirror of the relation betwixt Christ and His Church. " Husbands, love your wives " (Eph. v. 25-33), " even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it. . . . Wives, see that ye reverence your husbands." This is the culminating ideal of Christian marriage ; marriage as God from the beginning meant it to be ; marriage such as for many Christians now it is ; and when the ideal is fully accomplished in the actual, for all Christians yet will be. Conjugal love will be the earthly counterpart of Christ's love for His Church ; and only when it can be conceived that Christ is divorced from His Church, will it be conceivable that Christian husbands and Christian wives will be divorced from each other.

But some man will say, all this is true, but it will not work in an imperfect world of mundane men and women. Let us think of this. Remember our Lord's message was to His disciples. His words were, " I say unto you " : you, My chosen seed, whose aspiration is to absorb My ideals and obey My precepts. Likewise also the teachings of the Apostles were intended for the Church ; whose mission is to save the world for God and for the noblest conceptions of the highest human



life. For although the world is often hostile to God and to divine ideals, it would be practical atheism to regard it as the devil's kingdom, over which the powers of evil reign supreme, and from the sovereignty of which God has been for ever dethroned. It is not so. The world is not the creation of a wicked demiurge. It is the good God's creation. It is His also by redemption. He so loved it, even in its enmity, that He gave His Son to die for it. And although it has wandered far from God, it will in the end come back to Him; and in the final restitution of all things, the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdoms of our God and His Christ.

And the plain duty of the Church is to work with God, and for God, in bringing about this glorious consummation. The work is very slow, but it is also very sure. No one who truly believes in God as the Father of all men, and their Redeemer and Inspirer also, can be a hopeless pessimist. Not only the faith of the Gospel, but the study of history is a certain cure for pessimism. Notwithstanding the countless evils still at work in it, the world in each successive century is better than in preceding centuries. With every new generation its ideals grow more beautiful, pure, and high, and particularly its consciousness of the very brotherhood of man and the very Fatherhood of God.

The Church cannot, therefore, because men and women are still imperfect, give up its appointed task, which is to placard divine ideals before the minds of men, to warm their hearts and bend their wills towards them, to stimulate enthusiasm for their beauty and their goodness and their worth. To do this would be to act as traitress both to God and the world. No! The manifest mission of the Church in relation to all divine ideals, and not least of all to the divine ideal of marriage, is to persevere, in spite of all hindrances, in setting them before the eyes of the people; portraying their loveliness and truth; making clear that misery always pursues their neglect, and happiness is always the reward of allegiance to their sway.

Various branches of the Church have hitherto been singu-

larly inconsistent in their teachings about the divine ideal of marriage. Their inconsistency is partly responsible for the present laxity of thought on this momentous subject. On the one hand, marriage has been exalted as a sacrament; on the other, the state of celibacy and virginity has been pronounced more high and holy than the state of matrimony. On the one hand, the marriage bond has been proclaimed indissoluble; on the other, dispensations have been granted for political, personal, and pecuniary considerations. Is it any wonder when Churches have been so loose and inconsistent in their treatment of marriage, that the world should be more careless still?

Moreover, some Churches do not seem to clearly realise what their own actual share in marriage is. A Church can hallow, but it cannot make a marriage. A Church can bestow its blessing on a marriage; which is no slight matter, but a great reality. It can also define and determine the conditions on which alone that blessing can be granted. But the Church's benediction is not necessary to the validity of the marriage bond. The essentials of that validity are the will and consent of the marrying parties, certified in writing, and duly attested by accepted witnesses under such circumstances, and under such limits, and free from such obstacles as the community, in its public legislation, shall require. It is not the service at the altar but the signatures before the accredited authority which create the marriage bond. The service at the altar is a very real and most solemn fact. It is not to be entertained lightly. It is not a dressmaker's, or a jeweller's, or a florist's display. It is a deeply religious service, and whoever takes part in it, or is present at it, in any other than a truly religious spirit, is a profane person, guilty before God of the sin of desecration in His consecrated temple. Moreover, in the course of the service most sacred troths are plighted, and whosoever violates these troths, not only by gross and sensual indulgences, but even by neglect of the finer duties of self-sacrificing love, to which the parties pledge themselves in their troths, is a false and oath-breaking person before



God. And in face of this prevalent oath-breaking, it is not unnatural, but natural, that marriages often end in misery. When we break our promises to God it is not strange, but sure, that God will withdraw His blessing. Every unhappiness in marriage is the fruit of some breach of promise made to God. That instance of married misery has yet to be found in which the contracting parties have pondered well, and prayed well, over their vows before making them, and have lovingly and religiously kept them after they were made. Happiness and blessing are children of truth. And so long as we are true to our promises to God, God cannot fail to be true to His promises to us. But if we are false, the inevitable consequences follow.

The distinction, therefore, between the blessing of the Church and the actual bond of marriage in no wise diminishes, but rather augments, its duty and responsibility to teach, and enforce upon, its members the glory of the marriage ideal and the inexpressible value and sacredness of the marriage troths. But in the discharge of this duty the Church should be very watchful not to overstep the boundaries of truth and wisdom. When a Church teaches that marriage is a sacrament, it teaches what neither Christ nor His Apostles ever taught, and what is not a fact. When, on the supposed strength of a passage in Leviticus, it confuses the barriers of affinity with those of consanguinity, as insurmountable impediments to marriage, it is building the shrines and bulwarks of marriage on a foundation of sand. Everybody knows that as a matter of verifiable truth, as distinct from unverifiable tradition, the two things are not the same. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister may be, and I think certainly is, most undesirable for many reasons; reasons which seem to me more strong than those which are commonly, and I have no doubt conscientiously, urged in its favour. But to contend that marriages of affinity are anti-scriptural or anti-Christian in face of the fact that Moses commanded that if a man died leaving his wife childless, a brother should marry the widow; and of the further momentous fact that our Blessed Lord

connected one of His grandest revelations of immortality with a story of this Mosaic custom without adding a single word of condemnation of the custom, appears to me, at least, a very serious contention for any Christian Church to wage. I do not enter upon the meaning of the words, "they twain shall be one flesh," because St Paul makes the meaning abundantly clear when writing to the Corinthians (1 Cor. vi. 15-17) about the defilement and horrors of fornication. But as no one would dream of building a relationship of affinity upon St Paul's use of the words in his malediction, how can a relationship of affinity, tantamount in this respect to consanguinity, be built on the same words used in our Lord's benediction? No! There are beautiful and gloriously true relationships of affinity; but not of a kind like to those of consanguinity, or of such a nature as to render intermarriages of affinity anti-scriptural acts or offences against God.

A Church has an indefeasible and absolute right to specify the terms on which its ministers shall celebrate marriages or admit persons to the sacrament either of its font or its altar; but Churches cannot escape the consequences of the terms they make. "Things are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be," whatever even a Church may teach to the contrary. And if a Church sets itself against the enlightened reason and devout consciousness of any considerable multitude of Christians, the results cannot but be feebleness and loss. A Church has a right, I say, like any other community to make its own regulations. It can properly decide that marriages outside its prescribed limits shall not be celebrated within its pale; that persons contracting such marriages shall not be admitted to partake of the Holy Communion at its altars, or at least not till a period of discipline has intervened between the marriage and the administration; but when it writes down such persons as "evil and notorious livers, guilty of incest," it stands on perilous ground; and through the proclamation of such untenable conceptions of marriage is in danger of inflicting



enormous damage on those magnificent ideals which form part of the precious heritage received from the Lord Christ, and which it is its function to educate the world to understand, to seek after, and ultimately to realise.

True thoughts upon marriage are matters of supreme, incalculably supreme, importance both to individuals, and communities, and states. Marriage is the primary foundation of all commonwealths and communities. Loosen or destroy the sanctions of its bonds, and you will loosen and destroy those bonds themselves. Strengthen and purify those sanctions, and the bonds themselves will be strengthened and purified. The happiness or unhappiness of countless multitudes, the grief or gladness of every home, are inextricably interwoven with views of marriage. At present luxury and lust, self-will and thoughtlessness, licence and indolence, extravagance in dress and the silliness of show, gambling and drinking, a cynical contempt for obedience and self-sacrifice, brilliant and bad books (all the worse for being brilliant), subtle innuendoes and scandalous plays, putrid conversations and filthy practices, selfishness in every form whether brutal or refined, week-ends and Sunday desecration, base theories of morals, disdain of the sanctities of religion, materialistic views of manhood and despicable views of womanhood, a cowardly reluctance to bear one another's burdens, notably family burdens, are working together in powerful and menacing combination to undermine the stability of marriage and drag its glories through mire and dirt.

The Report of the Divorce Commission will soon be published.<sup>1</sup> The enquiry which has preceded and prepared the way for that Report is "the first comprehensive enquiry ever made in England into the wide and profoundly important subject with which it deals." As I write these lines I have no knowledge of what the findings of this Report will be. But whatever they are, their results will probably affect the whole life of the nation; will provoke a storm of controversy; and

<sup>1</sup> It is now published: 12th November 1912.

will tell with great power for evil or good upon the future development of marriage ideals and marriage relationships; and, in consequence, upon the stability of family life, which is the bed-rock of a nation's progress and a people's happiness. The impending battle upon marriage will be vastly more far-reaching in its results than any military battle; as much more far-reaching as the degradation of morals is worse than defeat in arms, and the triumphs of splendid ideals more glorious than conquests of territory or aggrandisement of political power.

But without knowing anything of the Report, two general principles underlying true marriage may be enunciated, which ought to be our guide in considering the details of the Report when it is published, and fortify us in the battle which will ensue. For these two principles seem unmistakably clear and certain. (1) Divorce is both a social and civic question and a moral and religious question. In so far as marriage affects the welfare of Society, Society has a clear right to formulate its opinions on the character and permanency of the marriage bond, remembering always the tremendous responsibility of its formulations, and that it cannot escape the inevitable consequences of such formulations whatever they be. Again, in so far as marriage is a civil contract, the State, and the State alone, can determine the conditions of the contract. Regarded exclusively from the civil point of view, where the State binds the marriage contract, the contract is bound; where the State looses it, the contract is loosed. But in forming its decisions the State is obliged, because it is a State, to pay greater heed in its decisions to the collective good of the entire community than to the individual hardships, however severe, of personal sufferers. Nor can any State with wisdom shut its eyes to the moral and religious aspects of this question; for morals and religion are the most sure foundations on which the stability and prosperity of a State can be set. The best citizens of every State are its moral and religious citizens. Its most dangerous elements are those which have low morals



or no morals, no religion or little religion. The opinions of the former are, therefore, of largely greater worth and value to the State than those of the latter. And it is a serious moral question whether the breaking of one's word to the State should not be nationally deemed a public dishonour and public shame; whether even a civil contract, especially a contract involving the happiness of families, the career of children, and the welfare of homes, should be readily loosed; but should not rather be more strictly bound in order to encourage deliberation before making it, and fidelity in keeping it. Perjury is becoming the most common of crimes in our courts—so common that our judges are perplexed how best to deal with it. But divorce is essentially the breaking of one's word and the violation of solemn vows. To give facilities for divorce, therefore, is to give facilities for breaking one's word, and to foster a laxity of conscience before which neither infidelity nor perjury feels any resisting sense of shame.

The religious aspect of marriage is, of course, its most beautiful and lofty and noble aspect; and the only aspect possible, as it seems to me, for Christian people to encourage and set forward. When men say complacently, "We must take the world as it is, and make the best of it"; my answer is, "I quite agree; but are you making, can you make, the best of it, by relaxing its morals, and lowering its standards, by fostering selfishness and discouraging self-sacrifice, and weakening the endurance of personal wrongs for the sake of the general good." To me, at least, it seems that the needful and more promising way of making the best of the world as we find it, is to find for the world the best ideals we can of human life in all its departments, and to try and live them out ourselves, and persuade others to live them out also. This, I repeat, is the great work of the Church of Christ: to uplift the ideals of the Saviour, by every possible means to draw men towards them, to assure people of heavenly grace and strength in seeking to attain them, and of their own ineffable joy and gladness in the pursuit.

(2) This brings me to my second observation. How can the Church most effectually persuade the world to follow the guidance of God's ideals in the conduct of the affairs of this mundane life? It is a most penetrating, yet very practical, question. And I think only one true and sufficing answer can be given. In dealing with the world the Church must imitate the methods and follow the example of the infinite patience of God. Although from the beginning God set His ideal of true marriage, like a shining orb, in the firmament of human life; yet He knew that the human race would have its childhood, its youth, its riper age, both in morals and religion; and in His fatherly wisdom and love He dealt with it accordingly. He was the Friend of Abraham and the Strength of Jacob, although Jacob had two wives at once, and Abraham had concubines. Writings of divorcement were legal under the Mosaic code—a code sanctioned by God. Some of the most highly favoured men of the Old Testament were polygamists. But there is another side in the Old Testament, another light, another principle at work. All the way through its records we nowhere find that polygamy brings domestic happiness or that concubinage is a moral stay. These customs are portrayed as the prolific parents of domestic faction, domestic jealousies, domestic bitterness, even domestic murders. They are proved to turn men's hearts from God and their own nobler nature. A harem is never confounded in Scripture with a home. Slowly but steadily the history of these records, the pressure of these facts, the stern penalties of adultery, and the fascination of the primary ideal, made their way into the consciousness of the people; polygamy grew rare, indeed was practically abolished in the fulness of time, and so an effectual entrance was prepared for the higher teachings and the nobler ideals of Christ concerning marriage.

I know of nothing more remarkable, nor more inscrutable, than this patience of God, and the slowness of His methods in the moral and religious education of the world. But the facts



are unquestionable. God deals with humanity according to the stage at which it has arrived. He gives it such moral and religious food as is most convenient and most nourishing. He does not feed youths with the food of babes, nor fathers with the food of youths. He does not expect from the heathen what He expects from the Christian, nor demand from the savage what He demands from the saint. And the wisdom of the Church of Christ, indeed the only right course it can adopt, is to practise the methods and imitate the patience of God. To do this is neither accommodation nor compromise; it is even more than adaptation. It is the way of evolution and the method of the All-Wise and All-Holy One.

What, then, on this divine principle, is the Church's duty in the matter of divorce? The Church must never lower its Redeemer's flag; never suffer the Christian ideals of human marriage, as a mirror of the divine union betwixt Christ and His Church, to grow weak or dim: must always proclaim and strongly urge the truth that in the realm of true Christian marriage there is no room for divorce; yea, no possibility of it. Except the cases of insanity which stand by themselves (and even these require cautious watching), there is not a single ground on which the world seeks to justify divorce—infidelity, cruelty, lengthy imprisonment, incurable drunkenness, desertion, violent temper, self-contracted, contaminating disease, and the like—which is not the fruit of anti-Christian seed, sown in anti-Christian ground, and nurtured by anti-Christian tillage. If all men and all women were Christians, genuine Christians, the Divorce Court would perish of inanition. It would be starved out of existence. There would be nothing for it to feed upon, or to do. Persons must begin by abandoning Christianity before they can qualify as defendants in that Court. The virtues of the Christian religion and the vices which lead to divorce are wholly and absolutely incompatible things. And in loyalty to Christ it is the duty of the Church to say so without flinching, and without ceasing.

But while it is the duty of the Church to uphold in their

integrity the Christian ideals of marriage and to chastise with the scorpions of indignation the brutish indulgences, and heathenish immoralities, and undisciplined tempers which sometimes render the relationships of married life disgusting, crushing, and intolerable: is the Church to take no part in deciding upon the provisions of divorce laws and the proceedings of Divorce Courts and their inevitable issues? If the Church cannot as yet abolish divorce, by removing its causes, can it not do something to amend its present inequalities and mitigate its present horrors? I think it can. And, acting on the divine method of doing what is practically best without waiting for the advent of the ideally best, it ought to do several things, and do them with a promptness quite sacredly fierce. It ought to teach that all unchastity is sin, and an equal sin in both sexes. Evil doings are not less evil when done by a man, than when done by a woman. Apart from all differences in physical results, vice and dishonour are, in themselves, vice and dishonour without respect of male or female. On whatever grounds, therefore, divorce is granted to a husband, on the same grounds both justice and equity demand that it should be granted to a wife.

Again, no distinction should be allowed between rich and poor. On whatever terms release from the marriage bond is granted to the rich, on the same terms and with the same relative cost, proportioned to the power to pay, it should be granted to the poor. Would to God that neither rich nor poor desired divorce! But so long as the State allows it to either, in the name of justice it should allow it on equal terms to both.

Further, the Church should demand that some restrictions should be placed upon the publication of the proceedings in the Divorce Court—especially on the poisonous details of evidence in those proceedings. I reverence the liberty of the Press. I know something of the splendid power which the Press has exercised for the protection of human rights and the amelioration of human wrongs. I recognise also the im-



measurable value of trial in open court as a deterrent to evil-doers and a guarantee against judicial miscarriage of justice. I realise how delicate and dangerous a thing it is to curtail, and meddle with, these strongholds of fair dealing and progress. Yet I cannot but think that the State might wisely and rightly do something to lessen, if not altogether stamp out, the devastating exhalations from the indecencies of the Divorce Court. We have not hesitated, through craven fear of abridging the scope of liberty, to make laws and regulations for material sanitation. Let us take courage and make laws for moral sanitation also, seeing that the welfare of the community depends fully as much on the moral as on the physical health of the people. A good moral public conscience is at least as important to the well-being of a community as a rightly constructed drain.

In these endeavours, and all others, on behalf of justice and equity, moral and religious sanitation, the Church, it seems to me, ought to take a leading and powerful part. Because it cannot do everything it would, it ought not to fail in doing everything it can. If it cannot abolish divorce, it can require that the laws regarding it shall be just and equal between rich and poor, husbands and wives. If it cannot make a clean sweep of the mischiefs flowing from the publication of the Court's proceedings, it can resolve to reduce them to a minimum. Moreover, within its own sphere, it can make a stupendous distinction between the plaintiff and defendant in divorce cases, the innocent and the guilty. It can refuse under any circumstances to celebrate or recognise the re-marriage of the guilty parties. It can also resolutely decline to accept them as communicants. With the innocent, remembering their wrongs and sufferings, it can deal more gently and with the tenderness of mercy—yet not mercy indiscriminate, and apart from desert. It can also set its face like flint against free-and-easy divorce; divorce by collusion or mutual consent; divorce for any cause except possibly one; recollecting that the Saviour said that the only Mosaic allow-

ance for divorce sprang out of the hardness of men's hearts. And the testimony of universal experience shows that the more easy divorce is, the harder men's hearts become.

But if the Church stands aloof from legislation in these matters, or insists on legislation according to the perfect ideal, without discerning the possibilities of the time, the result will probably be disastrous both to legislation and the Church. Legislation should always be in advance of the times, otherwise it weakens its educational power; yet if it be so far in advance as to be wholly out of reach and touch with the times, it retains no power at all. The Church should take care that every step in legislation is a step in moral advance—all moral reversions it should oppose to the uttermost. Yet it should not be disheartened, or give up the struggle, because the step is short and the advance is slow; else will it forfeit all influence over the State, and wholly fail in following the example of the patience of God.

The ways of evolution are very gradual; yet, even in morals and religion, they are the ways of God. The strife after ideals is long, and weary, and often disheartening; yet without ideals there would be neither moral power, nor spiritual beauty, in human life. While, therefore, we work in practice under the limitations of what is possible, let us cling to the noblest ideals in purpose and thought. And the Christian ideals of marriage are divinely noble. They are ideals of holy love; of mutual respect; of patience and endearment; of succour and solace; of the carrying of another's burden and the rejoicing in another's joy; ideals which only once, in the history of humanity, have found their perfect and complete realisation in the indissoluble, undivorceable marriage of Christ with His Church. And exactly in so far as human marriages are contracted, and their relationships fulfilled, in this divine spirit, will they be deeply satisfying, permanently happy, beautifully and mystically Christian.

J. W. CARLIOL.



# LOVE AND THE LAW :

## A STUDY OF ORIENTAL JUSTICE.

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### I. THE TWO SYSTEMS.

No Englishman who has spent many of the best years of his life in the active administration of one of our Oriental dependencies but must look back on his career with mingled feelings—pride of his countrymen, who bring to their task an enthusiasm and a singleheartedness which only those who have seen can know, who fall so rarely from the high ideals with which they set out; satisfaction at the results achieved, the material prosperity increased, the corruption put down with a strong hand, the growth of efficiency attained only with the most unceasing care and watchfulness; sorrow that, in spite of all that has been done, there remains a mysterious bar to complete success. He knows that the administration that we have striven to set up has not really taken root, and would crumble to dust to-morrow if our hand were withdrawn. Many of us, before many years, give up the problem in despair of ever finding a solution of it, feeling that there is something in the East which we cannot understand, which we would wish to alter but cannot, and we go on our way doing our duty as we see it, feeling that in the unremitting work which Oriental administration requires we have enough to occupy our thoughts and energy.

But we, as a nation, cannot rest satisfied with this situation.

The problem must be thought out. Sooner or later we must find a solution, and I believe that by patient study we shall arrive with less difficulty than we think at a just conclusion as to the causes of our partial failure. The mystery is not so deep as we imagine; the Oriental is not the incomprehensible being we take him to be. He is moved by the same motives, governed by the same impulses, victim to the same passions as we are. The more we know of human nature, the more we come to realise that the differences between different races are less startling than the resemblances.

The following paper is an attempt to explain why one of the most important branches of our Oriental government, the criminal administration, is one of the least satisfactory, and why no reforms that we may make will ever prove lasting until we have grasped the attitude of the Oriental towards the vital question of the trial and punishment of offenders. My experience being chiefly in Egypt, what I am about to say has especial reference to the government of Mohammedans, though I believe that in the main it is equally true of all Oriental peoples.

The Eastern and the Western take diametrically opposite views of pænology—just as different as were those on medicine of the leech of the Middle Ages, who bled and cupped and drugged, from those of the physician of to-day, who distrusts violent methods and perceives that all he can do is to put the patient in the best situation for Nature to operate her cure in her slow, mysterious way.

Our Western criminal administration is thoroughly mechanical. The discretion which little by little we tend to allow the judges is slight and imperfect. Broadly speaking, the severity of the punishment varies with the importance of the offence—the man who steals a pound is more severely punished than he who steals a penny. What does judge or jury know of the mentality of the man they deal with? What study have they made of the history of the case, the influences which may have acted on the man, his temptations,



struggles, successes, and failures? What can the judge predict of the effect of his sentence, whether it will be for good or evil? Nothing. All that has to be proved is that a man has done a certain deed; all that has to be done is to perform on him a certain operation, regardless of its consequences. Our system admits of nothing more than this, and with us the system is everything, the individual nothing. We accept the principle that an offence entails a penalty; we do not think about the question at all.

There exists no such doctrine in Mohammedan countries, nor probably in any Eastern country. The Koran, it is true, provides penalties, sometimes of extreme severity; but it is left to the injured person to demand their application. The punishment of the offender is not the duty of the State, but the right of the injured. Contrary to the European system, the State in the East has nothing to do with the administration of justice, and has no machinery for the purpose. When it intervenes it is merely as a military power, dealing summarily with a situation which has grown beyond the control of the local authorities.

The Mohammedan, under his old constitution, is, as an injured party, entitled to the exercise of one of three rights:—

- (a) The right to compensation, the payment of which purges the offence, even to murder.
- (b) The right to retaliation, which is the utmost rigour of the law, and which, to judge by the present practice of those among whom the Mohammedan system is in vigour, is only enforced on the rarest occasions.
- (c) The right to forgive, that is to say, to abandon his claim to either retaliation or compensation; and so deeply engrained in the mind of the Mohammedan is the sense of the all-importance of the duty of forgiveness that, strange as it may sound to our ears, one of the primary duties of the Kadi is not to judge but to reconcile; and, before passing sentence, he is enjoined by the Koran to use his influence with the

prosecutor or the plaintiff to forgive, or, at least, to abate the rigour of his full demand.

The offender, on his side, has the liberty to plead his cause before the injured party direct, and this is why the Oriental, at any rate the Mohammedan, always addresses supplications to the aggrieved person.

Besides these, there is the general customary right to have these matters discussed and, doubtless, as a rule, determined by the village organisation, application being only made to the Kadi in case of failure to settle the case.

Remember that these, which are the basis of the social life of the Mohammedans, and which, on the advent of a European administration, are entirely overthrown, are constitutional rights to which they cling with deep conviction, and are more sacred to them than are trial by jury and the Habeas Corpus Act to us. We establish in their place a system which is so utterly different, so opposed to all the ideas of the Mohammedans, that it would be no exaggeration to say that, if we suddenly swept away the British constitution and established in its place the old Russian autocracy, the revolution would not be more complete than that which has been forced on the East.

In the first place, the system of village units, which was the foundation of the whole organisation and was to a remarkable extent popular, democratic, constitutional, decentralised, has been broken up and a State system introduced, which is purely bureaucratic, despotic, centralised. The State becomes the injured party, independently of the wish of the individual or of the village community. The whole matter is taken entirely out of their hands, the prosecution is undertaken by the State, and the injured party becomes merely a witness. He has no power to vary the sentence, much less to forgive.

The difference between the two systems is fundamental, irreconcilable. They are the antithesis of one another. The one is the outcome of the struggles of the restless, fierce peoples of Europe against each other, each striving for mastery, ruled by the exigencies of a military organisation.



Crime tended to produce division in the ranks; it was an offence against the State to be punished as such by the military Chief, summarily, cruelly, without regard to the feelings or wishes of individuals, a thing to be suppressed at any cost.

The other was the growth of the life of a free, pastoral people, coming together in their villages for seed-time and harvest, or gathering for markets; at other times scattered over the scant pastures of Arabia or Sinai or Egypt, following with their flocks the tracks of the rainstorms, their life a great solitude, filled with the two mysteries of the Hand of God and the Mind of Man, both to be treated with deep reverence, not rudely to be interfered with.

It is impossible that the East should accept our principles. The Mohammedan does not believe in the propriety of punishment following an offence mechanically, as the sound follows a blow on a bell. He does not believe in the efficacy of human punishment. Our stern sense of justice, meted out with equal hand, never wavering, never forgiving, paying little heed to the complex questions of temperament, environment, temptation, etc., strikes the Eastern as simply barbarous. The man who, though having just cause for anger, yet refuses to punish and forgives time after time, that is the man who is the most respected. One has to realise this point of view to understand the exhortation: "Not until seven times; but until seventy times seven." God is El Rahman, El Rahîm, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Nature, that is to say, works its cure of the soul gently and slowly, without sudden transitions or violent methods, precisely as the healing of the body is worked. All at once an inexorable administration steps in and condemns the offender to the violent torture of the prison.

Our action shocks the Eastern as that of a sacrilegious boggler, meddling with a problem we do not understand, and placing the victim of our ignorance in a situation in which Nature's gentle art of healing is retarded, if not permanently

defeated. What we call justice is to the devout Mohammedan wickedness, repugnant to his most sacred feelings. Moreover, the common people do not in the least understand that we are merely introducing the same system that is in force in our own country. They believe it to be a system of intentional oppression. They cannot realise that we treat our own people in a manner so contrary to the religion that they have been taught. How should they realise it? To them a system of government divorced from the principles of religion is an inconceivable thing, and when they see it they naturally ascribe an evil motive to those in power.

The simile which I have chosen of the modern physician and the medieval leech exactly typifies the situation which arises in the East from the divergence of views on this point, between the government and the governed.

## II. UNTIL SEVENTY TIMES SEVEN.

If what I am writing is to be of any service, it is necessary not only to understand with the cold reason of an alien, but to feel as one of themselves, all that their old constitution means to these people; how it forms part of the life and history of our subjects of the East. And I have thought of no better way to bring vividly before the reader the Mohammedan village-unit system of the administration of criminal justice and the practical working of the doctrine of forgiveness, as preached by Christ and Mohammed, than to reconstruct from imagination the incident of Christ's saying, just as it might have happened in any village of Egypt not fifty years ago, or in many parts of other Mohammedan countries to-day. Every detail of this imaginary incident is true to life, pieced together from scenes which, for the most part, I have witnessed. It may seem to many readers but a travesty of justice; but they would be less inclined to think so if they had lived among the people. It is as solemn to them as the proceedings of a court of justice are to us. It is different, that is all.



For the seventh time a man had been caught robbing an orchard, and had been brought before the council of sheikhs. There were three of them, and they had all suffered from his predatory habits. On previous occasions, the owners of the orchards had, with the approval of the sheikhs, forgiven him. He had been admonished and dismissed, the last time with a caution that, if caught again, he would be prosecuted.

He was conducted into the courtyard of the headman's house by two watchmen with long staves. He was raving hoarsely, swearing that he had not left the house since sunset. He had never been near the orchard. The watchmen were in league to ruin him and his family. Ask such and such persons if they had not heard them swear to ruin him and his father; curse them and their families! He invented every sort of impossible and contradictory lie. He shouted the name of God and the names of all the prophets he could remember in a passionate voice. He was staggering to and fro like one drunk, gesticulating wildly, tossing his head from side to side. His headdress had fallen off, and the customary long lock of hair<sup>1</sup> streamed over his face. His features were swollen with crying; the veins of his face and neck, congested with the emotional strain, stood out like hard cords. He had thrown himself against a wall, and his forehead was bleeding. He made no attempt to escape, and he was not held. The watchmen treated him gently, merely putting their hands on his shoulders to make him walk on if he stopped. He would shake them off and go on. In the midst of his ejaculations he would become repentant and confess that he had done wrong, begging for forgiveness. His brain was woefully jumbled; he hardly knew what he was saying, but he felt an ungovernable impulse to rave, to let his emotion pour out in words, curses, accusations, lies, bits of the Koran, anything.

The owner of the orchard was invited to sit down, and

<sup>1</sup> The lock by which the angels hold up the faithful, when, after death, they pass over the knife-edged bridge.

the sheikhs said that, for the sake of the community, they considered it to be his duty to prosecute; an example should be made; the man was incorrigible.

The owner hesitated. What the sheikhs said was true. He was incorrigible, perhaps; certainly he was a bad example to the youths of the village. But it was the first time he himself had been robbed, and his faith taught him to forgive. Surely it was his duty to forgive at least once. And the punishment, if he prosecuted, was horrible. His right hand. How was he to live; what would become of him and his family? He looked at the man standing before him, a magnificent figure of a young athlete. The deep chest sprang in an arch from the base of the neck, and the shoulders were broad and thick. The massive neck was perfectly rounded, and rose in graceful curves to the small, well-shaped head. He was a typical tiller of the fields. Only his features marred the symmetry of his body. Coarse and bovine at the best of times, they looked doubly so now, swollen and stained as they were.

As he saw the hesitation of the owner, the young man threw himself on the ground in an agony of supplication. Suddenly there sprang to his dull imagination the vivid picture of the stump of his right arm, bound with rags and the blood oozing through. He seized the hem of the landowner's robe and kissed it. He seized his feet and literally covered them with kisses, and bathed them with tears. If he would but forgive this once, he would never steal again. He would be his slave for ever, asking no wages, only that he should live and have the use of his hands. What could he do maimed, with one hand? By the life of the prophets, by the beard of his father, he swore to sin no more, and in the name of their common faith, as they themselves expected forgiveness, he implored it.

His father stood beside him, mute but with moving lips, the palms of his hands turned towards the council in supplication, looking from one to the other, the tears streaming



down his deeply wrinkled, monkey-like face, grotesque, pathetic. He took his son by the hand and helped him to rise. The women-folk stood in the courtyard wailing, with the plaintive, twittering wail peculiar to the East. The owner of the orchard could see them through the narrow window stoop from time to time to pick up a handful of dust and shower it on their heads. The tears made channels through the dust on their faces.

“As you command, O my lord.” That was all he had to say to the village headman, and the offender would be taken before the Kadi. But he could not say it. He murmured to himself, “his right hand, his right hand.” He shook his head.

It was a dramatic scene in the bare room of crude bricks; but it affected the headman less than the others. He had seen these scenes before, when the tax-gatherers came for his land tax, the year that the crops had failed; or the year of the war, when the military commission had come to beat up recruits. Moreover, the man had already robbed him, and the other sheikhs expected him to be firm. What was he to do? He argued that the owner of the orchard had no right to forgive a seventh time; already custom had been stretched to its utmost when the man was forgiven the last time, and the law must be obeyed. What was it there for if it was not to be put in force. The owner of the orchard need not fear the responsibility. The law was responsible, not he; he was merely the instrument of the law. It was his duty according to the prophets.

With bowed head he listened in silence to the headman's words, and vaguely heard the young man's father pleading, without understanding, except that every now and then his ear was bruised by the words, “his right hand, his right hand.” He saw the women straining their hands upward or bowing to pick up the dust. He was thinking . . . “Slow to anger and of great mercy.” “His compassions fail not. They are new every morning.” The words of

God.<sup>1</sup> Did not Joseph forgive his brothers, and what was this poor thief's sin compared to theirs? And did he not need pardon himself? Did he not mix dry earth and pebbles with the corn he sold to increase its bulk? Had he not filed a little off the corners of the weight of the steelyard with which he weighed out his wool? Nearly everybody in the village did the same, but still . . . What was the penalty for giving false measure? He did not know; he had never heard of its being inflicted; perhaps the loss of an ear. As a boy he remembered going to Bethlehem and seeing a man who had been condemned for robbery, the only time he had seen a case of the kind. The man sat at the corner of the street and showed the stump of his wrist to the passers-by.

Without moving his head he looked up at the young man. How old was he? About twenty, he calculated. How often he had seen his broad, muscular shoulders bared to the sun! The earth wanted such men as him. How proud his father was of him! When he put his back into a job, he was worth two, and there was no one like him for dealing with a vicious mule. He had no fear. And when he was convicted he would sit like the other man his life long at the street corner near his, the prosecutor's, house, and would appeal to him for alms every time he passed. No, decidedly, he could not do it; he could not mutilate so perfect a work of God; he could not risk his own condemnation hereafter.<sup>2</sup> Besides, he would be marked as the prosecutor, and the people would hate him for it. But the headman said he must, and he dared not disobey him. And the law; what did it say? What was he to do? He did not dare look up. He was desperately troubled.

Suddenly the remembrance of Bethlehem awoke in his slow mind a brilliant thought. He had found a way out.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the following quotations from the Koran:—"Heaven is prepared for those who bridle their anger and forgive men." "Whosoever shall remit punishment, it shall be accepted as an atonement for him." "But he who forgiveth and is reconciled shall receive his reward from God."

<sup>2</sup> See note at the end of the article.



Jesus, the Mufti<sup>1</sup> and Dervish,<sup>2</sup> had returned to Bethlehem. He should decide and take the responsibility. The relief was so great that he could not contain his emotion. He stood up and, raising his hands, the palms upward, he cried: "What God wills, what God wills." His eyes were full of tears. He turned to the headman and said: "Bear with me, my lord; I am thy servant and I cannot decide. I will abide by the fetwa<sup>3</sup> of Jesus."

The father of the young man was holding his son in his arms, tenderly patting him on the back and murmuring from time to time, "God is great. God is merciful. Fear not, my son." The son had laid his head on his shoulder. One arm hung wearily by his side, the other was flung round his father's neck. He was prostrated by the violence of his emotions. He was sobbing slowly, heavily, like a tired child. The watchmen stood near, leaning on their long sticks impassively.

The headman had done what he believed to be his duty, but was no less relieved than the other that the odious responsibility should be lifted from his shoulders. He willingly acquiesced in the solution. "Let us go," he said, "to Jesus."

The villagers were much excited and had collected in a throng in the street outside the headman's house to learn the fate of the offender. They had never ceased discussing the matter among themselves. Most sided with the offender. He was young and poor; he would soon marry and settle down. Moreover, he was strong and had the rare gift of courage which made him popular. All approved the appeal to Jesus. He was a friend of the poor.

The headman and the sheikhs and the victim of the

<sup>1</sup> A sheikh learned in the law, who has studied in a recognised school of religious law and is entitled, by his superior knowledge, to deliver authoritative opinions. Muftis, however, like doctors, often differ among themselves.

<sup>2</sup> The use of the word varies somewhat. Properly speaking, it denotes a holy man, vowed to celibacy and poverty, who wanders homeless and lives on charity. He is generally regarded as inspired either by God or by some spirit. They are sometimes accompanied by followers. Many dervishes, however, are pure frauds.

<sup>3</sup> The pronouncement of a mufti.

theft mounted their donkeys and rode out of the village. Then arose an important point—What was to be the wording of the question?<sup>1</sup> The owner of the orchard, who was no politician, thought the best thing to do was to relate the circumstances as they had occurred, and ask the opinion of Jesus on the law of the case. A terrified expression came over the headman's face. State publicly before the villagers of Bethlehem that they harboured a robber? He must be mad to make such a suggestion. He might as well go at once and report the matter to the district sub-governor. The danger of publicity—that had all along been the pre-occupying thought of the headman. The thefts themselves were of no great importance; but if they became known outside, it might bring disaster on the village and more especially on him. Every case of undiscovered robbery that took place in the neighbourhood would bring suspicion on the village. With a little ingenuity, the robber would be traced to the village; the sub-governor would be informed; an inquiry would be set on foot. The young man's past would be raked up: how he had consorted with bad companions; how he had drunk the intoxicating wine of the date-palm and smoked the maddening herb; how he had committed seven robberies and had gone unpunished. Abundance of evidence would be forthcoming from his, the headman's, enemies in other villages to connect the man with the crime. Details too perfect to be true would be furnished. The sub-governor would not sift the evidence too closely; he was much too lazy and incompetent for that. A heavy fine would be laid on the village; more than their fair share of young men would be taken for the army; he himself would be accused of incompetence. The villagers would turn against him as the author of their woes. Why had he not been firmer? Why had he not insisted on the law taking its course?

<sup>1</sup> It is the practice to put such questions in a general, impersonal form, and the mufti is not supposed to know the actual case to which a question refers.



He saw a whole vista of horrible possibilities arising out of the young thief's irregular life, ending with his own dismissal and, worst of all, ruining his son's chance of succeeding to the headship, which had been for three generations in the family. He was indignant at the father's culpable weakness in making an idol of the boy on account of his strength and courage. "Curse him; curse his father and his mother and all his family! May their bodies rot on dunghills defiled by dogs!" He had lost his habitual self-control and was gesticulating with both hands.<sup>1</sup> The others calmed him, and the argument proceeded. All that was wanted was to know how many times it was lawful to forgive an offender. At last the form of the question was agreed upon: "How oft shall my brother<sup>2</sup> sin against me and I forgive him? Until seven times?" That, at least, was not compromising. No one could tell from it what had happened in the village. This was followed by another almost equally knotty point. Who should put the question? The headman refused at once. It would be too suspicious; someone would be sure to guess that some serious offence had happened in the village and would ask inconvenient questions. The others equally disliked to put the question in case it might be thought that there were divisions in their families. One of them suggested the idea of asking one of the pupils to put the question; this would have many advantages. They need not appear at all; they would merely pretend to have come to see the learned dervish and hear him propound the law. The suggestion was hailed with delight.

So the question was put and the fetwa was given: "I say not unto thee until seven times, but until seventy times seven." There was no limit, then, to the right to forgive; that was

<sup>1</sup> The donkey is ridden without reins, leaving the hands free, and is guided with a little stick. The whole trappings consist of a saddle or shaped cushion which requires no girths.

<sup>2</sup> The word brother does not necessarily indicate the relationship we understand by the word. It may indicate membership of one family or of one community, or even merely one of the faithful.

what the fetwa came to. Certainly it had never been the custom to interpret the law so laxly. It was generally considered that three times<sup>1</sup> was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of religion. The headman was silent and preoccupied, and the others, from politeness, did not interrupt his thoughts. Obviously, after the fetwa, there could be no question of further urging a prosecution. He was not in favour of punishment *per se*; it never entered his head that it did good, except in the case of gang robberies. The question was, What would the imperial government think? How devoutly thankful he was that his innate caution had prevented him from putting the question in person! He was equally thankful that the dangerous fetwa had not been given in his village. The headman of Bethlehem was no friend of his, and he could not help smiling at his embarrassment. It was impossible to keep so important a fetwa secret; a number of people had heard it, and in a day or two at most it would be the common topic of discussion in the villages. There was no doubt what the view of the villagers would be; they would be delighted. Jesus would be the most popular mufti in the country. Whenever there was a question of a prosecution, they would clamour for a fetwa. Prosecutions were unpopular enough as it was; they would become almost impossible.

The headman had served under many sub-governors, and knew well enough the view of the central authorities. All that the sub-governor cared for was that, while he was in office, the taxes should be collected regularly, there should be enough young men of good physique for the army, and there should be no serious breach of the peace or gang robbery. The internal happiness of the village was nothing to him; the feelings of the villagers were not his concern. He neither knew nor cared what ill-blood, what heart-burnings, what inextinguishable feuds might be aroused by an ill-judged

<sup>1</sup> Thrice is the customary limit of pardon. It is so enjoined in the Talmud. Thrice is also the rule in Siam, a purely Buddhist country; probably also in other countries.



prosecution. It was useless to try to explain to him the difficulties of the headman's position. If there were troubles, it was always the headman who was responsible, even though his own arbitrary action had aroused the difficulty. A man who robbed orchards was a bad character, and might in the future create a disturbance, which might, however unjustly, bring discredit on his, the sub-governor's, administration. Bad characters must be dealt with without mercy: that was the sub-governor's theory of government. Further than that he did not investigate. He would have laughed at the idea that each human being was a problem to be dealt with with infinite care. The empire had always been governed on his system and had hitherto been successful. That was enough for him.

The headman sighed. Fortunately such cases were very rare. In the thirty odd years of his headmanship, he had only known of one other similar case, and the young offender had turned out an exemplary citizen. Quarrels were frequent enough, generally about the land question. Every now and then a virgin was seduced, and the seducer and the girl were quietly put out of the way by the girl's family. Now and then some overwrought passion would end in a dramatic crime, which might give some difficulty in settling the compensation. But offences against the law were rare, and there was no happier and more peaceful village.

The owner of the orchard was equally pensive. He had wanted a fetwa which would allow of his forgiving the young man. If Jesus had said he must prosecute, he would have spent a sleepless night. But he had rather hoped that he would lay down that pardon might be given seven times but no more, so that, if the man continued his evil life, he would be punished the next time he was caught; but he might fairly hope that another would be the victim, so that the odium of a prosecution would not fall on him. But the completeness of his victory staggered him. Till seventy times seven; why, that was a virtual abrogation of the law. Of course, Jesus did not mean that you must forgive; merely that it was

permissible. Nevertheless, the fetwa was inconvenient, there was no doubt of that. If one had to do something unpleasant, it was a great strength to feel that one was merely an automaton, that the law required one to act in a certain manner. But so wide a discretion was embarrassing.

What could have made the lad take to thieving, disgracing the village? How many years was it since such a thing had occurred? More than ten, certainly; perhaps twenty; his chronology was vague. It must be that the lords were riding him;<sup>1</sup> that was the only explanation. He must be made to join the Zikr<sup>2</sup> on every feast-day, and must keep it up till he fell in a frenzy and had to be carried out. If it was the lords, that would probably drive them out. He must mention it to the headman.

The headman sighed again. "In the name of the merciful and compassionate God," he said reverently, looking upward. Then he turned to his companions and explained what he proposed to do. The man must be made to work so many days in the year, for so many years, for the good of the village. They assented. "He will do as you command, O my lord," they said. The owner of the orchard mentioned the advisability of the man's attending the Zikrs. Yes, it was right; the headman would also see to that.

As they reached the village, the villagers trooped towards them. They made way respectfully for the headman and the sheikhs, but crowded round the owner of the orchard, questioning him. He repeated to them the fetwa. At once they fell back, repeating the words, which flew like fire round the whole village, even to the women and children: "Forgiveness till seventy times seven, till seventy times seven."

In the courtyard the father and his son and a watchman were sitting on their hocks against the wall of the house.

<sup>1</sup> A euphemism for possession by devils.

<sup>2</sup> A wild and fatiguing religious exercise. The word, like other Arabic terms I have used, may be an anachronism, but the exercise itself must be much older than Mohammedanism or Christianity.



The watchman's presence was almost a formality; there had been no thought of attempting to escape. As soon as the elders had left, the father and son had rapidly calmed themselves and washed their faces. They had sat in the court all the time amicably talking on indifferent topics, except for two hours in the middle of the day, when they had all slept. When the party returned they rose and followed them into the house.

The headman delivered his decision. There would be no prosecution, but the offender must do so many days' work in the year, for so many years, for the good of the village. He must begin at once repairing the foot-bridge; and after that he must make so many thousand bricks for the repair of the mosque; and he must attend all the Zikrs, and keep them up as long as possible.

Father and son at once began a torrent of thanks. The headman should see how his son would work. Was he not the best workman in the village? They would both work together and do the double of what was required. No two men would make so many bricks in the day. As for the bridge, was it not a five days' job? It should be done in two. They would begin work at dawn to-morrow, if the headman would give them the wood and the nails. They would not stop for the midday meal, but would work fasting till an hour after sunset. Not a Zikr should be missed in the whole year.

Then the headman administered a grave admonition and exhortation, till the young man's tears again began to flow—tears come more easily with them than with us.

When the speech was finished the father, who throughout the proceedings of the day had remained quiet and gentle, turned on his son like a savage, and raged at him, shaking his fist in his face and showering on him all the curses and abusive names he could think of, and his vocabulary was surprisingly rich. The son, with an expression of abject contrition, like a naughty child, contrasting oddly with his powerful frame, murmured at intervals: "Forgive me, O my father: forgive

me, O my father." Those present had to help to quell the storm of language by patting the old man on the back, and repeating: "Forgive him, O my lord; forgive him, O my lord." Trembling all over with rage, he was gently urged toward the door, followed by his son, who seized in turn the hands of the headman and the sheikhs and kissed them passionately.

Justice had been done.

Outside the yard the whole village of men and boys met them. Someone in the crowd struck up a measure on the tabla.<sup>1</sup> At once the young man, borrowing a staff from one of the watchmen, put himself at the head of the crowd and began to dance. Holding the staff in both hands, he brandished it over his head, making passes at an invisible enemy, or swept it round his feet in a circle, all the time dancing round and round with little steps, sometimes hopping on one foot, sometimes on the other, swaying his body gracefully. Groans of approval broke from the villagers from time to time, in which even the watchmen joined. In this manner they made their way slowly to the house.

As the sound died away in the distance, the headman sat sipping a cup of Arabian coffee, drawing it through half-opened lips with a hissing, gurgling sound, and musing. It was certainly more like the triumphal entry of a returning hero than the repentance of a criminal who had barely escaped the law. But their hearts were the hearts of children and they meant no evil. They annoyed him sometimes, but they were his children and he loved them. They were fine upstanding fellows, almost without exception, with the muscles of oxen, patient, obedient, laborious. When the flood had carried down great trunks of trees, piling them up against the stone bridge which the imperial government had built, threatening to carry it away, how they had responded to his call! Had they not worked one and all for thirty hours on

<sup>1</sup> A small drum beaten with the fingers. It is of earthenware, jar-shaped, and the bottom is replaced by a skin.



end, without sleep and almost without food, at the dangerous task of forcing the trunks endways under the arch? These great strong men, who would stand meekly to be beaten and would cry like women in the presence of the recruiting officer, had done acts of incredible strength and courage, for the sake of the imperial government of which they stood in such dread. And when they had finished their task and saved the bridge, instead of being worn out with the strain, they had danced home just as they were dancing now. They had received no reward, nor had they expected it. He had reported all that had been done, and had not even been thanked.

He had felt obliged to urge a prosecution, but he thanked God that He had ordained otherwise. Only God knew what was in the heart of man. Who was he that he should judge the works of the Almighty?

### III. THE DOGMA OF DIVINE RECIPROCITY.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of realising the power in the East of this dogma. "For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." "For with what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you."

Though there is no doctrine in the New Testament more categorically stated than this, it never seems to have taken root with us. If you were to seriously say to a young Englishman with a high sense of duty and an eager interest in his work, that by want of indulgence for the peculations of his subordinates he was risking his chance of heaven, he would look at you with laughing, honest eyes, and would say: "Oh, bother heaven!" He will believe anything you like in a sort of way, if you don't want him to think about it or allow the belief to clash with his ideas of right and wrong. If he really allowed his hopes of heaven or his fears of hell to weigh against his instincts of honour, he would be untrue to himself.

So he goes his own way, regardless of heaven and hell, all the dogmas in the Bible notwithstanding. But not so the Mohammedans. More real Christians than we, they believe the doctrine of divine reciprocity with fervent conviction, and follow it with superstitious reverence. It tinges all their mutual relations, and explains what is otherwise incomprehensible: the want of discipline among them; the inefficiency of their administration; and it explains why they tolerate inefficiency and corruption with equanimity, and oppose passive resistance to our reforms which entail unchristian severity.

After all, it is quite natural. Christian dogmas or superstitions, if you like, have the disadvantage of being exotic in our country, while in theirs they are native to the soil; and it is a curious and instructive sight to see our parents trying to implant the Christian precepts in their blue-eyed children's minds, while we vainly strive to uproot them from the minds of our Eastern subjects. But while we have long since abandoned the endeavour to enforce religion in our country, at least on grown-ups, by means of punishment, we still do our best by this means to enforce impiety on our native subordinates, whom, when they act on their faith, we charge with culpable weakness, if not with corruption.

#### IV. OLD AND NEW.

Would it be possible to imagine a greater contrast between the old method and the new, that of the East and that of the West? There everything done by the popular village council, here by bureaucratic officials; there all the actors members of one community, known to each other, here the procedure carried out by complete strangers; there all the circumstances weighed, the details known, and the effect canvassed, here nothing but the bare facts taken into consideration; there the precepts of religion borne in mind, here rigorously excluded; there full play allowed to the human emotions, here every emotion suppressed; there a prosecution regarded as a thing to be avoided, here regarded as the one essential aim; there



the idea of judicial or police punishment repugnant to the public sense, here the whole strength of society put forth to take vengeance on the culprit ; there everything conducted by word of mouth, here every word written down in a peculiar, legal jargon, none of which the ordinary peasant can understand ; there everything done on the spot, immediately, informally, as in a family, here the procedure one long string of formalities, incomprehensible without the aid of a lawyer versed in the complex and tricky technicalities, the matter being dealt with often in a distant town and after interminable delays.

Was I wrong to call the change a revolution ?

The necessity of confining this article within strict limits of length prevents me from writing of more than one aspect of the change, namely, its effect on the manner of dealing with punishable offences. But, in fact, it touches almost every relationship of life.

Ideal justice is the combination of the three essential elements of law, religion, and custom, each in its due proportion :—

Law is the statements of the bare principles governing the relations of individuals to each other as members of a community. Without law, a community would not develop or cohere. But the law pays no attention to the feelings or the happiness of individuals, nor to the circumstances under which the relations arise. The law protects the rich but not the poor, the creditor but not the debtor, the landlord but not the tenant, the victim of a theft but not the thief, the husband but not the adulteress. In technical language, the law is inexorable. If applied alone and in every case, it would produce heartless tyranny and tragic suffering. The tyranny and the suffering would be so great that the community would, if pure law were applied, rapidly disintegrate instead of cohering, and a general degeneration of the individuals would result.

Religion<sup>1</sup> is the statement of the moral principles which

<sup>1</sup> I am not here speaking of the mystical dogmas of religion, but of the ethical precepts.

govern the relations of individuals to each other, and so modifies and adapts the application of the law to individual cases that tyranny on the one hand and suffering on the other are avoided, and the progress of the ego or soul of the individual towards some unknown goal is not impeded. Religion, therefore, is as essential to the administration of justice as law. It protects the poor against the rich, the debtor against the creditor, the tenant against the landlord, the thief against the victim of the theft, the adulteress against the husband.

Custom decides how these two great principles shall be harmonised in practice.

Law and religion vary but little the world over, and may be considered for practical purposes as being unalterable. At least, the principles that now prevail in Europe and Asia do not seem to have materially altered for six thousand years. But the variations of custom are infinite, and literally change from day to day, from village to village, and from family to family.<sup>1</sup>

Law says that a tenant shall pay the rent agreed on, but religion says that the landlord shall not use his power to extort an exorbitant contract, and custom decides what shall be considered a reasonable rent. Law says that a creditor is entitled to the payment of his debt on the day on which it falls due, but religion forbids a man to bring his fellow-creature to ruin, and custom dictates the delay that shall be granted to the poor debtor, and the amount of property that shall in all cases be left to him.<sup>2</sup>

Law permits the discharge of a servant when no longer required, but religion requires that a man shall deal lovingly with those who have served him faithfully and forbids their dismissal to end their days in want; while custom decides the amount of their pension.

<sup>1</sup> Lafcadio Hearn gives some remarkable instances of variations of custom in the same trades in Japan.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the American Homestead Laws, the principles of which are similar to those of the Mohammedan Law.



Law provides a severe penalty for theft, but religion insists on the duty of compassion, and custom decides that circumstances warrant the mitigation of the law by religion.

Law says that the adulteress shall be stoned to death, but religion says: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her"; and custom decides between the two extremes.

Law and religion, I say, are invariable, while custom varies and refuses to conform to stereotyped rules. Where the self-governing unit is small enough, practice easily follows its changing phases, and the general influence, which is usually for mercy, makes itself felt in restraint of the rigour of law. In countries, therefore, where the village system prevails, that is to say, a village-unit system which is a compound of law, religion, and custom, written ordinances are not required.

I do not say that our centralised system of justice has no advantages over the other. It has, especially under modern conditions of life. I do not say that the Eastern system worked perfectly—no system does. But its imperfections were accepted; they were hoary with reverend age, while those which we have introduced are new, harsh, and fearful to the people. Whatever may be thought of the Eastern method of government as a whole, it has one priceless advantage over our method—that is, its elasticity. In the European system, where the whole country is the unit, there is no place for the consideration of local circumstances, the general good of the village or the wish of the villagers or local custom. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to give effect to what only those brought up on the spot can understand and sympathise with. Rigid ordinances have to be applied in every case, however different the circumstances, however tragic the result. The due proportion of the ingredients of justice is no longer observed. Religion and custom dwindle almost to nothing, while law becomes a fetish to be worshipped for itself, because it is *The Law*, and it can only be changed by a cumbersome process in the teeth

of opposition from those who benefit by its asperities—and they are many and powerful. Change can thus only come long after the need for it has been generally recognised, and after the victims of the law have passed through great suffering. Formidable pressure can alone set the heavy machinery in motion to change the written word.

In the West we are trying to make good the want of religion and custom in our judicial system by an ever-increasing mass of statutes limiting the power of masters over their servants, of creditors over their debtors, of landlords over their tenants, of capital over labour. How imperfect soever our attempts are, they at least count for something. But in the East we have destroyed without rebuilding; and even if we could rebuild by statute, which I deem impossible, how poor a substitute for ancient religion and immemorial custom would the result be!

Religion with Eastern peoples is a vital power, a thing to be enforced. With us it is optional, indeed, in private relations, but so far as the State is concerned, it is a mere mummerly of forms and words. Worse than this, its teaching is repudiated by the State. If I deal with a criminal as my conscience dictates, I should myself be guilty of an offence against the law. The State would step in and say I was compounding a felony, and would severely punish me for doing so. And even in civil life the option is often, for reasons I cannot here go into, more theoretical than practical.

Gresham's famous law of currency applies with equal force in matters of private relations. Where two optional standards of conduct exist, the worse will drive out the better, the merciless will drive out the merciful. This is the key to the whole mystery that surrounds our dealings with our Eastern subjects. Religion and custom are slowly being driven out of the relations between man and man, and law reigns alone.

A. MITCHELL INNES.



## JOSEPH PRIESTLEY.<sup>1</sup>

SIR EDWARD THORPE, C.B., F.R.S.

THE man whose association with this place we commemorate to-day played no inconsiderable part in the history of his own times. Indeed it may be said of him with perfect truth that he played many parts, and each with distinction. Mr Frederic Harrison has styled him the hero and type of the intellectual energy of the eighteenth century.

Joseph Priestley was eminent as a theologian ; as an acute philosophical thinker ; as an active and incisive political writer and an eager lover of liberty ; as the champion and fearless exponent of a broad-minded liberalism ; as an industrious man of letters of astonishing versatility ; and as a diligent and remarkably successful man of science.

It is unnecessary for me to remind you why we are gathered together in this particular place to do honour to his memory. You are all doubtless aware that he was born in this neighbourhood, namely, at Fieldhead, in the parish of Birstall. The date was 13th March (O.S.) 1733. He was the eldest son of Jonas Priestley, a hand-loom weaver and cloth-dresser. His mother, Mary Swift, was the daughter of a farmer and maltster living near Wakefield. He came of a stock pre-eminently characteristic of this locality—simple, God-fearing folk, honest, sober, shrewd and thrifty ; deeply religious, and for the most part staunch Calvinists. “The children of the Priestley families,” wrote one of their

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered on the occasion of the unveiling of the statue at Birstall, Yorkshire, on 12th October 1912.

descendants, "were all named after Scriptural characters. They were Josephs, Timothys, and Sarahs from one generation to another. The Bible was stamped into them, and from it they drew all the inspiration of their lives."

The boy Joseph lost his mother when he was barely six years old, and was eventually entrusted to the care of his aunt, Sarah Keighley, who became, as he subsequently wrote, truly a parent to him so long as she lived. Mrs Keighley was in good circumstances, and from all accounts was a vigorous-minded, intelligent woman. Indeed we glean as much from the character of those who sought her society and frequented her house. Every cultured person in the neighbourhood seems to have been welcomed there, no matter what his religious or political opinions were. Such a circle could not fail in its influence on the eager, active mind of an impressionable boy, and we can trace to this upbringing many things that are characteristic in the conduct of the man. As the twig is bent so is the tree inclined. The young Priestley owed much to his worthy aunt, and to the men, mostly dissenting ministers, he learned to know under her roof. His mind was strengthened and enlarged by their conversation, and some of them were quick to discern its latent powers. They taught him geometry and other branches of mathematics, Hebrew, Latin, and Greek; and they read with him such books as Watt's *Logic* and Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*. He was too weakly in health at this period to attend the public school with regularity. Boys in those days began their lessons at seven in the morning—eight in winter—and were kept at them until five in the afternoon, with a couple of hours for meals. But, notwithstanding the help he received, he was largely dependent upon his own efforts for such education as he was able to get in early youth.

It is hardly to be wondered at that, with such marked habits of study, his aunt should have deemed the ministry the most fitting of careers for him, and accordingly, as he fully concurred in her views, he was sent, when nineteen years of age,



to the Daventry Academy, to emerge three years later in all the glory of a full-bottomed wig, prepared to minister to any congregation that might solicit his services.

His first charge was at Needham Market, in Suffolk, where he was well-nigh starved on the wages of an agricultural labourer. It was an inconsiderable congregation, and the young, stuttering divine made no impression on it. When Rutt was preparing his edition of Priestley's *Memoirs* no reminiscences of him could be found at Needham.

From Needham he passed on to Nantwich, where he found a more congenial community. He had been previously tried at Sheffield, but his manner was thought "too gay and airy."

At Nantwich he started a school, in addition to his ministerial office, and was happy in the discovery that teaching proved an interesting and grateful occupation to him. His success as a schoolmaster was the turning-point in his career, for it led to an invitation from the trustees of the newly founded Academy at Warrington that he should act as tutor in the classical languages and in what was then termed polite literature.

The Warrington Academy "for the education of young men of every religious denomination for the Christian ministry or as laymen" played a noteworthy part in the history of Nonconformity in England. It had its origin in the older Presbyterian Academies of Findern and Kendal, and was the direct ancestor of Manchester College, Oxford. No place of learning at that time could boast of a more eminent set of teachers. It was the home of Taylor of Norwich; of Aikin and his daughter Anna Lætitia, afterward Mrs Barbauld; of Reinhold Forster, the naturalist; of William Enfield, Pendlebury Houghton, and Gilbert Wakefield. It was here that the free thought of English Presbyterianism first began to crystallise into Unitarianism. For a time it was the centre of literary taste, and of political liberalism of the district in which it was situated—the Areopagus in the Athens of Lanca-

shire (Henry A. Bright, *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, vol. xli., 1858-9).

Priestley remained at Warrington about six years. There he married Mary Wilkinson—the daughter and sister of the famous ironmasters of Wrexham and Bradley—"a woman," he says, "of an excellent understanding much improved by reading, of great fortitude and strength of mind, and of a temper in the highest degree affectionate and generous." It was well for Priestley that she was so richly endowed; she had need of all these good qualities in the stormy times that were before her. At Warrington also he began to turn his attention to natural science, and it was here that he shook himself free from the last links of what he felt to be a rigid, intolerant Calvinism to land himself eventually on the broader platform of rational Humanitarianism—all circumstances that profoundly affected the subsequent course of his life.

He was now invited to Leeds to take charge of the Congregation of the Meeting House, adjoining the Alms House Garth, now known as the Mill Hill Chapel. During his career as a schoolmaster he compiled an English grammar which had a considerable reputation in its day. David Hume paid it the compliment of acknowledging that its perusal first made him sensible of the Gallicisms and other peculiarities of his style. He also put together his *Lectures on History and General Policy*, to which he prefixed an essay on a *Course of Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life*. At Warrington he gave lectures on *The Theory of Language*; on *The Laws and Constitutions of England*; on *Oratory and Criticism*—all of which were published and may still be read with profit, despite Brougham's sneering allusion to the adventurous tutor afflicted with an incurable stutter who, having never heard any speaking save in the pulpits of meeting-houses, promulgated rules of eloquence and of jurisprudence to the senators and lawgivers of his country. The adventurous, stuttering tutor was even bold enough to teach elocution.

Another useful compilation which made its appearance at



about this time was his *Chart of Biography*. It is now practically forgotten, but in its day was considered sufficiently meritorious to procure for its author the degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of Edinburgh—the only academic distinction he ever received. A still greater service was that it provided him with an introduction to the learned life of London and led to the acquaintance and friendship of such men as Benjamin Franklin, Canton, Cavendish, Wedgwood, Watt, Pringle, Banks, and others of the eminent band that made the reign of George III. the Augustan age of modern history.

The intercourse with Franklin and Canton led Priestley to compile a *History of Electricity*: it ran through five editions in his lifetime, and was the immediate cause of his election into the Royal Society. For some time previously he had begun to make experimental studies on frictional electricity, and his book contains the results of his observations. He was thus fairly launched on a scientific career, and to the end of his days such time as he was able to set apart, amidst his multifarious avocations, was devoted to the elucidation of natural phenomena.

At Leeds he began the course of inquiry which eventually gave him his unassailable position as one of the most prolific and most successful chemical discoverers of his age. Without previous training in chemistry, with little or no acquaintance with its terminology or its literature, with no experience of laboratory methods, or of the apparatus of operative chemistry, he stumbled, more by accident than of set purpose, into a field of virgin soil—a field which, in spite of the labours of Van Helmont, Hales, and Black, had remained practically untilled. The particular section of chemical inquiry upon which he had entered was the study of the various forms of *air*, using that term in the comprehensive sense in which it was then understood—or, in other words, the study of the gaseous forms of matter, the individuality of which was but dimly perceived by his predecessors.

I cannot attempt at this time to survey the state of knowledge on this special department of chemistry at the period when Priestley began his experimental work. I can, however, state the result of that work in a very few words. This untutored tyro, this sciolist in science, a dabbler in the art of discovery, with nothing but his own resourcefulness to help him, with no other guidance than that afforded by his inborn perspicacity, with domestic utensils for his apparatus and tallow candles as his source of heat, accomplished more in the half-dozen years of his experimental activity than the collective labour of his forerunners had achieved in as many centuries.

Paradoxes are apt to be based upon half-truths, the most dangerous form of untruth; but Priestley himself, who, notwithstanding his mental peculiarities had no special love of paradox, may be cited in support of the statement that it was this very ignorance of chemical facts, and of the operations of practical chemistry, that was the true cause of his discoveries. For, he says, it was the situation in which he found himself that led him to devise apparatus and processes of his own adapted to his views and circumstances. He was convinced that had he been accustomed to the usual chemical processes he might not have so easily thought of any other, and without new modes of operation he would hardly have discovered anything materially new.

The particular kind of gas on which Priestley tried his 'prentice hand was already known, and its existence as a chemical entity, differing from "common air" and the various forms of "inflammable air," had been clearly made out by Black. Its main properties, too, had been fairly well investigated. It was the accident that his house in Leeds adjoined a public brewery that first led him to make experiments on it. It was called "fixed air" in Priestley's time, and was known to be produced in large quantity in alcoholic fermentation. To-day it is commonly known as carbonic acid, and can be obtained, as Priestley learned to know, in a variety of ways.



Priestley's experiments led him to a discovery of no less interest than that of "soda-water," and it came to be made as an article of commerce under the name, for a time, of the "mephitic julep," a term which connotes, what indeed was the case, that what we call soda-water was originally intended for use as a medicine and not as a beverage. In the system of therapeutics current in the middle of the eighteenth century "fixed air" was considered a remedial agent of considerable potency and it played a large part in the theory of disease.

In conformity with this theory Priestley suggested the employment of his julep as a preventive of sea-scurvy, and brought his invention to the notice of the Admiralty, who referred the matter to the College of Physicians, before whom he was requested to exhibit his apparatus. The report of the College was so far favourable that two warships were fitted with appliances for making the new drink. But, as might be surmised, the Navy of these days failed to take kindly to it: as in the case of Lord Derby's choice between the gout and the sherry, they preferred to take their chance of the scurvy. The Royal Society, however, was so strongly impressed with the merits of soda-water that they promptly conferred the Copley Medal on its inventor.

Priestley's position as a man of science was now secured, and he had every inducement to continue in the path of inquiry he had opened up. It was probably owing to the little flutter of excitement his invention occasioned that the first Marquess of Lansdowne, then Lord Shelburne, was led to think of Priestley as a possible "literary companion." Lord Shelburne at this period was out of favour in Court circles: he had been dismissed from Pitt's ministry on account of his conciliatory policy towards the American Colonies, and was living in retirement at Bowood. Priestley's political sentiments were doubtless not unknown to the Secretary of State, and on the great questions which then divided parties they were, broadly speaking, in sympathy. But the proposed connection was not to be based upon political considerations,

or on the anticipation that it would involve political service. Nothing of the kind was demanded or expected, nor is there any evidence that it was ever rendered. Lord Shelburne's terms were highly generous, and Priestley's friends strongly advised him to accept them. Accordingly, either at the end of 1773 or in the beginning of 1774, Priestley, with his young family, moved to Calne. His office was nominally that of librarian, but his duties left him ample opportunity in which to prosecute his experimental labours. Lord Shelburne took an interest in his work, and frequently requested him to repeat it for the amusement or enlightenment of his guests. Moreover, he contributed liberally to its cost, so that Priestley was in a position to provide himself with material and apparatus which his straitened means at Leeds would not have enabled him to procure.

The outcome of these labours is contained in his *magnum opus*, *Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air*, the first edition of which appeared during the years 1775 to 1786. This remarkable work is one of the classics of chemistry. It contains an account of the memorable discovery of the action of plant life in maintaining the uniform composition of atmospheric air; it laid the foundations of the methods by which that composition may be ascertained—the beginnings of the art of eudiometry. It gives an account of the methods by which he first made known the existence of certain of the oxides of nitrogen and of the gaseous principles contained in spirits of salt and of hartshorn—substances known from very early times, but of which he first indicated the true nature. It contains a description of the manner in which he first obtained sulphurous acid in a state of purity, and he recognised that this gas was identical with the product formed by burning sulphur in air. He also prepared sulphuretted hydrogen and silicon fluoride. Lastly, the work contains an account of his epoch-making discovery—the isolation of oxygen—epoch-making because it led to the overthrow of a false doctrine and completely revolutionised the science. It is truly an



astonishing record of achievement for a man who a few years previously had no knowledge of the principles of chemistry and no acquaintance with its processes.

Priestley remained with Lord Shelburne for about seven years. How advantageous the connection was to him and to science is abundantly evident. Furthermore, it was the means of making Priestley personally known to his scientific contemporaries abroad, particularly in France, and this again was to the benefit of science. Indeed, Priestley's visit to Paris in Lord Shelburne's company, and the opportunity it afforded him of intercourse with the creators of the new school of chemical philosophy led by Lavoisier, had, as every student of chemical history now recognises, a profound effect on the course and development of chemical theory.

But however advantageous to Priestley the connection with Lord Shelburne might be, it had its perils and difficulties, and in time it proved irksome to each of the parties. Priestley had the *cacoëthes scribendi* in its acutest form; his pen was always busy, and never more so than at Calne or Lansdowne House. Certain of the theological and metaphysical treatises he published at this period occasioned considerable uproar, and Lord Shelburne's political enemies were not slow to strike at the patron through his "tame philosopher." Hence it was deemed expedient in the interests of both that the connection should cease. Priestley was induced to take up his residence in Birmingham and to resume his ministerial office in charge of the Congregation of the New Meeting. But events showed he had become a marked man. His *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*; his *History of Early Opinion concerning Jesus Christ*; his *General History of the Christian Church to the Fall of the Western Empire*; and, above all, the persistency with which he expounded and defended the principles of Humanitarianism, were rocks of offence to the Establishment. Some of these publications were no less obnoxious to Nonconformity—especially to the Calvinists—and one of his books was ordered to be burnt by

the common hangman at Dordrecht. The spirit of the Synod of Dort was still alive in that place.

Moreover it was a time of great political unrest. The portents were ominous of impending change. Europe, particularly France, was seething with discontent. The spirit of liberty—civil, political, religious—was abroad, and Priestley recognised its coming and hailed its advent. The Birmingham Riots of 1791 were the outcome of the feeling of strain and nervous apprehension then prevalent in England. There is no longer room for doubt that this maniacal outburst was largely instigated and directed by Priestley's enemies. In the beginning he was the chief victim. His chapel was destroyed, his house and laboratory wrecked, his books and apparatus burnt or stolen, and he himself was driven, in peril of his life, from the town. The fate which Socinus suffered at the hands of a Cracow mob was also his. London—even then a vast solitude—was the only place in which he was fairly safe. But such was the temper of the times—such, in Pitt's words, "the effervescence of the public mind"—that it was impossible for him to be seen abroad. The rancour of his enemies left him no peace: venomous attacks upon him were incessant. He was burnt in effigy, inveighed against in the House of Commons, and shunned by his associates in the Royal Society. At length he determined to leave the country, and turned his eyes towards America. The countrymen of Franklin at least were not unmindful that in the hour of their necessity he had proved himself their friend. He reached New York in June 1794 to learn that his great protagonist, the illustrious Lavoisier, had met even a harder fate than his own. Eventually he settled at Northumberland, on the Susquehanna, and here, active and industrious almost to the last, he died on 6th February 1804 in the seventy-first year of his age. His last mortal act was to correct a proof-sheet.

Priestley's fame would seem to rest mainly upon his chemical discoveries. At least, that such is the case may be inferred from the fact that whenever men have sought to do



him honour and have desired to perpetuate his memory by statues in public places, he is invariably represented as making a chemical experiment. Perhaps this fact is due to the circumstance that whatever may be our political or religious convictions we are on common ground in our admiration for him as a man of science. Indeed, there can be no difference of opinion concerning his merits as a discoverer. His position in the history of science rests upon his additions to our knowledge of pneumatic chemistry. His discoveries in that field contributed, perhaps more than any other set of facts, to the final overthrow of a physical conception of the material universe which had its germ in the oldest philosophies. The sufficiency of that system was seriously impugned by Robert Boyle—one of the greatest chemical reformers who ever lived,—but it may be said to have received its death-blow by the labours of Priestley. But it is difficult to determine how far this was recognised by Priestley himself—how far, in fact, he was conscious that he had reached such a consummation.

I am thus led to say something respecting Priestley's true character as an investigator, and to point out, as impartially as I can, what I conceive to be his real position in the hierarchy of science.

Priestley was a man of ingenuous simplicity and of a most engaging candour. Nothing can be more charming than the *naïveté* with which he takes his reader into his confidence and makes him aware of his doubts and perplexities, his troubles and failures. He lays bare for us the inner workings of his mind. He indicates each successive step, however devious and uncertain, by which he arrives at his conclusions. He is frequently prolix, occasionally tedious, and sometimes even trivial. But as a revelation of character his scientific memoirs are among the most delightful of his compositions. We read him as we read Pepys—as much for the pleasure we have in sharing his confidences, and in watching the working of his ingenuous mind, as for the information he imparts. Prefaces, as a rule, are rather dull reading, but Priestley's prefaces are

not to be skipped: they have a charm all their own as the unstudied efforts of a singularly sympathetic and transparent nature. We judge Priestley, then, upon the evidence which he himself affords. No one has done more, or could possibly do more, to indicate and appraise his true character as a natural philosopher. He was pre-eminently the type of man whom Hobbes sneered at as an "experimental philosopher." Like his great contemporary Scheele, who divides with him the honour of the discovery of oxygen, he has no claims to be regarded as a speculative philosopher. He gave us no laws; he formulated no system. He was quite aware of his limitations. Not that speculation had no interest for him. He deprecated being considered merely "a dry experimenter," as he called it; but he dreaded still more being regarded as "a visionary theorist." When he gave the reins to his imagination he did it in fear and trembling, and sought courage from the example of Newton. But his imagination was at best but an ambling, stumbling kind of steed and invariably landed him in a bog. Speculation may, as he said, be "a cheap commodity," and the phrase, perhaps, expresses his real opinion of its value, but the fact remains that not one of his attempts at theorising has stood the test of time, or has had the slightest influence on the course of chemistry.

Nothing is more certain than that Priestley was quite unconscious of the true import and significance of his discoveries, and least of all of that cardinal discovery which is signalised in every public statue we have of him. In this one respect he did not achieve greatness: the greatness has been thrust upon him. He was unable, even to the end of his days, to perceive how the isolation of oxygen did more than any other circumstance to destroy the generalisation to which he continued to cling, with a simple, almost unquestioning faith down to his death. Receptive as he might be in other matters, he remained quite oblivious to the fact that his discovery constituted the one central dominant fact on which the new chemistry, of which he saw the dawn, was based.



Priestley was an active and industrious observer, absolutely truthful, and, as he hoped and believed, unbiassed and impartial. But we must admit that he was almost wholly lacking in the higher qualities of imagination which characterise such leaders and lawgivers as Newton, Dalton, Davy, Faraday, and Darwin. I have elsewhere ventured to point out how striking is the contrast between Priestley the social, political, and theological reformer, always in advance of his times, receptive, fearless, and insistent ; and Priestley the man of science, timorous and halting when he might well be bold, conservative and orthodox when almost every other active worker in science was heterodox and progressive.

Great as Priestley's merit is as an experimentalist and a discoverer, I venture to think his greater claim on our regard and esteem rests upon his struggles and his sufferings in the cause of liberty.

All accounts go to show that Priestley was regarded by great numbers of his fellow-countrymen as perhaps the most cantankerous man of his time, always warring against established usage and constituted authority, and who purposely deserted the trodden track of opinion from sheer perversity of mind.

Such a conception of his character is altogether wide of the truth. In reality he was one of the most peaceably disposed of men, gentle in disposition, not naturally prone to disputation, singularly tolerant and open-minded. No man was more quick to acknowledge any error he perceived he had fallen into. It was sheer force of circumstance that made him an active controversialist and indefatigable pamphleteer. He was no casuist, and his methods of controversy were irreproachable. His language was simple and direct and his meaning transparently clear. He has no pretensions to be regarded as a stylist ; his object, he said, was not to acquire the character of a fine writer but of a useful one. As a preacher he was persuasive and unaffected and his sermons are models of sound reasoning and good sense. He was no orator : his manner was

rather that of one friend speaking to another. He was a sincere lover of literature, and in every place in which he dwelt he left evidence of his efforts to bring books within the reach of everyone. He was very methodical in his habits and a rigid economist of time and had an extraordinary power of rapid work. In his home he was uniformly kind and affectionate, and, as was truly said of him on Darton's portrait, "Not malice itself could ever fix a stain on his private conduct or impeach his integrity."

The clouds which obscured his fair fame for a time have now for ever passed away. The services he has rendered to our common humanity are everywhere gratefully recognised, and nowhere more warmly than by those communities among whom he dwelt. We have public memorials of him in Birmingham, Warrington, and Leeds ; and now Birstall, where he first saw the light, has done him and herself justice in the admirable monument which it has been my privilege to unveil.

T. E. THORPE.

SALCOMBE.



# INTELLECTUALISM AND FAITH.

PRINCIPAL P. T. FORSYTH, M.A., D.D.

## I.

ONE of our Premiers once said that the sterling British mind neither liked nor understood cleverness. How true it is! How fortunate that it is true! We do take to Samuel Johnson; we do not take to Mr George Bernard Shaw. The saying indicates a real source of our peculiar place and power in the world. We have a healthy dread of Intellectualism. We have, of course, the defects of that quality, which are revealed in time of war, whether on the veldt or in the soul. We have a fatal fear of knowledge and of education. We are bewildered as problems grow subtle, and our stupidity turns silliness. But suspicion of the clever is a great quality, rightly taken. Judgment is a greater gift than ability. The world is neither to be understood nor managed by sheer talent, logic, or knowledge. The greatest movements in the world have been irrational, or at least non-logical. And the irrationality of the world, the faith of a principle which flows underneath reason on the one hand, and of a power which rises beyond it on the other, and even seems to reverse it, has done more to keep religion quick and deep than any sense of the world's intelligent nature or consistent course. Faith, which is the greatest power of history, flourishes, and even exults, on the offence of the cross, and the paradox of the spirit.

Is there, then, for Briton or for Christian, a premium on stupidity? Must piety be humdrum? What concord has

faith with dullness? or what fellowship has Christ with the dunces? What enmity has Christ with mind? In what sense must we become fools for Christ's sake?

In the first place, it may be said, no mere fool can see how foolish the world's wisdom is with God. Of course, any fool can gird at a scholar, but it needs an able man to realise the insignificance of mere ability; while the worship of prompt intellect is a sign of intellectual poverty. The pestilent wit is the man who spends himself on wit. The merely clever man has no idea how little cleverness goes for in affairs, how different it is from a powerful sagacity. Cleverness seldom goes with greatness; it is not dramatic enough, for all its love of effect. The course of the world mocks the mere acuteness of man. And, says Pascal, the man who lives for *bons mots* has a bad heart. He meant Gallic wit, and living for salons. For *bons mots*, in the sense of the just, pointed, *frappant* phrase, abound even in the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels.

One thinks in this connection of Christ's dialectic, so easy and so effectual, in His controversies with the religious dunces and quacks of His day, the readiness of His wit, the happy skill of His fence, the deadly stroke, and the ironic parry. One recalls His deft handling of every situation, the aptness of His phrase, and the incisiveness of His epithets. "You solemn mummers!" "You quacks!" "You brood of snakes!" "Tell that fox." We note His paradoxes, His epigrams, His "lose your life to save it," His "serve to rule," His "give to gain." We mark the congenial way in which a witty faith appealed to Him, and fairly mastered Him, in the reply of the Syro-phœnician.

His wit is well recognised—His gracious wit and His wounding wit; but He is charged with the lack of humour, of an element so great, if not essential, in humanity as humour. And some of His servants who possessed the gift have thought it stood in their way for His work. But it is not that Jesus had none, but that he had not the Western,



Shakesperean, modern type. He had the type that goes with the prophet's genius, with the genius of Israel, the genius of ethical insight and exaltation, the genius of Isaiah, of Socrates, of Paul, of Pascal. He had irony, as all these had. He not only saw the irony of the world, but He exercised upon His foes the lofty irony of God. What was His silence before Pilate? Or "those ninety and nine just persons *that need no repentance*"? It betokens the deepest foundation, and the repose of unearthly power, to be able amid crises to play so freely about life as His insight and irony did. The odd thing is that, while the sunny Shakesperean humour, or the genial humour of daily life, is not felt by most Christian people to be foreign to Christ, or at least to Christian faith, the ironic humour, tending to the bitter, is so felt. As if Jesus was never bitter and sarcastic! How bitter was that, "It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem"! The Bible has much more room for the humour of Carlyle than for that of Scott, for the grim than for the sunny. Nothing could show more clearly than this soft horror of irony and of scorn for the quack, how far the popular Christian mind has gone from the Christ of the Gospels, how the conception of the loving Jesus, being overdriven, has demoralised the Christian public, how false is the mere genial Jesus, or the merely domestic Jesus of fireside faith, how greatly we need to be forced back on the virility, what I might call the first-rate-mindedness, of this passionate Man, on His moral realism, on His sense of law, and holiness, and wrath, and of the bitter shams and incongruities of life—and of the religious life not least. It is not quite wonderful that men like Carlyle and Meredith should have been consumed with contempt for the "parson-opium" of the Victorian Age. We need to be urgently reminded of that in Him which so grasped the eternal verities that He could apply them to each juncture with an incision that made even His own afraid to ask Him any questions.

We note, further, in the Epistles the extraordinary felicity, pungency, and pregnancy of expression, as well as the acumen

of the dialectic, to say nothing of the sacred pun. We recall Paul's exultation in the irony of the Cross in 1 Cor. i.—the foolishness of God is wiser than men. In many respects the Bible is the wittiest book in the world ; it is certainly not the most lucid, matter-of-fact, or simple of feeling. Jesus was not a plain man. We follow up with the brilliant style of many of the Fathers, and no few of the Reformers—to name but Tertullian, Augustine, Zwingli, and Erasmus. And it becomes harder than ever to explain the popular idea that Christian goodness should be monopolised by the dense and the slow of heart, or that the trusty must be the dull. We do not forget, of course, the patience of Christianity with the weak and slow, and its destination for mankind, and not for a cultivated *élite*. These features of it help to explain the association that has grown up. Something is also due to the recent substitution of mere piety for faith, and to the common use of religion as a refuge when we have so spent ourselves on the world as to be fit for nothing else but a rest-cure as we turn to God. No doubt other factors of the situation would emerge if we gave ourselves to its analysis. But that would perhaps be more interesting than useful.

The dunce, of course, will always see in the witty only the acrobatic or the smart. But is there not all the difference in the world between the mind-play of the moral master and that of the mental elf, between swift lambency and nimble coruscation, between the beam of the burning sun and the flash of the manufactured spark, between the lucid and the fulgid, between the lustre of paradoxical truth and the phosphorescence of freakish wit ? Do we not all part the man who sparkles like a rich diamond at a chance angle from the other man who crackles like a made-up firework ? There is the man whose good points drop from him accidentally while he addresses himself *ad rem* rather than *ad populum* ; and there is the man who speaks on commission, and evidently in order to make a setting for the phrases he concocted to fetch the surprise. Is it not one thing to hunt for epigrams and antitheses, and



another to see all things set one against another, and so deeply to read the paradox of existence as to be able to be briefly just to it only by phrases that compass two worlds? Is it not one thing to play the fool, and another to recognise our human need of nonsense—as Hazlitt was the first to note that Shakespeare did? Is it superfluous to point out that intellectual agility is one thing and moral acumen quite another, that mental vivacity is not effective grasp, that the keenest sight will not do the work of insight, and that we live by insight and not by sight? Carlyle speaks of Mrs Mill as possessing a great deal of unwise intellect. It is not a rare possession; and it may be the cause of more failure in life than stupidity. What life has chiefly to do with is not a world of truth sharply presented to us, but a world of reality deeply working on us, and intimately experienced in us. And in religion above all things it is with reality we have to do more than with truth. Faith lies far nearer the dramatic sense than the intellectual. It is an act of ours answering a creative action in God—but a pointed issue, a crisis, an epigram of action. Truth may be a matter of vivid perception, but reality is a matter of intimate practical penetration. The God who is denied as an intellectual truth may be worshipped as a moral reality, as every Kantian knows. And faith lives in a vast antinomy.

## II.

Such observations open up for us the whole question of the place of mind in faith—either as the play of mind upon an occasion, or the grasp of mind upon reality.

It is frequent to-day to hear a protest against theology, on the ground that it is an intellectualising of what is really a religion of the heart and conscience, that it is the capture of Christianity by an aristocracy of subtle or ingenious intellect. But it might arrest some of this mindlessness if time were taken to ask what theology means in each case. We should then note that there is theology and theology. There is what

may be called a primary theology and a secondary. And they are thus distinct. The one is the statement of faith, the other its exposition. The former belongs to the very nature and conveyance of Christian faith, the other belongs rather to its scientific treatment. The one is verified by experience, the other by thought.

Our first task in life is not to see a clear truth but to grasp an actual situation. We have not to perceive so much as to realise. We have not to watch the procession but to march in it. Religion especially has to do only in a secondary way with truths, statements, aspects, and co-ordinations, however clear or however pointed. With all the scientific side of things, with the way things lie, its concern is secondary. But it has in the first degree to grasp and deal with the way things work, with a practical situation, with the reality involved in our personal situation, historic and bequeathed, or experienced and intimate. And as that is a moral and actual situation of life, and not a scientific construction of truth, the intelligence required for life, and for the faith which rules life, is not intellectual, and not academic, but it is active and sagacious. The great matter is not the intellect but the understanding. Who speaks of Scott's or Shakespeare's intellect? It is their understanding, their grasp of life, that tells. Many a man who is slow in his wits has a wonderful power of gauging an actual situation. Many a man devoid either of science, taste, or the faculty of expression yet has the understanding that bottoms affairs, masters life, and commands his fellows. He is of the quiet, awkward men who do things. He has the instinct for what matters and the capacity for what rules. If he have not pathetic humour, or Gallic wit, he may have ethical humour, dry humour, or even the irony of the prophet. With such minds the chief use of the intelligence as the servant of personality is not in adjusting facts but in weighing them. We use our mind better in asking sin's weight than its origin. Our mind is there not to give us a centre but to lead us to a spring. It does not give us our



bearings so much as couple us up with our source of power. The intellect is, for the purposes of life, an organ of estimate, far more than of mere cognisance. It makes value judgments (as the phrase goes). It assesses things rather than places them. And it sees in them a value which may be in ironical contrast with their actual place. That is its great function for *life*—appraisement, and not orientation. And the order of mind that runs to that use of the intelligence is the order that effects most, whether in history or in faith. But intellectualism on the other hand is intellect detached, acting outside life without being morally involved or committed, without practical judgment or grasp of complete situations. It is intellect either at play, or at mere exercise, or on parade. It is at sport, gymnastics, or pose, rather than at actual work among things. It is the literary rather than the parliamentary intellect. It loves to criticise from platforms but not to act on committees. And that is the cleverness, superior and doctrinaire, or elfish and irresponsible, which is so alien both to our national and Christian temper. Would, indeed, that our intelligence had more alert play and abandon about it! Would we were less dense, dour, or grim! Would we could laugh at our enthusiasms a little without losing them, and be intensely in earnest without taking ourselves so very seriously! Would that we were less the victims of the merely serious, and more of the truly sagacious! But only so long as that improvement is not secured at the cost of moral judgment, practical insight, and command of affairs.

It is not with truth that our intellect has chiefly to do, I repeat, but with reality. And reality is in the nature of action. It has to do with experience more than thought. We study, not in order to become pedants, but to go into action properly equipped. To cope with final reality and be adequate to it, our intelligence must be capable rather than clever, ethical in its nature rather than rational, experienced more than able, theological and not theosophic. The question we have first to meet is one which so many people will do

anything rather than face. It is, "Where are we?" As business people we take stock and balance books periodically; as religious people there is nothing we shirk more. And that question does not mean, "What is man's place in the cosmos?" (which, as it keeps us from self-examination, is a very marketable line of inquiry), but, "What is our actual moral condition with reality? How is it with our soul?" (an inquisition which, as it makes us take ourselves in hand, has not ready sale). The question is, What is our actual, habitual, personal relation to the last reality? How do we grasp that with which, as living souls, we have chiefly, radically, and eternally to do? It is dreadful how little fear we feel before that to-day. If there is anything more formidable it is the way some pietisms can fondle it. But no nimbleness of apprehension can seize it, no alert ability can handle it, nor indeed welcome it. And accordingly some desperately or idly think that what cleverness cannot do here must be done by ignorance, that the good man need know little, that he may bungle the utterance of what he knows, and that the true illuminate must be illiterate. This is a delusion so current in religion because religion has to do with the greatest of actual situations and realities for all men, therefore with a region where the race is not to the swift, and mere mind is absurdly at fault. But for all that there was never a great thing done yet by a stupid or ignorant man. If the great thing was done it was done by one who had enough intelligence to grasp the situation, who had the practical wit to grasp with two hands its opposing sides, and who had enough practical knowledge to cope with it. Many great things have been done by illiterates, but none by fools. There is no beatitude for the dunce.

Every ray of intellectual light we have is to force, and enable us the better to put, the question, "Where am I?" "What doest thou here, Elijah?" It is not a question, "What do I hold?" but, "How do I behave to what holds me?" It is not, "What can I make of the world?" but,



"How do I stand to what is given me in a world?" It is not, "What do I know?" but, "How far do I realise that I am known?" It is not, "How do I conceive the divine truth of the world?" but, "How do I meet the divine action in the world?" Not, "Do I see the cohesion of God's great truth?" but, "Do I gauge and answer the bearing of God's eternal act?" Not, "How do I feel about God?" but, "What dealings have I with Him?" Our first concern is not with the riddle of the Universe: it is with the tragedy of the Universe. And, in faith's name at least, we may only complain about poverty of intellect if it leave the Church unfit to grasp the moral dimensions of that tragedy, and therefore to gauge its gravity, or its redress—which things it sometimes seems slowly, and often incompetently, even flippantly, ceasing to do. It is here that concern for a theological religion (as distinct from a theosophic) becomes of prime urgency for a Church that claims to know where it is, or to gauge the moral world. For what is theology (as based on revelation) but a spiritual grasp of the moral, the human, tragedy, in God's terms and with God's power. So when I hear it charged that the theologians wish to make faith the victim of intellect, I want to carry the war into the other camp. The complaint we have to make is that the modern world is becoming the victim of intellectualism for lack of theological faith. And under a shell of ethical interest it is becoming hollow in moral power and judgment, for want of a moral theology.

This may readily seem to such victims one of the paradoxes by which ingenuity amuses itself at the cost of seriousness. So little do they realise their situation, so slight is their world. But I will try to make the statement good.

### III.

A favourite form of that reaction from serious faith which makes the amateur dislike of theology is this. It falls back from Christ the Victim and Atoner of the world's moral

tragedy upon Jesus the Teacher of spiritual wisdom. It disowns, sometimes with cheap anger, the sophistication of this loving and devoted Jesus by the intellectualism of the divinity schools. It dismisses the cry of the conscience for a day's-man, and explains it away as an extravagant perversion of the natural ache of finitude, produced by a tradition of monastic self-torment. The need of an Atonement it gets rid of by tracing it to crude Jewish notions about sacrifice, aggravated by pagan mollifications, and accentuated by mediæval jurisprudence, with its ideas of compounding for the damage of an offence. And it recurs to those simple interests of the heart which (it says) are so warmly and really met by the words of the Master. (For St Paul we may note that Christ was his Owner, but for modern self-respect He is only our Master, when He passes beyond our Brother.) It has recourse, therefore, to the teaching of Jesus. And my case is, that in doing so it retires from the living present we experience to the remote past of which we learn, from the living, reconciling Christ to the merely historic and hortatory Jesus. It leaves the region of spiritual reality and moral experience in the classic protagonists of the conscience, and it succumbs in the name of history to the intellectualism which has been the note of orthodoxy and the death of religion. The cry for the simple teaching of Jesus, the simple religion of Jesus, is a piece of fatal intellectualism and orthodoxy. That is the absurd statement I have to try to make good.

What I am saying is that every denial of the central, final, crucial, and saving value of Christ's death, both for His life and ours, is based on this vicious, intellectualist, and gnomie idea of revelation. Sooner or later it reduces Christ to a teacher. It denounces doctrine in the interest of the doctrinaire. And I will put it thus. I will suppose that you recognise that Jesus came to deal with the conscience and its sin, and not merely with the heart and its aches. He had to do with our tragic guilt more than our tragic lot. You then go on to say that He did so deal with sin by telling us (with



supreme impressiveness) of a loving, forgiving God instead of a holy, judging, redeeming God. He makes statements, with convincing magnetism, of a loving God who is ever ready to forgive when we repent. He does this, instead of really bringing a God who is carrying our sin, meeting His own judgment, actually redeeming, and creating repentance in the process. You say that Jesus replied to our laborious morbid concern about our soul by telling us of a better way, urging us to take it, promising us Divine help in taking it, and assuring us of its safety, with all the force of a most earnest personality. Now, what is that but intellectualism? It declares that our case can be met by something in the way of fervid information, by something urgently exhibitory, by the goodness of God being made to pass vividly before us, by something we are sublimely told about God; that is, by certain statements, certain truths which Jesus supremely, and even authoritatively, declared as His convictions. But wherever you have salvation by truth or truths, however warmly opened up or kindly declared, there you have intellectualism. It does not matter whether the truths be simple or complex, whether they are those of a gnostic sage or of a reasoned system. If the prophet has no more than his intuition to give us, backed by his character, if he do no more than avouch his experience, and if he do not give us himself, or his deed, in a real, positive, and effective sense, then it is but statement he can give us, however luminous, however glowing. It is a statement of his experience or conviction of God. Now our experience we can but state or express. We cannot transfer it. It can only be created in others at the same source—unless it be the mere epidemic of a crowd—and all we can do is to bring men to that source with a certain will to believe. Therefore it is that we preach not ourselves but Christ—Christ, and not our experience of Him—not even the religious experiences of Jesus Himself. For we should then be saved, not by Jesus, but by the teaching, the testimony, the recorded insights and impressions of Jesus, not by the truth which is Jesus, or which He achieved,

but by the truth which (rightly or wrongly) impressed and engrossed Jesus, according to His statement. And it makes no difference to the case whether the doctrine be gnostic or dialectic, sententious or systematic, nor whether the statement be scientific or sympathetic, cold fact or hot gospeling. It is dogmatic all the same. It is salvation by statement winged by personality, by doctrine incandescent in a prophet. It says that Christ's testimony of God was quite parallel to the testimony of Christ by Apostles or Fathers. In principle there is no difference whether the doctrine be the Sermon on the Mount or the Athanasian Creed.

But surely, it is objected, one of these is ethical, the other metaphysical. But the one is as ethical as the other at root, when we consider that their real matter and shaping interest is salvation. And when we consider their form or method, each is doctrinaire. Each is in the form of statement, of preaching, of theology rather than religion. In each we face a mirror of God and not God's gift of Himself. Each assumes the mode of statement congenial to its place and hour. Athanasius did not teach metaphysics; he taught the Gospel; but he did it in the language of metaphysics. But, allowing for the metaphysics, that is what the Sermon on the Mount is. It is statement and appeal—it is not action. It is mere preaching, it is not saving. In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus speaks as yet but as a religious sage, *i.e.* as a saintly moral theologian, rather than as personal Redeemer. He speaks about life, conduct, and God; He does not mediate them. In the Sermon He faces men as a prophet; in the Cross He comes to grips with them as a Saviour.

Truth or truths about the spiritual life, if they stand alone, are intellectualist however impressive, or, to use a word fitter in some ways, they are æsthetic however penetrating. They may produce the certainty of knowledge but not of salvation. The speaker is not the object, he only has his eye on the object, with more or less power and veracity. He is a perceiver rather than an agent, a hearer rather than a doer, or, as



it would be put in the language of art, an æsthete rather than a poet, a seer rather than a maker. He is a reporter of his convictions rather than a creator of reality. His person is not the life, but only points to it or mirrors it. His personality may be a great dynamic for his principle, but it is not itself God in a gift, the Resurrection and the Life. He may talk of the living God with extraordinary power, but he is not God in life. He is still the preacher, the helper, he is not the Saviour. He is God's organ for effect, but he is not with us and in us as Life. He has something to tell us which has a great influence in making us; but it is not he that makes us, it is we ourselves, with his help. He is not the new Creator.

For those who would take this line in New Testament criticism the great effort is to get back as closely as possible to what Jesus really said. If we had that in its original form (it is held) we should have the best and greatest that He brought. The value of His personality was to give wings to His message, to feather His arrows of light. That message would be the real revelation, which therefore would not be in Himself but in His truth, His report. What is communicated to us is not God but doctrine, or even enthusiasm, about God. We receive lofty, urgent, or gracious exhortation on that basis, and deep impressions from a prophetic personality. Imaginative intellectualism and impressive conviction on the supreme subject is all we then should have. The revelation is in the doctrine, not in the historic person, facts, or acts. That is the point. And that is the bane of orthodoxy. No facts of revelation have then special value as facts, but only as they are incidental to the activity of Jesus as a Teacher who drew death down on Himself by the unpopularity of His momentous doctrine and the courage of its expression.

And this intellectualism, this orthodoxy (aphoristic or systematic), runs through much that is known as up-to-date theology. Modernism, dropping much even of the teaching of Jesus, and almost indifferent to His history, seeks to keep the Church alive on its dogmas taken as ideas, on truth

emptied of the person yet treated as the power. But, however modern, that theology is simply exchanging old lamps, old clothes, old views for new. For it is a case of views or truths either way, new or old, narrow or broad; and it is not a case of act and deed in the heart of universal reality. The Cross appears as an exhibition, an object-lesson, an enacted statement, a crowning testimony, and not as a final achievement for the race. God reveals Himself in truths rather than in acts, in divine doctrine rather than in divine deed, in statements rather than in history, in instructive activity rather than in a sacramental or a creative act. His object is the most effective publication of His truth. His organ is the most gifted seer rather than the most effectual doer. And, where Jesus is the organ, salvation is through the impression He makes by His martyr death rather than by the work He achieves, and the world-crisis He solves, by His redeeming will. Jesus is the great figure in the history of religion rather than the great power in the religion of history. He talks aptly to the nature of the religious soul, but He does not handle aptly the total and eternal situation of the moral soul in the universe, nor deal with it for good and all. He speaks to the need of the heart; but He does not assure us that He is its food, and that He has the final disposal of a universe which is warranted to fill the heart's needs, and not flout them, at last. He is simply convinced in the deepest way that all things work together for good to them that love; He is not the guarantee of it, the ground of it—Himself the agent and anticipation of it. He appears in history, but is He the focus of the historic crisis, of the Lord's one controversy with man? In Him God reveals Himself to history, rather than in history, and through it. His revelation inspires action in us rather than forms the decisive action by God. His person preaches to us rather than re-creates us. Jesus diagnoses the soul's deep condition and prescribes for it, rather than determines its final destiny. He speaks powerfully to the question rather than takes command of the situation. His work is æsthetic rather than dramatic.



The anti-theologians are thus the intellectualists—only they intellectualise in saws instead of systems, and by maxim rather than method.

The cure for this intellectualism, whether old or new, orthodox or rationalist, drastic or dreamy, is history—but history treated religiously not scientifically, morally not psychologically, and answered by faith and not mere assent, history as *Geschichte* and not mere *Historie*. It is history as the soil and series of revelation. It is a history whose old Jesus is our Eternal Christ—the Lord the Spirit. The prominent thing in Christianity is not a seer's eternal truth but a Person's eternal deed and gift. It is not the doctrine but the Cross. In the beginning was the endless Act. And the Cross is here taken not as the closing incident of the martyr life of Jesus, but, first, as the supreme action of the Son of God, and the supreme crisis of man's fate, and, second, as the eternal act of a Person thus present with us still. Revelation is only Christian as redemption, and not as mere manifestation. It does not say things, it does them. Its effect is not a belief, nor a school, nor a mood of mind, but a faith, a church, and a kingdom, all living only because Jesus Christ lives in them in this eternal act. The great historic act leaves for its great historic product a living society in which it "functions." Its first-fruits are not theologians but believers, not disciples but a church of active confessors. Its answer is not the mere resonance of assent but the response of faith, not impression but regeneration, not mere correspondency but commerce with God. We are not Christ's disciples merely, but His subjects. And we are not so much Christ's subjects even, but His property, by conquest, by purchase, by redemption—phrase it as you will. In living faith we are not simply loyal; we are in no respect our own. Loyalty is but one aspect of faith and quite incomplete. Loyalty mostly means fidelity to a king who yet has no business in our conscience. But the kingship of Jesus is much more Oriental than that. He sits, by a right He created, on the throne of conscience, in absolute

command of our whole moral self. It is His, for He made it in our new creation. We are not quickened but changed. You may have the most impressive addresses for the deepening or quickening of the spiritual life, yet they are all but flushes brought to our face till Jesus Christ enter our history for good at its core and crisis, live in our heart by faith, and Himself become our new life. They are but impressionist, not sacramental. The way the Church invites this seer or that to lift or revive it on some particular occasion may or may not be wise and proper, but it is a confession of the absence of this life, and of a starved preoccupation with views and interests rather than facts and powers, with impression rather than regeneration.

I know that some feel the inadequacy and the danger of the mere teaching of Jesus, but, as they will do anything rather than call themselves His *δοῦλοι*, and take that yoke of the Cross which has made theologians of the most thorough Christians, they seek to escape from their rationalism by going behind the doctrine of Jesus to His life and character, as revealed by a scientific historicism in the Synoptics. (Scientific historicism—it may be observed in passing—when it is made the basis of faith, is a piece of intellectualism or mind-worship.) They view Him either as a powerful example, or as an æsthetic source of the deepest impressions—only not as absolute Redeemer and rightful Owner of our wills.<sup>1</sup> It is in vain, however, that we seek to escape the intellectualism of Jesus the doctrinaire by the impression of Jesus the hero or saint. Ethical magnetism will not deliver us from the bondage to mere knowledge, nor from the cult of the religious genius and his illumination. The choice between Jesus the prophet and Christ the Redeemer is in the long run imperative and sharp. If He preach by His character, it is yet but preaching, so long as we are preoccupied with His life, so long as His person is

<sup>1</sup> I do not think Hermann's noble and vivid picture of the action on us of the inner life of Jesus really lifts us above profound moral impressionism; it does not give the regeneration.



not consummated in the saving act of a death which has its chief value for God, and is decisive for eternal human fate. Did we regard Him as the complete saint, and the divinest lover of His kind, He would yet be but one *from whom we learned* and not one *in whom we believed*—believed in the serious sense of putting our souls into His hands for ever as the hands of God, which is the Christianity and the faith of the New Testament taken as a whole. By the very perfection of His silent character He might be no more than a reporter of God, in the sense of a witness, a reflector, instead of God with us, and working in us. And wherever Jesus is but God's supreme prophet you have religion sinking in due course to a rationalism, Pharisaic or Sadducean, orthodox or heterodox, from which all the prophets were found unable to save Israel. Prophetism cannot in perpetuity moralise intellect, or worship, or action. It did not do so in Israel, nor has it done so in Islam (in spite of the Spanish Moors). It could not do it even in Jesus as prophet. That is only possible to a Christianity of redemption and reconciliation by the Cross.

Now the dilemma between these two views of Christ may slumber unrealised without doing serious harm. But it cannot always slumber. And when it is forced into consciousness the choice becomes a matter of life and death to Christianity and its future—nay, ere long, to personal religion. For the wrong choice places Christianity simply in the chain of religious evolution, with a promise of something better one far day. The right makes it God's last but eternal Word to the race. The wrong view believes that Christ came to serve Humanity, by improving its fundamentally sound position in the Universe; the right believes that He came to recover it from its fatal moral tragedy. The difference also represents the great and hopeful advance in the negative camp from Strauss to von Hartmann and Nietzsche, from a religion of life concerned sanely only with the untoward, to one which grasps life dramatically as essential tragedy.

Finally, I am liable to be told that I have done more in the way of stating my position than of arguing it. But that is the very nature of my plea. Theology must be dogmatic, and it is only a choice of the right and wholesome kind of dogmatism. Theology is not syllogistic—that would be theosophy. It is not ruled by the logic of an idea. It is empirical in the great sense, in the soul's sense, the will's sense. By its nature it is dogmatic, as conscience is, as science is about nature's uniformity, or as society is about marriage. It is not the deduction of a system from an innate principle which Christ brought to the surface, nor is it the analysis of the Christian consciousness, but it is the exposition of what the living conscience of the Church finds in the fact and act of Christ, creative and historic. It is not progressive argument so much as enlarged statement, not the movement of a dialectic but the exposition of a corporate experience. Everything turns on what the soul does, or does not, find in the objective fact of Christ as the self-donation of God to our case. No otherwise do poetry or science deal with the gift in nature. We are always more sure of the reality than satisfied with the rationality of the matter. Living faith is always more of a moral miracle than a mental sanity. It is a will's mysterious choice and not a mind's lucid flame.

P. T. FORSYTH.



## MODERNISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONSCIOUSNESS.<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE COORE.

A DECADE has now elapsed since, in 1903, Loisy introduced to the European public a new apologetic, or philosophical restatement of Catholicism, based upon radical conclusions in historical criticism, a restatement which profoundly stirred the Catholic world, and formed the starting-point of a discussion that for the ensuing five years was carried on with eagerness, not to say impetuosity, in every country in which any intellectual foothold is left to the Roman Church; five years have passed since, in 1907, the Supreme Authority of the Roman Catholic Church, in a weighty document which plainly evidenced a patient and minute investigation of the incriminated literature, subsumed under the aptly chosen name of Modernism the various positions, tendencies, and implications brought out by the discussion, and condemned them as a system in terms which were final and absolute, and must on any estimate be recognised as definitely closing a chapter in the story of Church life.

The passing of a decade marks an epoch in human affairs; a new generation rises to maturity and applies itself afresh to the old intellectual problems; and, what is more important, events begin to fall into their true historical perspective, the speculative solutions of yesterday stand tested by

<sup>1</sup> An article on "Modernism and the Protestant Consciousness," by Professor P. Lobstein, appeared in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for October 1912.

a measure of experience, and it becomes possible to form at least a provisional judgment of their abiding practical value. Modernism, then, is passing into history, and the moment is opportune to inquire in what relation, apart from and always subject to the final determinations of Authority, its tendencies and positions stand towards those habits of thought and states of culture which constitute what may be termed the Catholic consciousness: in particular, to ask how the critical conclusions with which Modernism is identified are adequate to the data of religious experience as lived in the Catholic Church. Perhaps within due limits an inquiry on these lines may, without presumption, be essayed from a point of view that is frankly lay and non-expert in regard to the special studies both of the theologian and the critic; a point of view, in short, that is simply that of the plain Roman Catholic believer who realises the difficulties of belief and the necessity for facing them.

Some opponent has picturesquely said that the barque of Peter floats securely upon the placid depths of the great ocean of ignorance; and Oscar Wilde, whose brilliant but perverse intellect was no stranger to the higher things of the Spirit, exclaimed regretfully that ignorance guarded the gates of the Temple. The first of these metaphorical statements must be accepted as corresponding to fact, and the second as posing the problem which the Modernist movement, in common with all liberal movements, seeks to solve: how to make the shrine of the Spirit accessible to Reason, how to reconcile traditional religion with ascertained scientific truth. To say that religion represents the ignorance rather than the knowledge or rational enlightenment of the civilised world may be but another way of saying that religion is essentially the philosophy of the simple, the consolation of holy and humble men of heart. There lies the ultimate truth of the situation: it is the mentality of the simple common people, their spiritual genius and their intellectual limitations, that must in some sort determine the conditions under which



the portals of the temple can be thrown open to those seekers after truth who would fain be guided by the dry light of reason and scientific fact. Not that we should make an idol of ignorance, as some devotees have all but done, or fly from the difficulties of knowledge like scared bats back to the dark retreats of unreason. But it does seem necessary to admit that the religious instinct is essentially, for its first immediate apprehensions, independent of the reason; it does seem impossible not to be conscious of a perpetual antinomy between the two. Into the ultimate religious synthesis both elements must enter, but in following out the reasoning process it is ever necessary to be on guard against losing touch with the primitive, non-rational, intuitive spiritual sense that is of the very essence of religious faith. This sense lies deeply embedded right down in the innermost core of the human heart, and in order to get at it, to ascertain what the ultimate constituents of religion really are, it is necessary to penetrate beneath the surface layers of reason and civilisation.

Now, popular Catholicism, beyond any other religion of the Western world, stands for the crude, primitive religious yearnings of the human heart, untutored by reason, untrammelled by the distractions of industrial civilisation. Is not the daily reproach levelled against the Roman Church that its adherents among the peoples of Europe are either decadents who have dropped out of the triumphant march of industrial civilisation, or primitive peoples not yet aroused from secular slumbers? Latins and Slavs and Celts, the Catholic peoples constitute, as it were, the fringe of European civilisation, dwellers in a twilight that barely catches the illumination kindled by the virile Teutonic races whose boast it is to lead in imperial, industrial, and intellectual achievement. A twilight, yes, but a twilight which at least renders still possible the vision of the everlasting stars of faith, the distant stars that are the glorious suns of the world to come. When, then, we speak of the Catholic consciousness, we must think primarily not of the intellectual few, nor even of the great

semi-educated middle-class to whom I will refer presently, but of the peasants of Croatia and Connaught, and all the great uneducated masses who, whether as tillers of the soil in regions remote from the industrial movement, or as toilers in the lower ranks of labour in the industrial centres, stand nearest to mediævalism, nearest to barbarism, nearest to Oriental indifference to material welfare, nearest, in short, to all that is fundamental in Catholicism and to all that is primitive and basic in the religious nature of man.

But it would be short of the truth to picture Catholicism as composed exclusively of the less advanced races, or of peasants and proletarians. It embraces in Central and Western Europe, in France and Germany, in Northern Italy, among the semi-Anglicised Irish of the Anglo-Saxon world, certain upper and middle strata of society, whose intellectual limitations in turn are often a source of reproach to the Roman Church. This section includes a disproportionately small number of persons of university education, or, at any rate, of the higher culture that a university education aims at imparting. In the main, too, the Catholics of this class do not control the greater industrial and financial undertakings of the world. They are a people of middle culture and modest enterprise. Nevertheless, there are to be found among their ranks a considerable number of persons who play a creditable, if not a leading, part in practical affairs, in the professions, the services of the State, and in commerce. The life of action, with its call to grapple continuously with complex facts and concrete issues, strengthens the judgment and is in itself no mean educational instrument. Intellectual study gives the wider outlook and the faculty to appreciate great ideas; but conversance with affairs supplies the steadying measure of common sense, the ability to judge of the applicability of principles to circumstances, for want of which the idealist and the thinker may easily go astray. Thus, this middle stratum of the Catholic collective consciousness tends to exercise a critical function in two opposite directions. On the one hand, in virtue of its constant contact with the



workaday modern world, it is always correcting and refining upon the crude conceptions of popular religion, sifting out the grain of faith from the chaff of superstition, finding reasonable explanations and applications of the childlike beliefs and practices of ancient times and simple peoples, and preventing the religious body as a whole from utterly losing touch with the progressive movement of lay society. On the other hand, the attitude of such a class towards a philosophical movement like Modernism is conditioned by the distrust of new ideas and theoretical solutions which is habitual to the man of action even apart from any limitations of early culture. Busy about many concrete things, the man of this temperament, who may be taken as typically the plain Roman Catholic, is slow to apprehend the practical import of any new trend of speculative thought, or the latest assured results of historical criticism. At present, the plain Roman Catholic has hardly begun to apply his mind to the problems which have vexed the more philosophical believer for the last decade. When he first approaches the subject he will do so from the standpoint of a general distrust of intellectual novelty and a deep attachment to the profound realities of the popular religion; his critical faculty, his practical capacity for seeing the points of a problem, will be exerted upon the novel solutions rather than upon the difficulties of established belief. Yet, in the long run, his intelligence will forbid him to remain blind to these difficulties and to ignore indefinitely the points of scientific criticism; and in proportion as he realises these difficulties, and takes these points without loosening his hold of the spiritual realities, he will be assisting (subject always to the overruling guidance of Authority) to an ultimate solution of the problem.

It will be useful at this point to indicate summarily the leading characteristics of the Catholic consciousness as they emerge from a survey of the lower and middle cultural strata above described.

In the first place, then, the outstanding feature of popular and essential Catholicism is its intense and vivid

realisation of the supernatural, the like of which, in all its confidence, in all its prodigality, and in all its weirdness, is not to be found elsewhere, outside the great mystical religions of the East. It is this that runs like a golden thread through the whole Catholic system and through the whole Catholic life; it is this which, in spite of all the grave and weighty objections, often unanswerable by argumentation, that can be urged against its creeds and its discipline, makes the Catholic Church the only possible spiritual home for him who has once captured her secret.

Yet even here, in the domain of the supernatural, a silent but sure process of criticism and discrimination is always going on. The prodigality of popular belief produces a plentiful crop of legends, largely unknown beyond their own parish or locality, and upon these the critical faculty, awakened by popular education, is not slow to exercise itself. This aspect of Catholicism has hardly received sufficient attention from investigators, but it is impossible to wander among the churches and shrines of such a traditionally Catholic province as Tyrol or Liguria, without feeling what a wealth of material is here offered for a phenomenology of popular religion, and what fruitful results might be yielded by a sympathetic study of the psychology in this respect of a people brought by compulsory education into touch with the more sophisticated, more rationalistic culture of modern civilisation. We should find, I think, on the one hand, a large class of legends which, considered as historical phenomena, are demonstrably false, yet still have, for those who realise their historical untruth, a precious survival-value of religious edification. Thus, shrines of hagiological tradition are for the enlightened Catholic real means of grace; they diffuse about them a spiritual power which is altogether independent of the historical explanation traditionally assigned, and that too, not merely as symbols, but as efficient instruments of a spiritual "magic" that is of the essence of Catholic religion. The Holy House of Loreto may be cited as a case in point.



On the other hand, there are a number of legends which cannot be disproved by historical evidence, and which for the believer may well have historical as well as spiritual truth, *e.g.* the legend of the Angelic Dedication of the famous black image and chapel of Our Lady of Einsiedeln near Lucerne, which surely no Catholic can visit without a quickening of the religious sense; and the better known instance of the Portiuncula of Franciscan story.

Lastly, there is a class of legends which are so interwoven in the religious life of a particular people that it is very difficult and painful for that people to realise their historical baselessness, although to others, including the great mass of the Catholic people themselves outside that special area, they are in no wise essential and are perhaps barely familiar. *E.g.* the legend of St James of Compostella, for Spaniards.

In general, a study of this folklore side of Catholicism would tend to confirm the justice of Jowett's observation that Catholic orthodoxy understands, as Protestant orthodoxy does not understand, the right use of legend as an instrument of religious edification. This, surely is a circumstance of good augury for Catholic Liberalism. The difficulties that perplex the Catholic believer in the spiritual sphere are neither novel nor peculiar; they do but reproduce, albeit certainly in matters of more vital moment, what are familiar features of the extra-biblical beliefs of traditional and popular religion. May not the like accommodations suggest themselves in the scriptural sphere as in the hagiological, in some cases easily, in others with difficulty? And shall we not expect to find in other cases again that concession to criticism seems to threaten the very soul of Faith, while all the time there are multitudes to whom the cherished belief is of no practical import at all? Always, in extra-scriptural hagiology, it would seem that the spirit tends to endure beyond the letter, yet the psychic element, the belief in the marvellous and supernormal, ever perhaps more vague and more elusive, persists, too deeply rooted in the

religious nature to be wholly eradicated by any rationalising process. And if the resulting state of mind be what Dean Inge is pleased with some asperity to call "half sceptical, half superstitious," I for one am content to rest under the stigma, not seeing what other state of mind is consistent on the one hand with respect for the principles of scientific criticism, and on the other hand with the haunting sense of the supernatural or supernormal, which I take to be an essential part, though not the whole, of religion as rightly understood.

Catholicism, then, as discoverable in the Catholic consciousness, appears as a highly supernatural form of religion, capable, nevertheless, of important accommodations and readjustments in relation to what may be called the common standard of credulity as determined by the diffusion of scientific knowledge.

It remains to draw attention to certain specific beliefs and articles of faith which any theory of religious assent, any philosophy of religion, is called upon to explain intellectually. In the first place, Catholicism shares with orthodox Protestantism the Incarnation theory and the Christology; but I venture to think that these tremendous doctrines are more fully realised and loom much larger in the Catholic consciousness than in popular Protestantism to-day. Is not the devotion of the Protestant apt to be attracted rather to the incidents of the human life of Our Lord, His spoken words, His acts of compassion, than to the mystery of His Godhead? But thanks to such popular devotions as the Rosary, and the Stations of the Cross, thanks, above all, to the doctrine of the Mass and the cult of the Blessed Virgin, Catholic piety is ever gazing in rapt awe upon the mystery of the Incarnation, upon the sacrificial suffering of the God-man. The cry, *Ho Theos tethnēken*—"It was *God* who died!"—that rang through the streets of Constantinople on the morrow of the definition of Chalcedon, is ever echoing in the Catholic heart; and when the simple Catholic turns to the New Testament, it is in the Fourth Gospel that he finds pre-eminently that presentation of



Jesus Christ which the popular devotions have impressed upon his imagination.

I have referred to the doctrine of the Mass and the cult of the Blessed Virgin. These are the two doctrines that are essentially characteristic of Catholicism. As Mr Birrell has pithily said, it is the Mass that matters. The belief in Jesus Christ ever present under the Sacramental form upon the Altar, is the daily supersubstantial bread of the Catholic religious life. It is a belief not in a symbolic but in a real, though supra-physical, presence, *sub specie*; a belief which inspires devoted souls to watch day and night before the Altar, offering to Our Lord beneath these humble forms on earth the adoration which the angels offer before His Throne in Heaven; a belief which, when the Sacred Species is borne aloft, thrills the kneeling multitude with the sense that Jesus of Nazareth passes by. And what is important for our present purpose, this devotion to the Eucharist has grown in fervour and intensity in modern times; it is the specially characteristic devotion of these later ages of the Church; it so colours and dominates her spiritual and social life that the only international gathering of Catholics now countenanced by the Holy See is that which meets under the name of the Eucharistic Congress to do honour to this central mystery of the Catholic cult.

Similarly, the cult of Mary as the Theotokos, or Mother of God, is inextricably rooted in the Catholic heart and has strengthened its hold, in point of devotion as well as in point of doctrine, in modern times. Following naturally upon the full identification of Christ with God achieved at Chalcedon, the Mariology reached its full doctrinal development with the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate by the supreme pastoral authority of Pius IX.

I would add, by way of parenthesis, that the present importance of the devotion to the Eucharist and the cult of Mary is due in great measure to the Ultramontane movement, and that those who look upon that movement as a merely

governmental development fail, it seems to me, to do full justice to its true scope and significance. It was the fervour of its piety and the rich human glow of its religious revivalism (when every allowance is made for certain extravagances), that carried Ultramontanism to victory over the lukewarm Gallican and Cismontane tendencies that immediately preceded it.

The Holy Eucharist and the cult of Our Lady also illustrate what Cardinal Manning used to insist upon, and what the rationalistic Modernists are very apt to forget, that the dogmas of the Catholic Church are not dry and lifeless propositions, but the necessary intellectual expressions of a true religion of the heart.

Now whatever be the ultimate irreducible historical data required to support the Eucharistic doctrine and the Mariology, it is obvious that they both presuppose a transcendental conception of the Person of Jesus Christ. Every genuflection made before the Blessed Sacrament, every Hail Mary uttered, is an affirmation of the superhuman nature of the historical Jesus.

Are the Modernist historical positions adequate to the necessary implications and presuppositions of the actual doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church, doctrines and practices which are indisputably essential to the continuity of its type ?

It is worth while here to recall the mental attitude of the more intellectual Catholics of modern education just prior to the appearance of Modernism. The eighties and nineties saw in France and in England a certain accession of cultivated minds to the Roman Church. These conversions and adhesions did not include any names of the first rank intellectually, but there were found among them in France some men of great literary distinction, such as M. Brunetière, M. Paul Bourget, and other prominent writers, and in England certain scholars and literary workers, of whom the late Lionel Johnson may be cited as an example. Assent in these cases and at that time was, I think, always primarily an assent of the heart ; indeed, some converts



would say they were drawn to the Roman Church by an attraction felt to be of the purely mystical order. But the intellectual explanation accepted was the traditional historical explanation of her credentials offered by the Catholic Church. The convert would come to Christ in the Church through the attractive power of the Catholic cult and its mysteries, and, because he was conscious of that power, he would accept the historical reasons which the accredited stewards of those mysteries assigned. M. Huysmans depicted this state of mind in its most pronounced form with graphic force in *En Route*. His hero, kneeling in the Church of Notre Dame des Victoires, believed, he knew not how or why; he accepted the creed of the Church in virtue of an act of faith, which was an assent of the whole nature and demanded no intellectual proofs because it was experienced as immediate in life. There was a sense of security, of carelessness of historical difficulties, in those days which was destined to be short-lived.

It was the publication of *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* that brought home to the converts of the nineties the impossibility of ignoring historical science, the necessity for reconsidering their position in the light of that discipline of concrete fact which they had wrongly (as it now appeared) fancied they could dispense with. In this epoch-making book Loisy, with the insight of genius, brushed aside the historical difficulties about events that are the first to trouble the ordinary believer, and summoned the Catholic world to consider the problem of the eschatological teaching of Our Lord, as the essential and root difficulty of Christian faith in the light of modern criticism, beside which all else appeared to him to be secondary and subordinate, and in a way indifferent to the issue. If Jesus Christ really taught the imminence of His Second Coming, if that was the chief burden of His message to His contemporaries, if He died clinging pathetically in His Agony and Dereliction to that vain belief—what then? Is it still possible to find a basis for the Catholic cult? Can we accept the Church as a substitute for the Messianic Kingdom? Can

we still identify Jesus of Nazareth with the Christ of experience and acclaim Him with the faith of St Thomas, according to the mystical Gospel, in words that cannot have been easy of utterance for the first Christians—"My Lord and my God!" There are those, whose judgment commands great respect, who are prepared to give an affirmative answer to these questions. There are others who have felt bound, at least in these most vital issues, to reconsider their position in view of the condemnation pronounced by the highest authority of their Church against the theories of M. Loisy and his school.

Certainly for the ordinary Catholic this view of Our Lord's teaching lays a cold stone on the very heart of religion. If Our Lord was indistinguishable from an ordinary man in the manner of His entering and leaving the world; if He wrought no miracles that cannot be ascribed to a psychic faculty easily paralleled among mystics for whom no divine origin is claimed; if His spiritual teaching, though pure and holy, reveals no striking originality, but simply reflects the best religious thought and life of His race and time; and if in addition to all these limitations, to all this absence of the abnormal, He shared to the full a capital contemporary delusion, what is there left in the Christian origins to support the towering superstructure of the Christology? Are not the facts wholly unequal to the Incarnation theory, and is not so extraordinary, so tremendous an explanation hopelessly disproportionate to the facts? It is not only Pius X. who suggests misgivings on this head; it is the author of this new Christology himself. M. Loisy has definitely abandoned the attempt to square the circle; and in his article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October 1911, he gives a purely rationalistic explanation of the Christian origins which, upon his historical data, is much more convincing to the ordinary mind, viz.: that the teaching of Jesus was purely eschatological and Jewish; the notions of the Eternal Christ, the Redemption, the Eucharist (upon the importance of which in Early Christianity M. Loisy always insists), were due to St Paul's familiarity with the mystery-religions of the



Levantine Greeks. Thus, Christianity is the resultant of many historical forces for none of which it is necessary to postulate an origin transcending human experience; its forms are a manifestation of the Spirit of God, but the manifestation possesses no finality and can lay no imperative claim to universal allegiance. Christianity is explained, and the explanation does not deprive us of the possibilities of a rich spiritual experience; it leaves us (as it seems to me) the belief in Theism, the sure and certain hope of a personal after-life (for was not this last more fully realised by the idealistic Greeks than by the materialistic Palestinian Jews?), but of Catholic Christianity in any recognisable shape no trace remains.

I do not forget the striking explanation of our Lord's eschatological teaching offered by an anonymous writer in a French magazine soon after the appearance of M. Loisy's book, viz. that it was Our Lord's divine enthusiasm for the Kingdom of God, for the triumph of God on earth, that caused Him to conceive the establishment of the Kingdom as imminent. This explanation seems to me in no wise to relieve the strain which the criticism in question puts upon the common sense of the ordinary believer. Doubtless illusion plays a part in the history of great ideas, and the Ideal as a step from the actual to the Real is separated by no great distance from Illusion; yet mankind, most of all in this age of conscientious scientific inquiry and exact knowledge, has a right to expect in its prophets and heroes the absence of gross and demonstrable, nay demonstrated, error in vital matters of fact. To say, *e.g.*, as certain German thinkers are saying, that Socialism is pure Illusion, and that it has only to become religious in order to be legitimate make-believe, is to run serious risk of making religion repugnant to robust common sense and banishing it to the fantastical dreamland of fanaticism and eccentricity. Granted that the illusion of the Parousia played a great part in building up the edifice of Early Christianity, the Christian consciousness must surely postulate that Our

Lord transcended the mentality of His followers; else the gap between the Jesus of history and the Lord Christ becomes unbridgeable, and the Incarnation theory fails for lack of historical foundation.

Still more inadequate do the Loisy positions appear in the light of the Eucharistic doctrine of the Catholic Church. That doctrine, quite apart from the actual account given in Holy Scripture, would seem to postulate a historical origin for the rite as a conscious act of Divine Power. By all means let it be shown that as a rite it has its historical and anthropological precedents and affinities; because when God speaks to man we may expect that He will speak a language already familiar. The "*teste David cum Sybilla*" is an old maxim of Catholicism, and the Catholic of Græco-Latin tradition should be the last to condemn the Hellenic elements in his religion. But if we are to believe in the Eucharist as the Church bids us believe, if we are adequately to explain the Eucharistic experience, if we are to distinguish it from the vague mystery-rites of other mystic creeds, it seems absolutely necessary to accept the scriptural account of its origin as interpreted by the Church; to believe that Our Lord in those ritual actions at His Last Supper was conscious that He was instituting a solemn rite, conscious that He was Very God of Very God, of one substance with the Father to whom He was about to return, conscious that He was performing an act that only God Himself could perform, conscious that He was giving to His disciples, and to their successors for all time, "*His very Self and Essence all-Divine.*" And if this is so, then of course the extreme Kenotic theory of the eschatological teaching must fall to the ground, or, conversely, if that theory be accepted, the Eucharistic belief, and with it the Catholic Church, must perish for lack of intelligible support.

But if we can accept the Eucharistic standard of belief, then it may be that, in approaching the problem of miraculous events, we can accept as helpful and consoling the great and unquestionably far-reaching saying of Loisy that "Jesus was



great enough to merit the Christology." It is not the deeds of the Prophet, but the word of the Prophet, enduring for all time despite the contempt and persecution of the world, that prove the Prophet's mission to be of God: so, for instance (Professor Browne tells us), the Persian Babis argue. For us Catholics, given the conscious institution by Christ Himself of the Eucharist (the miracle of which belongs to the metaphysical and spiritual order), is a certain indifference to the credentials of thaumaturgy a possible attitude?

It is no part of my task to essay a critical discussion of the problems of the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, and the New Testament miracles, but the present inquiry would be incomplete without some reference to this part of the subject. Let us acknowledge at once the difficulties of the position. In regard to all miraculous happenings the attitude of the sceptic is the easiest (and in a sense the laziest) thing in the world; equally so is, or was, when still possible, the attitude of the simple uncritical believer in the authority of Church and Bible; but he who would seek to reconcile Faith with Criticism makes himself a veritable storm-centre of warring and apparently irreconcilable elements. It is therefore with the greatest diffidence that the following purely tentative observations are offered.

In the first place, it is palpable and notorious that in the mind of the ordinary believer the belief in the Incarnation is associated with belief in the Virgin Birth and the physical Resurrection. Is it yet proven as a matter of experience that for Catholicism as an institution the two categories of belief can be dissociated? In the next place, it is necessary to consider the bearings upon the problems of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection respectively of the specifically Catholic doctrines and devotions of the Mariology and the Sacred Heart.

As to the Mariology, historically and logically the cult of Mary depends upon the fact of her being the Theotokos or Mother of God; the mode of her maternity, and the fact

of her perpetual virginity, would seem, then, to be secondary and ancillary. On the other hand, the notion of her virginity is strongly rooted in the mind of the Church, as evidenced by her liturgical as well as her popular devotions. Do we not affirm it every time we say the words, "Confiteor Deo Omnipotenti, Beatæ Mariæ semper Virgini, Beato Michaeli Archangelo, etc."? is not the pre-eminent place there assigned to Mary in the Heavenly Hierarchy, as higher than the angels, the first of created beings, expressly connected with the privilege not only of Virgin motherhood but of perpetual Virginity, this doctrine of Perpetual Virginity forming, as it were, a second line of entrenchment in the religious consciousness for the doctrine of Our Lord's Divinity? And is it not in liturgical prayers even more than in theological formularies that we may most readily catch the mind of the Church mystically informed by the Divine Spirit? I need not dwell upon the article in the Creed, so difficult to interpret in any sense other than the sense assigned to it by the universal tradition of the Church. And yet, throughout the Mariology, does there not run something of the Logos idea, the idea of the mystic Woman, Immaculate in her Virginity and Virginal in her Maternity, the Woman of the Apocalypse clothed with the Sun, the heavenly visitant who says to the child Bernadette, in her vision at Lourdes, not "I am Mary Immaculate," but "I am the Immaculate Conception"?

Then as to the Resurrection of Our Lord, no doubt the cult of the Sacred Heart, the veneration of the Sacred Humanity as united "ex hypostasi" to the Divine Word, is to be reckoned as a strongly conservative force. Yet, even so, if we may probe the mystery, it is a glorified Body that appears to the disciples, and even with the Empty Tomb we are led on to the problem that preoccupied the ancient Egyptians—What is it in the nature of our humanity that survives physical death? There remains this difficulty, that we can neither explain the Resurrection as an article of faith, nor indeed, as it seems to me, explain Christianity in any orthodox sense at all,



unless we believe that the Apparitions of Our Lord were so vivid, so striking, so convincing, and so informing, as to utterly transcend all human experience in regard to the departed. And having regard to the shadowy and phantasmal character of all other experience in this respect, are not all attempts at accommodation and compromise open to the charge of simply substituting one miracle for another, of explaining the unknown by the more unknown?

Here it would seem necessary to bear in mind that there is in religious belief an element which is largely psychological, and relative to the historical categories of human thought and culture. Beliefs which are easy of credence to one stage of development are incredible to another, and conversely, conceptions of Faith which at one stage of development are impossible save with the aid of certain auxiliary beliefs, are at a later stage readily grasped without these adventitious supports. An instance that may seem specially relevant to the problem of the Resurrection is to be found in the Mariology. The mystery, as the Church calls it, of the Assumption of Mary has carried with it a belief that Our Lord did not suffer that Virgin body which bore Him to see corruption, and that Our Lady's body was miraculously taken up to Heaven at her death. Yet this "mystery" is felt to be susceptible of a spiritual interpretation, and there must now be many who find spiritual edification in contemplating the glorious reunion of the Divine Son and His Immaculate Mother without having recourse to the physical side of the tradition. And we have seen how in hagiology this principle of spiritual interpretation has a wide and continuous range of action. The difficulty of applying it to the innermost sphere of Catholic belief would seem to lie, not so much in any impossibility of satisfying the intellectual and also the spiritual needs of those who are trained in critical habits of thought, as of reconciling its conclusions with the mind of the Church as embodied in her authoritative decrees, her formularies, her liturgical literature, and her popular devotions.

In effect, we must acknowledge a fundamental opposition between the historical, or what Dr Forsyth would apparently call the "historicist," theory of the phenomenal fact, and the theological, or religious, theory of the dogmatic fact. To the "historicist" no fact is admissible which does not admit of strict inductive proof according to the canons of historical criticism. The religious consciousness is not insensible of the pressure of this mode of thought, nor unaware of the psychological variations in the standard of credulity; yet, throughout, it remains deeply persuaded of the actuality of the supernatural, as potent to reveal itself here on earth where its own issues, the issues of religious life and truth, are concerned. In the face of criticism we can hardly any longer claim that such revelations are the subject of a *posteriori* proof. From the point of view of the reasoning processes there is something at once disconcerting and elusive in these other-worldly visitations, these coruscations from another plane of being that flash across the darkness of this world of sense. The miraculous defies proof; it carries conviction to the immediate percipient; those who are more remote it convinces only in virtue of Faith: upon the principle, "Blessed are they who have not seen, and have believed." To such believers the miraculous appears necessary to complete the picture of a Divine manifestation in human experience. The religious consciousness, accordingly, cannot yield to history the sole arbitrament as to events that form an integral part of the religious tradition; it can neither give up the supernatural altogether nor completely reconcile its beliefs with the results of those processes of inductive reasoning which are appropriate to historical phenomena; the difficulty lies rooted in the very nature of things, in the antinomy between instinct and reason by which the whole religious problem is conditioned.

In conclusion, then, it would seem that Modernism has failed in certain material respects to satisfy the religious consciousness of the Catholic people. (1) It has not taken sufficient account of the intensely supernatural character of



Catholic belief. Quite apart from the dictates of orthodoxy, the Catholic hunger for spiritual food can never be satisfied with the dry intellectual and ethical fare of German Rationalism. (2) On the central and vital question of Our Lord's Human Personality, it offers a theory that appears to leave no sufficient basis for the doctrinal system with which Catholicism is identified not merely as a scheme of theology but as a life-giving religion of experience. (3) With respect to events of the supernatural order that are intimately bound up with the religious tradition, and are in fact essential to Faith as heretofore understood, Modernism has at least prematurely yielded to history a right of determination which, upon the lowest religious claim, history must share with the religious consciousness. (4) In general, the reflection suggests itself that the Modernist movement has been too purely academic or intellectual, too widely divorced from the religious life of the simple folk to whom Our Lord was pleased to address Himself, too remote from a mentality which is in close touch with religious truth in proportion as it is free from intellectual sophistication. No settlement is possible which does not embrace the Catholic consciousness as a whole, its more simple-minded as well as its more intellectual component parts; nor is conciliation anything but illusory and self-destructive if it is achieved at the cost of those elements wherein consists the abiding spiritual appeal of Catholicism to the human heart.

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## ARE "THE BRAINS BEHIND THE LABOUR REVOLT" ALL WRONG?

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IT has for some time seemed to the ordinary observer, and we have recently been told with some show of authority, that "the brains behind the labour revolt" are bent upon a war of classes. The purpose of this article is to raise the question whether they are right or wrong.

It is seldom that a body of able men are wholly wrong. Nor are they in this case. They set before themselves a certain end, and they hope to reach it by certain means. In respect of the end they are in the main right; it is the means by which they propose to attain the end that are questionable. They are convinced that our social organisation must be profoundly changed. They look out upon England as industrialism has made her, and see that it is *not* all very good; they extend their view over the world as it is rapidly being industrialised, and their conclusion is still the same. They are quite right; or rather they are wrong only in that they are not sufficiently radical in their views. If they were completely successful in their aims, industrialism would still remain essentially what it is. Supposing the change to be brought about without weakening the springs of production, the toilers would either have more to spend or have more leisure. Their lives would not be greatly changed. There would still be workers whose sole function would be to polish pin-points or to punch eyelet-holes. If syndicalism



were to triumph on the coalfields, and the management remained not less skilful than it is now, the miners would divide among themselves what now goes in royalties and profits. But the one business of their lives would still be mining, and for many of them the difference would simply be that there would be more money to spend in drink or in gambling, or more time to watch football. It is natural enough for the miner to desire this, but it is not altogether certain that the gratification of the desire would greatly benefit society or even the man himself. There is a science of the use of money, and one of the vices of the industrial system is that it renders the mastery of that science exceedingly difficult. What helps towards wise expenditure does the life of the miner give? Is it to be wondered at, that, according to the testimony of men who work among them, the wages earned are in a large percentage of cases most unwisely used, and that labourers, fresh from the country, earning little, but faithful to their traditions of frugality, are often, in the true sense of the phrase, better off than skilled workmen whose wage is far larger than theirs? But there is a science of the use of time also. The Greeks knew this well; the moderns mostly have forgotten it. "Time is money, says the vulgarest saw known to any age or people; turn it round about, and you have a precious truth—Money is time." To George Gissing, the author of the phrase, it *was* a precious truth. But, again, the value of time depends upon mastery of the science of using it. Often they who possess it in abundance can find nothing better to do with it than to kill it. Under existing conditions the miner is only too likely to follow their example, with little benefit either to himself or to others.

Here is one point in which the leaders of the labour revolt seem to have erred. They imagine that there is needed only some tinkering of the existing system. Capture rent and profits and enrich labour with them, and all will be well. That is the creed of the Marxian socialism, and still more of syndicalism. It is essentially materialistic; it presupposes

that the moral problem will solve itself, if only the economic one be solved. It leaves untouched the problem of the relation between the population and the land. And yet surely this is vital. What revolts the thoughtful mind in relation to our industrial classes is not solely the excess of toil and the inadequacy of their reward : it is very largely the thoroughly unnatural conditions under which their lives are lived. Increase of wages and diminution of hours of labour would be but a very imperfect remedy for the evils under which they suffer. Ruskin and William Morris were right when they insisted that the aim ought to be to find joy in work ; Tolstoy was more than half right when he insisted that there must be a return to the simple life of the country. The sacrifice of civilisation which his doctrine involves is, it is true, too heavy. Men in all ages have found the city indispensable to their own elevation. Civil, urbane, polite — language bears eloquent testimony to the fact that the life of the town has humanised and refined that of the country. But never in the history of the world has the balance between the two been shaken as it is now in England, and as it is coming to be wherever industrialism gains a footing. No treatment of the social problem can be satisfactory which does not take account of this aspect ; and here syndicalism and militant trade unionism are silent. They leave the population of the city in the city ; they expect the workers to find their recreation in the streets, and to begin to live their real life when they cease to work. Surely Ruskin and Morris were more nearly right when they taught that the joy which men naturally desire is to be sought, and can be permanently found, only in work itself. But not in polishing pins and punching eyelet-holes. The brain-worker, the man whose hands are busied in fashioning things of beauty, the skilled artisan whose every faculty is absorbed in his daily occupation — these can and do find their pleasure in their ordinary work. But he who simply feeds the machine he did not make and cannot repair has no such pleasure ; and, under the industrial system, his is the lot of the majority. The era of machinery



has brought much gain, but also heavy loss. The handicrafts are dead or dying; the handicraftsmen have mostly been transformed into machines much like those they tend. The Poor Law Commission found that the demand for skilled labour was declining. It would seem, then, that what we have to do is to take a broad view of the situation, and see whether we can reap the gains, and yet, in some measure, at least, evade the losses. There is apparently but one course that is feasible—back to nature. The pleasure that appeals to nearly all humanity is the pleasure of contact with her; and the problem of problems is whether this can be got for the majority at any price less than that which Tolstoy would have paid.

There is, then, no objection to be taken against the leaders of the labour revolt when they insist that some great change is imperative; rather, the objection is that the change they propose is inadequate for the end in view. But the present writer joins issue with them when they go on to say, or to imply, that change can come only through a war of classes. He desires to treat the question simply as a hard and cold matter of business, excluding all ethical considerations. Not that he believes such considerations to be either irrelevant or unimportant; on the contrary, he holds that they are paramount. But clearly the case against "the brains behind the labour revolt" is all the stronger if it can be made good irrespective of the moral aspect of the question; for it will hardly be argued that morality *demands* class warfare.

In the first place, such warfare must, like all warfare, be wasteful. Hardly even the least thoughtful can suppose that the *whole* wealth of the rich can be transferred to the poor except with the consent of the former. It is true, as one of our statesmen has said, that the land would remain, and the railway tracks, and the buildings. But all that portion of capital which is liquid would inevitably disappear in a war of classes. Not a few think they already see the shadow of the coming event, and millions which would otherwise have been invested at home have gone where no war of classes in England

can affect them. Incomparably more would follow as the event drew nearer, and industry would suffer from starvation; for the fixed capital is only half efficient without the circulating capital. But further, credit would be shaken; and though credit creates no wealth, it makes that which exists far more efficient. Every commercial crisis proves its importance, for a great part of the evil is due just to the temporary damage to credit. But as the war of classes would be of incomparably greater social importance than a mere commercial panic, so the injury to credit would be much greater and more lasting. In estimating the wisdom of the policy of war, therefore, we must make a heavy deduction from that £200 per family which, according to Mr Lloyd George's calculation, is the amount of the present wealth of this country. Further, as Mr Mallock has pointed out, a different impression is given if we divide the total sum of wealth, not by the number of families, but by the number of workers. If we suppose half the population to be workers, the average wage which a communistic system would yield to each would be barely 31s. a week. If any serious deduction be made from that for loss of circulating capital and of credit, the revolution does not look very inviting. And they who lay stress upon the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist under the present system are estopped from arguing that such items are insignificant. Apparently, then, "the brains behind the labour revolt" propose to shatter the fabric of society for a somewhat scanty "mess of pottage," and many of those who follow them now may discover, to their surprise, that their particular mess would, under a communistic system, be smaller and less palatable than that which they at present think insufficient.

War is the *ultima ratio*, and even the militarist admits that the only plea which can justify it is the plea of necessity. Necessity, therefore, must be the plea of the leaders of the labour revolt. They can justify themselves only on the ground that the mess of pottage, however scanty it may be, can be won only at the sword's point. But is this the case?



Accumulated wealth and means of production will certainly not be surrendered by their present possessors without a struggle. But what about wealth that is not yet accumulated? What about unused possibilities of production? All economists are agreed that the power to produce wealth has within the last century grown far more rapidly than the actual production. According to some—Herzka, for example—the power of production is now on the average from ten to fifteen times greater than it was a hundred years ago; according to the most cautious, it is at least from four to six times greater. The question, What has become of this enormous power? may be worth asking before we finally decide on war. It is worth asking, for it can be answered; and the answer is that it has partly gone to enrich the already rich and partly into the pockets of the workers. But the greatest part is not used at all; and the reason why it is not used is that demand lags behind power of supply. Demand lags behind, not because human wants are satisfied, but because so many have not the means to pay. If it were possible, therefore, to stimulate demand, which would be done by the pleasant process of raising wages, the spectre of class warfare would vanish.

The question whether this is possible or not depends upon two considerations—the real productive power of labour, and capacity to organise. As to the first, there is a pretty widespread belief that much labour is paid less than a living wage, because the labour is incapable of earning such a wage. But against this there may be advanced two arguments. The first is that a century ago a worker of ordinary competence could produce enough to keep a family. This is not a matter of speculation, but a fact of history. If, therefore, in the interval the power of production has, on the average, increased fourfold, a worker of similar competence ought now to be able to produce four times as much. The second argument is founded upon the experience of the Swiss forced-labour colony of Witzwyl. There the delegates of the English Poor Law Commission found that labour of exceptional inefficiency,

because it was the labour mainly of tramps and vagabonds, was able to produce enough to maintain itself without burdening the community. The great success of this colony is attributed by the delegates largely to two causes—the personal influence of the Governor and his wife, and the system whereby a considerable percentage of capable paid workers are employed to work with and guide and instruct the prisoners. We see, therefore, that the wonderful results attained at Witzwyl are in no sense miraculous, but are due to the agency of two familiar forces—personal influence and a happy system of organisation. The former is in some measure incommunicable. But a scheme of organisation, once framed, may be mastered by anybody; and this scheme suggests the reason why gangs of the unemployed, ill-supervised and uninstructed, have time after time proved unable to work except at a ruinous loss. They had not the indispensable practical instruction supplied by capable workmen working side by side with them.

Obviously, then, Witzwyl throws light on the question of capacity to organise as well as on that of the capacity of the worker to maintain himself. What has been done once may be done again: it is possible so to organise labour that even workers who are exceptionally inefficient shall be self-supporting.

But there is light on the question from many other sources as well. The superiority of an army to a mob is essentially a matter of organisation. In the economic field the difference between a successful business and an unsuccessful one is often just the same. In the economic field, however, organisation has been applied piecemeal, each “captain of industry” managing his own little section, but the whole remaining unregulated. Here we come upon the division between the socialist and the individualist, the former maintaining that a general regulation is both possible and imperative, the latter that it is neither possible nor desirable. The force of the arguments on both sides is obvious. The socialist has but to adduce the confusion and wretchedness of our present condition; the individualist need only mention the danger to



personal liberty involved in the opposite system. In point of fact the great majority of us are neither pure socialists nor pure individualists. Individualism quite unmixed is clearly impossible, because it is the negation of society. Unmitigated socialism has never been tried on a great scale, and the minor experiments in it have not been encouraging in their results. But may not some mingling of the two, more rational and less haphazard than that which we see at present, be better than either alone? The author of *The Coming Triumph of Christian Civilisation* and of *Administrative Efficiency* thinks so; and from two or three simple fundamental facts he develops a fascinating programme of social reform which is quite free from the taint of class warfare, and far more promising than that which begins with war.

The postulates of Captain Petavel's system are: that the economists are right in their belief that the power of production per unit of labour has, on the average, increased at least fourfold within the last century; that the greater part of this increased power remains unused; that it is unused because demand has not grown *pari passu* with power of production; and that even what would usually be called inefficient labour, if skilfully managed, can support itself.

From the last proposition it follows that demand may be greatly stimulated. If inefficient labour can maintain itself, efficient labour can do much more; and, given the means to spend, men in general will spend. If men were rich enough, demand would keep the forces of production in full play. But they will never be rich enough until we get rid, somehow, of the phenomenon of unemployment—that is to say, of course, of involuntary unemployment. The idle and the vicious we shall have with us always. They must be dealt with penally; and they *will* be dealt with more sternly when we can with reasonable certainty distinguish between them and the unfortunate. Here we see the necessity of some socialistic organisation within the State; while the State itself need not be socialistic much farther than it is so already. The methods of dealing

with unemployment hitherto tried have failed; and it seems difficult to conceive any method which will not entail disastrous loss, except one whereby the man thrown out of employment shall immediately be employed again, and, in as many cases as possible, employed at his own trade. Immediate opportunity to work is necessary, because unemployment speedily becomes inefficiency; and opportunity to work at the man's own trade is highly desirable, because otherwise all his acquired skill is sacrificed. But clearly this will not be possible in all cases. The chauffeur displaces the bus-driver, and demand for the special skill of the latter returns no more. But Witzwyl goes far to show that there is an alternative incomparably preferable to that which at present confronts the worker thrown out of employment by the progress of invention. He has to face immediate suffering and ultimate degradation; whereas, if his labour could be made available at its true value, he might escape both. This may fairly be inferred from the Witzwyl experiment because, though Witzwyl is a colony of forced labour, the lesson it teaches applies to free labour with even greater force. "There is only one prison warder of the usual type" (*i.e.* armed) "to the one hundred and sixty convicts at Witzwyl."<sup>1</sup> The lash and the goad, then, are not the secret of success. And it will hardly be disputed that free labour is likely to be more efficient than labour with such a mild stimulus of force behind it.

Before we can stand ready to employ the unemployed, and to do so in great measure at their own trades, there must evidently be a considerable change in our existing system. But it need not be the gigantic change which is presupposed in State socialism, nor need it threaten individual initiative and freedom as that threatens them. What it involves is the establishment, somehow, of "production-for-use associations" on a very broad basis. Associations of the sort have been tried and have failed, because they were narrow; but it does not follow that more comprehensive associations would

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Poor Law Commission*, Appendix, vol. xxxii. p. 77.



also fail. There are at least three conceivable ways in which such associations might be started. They might possibly be capitalistically initiated and managed. More probably they would require for their success the intervention of the State, which to that extent would increase its socialistic activities. There are two ways in which the State might do this: through the army, or by a system of industrial education, which would prolong the period of training to about eighteen, and would incidentally solve the hitherto baffling problem of "blind-alley employments." This has been partly done already in Germany; and Munich in particular has experienced the benefit of such industrial training. These two ways are obviously not mutually exclusive; they might run side by side. And either, or both, would supply that system of workshops where the unemployed might find their temporary refuge, receiving payment in kind, until the flow of trade swept them back once more into the main stream.

A self-supporting army! This is one of the startling conceptions which the books above mentioned bring before us. We are so much accustomed to think of the army as a bottomless abyss where wealth sinks out of sight as fast as we pour it in, that the first impulse is to reject the idea as an obvious absurdity. Yet able soldiers have come to the conclusion that it is within the bounds of possibility, and that the army might be industrialised for the supply of its own needs with profit rather than loss to its efficiency as an army. If so, the traders who at present supply it would certainly lose, but as certainly the general community would gain in proportion to the burden lifted from its shoulders. Clearly also, it would become possible to fix the size of the army by reference to the requirements of safety, rather than to financial considerations.

The possibilities opened up by the educational scheme are equally, if not even more, alluring. Most of us are convinced that our present system is too bookish, and has too little relation to the lives which the majority of those who receive

it must subsequently lead. We have hardly been satisfied with the tentative and inadequate schemes of technical instruction which have been grafted on to it; yet we are afraid to ask for more because of the expense. But does not Witzwyl offer encouragement here again? If the labour of vagabonds, sandwiched among competent workers, can be made self-supporting, may not the labour of boys from sixteen to eighteen be made self-supporting too? Even if it were not so, much of the expense, if not all, would be subsequently recouped. The breeding of men who cannot earn their own living is as costly as it is morally disastrous; and the present system, which, at the close of the school period, turns thousands of children on to the streets, there to make a precarious living for a few years, inevitably produces that result. The enormous influence which industrial education may have in this matter is demonstrated by the experience of Munich. Before the establishment of the system now in vogue there, it was found that "of 5400 boys in the continuation schools, nearly 1000 were in unskilled occupations, or were loafers without any occupation at all."<sup>1</sup> There was a great change when workshop instruction was introduced, and the class in which it was given was made compulsory. "Of about 2200 boys who in the last school-year left the highest class of our elementary school, 2150 went at once to handwork or some other skilled occupation."<sup>1</sup> It is not pretended that the whole of this great change is due to a single year's work in the elementary schools. That is followed up in the industrial continuation schools, and to the two together the result must be ascribed. But there seems to be good reason to believe that the problem of "blind-alley occupations" has been solved, and that the solution is—industrial education. Industrial schools already exist; their influence where they are found is of the most beneficent sort, and we may confi-

<sup>1</sup> The quotations, which are from Dr Kershensteiner of Munich, will be found in a letter by Mr T. C. Horsfall in *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th April 1909.



dently anticipate that their further extension and development would be attended by a proportionate increase of benefit.

Now, it is surely not beyond human capacity to organise for a country a system of education which has already proved successful in a city; nor can it be wholly impossible to organise an army for peace, seeing that vast armies have been so elaborately organised for war. But granted either of these suppositions, and, to say the least of it, a gigantic step has been taken towards the solution of the problem of unemployment. The unemployed who are not unemployable would not only be able to produce, through access to the machinery of their several trades, but they would serve as instructors. They would play the part of the gangers at Witzwyl. The instructors in the Munich schools are artisans.

It may be asked how such an organisation would react upon the individualistic community outside, and the answer is clear to this extent, that, in so far as the "production-for-use association" was self-supplying, it would make no demand upon the external market: and so, the more thorough the organisation and the more complete its success, the less important its external relations would be. But it would be a mistake to suppose that what we may call external trade would be diminished by the amount of the products. As the unemployed are not producers, they can only be in the most meagre degree consumers, and even in that degree they are unprofitable customers. So, too, the production of the young under industrial training would be in a great measure an addition to the gross production of the community. There would be a greater total of wealth rather than a lessened demand on individualistic industry. Further, an organisation of the sort contemplated would react upon and raise wages in the community outside; and higher wages would mean freer expenditure and more prosperous trade. It is against all experience to suppose that trade flourishes on low wages. The illusion that it does so is due to narrowness of view. The individual employer sees clearly enough that, if he could get

labour for nothing and carry on his trade all the same, he would be richer at the end of the year by exactly the amount of his wage-bill. Low wages, therefore, would seem to mean wealth to the employer. But when we extend the view to communities we begin to suspect that there is a fallacy somewhere. England and the United States are the countries of high wages, and they are also the countries of large fortunes. Apparently, therefore, economic prosperity diffuses itself, so that increased wealth to the worker does not necessarily mean diminished wealth to the capitalist. Experience seems to prove that it means rather the contrary. If we look back a little we see exactly where the fallacy lurks. The supposition is that the employer gets his labour for nothing *and carries on his trade all the same*. If the first supposition were possible, the second would be almost realised by a single employer, or by a small group of employers. But universalise: suppose this to take place first through the whole State, and then all over the world, and evidently demand withers altogether away. The goose that laid the golden eggs has been killed. Now, in the efforts to lower wages we are perpetually attacking the unfortunate bird. Perhaps we might do better if we turned our attention to the other side of the problem, and tried to stimulate production. For evidently this is a condition of the payment of high wages. In the long run there is no escape from the law that unless you produce you cannot consume. Individuals may indeed evade it by trickery, but communities cannot. No Minimum Wage Act can permanently get itself obeyed unless there is a product at least equal to the sum required to pay the wage.

One effect which the socialistic community within the State would certainly produce would be to raise wages. That community would, as the author of the scheme phrases it, be a "city of refuge" to the unemployed, and to those the conditions of whose employment were wholly unsatisfactory. No one could be pressed quite to the wall. In fact it would establish, far more effectively than any Act of Parliament ever can, a



universal minimum wage. There would always be a subsistence within the "production-for-use association" for any worker who could produce at all. Again, obviously this rise of wages would greatly stimulate demand. Those 13,000,000 of whom Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman once spoke would become consumers in a measure undreamed of now.

The ultimate balance between the socialistic element and the individualistic could only be determined by experience, and it would doubtless be settled by efficiency. If the socialistic organisation were superior all round, it would sweep the board. But the most determined individualist would have no ground for objection. His opposition to State socialism is based upon a belief in the value of individual initiative. He objects to that initiative being curbed and fettered by compulsion. But if individualism were beaten in fair fight, on a free field, he of all men is the last who should repine.

It will be noticed that the fourfold increase in the power of labour, of which economists speak, is an increase on the average. It is certainly not the case that in every sphere of activity labour is now four times as productive as it was a century ago. In some of its applications the increase is far greater; in others it is less; in others, again, there has perhaps been no increase at all. Now, if we consider the vitally important matter of the cultivation of the earth, it is at once evident that there has been no fourfold increase. The great advance is due to machinery. Given unlimited land, no doubt machinery could be so used as to enable one man to raise many times as much grain as he could have raised in the old days of rude ploughs, or of spade husbandry. But land is strictly limited, and we may at once dismiss this unrealisable postulate. More and more, with increase of population, agriculture must have become intensive rather than extensive; and this means that the spade must gradually play a greater and the steam plough a lesser part. At first sight this seems nearly to annul our satisfaction in the increase in power of production. But, rightly considered, does it do so? The

answer to the question depends upon the ideal of life with which we start. If the ideal be ease and idleness, the sky is indeed clouded; if, on the contrary, it be work healthful to body and mind, it is all the brighter. There can be no doubt that men instinctively regard work as an evil. They fix upon it as the primal curse: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." And they imagine a heaven which is little more than "an eternal tea-party." The leading characteristic of the golden age of fable has almost invariably been repose and relaxation. Men long for some castle of indolence, some lotus-land of rest and dreamful ease. They imagine regions of miraculous productiveness, gardens of Alcinous, where the trees are for ever in blossom and for ever bearing fruit, and they conceive it to be perfect happiness merely to reach out the hand and pluck the fruit. But history and philosophy teach a widely different lesson. Ruskin and Morris were right in their belief that the true ideal was work with joy in it; Stevenson was right when he said that man "was born for the struggle, and only tastes his life in effort and on the condition that he is opposed"; Gissing was right in his repudiation of the conception that labour is a curse, and his assertion that, on the contrary, "labour is the world's supreme blessing."

If it be so, we may regard with less disquiet the fact that the law of progress in agriculture is different from that which holds with respect to manufactures. In manufactures, mechanical ingenuity has already made it possible for the labour of comparatively few to provide amply for many; and mechanical ingenuity is by no means at the end of its resources. In this sphere the need of labour can be indefinitely diminished. That no such indefinite diminution is possible in agriculture may prove to be matter for rejoicing rather than regret. But, in order that it may be so, we must make some change in our system such as will take away the stigma that attaches to words like "boorish" and "rustic." It would be all the better if at the same time that change should



give a new lustre to the tarnished words "civil" and "polite." The stigma attaches to the one and the tarnish has come upon the other because the two types of life have been too widely separated. The man of the country must remain a boor unless he has reasonable opportunity of intercourse with his fellows; the citizen will assuredly become less than civil and polite and worse than boorish, if the seat of his citizenship be slumland.

Once more the problem of a change for the better is a problem of organisation. Hitherto labour has reaped far too little of the benefit which might flow from mechanical inventions—if only organisation kept pace with them. But keeping pace would imply a due balance between agricultural industry and manufacturing industry—a balance which has been lost in England, is threatened all through Western Europe and the United States, and would ultimately be destroyed all the world over, if movement on the present lines were possible indefinitely. But the balance must be kept, or, should it be temporarily lost, must somehow or other be restored, because nature has so decreed. There is no escape from the law which makes agriculture fundamental and manufactures subsidiary.

For us in England the question of questions is whether the deranged balance can be restored; and here, once more, the books already named are fertile of suggestions of which it is not possible here and now to give so much as an adequate outline. Among them are suggestions for the transformation of our overcrowded towns into garden cities, bringing the population again into contact with the soil, and reviving English agriculture through the enormous increase in the area of accommodation land. For "accommodation land" is best defined as land which is in direct contact with a market. The size of the market is a minor consideration; immediate access to it is vital. Clearly, if the population now heaped layer above layer in the slums were dispersed in cottages with gardens attached, it would itself absorb a large area of land which would acquire the value of

accommodation land, and would be in direct contact with another great area whose value would also be enhanced. Under our existing system, even as recently modified, the greater part of these increased values would be of only indirect importance to the community. But the argument of the unearned increment is unanswerable, if we only have the courage to face its correlative, decrement. For the present we have deemed it best to shut our eyes and pretend not to see. Not only is this course unjust to individuals, but it may prove to be injudicious from the point of view of the community. Possibly the claim of one hundred per cent. of increment, with a frank acknowledgment of obligation to make good one hundred per cent. of decrement, might be more profitable as well as more logical.

Evidently we have here the suggestion of a change of more far-reaching importance than any proposed by syndicalism. For this change involves not only, or even chiefly, an increase of wages, but a revolution in life. The pins and the eyelet-holes need no longer be the only concern of any. Access to a plot of land gives to all who possess it the possibility at least of that rational joy in work which our present system denies to millions, with disastrous results, physical as well as moral. The facts about the Manchester volunteers during the Boer War are ominous—11,000 volunteers, of whom only 1000 were fit for the regular army, and 2000 more for the less exacting militia! There is force in the contention that, somehow or other, cost what it may, such results must cease to be possible. A race which boasts to be imperial must make itself once more fit to bear that titanic portion of the white man's burden which it has taken up.

Many will regard the conception of vast changes such as are here faintly outlined, as a vain imagination. But before they reject it as hopelessly utopian they would do well to consider the possibilities opened up by modern means of transit. The Belgian State Railways carry passengers twenty-four miles for one penny. Even in England the Great Eastern



carries them over ten miles for the same sum. Evidently, therefore, cost of transit need be no bar to a man's living far from his work. Neither need time be a bar if congestion at the centre were relieved. It is that congestion which makes high speed impossible. The centrifugal tendency of industries has already shown itself, and factory after factory has moved from the centre to the suburbs, or from greater aggregates of population to smaller ones, because of the cost of land. A further dispersion, therefore, would merely be the continuance of a process already begun. If it were accompanied with a well-considered scheme of town-planning, it would make possible an improvement of health such as the most skilful management of our existing cities could not effect.

It may be well to repeat that if the economic estimate is sound, the rest is all a matter of organisation. There can be no doubt that such organisation would be exceedingly difficult, but we cannot know it to be impossible until we have tried. Signs that the present system cannot last for many years are rapidly multiplying. What is the alternative? Syndicalism, even if it were completely successful, might raise wages, but would not reform lives. State socialism would have to face difficulties of organisation more gigantic than those involved in the schemes propounded in *Administrative Efficiency* and *The Coming Triumph of Christian Civilisation*. Moreover, it treats one-half of human nature as if it were the whole, just as the individualism of fifty years ago treated the other half. The latter, it is true, never was consistent; nor can the former ever be so: human nature is too strong for both. But it is an indubitable advantage to begin with the philosophically sound principle that both halves have a right to exist and ought to be recognised; and there is surely more hope in a scheme which would leave the lines of demarcation between them to be determined by mutual interaction, than in one which settles the whole problem beforehand.

HUGH WALKER.

# MODERN JUDAISM AND THE MESSIANIC HOPE.

A REPLY TO A RECENT INDICTMENT OF JUDAISM.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

"BEFORE the University of Oxford" there is given every year a discourse, the "Macbride Sermon," on "Messianic Prophecy in relation to Christ." In 1912 the sermon was preached by the Rev. G. H. Box, the learned and accomplished editor of the *Ezra-Apocalypse*, to whom all students of that fascinating book are under such deep and lasting gratitude. Mr Box's sermon was so interesting and so scholarly that, sermon though it was, it found the place of honour in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for April 1912. The editors of that journal were well justified in their approval. For the sermon gives a valuable sketch of the views which were held by different sections of Jewish thought in the first and second centuries A.D. about the Messiah and the Messianic age. Many readers may be induced by a perusal of the sermon to pass on to the *Introduction to the Ezra-Apocalypse*, and if they do so they will indeed be richly rewarded.

Mr Box very properly distinguishes between the conception of the Messianic age and the conception of the personal Messiah. He says: "The Messianic age has always occupied a larger place in the thought of Rabbinical Judaism than the personal Messiah." The "rôle assigned to the personal Messiah in orthodox Judaism" is, he observes, "subordinate and unessential." Upon the whole, though some orthodox



Jews would probably allege that the word "unessential" goes somewhat too far, I think that Mr Box's statement is accurate.

And it is no less true that Reform, or, as we now usually say, Liberal Judaism, has eliminated "the Messiah altogether."

Liberal Judaism upholds and maintains the *idea*, but it has dispensed with the figure with which the idea has been so long connected, and under whose sheltering influences it grew up and developed. The conception is retained: it is regarded as essential and abiding; but the old historic figure has been dropped. The idea no longer needs, we think, the protection of the form.

But is this abandonment of the belief in a personal Messiah so much to the religious discredit, or dilution, of Liberal Judaism as Mr Box seems to suppose?

Mr Box quotes from two manifestoes of Reform principles in America the following statements:—

"The Messianic aim of Israel is not the restoration of the old Jewish state under a descendant of David, involving a second separation from the nations of the earth, but the union of all the children of God in the confession of the unity of God, so as to realise the unity of all rational creatures, and their call to moral sanctification." (1869.)

"We recognise in the modern era of universal culture of heart and intellect the approaching of the realisation of Israel's great Messianic hope for the establishment of the kingdom of truth, justice, and peace among all men. We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state." (1885.)

These passages cause Mr Box to exclaim: "This surely is a confession of religious bankruptcy! As the fulfilment of the glowing hopes, expressed by the prophets and psalmists of Israel, of a divine intervention we are offered modern culture and the spread of cheap enlightenment!"

But is this verdict fair? I am not concerned to defend the exact choice of language in which the manifestoes put forward their ideas. They are American manifestoes of a particular date, and make use of somewhat chilling rhetorical and rationalistic expressions. Nevertheless, the root of the

matter is in them, and Mr Box's notes of exclamation and disdain are hardly justified. For what do the words imply? Surely a great deal more than "modern culture and the spread of cheap enlightenment." They mean something much more than what is small and easy and poor. Truth, justice, and peace are, at any rate, big conceptions; and when "truth, justice, and peace" do actually exist "among all men," a fair consummation will have been attained. The manifestoes are really alluding to those large and luminous conceptions which each generation must fill up and fill out for itself, and must embody with ever richer content. Even to those American Jews the kingdom of truth, justice, and peace did not mean less than the realisation of the best aspirations of the best social reformers, the best philanthropists, the best dreamers of dreams. "What one is, why may not millions be?" said Wordsworth. "What one is" in goodness and in knowledge. If you put modern culture for goodness, and cheap enlightenment for knowledge, you lay yourself open to a sneer, but it is perhaps a sneer of doubtful propriety. And though the Americans spoke of "universal culture of heart and intellect" (in truth a cold and inadequate expression), they did *not* speak of "the spread of cheap enlightenment," and it may be questioned whether these words express their meaning so well as "the kingdom of truth, justice, and peace." The fulfilment of Wordsworth's hope would be the advent of the Messianic age, and the belief in its gradual coming, though without a personal Messiah to bring it about, is the doctrine which the American Jews desired to emphasise as a fundamental principle of Liberal Judaism.

Assuming, then, that the Messianic idea as interpreted by Liberal Judaism and the American Jews means a good deal more than "the spread of cheap enlightenment," assuming that it means all that the most wise and loving reformer and philanthropist could desire, must we nevertheless hold with Mr Box that one special feature of it has sufficed to bring about "a dissipation of the substance of the Messianic hope"?



This dissipation is not caused by the elimination of the personal Messiah, though that, I conclude, is bad enough, but by the absence of "divine intervention." It was in this "divine intervention" that the Prophets and Psalmists of Israel most undoubtedly believed, and the lack of it "dissipates" the "substance of the hope."

Mr Box seems to think that the "substance of the hope" resides in the manner of its accomplishment rather than in the content. It must be realised by a "real divine intervention." He declares that the hope "is deprived of most of its significance if it is thus rationalised away into a colourless evolutionary process." Again I ask: is this assertion just? Mr Box is quite right in holding that Liberal Judaism has got rid of the miraculous and catastrophic elements in the old Messianic beliefs. It *has* substituted for a sudden transformation of Very Bad into Very Good, of the Kingdom of Satan into the Kingdom of God, a slow and gradual "evolutionary process." So far the statement is, upon the whole, correct. But what is not correct is to call this evolutionary process colourless. That it most decidedly is not. For God is not eliminated: He remains. In fact, He is there more than ever. The world is not without God even now. It is not the devil's world. It is not necessary to restore the world to God, and God to the world, by a sudden divine intervention, because God is kept in the world, and the world is kept for God, all along. The "evolutionary process" is itself divine, and therefore rather colourful than colourless.

Far be it from me to say that this conception of the Messianic hope is free from, or gets rid of, difficulties. I will not even assert that it possesses less difficulties, or avoids more, than the theory of a "real divine intervention"; but at all events it is not colourless, it is not atheistic. God leads. In the Messianic hope of Liberal Judaism there is not less of God but more. God everywhere; God always. Much is dark, painful, agonising, mysterious; but, though we do not comprehend or understand, we have faith—faith that He is

there, and that He guides and rules. "Our Father"; yes, truly, but to Judaism always also, "our King." The one metaphor is as real and important to us as the other. Father, King, Lord, Saviour—all these, and other metaphors as well, do not exhaust or satisfy our requirements, for Judaism needs, as it were, a great deal from its God. He has to play a very big part. He is wanted most constantly.

And that is perhaps why Jews, whether orthodox or liberal, having so much for God to do, possessing Him so fully (if such a phrase be allowable), want nobody beside Him. He and they together can, for instance, bring about in man that true repentance on which Judaism of every shade has ever laid such insistent and abundant stress. Mr Box says, with courteous generosity: "The Rabbis may with truth be said almost completely to have spiritualised the idea of sacrifice and atonement. Nothing could well be nobler or higher than their doctrine of repentance. Even the acknowledgment of sin seems to be expressed in the penitential prayers in adequate language; while the emphasis that is laid on God's mercy and yearning for the return of the penitent is fervent enough almost to be Christian."

But, adds Mr Box with emphatic italics, "where Christianity and Rabbinical Judaism part company is as to *the means by which such true repentance is to be secured.*"

Now this assertion is by no means false. But the very next sentence contains an assertion which is far more dubious and questionable. "In place of a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world, Judaism offers to the sinner the Law, the Day of Atonement." That is not so. In order to express correctly the true Jewish position, the sentence should run thus: "In place of a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world, Judaism offers to the sinner God." That is why Judaism can do without the self-sacrificing Saviour. It has Him who is in Himself, and without a human death, Saviour and Lord and Father and King. And God just makes the difference. It is He really who does the needful, not the Law or the Day of Atonement. *They* are His gifts, the vehicles



of His grace; but without Him and in themselves they are nothing. The Law, the Day of Atonement, sound wooden, mechanical, lifeless; but God, who shines and operates through them, is very much alive. He is as tender, as loving, as pitiful as human imagination can make Him. And thus it is that Liberal Judaism, which conceives and uses the Law in a very different way, and the Day of Atonement in a somewhat different way, from orthodox Judaism, can yet manage perfectly as to repentance. Having God, it has all. Indeed, on this matter of "the means by which true repentance is to be secured," it is not separated at all widely from orthodox Judaism. Both hold that human effort and divine help are "the means." The loving God is common to both.

Because, according to Mr Box, Judaism, in lieu of "a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world," can only offer to the sinner "the Law and the Day of Atonement," therefore a very unfortunate result ensues, of great moment and significance. The following sweeping assertion succeeds the statement about the Day of Atonement and the Law: "Judaism has ever been deficient in sympathy with the unlearned, the ignorant, the weak, the fallen, the lost."

Judaism has "ever" been deficient in these matters. This means, I suppose, that it was deficient in 100 B.C. and in 100 A.D., deficient in 500 and deficient in 1500, deficient in the days of Jesus and deficient to-day. So long as Judaism rejects the theory of "a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world," it will, I presume, always be deficient. The deficiency extends throughout its whole past history; it includes its present condition; and unless it changes its entire character, and, by accepting a particular dogma, becomes Judaism no longer, the deficiency must continue to the distant future.

Let us examine this grave indictment a little more closely. Certainly it would be a generous estimate of the adherents of any religion if we were to reckon that one-tenth of them could be denominated "learned," while only nine-tenths of them must be called "unlearned." On this reckoning Judaism has

“ever” been, and still is, deficient in sympathy with nine-tenths of its adherents. This is rather remarkable when one considers how tenacious much more than one-tenth have “ever” been in maintaining their faith, and how many of them have even been willing to die rather than renounce it. Even to-day in Holy Russia a few drops of water can make the difference between a life of comfort and a life of misery, and yet these few drops are rarely accepted by the nine-tenths who are unlearned. An ungrateful religion truly to show so little sympathy with those who, amid almost unbearable cruelties, disabilities, and persecutions, are yet so clinging and so faithful! The children seem to love their mother, but the mother lacks sympathy with nine-tenths of her children.

And what is the evidence for this psychological enigma? We shall probably be referred to the Gospels and to the *Am ha'Aretz*. Now a discussion of the Gospel evidence would take far too long, but even if we do not allow, as we should allow (if we apply to the Gospels the same canons that we should apply to any other party and polemical documents), for exaggeration and over-colouring, the evidence of the Gospels would only be valid for one particular period. Supposing that the allegations of the Gospels as to the “unlearned” are not true of any *other* period, must we not seek some other cause for their truth in the Gospel period *over and above* the Law and the Day of Atonement? As to the *Am ha'Aretz* of the Talmud, he is notoriously a very obscure and disputed figure, concerning whom the best scholars are by no means in agreement.

Let us, however, assume that from B.C. 100 to A.D. 200 Judaism was deficient in sympathy with “the unlearned, the ignorant, and the weak.” The charge is, at any rate, inaccurate for the period from 200 to 1912. It is true that the unlearned have always respected the learned, the ignorant have always admired the scholar; it is true that Judaism has escaped spiritual degradation by maintaining an ideal of learning and of scholarship; but it is untrue that there has been any



tendency to declare that God does not care for the unlearned, or that the ignorant can find no access to Him. That repentance can only be secured by the learned, or that the scholar can sin and repent but that the ignorant can only sin, would be assertions utterly unknown to Jewish theology. As to the "weak," the beauty, tenderness, and delicacy of Talmudic and mediæval Jewish charity are enough to dispose of the charge. It is not necessary to speak of Jewish charity to-day. But we have no occasion to fear comparison with our neighbours.

But then, the last two of Mr Box's five categories. If he is wrong as to the ignorant, the unlearned, the weak, is he not surely right as to "the fallen and the lost"? Here we have a much smaller proportion of the adherents of any religion to take into account. For if the unlearned, the ignorant, and the weak make up at least nine-tenths of any particular community, let us hope that "the fallen and the lost" do not make up more than a twentieth. But still, even though nineteen-twentieths are cared for, and though for nineteen-twentieths the "sympathy" is adequate, the one-twentieth represent a sad and important remainder. Mr Box quotes an old, well-worn, anti-Jewish utterance of Dalman's. "Judaism," says that excellent scholar, with offensive condescension, "exhibits no lack of benevolence, even outside the circle of its race connection. It possesses, however, nothing corresponding to the Christian efforts for saving the lost, nothing parallel to our home and foreign missions, nor can it possess anything of the kind" (here the quotation from Dalman ends, and Mr Box concludes the sentence himself), "because it has failed to make Love the central principle of Religion."

Now, as to the reasons why Judaism possesses no foreign missions this is not the place to speak. The reasons are manifold, nor have they always been the same. But the absence of these missions is not connected with a deficiency of sympathy with the fallen and the lost. The absence of foreign missions to-day might much more properly be said to be due to a very strong belief that those who differ from us in matters of religion

are neither lost nor fallen, and that they need no missions to convert them to a truer faith. I do not myself hold that this attitude is completely satisfactory, but it is, at any rate, not caused by lack of sympathy.

But what Dalman calls "home missions" remain over. Here we need to walk warily and to distinguish. We must be careful what causes we assign to existing facts. I have freely acknowledged that a certain portion of the teaching of Jesus as regards sinners was novel and original. For instance, I have said:

"The Rabbis attached no less value to repentance than Jesus. They too urged that God cared more for the repentant than for the just who had never yielded to sin. They too welcomed the sinner in his repentance. But to seek out the sinner, and, instead of avoiding the bad companion, to choose him as your friend in order to work his moral redemption, this was, I fancy, a new thing in the religious history of Israel."<sup>1</sup>

"Jesus sought to bring back into glad communion with God those whom sin, whether real or imaginary, had driven away. For him sinners (at least certain types of sinners) were the subjects, not of condemnation and disdain, but of pity. He did not avoid sinners, but sought them out. They were still children of God. This was a new and sublime contribution to the development of religion and morality. When tenderly nurtured women work in the streets of London, and seek to rescue the degraded victims of deception or cruelty, they are truly following in the footsteps of their Master."<sup>2</sup>

But because Jesus struck this superb and novel note, it will not do to argue that it can only be struck after him by those who believe "in a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world." The note can be imitated by all who are earnest in the love and imitation of God. There is nothing in the sympathy with the "lost and fallen" which is inconsistent with Judaism whether orthodox or liberal.

Moreover, let us look at the matter more closely still. Who are the "lost and fallen"? How do they become lost and fallen? Mainly in two ways: (1) by drunkenness, (2) by unchastity. Now, as regards the first cause, it is universally acknowledged that the number of heavy drinkers among Jews has been very small. Hence the number of those who have become lost from this cause must always have been limited.

<sup>1</sup> *The Religious Teaching of Jesus*, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *Synoptic Gospels*, vol. i, p. 86.



Next as to unchastity. Up till recent times, while the Jews lived largely to and among themselves, the percentage of chastity among Jewish women was, I believe, extraordinarily high. And just because so very few Jewish girls "fell," those who *did* fall received a treatment which, I admit, was stern and unforgiving and cruel. There were not enough of them to need organised effort for recovery and redemption, and (what is much more important and therefore more sacred) for prevention. The individuals who did fall were regarded (at least, so I am informed, and I think not inaccurately) as outcasts, and no helping hand was stretched out to them. We cannot approve of such an attitude. But it was not due to the Law and the Day of Atonement. It was rather due to (1) the extreme horror with which unchastity was looked upon, and (2) the seldomness with which cases of unchastity occurred. I have been told, with what truth I cannot say, that Ireland is the chastest land in Europe, but by no means the most loving and solicitous towards the few of her daughters who "fall." And yet in Ireland there is no question of the Day of Atonement or the Law.

In recent times, unfortunately, owing to persecution and terrible poverty and to the fierce competition and unrest of modern industrial life, the amount of unchastity among Jewish women has somewhat increased. And with the need have sprung up the desire and the organisations to remedy the evil. We now possess our Jewish societies which seek to prevent and to save, and Dalman's statement as regards "home missions" is already antiquated and inaccurate. The ideal which these societies pursue is thoroughly Jewish. When, in England, the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women sought for a motto or quotation to print at the beginning of its yearly reports, it was not necessary to go to any author who believed "in a Saviour who died for the sins of the world." It was only necessary to remember that man's highest ideal must be to imitate—so far as man can—the supreme perfections of the Just and Loving God. And it

was in the most "legal" of the Prophets that the motto (God being the speaker) was actually found: "I will seek that which is lost, and will bring again that which is driven away, and will bind up that which is broken, and will strengthen that which is sick." Let the Jews imitate that aspect of the Divine Goodness which is here described by Ezekiel, and they can have all the religious motive force required for "home missions" without sacrificing the Law and the Day of Atonement, and without any belief "in a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world."

Mr Box and Dr Dalman affirm, indeed, that Judaism "cannot possess anything of the kind because it has failed to make Love the central principle of Religion." It would take too long to examine this statement and to test its precise degree of inaccuracy. Assuming that the central principle of Judaism is righteousness rather than love, it would have to be considered how far love is not, so far as Judaism is concerned, an element of the Jewish conception of righteousness. The love of God, at any rate, is the greatest command in the Law. The confession of the divine unity is immediately followed by the injunction—and injunction in Judaism is ideal and mandate in one—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul and with all thy heart and with all thy might." And it was not the least, and certainly it was not the least "legal" or the least "political," of the early Rabbis who said that the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," was the greatest principle of the entire Law. Verily the assertion of Messrs Box and Dalman needs many a qualification.

Mr Box seems to think that Liberal Jews are incurable. Little, I suppose, can be hoped from people who have abandoned the substance of the Messianic expectation and the belief in a personal Messiah. But for orthodox Jews something might yet be done. "What is needed," he says, "for the orthodox Jews is a demonstration on a large scale of the truth of the New Testament claims to be the true and legiti-



mate development of the religion of the Old Testament." He even thinks that "orthodox Jews were never more ready to listen than at the present time." Well, orthodox Judaism and orthodox Jews can look after themselves. Personally, I believe they will be a harder nut to crack than Mr Box seems to think. The stiffneckedness of the Jews in this respect has still not deserted them. But, at all events, I am sure that Mr Box's new methods and his "demonstration on a large scale" will be alike more scholarly and more gentlemanly than the methods with which the Jewish community has, so far, been most familiarly acquainted. They will avoid the medical missions and the children's treats, and be altogether more learned and less expensive. They will need fewer legacies from earnest and amiable old ladies. They will seek to tackle the educated rather than the "unlearned, the ignorant, and the weak."

Liberal Jews are apparently to be left severely alone. And profoundly as many of us admire the character and teaching of the historic Jesus, greatly as we appreciate the work which Christianity has accomplished and is accomplishing in the world, it is very doubtful whether this admiration and appreciation will lead on to the goal which Mr Box would desiderate. The orthodox Christian to-day, before he can hope for much success with the educated and Liberal Jew, must begin and succeed nearer home. He must convince the Unitarian; he must convince the thousands of educated men in every country of Western Europe who no longer believe, in any old orthodox sense, in the full Divinity of Christ. Let him first of all bring all these to believe once more (I use with Mr Box the words of Dr Briggs) in the "second advent of God's only-begotten and well-beloved Son, very God of very God, the Light and Life and Saviour of the world." There may then be some hope that Liberal Jews will follow suit.

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LONDON.

## CONSCIOUSNESS AS A CAUSE OF NEURAL ACTIVITY.

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To the ordinary person volition is the cause of muscular activity; when a man wills to raise his hand and does so, he has not the slightest hesitation in believing that his will is the cause of the movement. The philosopher may try to shake him by reminding him that because one event constantly follows some other, the latter is not necessarily the cause of the former, just as day is not the cause of night, nor *vice versa*. The physiologist, analysing what occurs on the material side, would tell him that the molecular disturbance of the cortex cerebri is the causal antecedent of the activity of lower nerve centres which, emitting impulses, stimulate the muscles to contraction; in other words, the muscles are innervated. According to the physiologist, not the will but impulses (which he is good enough to permit us to call "volitional") proceeding from an excited region of the cerebrum are the cause of the activity of the muscles. He speaks exclusively in terms of nerve-impulses proceeding up and down a closed physical chain, and utterly abhors the idea that at any place in that chain there should arise a conscious state capable of being the cause of any physical phenomenon, no matter how closely the latter may seem to be connected with the former. This consciousness appearing or arising at some link in the chain—that of the cerebral excitement—the late Professor Huxley



called an *epi-phenomenon*, which we may translate as by-product, and by which term he meant to indicate that consciousness, though produced by nerve-impulses, could not itself produce them. Huxley, in his trenchant and lucid style, refused to admit that consciousness can effect anything more as regards the production of bodily activities than the whistle of the steam influences the driving power of the engine: the passage runs thus:<sup>1</sup> "The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of such changes." And again, "The soul stands related to the body as a bell of a clock to the works, and consciousness answers to the sound which the bell gives out when it is struck." And still further, "I mean that the conclusions deduced from the study of the brutes are applicable to man." And lastly, "All states of consciousness in us as in them are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain substance. It seems to me that in men as in brutes there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism . . . the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act."

In spite of Professor Huxley's protest to the contrary, this is physiological materialism *in excelsis*. A neural process may give rise to consciousness, but consciousness cannot give rise to a neural process: this is the materialistic neurologist's position.

The whole object of Professor Huxley's "Essay on Animal Automatism" is to uphold the view that the emotions of

<sup>1</sup> T. H. Huxley, *Collected Essays*, vol. i., "Method and Results," London, Macmillan, 1898, p. 240.

animals are merely epi-phenomena, and that, therefore, probably those of human beings are such also. But if we deny any causal efficacy to the emotions of animals, it seems to me that we make the observations of Professor Gamble and others on the colour-changes of fish, prawns, etc., of no meaning. Professor Gamble has shown that a certain prawn when frightened assumes its night colour, a kind of blue which makes it almost invisible in the dark waters of the sea. The red "parrot-fish" when hiding and quiet is "pale like a dead thing"; when alarmed, its colour changes to a dark hue. The blue "Tang" when placid is of a whitish colour, when disturbed becomes blue.

Now it is convenient and correct to describe these phenomena as emotio-motor reflex actions, but we do not thereby mean to imply that the emotions are not causal. On the contrary, were the emotions not present, these changes of colour would not occur. These changes are reflex actions because the will can neither originate nor inhibit them; but that does not preclude emotion, something quite other psychologically than volition, from bringing them to pass. The extremely primitive character of the emotional consciousness of the fish or the prawn does not invalidate the present argument; without the emotions these results would not follow. Unquestionably the fish and other similar lowly animals are the unconscious exhibitors of reflex action both excito-motor, in which consciousness is not present, and sensori-motor in which consciousness plays no causal part whatever. When the light shining into the frog's eye causes the pigment-cells in its skin to contract, and the skin therefore to become pale like its surroundings, the accident of the frog's happening to see the light has nothing to do causally with the change of colour. The frog is the seat of a sensori-motor reflex action, in which its consciousness may be called an epi-phenomenon; but what a frog or a fish does when and because it is frightened or disturbed is not a sensori-motor reflex action at all. What



it does may be reflex, but is not devoid of consciousness ; in other words, consciousness is not absent from all reflex actions. It is absent only from the excito-motor ; it is present, but only as a by-product, in the sensori-motor ; while in the emotio-motor and ideo-motor it is present and causally so. Long ago, that prescient Scottish physiologist—John Reid—propounded virtually the same thing as regards the latter two classes of reflexes. In his *Researches*, published the year of his death, 1848, we have a lecture entitled, “On Sensational and Emotional Reflex Actions.”<sup>1</sup> Although some of the paper is expressed in terms now obsolete, the main thesis is admirably upheld, that we have tissues and organs often profoundly affected by mental conditions chiefly emotional, and since these are entirely outside the realm of voluntary origination, imitation, or control, we must call them reflex actions. Reid’s contention is that these reflex actions do not merely involve consciousness, but are constituted through consciousness having been aroused.

According to the late Dr W. B. Carpenter, “The extension of the doctrine of reflex action to the brain was first advocated by Dr Laycock in a very important essay read before the British Association in 1844, and published in the *British and Foreign Medical Review* for January 1845.”

Professor Laycock himself claimed to have recognised reflex actions through cerebral arcs twelve years before Dr Carpenter wrote on the subject. Laycock, in fact, asserts that it was John Reid who suggested to Carpenter the essence of the notion as to the extension of reflex action to the cerebral nerve-chains. Professor Huxley’s view involves the strained position that the sight of an object can cause the emotion of shame, but that the emotion does not cause the subsequent dilatation of the blood-vessels which, physiologically speaking, constitutes the blush. To the plain man this conclusion is

<sup>1</sup> I may say that I did not see this paper by Reid until four years after I had published my “Classification of Reflex Actions on a Psycho-physiological Basis,” *Brain*, 1894.

ridiculous, and it seems to me that it is not sanctioned by the latest physiological teaching. Now, I do not propose to traverse the well-worn path leading to the controversy about the will as a *causâ efficiens*, but I should like to examine certain types of physiological activity in which consciousness appears to be absolutely necessary to their exhibition.

For, after all, the behaviour of the living tissue must constitute the ultimate facts for the building up of any hypothesis as to the inter-relations of mind and matter, the day having passed for scorning to take into account the actual physiological conditions connected with, and in the opinion of the plain man producible by, some antecedent psychic state. Thus the view of the late Professor James, that a particular emotional condition was due to a particular physiological state of some peripheral tissue, was given an exceedingly severe blow by Professor Sherrington's observation that a dog was capable of exhibiting much emotion even after all neural connection between a very large portion of its periphery and its brain had been severed some months previously. From the standpoint of the *a priori* reasoning of general philosophy, the view that we have experienced the emotion of shame because our blood-vessels have previously dilated, is just as likely as the other or older one, that our blood-vessels dilated because we experienced the emotion of shame. The methods of experimental physiology were the most likely to settle the question of the causal relationships between the two phenomena—the mental and the protoplasmic.

Now, it so happens that within recent years an interesting and important experimental inquiry into the flow of gastric juice in the dog has been made by Professor Pawlow of the Military Academy, St Petersburg. By certain experimental procedures the food swallowed was prevented reaching the stomach, so that the gastric juice in a state of purity could be observed in process of being secreted, and the nerves to and from the stomach could be stimulated or divided as desired. It was noticed that even if the dog was shown food, no juice



flowed unless it was also hungry, while artificial (electrical) stimulation of the nerves to the stomach called forth a flow of juice no matter whether the dog was or was not hungry.

But further, when a hungry dog which was shown food and had in consequence a copious flow of gastric juice, understood that the food was after all not going to be given him, the flow of juice forthwith stopped, or, in physiological language, was inhibited. And again, when Pawlow placed meat inside the stomach of a dog which was unconscious (asleep), no flow of juice was elicited.

Here we have a particularly valuable example of the importance of the intervention of a mental state under conditions which are more suitable for physiological study than is the intact animal exhibiting its usual emotional or volitional activities. The value of these observations consists in the certainty that with one quality of emotion, the pleasurable expectation of food, a definite physiological, and it happens secretory, condition is produced; and conversely, with the opposite kind of emotion, disappointment, the exactly opposite organic state occurs; while when there is no consciousness, there is no secretion at all. The experiment could be represented by symbols:—

+ E is followed by + J ; and

– E is followed by – J ; and

Zero E is followed by Zero J ;

where E is emotion or consciousness and J is gastric juice. Now, we have been accustomed from the earliest days of our studies in logic to be allowed to affirm that when a given phenomenon was invariably preceded by some other, and that when that phenomenon was absent the former was also absent, the former was the cause of the latter. But the materialistic physiologist, while of course admitting the validity of this method of difference (Mill), refuses to apply the method to such cases as those in which the antecedent happens to be a mental state. But surely the methods of logic are applicable to all cases of invariable relationship, even when we cannot

understand the nature of the bond between two sets of phenomena apparently causally related. It would be supremely absurd to refuse to admit that the moon was the cause of the tides, because it happens that we cannot explain *how* the gravitational pull of the moon on the water is actually brought about; nor *how* and why a magnet moves iron filings. But we believe in the reality of action at a distance as a cause, even in those cases in which we cannot explain the nature of the relationship.

As a type of the sort of criticism to which I allude, let me quote the following passage from a textbook of physiology by Professor Noël Paton of the University of Glasgow:—<sup>1</sup>

“The sight of food in a fasting dog produces after a latent period of five minutes a copious flow of gastric juice. Pavloff calls this ‘psychic’ stimulation. It is an example of how the ‘distance receptor’ in the eye reflexly brings about an appropriate reaction—just as the ‘non-distance receptor’ in the wall of the stomach under certain stimuli brings about an appropriate reaction. It is somewhat rash of a physiologist, who can know nothing of the relation of the psychic state to the actions with which it is associated, to affirm, as Pavloff does, that the psychic change is causal.”

Professor Pawlow seems entirely justified in inferring that the flow of gastric secretion is due to the antecedent psychic states of hunger and anticipation, because, for one thing, when these are not present, there is no flow of juice, and for another, because the mere sight of food, without the arousing of the emotion of desiring it, is not provocative of the flow. In other words, the sensation alone is not sufficient to cause the secretion, that is, the mere stimulation of the eye (distance receptor) alone does *not* suffice, in spite of what Professor Paton asserts: there must be the emotion as well as the vision of the food. This, it seems to me, is the important point in the matter: the sensational consciousness alone in

<sup>1</sup> *Essentials of Human Physiology*, Green & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1907, p. 365.



this instance is not causal, the emotional also must be aroused.

I do not now digress to inquire into the full meaning of this; the point for us at present is that a form of consciousness, an emotion, is an absolutely essential link in a chain of neural events with food at one end and a flow of gastric juice at the other. If what Professor Paton says is correct, we ought to get the "reaction" just as well in an unconscious dog to the eye of which a piece of food was exhibited; but everyone knows we do not. Now, the distance receptor is here stimulated, and yet there is no reaction: further, the distance receptor may be stimulated in a conscious dog which does not happen to be hungry, and still no juice will flow. But it ought to flow reflexly if Professor Paton's assumptions are correct, for there is a complete neural chain beginning at the eye, traversing the central nervous system, and ending in the stomach, and yet since the emotion of desire for food (which can only exist in the hungry dog) has not been aroused, no secretion is elicited. A clearer case could not be given of the causal presence of a certain modification of consciousness: in this case, at any rate, consciousness is *not* the epi-phenomenon which Huxley declared the emotions of animals to be. I have taken this definite case of emotion as causal for bodily states because it is one experimentally worked out by an eminent physiologist of the present day, although the ordinary person needs no such example to tell him that he blushes or blanches because he is ashamed or afraid, that he has a dry mouth because he is the victim of anxiety, that his heart beats faster because he is delighted at something, and so forth.

I have purposely taken a case new to physiological analysis as illustrative of the important class of emotion-produced bodily conditions, not because the more familiar instances of this sort of thing are not equally illustrative, but partly because to many people something new has a convincing power which something older does not possess. To the minds of all except materialistic physiologists, the fact that by

volition and emotion bodily phenomena can be produced is sufficient proof that the volitional and emotional states of the soul are causal. We have even evidence that the bodily effects are increased in intensity *pari passu* with the psychic intensity. Thus we find Dr Macdougall, F.R.S., writing:—

“If a man is but just awakened from deep sleep, or if he is thoroughly fatigued, the most forcible contractions of the muscles that his will can evoke are relatively feeble; if he is fresh and wide awake he can exert greater force; if he is emotionally excited, that is, if a large part of his nervous system is in a state of high excitement, the force he can exert is still greater; and if his whole nervous system is in that state of extreme activity that characterises the condition of maniacal excitement, he can exert a degree of muscular force far beyond any that he can achieve in any normal state.”

Here we have an application of the method of concomitant variations as between a psychical antecedent and a material subsequent. Of course, one can state the problem exclusively in terms of the neurones or units of the nervous system, but to do this is deliberately to ignore a factor obviously causal in the chain of phenomena, namely, the increasing intensity of consciousness, from its feeble flicker at the moment of awakening from deep sleep to its tremendous effort in maniacal excitement.

We therefore unhesitatingly believe that Professor Pawlow is quite justified in writing of the “psychic” juice, because it is juice elicited on account of the antecedent existence of a definite emotion. He is justified in believing in the causal nexus, although he is unable to explain its nature.

Mentally caused conditions are of the utmost consequence in the practice of the healing art; we are daily forced to recognise certain states of bodily activity as due to the presence of antecedent mental conditions, and other states—the lessening or abolition of that activity—as truly due to the opposite mental conditions. Psychically caused inhibitions,



more or less severe depressions of vitality, are amongst the gravest problems calling for therapeutic solution; that the mind should be denied its place as a cause, just on account of the inability of the materialists to explain *how* it is so, seems wholly unreasonable.

The whole question of the causal intrusion of consciousness is a vital one for physiological psychology, and underlies the subject of the classification of Reflex Actions. In *Brain*, in 1894, I published a classification of reflex actions on a psycho-physiological basis, that is to say, mainly on the principle of increasing degrees of psychic involvement. They were divided into two great groups—

- A. Those which do not need consciousness for their consummation, the periphero-motor, which include the two sub-groups of excito-motor and sensori-motor;
- B. Those which do need consciousness for their consummation, the centro-motor or psycho-motor, which include the emotio-motor and the ideo-motor.

In the excito-motor reflex action consciousness is not present at all: as examples, we may take the classic reflexes of brainless frogs and other animals, the reflexes of animals and children asleep, and those in the man with his spinal cord severed in the middle of the back. In the sensori-motor group, consciousness is present but not causally so; it is here, if you will, a by-product or epi-phenomenon, an excellent example of which is the reflex contraction of the iris when light falls on the retina. In the emotio- and ideo-motor groups, consciousness is present as an essential causal link: as examples of these, we have blushing or blanching on account of emotion or recollection; perspiring, trembling, increased heart-action, and so on. Now, this kind of action, which is typical of a large number of actions in the body, is wholly due to the emotional consciousness present, for blushing is not a voluntary act, and is quite incapable of either origination or inhibition by the will. It is therefore entitled to be called an involuntary or reflex act, as it possesses two of the character-

istics of these acts, namely, (1) the will cannot produce them, and (2) the will cannot arrest or abolish them.

It makes no difference to the general argument whether we speak of involuntary or reflex action as co-extensive with the psycho-motor group as above given. Certain bodily states, dilated vessels, active glands, increased cardiac activity, are the direct results of certain antecedent mental states; but not only so, there is, in addition, an interesting specificity in the relationship. Darwin reminds us that Seneca remarked, "The Roman players hang down their heads, fix their eyes on the ground and keep them lowered, but are unable to blush in acting shame." The blush cannot be induced in all its specific characteristics by any other than the appropriate quality of emotion, for in order that only *some* of the arterioles of the skin dilate, there must pre-exist not any kind of cerebral excitement, but a most definite and specific variety of consciousness—the blush-producing emotion, whatever that may be. In other words, a specific emotion is needed to produce a specific bodily result, in this case a vascular one. It seems to me that here we have another characteristic of a causal relationship, for if *any* kind of emotion could produce the vaso-dilatation or the perspiration, or the weeping, then there might not be any definite connection between the mental and the bodily state, whereas, on the contrary, the relationship is characterised by a degree of specificity that is absolute.

Emotions and ideas are universally recognised by common sense as causes of definite bodily states. We have the increase of chemical tone not only of muscles but of other tissues also, as a result of pleasurable emotion, good news, and so forth, but a diminution of tone from emotions of an opposite character. The medical man well knows that a cure will depend less on his drugs than on the patient's peace of mind, or, at any rate, on the absence of depressing mental conditions. A prolonged state of emotional depression has, with a great show of reason, been blamed for such diminutions in the resisting power of tissues as underlie dental caries, and such



alterations of chemical tissue-tone as underlie diabetes or the blanching of the hair. "Laugh and grow fat" is the popular recognition of these principles.

One of the latest discoveries in connection with the suprarenal capsules is that, in the dog, violent emotion—anger, terror, etc.—can produce a marked increase in the output of the internal secretion of those ductless glands, the result being increase in the tone of the muscles necessary for fight or flight respectively.

The profound fatigue produced by exhausting emotion is another illustration of our present point. Fatigue has lately been demonstrated to consist in a certain definite physico-chemical alteration of certain microscopic granules in the nervous system, and in this case the powerful emotion and nothing else is the ultimate cause of that alteration.

A very grave state of shock—collapse—can be brought on both by pleasurable and by disagreeable emotions, the heart being usually inhibited, and the pulse to the brain abolished for a period sufficiently long to cause fainting and a total abolition of muscular tone, which results in the loss of power to maintain the erect posture. To say that all this is not due to the particular state of mind is untrue, but to have to attribute it to an epi-phenomenon is ridiculous.

When the unfortunate miner, about to descend the pit-shaft, saw that the rope was broken, and that unless he sprang out of the cage at that instant he would be dashed to death, realising the whole horror of the situation, became insane for the rest of his life, it was his emotion of horror which was the cause, and the only cause, of those structural changes in his brain-cells which constituted the physical basis of his insanity. His brain-tissue was damaged by an overwhelming emotion which acted on it as really as the moon acts on the sea, but as inexplicably; to say that his consciousness was a by-product in the chain of neural events is to be guilty of psycho-physiological insincerity.

Equally causal with the emotion is the idea in the ideo-

motor reflex or involuntary action. For instance, under the influence of a fixed idea (monomania) bodily changes, as well marked as those due to emotion, can occur. The impulsion of the insane idea is, in some instances, more dynamogenic than is the will.

The whole of mental therapeutics depends on recognising consciousness as an efficient cause. Any beneficial results obtained by the method of "faith healers" have been obtained through the causal agency of the patient's mind in expectant attention, or in some other condition leading to an outflow of beneficial nerve impulses; these may be called the beneficent neuroses. A similar explanation accounts for the striking mentally-caused bodily conditions which are included under the designation of hysterias.

Undoubtedly the psychological differences between an ideo-motor reflex action and a volition are not many, but the two kinds of action are not identical. In the reflex actions of the psycho-motor group, the element of inevitableness is one of the characteristics, and it is just the one which is not present in the volition. In volitions, the power of deliberation and the possibility of choice are exactly what preclude us from describing them as reflex actions. The will, if you like, may be called a residual phenomenon, but never an epi-phenomenon; it is a residual phenomenon, for when we have classified a large number of actions under the various groups of "reflex," there is still found an important group remaining in which the element of inevitableness is just the one that is *not* present.

There are reflex tendencies to action and also to restraint of action, but the will is not the simple product of any of the former reinforcing one another, nor of any of the latter interfering with the former: the will is an arbiter above the reflex. Yet, in certain cases, reflex tendencies defy volition and make it of none effect. We can, for instance, by an effort of the will suspend our breathing and bring about the so-called voluntary apnoea. But this is possible only for a certain time, after which not all the volition of which we are capable will



restrain the next breath. The reflexigenous and chemical factors operating on the inspiratory centre defy the will and reinstate the inspiration. The will is an arbiter which is not, however, omnipotent; nevertheless it is not merely an epiphenomenon, still less an automaton. The will can, to a large extent, originate and, within limits, can control; but there are activities it cannot arouse and activities that it cannot restrain. The will has no power over the vaso-motor centre, the cardio-motor, the perspiratory or the vomiting; in extremely few cases can it stop the heart or evacuate the stomach; but its occasional powerlessness does not make it a reflex action or any synthesis of these. Emotions and ideas can sometimes effect what volition cannot; when an overwhelming sorrow reduces the strong man to a semi-lifeless mass of toneless muscle, when the sense of impending disaster makes the muscles of a weak woman as strong as a giant's, it is the psychic event in each case that is the sole and immediate cause of the collapse and of the heroism respectively.

Physiologists have been so successful by the aid of the microscope in tracing a complete chain of nerve-units from the surface of the body into the centres and out towards the surface again, that the all-sufficiency of this chain has become a perfect obsession with them, and to such an extent that they have left no room for volition. Of course, this in itself physically all-sufficient chain of neurones can be proved to exist; but it is one thing to trace a path from a certain place to some other and back again, and quite another thing to be told that somewhere on that route their lives a gatekeeper who may or may not at any particular time permit you to walk over that path, however familiar it may be. The power to quell or inhibit activity we must never forget while thinking, as one usually does, of volitional *stimulation* to activity. The will can produce activity, but it can also prevent it; and that which can prevent the tendency to action, or inhibit action in progress, must of necessity be a *causâ efficiens*. That which can scorn fatigue and keep even death at bay is no mere by-

product of consciousness to be denied the name of cause. We must not make our incapability to explain the causal nexus a reason for denying that the psychical is a cause. This is to ram the universe into the cramped mould of our conceptual infirmities. How little progress would have been made in the science of electricity if that principle had been applied there!

A reaction is steadily setting in against this excessive materialism in physiology, a recent apostle of which we find in Professor Ostwald.<sup>1</sup> Dr J. S. Haldane, F.R.S., of Oxford, has, on more than one occasion within the last two or three years, protested in an outspoken manner against the continued attempt to explain life on any exclusively physical or chemical hypotheses. In a philosophical address at the meeting of the British Association at Dublin in 1908, and again at a meeting of the Manchester Pathological Society in October of the past year, Dr Haldane pointed out with great cogency the insufficiency of these as an explanation of life. He said: "The point now reached is that the conceptions of physics and chemistry are insufficient to enable us to understand physiological phenomena. . . . In recognising it as an organism we are applying an elementary conception which goes deeper than the conceptions of matter and energy, since the apparent matter and energy contained in or passing through or reacting with the organism are treated as only the sensuous expression of its existence. As soon as we pass beyond the most superficial details of physiological activity, it becomes unsatisfactory; and it breaks down completely when applied to fundamental physiological problems such as that of reproduction."

Another Oxford teacher, Dr MacDougall, does not hesitate in his *Physiological Psychology* to treat of the soul not as a metaphor or as some effete notion of pre-scientific days, but as a real existence. On p. 167<sup>2</sup> we actually find the expression, "A psychical resultant of the separate *actions upon the soul*

<sup>1</sup> *Natural Philosophy*, W. Ostwald. London, Williams & Norgate, 1911, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> *Physiological Psychology* in the "Temple Series," London, 1908.



of two elementary psycho-physical processes." Such words some years ago would have been sufficient to place their author outside the pale of physiological respectability on an oasis where he would have found his colleague Dr Haldane already banished. MacDougall is apparently thoroughly convinced that at any rate in physiological psychology we cannot dispense with the notion of the soul, for his words are: "We are compelled to postulate, as a necessary condition of the development of the magnetic field, a medium or substance which we call the ether. Just so we are compelled to postulate an existent, an immaterial being, in which the separate neural processes produce the elementary affections which we have called psychical elements, and this we call the soul. . . ."

"These are questions that can never be laid to rest by the dictum that the soul is nothing but the sum of psychical events, or by any other dictum of the logician or metaphysician reasoning from the data at present available. They can only be answered by the discovery of new empirical evidence. The physiological psychologist, above all men, must proclaim a sceptical agnosticism, not that spurious agnosticism which says, We shall not and cannot know, but that nobler agnosticism which says, We do not know, let us try to find out." These are noble words, because they are the utterance of honesty. Some of us are trying to find out by analysing such new empirical data as have been given us by the experiments of Professor Pawlow. Properly understood, the emotions, even of dogs, may teach us much; they teach us at least this, that consciousness, how we know not, can be a cause in as full and perfect a manner as any other cause of which we have experience. Just as we hesitate to affirm, just as we doubt, because our knowledge is imperfect, so let us venture to believe for the very same reason.

D. FRASER HARRIS.

# THE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF GOD.

PROFESSOR H. A. OVERSTREET,

New York.

IT is true of philosophy, as of other disciplines, that necessity is the mother of invention. Philosophy exists to serve human needs. As the needs change, taking new shape and direction, philosophy undergoes corresponding transformation. It is, of course, abstractly conceivable that a philosophy should be elaborated which should possess the answers to all questions that might ever be broached. We have long since learned, however, through the chastening sorrow of many a metaphysical overturn, that what is thus abstractly conceivable shows small promise of being concretely realised. Philosophies have, with greater or less success, answered the needs of their day in the spirit of their day. As a recent writer has expressed it, "Philosophy is . . . the deepening and the broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness."<sup>1</sup> It follows, then, that if the present age in some deep-reaching way has set a new problem, has developed a new "practical thoughtfulness," philosophy must be alive to these altered needs. Professor Ludwig Stein, in his *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart*, describes the present situation as follows:<sup>2</sup> "The problem of human society has reached an acute stage. It knocks at every door and wakes out of his fantasies even the most

<sup>1</sup> Perry, R. B., *The Approach to Philosophy*, 1905, p. 21.



slumbrous dreamer of speculative dreams. Men wait impatiently for the answer. Philosophy dare not delay unless it would suffer the danger of being asked no more. . . . After two thousand years man is returning to himself again."

That this is true need scarcely be argued. Our serious concern with human life, our effort to know it systematically, thoroughly, in a word, scientifically, has brought into being rich funds of new material. We have been forced to penetrate to the depths of life in order that we may know and direct its surface sweep. Anthropology, ethnology, comparative philology, social psychology, the psychology of religion, animal psychology, economics, politics, social medicine and hygiene, comparative jurisprudence, international law, sociology,—these are a few of the sciences that have had their first rich development in our own day. Have they given us, in any sense, a new understanding of social values, a new view of the functions and possibilities of human society? If they have not, we may rest assured that, with all their vast extent of new material, they will effect no considerable change in philosophic thought. If they have, we may be equally assured, that quite irrespective of our conscious will in the matter, they will inevitably transform philosophy—our thought of God and the world—into harmony with the new insights.

This unprecedented stimulus to social research and understanding is clear indication that in human life there has been a new stirring of the waters. What is in fact so significant about the newly enriched social sciences, and what makes our judgment as to the new social valuations so much the surer, is that the same fundamental conception runs through them all. We may take the science of charity. Aid to the unfortunate has from time immemorial meant the relief of physical and mental distresses. But in the past such relief was administered for the sole purpose of removing the obvious local evil. The vast system of almsgiving developed throughout the Middle Ages, and in the early centuries of the modern era was a largely ineffective and self-ruinous system of social palliatives. At

the present day it seems to us almost incredible that the huge, poverty-breeding system should have lasted as long as it did without the discovery that the principle involved was fundamentally wrong, that the treatment of distress must be not by the administration of local palliatives but by radical, organic cure, and by the establishment of the individual upon a sure foundation of self-help. The situation, however, is easily explained. Almsgiving was the consistent outcome of a negative and dependent view of human life—of the view that human life does not *make* its well or its ill, but *accepts* it,—from god or demon or the unsearchable order of things. The best that could be done was to ease the suffering of the victim. “Free bounty in alms,” says Hobhouse, “is the virtue appropriate to the lord dealing with humble dependents.”<sup>1</sup> Almsgiving developed to greatest proportions, as in the Christian Middle Ages, where such a negative view was dominant. Our present science of charity, on the contrary, is thoroughly, and with intent, positive. It exists only incidentally to relieve the specific ills; fundamentally, its function is to construct and reconstruct the normal and healthy life. It, indeed, applies the local salve; but more deeply it attempts the organic cure. Nor is its concern solely with the particular distresses; rather it is with the deep-lying causes as they exist in the wide-ramifying relations and institutions of society. It attacks the causes that it may re-establish the sufferer, set him in his normal place, make him independent, self-helping, socially worthful. It does all this not simply because it has grown wiser through experience, but because it has a radically different view of human life. It believes that human life, individually and collectively, is, in the main, the creator of its own good or ill. Its ideal is that of a society which, by a long, vigorous process of correcting social evils, has at last wrought out its own health and happiness. It sets about its task, therefore, with a broad faith in humanity’s power to take care of itself, with a belief

<sup>1</sup> Hobhouse, L. T., *Morals in Evolution*, p. 31.



in its essential sanity and self-maintenance. In short, modern charity has its stimulus and power in a fundamentally democratic conception of society.

We might pass in review the various typical institutions—marriage and the family, industry, law and justice, education, the state, the church,—and we should find in each the same increasingly conscious advance to democratic conceptions and organisation. To make this clear in as brief a space as possible, we must recapitulate, in broad outline, the development of human civilisation. It may be expressed shortly as a movement from non-differentiation to class differentiation, to personal differentiation. Human society in its first or primitive stage ran, so to speak, in the pack.<sup>1</sup> As in a wolf pack, there was no distinction of class as between male and female, subject and ruler, lord and vassal. Civilisation took its first important step in advance—in patriarchal and military society—by developing certain broad class differentiations. The woman that had run side by side with her fellows, sharing the hunt and the foray, came, after long economic and social development, to be placed over against her masculine fellows in a class by herself. She was relegated to a social group in many ways inferior to the masculine group. Again, the improvident, lazy, reckless fellow who, in the pack stage, was carried or kicked along by his fellows, or who in the struggle of life was ruthlessly eliminated, in the later stages dropped into a class with his fellows, and served the more capable group. Society differentiated into the masters and the servers. As the stage of communal ownership was gradually succeeded by the stage of more or less extended private ownership, a further class differentiation developed, of the wealthy and the indigent, the employer and the employed. And as the military state developed out of patriarchal society, a new distinction was established, of lord and vassal, noble and base-born.

It is significant to note that, up to recent years, the

<sup>1</sup> Jenks, Edw., *History of Politics*, p. 8.

typical point of view of society, in its legal and social regulations, its morality, religion, art, has, in greater or less degree, *been determined by this thought of class differentiation.* From the code of Hammurabi to the common law of England in the nineteenth century, the interpretation of human values has in greater or less degree been in terms of class status. For example, males, as a class, had rights not accorded the female class. It will be recalled that it was not until 1882 that the English law permitted women to retain property in their own right. Before that time—or at any rate before 1857—it was legal for a man to desert his wife, compelling her to support their common family, and then, depleted in pocket, to return and appropriate all her earnings; and to do this again and again without the possibility of legal redress on her part. In law countenancing such difference of human rights there was precisely the same *class* point of view as was present in the old Hindoo law of Manu, which prescribed that “day and night women must be kept in dependence by the males of their families”; or again, that “though the husband be destitute of virtue or seeking pleasure elsewhere, or devoid of good qualities, he must be constantly worshipped as a god by the faithful wife.”<sup>1</sup>

Again, in the administration of justice, where we should expect, if anywhere, to find personal values truly estimated, we discover that from the earliest times up to the present day—in lessening degree, doubtless—punishment has been meted upon a basis of class status. “If the doctor has treated a gentleman for a severe wound with a lancet of bronze, and has caused that gentleman to die, or has opened an abscess of the eye for a gentleman . . . and has caused the loss of the gentleman’s eye, one shall cut off his hands.”<sup>2</sup> “If a doctor has treated the severe wound of a slave of a poor man with a bronze lancet, and has caused his death, he shall render slave for slave.”<sup>3</sup> Compare this with the situation in modern England: “Nor was the English law altogether free from

<sup>1</sup> *Manu*, ix, 2; v, 54.

<sup>2</sup> *Hammurabi*, 216.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 219.



caste distinctions in the earlier part of the modern period. The benefit of clergy, which had originally been an immunity claimed by ecclesiastics from the secular courts, had been gradually transformed into a mere class privilege, whereby educated persons could escape punishment for secondary offences. Thus, in the seventeenth century, the question whether a man would be hanged for larceny or not depended on whether he could read. . . . It was not until 1827 that [benefit of clergy] was finally abolished, but even then it was doubtful whether the privilege of peers fell with it. This question was not settled until 1841, when the statute of Edward VI. was repealed, and peers accused of felony became liable to the same punishments as other persons."<sup>1</sup>

As to the industrial order, we are so well aware of the manner in which, from the earliest ages, legislation has been enacted by an economically regnant class for its own class advantage, that we need not elaborate the point. Whether the regnant class has legislated for the Greek or the Roman or the American slave, for the English or the Continental serf, or for the modern wage-earner, it has regarded him, in each case, not as a full person having rights equal to those of all other persons, but rather as a quasi-person, limited to the small circle of rights accorded to his group.

With this prevalent class point of view in mind, we may regard now the typical movements of the present day. To many persons, the present struggle of women to achieve a more enviable economic and political status is but a distressing symptom of a temporary social decadence. Considered from the point of view of the history of civilisation, however, it is seen to be one of the significant indications of the advance which civilisation is making to its third stage. The same is true of the efforts for legal and industrial reform. We have named this third stage, as over against the first two—non-differentiation and class differentiation—the stage of personal differentiation.

<sup>1</sup> Hobhouse, L. T., *Morals in Evolution*, i. 322.

The problem of the third stage may be briefly expressed as follows: For one reason or another, in the course of human development, barriers to individual initiative have been erected without reference to individual capacity or worth. The result has been twofold: a loss to society of capacities thus alienated and suppressed; and an injustice to the individual. At the present stage of civilisation, then, the effort is to break down the relatively arbitrary and indiscriminating barriers, and to allow all life to exert itself to its full possibilities. In other words, society, instead of differentiating into classes, now differentiates into persons. And thus we reach our typical present-day demands: (1) unhindered opportunity for personal development; (2) in cases where such opportunity is still hindered—as in the class disqualification of women, in the economic weakness of the wage-earner, in the legal inferiority of the poor man, in the political subjection of the majority to the favoured few—vigorous social action to the end of removing the hindrances.

Such, briefly, are the problem and the ideal of this third stage of civilisation—the stage of social democracy. Let us now, in order to show the bearing of all this upon philosophy, point out a significant change which the third stage is effecting in our understanding of the manner in which human progress is accomplished. In a society permeated with the spirit of class status, where the family, the civil order, the industrial system, the state, religion, all exhibited, in their varying structure, the distinction between a superior, guiding class and an inferior class subject to guidance and rule, it is natural to suppose that a certain habit of thought would be engendered, namely, of regarding society as *necessarily* differentiated into leader and led, ruler and ruled, master and dependant. Nothing is more anomalous in the older days than the condition of the masterless man. “From the top to the bottom of the social scale every free man acknowledged a master, who secured to him justice and protection in exchange for his obedience and fealty. The moment an Egyptian tried



to withdraw himself from this subjection, the peace of his life was at an end; he became a man without a master, and . . . without a recognised protector. . . . Any man might stop him on the way, steal his cattle, merchandise, and property on the most trivial pretext, and if he attempted to protest, might beat him with almost certain impunity.”<sup>1</sup> The thought, then, of a “masterless” society, going its own free way, working its unrestrained will, without the strong hand, the superior word, would, to the earlier ages, have been equivalent to the thought of social chaos. As well think of the stars wildly careering through space! No, for a class-constituted society, there was but one possible thought—and it is easy to see how it would inevitably extend to embrace the universe and produce the various theories of god-rulership—the thought, namely, that the mass of beings must be directed by superior ones who are not of their number.

Now a long-established social habit such as this is not easily broken. Indeed, there can be little doubt, I think, that in a number of regions of our life—particularly in the industrial order and religion—the old subject-ruler habit of thought still holds sway. Nevertheless, even in these regions, but more particularly elsewhere, we are gradually forming a new habit of social thought which must eventually displace the old one.

In a democratic state, there is no single person who holds the key to destiny, nor any group of persons who know clearly and truly the way of future advance. Wise and foolish, moral and immoral, broad-minded and narrow-minded, egoistic and altruistic, patriotic and unpatriotic, good, bad, indifferent, men and women and children—all together, the gigantic, unassorted mass of them,—make the destiny of a modern democratic state. When we ask how the destiny is accomplished, we sometimes stand aghast; oftentimes we are plunged in despair; but mainly, if we are wise, we watch with calm assurance this mass-life,

<sup>1</sup> Maspero, G., *Recueil de travaux relatifs à la philologie et à l'archéologie Egyptienne et Assyrienne*, 1870, p. 309. Quoted by Hobhouse, i. 296.

seething, tumultuous, without compass or guide or will or plan, that we call the modern democratic state. "Who is to lead my people?" comes a melancholy cry out of the wilderness of old thoughts and past ideals. "The people lead themselves!" comes the answering shout of hopeful voices. "Woe, woe! Their way is destruction; their path is death!"

So it must seem to the point of view of the old class-guidance theory. The king, or the wise men—the masters—must know the destiny, must hold the way. What this view lacked was a knowledge of the deeper, subtler processes of mass-life, the ceaseless action and reaction of each and all, the mutual adjustment, modification, adaptation, the endless resistances, co-operations, agreements, disagreements—in short, the infinitely complex "social dialectic" everywhere and always at work. The old view believed rightly in conscious guidance; but it failed to realise that such guidance plays but upon the surface of the deep, unconscious, self-adjustive and self-advancing movement of life. We are coming therefore to the new thought that society is guided—if we may still use that word—not by king or class, but by the infinite action and reaction of all its members. This new conception of society *making itself*, lifting itself through its very imperfections—through the struggle of these one with another—to planes of more effective realisation, must obviously have profound bearing *upon the manner in which we shall view the process of the total universe*. Must it not change profoundly our hitherto typical way of regarding the organisation of the world? What, in short, is to be the new world-view consonant with this democratic thought of a society *making itself*?

But objections will bristle at this point. All this movement which we have traced concerns humanity alone, an insignificant speck in the universe of life. What justification have we for thus extending a conception whose known application is solely human to the total universe. The briefest answer to the objection is that the conception in its essential meaning is *not* simply applicable to human life,



that it has already, under another name, been systematically extended beyond the human to the widest known regions of animal and plant life.

We are all so well aware of the changed attitude which the biological sciences have engendered towards nature's way of growth that I need not elaborate the point. Yet it will serve us, I think, to compare our change of attitude in this respect with the change in our conception of human social advance. The pre-evolutional conception will be recalled—the thought of nature's various beings as somehow made by an outside power, set in their place, and guided to their destiny. There was no thought of nature's brute hosts guiding themselves, working out their destiny from within their own number. Yet this is precisely the view to which the biological sciences have brought us. Through the very processes of variation and struggle and adaptation, which we have pointed out as characteristic of human society, animal and plant society work their slow way from form to form and stage to stage. We have no difficulty now in conceiving a "masterless" animal society. It needed no interfering hand to guide the simian to the man. The whole was a process of self-advance, of an animal society raising itself through the infinitely slow and subtle processes of mass-struggle to stages of greater fitness and power. Nature, in short, instead of being a realm subject to external guidance, doomed to play a passive part in the drama, is found to be a myriad society in intense, unceasing activity, *working out its own destiny*, a destiny which, for all that we can know, may carry it, not only beyond its present low condition, but even beyond the farthest limits which we can now conceive.

Thus, we are forced to surrender the age-old dualistic notion that the ways of humanity are not the ways of nature. Fundamentally their ways are the same—of struggle and adaptation, adjustment and readjustment. Each is a mass-life *making itself*, through mass dialectic, into more adequate forms. Human society, in short, is but a specific group differing in

greater or less degree, but in no sense radically, from the other myriad groups of the universe.

This conclusion as to the essential similarity of behaviour of human and animal life, has been strengthened by various researches that have followed in the wake of the biological sciences. Even at the present day it is still a prevalent thought among a considerable body of men that the human person is possessed of at least two endowments that belong uniquely to him. These are intelligence and morality. According to this view, the world is sharply divided into the favoured possessors and the unfavoured non-possessors. On the other hand, contemporary psychological and ethical researches are rapidly undermining this dualistic view of human and animal life. In the first place, psychology, by the extension of its researches to the regions of animal life, and by the discovery, in human life, of the hitherto unsuspected range and power of unconscious psychical activities, has swept away the barriers between the lower and the human animal; has shown, in short, that the developed intelligence of the human person is not so far removed from the relatively simpler responses of the animal as to preclude the tracing of the one in continuous development out of the other. "The immense intellectual disparity between a man of genius and a catarrhine ape is due to the accumulation of anatomical variations, so slight in their beginnings as to be hardly perceptible."<sup>1</sup> Or, as Bergson expresses it, "One need but compare the structure of the brain with that of the spinal cord to convince oneself that there exists between the cerebral function and the reflex activity of the medullary system a difference solely of complexity and not of kind."<sup>2</sup>

In the second place, as to the moral endowments of man, the relatively recent genetic study of moral concepts is increasingly convincing us that moral consciousness is the result of a slow, continuous development out of non-moral consciousness,

<sup>1</sup> Evans, E. P., *Evolutional Ethics and Animal Psychology*, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Bergson, H., *Matière et Mémoire*, p. 15.



that the enlightened honesty of a human person, for example, differs from the brute fear instinct of the lower animal only in degree of complexity and of social development, and not radically in kind. In short, the genetic sciences are everywhere convincing us that there is no fundamental break in continuity between the lower animal and man, that, as Forel states it, "All the properties of the human mind may be derived from the properties of the animal mind," and that therefore "the doctrine of evolution is quite as valid in the province of psychology as it is in all the other provinces of organic life."<sup>1</sup>

There remain two great steps still to be taken. Below the animal is the plant; below the plant is the so-called inorganic. Even now psychology is making groping advances into the region of plant life,<sup>2</sup> with results that increasingly confirm our suspicion that the region of psychical activity extends below the so-called animal plane of life. On the other hand, the inorganic still remains a realm of almost total obscurity. But the impulse given to the discovery of psychical life below the hitherto accepted planes, and the astonishing success of our researches—a success revolutionising our traditional thought—makes it impossible to stop short of penetrating the inorganic to find there, perhaps, some minimal form of life continuous with the higher forms. We have rid ourselves of the notion of a difference in kind between the human and the lower animal; we are increasingly doing so as between the animal and the plant. The difference between these hitherto separated orders of life is now seen to be one of greater or less complexity in the power to vary reactions to stimuli. As we descend in the scale of life from the human to the lower animal, the power to vary reactions becomes increasingly limited; as we descend to the plant it becomes still more limited. In the inorganic, we seem to find a kind of substance that has no power whatever to vary its reactions; action and reaction are always the same. And yet it is not inconceivable that the inorganic may

<sup>1</sup> Forel, A., *Ants and Some Other Insects*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Binet, A., *Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*.

be at or near the lower limit of variation ; in other words, that it may react to stimuli with such infinitesimal variations as utterly to escape our detection, so that it presents the appearance of an absolutely unalterable stuff—"dead matter." If this should prove to be true, then the inorganic is fundamentally the same in kind as the most advanced forms of life. It is significant in this connection to note that many of the recent discoveries in chemistry and physics frankly cast suspicion upon the long-accepted tradition of the absolute invariability of inorganic matter.

We cannot, of course, forecast at present how these problems of plant life and inorganic matter will be solved. Yet there can be no doubt whatever of the dominant trend of scientific endeavour. It is the effort to break down all barriers, to link all the orders of the world together in an essential oneness of quality and process. In the light of this dominant trend, we make a serious blunder if we suppose that the physicist, chemist, and biologist are concerned with realms whose processes are utterly unlike those of human life, or that the social scientist, because he is dealing with human society, must speak in terms wholly foreign to the physicist, chemist, and biologist. If the human, as we are more and more suspecting, is but the more complex physico-chemical, or plant, or animal, or, *vice versa*, if these are but simpler forms of what is more intricately organised in the human, the discovery of what is truly fundamental in any one sphere of life will be a discovery valid for all spheres. If we can find this essential law of all life, we have, assuredly, the stuff out of which we may fashion our present-day philosophy.

The bearing of the foregoing argument should now be clear. We have pointed out, on the one hand, the dominant social thought ; on the other, the dominant biological thought of our day. They seemed at first to have no concern with each other. But looking more deeply, we saw that the fundamental way of democracy—the self-modification of the mass-life by the actions and reactions of all its members—was



the fundamental way of all life. Here, then, we have discovered a law of life wider than the purely human or the purely non-human. There remains, indeed, a region of existence—the inorganic—still unsubjected to this law. But, as we have said, the whole effort of scientific thought is to link the inorganic in essential continuity with the organic.

Here, then, is the stuff out of which our new philosophical concepts are to be formed. It is greatly different from that out of which the social and scientific concepts of former centuries were formed. The latter was oligarchic and static. Human society was regarded as, in the main, passive material to be moulded by the heaven- or blood- favoured few. Again, human and animal and plant were conceived as fashioned from the outside, sustained and guided by a power or powers not themselves. It is not difficult to infer the type of world-view that must inevitably have issued from such social and scientific habits of thought. The world would be regarded as passive material, fashioned and guided by a power or powers not itself. It is not surprising, then, to find everywhere in ancient and Middle Age philosophy, both eastern and western, this dominant thought of an oligarchic government of the universe. On the other hand, the spirit of modern thought is democratic, dynamic. Human society is not in the main passive material, moulded to the will of the few. It is self-active, self-sustaining, self-advancing. Again, human and animal and plant are no longer regarded as fashioned from the outside, to remain fixed in their respective spheres. Through ceaseless activity they are fashioning themselves, creating, through their own mass-struggle, new problems and new destinies. Is it difficult to infer the type of philosophy that must issue from this democratic-developmental thought of the present? Certainly we may say at once that it will have no sympathy with the typical “ruler” and “guide” views of the past. Ruling and guiding must be from within society, operative through the actions and reactions of each and every member. I would lay stress upon the last clause. The democratic ideal calls for the abrogation

of all exclusive class privilege. It holds that all persons have fundamentally the same kind of privilege. Would it not seem to follow, then, that to invest one being or one power with a vision and a control radically different in kind from all other beings, is to return to the unbiological, oligarchic spirit of a class-constituted society. Or, to state the matter more clearly, to divide the universe into two mutually exclusive kinds of being, one absolute in perfection and power, the other limited and imperfect, would be to continue into modern life a habit of thought bred in the older externalistic spirit of class status. Let us then state the issue frankly: a philosophy fashioned in the spirit of democratic-biological ideals will inevitably repudiate whatever of monarchic or oligarchic still lingers in the god-views of the present. We are well enough aware that these elements do still linger, that the conception of a supreme person ordained in the nature of things to be eternally perfect, as against the mass of beings struggling with imperfections, is still the prevalent thought. But the continuance of such a monarchic view means simply that the biological-democratic way of thought has not yet grown into a habit of our life. Eventually, no doubt, it will do so. Until it does, we may be assured that the old oligarchic habits of thought will still linger. As philosophers, however, this need give us little concern; for preliminary to the thought-habit must come the thought not yet grown into a habit. If democracy is a concept that must inevitably displace the older ways of thought, we shall be wise if, instead of waiting to be violently dispossessed of the old interpretations, we seek consciously to adjust our older habits to the demands of the living situation. Nor should one fear overmuch the thought of changing the accepted meaning of God. Such changes have been continuous with the advance of civilisation. It would be folly, then, to hold that any view inherited by our day and generation is to have the unprecedented privilege of remaining unchanged *in sæcula sæculorum*. It is truer to history to accept the fact that god-views alter as society changes, and



to set vigorously about the task of finding how the truly momentous changes in contemporary thought and life are to affect our view of God.

It is a well-known psychological fact that we seldom conceive any great significance to attach to the present or the near-at-hand. All the great events, we are sure, happened in the far past, or at some distance. Yet I venture to say—although it will sound inexcusably oracular—that the present change in social and scientific outlook is gradually effecting a modification of our idea of God which, in the accomplished result, will be as profoundly momentous as any of the great changes of the past. There was the slow transition from an unordered animism to a systematised polytheism; from polytheism to monolatry; from monolatry to monotheism; from simple monotheism to tri-theistic monotheism; and from tri-theistic monotheism to a purer form of monotheism. I believe that in western civilisation we are to-day witnessing the transition from the last of the oligarchic views of the universe to a view of the world consistent with the spirit of evolutionary democracy.

“This new spirit, forming itself, as it were, upon the restless sea of humanity, will, without doubt, determine the future sense of God and destiny. The deistic conception of an age now completely past, that God is some distant monarch, will fade into the darkness with the social system which gave it rise; and society as a federal union, in which each individual and every form of human association shall find free and full scope for a more abundant life, will be the large figure from which is projected the conception of the God in whom we live and move and have our being.”<sup>1</sup> It is this “large figure,” not simply of human, but of cosmic society, which is to yield our God of the future. It is the figure of myriad lives, and yet of one vast group life, in ceaseless activity. There is no place in

<sup>1</sup> “Democracy: a New Unfolding of Human Power,” by Robert A. Woods; in *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology by Former Students of Charles Edward Garman*. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1906.

the figure for an eternally perfect being, and no need: no need, for the vast society by its own inherent mass-dialectic—of struggle and adaptation, co-operation and conflict—is working out its own destiny; no place, for the society, democratic from end to end, can brook no such radical class distinction as that between a supreme being favoured with eternal and absolute perfection and the mass of beings doomed to the lower ways of imperfect struggle. It is the large figure out of which is projected the conception of the God *that is ourselves*, in whom and of whom we literally are; the God that, in every act and intention, *we, with all our countless fellows, are realising*. Nor is it indeed a God, as idealistic absolutists would have it, in whom our imperfect actions vanish in perfection, but one in whom they are the means whereby, out of an imperfect present, a less imperfect future is being wrought. It is a God that in one respect is in the making, growing with the growth of the world; suffering and sinning and conquering with it; a God, in short, that *is* the world in the spiritual unity of its mass-life.

Such is the new type of view which, it would seem, must eventually displace the rapidly waning monotheism of past social orders. That it is already in process of formation is witnessed by the increasing insistence among progressive religious thinkers that if the conception of God is to be retained it must be the conception of a God *growing with the world*—in time and change and progress—a God in and of the total world-process. That it will be a view incomparably better fitted to the spirit of our day than the various theisms of the past, one may firmly believe. Indeed, there are many signs that point to a more or less general dissatisfaction with the traditional world-view. In religious circles it expresses itself in a vague unrest and incipient scepticism, a feeling of the unreality of the accustomed religious ministrations and admonitions. In philosophy it expresses itself either in an entire indifference to the whole question, or in the frank reconstruction of world-views along lines other than those of



the traditional theisms ; while in that indeterminate but always significant realm of ordinary men who think for themselves, it expresses itself in a vast medley of new religions, cults, beliefs, practices, panaceas. There is here much the same unrest as was evident in the years immediately preceding the birth of Christianity. It is too easy a solution to denounce the present age as decadent, irreligious. It is wiser to note the splendid new ways of thought, the deeper and more far-reaching new valuations of life. It is not because the age is decadent that it prays less fervently, "Thy kingdom come." It is because the whole conception of a kingdom and of an eternally ordained guardian of the kingdom is becoming more and more impossible for an age increasingly permeated with the spirit of democracy. The world-order that shall in the future win men's devotion and love and co-operation must be a world-order thoroughly and consistently democratic in structure. It is for that reason that monotheism must pass, and some form of view consistent with a cosmic evolutionary democracy must take its place. In the words of Joachim de Lyra : "The Kingdom of the Father has passed ; the Kingdom of the Son is passing ; the Kingdom (which, indeed, is the democracy) of the Spirit is to come."<sup>1</sup>

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NEW YORK.

<sup>1</sup> At the time this paper was submitted for publication, Professor Lovejoy remarked its similarity to an article of Thomas Davidson, published in the *International Journal of Ethics*, October 1899 (vol. x, pp. 21-41), entitled "American Democracy as a Religion," an article which, the writer confessed, he had not read. It is a pleasure for the writer now to record his appreciation of Mr Davidson's brilliant exposition of democracy as religion.

## SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 6.

### THE NEEDS OF DISCHARGED PRISONERS.

R. S. NOLAN.

ON 20th July 1910 Mr Churchill, as Home Secretary, announced certain important changes with regard to the discharge of convicts and their relations to the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies dealing with them. These changes, which referred only to convicts, that is, prisoners sentenced to penal servitude, were put into operation in April 1911. They are, briefly, as follows:—A Central Association has been formed, whose Council consists of representatives of Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies dealing with convicts, and of officials of the Prisons Commission, with the Home Secretary as President. All convicts are discharged through this central body, which is to allocate them to the different Societies. It is the duty of the Societies to make the best provision possible for the convicts allocated to them on discharge, to continue to exercise some care and observation in their regard, and to report upon them to the Central Association. Financial help is often granted to the Societies for the needs of particular cases. The convict, on the other hand, is supposed to perform his part of the relationship by proving himself amenable to the efforts made by the Society on his behalf: in many cases he is remitted from the hitherto existing duty of a monthly report to the police while he is still on licence, and of a report of



every change of address, but if he proves recalcitrant he may be relegated to that duty.

The aim of the Society will be to establish or re-establish the convict as firmly as possible in an honest life. Some convicts are quite unfit for the battle of life if they are to observe its rules. They will profess with pathetic helplessness their willingness to do "anything," not reflecting how much harder it is to do "something." They have some mental or physical defect which bars to them, in fact, all the ways of livelihood open to others of their social class. State or State-aided provision, attended with State or State-sanctioned supervision, seems to be the only remedy for them. To restore them to absolute freedom in a life which they cannot for one month materially maintain with honesty seems a mockery.

There are others whose moral equipment is so twisted or so scanty that, even if they are provided with a means of honest livelihood, their perseverance in it, unless fostered by an exceptional measure of external care or by exceptional good fortune, will be highly improbable.

To many others this latter statement applies in less and less degree, while some are strongly desirous of casting away from themselves completely the episode of crime and penal servitude, and of starting and maintaining a normal life. Of these last-named, some are persons who have committed only one crime, though one of so serious a nature as to have resulted in penal servitude. Their crime may have been the outcome of an unfortunate combination of circumstances at a given period. Sometimes their unhappy experience has developed in them a deeper and keener sense which will help them to make a more serious and determined use of any chance given to them than one who has never had such experience might make of it.

The Society is probably constituted mainly of voluntary workers giving as much as possible of their time to the work. It will seek to enlist the services of volunteers who will be ready to take a personal interest in the welfare of individual

convicts. The value of personal interest in this particular province of social work is perhaps greater than in any other. If the convict once comes to feel that he has a personal friend anxious to help him along the road of which the convict himself may have only a very dim and blurred vision, a big step will have been already taken. To some the feeling will not come at all easily. A sense of gratitude or obligation or of responsibility of any kind seems never to develop itself in some, so sheerly callous and characterless is their nature. But in many imprisonment develops a genuine desire to trust, which, if not provided with an opportunity of exercising itself at the time, will probably rapidly disappear.

A feature which must strike most persons who have had experience of this work is the complete alteration which often happens almost simultaneously with the actual discharge from prison. The liberation from the actual restraint of prison seems often almost automatically to obliterate the impression which it had made, and the view and purpose which had resulted. This is more especially noticeable in convicts, on account of the longer and keener separation from ordinary life which penal servitude involves: thus, it seems to afford an additional argument for the use of the licence advocated below.

The friend must have made himself well acquainted with the history and with the circumstances of the convict. Often the domestic bearings of his case are such that he cannot be treated as a unit; but if anything is to be done to raise him, something must be done for his family too. The efforts which the friend is to make for him must be thorough if they are to produce a real result, and the relationship should be more or less constant till the convict seems to be fairly secure. This will mean a different period in different cases.

In many cases an interval of regular work is not a sure sign that the great, peculiar dangers of the average convict character are left behind. The possession of an unusually large number of shillings in his pocket, or the fact of having taken too much



drink, may prove fatal occasions, and may lead to breaks which seem wholly inexplicable unless one realises that the man's character consists as yet almost entirely of an anarchical mass of impulses. Continuity of purpose or, in other words, perseverance with the intention of it, has yet to be in some degree attained.

Periods of unemployment are most dangerous, both on account of the condition of being idle and on account of the pressure of consequent distress. During such periods the friend ought to redouble his touch with the convict.

Even apart from this most desirable individual relationship, there are many other ways in which valuable social service can be rendered. The scope of a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society allows of wide activity. Sometimes the most successful cases have been settled with little or no money expended, merely through the generous application of personal service. Relatives, when prudently approached, will occasionally be ready to provide a complete solution of the difficulty. An interview with a former master sometimes results in re-employment, and a personal explanation of the needs of a particular prisoner will often induce a generous employer to give the stranger a chance on his discharge. There is a vast correspondence to be conducted. Communications have to be made with Government departments and with officials of the colonies or foreign countries. In these and numerous other ways there is a vast field for social service. What the active Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society cries out for even more than for further funds is "further workers."

The foregoing observations as to the need of personal effort apply likewise to prisoners other than convicts. In their province, just because it is so much larger, the need of voluntary workers is much greater. Some of these prisoners have already received a sentence of penal servitude, and many of them will receive it unless serious efforts are made to pull them up.

The principles upon which the alterations initiated by

Mr Churchill are based show a marked progress. They tend to co-ordinate the work of the different Societies. The chief defect seems to be that the most important use of the system of licence continues, in the main, to be disregarded. The licence is, properly, a conditional release granted to convicts before the period of their sentence has expired. Two of the conditions upon which it is granted are that the holder of the licence shall not habitually associate with notoriously bad characters, and that he shall not lead an idle and dissolute life, without visible means of obtaining an honest livelihood. In addition to the conditions, the licence contains a notice that the breach of any of them will cause the licence to be forfeited. But in practice it has generally only been forfeited if the holder has been convicted of some indictable offence—among indictable offences being the failure to comply with the aforesaid duty of reporting himself. A consequence has been that convicts have often been enjoying their licence in absolute disregard of, at least, the second of the two conditions mentioned above. Thus the most beneficial use of the licence, which is one of the most important parts of the whole convict system, has been neglected. What is so acutely needed is the power of controlling the convict's movements during the period next following his discharge. Until in logical extension of, if not already in logical consistency with, the words granting the licence, it is to be forfeited upon the convict's wantonly failing to adopt and to persevere in some reasonable means of an honest livelihood offered to him, the policy of dealing with discharged convicts can never be really efficient, and one cannot hope to attain any considerable reduction in the alarming figures of recidivism. Moreover, in the proposal by a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society of any plan for a convict's livelihood on discharge, a reasonable regard should be had to the avoidance of occasions of relapse into crime, such as abstaining from the old ostensible means of livelihood, abandonment of the old locality, etc.; and in their reasonable regard to such important points the Society ought



to be able to count upon the due official support which the control of the licence should be able to supply. Without that support the efforts of the Society must in many cases be wasted.

Having inaugurated the new policy as regards convicts, the Prisons Commissioners have been turning their attention to the needs of the prisoners discharged from the various local prisons, and to the work of the numerous local Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies on their behalf. The number of persons received into local prisons under sentence of imprisonment or of penal servitude, or of detention in Borstal Institutions, during the year ending 31st March 1911, excluding those sentenced by courts-martial, was 167,695. This figure does not include debtors or persons imprisoned on civil process, and it is pleasing to note that it shows a decrease of 12,226 as compared with the previous year. Out of this number, 105,287 had been previously convicted. 17,590 had from six to ten previous convictions. The total number sentenced to prison as distinguished from penal servitude, those sent to Borstal Institutions being excluded, was 166,249. Of this number, 12,289 had over twenty previous convictions. The report does not tell us what were the offences of which these persons were last or previously convicted. But it will not be rash to conclude that, as regards many of them, their having been sentenced to imprisonment instead of penal servitude was a matter of luck on their part. The gamut of sentences for similar offences by prisoners with almost similar records is an amazingly long one, and why in this particular case such a high key was struck, and why in that case quite a low key, is often a question beyond the comprehension of the ordinary student. Undeniably, it is most desirable that Courts should have a discretion, so as to be enabled to apportion the sentence to each particular case; but the difficulty occasionally is to ascertain how far any discretion was applied. To begin with, a good deal of unevenness in the apportionment of sentences is caused by the fact that so often Courts of Summary

Jurisdiction, with their limited powers, deal with offenders who might before a Court of Assize or of Quarter Sessions receive a sentence of penal servitude.

There is in a very large number of cases no substantial difference between the man who has been sentenced to penal servitude and the man who has been sentenced to imprisonment. This is the pregnant fact which it seems important to bear in mind. Many a man sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour comes from persons of precisely the same category as regards surroundings, habits, mode of life, and all other circumstances as the average convict. The fact that the one receives a sentence shorter in duration and different in system from that received by the other is important. But the most important fact is that, whereas the convict upon his release from confinement has only a conditional freedom and is subject to supervision, the other acquires absolute freedom and is subject to no supervision—the comparatively unusual cases where a supplemental sentence of police supervision is passed excepted. From the point of view of the person sentenced, the hard-labour prisoner scores; from the point of view of the person interested in the attempted reformation of criminals and the diminution of recidivism, the convict scores. The studious observer asks in wonder, “What fundamental cause is there for this fundamental distinction in result?” The answer seems to be, “None: it is pure accident.”

The report of the Prisons Commissioners tells us that, analogously to their recent policy with regard to the aid of convicts, the desirability of creating a confederation of all the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies operating in local prisons is under consideration. The report gives no hint of any suggestion that, as far as possible, an analogous, or any, control over persons discharged from these prisons should be sought.

In their methods as a whole there is a distinct need for a closer co-ordination between all the different Societies. The co-operation of efficient Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies is



an essential element in an efficient penal administration. Similarly to the important new policy concerning convicts whereby they are all to be discharged through the new Central Association, and are to be allocated to and dealt with by one or other of the Societies for aiding convicts, so all prisoners coming at all within the category of criminals ought to be discharged through some Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society. In the application of this policy to local prisoners there are, undoubtedly, difficulties to be considered. Whereas, in the year ending 31st March 1911, 1320 convicts were discharged, there were 202,397 persons discharged from the various local prisons, of whom, however, some were not within the category here under consideration. But on the other hand, whereas there are only five societies which deal with convicts, there are sixty which deal with local prisoners. It is quite true that for many of these prisoners, whose numbers are so great, no substantial efforts can be made by a Society. But it is also true that for a considerable proportion of convicts no substantial effort can be made, many of them being fit for nothing but institutions which refuse them, or for the work-house which they refuse. But even if no such effort could be made, there would be some general gain in the fact that their cases had come before the committee of a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society and had been duly considered. The committee would carefully note the fact of the consideration and the grounds upon which it had been resolved that nothing could be done. Such a circumstance would be entitled to the notice of any tribunal which might have subsequently to deal with the person concerned. By means of this system there would be a record of every re-convicted offender, stating his position on any previous discharge from prison. It would be a valuable guide to the Court in the infliction of the most fitting sentence, and it would often show the past in its real light, as is due to the prisoner, instead of leaving the Court merely to the assistance of, often, too vague information as to what work he has not done. After all, no efforts by

the most zealous administrative officials to stem recidivism can be generally successful unless the infliction of sentences is methodically directed towards the same end.

But for the recidivist, or the offender who is in danger of becoming such, it is not enough, even if it were always desirable, to have long confinement: it is necessary to have a period of qualified freedom. More especially in the case of youthful criminals there is a crying need for such treatment. Every Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society in a town of any size must have had experience of some youthful prisoner who might, probably, have stood a good chance of doing better if he could have been got away from the town; and the Society may have been in a position to send him to sea, or to a farm, or to work in a country district, but it has not been in a position to put any pressure upon him, and so to overcome his own instinctive clinging to the old town life and the solicitations of worthless relations and friends. Probably most persons who have directed some effort to the question of dealing with discharged prisoners will have been, from time to time, struck with the thought how easy it is for certain persons, perhaps more accurately described as being in a certain class of circumstances than as being themselves a class, to drift into a criminal mode of life, especially if once convicted and not consequently subjected to due precautionary measures. Some period of probationary freedom would be attained if the remission which Lord Gladstone, as Home Secretary, rendered earnable on all sentences exceeding a very few weeks in duration were made conditional also on the prisoner's conduct at the time of discharge and during the remitted period. But in many cases even of fairly considerable sentence the period so acquired would not be sufficient. A difficulty—not serious for the legislature—must occasionally present itself in the fact that a sentence of imprisonment may not exceed two years in duration. The normal substantial sentence of imprisonment ought to carry with it, whether by remission to be gained or a supplemental sentence which



Courts might be empowered to pass, or a combination of both, a proportionately substantial period of only conditionally licensed freedom. It would be highly desirable that very many sentences, even though not substantial in duration, should carry with them some such period. During that period the relation of the prisoner to the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society ought to be, in all its main features, the same as that which should subsist between the licensed convict and the Society to whose care he has been committed, subject to any central, official or other, supervision which may be desirable. His liberty during that period should be conditional on his avoiding courses which may reasonably be said to lead to grave danger of relapse into crime, and on his adopting and persevering in some reasonable means of honest livelihood which may be provided for him. Many a prisoner still in early manhood might, probably, have been saved from recurring convictions and punishment if, on discharge from one or other of his early sentences, he had been subject to that effective control which the presence of the alternative of a return to prison supplies. It is difficult to think of any other possible control: one cannot think of one more reasonable. In regard both to convicts and to other prisoners, any policy falling short of such control, no matter how great an improvement it may be on a previously existing system, is still one which only plays around the point instead of playing upon it.

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## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### MR LANDA AND THE FUTURE OF JUDAISM IN ENGLAND.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1912, p. 168.)

THE temperate article by Mr Landa on "The Future of Judaism in England" contains various errors, one or two of which it may be worth while to correct.

1. It is untrue that the new Liberal Jewish Synagogue in Hill Street is "outside the general community to such an extent that negotiations for burial rights in a Jewish cemetery have been broken off." On the contrary, the authorities of the Upper Berkeley Street Synagogue have kindly placed a certain number of grave-spaces at our disposal in their cemetery, and, if their ground had been less limited in size, they would have given us more.

2. The statements about Reform and Liberal Judaism in America on p. 173 contain a number of inaccuracies, from which I select the following :

- (a) It is inaccurate that, in America, there is an "open competition between the Reform Ministers in the introduction of innovations."
- (b) It is inaccurate that "the ancient ritual has been metamorphosed out of all resemblance and keeping with Judaism."
- (c) It is inaccurate that "it is much more akin to Christianity in its concepts, its appearance, and its practice."
- (d) It is inaccurate that "the Sabbath has been changed from Saturday to Sunday." Out of the very large number of Liberal Jewish synagogues, there are not more than two or three which have no service on Saturday. Very many have no service on Sunday. Some have service both on Saturday and Sunday. In Cairo, Englishmen in the service of the Egyptian Government have to work on Sundays; therefore, there are special Church services on Friday, the Mohammedan rest day. Even so, because the immense majority of American Jews have to work on Saturdays, services have been arranged for them on Sunday mornings.
- (e) "Marriage with non-Jews is countenanced by some ministers." There are very few indeed of such ministers. And if "countenanced" means "approved" or "encouraged," there are none.



All that can be said is that a very few ministers, rather than that there should be no *religious* sanction whatever to the marriage, prefer, as the lesser of two evils, to give that sanction themselves. And, even in these few cases, it is, I believe, often stipulated that any offspring of the marriage are to be educated as Jews.

(f) "The weekly reading of the Torah (Pentateuch) has been discontinued." Again inaccurate for the *immense majority* of Liberal Jewish synagogues.

As regards the New Testament and the right position of Jesus in the Jewish religion, it would not be easy to find out, without much wider knowledge than either Mr Landa or I possess, the exact state of the case. A good deal depends upon the sense assigned to the word "prophet." Personally, I should not be disposed to quarrel with the American Jews, if their assessment of Jesus were on the lines indicated by Mr Landa. But it is rather strange that I should just have received a letter from an eminent Christian divine in New York, in which he says: "It has been a cause of surprise to me, as well as of deep regret, to see how completely many of your co-religionists, in other respects men of breadth and intelligence, have surrendered their own right to Jesus without protest. The recent *Theology of Reformed Judaism*, published by Dr Kohler, is a notable example of this." Now Dr Kohler is one of the most prominent Liberal Rabbis in America, and he is the head of the Hebrew Union College for the training of Liberal Jewish ministers for all the United States.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

### "CONFORMITY AND VERACITY, 1662 and 1912."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1912, p. 816.)

DR CALLAWAY's point against me (on p. 197 of the October *Hibbert*) depends partly on a misapprehension. When I asked, "Is religion concerned with this?" the word "this" was not meant to refer to verbal veracity, as Dr Callaway supposes, but to the use of words as vehicles of mere information. I quite agree with him that veracity "is essential to wisdom, power, and holiness," and that what appears to be unverity in the clergy has an evil effect on the laity. Indeed, my paper would be meaningless on any other assumption.

Still, there is an important difference between Dr Callaway's view of veracity and my own. I do not regard the use of an expression like "God spake" as necessarily false because it is not literally true. If we speak of God at all we must needs speak in metaphor, and metaphor which is accepted as metaphor must be tested in its degree of truth by some other standard than that of verbal veracity. In fact, I cannot regard words as possessing in their own right a fixed intrinsic meaning. We are not to speak of "true words" or "false words." By verbal veracity I understand truthfulness in the use of words, and this depends partly on the candour of the speaker, partly also on the degree of correspondence

between the sense in which they are spoken and the sense in which they are likely to be understood.

If, for instance, the whole "Apostles' Creed" were recited and understood in a special sense—as metaphor, as symbol, as a form which conveys spiritual but not historic truth—I should not regard the terms "true" and "false," in Dr Callaway's use of those terms, as applicable or relevant to it. The clauses which refer to the Ascension, the Heavenly Dwelling, the Second Advent of Christ are, I believe, as a rule emptied of all physical meaning by the worshippers who recite them, and are used as picturesque symbols of vague spiritual intuitions. What troubles me in the Creed is the opportunist fashion in which the clergy of to-day play fast and loose with this principle.

The Creed may be purely symbolic; it may be literal. Can it be a patchwork of literal and symbolic phrases, with no mark to show where literal interpretation is abandoned and symbolic begins? Take the great second clause, with its long list of participles referring to Jesus Christ: συλληφθέντα . . . , γεννηθέντα . . . , παθόντα . . . , σταυρωθέντα, θανόντα καὶ ταφέντα, κατελθόντα . . . , ἀναστάντα . . . , ἀνελθόντα . . . , καθεξόμενον: the first, seventh, ninth, and tenth of these predicates are, as a rule, with the goodwill of the bishops, recited in a symbolic sense only; a symbolic force is gradually being given to the eighth; the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth are (all but universally) intended and accepted literally; we have lately seen an attempt to raise the second into the region of symbol denounced and punished by a bishop. All this within one sentence!

Now, is this Creed used to convey information? Is it, in fact, a public avowal of personal belief? If so, considering the great difference between the critical culture of the clergy and that of the laity, it is and must be so thickly beset with peril to veracity that scrupulously veracious men will refrain from reciting it. If, however, the convention could be in some way established that (whatever the private views of separate worshippers might be) the Creed in church is not an avowal of personal opinion but a religious poem, bodying forth the wisdom, power, and holiness of the Supreme, then the question of verbal veracity could no longer touch it. The Creed might still be obnoxious to criticism on other levels, but it would no longer exclude from the Church men whose sole disability for the sacred ministry is their scrupulous truthfulness.

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## MODERNISM AND THE PROTESTANT CONSCIOUSNESS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1912, pp. 63-84.)

MODERNISM is apparently trying to find something that will be independent of critical scholarship and science (p. 76, first par.); and it seems to find it in the Christian conscience of to-day (p. 77, middle). "The primitive



factor and permanent agent is Christ, not Jesus of Nazareth imprisoned in the bonds of the past, but Christ identical with the Spirit immanent in the Christian conscience" (p. 77). It is a spirit alive and pervading society, a living tradition influencing conduct rather than thought, a spiritual tradition which has reached us and entered into us "according to the laws of psychology and history," transmitted, I suppose, through the influence of family affection and respect and the prestige of the great (pp. 74-5). It is not a matter of a teacher and his mere teaching, but it is the apprehension and absorption of his personality within us, a Divine indwelling and saving spirit. This is the permanent essence of Christianity (p. 74). It is not an intellectual or doctrinal tradition, but "a tradition of spiritual life."

I dare say most people will agree that the Christian spirit is the important thing, and to be of any good it must be absorbed by us; but the main question that concerns Professor Lobstein is, "Whether religious faith can remain fettered to the personality of the terrestrial Jesus" (p. 71), apparently—whether we can dispense with the "Gospel of Christ" as given in the New Testament, and which Harnack has spent years in studying, to discover it in its simplest terms (p. 70, top). Is this study all futile? Is the Record useless; and is Tradition, as living to-day, all-sufficient? I am ready to yield its full due to living Tradition. As Professor M'Dougall has said: "All that constitutes culture and civilisation, all, or nearly all, that distinguishes the highly cultured European intellectually and morally from the men of the Stone Age of Europe, is summed up in the word 'tradition,' i.e. a living tradition with its guiding hand, not a lifeless tradition with its cold dead hand. We know, *e.g.*, that in certain historic families there have been handed down from one generation to another high and honourable traditions. There was some one, however, who gave the first great impetus to them, great enough to impress the imagination of his descendants. But they have not tied themselves to the details of the life of this great original personality, but only to his main line of life, his dominating principle or principles. It is not necessary, perhaps, to know him as he was "imprisoned in the bonds of the past." When we talk of the spirit of Cromwell or Luther we do not mean their whole lives, but their governing passion. This is what mainly lives on in tradition. But who does not know that tradition may also weaken and die out altogether, or may become distorted and corrupted, where it has experienced not "evolution," but has been poisoned? One generation of our "historic family" may become utterly indifferent to its past ideals, or quite sceptical as to their utility or beauty. There is a complete break in the living spiritual tradition. And how is it to be revived, if there is no other connection with the past, no record of some sort of what has gone before? Whereas, if there is such a record, the tradition stands a great chance of being revived again. Has not this been the case in the history of Christianity? Have there not been times when practically the whole Church has forgotten, or distorted, or forsaken the high Christian tradition,

and has been animated by a totally different spirit? And has it not been the discovery of the Gospel narratives once more that has produced a real revival of religion and of the great tradition? Where is the influence to-day of the non-literary prophets, like Elijah and Elisha, compared with that of the "literary" prophets of Israel? Wellhausen tells us (*Encycl. Biblica*, cols. 3177-8) that Moab and Israel had a common origin, and the same religious traditions; but whilst Moab became extinct, Israel has "issued in eternity," mainly through the service of her prophets. It will be well for us to remember the kernel of truth contained in Gibbon's words (*Decline and Fall*, chap. ix.): "The use of letters is the principal circumstance that distinguishes a civilised people from a herd of savages incapable of knowledge or reflection. *Without that artificial help, the human memory soon dissipates or corrupts the ideas intrusted to her charge*; and the nobler faculties of the mind, no longer supplied with models or with materials, gradually forget their powers; the judgment becomes feeble and lethargic, the imagination languid or irregular. . . . Without some species of writing, no people has ever . . . made any considerable progress."

I, therefore, do not think it wise to belittle the records of the past and ignore their study. They contain more than contradictory details; they preserve a great guiding spirit, which Providence does not favour the world with every day; and to trust to mere tradition without the help of this corrective record, is to trust to that which is liable to all kinds of distortion, degeneration, and decay.

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## A NATIVE FIJIAN ON THE DECLINE OF HIS RACE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1912, p. 85.)

THIS essay has more than an academic interest, as Mr Hocart is probably well aware. No information is given as to the age and condition of the writer, but from internal evidence I take him to be very young and perhaps a disappointed aspirant to the native Civil Service. The originality of his ideas seems to occupy his mind more than any sense of religious truth; he strikes a false note when he implies that Fijians pity white men, for, though such a feeling does occur to Fijians, it is always in respect of the physical and not the mental inferiority of the white race. Compare the following letter written to me in Fijian in 1893 when the minds of the natives were exercised with the heavy infant mortality:—"There appears to me to be but one reason for the decrease: it is the white gentlemen who live among us. (1) They are blighting us, the natives, and we are withering away. A chief cannot live with his inferiors, wearing the same clothes and using the same mat or the same pillow: in a few days the neck or the belly of the low-born man will swell and he will die: his chief has blighted



him. It is so with the white chief and us natives. (2) A plant cannot grow under the shade of a great ivi tree. It is the same with the gentlemen from the great lands who live among us : that is why we are decreasing. . . . Let us practise religion."

Because Mr Hocart's less simple-minded Fijian is guilty of affectation it does not follow that he is wholly insincere, or that his ingenious doctrine, or a variant of it, would not attract a following. If the man really persuades himself of the truth of what he writes and has some driving power behind his preaching, he may become a serious political danger. The people of the Lau sub-group, to which he belongs, have always shown independence in religious matters. At this moment there is a party in Lakemba agitating to break away from the Wesleyan Conference and to establish a free church maintained by natives on the Tongan model. Our essayist will therefore be sowing in a fertile soil. In the early 'eighties the orthodox natives of Lakemba and Lomaloma were scandalised by a report that angels had appeared in the remote island of Matuku. The "angels" proved to be natives who professed inspiration, and on the intervention of the Government they relapsed into their former mortal state. Close beneath the phlegmatic surface of the Fijian there runs a strong current of neurotic hysteria unsuspected by the Europeans who know him best. The early converts often startled their missionary by their paroxysms of Pentecostal frenzy. Even the revival meetings permitted by the Wesleyan missionaries fail to satisfy certain cravings for histrionic excitement that are at the root of their emotional nature. Only last year the magistrate at Lomaloma discovered that the forbidden heathen cult of the "water-children" (*Luve-ni-wai*) was being secretly practised by Christian natives at the back of the island. The precepts of our essayist are not quite new. It is true that Ndungumoi, the prophet of the Tuka heresy in 1885, went a little further, for he discovered that the Kalou Vu were none other than the Christian Trinity under Fijian names, and that on a given day they would return and drive the foreigners out of the country. If he had not been laid by the heels murder would have been done upon Europeans in outlying districts. To go a little further afield, one may recall the confusion of Christian and pagan theology among the Hauhaus at the time of the Maori War. The Fijians propitiated their Kalou Vu with sacrifice, and the bodies of slain men were more acceptable than those of pigs. It makes matters no easier that our essayist is right in his main contention that the decline of his race dates from the desertion of the ancestral gods, since apostasy went with the decay of customary law, the introduction of European diseases, and the loss of the incentive to exertion provided by intertribal war. It is now too late to go back, and in the interests of the natives as well as the Europeans the Colonial Government will do well to keep a close watch upon our essayist and his friends.

BASIL THOMSON.

# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE new volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (N.S. xii., London, Williams & Norgate, 1912), containing the papers read before the Society during the session 1911-1912, is full of interesting and important matter, and deserves to be widely known. The Presidential Address by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars," handles a perennial theme with much freshness and originality. Mr Russell holds that the dualism between entities of the two classes, universals and particulars, is ultimate, although he does not feel the grounds in favour of its ultimate nature to be very conclusive. Particulars enter into complexes only as the subjects of predicates or the terms of relations, and, if they belong to the world of which we have experience, exist in time, and cannot occupy more than one place at one time in the space to which they belong; universals can occur as predicates or relations in complexes, do not exist in time, and have no relation to one place which they may not simultaneously have to another. Two symposia are included in the volume. The first is concerned with what is called the time difficulty in perception. The "difficulty" has been formulated thus: the sensible appearance of an object is necessarily synchronous with the perceptive state, whereas the object (*i.e.* that phase of it which is perceived) belongs to an earlier moment. Dr H. Wildon Carr argues that the only theory of perception which effectually disposes of the difficulty is that of Bergson. Principal Jevons insists that the difficulty is due to a confusion of percept and concept. What we *conceive* may be something that was, but what we *perceive* is always what is. On the other hand, Professor W. Brown maintains that what we perceive is always what was; we see the sun as it was eight minutes ago, not as it is now; we are compresent with the past sun. Finally, in a concluding paper, the writer of this survey contends that if we distinguish the conditions involved in the genesis of the cognitive act from the conditions



involved in that act's relation to the object, there is no reason for supposing that we do not apprehend the actually present object. The second symposium is on "Purpose and Mechanism." Professor Sorley opens the discussion by attempting to limit the issues and to render them precise. He argues that whilst purpose does not provide a new supply of energy or of material, it does control them in a way which must be described as non-mechanical, and that this control takes the form of guiding the direction of movement. Mr A. D. Lindsay finds the ground of distinction between purpose and mechanism to be, that a purposive system is one which has unity in time, whilst a mechanical system is one whose unity is spatial. Dr Bosanquet emphasises the importance of mechanism even in finite purpose, and insists that a mechanical system, if it has qualities, as it must have to operate mechanically, cannot be purely spatial. Professor James Ward contributes some valuable critical notes to the discussion. If we are prepared, after the manner of Leibniz, to regard the organism in a psychophysical system as consisting of organisms of varying degrees in orderly array, Professor Ward thinks there are no appalling difficulties in the so-called "guidance theories." Miss Beatrice Edgell's paper on "Imagery and Memory" is an able attempt to show, as against Professor Alexander's "conational psychology," that in memory there is always presentation involved, in different grades of distinctness. She argues from this that inability to detect this factor introspectively is no reason for denying its presence in other forms of cognition.

The current number of *Logos* (iii. 2) opens with an extremely able and suggestive article on "Systematische Methode" from the pen of one of the younger members of the Marburg School, Dr Nicolai Hartmann, the author of a work that ought to be more widely known than it is in England, *Platos Logik des Seins* (Giessen, 1909). Dr Hartmann points out that it is one thing to make use of a method, and another thing to be aware of the principles involved in that method. Whilst method is a first condition of knowledge, the knowledge required to grasp its nature and character is the culmination of knowledge. He tries to indicate the features of a systematic method by showing how the empirical (or "descriptive") method on the one hand, and the dialectic method on the other, are connected with the transcendental method which is the natural starting-point. The latter is that mode of procedure according to which, the reality of an object being recognised, the conditions of its possibility are sought. For philosophical investigation, the *a priori* conditions are never immediately given; they have always to be discovered. Only the object is given but not *as object*, that is, not with those determinations which first constitute it into an object, but only in the form of an anticipation, a problem. The transcendental method rests upon the results of the special sciences; it takes these results as its factum. And description, not simply a noting of particulars, but an interpretation of them in general notions, is involved in all the special sciences. Even the *Grenzgebiet* of logic and psychology makes manifest the claims of the descriptive method. Not in

vain were Plato and Aristotle concerned with  $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ , Leibniz with "confused thought," Kant with the perplexing determinations which the "manifold" already brought with it, Hegel with the phenomenological stage of mental development. So, too, the transcendental method leads to the dialectical. For, the *a priori* conditions or categories have not merely relativity in respect of objects; they are reciprocally related to one another, and together constitute a logical system. It is true that for human thought the ideal of such a method is not attainable,—pure dialectic would be a method for the  $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$  who already had knowledge of the principles, not for the  $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{o}\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma$  who must strive after it,—but human thought is always reaching after that ideal. Under the title "Kategorienprobleme" there is some interesting criticism of Emil Lask's *Logik der Philosophie*, by D. H. Kerler, in the *Arch. f. system. Phil.* (xviii. 3). Lask finds the essence of Kant's critical theory to lie in the transcendence of the assumed duality between object and truth, between being and knowing; truth, according to that theory, is not beyond being, but in it and with it. The writer of the article holds, however, that the *Zweiweltentheorie*, in the sense of a fundamental antithesis between validity (*Geltungsgehalt*) and subsistence (*Bestand*), is justified. In the *Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Phil.* (xxx. 2), Professor Karl Marbe, concluding his "Beiträge zu Logik und ihren Grenzwissenschaften," insists upon the importance of determining, in view of certain familiar philosophical controversies, the precise significance the term "existence" is to bear. He distinguishes five different senses of the term, according as we are speaking of the existence of an object, of what is immediately given, of the causes of experiences (*Erlebnisse*), of what is logically valid, and of laws and commands. Professor F. M. Urban writes, in the same periodical, "Ueber die Unterscheidung zwischen logischer und empirischer Wahrheit," and bases his treatment of the former upon the writings of Russell and Whitehead. A proposition is true empirically when it is the representation of an object given in experience. A scientific system is true empirically when every proposition of the system and every group of propositions, together with all the consequences deduced from them by purely logical operations, have the character of empirical truth. The article in the *Rev. de Métaphysique* for September on "Les conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de l'intuition," by M. Gabriel Marcel, deals with a topic that lately has been much in discussion. The author maintains that a philosophy of intuition can only be constituted on the basis of a dialectic which permits the establishment of the immanence of being as being in mind; that such a dialectic itself assumes a critique of absolute knowledge which manifests the transcendence of thought in relation to knowledge, and that intuition even reduces itself in the end to the act by which thought affirms that it is in itself transcendent of that which in it is only pure objectivity. A very useful account of "Das Problem der Gegenständlichkeit in der modernen Logik," by Dr Heinrich Lanz, appears as an *Ergänzungsheft* (No. 26) of the *Kantstudien*. Especially helpful are the chapters devoted to the work of



Husserl and Meinong—some of the most important of recent philosophical investigation.

I have to chronicle the publication of several translations and reprints of well-known treatises. Miss Haldane and Dr Ross have completed their English version of *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*. The second volume, just issued by the Cambridge Press, contains the whole of the Objections and Replies, which arose through the circulation, by Father Mersenne, of the *Meditations* in manuscript among various theologians and philosophic thinkers. It is greatly to be hoped that Miss Haldane and Dr Ross may be induced to extend their labours, and to give us an English version of the *Recherche de la Vérité* and the *Entretiens* of Malebranche, together with Arnauld's little-known, but wonderfully acute book, *Des vraies et des fausses idées*. The translation by Professor J. S. Phillimore of the *Apollonius* of Philostratus (2 vols., Clarendon Press, 1912) will be welcomed by students of philosophy no less than by those of theology. The translator has written an introduction dealing with both Apollonius and Philostratus. The *Apollonius* he takes to be a philosophical and historical romance. Professor Eucken's *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart* has been rendered into English by Dr Meyrick Booth, under the title *Main Currents of Modern Thought* (London: Unwin, 1912). Eucken is here engaged, as he himself tells us, in trying to grasp the specific character of our age through a study of its more central problems; and, with the object of liberating those problems from what is accidental and transitory, he seeks to throw light on them from the standpoint of the historical development of humanity. The translation, so far as I have been able to test it, seems to be well done. A new edition has been published in two volumes of Renouvier's *Traité de logique général et de logique formelle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1912), which formed the first part of the elaborate work, *Essais de critique générale*. Renouvier develops in the *Logique* the foundations of his system of "Néocriticisme," which certainly marked an era in the history of French speculation. Although in essence Kantian, the system deviated widely from that of Kant's *Critique*. The first two parts of the *Logique* are devoted principally to the establishment of phenomenalism, and to the exclusion of the Absolute and noumenal entities,—to the exclusion, namely, of what Renouvier calls "fetishism in philosophy." The third part contains the analysis of the fundamental laws of phenomena, and instead of Kant's categories the following nine are substituted: Relation, Number, Position, Succession, Quality, Becoming, Causality, Finality, and Personality. In the fourth part, the problem of a unique and total synthesis of phenomena is discussed, and the conclusion reached that, although there must be such a synthesis, it is a synthesis inaccessible to us. But the criticism of knowledge enables us to affirm the liberty and personality of man, and an order in nature compatible with contingency. I am reminded of Shadworth Hodgson's articles on the philosophy of Renouvier in 1881, and this leads me to refer to Dr H. Wildon Carr's article on Shadworth

Hodgson in *Mind* (October 1912). The main task that Hodgson undertook and carried out, Dr Carr indicates, was a thorough analysis of experience. By means of such analysis he endeavoured to show how sense data, directly or by their combination, are evidence of a reality that is not consciousness. The material reality he held to be the condition of the *existence* of that same consciousness which *as a knowing* is the only evidence of that which conditions it. In a third article on "The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy" (*Phil. R.*, September 1912), Professor A. O. Lovejoy refers to the fundamentally important modification in Renouvier's neo-criticism made by Pillon. Both Pillon and Bergson agree, as against Renouvier, that the idea of time envisaged as a continuum similar to space, and represented under the form of a straight line, is an idea which does not correspond to the true nature of duration and succession as they are actually known in experience. But beyond this point the doctrine of Pillon singularly diverges from that of Bergson. Pillon is of opinion that succession as experienced is not a continuum, but a sequence of discrete states, and that it is through our habit of thinking in spatial terms that we have come to imagine that the time which we perceive is, in the mathematical sense, continuous. Professor Lovejoy is of opinion that in his last philosophising James reverted to Renouvier's neo-critical position, as modified by Pillon. "Time itself," said James, "comes to us in drops."

The problem of perception is still uppermost in philosophical discussion. Professor C. A. Strong's three articles on "The Nature of Consciousness" (*Journal of Philosophy*, 20th September, 10th and 24th October) are concerned almost exclusively with that problem. Professor Strong argues that the image, or sensuous fact in perception, is a psychic existence, and that it is the medium of cognition, or the part of the mind concerned in cognising. The part of the mind that perceives is the image itself, and awareness must be a relation passing from it to the object. In a paper on "Consciousness and Object" (*Phil. R.*, November 1912), Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge tries to emphasise the importance of the position that consciousness is not a term, but a relation. It is not, he protests, convincing to criticise what in a relational theory of consciousness is said about perception, or about the relation between the organism and its environment, as if *in that theory* consciousness were still functioning as a term. Mr William W. Carlile contributes to *Mind* (October 1912) an article on "Perception and Intersubjective Intercourse." He maintains that the "transformation of impressions into objects" takes place before the stage of consciousness is reached. In reference to the possibility of intersubjective identification, he emphasises the importance of a distinction between various kinds of sensation. Whereas such sensations as the auditory are open to the experience of an indefinite number of people at once, the muscular and tactual are confined to the experience of one at a time. The primary qualities of matter, based upon the latter sensations, are the products of intersubjective intercourse,



whilst the secondary qualities can be reached at the stage of simple individual sensation. Many readers will welcome a new volume by Professor G. S. Fullerton, entitled *The World We Live In, or Philosophy and Life in the Light of Modern Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1912). The author seeks, in clear and homely language, to do justice to the claims of "Everybody's World"—the world of common experience and of science—as against the violence he conceives to be done to it by such systems of thought as the idealism of Berkeley, the scepticism of Hume, and the phenomenalism of Kant. In a chapter called "Playing with the World," there is an amusing criticism of pragmatism, in the form of a vigorous discussion between Christian and Faithful. The book, as a whole, is an attempt to work out a sober realism, which will not refuse to accept suggestions from the idealist where such seem helpful, but which will take pains not to wrong the unmistakably real world given in experience. Writing on "Henri Bergson: Personalist" (*Phil. R.*, November 1912), Miss M. W. Calkins makes the rather extraordinary discovery of its being "perfectly evident that Bergson regards the human body, all other external objects, mathematical space, and measurable time as the constructions of individual selves." A much truer account of Bergson's position will be found in the article on "Perception and Organic Action," by Professor John Dewey (*Journal of Philosophy*, 21st November 1912). Professor Dewey argues that there is an oscillation between inconsistent views in Bergson's account of perception. According to one view, perception implies indeterminate possibilities (and hence time, freedom, life) in the quality of its operation, subject-matter, and organ; according to the other, indeterminate possibilities are conditions *sine qua non* of the act, but do not qualify its nature as an act nor the nature of its subject-matter. Perception, as Dr Dewey conceives it, is not a choice accomplished all at once, but is a process of choosing. And the perceived subject-matter is not simply a manifestation of conditions antecedent to the organic responses, but is their transformation in the direction of further action.

Two recent handbooks of psychology, each written by a leading psychologist, make one realise how excessively difficult, if not impossible, it is to write a book on psychology suitable for the general reader. Psychology, as a science, can only be fruitfully followed on the basis of a prior philosophical training, by means of which even the meaning and significance of the terms used can alone become clear. Both these books are open, I think, to the objection that they throw a semblance of simplicity over questions which are essentially abstruse. As was to be expected, there is in Mr W. M'Dougall's *Psychology* ("Home University Library") much that will prove helpful and stimulating to the psychologist. What the author has to say on the structure of the mind, on animal behaviour, and on abnormal mental phenomena, is full of suggestive reflection. I note especially the reasons he gives in support of the position that even the more extreme forms of "subconscious activity" are con-

tinuous with normal mental processes rather than of an altogether different order. But, to the *general reader*, the extremely dubious description of psychology as "the positive science of the behaviour of living things" can scarcely be illuminating,—it seems to take for granted that "the manifestation of purpose or the striving to achieve an end" is an ultimate characteristic of mind, itself calling for no psychological explanation. And no indication is given that the view presented of "sense-impression" and its relation to thought is highly questionable and uncertain. So, again, one is dismayed at the summary manner in which such an initial problem as the nature of "introspection" is dismissed. Professor Wundt's *Einführung in die Psychologie* (Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1911), translated into English by Dr Rudolf Pintner under the title *An Introduction to Psychology* (London: George Allen, 1912), is equally ill-adapted for the purpose it was intended to serve. It will be a useful epitome for the psychologist of Wundt's own views as to the nature of association and apperception, of his doctrine of the "Aktualität der Seele," etc., but it is not the book to put into the hands of a beginner. Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's *Instinct and Intelligence* (London: Methuen, 1912) contains many contentions concerning which considerable difference of opinion prevails, but it is a distinct contribution to the difficult subject with which it deals. Using the terms "instinctive" and "intelligent" as adjectives to qualify the word behaviour, the author distinguishes analytically two types of behaviour—a congenital type to which the term instinctive should be applied, and an acquired type to which the term intelligent should be applied. He would restrict the term instinctive in its biological acceptation to congenital modes of behaviour dependent upon inherited dispositions *within the lower brain-centres*. Whilst conceiving that Bergson is right in contending that time and process, change and motion, are *primarily* given in experience through intuition and enjoyment, Professor C. Lloyd Morgan believes him to be wholly wrong in restricting time and process and movement to the so-called vital order and leaving the material universe timeless, processless, and immobile.

Mr G. E. Moore has written an extremely able and valuable little volume on *Ethics* for the "Home University Library" (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912). In the two first chapters he analyses with great care the ethical theory of utilitarianism, because it is particularly simple, and brings out clearly some of the main questions which have formed the subject of ethical discussion. The theory does not, he insists, deny all value to anything except pleasure and wholes which contain it, but only all *intrinsic* value. According to it none of them *would* have any value if they existed quite alone, but since none of them do exist quite alone, it may quite consistently allow that, as it is, many of them have very great value. By saying that a thing is *intrinsically good* is meant that the existence of the thing in question *would* be a good, even if it existed quite alone, without any accompaniments or effects whatever. Mr Moore argues,



as in his former book, that when we make judgments of what can be called intrinsic value, we are not merely making an assertion about our own or about anybody else's attitude of mind towards the state of things in question. He thinks that those who have adopted the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, have not clearly realised all the consequences of such a view. It involves, for instance, our saying that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed—no knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities—must yet be intrinsically better, better worth creating, provided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existed *as well as* pleasure. Mr Moore holds that there is no characteristic which belongs to all things that are intrinsically *good* and only to them, except simply the one that they *are* intrinsically good and ought always to be preferred to *nothing at all*, if we had to choose between an action whose sole effect would be one of them and one which would have no effects whatever. Apart from the important argument unfolded in these pages with admirable lucidity, the book will do, I think, a great service by showing its readers the extreme intricacy of the fundamental ethical problems, and the uncertainty which attaches to most of the historical ways of dealing with them.

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## THEOLOGY.

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IN the current number of the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (pp. 64–92) Professor Titius surveys the work of Ritschl in the light of modern research, and notes how, at various points, it has ceased to afford a tenable basis for the reconstruction of Christian doctrine. Hardly one of Ritschl's fundamental positions, it is argued, remains unaffected. His identification of the kingdom of God with a Kantian realm of ends or of personalities in moral action, has been disproved by recent study of the Gospels. His explanation of Paulinism is as one-sided as the orthodox doctrine which it was meant to displace. Furthermore, his theory of knowledge and his conception of value-judgments are open to serious suspicion. His emphasis on lordship over the world, as distinctive of Christian piety, does not do justice to the mystical sense of triumph over, and indifference to, the world which characterises the New Testament and Reformation type of devotion, and he equally failed to appreciate with proper sympathy the consciousness of sin in the Christian experience. "Ritschl did recall Spangenberg's testimony that 'one who has been loyal to the Saviour for fifty years is a far greater sinner in his own eyes than he was at the outset of his conversion,' but we cannot say that he really followed out satis-

factorily the consequences of this thought." Along with this consciousness of the difference between the holy God and sinful man, the conception of the Spirit as an impulse of love and yearning, which is not "logical" in the strict sense of the term, was undervalued by him. In these and other ways, his services to Christianity, however great, were defective. "It was the audacious tone of 'German,' i.e. Neo-platonic, mysticism, as voiced by Eckhart and Angelus Silesius, which Ritschl had in mind as he rejected, not without justice, mysticism. But even here it was a mistake to repudiate and deny it, instead of appreciating its inwardness and depth."

Neo-platonism had its speculative as well as its mystical side, however, and the bearing of the latter criticism is illustrated by a remark of Troeltsch (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1912, 727), in reviewing Kaftan's critique of his own theological position. Kaftan (*Ernst Troeltsch: Eine kritische Zeitstudie*) charges Troeltsch not only with anti-supernatural bias, but with being no more than a Neo-platonist who is coloured by Christianity. Well, Troeltsch retorts, that sort of blend has characterised Christianity from Origen to Hegel. "In my opinion, the sharper stress of the scientific and philosophical spirit in modern times has made that blend the only possible solution of the problem at the present day, and I do not doubt that this synthesis of Neo-platonism and Christianity will once more be dominant in modern thought." It is only a synthesis, but Christianity, with its free movement as a constant revelation of the divine spirit, requires such restatements from time to time. Christianity is not something of which you may say, "sit ut est, aut non sit." The alternatives are not adherence to confessional and ecclesiastical formulas, or recourse to the Utopian dream of constructing a new religion altogether. Troeltsch elaborates this, with particular reference to civilisation, in his *Protestantism and Progress* (Williams & Norgate: Crown Library), a trenchant analysis of Protestantism as the religious principle of personal conviction and freedom, whose real strength lies in its specifically religious affirmations and not in its capacity for creating ecclesiastical organisations. He traces the relation of this to science, industry, and art, concluding that "the religion of the modern world is essentially determined by Protestantism, not by a simple and uniform Protestantism, however, but by one which is capable of many formations. Individual personal seeking, personal experience of pain of conscience and pain of doubt, a grasping of the hand of God which is held out in the historic revelation, in order, having done so, to proceed further along the pathway of personal responsibility and decision to ultimate conviction, with a calm acceptance of all the enigmas which lie unsolved along this path—such is the character of modern religious feeling." And this, Troeltsch points out, answers vitally to Luther's conception of faith, as manly and courageous. "When all is said and done, the iron of the Protestant conception of faith rings through." A corresponding attitude is adopted by M. Cornils in his *Theologie: Einführung in ihre Geschichte, ihre Ergebnisse und Probleme* (Leipzig: Teubner).



In the same series as Troeltsch's volume, Harnack's *Bible Reading in the Early Church* also appears, an attempt, *inter alia*, to show that Lessing<sup>1</sup> was incorrect in stating that the Church of the first three centuries hindered the laity from reading the Scriptures. Mr M. Gaster, in the *Jewish Review* (1912, pp. 194-218), begins a parallel study of "The Biblical Lessons: a chapter on Biblical Archæology," in order to ascertain how far and how early the reading of the Bible entered into the private and public worship of the Jews. As the sub-title shows, the writer is interested specially in the effect which the practice had upon the text. He insists, incidentally, that the Massoretic divisions of the Pentateuch into Parasha were prior to the liturgical paragraph-sections of the Perikope.

On the text of the New Testament two manuals have been issued. The first is a second and revised edition of Sir F. G. Kenyon's *Textual Criticism of the New Testament* (Macmillan), an excellent introduction to the subject, which in this form deals stringently with the demerits of von Soden's theory and scheme of enumeration. L'Abbé Jacquier treats the same subject in the second volume of his *Le Nouveau Testament dans l'Église Chrétienne* (Paris: Libraire Victor Lecoffre). Both writers praise Professor Souter's edition of the Greek text, which Sir Frederic Kenyon pronounces "incomparably the best for general use."

Four English commentaries on the Epistles have to be noticed: one by Mr A. E. Brooke on the Johannine Epistles, in the International Critical Library; another in the same series, by Professor Frame of New York, on the Thessalonian Epistles—an extremely careful and scholarly piece of work; a compact edition of Galatians in the "Reader's Commentary," by Rev. C. W. Emmet, which caters untechnically and effectively for the English reader; and a fine edition of Second Corinthians by Professor Allan Menzies (Macmillan). Dr Menzies prints the Greek text side by side with the English, above his notes, as in his edition of Mark's Gospel. He champions the integrity of the epistle, instead of supposing that the last four chapters formed part of an earlier epistle. It is useful to have this view presented afresh by a competent scholar; and although Dr Menzies does not succeed in putting forward a theory which meets all the difficulties pressing on those who feel obliged to take the other theory, he has made out a case for re-examination of the data in the light of the exegetical considerations which he adduces with characteristic modesty and penetration. His commentary is one of the most considerable and original contributions which have been made of late years to the exegesis of the Pauline epistles to Corinth. The translation is particularly helpful.

In the criticism of the Gospels, Mr F. W. Worsley's *The Apocalypse of Jesus* (London: Bennett) is a study of the life of Jesus as an apocalypse in action, which distinguishes the apocalyptic teaching of Jesus from the eschatological, and lays stress on the knowledge possessed by Jesus of apocalyptic literature. The author deplores "the wretched standard of scholarship with

<sup>1</sup> Professor Loofs's lecture on "Lessing's Stellung zum Christentum," *Stud. u. Kritiken*, 31 f., is occupied with other aspects.

which the average Anglican clergyman is content at present," and seeks to read the life of Jesus in the light of the newer eschatological theory without dropping the creative and original note in the Gospels. The closing chapter on "Jesus or Christ" discusses the existence and the authentic knowledge of the historical Jesus from much the same standpoint as the Rev. David Smith in *The Historic Jesus* (Hodder & Stoughton), a popular and simple presentation of what can be urged against the Drews theory. In *The Historicity of Jesus* (Chicago), Professor S. J. Case states the evidence for the existence of Jesus in a scientific and extremely able fashion. His volume is one of the most trenchant restatements of the case for the historical reality of Jesus, and disposes of the pseudo-historical contentions drawn from the silence of Josephus and Tacitus, or from the extant literature of the Early Church. The last two chapters, which should be read in connection with Heitmüller and Baumgarten's article in *Religion in Geschichte u. Gegenwart* (vol. iii. pp. 343-433), discuss the value of Jesus, from the standpoint of liberal theology, to Christianity. Historical criticism, the writer argues, brings out the reality and individuality of Jesus, his worth for life, and the inspiring power of his spirit; "the present calls for men who not only have seen Jesus standing in a niche of the past, but who see him to-day beckoning them on to the realisation of the noblest attainments in the modern world of action." In *The Theology of the Gospels* (Duckworth), the present writer attempts to analyse the theological conceptions of the Gospels in relation to the personality and teaching of Jesus, with special reference to the eschatology.

The interest of the modern mind in Jesus is reflected from a broader standpoint than Professor Case's in another American book, *The Promise of the Christ-Age in Recent Literature* (Putnams). The author of this charming volume, Dr W. E. Mosher, describes not theology, but the views of recent writers like Frenssen, Rostand, Fogazarro, Pontoppidan, and Hauptmann, upon Jesus, and shows how variously these novelists and dramatists conceive his character. He regards it as hopeful that so many prominent writers are not only interested in Jesus, but inspired by his genuine spirit of faith and love. The Christ-ward trend is to be taken as a hopeful feature of the age. Dr Mosher thus does for international literature the same kind of work which Herr Otto Frommel did for German poetry, last year, in his *Das Religiöse in der modernen Lyrik*.

Three books treat this modern sympathy with a spiritual interpretation of Christianity from a more or less distinctively Christological standpoint. In *The Unveiled Glory* (James Clarke), the Rev. L. W. Caws views Christianity as the evolution and realisation of the archetype of humanity in Christ, contending that "the historic method of Jesus in the flesh once in time was but a temporary emergence on the earthly plane of the eternal love which indwells the Christ of all the ages, and is raising upon the ruins of the Adamic race a nobler, Christlier race—the race that is to be." Mr R. D. Stocker, in *The God Which is Man* (Francis Griffiths), sits loose to such speculations. He defines the message of idealism as "the substitution



of the human for the theistic ideal," and sketches the development of man's personality within a kindlier social environment. Mr J. O. Bevan's *Scientific Basis of Religion* (George Allen) traverses much of the same ground as Mr Stocker's argument, but it is definitely Christian, an attempt to meet such problems of Nature and Life as are raised to-day, and to meet them without appealing to Scripture, since the popular criticisms of Christianity and the Church often have to be encountered on a plane where such appeals are invalid. Mr Bevan writes with knowledge and fairness, and his apologetic temper is worthy of all praise. In *Creation and Man* (Longmans), the fifth volume of his Dogmatic Theology, Professor F. J. Hall, the well-known Episcopal theologian of Chicago, handles these problems from the technical standpoint. His conclusions are "catholic," in the ecclesiastical sense of the term, but he is far from being fettered by Latin theology, and his learning adds weight to his pages. Those who agree with his dogmatic position will probably find that his volumes state the "catholic" hypothesis with a candid if not an adequate appreciation of the modern objections to it. For example, he admits frankly in this volume that "St Augustine, while retaining the catholic doctrine of sin, enveloped it in a speculative theology which in certain particulars neither has catholic authority nor can be reconciled with modern knowledge and reflection." A counterpart to Dr Hall's exposition, from the Roman Catholic side, is to be found in the recent articles on dogmatic theology by Fr. Maas and Dr Pohle in the fourteenth volume of the *Catholic Encyclopædia* (New York).

Finally, two Anglican clergymen have published volumes upon the question of unity. In *The Church and Nonconformity* (Arnold), Archdeacon Greig makes one of the most remarkable contributions to the readjustment of ecclesiastical relations which have appeared from the pen of a responsible dignitary in this country. He realises, though hardly with sufficient seriousness, the sectional divisions of his own communion, and he recognises frankly the divine function and effectiveness of Nonconformist sacraments and ministry. "Dropping technical language about validity or invalidity, is there anyone who seriously doubts that those who attend the Holy Sacrament in Nonconformist churches receive grace and blessing in proportion to the faith and love, penitence and thanksgiving, with which they come?" But, although episcopal ordination is not necessary to the due administration of the sacraments, the historic episcopate is an essential part of the Church, and in maintaining it the Church of England has conserved a feature which is wanting in the Nonconformist ministry. The Rev. W. J. Sexton takes a similar view in *The Open Sore of Christendom* (Bennett: Century Press)—a more historical and elementary handbook, but characterised by much the same temper of fairmindedness, by a sincere conscience for the waste of the present situation, and by a sense that it is not the Nonconforming churches which are to blame alone for the divisions of British Christianity. Both writers point to the Church of England as the rallying-point of

unity; both emphasise the Nicene Creed and the historic episcopate as essentials of any united church—in a way which shows an imperfect comprehension of the essentially religious principles of Protestantism, such as these are analysed, *e.g.*, by Troeltsch,—but the spirit of both volumes is a distinct advance upon the class of books to which they belong, and the result ought to be an increase of mutual understanding on the part of the different churches. The impression left by both upon the mind is that the problem is ultimately one of theology, not of ecclesiastical diplomacy. Whether the reconciling theology is to be that of the Nicene Creed,<sup>1</sup> is another and a more dubious proposition, although Mr C. H. K. Boughton, in a paper on the “Function of Creeds” (*The Churchman*, September), confidently upholds that Creed and the Apostles’ Creed as against the Athanasian.

JAMES MOFFATT.

<sup>1</sup> In an article on “The Christian Challenge to Other Faiths,” contributed to the *International Review of Missions* (October 1912, pp. 659–673), Dr Garvie states this explicitly from the standpoint of the theologian who is face to face with the problems of mission propaganda. “The Westminster Confession, or the Thirty-nine Articles, or even the Nicene or the Athanasian Creed, do not assuredly give us the form in which Christianity is to be taught throughout the world. I, at least, cannot imagine that a sacramental priesthood or a historic episcopate is essential to a universal gospel.”



## REVIEWS

*Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell.*—Arranged, with Supplements, by M. D. Petre.—2 vols.—London: Edward Arnold, 1912.

### I.<sup>1</sup>

IN the searching and remarkable self-analysis contained in the first of these volumes, the inevitable difficulties attending such a task become plainly apparent. It is highly abstract and bears the reflex of later thought. Father Tyrrell ascribes all his early religious development to intellectual interest, and his account of himself creates the impression that he was devoid of any corresponding deep sentiment or belief. It is difficult, nay, impossible, to imagine this in the case of one who proved himself to possess so profoundly religious a nature. One cannot help feeling that he fails to do himself justice, perhaps partly owing to his abhorrence of anything like sensational emotionalism. But, chiefly, it must be remembered that this was written before his thought had attained its full depth and expansion, and, consequently, before he had schooled himself to distinguish clearly between definite belief in God and the religious consciousness as such. At the time he wrote this he had evidently not freed himself from the common prejudice, due to the pressure of tradition and training, which identifies the two. In his later works he recognised most clearly, and insisted on, the truth that the religious consciousness is deeper than, and prior to, any intellectual conception; that religion, in fact, is founded upon sentiment, albeit a sentiment which underlies all modes of thought and feeling. Still, his brilliant self-analysis must be taken as true on its positive side, owing to what we know of his whole development. And, therefore, what he says about the attraction and practice of Catholicism preceding, in his case, a clear conception of God, is very interesting, not merely because it is contrary to conventional habits of thought, but because it probably represents a psychological truth.

The reviewer had written thus far before reading the second volume, and was glad to find his criticism so absolutely confirmed by the maturer

<sup>1</sup> It has been thought desirable to publish two reviews of this book, from a Catholic and non-Catholic point of view respectively.—EDITOR.

thought of Father Tyrrell himself (vol. ii. p. 275). The two volumes—the first the autobiography, the second Miss Petre's addition—form one continuous whole, and from them we learn that Father Tyrrell was brought up as a Low Church Protestant, became first a High Churchman, then a Ritualist of a sort, a Catholic and Jesuit priest. He passed through the callow stage of noviceship to that of a full-fledged orthodoxy, whose fetters were not only imposed on him, but which he did his best to rivet on himself. A less original, active, and supple mind than Tyrrell's would have remained at this stage, or, at least, would not consciously have abandoned it. In fact, these qualities were necessary in a very high degree to enable him to break through the ring-fence of his surroundings, which were so opposed to the transmission of any outside stimulus. But the impulse seems to have come, in the first place, from within, through the highly orthodox channel of the study of St Thomas Aquinas, whom he read and understood, as indeed he did the *Spiritual Exercises* of his founder, not from the static standpoint of the schools, as fixing the bounds of human thought for all time, but as representing the living dynamic energy of the age in which he had lived, and containing germs which were valuable in the present. Hence, scholasticism was, with Tyrrell, a phase of thought from which he gradually freed himself, retaining of it only its more living elements and that valuable mental training which the thorough study of any systematic philosophy is bound to impart. There is no doubt, too, that it was a necessary preparation for the work he had to accomplish, giving his mind that inside view and grip of Catholic philosophy and theology which afforded him such power and mastery in his subsequent destructive and constructive work. It enabled him to turn his adversaries' arguments inside out and expose all their weak points, as in his controversy with Père J. Lebreton, S.J., in *Scylla and Charybdis*; and it enabled him, as notably in his final work, to seize upon the very volatile essence of Catholicism, held in solution by its vast system of philosophy, theology, and cultus, and exhibit the hidden sources of its reality and power, while avoiding any statement that could be definitely stigmatised as heretical. For it was not by his words, except so far as these were distorted from the context or wilfully misunderstood by stupid censors, but by the spirit of his works he was condemned, the spirit of freedom which breathed all through them and is as different from the confined atmosphere of rigid orthodoxy as the breeze of the downs from that of a coal-mine.

No doubt, too, the fact that "they were not able to resist the wisdom and the spirit by which he spake" counted much in his final overthrow. The *odium theologicum* of orthodoxy is notoriously rancorous, and on those rare occasions when it meets with an adversary who attacks and confounds it on its own ground, so completely that no answer is even possible, it can only grind its teeth in silent and impotent rage and seek its opportunity for revenge. That revenge, in the case of Tyrrell, after a good deal of bullying from the censorship and the like, finally



took the form of depriving him of the Sacraments, which was a punishment to him only on account of his devotion and spirituality. It pursued him after his death by the refusal of Christian burial, and by striking at the friend, Abbé Bremond, who performed the last offices over his body. But, as Miss Petre says, all this "was certainly in accordance with the spirit of 'Pascendi.'"

If Tyrrell's essence of Christianity became a mere essence, like Harnack's, it differed *toto cælo* from Harnack's in retaining all the Catholic elements in solution and in their due proportions. This becomes clear throughout his later uncensored works, and more particularly in the brilliant posthumous volume. There are also two remarkable letters which throw a great deal of light upon his intimate beliefs (vol. ii. pp. 413-416).

Tyrrell's instinct was right in finding (as did Newman) the heart of religion and the ultimate seat of authority within the conscience; in translating the substance-category of the old dogmas into mystico-moral values; in placing the motive power and strength of religion and morality in a transcendental world. His views were changing all his life, but he was not "changeable" in the sense of fickle or inconstant, though that term might have been applied to him by those whose theology is stereotyped and who are ignorant of the true value of words. To think is to change, and Tyrrell changed much because he thought much. But he was no weathercock: he did not return to a position that he had once left. He changed radically, and, in the concluding stage of his thought, from the end of 1899 onwards, the pace was much accelerated by his intercourse with other progressive Catholics and by his wide reading. Yet the whole of his life, as he says himself, was the explication of principles which underlay it from the first.

His was a steady progress in which each stage was the resultant of the whole past series. This is indeed a universal law—the law of mental dynamics. No mind can return exactly to a former position, when all circumstances, both external and internal, have changed. Some, however, have attempted this, at least as far as external circumstances are concerned. Tyrrell was far too consistent to act thus, although he was sorely tempted at the time when his troubles with "the Society" were at their height. Worried, harassed, and persecuted as he was then, is it surprising that he should have remembered the sentiments of his youth and have developed temporarily a sort of nostalgia for "the Church of Westcott, Hort, Lightfoot, Church, Liddon, etc."?

It is curious that, as perplexed High Anglicans look across the border and imagine a calm and peace in the bosom of Rome, which has no real existence, so he should have suffered from a similar illusion in the case of the Church of England. It shows how little he really knew of that Church, which he had left as a youth, in which he had never been a minister, and of which he could have formed but a very partial notion in Ireland. He had left it because of the futile claims to authority "of

irresponsible agents acting in defiance of the community to which they belonged," founded on individual and biassed interpretations of past history, which make the claims of Rome reasonable by comparison (vol. i. pp. 132, 137).

The question eventually resolved itself into a choice between the infallibility of such individual and conflicting claims and that of one vast communion of continuous traditions and world-wide extension (pp. 157, 158), to which a clear, logical, and sincere mind, such as Tyrrell's, could give but one answer. Besides, though the atmosphere of Anglicanism is, in some respects, freer than that of Rome, yet there is enough in it of theological sectarianism and dogmatism to have caused such a mind, so logical, so deeply religious, and withal so sensitive, especially in its early stages, to its surroundings, deliberately to impose upon itself the trammels and limitations of orthodoxy, in the sense of increasing the warp which must always result from early dogmatic teaching, and carrying out its principles to their logical consequences. We have already seen that he admits having put such compulsion upon his own mind at a certain stage of his Jesuit career, under circumstances in which he at least received the negative stimulus and pressure of a logical and consistent extreme, without which he might never have been driven to reaction and revolt.

It may, then, be safely said that if Tyrrell had remained an Anglican and become a clergyman, his mind would never have enfranchised itself. While, if, after the enfranchisement was accomplished, he had then rejoined that communion, he would necessarily have found himself out of harmony with his surroundings. For the comparative freedom enjoyed in the Anglican Church is rather the result of ecclesiastical impotence than of principle. The secular courts, to which she is subject, have scotched, but not killed, her cliquy clericalism. If Messrs Beeby and Thomson suffered for their very limited criticisms, how could Anglicanism have tolerated Tyrrell who criticised the whole intellectualist basis of dogma, making the *homousion* a symbol for moral and spiritual values? How his attitude would have struck even the ordinary Broad Church type of mind can be judged from the attacks of the Dean of St Paul's (vol. ii. p. 353). That attitude is, in fact, the antithesis of Anglicanism, which retains as jealously as Rome the absoluteness of certain dogmas, while leaving the rest vague. And this is precisely the position to which he takes such strong exception elsewhere (vol. ii. p. 409). However, upon consultation with Canon Hensley Henson, Tyrrell saw himself that his dream was impossible of fulfilment, and it went the way of all dreams. As a consequence of this interview he says (vol. ii. p. 377), "I am afraid things are very hopeless there." Even had he joined the Church of England, his adhesion could only have been nominal. He was at once too Catholic and too progressive. The last time the reviewer saw him, about two months before his premature death, he was referring to a Protestant theologian, who thought to escape the flood of higher criticism by taking his gospel



from St Paul's undoubted writings: "Yes," he said, "he makes his absolute of St Paul. Rather than that, I would make my absolute of St Thomas."

HENRY C. CORRANCE.

PARHAM HALL, SUFFOLK.

## II.

The many curious and hungry souls who have waited impatiently for Miss Petre's *Life and Autobiography of Father George Tyrrell* have not waited in vain. They may be surprised and even startled by the poignant confessions, but they cannot be disappointed.

When they have read through to the end they will feel bound to admit that the two volumes so thoroughly and conscientiously prepared are a worthy monument to the man and his work. Both are in fact human documents of the highest interest to all students of the religious problems of our time. The *Autobiography* on its literary merits alone is entitled to rank with the great masterpieces of the art—with the *Confessions* of St Augustine and Rousseau. Tyrrell tells, in his own inimitable style, the story of his early life of poverty and privation in Dublin, his first religious experiences, and how he gravitated as a youth from the stark Protestantism of Ireland in the 'sixties to High Anglicanism, and thence to Rome. At eighteen he left his friend Dolling and all, and joined the Society of Jesus. He did so in the belief that the Roman Church by virtue of its long tradition and universality was the chief guardian of the faith of Christ, and that the Jesuits as a body were animated by the true spirit of their founder, who conceived the Order as a militant advanced guard in the cause of Christendom, ready and willing to adapt itself to the spiritual needs of every age. In the later chapters we see how complete was his disillusionment. The Society proved to be the antithesis of all his hopes and dreams. At Rome it was and is the most conservative and obscurantist influence on the side of that rigid ecclesiasticism which threatens to strangle Catholicism. But having taken his vows Tyrrell felt irrevocably committed to the Church of his adoption, and in spite of all disillusionment he began to labour in the forlorn hope that his work and sacrifice might ultimately help towards her reform. "I feel," he wrote in one of his last letters, "my work is to hammer away at the great unwieldy carcase of the Roman Communion and wake it up from its mediæval dreams. Not that I shall succeed, but that my failure and many another may pave the way for eventual success." The passage gives us the keynote and meaning of his life and death.

To those who knew Tyrrell, all that was grandest and most significant in him is enhanced by the revelation of the defects and weaknesses out of which he built his strength. With fuller knowledge we feel more than ever the noble heart of the man, his entire unselfishness, his piercing intelligence, his hunger for affection—above all, his sublime courage, which no suffering or darkness could daunt. He was "not born informed and

fearless from the first." He was not given strength and power as young men are given moustaches. It was out of weakness that his strength was built. In youth he gave no promise of the saint and martyr he was destined to be. To Dr Newport White, who knew him well as a boy, his life appears as a miracle of divine grace. "If Dolling and Rome had not come his way," says this Protestant friend, "he might have become a clever man, but probably not a good one; certainly not great." This simple truth has been overlooked. Rome wrecked him, but she made him first. All his best work—those devotional writings which are treasured by thousands of the faithful to whom Modernism is either a meaningless word or simply anathema—he derived from the Saints, especially St Ignatius and St Thomas, and from that spirit that is with the Church always in darkness as in light even unto the end. Neither Newman nor St Ignatius was a firmer believer in that grand saying of St Ambrose: "Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum." But it was from Dolling that he first learnt it. "All my evangelical sympathies," he confessed, "all my revolt against the Pharisee and the Canon lawyer, is the outgrowth of the seeds of his influence. He could not and did not satisfy the rationalistic side of my mind; but he withdrew my attention from its exorbitant claims and made me feel there was something bigger and better." But if Tyrrell distrusted reason as the sole organ of truth, none could use it with more deadly effect against those whose sole appeal was to it. Is there in the English language a more relentless or terrible piece of reasoning than his "Mediævalism"? What needs to be emphasised is that if he set the truth of the heart, of simple, downright, and unaffected humanity, above all purely intellectual notions, he was no sentimentalist. If there is a truth of the whole man deeper and profounder than the truth of his reason, it can only be attained by diligent searching of the soul. Some rare and blessed ones may possibly acquire it as simply as they breathe, and be almost unconscious of their possession; but for ordinary mortals the way is strait and hard. It was so for Tyrrell, and he would have had it so for others. A man's goodness should make him smart, or he should at once suspect it of being a disguised complacency. "I do not know," he wrote, "that there is any comfortable way of getting to God, except *super aquas*, or any reliable support, except one's own dim conscience. If one could be faithful to that, one would feel nearer to God in mid-ocean than in an armchair; but it is not easy." No man can take up the Cross without suffering, without pain, and bitter self-denials. Conversion is not an end, but merely a beginning. The man of God who to-day confronts the world with a serene countenance is not a finished product of Divine Grace, but merely in a state of becoming. The heights that he has scaled have revealed others; every new accession of strength has created new temptations. "The Way, the Truth, and the Life"—it is not easy, nor was it meant to be. But the greatest souls have always "lived dangerously." All this Tyrrell knew too well from bitter experience.

Much that was conflicting and mystifying about him is explained by



Miss Petre and by his own revelations. But if in spite of all elucidation he remains in some respects a mystery, dazzling, baffling, and undefinable, and even a sign of contradiction, it is neither his fault nor his biographer's. No man since Rousseau has flayed himself so ruthlessly or exposed his own faults and weaknesses so mercilessly. It is so also in the Life. Miss Petre has resisted all temptations to glorify the man. She gives us the living Tyrrell with all his complexities and contradictions—the whole man, as Johnson would say, “warts an’ all.” This is just what he would have desired. He hated flattery or anything in the nature of hero-worship. He even confessed to a horror of so-called “earnestness,” and declared that he would prefer a white elephant to a disciple. “I should prefer,” he wrote, “to be liked less for what I am, rather than to be liked more for what I am not.” On every page Miss Petre has remembered that, and we may be sure that if she has felt it her duty to load the scale against him as he would have wished, she has been compelled for a variety of reasons to underestimate, if not to minimise, the many things in his favour, content to leave judgment till “God has made the pile complete.” Who knows, for instance, how many souls he helped—how many they are to whom he played the part of a good Samaritan, healing their wounds while they little suspected that his own need was greater than theirs, his own wounds deeper? It would be futile to attempt a final judgment on a life that is not yet complete, that penetrated the lives of others at so many points, and that concerned the future even more than the present. The things that one can define are fixed and complete; all their resources and potentialities are known; Tyrrell to-day is none of these things. He posed a great question—a host of questions; he lived a life even more arresting and worthy of study than the works of his genius. It is true then to say that though dead he yet lives. Nay, more! his death-day may be in the future calendar of his Church the day of his birth, the day when a mighty blow was delivered at the hydra-headed monster which threatens to stifle the spiritual life of the Church of Rome, the day when the scales fell from the eyes of thousands of the faithful and they saw or soon came to see whither they were being hurled by a selfish and godless bureaucracy. But if admirers had told Tyrrell that he was a martyr, they would have suffered a sharp rebuke. He would have laughed the idea to scorn. His sense of humour was unfailing and often incorrigible. It flashed out even on his deathbed. When in one of the brief intervals of relief from suffering he was asked whether Father D. would do to hear his confession, he replied with a faint smile: “Yes; he is as bad as me.” Though in truth the humblest of souls, he once declared: “I hope I am not humble from what I see of that virtue in others.” His wit and humour saved him from some of the worst temptations of his position. He used it to correct himself and the conceits of his friend, and sometimes even against his personal appearance, which none would have suspected as that of a man of genius. He would tell with huge delight the story of the retreat at a strange convent in the north country.

When he presented himself, the Mother Superior was aghast at sight of him, and straightway hurried off to the nuns and said: "My sisters, we must trust entirely to the Grace of God, for they have sent us a fool." But however Tyrrell regarded himself, he was undoubtedly a martyr in the truest sense of the word to the cause of religious freedom in the Roman Church. When he had thundered his denunciations, and after he had suffered years of subtle persecution, he might have seceded and escaped the worst; he might have found rest elsewhere, but that would have been to stultify his life's purpose. He was not the man to fly to a quiet haven when the storm threatened. As an Irishman he loved a fight, but this was not a sparring match; in the name of that spirit of truthfulness which "is the only infallible guardian of truth," he challenged principalities and powers. He knew that he must lose nearly all that he counted most dear and precious. But the time had come when somebody must be crucified. Nothing less than blood and sacrifice would avail to bring home to the faithful the need of a new life in the Church, the madness of ultramontaniam, and the general attitude of the Papacy to modern thought. So he suffered excommunication and boycott from the Altar, and became anathema for Christ's sake. His last days, so faithfully and movingly described by Miss Petre, were profoundly sad. They were the days of a bitter Gethsemane. "The look of suffering and desolation that marked him during the first months after his severance from religious life and the rights of the priesthood was impressed, not only on his face but on his entire frame, and will not easily be forgotten by friends who saw him at the time." His heart was in the Church; he loved the Sacraments; the Communion of Saints was manna to his soul; the very word "Catholic" was music in his ears. If in his terrible isolation there broke from him cries that revealed his deep distress and temptation, or if he were almost persuaded to seek peace elsewhere in the Anglican Communion, no one is justified in making controversial capital out of such bitter agony. To one greater than him it once seemed that God had forsaken Him. Rightly regarded, the very power of his temptation to secede is some measure of that other power which overcame it; those who enlarge upon the one are only paying unconscious tribute to the other. His ultimate triumph will be that he endured to the end.

By all human standards Tyrrell's life was a tragic failure. He was not a facile conqueror, but it may be that in God's good time the hands that stoned him will build up his sepulchre. Less forlorn hopes than his have triumphed. Joan of Arc was burnt at the stake as a heretic; to-day she is a canonised saint. May not history repeat itself in this case? All the great precursors of spiritual movements in the Church have been martyred. They appeared before their time, as Tyrrell did, when the old order, strongly entrenched, was in conflict with the new, that was struggling into being. Such times are times of violence and heavy sacrifices; but they pass. In the end there dawns a better day. It was for that dawn that Tyrrell gave all. He saw the promised land, but he was not to pass



into it. Yet with a sure faith he could have cried out of the depths, with the dying Paracelsus :

“ If I stoop  
Into a dark tremendous sea of cloud,  
It is but for a time ; I press God’s Lamp  
Close to my breast ; its splendour, soon or late,  
Will pierce the gloom ; I shall emerge one day.”

JAMES WALKER.

CARDIFF.

*Problems in the Relations of God and Man.*—By Clement C. J. Webb, Fellow and Tutor of Magdalen College, Oxford, and Wilde Lecturer on Natural and Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford.—London : James Nisbet, 1911.

THESE problems are attacked in this book with the advantage of adequate knowledge and with the disadvantage of inadequate method. The clearness and thoroughness of the treatment are hindered by the traditional Christian antitheses, which form the framework of the discussion. As far as possible all the old terms are retained. Thus we have Reason and Revelation, Natural and Revealed Religion, Nature, Grace, and Original Sin discussed in Part I. and Part II. To some extent this method is justified, in so far as it helps towards a valid reinterpretation of the old ideas. It is important that the case should be clearly stated for a middle way between the crude alternatives of acceptance or rejection of the literal and traditional meaning of ancient expressions of belief. Readers of modern theology are aware that the failure to distinguish between the form and the essence of beliefs is not confined to the opponents of Christianity in the public parks of our great cities. In Germany especially there is a widespread rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, on grounds which differ little from those which are popularly supposed to condemn it as “arithmetically incoherent,” since “one” cannot at the same time be “three.” We therefore welcome Mr Webb’s timely plea for an “attempt to penetrate the *religious* significance which such doctrines may have for those who hold them.” Mr Webb believes that “this attempt to understand religious doctrines from within is likely to result in the discovery that they are neither mere absurdities to be set aside as such, nor yet to be allowed a merely figurative or metaphorical significance. On the other hand, it will probably bring anyone sincerely undertaking it to distinguish in the doctrines an essential from an accidental element . . . which has come to possess a *merely* historical interest.”

This is a sound statement of principle from which one is led to look for good results ; but it is hard to follow Mr Webb in some of his applications of it. In Chapter I. the right of criticism is soundly based on the essential place of reason in religion. We cannot find the source of the

religious life in an incommunicable disturbance of the subconscious "region" of the mind, with no real object apart from the self. The antithesis between reason and revelation is clearly shown to be false. No revelation can come through mere intuition or feeling apart from reason; and, on the other hand, all the valid discoveries of reason must be revealed by God.

It is to be regretted that Mr Webb did not also condemn the similar distinction between natural and revealed religion. The result is that he is forced to explain the terms in a way that has but little connection with their essential and traditional meaning. Natural religion thus becomes the manifestation of God in nature apart from man! To take another case. It may be doubted whether it is wise to retain the words "original sin" to signify merely the tendencies to evil within and without the man. Mr Webb's attempts at reconstruction seem to be hampered by the implied necessity of making the new interpretations somehow fit into the old terms and the authoritative explanations of the Church.

In Part III. Mr Webb considers the problem of man's relation to God, and maintains that the reality of the object of the religious consciousness is not doubtful. The doubt is only "whether what we have been accustomed to call God is God at all." The reason for the certainty about God seems to be that Mr Webb conceives Him, not as a finite person, but as Him in whom "we have our being." This will satisfy those who hold with Mr Webb that God is the Absolute. Those who do not will not find the devout certainty of the unreflective religious consciousness in all ages a convincing proof that the just now live by sight and not by faith.

Mr Webb proceeds (p. 233) to defend a reciprocal love and "inner converse" between the Persons in God. On this subject we must be content to say that, if Mr Webb could have started from the ground of Christian experience alone, it is very unlikely that he would ever have evolved a speculative explanation of it so hard to defend on metaphysical grounds. As it is, Mr Webb seems to hold that we experience God as three finite Persons, and at the same time that we do not experience Him as one finite Person. To the present writer it seems far more misleading to speak of God as infinite than as finite, unless you are determined that "finite" shall imply some limit imposed upon God from without. Nor can he agree that it is as easy to worship the Absolute as to think of it. On the contrary, it is impossible to worship the Absolute if it includes much that is neither worshipful nor divine. And Mr Webb's attempts to defend the worship of a Being that includes all the world's evil leave me unconvinced. The objections felt to such worship by the moral consciousness are not to be removed by an appeal to any Jewish-Christian doctrine about the Son "who was made sin for us." Mr Webb conjectures that pre-human pain may be due to a devil, but he does not claim that this embarrassing predicate is thus removed from the Absolute he asks us to worship. He does admit that we can only suppose sin to further the divine plan by contradicting



the plain deliverance of our conscience. But the author's theory of the Absolute forces him to make this amazing supposition, and to clutch at any straw—such as the old idea of *felix culpa* which led to the passion and death of Christ—for his support. As soon as Mr Webb has reduced us to the level of “fragments” and organs of the universal Spirit, he proceeds to comfort us for our apparent loss of eternal value and dignity by noting our indispensability to the whole, and by quoting the scripture which says, “The very hairs of your head are all numbered.” The conclusion to which the book leads is this:—We are not extraneous to God. He has a life of His own: it is not a mere sum of our lives, though it is ever shared by that of the Son. What we fail to find, however, is a clear distinction between the sharing of Himself which involves perfect knowledge and sympathy on the part of the Creator, and the sharing of Himself which involves the ascription of our badness to His character. The credal phrase “*Deus de Deo*” may be applied to the life of the saints; but does not Mr Webb's theory require it to be applied to the sinners also?

CAVENDISH MOXON.

ST MARYLEBONE, W.

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*Essays in Radical Empiricism.*—By William James.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.

THIS volume is a collection of papers contributed by the author to philosophical journals during two years, 1904 and 1905, when the controversy raised by pragmatism was keen. They are mainly, if not wholly, controversial. Three of them and part of a fourth had already been included in the volumes of essays selected and published by the author in the last years of his life. They are reprinted here as originally written—that is to say, with the parts restored which the author had himself excised doubtless because they possessed a passing interest only. The concluding paper does not belong to the same period. It is a short paper contributed to *Mind* in 1884—not a regular article, but a critical reply to an article in the preceding number by Mr J. S. Haldane on “Life and Mechanism.” Its title, “Absolutism and Empiricism,” no doubt suggested it as a fitting conclusion to the volume. It is, however, strangely misplaced, for although it cannot be said to have lost either freshness or applicability, yet during the twenty years that have intervened between it and the other essays “vitalism” has acquired a new meaning. It is very doubtful if William James would have wished his views on that subject to be represented by this early article.

It is good nevertheless to have this valuable collection of papers in the convenient and permanent form of a volume. Who that loves William James does not feel that there is inspiration in his most casual writings? But was it necessary to insist on a purpose which the author has certainly

not explicitly expressed? Professor Perry tells us that he has designed these essays not as a collection but as a treatise. This hardly seems to do justice to the author. Criticisms of contemporary critics, and replies to their criticism, have this particular interest that, like the give and take in the discussion of an author's thesis, they often give us more insight into the meaning than the carefully prepared thesis itself. Why then are these replies and criticisms called "Essays in Radical Empiricism"? The only justification pleaded is that they were some among a collection of reprints found among the author's papers in an envelope, which he had inscribed with this title. Is it not possible that the editor was influenced by his greater sympathy with the author's radical empiricism than with his pragmatism? James himself held that the former was an independent doctrine. To some critics pragmatism and radical empiricism seem mutually incompatible. Whether William James, had he lived longer, would have found them so, or whether he would have succeeded in his attempt to bring them into harmony, we are now, alas! left to wonder. What this volume shows is that the author was cut off in the full vigour of a living development of thought and not in the contemplation of a fully matured system of philosophy.

What then is radical empiricism? It is the ordinary empiricism with which we are familiar in Hume, J. S. Mill, and others, with this added, that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive relations, are matters of direct experience, as much so as the things themselves. Relations are not *a priori* categories as the transcendental school in philosophy holds. This doctrine is very clearly brought out in the first essay, entitled "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" in which it is denied that the word "consciousness" denotes or stands for any entity. There is no transcendental ego; consciousness is a function, the function in experience which thoughts perform—that of knowing. Consciousness is neither a stuff nor a way of being; it is a relation between experiences, and this relation, like the things it relates, is itself an experience. In the second essay, "The World of Pure Experience," which is written as a sequel to the first, radical empiricism is expounded as a positive theory of cognition. Experience is submitted to analysis in order to show that knowledge is a relation that arises within it. What knowing is known as (and this is the whole of its nature) can be put into experiential terms. This doctrine is developed in the first part of the essay; the main and concluding part is devoted to proving that a philosophy of pure experience is not inconsistent with the pragmatic method, but that it lends it actual support. In combating the foes of pragmatism, the author aims his blows at the transcendentalists, and summons to his side the natural realists and the panpsychists.

These two essays are by far the most important in this volume, and the only ones that specifically deal with and endeavour to set forth the doctrine that gives the volume its title. The others are for the most part short articles that may indeed shed light on the doctrine, but were clearly



not designed to expound it, unless Professor Perry is right where he tells us, in a footnote (p. 193), that when James employs the term "humanism," he means "radical empiricism."

William James never claimed that there was anything original in the radical empiricism that he advocated. It was, as he was constantly saying, as he says more than once in this volume, based upon, and practically identical with, the analytical part of Shadworth Hodgson's *Metaphysic of Experience*. Probably also he derived it in great part from Renouvier. What drew William James to expound it with so much earnestness was the intense repugnance he felt to every form of the transcendental doctrine of the Absolute. What is original in James and altogether delightful is his brilliant and wonderful manner of flashing upon us new light on old doctrine. We feel that he is thinking out his problem as he writes, and he compels us to think it out with him as we read. He startles us out of dogmatic slumber. A splendid instance is the bold conclusion of the first essay, which may also fitly conclude this notice: "The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them. . . . Breath which was ever the original of 'spirit,' breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness."

H. WILDON CARR.

LONDON.

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*Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion.*—By Jane E. Harrison, LL.D., D.Litt.—Cambridge University Press, 1912.—Pp. 559.

THIS work will never be adequately reviewed, as Andrew Lang lamented in one of his last pronouncements; for no magazine can afford sufficient space, and it is hard to find a reviewer sufficiently equipped and sufficiently industrious to test the writer at each point. For Miss Harrison's equipment is manifold, and she ranges lightly and with perfect confidence over the widest areas of investigation, where the few year-long toilers find it hard enough to win any certainty. With ardent docility and without any reaction of the critical spirit she accepts the principles and the conclusion of those whom for the time being she adopts as her masters. These are now mainly Bergson in philosophy, Durkheim, Hubert, and Maus in the psychology of primitive ritual; and finally, much to her advantage, she has adopted Mr Marett and his theory of mana as conveyed in his brilliant *Threshold of Religion*. The task of *Themis* is to apply the theories of these distinguished thinkers to the minutiae of Greek religion and mythology with a boldness of imagination that might often dismay their authors, as the audacity of the pupil is sometimes an embarrassment to the teacher. *Si je t'aime, gare à toi*. What first impresses one in this singular treatise is the extraordinary dogmatism of the tone. Miss

Harrison possesses a creditable amount of learning; but no scholar in Europe possesses enough to be allowed so much dogmatism unchallenged. Also one soon becomes aware that this writer is the victim of the idea that happens to dominate her phase of thinking at any particular time; the idea may be fertile and applicable, but she tends to exploit it for far more than it is worth, and to distort the evidence of texts and monuments into an unreal harmony with it; hence half-truths or quarter-truths are paraded as the whole truth, and her work lacks balance, proportion, self-criticism, nor is she preserved from the most startling *reductio ad absurdum* by any saving sense of humour. The book seems to have been written in a white heat; and it is Miss Harrison's theory that books should be so written. We may demur to the theory. A white heat of the mind is good for poetry and art; but we may doubt if a scientific treatise, which undertakes to disentangle and interpret a vast complex of heterogeneous facts and records, is best composed in such a mental atmosphere. The shimmer that it casts over the landscape too often prevents Miss Harrison from looking straight at a text or round about it.

Between the *Prolegomena*, her earliest authoritative work, and *Themis*, although the same defects and prejudices appear in both, there is a great divergence, a marked shifting of the focus of interest. There the ruling themes were ghosts, spiritual bacilli, and matriarchal Korai; here we are chiefly concerned with the forms, ideas, and religious influences of the thiasos, the tribal mystery into which youths at puberty were initiated; and terms such as *Κοῦρος*, *Μέγιστος Κοῦρος*, *Ἐμμαντὸς δαίμων*, are found to be terms of power to reveal the origins of Greek religion. The main theory of *Themis* is something like the following: "Earliest Greek society was matriarchal, godless, totemistic or at least regulated by 'totemistic thought,' the religious factor being the tribal mystery into which all young men were initiated at puberty, which enshrined and imparted the doctrine of the death and rebirth of the initiated *Κοῦρος* and the continuous life of the tribe; at this early stage there is no self-consciousness of the individual or desire for a separate immortality; the initiated *Κοῦρος*, following the *Μέγιστος Κοῦρος*, cherished certain *choses sacrées*—the totem-animal, a thunderstone, a *ρόμβος* it might be—from which they derived 'mana' and with which they performed magic, not as a 'mimesis,' but as a 'foredoing' of the things they desired; from the *Μέγιστος Κοῦρος*, or from the *chose sacrée*, might be evolved or projected a daimon, who by dying and rising again linked the life of nature and the tribe; from the daimon might arise a *θεός*, who was doomed to 'desiccate and die,' if he separated himself from his thiasos and from nature, shed his totem-form, refused the privileges of a recurring death, rose to the sky, and claimed immortality: hence the fatuity of the 'Olympian' who inspired so much of Greek poetry and art; finally, the aboriginal system of the *θίασος* has left its traces upon the newly discovered hymn of the Kouretes and upon much Greek ritual that has only a superficial veneer of theism."

That the aboriginal Hellenes possessed a tribal initiation mystery of



the Australian type is a legitimate hypothesis for a comparative anthropologist to test by the facts. But the positive evidence brought forward by Miss Harrison breaks down on examination, and there is evidence against it which she ignores. Her sole evidence is the Bacchic mysteries and those of the Kouretes which have a Bacchic tinge; neither can tell us anything about proto-Hellenic tribal religion, for both are originally alien, pre-Hellenic, or non-Hellenic. The Bacchic mystery may have been tribal in Thrace; but there is no sign that its main motive was the admission, the feigned death and re-birth of the *κῶρος*; if we may judge it by the glimpses we have of it in Greece, the person whose death was enacted was more usually a babe. However that may be, the mystery, when introduced into Greece, could have had no tribal value, but belonged to the type of secret societies which are the subject of a treatise by Webster. At times Miss Harrison herself seems aware that this is the true account of it. The theory of a tribal puberty-rite fails to explain the double birth of the *babe* Dionysos, or the rending of the babe. We may also protest against the writer's misuse of the word *κῶρος* and her dogma that it always denotes "a young man just come to maturity"; on the contrary, it can equally well denote "babe," and in the only other ritual text, besides this hymn, where it occurs at all, it does denote babe, in special relation to its mother—*ἱερὸν ἔτεκε πότνια κῶρον Βριμὴ Βριμῆ*. The invocation, "*μέγιστε Κῶρε*," of the hymn is of neither more nor less importance than the cult-phrase "*Ἥρα Παῖς*" of Arcadia. The writer is wrong to sling the title about over a vast area of Greek ritual. We forgive her for the sake of her unintentional joke about Dionysos (p. 443), who, for her, is always a *κῶρος*: therefore, when she finds him bearded and very mature, as on a famous Delphic vase, she calls him "an elderly" *κῶρος*, as we might call a middle-aged bachelor "an old boy."

The passion of the book is fed by two dominant prejudices—the prejudice against the personal individual God and the patriarchal prejudice. The first leads her to maintain or to infer for the proto-Hellene a godless period of cult, a theory which is in itself most unlikely and of which she offers no real evidence. It leads her also to scold the "Olympian" and the poets and artists who glorified him: she scolds Homer, "who contrives to forget nearly everything of any religious interest" (p. 295): she scolds Pindar, sometimes mistranslating him (p. 203), generally misunderstanding him, never having apologised to him for a fatal *faux pas* in the *Prolegomena*; and she scolds Praxiteles. Her invective against the "Olympian" will apply, and perhaps was intended to apply, equally to Jahwe and Allah. The highest religion might conceivably dispense with a personal God; but to defame this belief as barren and temporary is to ignore history and human nature; and what is right in a propagandist book is not in place in a scientific treatise. Only once does she come near to appreciating the higher possibilities of a personal "celestial" theism: on p. 479 we are told that for the Greek "his Olympian is alive," "a great and beautiful reality," "loved for himself, not for the work he

does, not merely as a means of living." It surely belongs to a very high religion to love God for himself. Her statement is probably untrue as regards the average Greek; if it were true, it would be a sufficient answer to her own invective against "Olympianism."

Her further object, then, is to show that a great deal of Greek ritual ignores the personal deity and is godless. Aristophanes, if he read the book, might exclaim "*Ρόμβος βασιλεύει τὸν Δι' ἐξεληλακώς*." Much that she says on this subject is true, and we are indebted to her for having helped the investigation of this important point. But the induction that she derives from the facts, that this godless ritual belongs to a godless period, is fallacious. Much that we do—shaving, for instance—is godless, yet gods may be about all the time. And generally she is too eager to banish the *θεοί* and to postdate their emergence, though she is too vague to commit herself to dates. It is in this section that much of her most careless work is found, and we are constrained to call her method disingenuous, both in her treatment of texts and monuments. Only a few salient examples may be quoted here. On p. 45 we are told that in the hymn of the Kouretes the God is not worshipped and there is no prayer in it: she ignores the words *στάντες τὸν ἀμφὶ βωμόν*, and she chooses to interpret every "imperative" as a command, although it may just as well convey a prayer. On p. 96 it is said that Hesiod's farmer is enjoined not to "glorify Athena or offer burnt sacrifice to Zeus," but simply to "observe sanctities," that is, things which are pre-theistic: she has not cared to look at ll. 336, 465, where the farmer is carefully ordered to do what she says he is not. The worst example is her whole account of the Dipolia; her attempt to expel Zeus from this ancient Attic festival founders utterly at every point: she has either to ignore texts or to emend them; and Hesychius' text (*s.v.* *Διὸς θάκοι*) *τὸ τοῦ Πολιέως ἱερεῖον*, which contradicts her theory, is emended into *τὸ τοῦ πόλεως ἱερεῖον*, a phrase sufficiently godless for her purpose, but ungrammatical. On pp. 412–414, dealing with the text in the Supplices, where Æschylus describes the hill or mound of the *θεοὶ ἀγώνιοι* at which the Suppliants take refuge, she tries to expurgate the anthropomorphic *θεοί*; she imagines the holy things on the hill to consist of symbols merely, or of "sanctities that preceded any definite divinities," and she praises the Suppliants for calling them *daimones*; but being in her usual hurry she does not look on to ll. 430 and 463, where the Suppliants speak of these same sanctities as *βρέτη*, and threaten to hang themselves from the *βρέτη θεῶν*; one cannot conveniently hang oneself from a trident, or a herald's staff, or an omphalos, but quite easily from a human statue of a god, and *βρέτας* never means anything but the iconic idol, and we are wholly in the domain of anthropomorphic theism. The same hurry impedes her in her attempt (pp. 294 and 300) to prove that Hermes is a *daimon* or *Ἀγαθὸς δαίμων* on the strength of a gloss in Photius, *s.v.* *Ἑρμῆς πόσεως εἶδος*, which she finds "enigmatic": she would not have found it so, and would have been saved from an entirely false comment, if she had compared it with Æsych., *s.v.* *Ἑρμῆς* and Pollux,



6, 100. Finally, her account of the important ritual-inscription of Magnesia regulating the worship of Zeus Sosipolis is perverted by her anti-theistic bias, pp. 150-154; else she might have discerned that the service prescribed by it is of the usual theistic type, and there is no more magic in it than in any ordinary sacrifice.

As regards her matriarchal prejudice, it is past praying for or reasoning with; we must bear it silently when a relief is called "matriarchal"—as Raphael's masterpiece at Dresden might be—because there is no father in the scene, when the Hermes of Praxiteles is vituperated because he dares to usurp the woman's function of carrying a baby, when we are informed that Eurydike in good matrilinear days had no need of an impertinent Orpheus to come down and rescue her, as, being an earth-goddess, she could come up to the top whenever she liked (p. 523). Her interpretation of the vase on which she discovers Eurydike claiming this primeval prerogative appeared to Dr Dieterich "unwahrscheinlich": Dr Dieterich was always very mild in his judgment.

We may forgive or enjoy these escapades; but some of her archæological interpretations will make archæologists weep. Her exposition of the representations on the Hagia Triada Sarcophagus is perhaps the most perverse and unlikely of any that has been put forward. A scene on a hydria in Berlin, on which an ox is represented outside a sanctuary approaching an altar to be sacrificed to an enthroned Athena, is amazingly interpreted as if the ox were the object of cult and were inside the sanctuary as owner, and as if Athena were a negligible quantity (p. 149). In dealing with the Canosa vase of Munich (p. 521), where Dike is seen in the Inferno guarding Peirithoos, from whom Theseus is taking his leave, she insists against all ancient authorities and modern scholars that it is Peirithoos who is leaving and Theseus staying down, because Peirithoos means the man "who runs round," and she wants him to run up for the sake of the yearly cycle of the Eniautos Daimon.

Her account of the Agathos Daimon and the Ἐνιαυτὸς Δαίμων—let us hope that this ugly and unnecessary pseudonym will not live—has much in it that is interesting and acceptable; but the dogma confidently proclaimed on p. 288, that it was only as and because they (the local heroes) assumed this guise (of the Agathos Daimon) that they became "heroes" and won for themselves a cultus, is undemonstrated; and she would have probably found it undemonstrable if she had set herself the task of examining the details of every hero-cult, a task of laborious research.

There are many other religious pronouncements in *Themis* that a critical student of the history of religion must challenge; and none are more bewildering and kaleidoscopic than those about the making or the projection of a god or a goddess. Athena is variously "projected" from a pillar, an owl, and a snake: Apollo from a pillar, from the Apellai or the phratric functions of the Delphic Labyadai—though their inscription hardly seems to connect him with them, and his name cannot etymologically

be derived from them—also from a street, and finally from a stag; Hermes from a phallos, a serpent, and, according to a recent view of Miss Harrison's, from a cock. We have, in fact, in these projections, a series of conjuring tricks, which leave us utterly unable to imagine how Athena and Apollo arrived at last, just as we are unable to imagine how a puberty-thiasos of girls, by religiously cutting off a lock of their hair, can "project" Hippolytos, and how their little "dromenon" explains the Euripidean drama. And the only clear instance given to justify these phantasies is the Australian bullroarer's projection of Dhuramoolan. If only Miss Harrison would sometimes look to adjacent anthropology for help, she would not have "projected" Jupiter Dolichenus from the bull that he happens to be standing on, but would have discovered his more proximate descent from an old Hittite anthropomorphic god.

Her book, in fact, is marred not only by perverse archæology and an uncritical treatment of texts, but by an anthropology that is too narrow, too remote, and often in its application anachronistic; and her sympathetic delight in savages, which she in vain disclaims in her preface and which is an excellent trait in itself, is dimming her eyes and distorting her judgment of much Greek literature and art. Her books always have freshness, but not that freshness that ripens fruit. We do not find in *Themis* the great tradition of Cambridge scholarship.

L. R. FARNELL.

OXFORD.

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*The Religious Experience of the Roman People, from the Earliest Times to the Age of Augustus.*—By W. Warde Fowler, M.A.—London: Macmillan, 1911.

IN publishing his Gifford Lectures for 1909–10 Mr Warde Fowler has done good service to all students of the history of religion. The festivals and outward ceremonies have long been familiar, and a useful and judicious summary of them is to be found in Mr Fowler's *Roman Festivals*. But it is extraordinarily difficult even for the scholar to realise what these ceremonies meant to the average Roman. There may be some vague notion that the educated classes at the end of the Republic did not believe in the accepted gods, or in the efficacy of their worship, but regarded religion and its observances as expedient for the common people. But such a notion entirely fails to explain the attitude towards Roman religion of two men so different as Virgil and Augustus, or to help us to realise its position in the general course of religious evolution, or its influence upon Christian institutions. The peculiar difficulty in understanding Roman religion is due to various reasons; chief among them is the fact that Greek mythology and religion had so completely transformed and overshadowed Roman, before the age for which we have



literary records, that we can only infer the Roman from survivals, from the often suspected statements of antiquarian writers, and from other uncertain indications. Indeed, if scholars of an earlier generation confused our notion of the Greek gods by calling them by Latin names, still worse was the confusion they introduced into Roman religion by attributing Greek characteristics and legends to the primitive Roman divinities; and in this they were aided and abetted by almost all the Latin authors. And it is difficult to imagine a less appropriate stock on which to graft the vividly anthropomorphic imagination of the Greek, than the sense of vague but powerful *numina* that is the essential characteristic of Roman religion. Under these conditions it is not so much a matter of wonder that it is difficult to realise what religion meant to the Romans, as that it should be found possible to recover a good deal not only of the forms of their ritual but of the spirit that inspired it; it is only possible to a historical imagination and sympathetic insight such as Mr Fowler shows in these Gifford Lectures. This is to be seen above all in the earliest chapters, in which the growth of religious feeling is traced from "the threshold of religion," in magic and other survivals, to its organisation in family and village cults, and the establishment of the religious calendar. As to the gods recognised in this earliest stage of Roman religion, Mr Fowler allows even less scope to anthropomorphic imagination than most other mythologists, and gives good reasons for denying a belief in anything like married pairs with actual offspring, a notion which seems to come in early from external influence. Apart from such influence, the early and genuine Roman gods were probably not thought of in human shape at all, though the constantly increasing influence of surrounding people, above all of the Greeks and the Etruscans, soon led the Romans to make gods after the image of man, since they had not, like the Jews, any clear religious prohibition of such a proceeding. And from human form to human functions and passions is an almost inevitable step. But even when foreign influences have become predominant, we still find the peculiarly Roman characteristics of law and order in everything; and though these may have resulted in a lifeless formalism, they at least bequeathed to later religious systems the boon of decency and order. Two particularly interesting chapters are those on Virgil's religious feelings and on the revival of the religious customs under Augustus; the influence of philosophy and of mysticism are also clearly estimated.

In a subject so complicated and so controversial it is not to be expected that all Mr Fowler's opinions and conclusions will meet with universal assent; but his main arguments appear so sound and reasonable, and to show so intimate an appreciation of the Roman character, that they must commend themselves to all students; and the whole book will give to the general reader, as well as to the specialist, a wider interest in the world of ancient thought, and a deeper understanding of its needs and its aspirations. Such a book must suggest many questions and criticisms; only two or three of these can here be touched upon. One of them is the discussion how far

any notions of punishment or retribution after death had a root in the old beliefs of the common people. A belief in harmful or dangerous ghosts is usually more concerned with the protection of the living than with speculation as to the fate of the dead. The notion of moral retribution may come in, as Mr Fowler suggests, owing to the influence of Greek and Etruscan imagery; but there is little evidence of its primitive character. And the part of the Greek and the Etruscan in this are not easy to distinguish; the hideous and terrible figure of Charon in Etruscan paintings does not seem to have any traceable origin in Greek art; though the Charos of modern Greek folk-lore seems to imply some similar notion among the common people in early times, his connection with any recognised ancient mythology is very hard to trace. There certainly seems, in the more gruesome of the Etruscan pictures, some element which is entirely independent of Greek influence; and this element may be of importance in Italy. Again, however Greek in origin may have been the crowned processions of laurel-bearers at the *supplicatio*, the custom of prostration accompanying it seems Oriental rather than Greek. After reading Mr Fowler's wonderfully sympathetic chapter on Virgil, one hesitates to criticise his interpretation of a beautiful line; but surely the expression

“dum montibus umbræ lustrabunt convexa”

does not refer to cloud-shadows, such as may doubtless be seen in Greece and Italy, as well as in Scotland or Wales, but rather to the slower and less capricious shadows that define from hour to hour the outlines of the mountain and its foothills as the sun moves on its daily course; and this comparison is more fitting to the impressive and solemn *lustratio*, with its “slow processional movement.”

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*Socialism and Character.*—By Vida D. Scudder.—Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston and New York, 1912.—Pp. xvii + 431.

FROM various papers, some of which have appeared previously in the *Hibbert Journal*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, and other periodicals, Miss Scudder has attempted to construct a relatively continuous volume, the purpose whereof seems to be a reconciliation between the content of modern socialism and the content of moral idealism and the Christian religion. The book will possibly find a fair number of readers, and some who read may count themselves rewarded; but the present reviewer confesses that he found it difficult to overcome his repugnance towards the loose style of Miss Scudder's writing, her carelessness in working out ideas to their logical conclusions, and the generally chaotic character of her intellectual



methods. After reading the book, the feeling left uppermost was that here were matters of serious importance for the moment, meriting deep and serious discussion, but unfortunately treated by Miss Scudder in far too confused, too rapid, and too popular a manner. It may be that the time is not yet ripe for the kind of review of the situation and the synthesis of ideas which this book attempts. The very instability and wavering character of much of Miss Scudder's own thinking and writing show how true it is that the great formative and reconciling ideas of the immediate future have hardly, as yet, displayed even their most rudimentary outlines to the observer. We are all familiar with the unrest of the time; we know the presaging signs of revolution which constantly confront us; we are well enough aware that conflict and misunderstanding, such as Miss Scudder tries to reconcile, exist between, let us say, religion and a spiritual view of life on the one hand, and, on the other hand, some of the most powerful moving ideas of modern social democracy. Many of us would be more content than we are if we could accept Miss Scudder's methods of reconciling all the conflicting elements, of binding "conservative Christian and revolutionary Socialist" into one, of showing that the doctrines of economic determinism and the class-war are quite in harmony with the dogmas of Christianity and the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. But Miss Scudder's way is, in the end, too easy, and that sums up the persistent weakness of the whole book. It is all too easy: style of writing, style of argument, style of thinking, are all *too easy*—so easy that we cannot escape the feeling that the writer is, after all, only lightly touching the surface of incredibly deep waters.

The first part of the book, which is divided into four main sections, gives record of a kind of intellectual pilgrimage which others, besides Miss Scudder, have probably made. It relates the old story of the awakening of the spirit of revolt against the evil condition of the social order, as that awakening found expression in the great idealistic reformers and revolutionaries of the last century. There was the inspiration of Carlyle, Ruskin, Mazzini, Ibsen, Nietzsche, Tolstoi, all urging really toward the same discontent against the established ordering of social life, and impelling the earnest disciple partly to iconoclastic revolt, partly to moralising endeavour, partly, again, to the pathway of reform. Miss Scudder's treatment of the intellectual world of the latter half of the nineteenth century has the value only of the briefest and most fragmentary sketch, and consequently we should perhaps be scarcely justified in accepting too seriously her estimates, for example, of Nietzsche and Ibsen. It is enough to say that, in the end, she dismisses practically all the great idealists of the nineteenth century as "blind guides": the endeavour to put their teachings into practice, whether by revolt, or by the effort to moralise or reform society, under the sway of philanthropic and humanitarian impulses, ended in failure. "The further we proceeded," she says, "the more did the application of moral idealism to the social problems of our age appear invested with unreality" (p. 50). It is a sorrowful confession, and yet one that will

probably find endorsement by many. But light came over the dark and troubled waters from an unexpected source—none other than the “Communist Manifesto” and the teaching of Karl Marx. Socialism replaced all other ideals; and, for Miss Scudder, this replacement seems to have been a really momentous event, to the highest degree restorative. The difficulty, which has produced Miss Scudder’s book, and which we fully admit to be only too real a difficulty, arose when this new force of Socialism appeared in conflict with various presumably valuable attitudes and elements in human life, more especially with moral idealism and religion. Socialism found no very ready welcome except with the proletariat classes: to the so-called privileged classes the new creed was generally anathema. It was gravely materialistic, and, moreover, destructively revolutionary, aiming directly and unashamed at the very foundation of privilege, and indeed of the established social order, namely, private ownership of the means of production. Consequently there was hostility on the part of all existing privileges, and especially on the part of religion—hostility which the exponents of Socialism themselves did little to check and much to inflame. It was this hostility that produced the dilemma which, in its turn, produced this book. On the one hand, the socialistic doctrine seemed true and quite practicable, and offered a way of release from the evil state of things; on the other hand, it was opposed by, and seemed itself opposed to, practically all that was best and most worth while in the old order now threatened with destruction. How to bring about a real reconciliation?—that was the question and the problem. It was, and it is, and it will probably remain for many years, a *real* question and a *real* problem. Fully we admit that; our objection is that the reconciliation attempted by Miss Scudder is not likely to satisfy.

The second part of the book is devoted to an attempt to show that the root principles of Socialism do not in themselves conflict with moral idealism, and need not awaken alarm in the minds of worthy and religious people. The doctrine of economic determinism and the rule of class consciousness are taken here as the basal notions of modern socialism. Miss Scudder calls the latter “the sister doctrine” of the former; but it would not be easy to prove that the logical outcome of economic determinism is the class struggle. In reality, the class struggle is the far more important of the two: it is a fact, for which various explanations can be given, whilst the other is only a theory intended to explain, amongst other things, the class struggle itself. Against the theory of economic determinism other ways of viewing history can be set, and the case argued for and against; but there is nothing to set against the class struggle, if so we call it. There is nothing, that is to say, to set against the *clear fact* that the older order of industrialism, individualised and capitalistic, is breaking down before our eyes, and that the most powerful of the forces working its destruction is the activity of the workers themselves. A new order is being born, whether we like it or not: so far we agree with this book, but we confess that to us it seems sheer waste of time to try and commend the



class consciousness to timid people by showing that it produces loyalties and virtues of various kinds. Nor are we so sure as our authoress seems to be that the doctrines of Socialism will be found adequately to fit the mind and will of the coming democracy.

However, having commended Socialism to the timid, and presuming that they will make the choice and embrace it as creed and ideal, Miss Scudder goes forward to consider the probable "ethical reactions of Socialism" and its likely effect on religion, thus consuming the third and fourth portions of the book. Concerning ethics, the sum of the whole matter is this, that, under the present system of inequality, the finer virtues have no chance to flourish; but, given economic equality, virtues will blossom abundantly. The whole argument is based on the familiar and dangerous half-truth that it is not easy for the man with an empty stomach to attempt the hard way of the moral life; unfortunately, we have no guarantee that, if his stomach were filled, he would be any the readier for the adventure. Miss Scudder claims to have shown that "under Socialism . . . the principles of the Beatitudes will no longer have to maintain themselves against the trend of things, but will become as truly the law for social progress as they are now the law for individual holiness" (p. 315). *Are the Beatitudes the law for individual holiness?* We need some proof of this: no one has ever made them "work" yet, and it is indeed hard to see how they can have any literal and universal power, no matter under what social system they appear. And why the Beatitudes rather than the Ten Commandments? This seems merely a sop to conventional ideas.

In the final section of the book, Miss Scudder treats of "Socialism and Theism," "Socialism and Christianity," and "The Kingdom of God." A place is found for the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, all, we may notice, detached from the historical Jesus and become simply symbolic. There is little harm in this sort of speculation; but we must protest against the chapter on "The Kingdom of God." "The Social Ideal," says Miss Scudder, irradiates the story of Jesus "from the first dawn in Galilee to the light of Eastertide," and then she adds, "So far we are on sure ground." That is exactly what we are not, and, of all unsafe interpretations of the Gospels, this, which offers Jesus as a preacher of the "Social Ideal," in some modern sense, and John the Baptist as, forsooth, "a picturesque social reformer," is surely the most unsafe. The whole chapter is full of questionable statements, plausible and easy perhaps, but dubious and insufficient.

We regret that we have not been able to give this book a warmer welcome, but honestly we find its intrinsic value to be small. It has, however, an extrinsic worth. It does deal with matters of vital importance and raise questions pertinent to every thoughtful man and woman, and, in a measure, it does assert what is perhaps after all the greatest need of the moment, the necessity, namely, for all, who would live well into the future, joyfully to accept the risk of the time, give themselves with complete self-

consecration to the social task, and go forward boldly with the faith that no change of social order can really harm the true man, or take away the intimate and ultimate values of life.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

WARRINGTON.

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*The Evolution of Educational Theory.*—By John Adams, M.A., B.Sc., LL.D., Professor of Education in the University of London.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1912.

UNDER the general title "The Schools of Philosophy" Sir Henry Jones promises a series of books which, when completed, will offer to the English-reading world a full history of the evolution of philosophical thought in all its departments. Among the writers whose collaboration with him in this important enterprise is already announced are Professors Burnet, Latta, and Stout, and Dr R. A. Duff.

It needed some boldness on the editor's part to open his series with the present volume; for though most of the great philosophers have had their "thoughts on education," the development of educational opinion has not hitherto been recognised as one of the legitimate branches of general philosophical history. It may be said at once that Professor Adams has completely justified the new departure, and has shown impressively that the ideas embodied in the educational institutions of the civilised peoples have a continuity, a stability, and a depth of significance that make them, equally with political ideas, fit material for philosophical criticism. His book is, therefore, more than a very valuable addition to the technical literature of his profession; it is an interpretation of educational history which must engage the interest of any student of man's spiritual progress. It may be added that the success of this wider appeal is guaranteed not only by the author's learning and remarkable breadth of sympathy, but also by a mode of exposition, vivid, sincere, and humorous, which makes his pages delightful reading.

The normal use of the term Education implies a certain process of reaction between the educand (as Professor Adams happily calls him) and his social environment. To a superficial view the parent, the teacher, or the school may at different times be the correlative demanded by the notion of the process, but in ultimate analysis these are merely more or less specialised organs through which the environmental influences reach the educand. It follows that a theory of education, being a consciously held doctrine of the educative process, always presents two distinguishable, if not separable, aspects. On the one hand it is a doctrine of values, of educational ideals; on the other hand it is a doctrine of the means by which the educand can be "formed" in accordance with these ideals. In its second aspect educational theory must rest upon our knowledge of the



child's endowment and of the way in which it is affected by environmental action. Constant advance in this purely scientific knowledge implies constant improvement in pedagogical theories. In his second chapter Professor Adams briefly reviews these fundamental data of education and brings out clearly the significance of certain unsettled questions such as the inheritance of acquired characters and the modifiability of the inherited basis of character. But the development of educational theory cannot be wholly identified with progress in psychological knowledge. After all, Dr Johnson's famous assertion was not altogether wide of the mark. "There is," says Professor Adams, "a great body of generally accepted truth that is the common possession of all thinkers on education, and has long been so" (p. 97). Movements in educational thought take the form not of new discoveries but rather of new syntheses of old truths based upon new normative conceptions. "Each age demands a new statement of educational theory, just as it demands a new translation of a great classical work. . . . It wants all the matters that affect it to be brought into direct relation with its particular form of civilisation, and not with some other, however superior that other may be intrinsically" (*ibid.*). It is not surprising, therefore, that "maximal periods in the evolution of educational theory" (p. 99) coincide with epochs of great disturbance of old intellectual levels. Professor Adams recognises three such periods—the epoch of Plato and Aristotle, the Renaissance, and the present age.

The foregoing quotations represent the general point of view from which the author approaches his subject. It is important, however, to distinguish a second sense in which one may speak of the evolution of an educational theory. A theory arises as a consciousness of some new need of the social organism or as the formulation of a new doctrine of values, but its practical success depends upon the possibility of getting the schoolmaster to apply it. Thus while the history of the theory begins with a development of the first or philosophical aspect, its later history is inevitably a development of its second or technical aspect. In other words, educational theories always tend to run into pedagogical formalism in the hands of professional teachers (p. 157). Of this tendency Scholasticism gives the capital instance. "Socrates discovered the value of the concept as an instrument of educative teaching" (p. 97), and Scholasticism worked out the technical aspect of his discovery until it represented, as an educational system, "the most nearly perfect formal development ever reached" (p. 158). The inevitable revolt then occurred, bringing, under the influence of new ideals, an influx of new matter of instruction—doomed in turn to exhaust its vitality in formalism.

The historic educational movement is, then, largely the resultant of these two evolutionary forces: the conflict of ideal with ideal for predominance and the perennial conflict of form with matter. The latter finds its most important expression in the controversy—never more alive than at the present moment—as to whether the schools should prepare their pupils for specific adult occupations or should aim at giving a

"general training." Congruent with this opposition of opinions, but of deeper significance since it involves a clash of ideals, is the opposition between theories which give the first place to the formation of character by discipline and guidance, and those which pay chief honour to the cultivation of knowledge—the "organon of education" and the indispensable guide of conduct. Here we have expressed the antithesis between the monastic and the scholastic ideals of the Middle Ages and between naturalism and humanism in modern times. The present age sees the same conflict continued as a struggle between the views of those who hold that the child's soul contains a normative principle or "entelechy" capable, if left alone, of directing its best possible development, and of those who regard the whole personality of a man to its inmost recesses as the product of reactions working in accordance with unvarying laws.

It would be impossible in a small compass to convey an adequate idea of the richness of Professor Adams' treatment of all these questions, or to discuss with profit points where qualification of the author's views might be urged. It must suffice to say that Professor Adams' criticisms cover an amazingly wide field of opinion and are often extraordinarily illuminating, and that they always exhibit a sanity, a moderation, and a catholicity which must give his readers equal confidence and pleasure. The book may be commended as one of quite unusual importance and interest.

T. PERCY NUNN.

LONDON DAY TRAINING COLLEGE.

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*Biblical and Theological Studies.*—By the Members of the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary. Published in Commemoration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Founding of the Seminary.—New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.—Pp. 634.

IMMEDIATELY after the title-page of this fine volume there is printed the following note, which is the sole preface or introduction: "The first session of Princeton Theological Seminary commenced on the twelfth day of August 1812. On the seventh day of May 1912 its one hundredth session closes. This volume of essays has been prepared by the members of the Faculty of the Seminary in commemoration of the completion of the Seminary's first century of service to the Church." The present writer would begin by respectfully offering his congratulations on the event thus celebrated. The book has been produced at the Princeton University Press, and handsome as it is in appearance, there are nevertheless several serious misprints,<sup>1</sup> and, most unaccountably, there is no index. The essays are fifteen in number, by as many different writers, but there is no indication of the chair which each author holds; one must judge from the internal evidence of his work here printed. The tenth essay reads like an

<sup>1</sup> Take one example, περιπατεῖν for περιπατεῖτε, p. 238.



inaugural address in the chair of Homiletics, till at the close one is surprised to meet with a reference to a year's work already accomplished. The most ambitiously literary paper, an address on Jonathan Edwards, misquotes Wordsworth's most familiar line as, "The child is father to the man." After allowing for the American spelling and division of words, and for the frequent use of the (to us) ugly phrase "back of" (it even translates the German *dahinter*), there is little to indicate the trans-Atlantic origin of the book. The uncertainties in the future tense and the subjunctive mood might come from a Scot or an Irishman, and the scholars whose views are criticised are for the most part English or German, especially German. In "Modern Spiritual Movements" almost more stress is laid upon Keswick and Mildmay and Brighton than upon Northfield and Mount Hermon. It is curious, by the way, that more than thirty pages can be given to such topics as Holiness, Peace, Power for Service, and the like, without any treatment of the place of Sacraments in the religious life.

Adequately to review these essays would require a number of specialists, for they range over subjects belonging to the Old Testament, the New Testament, the Sub-Apostolic Age, Eschatology, the Philosophy of Religion, Preaching, the Koran, etc. I can only try to seize a point of view from which they may be contemplated as a whole, and then to bring out some salient features. The former is easy of attainment, for the characteristic of the book as a whole is that it is singularly conservative. On p. 43, Mark vi. 34 and Matt. xiv. 14 are put together in order to get a complete picture of our Lord teaching and healing, no notice being taken of the fact that this is one of three places where Matthew has substituted *healing* for Mark's *teaching*; cf. Matt. xix. 2; xxi. 4 = Mark x. 1; xi. 17, 18. On p. 65 the same writer takes it for granted that there were two cleansings of the Temple, a different view not being even alluded to; while on p. 184 another writer makes faith in the deity of Christ depend on belief in his physical resurrection.

Among the Old Testament studies is a most interesting one by John D. Davis on "The Child whose Name is Wonderful," which rightly maintains the Messianic interpretation of the great passage in Is. ix. "The Aramaic of Daniel" is a learned and careful examination by Robert Dick Wilson of Professor Driver's linguistic argument (*L.O.T.*<sup>10</sup>) for the late date of Daniel, and the reader feels bound to acquiesce in the conclusion that the Oxford scholar has overstated his case, and that "the dialect of Daniel . . . must have been used at or near Babylon at a time not long after the founding of the Persian empire." At the same time, this argument does not amount to a proof that Daniel as it now stands is of this early date; everyone who is acquainted with what Dr Driver has said in *L.O.T.* or in his Commentary knows that a number of different lines of proof go to establish the position there taken up. Perhaps the strongest is that derived from the prophecies, which are detailed up to the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes, but then become vague and general.

Under the title, "The Transcendence of Jehovah, God of Israel," Oswald

Thompson Allis establishes the textual integrity of Is. xlv. 24-28, and claims it for Isaiah. He has made a remarkable discovery which enables him to arrange the passage in three stanzas of three lines each, which, without the altering of a single consonant, rise gradually to a grand climax; each line of the first stanza begins with a Qal participle (רָקַע, נָטָה, עָשָׂה), each line of the second stanza with a Hiphil participle (מָשַׁיב, מָפִיר, מְסַר), and each of the third with הִאָּמַר. Arranging his stanzas in this fashion, he obtains a very perfect, if artificial, poem, the lines beginning short, and on the whole lengthening to the end. The conclusion seems inevitable that *Cyrus*, or at least a similarly accented word, is essential to the verse. But surely to establish this point is to go a long way towards invalidating his second conclusion. The more convincing the proof that here is a genuine prophecy of Cyrus, the more difficult it becomes to think of Isaiah as the author.

A lengthy dissertation (K. D. MacMillan) on the "*Shepherd of Hermas*" arrives first of all at the decision that "what the Muratori Fragment does, is not to take away the authority which had universally been conceded to the *Shepherd* at one time, but to check a growing tendency to regard it as canonical." This is exactly the opinion published many years ago now by Dr Salmon of Dublin in a book so well known as his *Introduction to the New Testament*. When the author proceeds to claim the *Shepherd* as an allegory, and to say, "In the words of the Church and the Shepherd and the other heavenly messengers we are to see the official teaching of the Church of Rome," I am unable to follow him. Dr Salmon seems to me indisputably right when he says (ed. 4, p. 585), "Now, if we take this story as allegorical fiction, it is impossible to assign a meaning to it"; and again, "The work of Hermas is not to be classed with Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, but rather with the revelations of St Teresa, St Francesca Romana, St Gertrude, St Catherine of Siena, and other literature of the same kind."

Want of space will not permit me to do more than draw attention to valuable studies on "The Supernatural," directed against positivism, monism, and pluralism, and in its latter part largely against the Ritschlian school; on "The Finality of the Christian Religion"; and on "Jesus and Paul." All these are very able arguments. The essay by Frances Gandy Patton, which opens the volume, is on "Theological Encyclopædia"; it claims that the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches of America "have won the conspicuous place they hold in theological literature through the labours of their systematic theologians," and asserts that "the great battle of the twentieth century is in its final issue a struggle between a dogmatic Christianity on the one hand and an out-and-out naturalistic philosophy on the other."

G. E. FRENCH.

WEST CAMEL RECTORY.



*Les Dieux ont Soif.*—Par Anatole France.—Calmann-Lévy, 1912.

THE agnostics of the world may be divided roughly into two classes: those who, since they do not know, are continually and untiringly searching for truth, who, because they have not made up their minds, leave no stone unturned which may possibly help them to that desirable end; and those who have long ago made up their minds that to know is impossible. To the latter class M. Anatole France undoubtedly belongs. And so for many years now we have had a succession of books from his pen, all written from this point of view: books written in a style unsurpassed in Europe for its lucidity and purity of language, and with a charity for human weaknesses that cannot fail to attract even his most determined opponents.

Let us think for one moment of the reasons that make us spend our last pennies on new books by Anatole France and H. G. Wells. The contrast between the two could not be greater. We buy Mr Wells' new novel because we want to know exactly where he stands at the moment. We want to watch his growth, and to see his reasons for what we know will be, in some degree at least, a new point of view, as well for him as for us. With M. France it is very different. We know, or think we know, what his point of view will be, and we can make a pretty shrewd guess at several of the characters that he will introduce; and so our chief reason for buying his book will be partly a desire to watch the skilful way in which he will fit these ideas and characters into his story, and partly, or rather chiefly, a desire to hear M. France himself. For those pet characters of his, Abbé Coignard, M. Bergeret, and, in the book at present under notice, M. Brotteaux, are the media through which he can come into direct contact with his readers. And it is when he is thus in direct contact that the joy of his readers is full. Our critical faculties are lulled to sleep by the charming manner of these wise old men. We cannot, if we would, arise in our might and smite them, for M. France is so fully agnostic that he laughs at his own opinions before we have time to catch him. To fight with a man who thus disarms himself is impossible.

In the present book he deals with the French Revolution, and surely a kindlier book on the subject was never written. It is not that he does not show us the most horrible of scenes; his hero, Gamelin, is a juryman on the Revolutionary Tribunal, who from the highest motives feels it his duty to condemn hundreds of unfortunates to death, without so much as a pretence at giving them a hearing; but in some way he inveigles us to sit with him on Mount Olympus, careless of mankind. We can only feel a calm, Epicurean pity for their strange antics and insane mistakes; the pity that comes from a real love of men and women, that feels their sufferings more bitterly even than its own, is far away. There is no passion aroused in our hearts, no burning love that sweeps away abuses, and, with all its mistakes, brings about those cleansing reformatations that are so necessary to society. Of this side of the Revolution he shows us nothing. Even the individuals in his story know not love, though there is much affection and no little sensu-

ality. But such is his way. One does not go to Anatole France for love, in the full meaning of that much abused word, for a passion that burns clean. Indeed, when one looks closely, one sees the necessity, from his point of view, for those "smutty" (there is no other word for them) stories, that seem at first to disfigure his pages; they are not mere excrescences, or wilful faults of taste, but rather keen weapons wherewith to attack love itself, which so unjustly (it must seem to him) has been enthroned above us.

But if he cannot, or rather does not mean to show us love in its highest sense, he can and does fill us with a great kindness. Let anyone read the scene where Brotteaux, the ancient aristocrat and follower of Lucretius, Père Longuemare, the Barnabite, and Athénaïs, the young prostitute, ascend the scaffold, and he will understand the affection that Anatole France can inspire in his readers. Those three friends so beautifully brought together and dying together, with such different outlooks and yet with such a strange sympathy for each other, are typical of M. France. No other writer could have created them; no other writer could have shown them to us with such sympathy. For he has great sympathy for the simple people of the world. It is only the greatness or nobility of humanity that he fails to see. He loves our failings and our weaknesses, he loves our self-contradictions; and if at times we wish that he could sympathise with the greatness of men and their ideals, that he was not so mortally afraid of being caught in a heroic attitude, none the less do we give thanks for what he can and does show us with so much kindness and charm.

To see the complete Anatole France one cannot do better than compare the scene mentioned above with the anti-climax on which the story ends.

In the first we have Brotteaux, whose only regret it is that he will never pull Père Longuemare by the sleeve and say: "Vous voyez; vous n'avez plus ni sentiment ni connaissance; vous êtes inanimé"; the old Father asking Brotteaux to pray for him, since in a minute he may perhaps be nearer to God, in whom he does not believe, than Père Longuemare himself; and Athénaïs asking the priest's absolution, who, giving it, replies: "Ma fille! vous êtes tombée dans de grands désordres; mais que ne puis-je présenter au Seigneur un cœur aussi simple que le vôtre."

There is the France one loves.

And he ends the book by making Élodie, the woman whom Gamelin had so tragically loved, turn to her new lover with the self-same words on her lips as only a few short months before she had used to Gamelin on a similar occasion.

And this is the France whose skill one cannot help admiring.

But the true Anatole France is compounded of these two.

RALPH FLETCHER WRIGHT.

CHIRK.



*Abbot Wallingford.*—By Abbot Gasquet, D.D.—Sands & Co., 1912.

THIS little book is an answer to the third volume of Dr Gairdner's *Lollardy and the Reformation*, which we noticed last July. In defending Abbot Wallingford of St Albans against Dr Gairdner (and all previous writers, we believe), in the matter of the charges contained in Cardinal Morton's famous *monition* of 1490, it raises indirectly the whole question of the Dissolution of the Monasteries. Abbot Gasquet's apologia rests upon three main contentions. We are first asked to rule out of court some thirty-five pages of the so-called *Registrum Johannis Whethamstede*, although these pages show all the stylistic peculiarities of the rest of the register. We are then asked to believe that Morton's *monitio* is not, as Froude called it, a record of what was found after inquiry, but a statement of "rumours," a piece of legal "common form" (pp. 48, 45). This supposition is, from the first, at variance with the words of the *monitio* itself; Abbot Gasquet would have done well to lay before his readers, as Froude did, so much of this document as can be rendered into naked English. How could Morton solemnly assert that Wallingford was accused "by *fama publica* and by frequent relations of people worthy of credit," unless he himself had inquired, personally or by deputy, into the credibility of the witnesses, and the facts to which they testified? How could he thrice reinforce his accusations with that damning word *notorie*? and how could he add that the public scandal was such as to besiege him daily with fresh clamours for the reformation of St Albans Abbey? Abbot Gasquet escapes these difficulties (1) by omitting from his analysis all reference to the *notorie* and the public clamours for reform, and (2) by misinterpreting the words *fama publica* and *diffamatus* in a way which does little credit to his knowledge of canon law. Both these technical terms refer to a well-known judicial process. When a man received from his lawful superior a formal *monitio* to the effect that he was *diffamatus* of any offence, this meant that he was already condemned by *fama publica*, which is defined as "the consentient voice of a whole town or neighbourhood, or the greater part thereof." He was now called upon to prove his innocence by ordinary legal methods; if he failed in this, or refused (as most *diffamati* did) to risk the trial, then judgment went against him. If Wallingford and his monks had been conscious of innocence, nothing would have been easier than to face Morton directly; the process for purging oneself of a *diffamatio* was almost absurdly lenient, except in the case of heresy. But they preferred to stand on technicalities, and appealed to Rome: nor is Abbot Gasquet correct in twice describing this as a matter of conscience. Wallingford might have admitted a visitation *pro hac vice* without any prejudice to the privileges which he had sworn to maintain; and those privileges did in fact suffer more by his appeal than they could have done by a more open policy. But he was old, wealthy, and powerful, and it seems quite certain that he successfully evaded trial during the two years of life that were left to him. Nor is Abbot Gasquet happier

in his third line of defence (pp. 44 *sqq.*). In this, he appeals to our sense of decency, and asks whether it is credible that Wallingford could have sinned so deeply or so openly as the town of St Albans and Cardinal Morton suspected. This two-edged argument at once provokes the inquiry: What indubitable records have we of similar cases?—for we must judge the Middle Ages by the Middle Ages, and not by twentieth-century notions. We have very full records of the life-work of four visitors, from their own pens: Odo Rigaldi in Normandy, Johann Busch in North Germany, Ambrose Traversari in Italy, and Felician Ninguarda in Germany and Austria. They range from the thirteenth century to the sixteenth; all four were equally distinguished for intellect, piety, and character; and they all record cases, again and again, which parallel or outdo every item of this Wallingford case which Abbot Gasquet would dismiss as incredible from its very grossness. Again, the history told in the *Evesham Chronicle* is in every particular worse than that revealed by Morton's *monitio*; and the *Evesham Chronicle* is, by the common consent of historians of all schools, one of the most valuable records of the Middle Ages. In this case at least an author has nothing to fear from the reproach to which Abbot Gasquet gives the additional emphasis of italics: "History must be founded on *facts*."

G. G. COULTON.

CAMBRIDGE.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF LIFE.<sup>1</sup>

PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE.

### I.

WHAT is essential to the Christian doctrine of life can be brought to mind more readily than in any other way known to me, by a very brief contrast between some features of the Christian religion and the corresponding features of the greatest historical rival of Christianity, namely, Buddhism.

Both Christianity and Buddhism are products of long and vast processes of religious evolution. Both of them originally appealed to mature and complex civilisations. Yet both of them intended that their appeal should, in the end, be made to all mankind. Both of them deliberately transcended the limits of caste, of rank, of nation, and of race, and undertook to carry their message to all sorts and conditions of men. Both showed, as missionary religions, an immense power of assimilation. Both freely used, so far as they could do so without sacrificing essentials, the religious ideas which they found present in the various lands that their missionaries reached; and, like Paul, both of them became all things to all men, if haply they might thereby win any man to the faith that they thought to be saving.

Both were redemptive religions, which condemned both the mind and the sins of the natural man; and taught salvation

<sup>1</sup> Delivered in Manchester College, Oxford.

through a transformation of the innermost being of this natural man. Each developed a great variety of sects and of forms of social life. Each made use of religious orders as a means of separating those who, while desirous of salvation, were able, in their present existence, to live only in a close contact with the world, from those who could aim directly at the highest grades of perfection.

Each of these two religions attempts, by a frank exposure of the centrally important facts of our life, to banish the illusions which bind us fast to earth, and, as they both maintain, to destruction. Each is therefore, in its own way, austere and unsparing in the speech which it addresses to the natural man. Each shuns mere popularity, and is transparently honest in its estimate of the vanities of the world. Each aims at the heart of our defects. Each says: "What makes your life a wreck and a failure, is that your very essence as a human self is, in advance of the saving process, a necessary source of woe and wrong." Each of the two religions insists upon the inmost life of the heart as the source whence proceeds all that is evil, and whence may proceed all that can become good about man. Each rejects the merely outward show of our deeds as a means for determining whether we are righteous or not. Each demands absolute personal sincerity from its followers. Each blesses the pure in heart, requires strict self-control, and makes an inner concentration of mind upon the good end an essential feature of piety. Each preaches kindness toward all mankind, including our enemies. Each condemns cruelty and malice. Each, in fact, permits no human enmities. Each is a religion that exalts those who, in the world's eyes, are weak.

And not only in these more distinctly ethical ideas do the two religions agree. Each of them has its own world of spiritual exaltation; its realm that is not only moral, but deeply religious; its home land of deliverance, where the soul that is saved finds rest in communion with a peace that the world can neither give nor take away.



In these very important respects, therefore, the distinctly religious features of the two faiths are intimately related. In the case of each of the two religions, but in the case of Buddhism rather more than in the case of Christianity, it is possible, and in fact just and requisite, to distinguish its ideas of the nature and the means and the realm of salvation from the metaphysical opinions which a more or less learned exposition of the doctrines of the faith almost inevitably uses.

Buddhism has its ideas of the moral order of the universe, of Nirvana, and of the Buddhas—the beings who attain supreme enlightenment—and who thereby save the world. These ideas invite metaphysical speculation, and furnish motives that tended towards the building up of a theology, and that, in the end, produced a theology. But each of these religious ideas, in the case of Buddhism, can be defined without defining either a metaphysical or a theological system. The original teaching of Gotama Buddha rejected all metaphysical speculation, and insisted solely upon the ethical foundations of the doctrine, and upon those distinctly religious, but non-metaphysical, views of salvation, and of the higher spiritual life, which Buddha preferred to depict in parables, rather than to render needlessly abstruse through discussions such as, in his opinion, did not tend to edification.

The common ethical and religious features of Christianity and Buddhism are thus both many and impressive. Some of the greatest life questions are faced by both religions, and, in the respects which I have now pointed out, are answered in substantially the same way. Moreover, in several of the ethical and religious ideas in which these two religions agree with each other, they do not closely agree with any other religion. So far as I can venture to judge, no other religions that have attempted to appeal to the deepest and most universal interests of mankind have been so free as both Buddhism and Christianity are from bondage to national, to racial, and to worldly antagonisms and prejudices. No others have made so central, as they both have done, the conception of a personal saviour of

mankind, whose dignity depends both upon the moral merits of his teaching, and of his life, and upon the religious significance of the spiritual level to which he led the way, thus moulding both the thoughts and the lives of his followers.

When we add to all these parallels the fact that each of these religions had an historical founder, whose life later came to be the object of many legendary reports; and that the legends, in each case, were so framed by the religious imagination of the early followers of the faith in question that they include a symbolism, whereby a portion of the true meaning of each faith is expressed in the stories about the founder—when, I say, we add this fact to all the others, we get some hint of the very genuine community of spirit which belongs to these two great world religions. That the imaginative Buddha legends show an unrestrained and often helpless disposition to adorn the religion with an edifying body of miraculous tales, while the relative self-restraint of the early Christian Church in holding in check, as much as it did, its vigorous myth-making tendencies, remains, in many respects, a permanent marvel—all this constitutes a very notable contrast between the two faiths. But this is, in part, a contrast between the two civilisations (so remote, in many ways, from each other) whose development lay at the basis of the two religions. Buddhism was more surrounded by an atmosphere of magic than the Christian Church ever was. Yet in those essentials which I have just reported, the agreements and analogies between the two faiths are both close and momentous. So far the two seem to be genuine co-workers in the same vast task of the ages—the salvation of man, through the transformation of a natural life into a life whose dwelling-place lies beyond human woe and sin.

## II.

Wherein, then, lies the most essential contrast between the Christian and the Buddhistic doctrines of life? This contrast, when it once comes to light, is, to my mind, far



more impressive than are the agreements. It has often been discussed.

The most familiar way of stating this contrast is to say that Buddhism is pessimistic, while Christianity is a religion of hope. This is, in part, true; but it is not very enlightening, unless the spirit of Christian hopefulness is more fully explained, and unless the Buddhistic pessimism is quite justly appreciated. Both religions hope for salvation; and, for each of them, salvation means an overcoming of the world. Each deplores humanity as it is, and means to transform us. The contrast is, therefore, hardly to be defined as a contrast of hope with despair. For each undertakes to overcome the world, and assures us that we can be transformed. And each regards our natural state as one worthy of despair, were not the way of salvation opened.

Nearer to the whole truth seems to be that frequently repeated statement of the matter which insists upon the creative attitude which Christianity requires the will to take, as against the quietism of Buddha. Buddhism has as its goal a certain passionless contemplation, in which the distinction of one individual from another is of no import, so that the self, as *this* self, vanishes. Christianity conceives love as positively active, and dwells upon a hope of immortality.

Nevertheless, the concept of beatitude, as the Christian thought of the Middle Ages formulated that concept, sets the contemplative life nearer the goal than the active life, even when the active life is one of charity. Hence, in their more mystical moods and expressions, the two religions are, again, much more largely in agreement than our own very natural partisanship, determined by our Christian traditions, tends to make us admit.

It is also true that Buddhism aims at the extinction of the individual self; while Christianity assigns to the human individual an infinite worth. And this is indeed a vastly important difference. Yet this very importance remains unexplained and a mere formula until you see what it is about

the human individual which constitutes, for the Christian view, his importance. One may answer, in simple terms, that, according to the teachings of Jesus, the individual is infinitely important, because the Father loves him; while Buddhism, in its original Southern form, has nothing to offer that is equivalent to this love of God for the individual man. Yet the further question has to be faced: Why and for what end does the God of Christianity love the individual? And it is here, at last, that you come face to face with the deepest contrast.

For God's love towards the individual is, from the Christian point of view, a love for one whose destiny it is to be a *member of the Kingdom of Heaven*. The Kingdom of Heaven is essentially a Community. And the idea of this community, as the Founder in parables prophetically taught that idea, developed into the conception which the Christian Church formed of its own mission; and through all changes, and despite all human failures, this conception remains a sovereign treasure of the Christian world.

### III.

The Individual *and* the Community: this, if I may so express a perfectly human antithesis in religious and deliberately symbolic speech—this pair of terms and of ideas is, so to speak, the *sacred pair*, to whose exposition and to whose practical application the whole Christian doctrine of life is due. This pair it is which, in the first place, enables Christianity to tell the individual why, in his natural isolation and narrowness, he is essentially defective, is inevitably a failure, is doomed, and must be transformed. This, if you choose, is the root and core of man's original sin, namely, the very form of his being as a morally detached individual. This is the bondage of his flesh; this is the soul of his corruption; this is his alienation from true life; this fact, namely, that by nature, as a social animal, he is an individual who, though fast bound by ties which no man can rend to the community wherein he



chances to be born or trained, nevertheless, *until* the true love of a community, and *until* the beloved community itself appear in his life, is a stranger in his father's house—a hater of his only chance of salvation—a worldling, and a worker of evil deeds—a miserable source of misery. *This* is why, for Christianity, the salvation of man means the destruction of his natural self—the sacrifice of what his flesh holds dearest—the utter transformation of the primal core of the social self. I say: It is the merely natural relation of the individual to the community which, for Christianity, explains all this. Here are the two levels of human existence. The individual, born on his own level, is naturally doomed to hatred for what belongs to the other level. Yet there on that higher level his only salvation awaits him.

Buddhism fully knows, and truly teaches, where the root of bitterness is to be found—not in the outward deed, but in the inmost heart of the individual self. But what, so far as I know, the original Southern Buddhism *never* clearly made a positive part of its own plan of the salvation of mankind, is a transformation of the self, *not* through the *mere* destruction of the narrow and corrupt flesh which alienates it from the true life, *but by the simple and yet intensely positive DEVOTION of the self to a new task—to its creative office as a loyal member of a beloved community.* Early Buddhism never, so far as I know, clearly defined its ideal of the beloved community in terms which make that community, viewed simply as an ideal, one conscious unity of the business, of the eager hopes, and of the patiently ingenious and endlessly constructive love, of all mankind. The ideal Christian community is one in which compassion is a mere incident in the realisation of the new life, not only of brotherly concord, but also of an interminably positive creation of new social values, all of which exist for many souls in one spirit. The ideal Christian community of all mankind is to be as intimate in its enthusiasm of service as the daily life of a Pauline church was intended by the apostle to be, and as novel in its inventions of new arts of common living as the

gifts of the spirit in the early Christian Church were believed to be novel. The ideal Christian community is to be the community of all mankind, as completely united in its inner life as one conscious self could conceivably become, and as destructive of the natural hostilities and of the narrow passions which estrange individual men, as it is skilful in winning from the infinite realm of bare possibilities concrete arts of control over nature and of joy in its own riches of grace. This free and faithful community of all mankind, wherein the individuals should indeed die to their own natural life, but should also enjoy a newness of positive life—this community never became, so far as I can learn, a conscious ideal for early Buddhism.

How far the Japanese religion of loyalty in its later forms of modified Buddhism, or in its other phases, has approached, or will hereafter approach, to an independent and original definition of the positive and constructive ideal of a conscious and universal human community which is here in question, I am quite unable to judge. The Japanese Buddhist sects well know what salvation by grace is. They well conceive and accept the doctrine of the incarnation of the divine being in a supernatural individual man; and are certainly universal in their general conceptions of some sort of human brotherhood. And they have reached these religious ideas quite apart from any dependence upon Christianity.

But what I miss in their religious conceptions, so far as I have read reports of these conceptions, is such a solution of the problem of human life in terms of loyalty, as *at once* demands the raising of the human self from the level of its natural narrowness, to the level of a complete and conscious personal membership in a beloved community, and *at the same time* defines the ideal community to whose level and in whose spirit we are to live, as the community of all mankind, and as one endlessly creative and conscious human spirit, whose life is to be lived upon its own level, and of whose dominion there is to be, in ideal and in meaning, no end.

The familiar article in the Christian creed which expresses



this perfectly concrete and practical and also religious ideal, and expresses it in terms whose ethical and whose religious value you can test by personal and social experience, whatever may be your own definition of the dogmas of the Church, and whatever your metaphysical opinions may be, and whatever form of the visible or invisible Church chances best to seem to meet this your interpretation—the familiar article of the Christian creed which expresses, I say, this ideal, just as an ideal, uses the words: “I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints.” One can understand and accept the spirit of this article of the creed, without accepting the dogmas or the obedience or the practice of any one form of the visible Christian Church. By this, Christianity has furnished mankind with its most impressive and inspiring vision of the homeland of the spirit.

#### IV.

Ethically speaking, the counsels which this Christian idea of the community implies, include all the familiar maxims of the Sermon on the Mount, and all the lessons of the parables; but tend to give to them such sorts of development as the ideals of the early Church, in Pauline and post-Pauline times, gradually gave to them. Always the difference between the two levels of our human existence must be borne in mind, if the interpretation of Christian love is to become as concrete as Paul made it in his epistles, and as concrete as later ages have attempted to keep it, even while developing its meaning.

You love your neighbour, first, because God loves him. Yes, but how and why does God love him? Because God loves the Kingdom of Heaven; and the Kingdom of Heaven is a perfectly live unity of individual men joined in one divine chorus—an unity of men who, *except* through their attachment to this life which exists on the level of the holy community of the Kingdom of Heaven, would be miserable breeders of woe, and would be lost souls. Let your love for

them be a love for your fellow-members in this Kingdom of Heaven.

Yes, but *this* neighbour is your enemy ; or he belongs to the wrong tribe or cast or sect. Do not consider these unhappy facts as having any bearing on your love for him. For the ethical side of the doctrine of life concerns not what you *find*, but what you are to *create*. Now God means this man to become a member of the community which constitutes the Kingdom of Heaven ; and God loves this man accordingly. View him, then, as the soldier views the comrade who serves the same flag with himself, and who dies for the same cause. In the Kingdom you, and your enemy, and yonder stranger, are one. For the Kingdom is the community of God's beloved.

As for the way in which you are to love, make that way of loving, to your own mind, more alive by recalling the meaning of your own dearest friendships. Think of the *closest* unity of human souls that you know. Then conceive of the Kingdom in terms of such love. When friends really join hands and hearts and lives, it is not the mere collection of sundered organisms and of divided feelings and will that these friends view as their life. Their life, as friends, is the unity which, while above their own level, wins them to itself and gives them meaning. This unity is the vine. They are the branches.

Now of such unity is the Kingdom of Heaven. See, then, in every man the branch of such a vine—the outflowing of such a purpose—the beloved of such a spirit, the incarnation of such a divine concern for many in one. And then your Christian love will be much more than mere pity, will be greater than any amiable sympathy with the longings of those poor creatures of flesh could, of itself, become. Your love will then become the Charity that never faileth. For its object is the beloved community, and the individual as, ideally, a member of that community.

Is such a regard for individuals too impersonal to meet the spirit of the parables ? No, it does not destroy, it fulfils, as



the early Christian Church, in ideal, fulfilled the spirit of the parables. Paul spoke thus, and thereby made Christian love more rather than less personal.

If by person you merely mean the morally detached individual man, then the community, the Kingdom of Heaven, is indeed superpersonal. If, by person, you mean a live unity of knowledge and of will, of love and of deed, then the community of the Kingdom of Heaven is a person on a higher level than is the level of any human individuals, and the Kingdom of Heaven is at once within you, and above you, a human life, and yet a life whose tabernacles are built upon a Mount of Transfiguration.

Reconsider familiar parables in the light of such an interpretation—an interpretation as old and familiar as it is persistently ignored or misunderstood. That, I insist, is a useful way of restating the Christian moral doctrine of life.

Over what does the father in the parable of the Prodigal Son rejoice? Over the mere delight that his son's presence now gives him, and over the feasting and the merriment that his own forgiving power supplies to the repentant outcast? No, the father has won again, not merely his son as a hungry creature who can repent and be fed. The father has won again the unbroken community of his family. It is the father's house that rejoices. It is this community which makes merry; and the father is, for the moment, the incarnation of the spirit of this community.

*Why* is there more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons? *Why* is the lost sheep sought in the wilderness? Because the individual soul has its infinite meaning in and through the unity of the Kingdom. The one lost sheep, found again—or the one repentant sinner—symbolises the restoration of the unity of this community, as the keystone stands for the sense of the whole arch, as the flag symbolises the country.

And *why*, in the parable of the judgment, does the Judge of all the earth identify himself with "the least of these my

brethren"—with the stranger, with the sick, with the captive? Because the Judge of all the earth is explicitly the spirit of the universal community, who speaks in the name of all who are one in the light and in the life of the Kingdom of Heaven.

## V.

These things remind us how ill those interpret the teachings of the Master who see in them a merely amiable fondness for what any morally detached individual happens to love or to suffer or seem. It is the ideal oneness of the life of the Kingdom of Heaven which glorifies and renders significant every human individual who loves the Kingdom, or whom God views as such a lover. And because Paul had before him the life of the churches, while the Master left the Kingdom of Heaven for the future to reveal, Paul's account of Christian morals is an enrichment, and a further fulfilment of what the parables began to tell, and left to the coming of the Kingdom to make manifest.

In suchwise, then, are the familiar precepts to be interpreted, if the Christian doctrine of the moral life is to be what it was intended to be—not a body of maxims and of illustrations, but a living and growing expression of the life-spirit of Christianity.

For the doctrine, if thus interpreted, points you not only backwards to the reported words of the Master, but endlessly forwards into the region where humanity, as it continues through the coming ages, must, with an unwearied patience, labour and experiment, and invent and create. The true moral code of Christianity has always been, and will remain, fluent as well as decisive. Only so could it express the Master's true spirit. It therefore must not view either the parables or the sayings as a storehouse of maxims, or even as a treasury of individual examples and of personal expressions of the Master's mind; expressions such that these maxims, these examples, and these personal sayings of the Master can never be surpassed in their ethical teachings. The doctrine



of the sayings and of the parables actually cries out for reinterpretation, for the creation of a novel life. That seems to me precisely what the Founder himself intended. The early apostolic Churches fulfilled the Master's teaching by surpassing it, and were filled with the spirit of their Master just because they did so. This, to my mind, is a central lesson of the early development of Christianity.

All morality, namely, is, from this point of view, to be judged by the standards of the beloved community of the ideal Kingdom of Heaven. Concretely stated, this means that you are to test every course of action *not* by the question: What can we find in the parables or in the Sermon on the Mount which seems to us more or less directly to bear upon this special matter? The central doctrine of the Master was: "So act that the Kingdom of Heaven may come." This means: So act as to help, however you can, and whenever you can, towards making mankind one loving brotherhood, whose love is not a mere affection for morally detached individuals, but a love of the unity of its own life upon its own divine level, and a love of individuals in so far as they can be raised to communion with the spiritual community itself.

## VI.

Now if we speak in purely human, and still postpone any speaking in metaphysical, terms, the community of all mankind is an ideal. Just now, just in this year or on this day, there exists no human community that is adequately conscious of its own unity, adequately creative of what it ought to create, adequately representative, on its own level, of the real and human communion of the spirit. Our best communities of to-day either take account of caste or of nation or of race—as all the political communities do—or else, when deliberately aiming at universality and at religious unity, they exclude one another; and are therefore not, in an ideal sense and degree, beloved communities. Two things, if no other, stand between even the best of them, as they are—between them, I

say, and the attainment of the goal of the truly beloved and the universal human community.

The one thing is their sectarian character—excluding, as they do, the one the other. The other thing is their official organisation, which cultivates in each of the more highly developed communities of this type, a respect for the law at precisely the expense of that which Paul experienced as the result of the legal aspect of the Judaism in which he was trained.

No, the universal and beloved community is still hidden from our imperfect human view, and will remain so, how long we know not.

Nevertheless, the principle of principles in all Christian morals remains this: “Since you cannot *find* the universal and beloved community, *create* it.” And this again, applied to the concrete art of living, means: Do whatever you can to take a step towards it, or to assist anybody—your brother, your friend, your neighbour, your country, mankind—to take steps towards the organisation of that coming community.

That, I say, is the principle of principles for Christian morals. But, for that very reason, there can be no code of Christian morals, nor any one set of personal examples, or of sayings, or of parables, or of other narratives, which will do more than to arouse us to create something new on our way towards the goal. Christian morality will not, either suddenly or gradually, conquer the world. But if Christianity, conceived in its true spirit, retains its hold upon mankind, humanity will go on creating new forms of Christian morality; whose only persistent feature will be that they intend to aid men to make their personal, their friendly, their social, their political, their religious orders and organisations such that mankind comes more and more to resemble the ideal, the beloved, the universal community. And the ethical aspect of the creed of the Christian world always will include this article: “I believe in the beloved community and in the spirit which makes it beloved, and in the communion of all



who are, in will and in deed, its members. I see no such community as yet; but none the less my rule of life is: Act so as to hasten its coming."

Now such an ethical creed is not a vague humanitarian enthusiasm. For it simply requires that we work with whatever concrete human materials we have for creating both the organisation of communities and the love for them. The work is without any human end that we can foresee. But it can be made always definite simply by resoluteness, in union with devotion. *That* is the type of work which always has been characteristically Christian, and which promises to remain so.

## VII.

The Christian idea of the community and of its relation to the way of salvation requires for its complete appreciation a comparison and synthesis which shall also include the idea of atonement.

What I have to suggest at this point will set the religious value of the idea of atonement in a light which must be for many minds somewhat novel; for otherwise the idea of atonement would not have been so long and so variously rendered more mysterious by the technically theological treatment which has been freely devoted to it. Nevertheless, in its deepest spirit, this very idea of atonement has been so dear to the religious mind of Christendom, and so familiar in art, in worship, and in contemplation, that it simply ought not to appear so mysterious. The fate of the Christian idea of atonement has been, that what Christian piety felt to be the head of the corner the Christian intellect has either rejected, or else, even in trying to defend the atonement, has made a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence.

Between the idea of the saving community and the idea of atonement, lie the gravest of Christian ideas—those which many optimists find too discouraging to face, or too austere to be wholesome. These are: the idea of sin, the idea of our original bondage to sin, and the idea of the consequences

involved in defining sin as an inner voluntary inclination of the mind, rather than as an outwardly manifest evil deed. These ideas about sin are in part common, as we have said, to Christianity and to Buddhism.

But, as a fact, Christianity has so developed these very ideas, has so united them with the conception of the grace and of the loyalty which save men from their natural sinfulness, that just these conceptions regarding sin, despite the fact that Matthew Arnold thought them too likely to lead to a brooding wherein "many have perished," are ideas such that their rightful definition renders Christianity what, for Paul, it became—a religion of spiritual freedom.

In studying the moral burden of the individual, and the realm of grace, we see that Christianity is a religion dependent, for its conception of original sin, upon the most characteristic features of that social cultivation whereby we are brought to a high level of self-consciousness. Early Buddhism had, so far as I am aware, no views about the nature of the social self as clear as those which Paul attained and, in his own way, expressed. But Paul's very doctrine about "the law"—that is, about the social origin of the individual self, and about that which "causes sin to abound," is a theory which lies at the root of the power and the right of Christianity to say to the self which has first attained sinful cultivation in self-will, and which has then been transformed by "grace" into a loyal self, precisely what Paul said to his converts: "All things are yours." For the doctrine of Paul is, that the escape from original sin comes through the acceptance of a service which is perfect freedom. Out of the Christian doctrine of sin grows the Christian teaching about the freedom of the faithful—a teaching which, in its turn, lies at the basis of some of the most important developments of the modern mind. The doctrine of sin need not lead, then, to brooding. It may lead to spiritual self-possession.

The doctrine of atonement enables us to extend the Pauline theory of salvation by grace, so that not merely our



originally helpless bondage to the results of our social cultivation is removed by the grace of loyalty, but the saddest of all the forms and consequences of wilful sin—namely, the deed and the result of conscious disloyalty—can be brought within the range which the grace of the will of the community can reach. The idea of atonement has a perfectly indispensable office, both in the ethical and in the religious task which the Christian doctrine of life has to accomplish.

### VIII.

Let me try to make a little more obvious this interpretation of the idea of atonement. Let me use for this purpose another illustration.

If my view about the essence of the idea of atonement is correct, the first instance of an extended account of an atoning process which the Biblical narratives include would be the story of Joseph and his brethren. Let us treat this story, of course, as obviously a little romance. We study merely its value as an illustration. The brethren sin against Joseph, and against their father. Their deed has some of the characteristics, not of mere youthful folly, but of maturely wilful treason. They assail not merely their brother, but their father's love for the lost son. Their crime is carefully considered, and is deeply treacherous. But it goes still farther. The treason is directed against their whole family community. Now, in the long-run, according to the beautiful tale, Joseph not only comforts his father, and is able to be a forgiving benefactor to his brethren, but in suchwise atones for the sin of his brethren that the family unity is restored. Here, then, is felt to be a genuine atonement. Wherein does it consist?

Does it consist in this, that the brethren have earned a just penalty which, as a fact, they never adequately suffer; while Joseph, guiltless of their wilful sin, vicariously suffers a penalty which he has not deserved? Does the atonement further consist in the fact that Joseph is able and willing freely to offer, for the good of the family, both the merits and the

providential good fortune which this vicarious endurance of his has won?

No; this "penal satisfaction" theory of the atoning work of Joseph, if it were proposed as an example of a doctrine of atonement, certainly would not meet that sense of justice, and of the fitness of things, and of the true value of Joseph's life and deeds—that sense, I say, which every child who first hears the story readily feels—without in the least being able to tell what he feels. If one magnified the deed of Joseph to the infinite, and said, as many have said: "Such a work as Joseph did for his brethren, even such a work, in his own divinely supreme way and sense, Christ did for sinful man"—would *that* theory of the matter make the nature of atonement obvious? Would a vicarious "penal satisfaction" help one to understand either one or the other of these instances of atonement?

But let us turn from such now generally discredited "penal satisfaction" theories to the various forms of modern moral theories. Let us say, applying our explanations once more to the story of Joseph: "God's Providence sent Joseph into captivity, through the sin of his brethren, but still under a divine decree. Joseph was obedient and faithful and pure-minded. God rewarded his patience and fidelity by giving him power in Egypt. Then Joseph, having suffered and triumphed, set before his brethren (not without a due measure of gently stern rebuke for their past misdeeds) an example of love and forgiveness so moving, that they deeply repented, confessed their sins, and loved their brother as never before. *That* was Joseph's atonement. And that, if magnified to the infinite, gives one a view of the sense in which the work of Christ atones for man's sin." Would such an account help us to understand atonement, either in Joseph's case or in the other?

I should reply that such moral theories of atonement, applied to the story of Joseph, miss the most obvious point and beauty of the tale, and also show us in no wise what



genuine atoning work the Joseph of the story did. Would the mere repentance, or the renewed love of the treacherous brethren for Joseph, or their wish to be forgiven, or their confession of their sin, constitute a sufficient ground for the needed reconciliation, in view of their offence against their brother, their father, or their family? If this was all the atonement which Joseph's labours supplied, he failed in his supposed office. Something more is needed to satisfy even the child who enjoys the story.

But now, let us become as little children ourselves. Let us take the tale as a sensitive child takes it, when its power first enters his soul. Let us simply articulate what the child feels. Here, according to the tale, is a patriarchal family invaded by a wilful treason, wounded to the core, desolated, broken. The years go by. The individual who was most directly assailed by the treason is guiltless himself of any share in that treason. He is patient and faithful and obedient. When power comes to him, he uses that power (which only just this act of treason could have put into his hands), first, to accomplish a great work of good for the community of a great kingdom. Herewith, according to the tale, he provides for the future honour and glory of his own family for all time to come. And then, being brought once more into touch with his family, he behaves with such clemency, and justice, and family loyalty; he shows such transient but amiable brotherly severity towards the former traitors, he shows also such tender filial devotion; his weeping when the family unity is restored is so rich in pathos; his care in providing for his father and for the future is so wise; his creative skill in making again into one fair whole what treason had shattered is so wonderful—that all these things together make the situation one whereof the child says without definite words, what we now say: "Through Joseph's work all is made, in fact, better than it would have been had there been no treason at all." Now I submit that Joseph's atoning work consists simply in this triumphantly ingenious creation of good out of

ill. That the brethren confess and repent is inevitable, and is a part of the good result; but by itself that is only a poor offering on their part. It is Joseph who atones. His atonement is, of course, vicarious. But it is perfectly objective. And it is no vicarious "penal satisfaction" whatever. It is simply the triumph of the spirit of the family through the devoted loyalty of an individual.

Joseph turns into a good, for the family, for the world, for his father, for the whole community involved, what his brothers had made ill. In his deed, through his skill, as well as through his suffering, the world is made better than it would have been had the treason never been done. This, I insist, constitutes his atoning work.

As to the brethren, their treason is, of course, irrevocable. Joseph's deed does not wipe out that guilt of their own. But they can stand in the presence of their community and hear the distinctly reconciling word: "You have been the indirect cause of a good that, by the grace and the ingenuity of the community and of its faithful servant, has now been created, while, but for your treason, this good could not have been created. Your sin cannot be cancelled. Nor are you in anywise the doers of the atoning deed. But the community welcomes you to its love again, not as those whose irrevocable deed has been cancelled, but as those whom love has so overruled that you have been made a source whence a spring of good flows."

The repentant and thankful brothers can now accept this reconciliation, never as a destruction of their guilt, but as a new and an objective fact whose significance they are willing to lay at the basis of a new loyalty. The community is renewed; the spirit has triumphed; and the traitors are glad that the irrevocable deed which they condemn has been made a source of a good which never could have existed without it. They are in a new friendship with their community, since the ends that have triumphed unite the new will with the old and evil will, through a new conquest of the evil.



Let my illustration pass for what it is worth. I still insist that an atonement of this sort, if it occurs at all, is a perfectly objective fact, namely, the creation by somebody of a definite individual good on the basis of a definite previous evil. That the total result, in a given case, such as that of Joseph, is something better than would have existed, or than would have been possible, had not that evil deed first been done, to which the atoning deed is the response—all this, I say, is a perfectly proper matter for a purely objective study. Such a study has the difficulties which attend all inquiries into objective values. But these difficulties do not make the matter one of arbitrary whim.

Moreover, if the atoning deed has brought, as a fact, such good out of evil that, despite the evil deed, the world is better than it could have been if the evil deed had not been done—that this very fact has its own reconciling value—a value limited but precious. The repentant sinner, seeing what, in Adam's vision, Milton makes the first human sinner foresee, will rightly find a genuine consolation, and a true reunion with his community, in thus being aware that his iniquity has been overruled for good.

A theory of atonement, founded upon this basis, is capable of as technical treatment as any other, and deals with facts and values which human wit can investigate, so far as the facts in question are accessible to us. Such a theory of atonement could be applied to estimate the atoning work of Christ, by anyone who believed himself to be sufficiently in touch with the facts about Christ's work. It would be capable of as technical a statement as our knowledge warranted.

This then, in brief, is my proposal looking towards an interpretation of the idea of atonement.

## IX.

Turning once more to view, in the light of this interpretation, the Christian doctrine of life in its unity, we may see how all the ideas now unite to give to this doctrine a touch

both with the ethical and with the religious interests of humanity.

To sum up: As individuals we are lost; that is, are incapable of attaining the true goal of life. This our loss is due to the fact that we have not love. So the Master taught. But the problem is also the problem: For what love shall I seek? What love will save me? Here, if we restrict our answer to human objects, and deliberately avoid theology, the Christian answer is: Love the community. That is, be loyal.

Yet one further asks: What community shall I love? Speaking still in human terms, we are to love a community which, in ideal, is identical with all mankind, but which can never exist on earth until man has been transfigured and unified, as Paul hoped that his churches would, at the end of the world, soon witness this transfiguration and this union.

So far as this ideal indeed takes possession of us, we can direct our human life in the spirit of this love for the community, far away as the goal may seem and be.

Yet what stands in the way of our being completely absorbed by this ideal? The answer is: Our enemy is what Paul called the flesh, and found further emphasised by "the law." This enemy is due to our nature as social beings, so far as this nature is cultivated by social conditions which, while training our self-consciousness, even thereby inflame our self-will. *This* our social nature, then, is the basis of our natural enmity both towards the law and towards the spirit.

How can this natural enmity be overcome? The answer is: By the means of those unifying social influences which Paul regarded as due to grace. Genius, and only genius—the genius which, in the extreme cases, founds new religions, and which, in the better known cases, creates great social movements of a genuinely saving value—can create the communities which arouse love, which join the faithful into one, and which transform the old man into the new. When once we have come under the spell of such creative genius, and of the communities of which some genius appears to be the spirit, only



then can we too die to the old life, and be renewed in the spirit. The early Christian community is (still speaking in human terms) one great historical instance of such a source of salvation. To be won over to the level of *such* a community is, just in so far, to be saved.

But the will of the loyal is, in the purely human and practical sense, a will that we call free. The higher the spiritual gifts in question are, the greater is the opportunity for wilful treason to the community to which we have once given faith. The consequences of every deed include the great fact that each deed is irrevocable. And the penalty of wilful treason, therefore, is, for the traitor, precisely in so far as he knows himself, and values his life in its larger connections, an essentially endless penalty—the penalty which he assigns to himself, the fact of his sin.

For such penalty is there any aid that can come to us through the atoning deed of another? There is such aid possible. In the human world we can never count upon it. But it is possible. And sometimes by the grace of the community and by the free will of a noble soul, such aid comes. As a fact, the whole life of man gets its highest—one is often disposed to say, its only real and abiding—goods, from the conquest over evil. Atoning deeds, deeds that through sacrifices, win again the lost causes of the moral world, not by undoing the irrevocable deeds, nor by making the old bitterness of defeat as if it never had been, but by creating new good out of ancient ill, and by producing a total realm of life which is better than it would have been had the evil not happened—atonement deeds express the most nearly absolute loyalty which human beings can show. The atoning deeds are the most creative of the expressions which the community gives, through the deed of an individual, to its will that the unity of the spirit should triumph, not only despite, but *through*, the greatest tragedies, the tragedies of deliberate sin.

Through the community, or on its behalf, the atoning deeds are done. The individual who has sinned, but who knows of

free atoning deeds that indeed have been done—deeds whereby good comes out of his evil—can be not wholly reconciled to his own past, but truly restored to the meaning of the loyal life. Upon the hope that such atoning deeds, if they have not been done because of our sins, may yet be done, all of us depend for such rewinning of our spiritual relations to our community as we have sinned away. And thus the idea of the community and the idea of atonement—both of them, still interpreted in purely human fashion, but extended in ideal through the whole realm that the human spirit can ever conquer—form in their inseparable union, and in their relation to the other Christian ideas, the Christian doctrine of life. The Christian life is one that first, as present in the individual, offers to the community practical devotion and absorbing love. This same life, also present in the individual, looks to the community for the grace that saves and for the atonement that, so far as may be, reconciles. As incorporate in the community, or as incarnate in those who act as the spirit of the community, and who create new forms of the community, and originate atoning deeds—as thus present in the community and in its creatively loyal individual members, the Christian life expresses the postulate, the prayer, the world-conquering will, whose word is: Let the spirit triumph. Let no evil deed be done so deep in its treachery but that creative love shall find the way to make the world better than it would have been had that evil deed not been done.

The Christian doctrine of life consists in observing and asserting that these ideas have their real and distinctly human basis. This doctrine also consists in the purely voluntary assertion that, in so far as these ideals are not yet verifiable in human life as it is, this life is to be lived as if they were verifiable, or were sure to become so in the fulness of time. For that fulness of time, for that coming of the Kingdom, we labour and wait.

JOSIAH ROYCE.



## THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.

THE REV. PRINCIPAL J. E. CARPENTER, D.D., D.LITT.

ONE great religion alone stands out at once in parallel and in contrast with Christianity as a religion of deliverance. The Buddha has endured the long travail of ages in successive lives that he may lift off from the world the veils of ignorance and sin. It may be worth while to sketch by way of comparison the remarkable process which culminated in this promise of universal salvation.

The ancient hymns of the Rig Veda, sung as the funeral pile was lighted, had pictured the dead as borne aloft in a chariot of fire to the upper world of life and light. There the loyal worshipper, the faithful sacrificer, the godly man who had duly followed the Path, was received into the company of the shining gods. There were the Fathers who had trodden the ancient way. There, under the sovereignty of Varuna, the great god of the sky, and Yama, first of men to die, they dwelt in blessed immortality. The godless and the wicked, on the other hand, passed into the deep pit, the nether darkness. Later theology conceived different worlds rising under the sway of different gods, and to those who made the proper offerings, or studied the Veda aright, or (putting ritual aside) gained the true knowledge, promised fellowship with the deities in their several realms. They should share the world, nay, even the very self or being, of Brahmā himself. But meantime the irrepressible instinct of speculation was at work.

If death overtook the believer in this scene, might not rebirth in another at last encounter the same close? Each man, it was taught with a profound meaning, would be born into the world that he had made; and if he had laid up for himself good and evil, how could the issues of his deeds possess eternal worth? Must they not be in themselves finite, and was not the realm of the finite a sphere of change, where everything that arose at last declined, and whatever had a beginning must in due time meet its end? This was the philosophical meaning of the doctrine of Karma, the Deed. By what steps it acquired its extraordinary sway over the whole sphere of existence I must not stop to indicate. It ruled the world from the topmost heaven to the lowest hell. It brought the events of every career under its power. It produced the profound conviction that every conscious being, *deva*, man, animal, or demon, always and everywhere got exactly what he deserved. Measure for measure was the fundamental law of the universe. Welfare and calamity, the gifts of fortune, the accidents of disease or loss, the generous temper or the heart of cruelty and lust, exactly matched some past deed or thought or word of good or ill. From age to age the sequences went on beneath an inexorable control. A rigid justice meted out its lots of happiness or pain, and even the dwellers in the radiant heavens could not keep out its messengers or evade its decrees. Rebirth involved the re-awakening of desire. Desire detained the mind amid objects destined to decay. Dissolution, therefore, would in due time claim its prey. Even over the felicity of the gods there crept the shadow of inevitable doom, and life became an endless chain of deaths.

At such a prospect imagination stood appalled. The longing arose for release from its constraint, and men began timidly to inquire "How?" The life of pious faithfulness, in ritual sacrifice or household duty, in diligent study of the Veda, or in generous help to the poor and needy, might secure the believer a place in one of the heavens where his merits



should be rewarded with an appropriate adjustment of duration and delight. But when these were exhausted, he might have to re-enter life below, or pass into a loathsome animal, to expiate a past offence, some deed of shame or wrong, some word of malice or falsehood, some thought of hatred or impurity. Was there no way of ending this succession, and passing out of the temporal into the eternal? That was the aim of one after another of the philosophies which swayed the higher mind of India; and the teachers of the Vedânta held out to those who gained the knowledge of the real unity of their individual selves with the great Self the hope of union with Brahmā under the form of Being, Intelligence, and Bliss.

It was in the midst of the immense variety of answers to these questions that Gotama the Buddha propounded his discipline of the Eightfold Noble Path. Suffering and sorrow were the lot of all who were involved in the vicissitudes of change. They had their roots in ignorance of the true meaning of life, and in the forces of selfish craving and untamed desire. Let a man tread the way of knowledge, master his passions, and he would find peace. How Gotama sought to subdue selfishness by dissipating the notion of a self, I am not now concerned to tell. But the moral discipline which he elaborated, contained the secret of deliverance, and he who fulfilled it severed the bonds of attachment to existence, and was set free from the process of rebirth. It was to preach this hope of release through the victory over ignorance and sin, that he sent forth his disciples into a world of misery and evil, and the long series of Buddhist missions was begun.

The new teaching had the immense advantage of embodiment, first of all, in a great historic personality, and, secondly, in a figure of lofty dignity as the moral ideal. For the Buddha, the completely Enlightened, had only won his knowledge through long lives of preparation, as he slowly toiled in the practice of the Ten Perfections after the supreme goodness which would supply the key to the great mystery. Far far back in distant æons the hermit Sumedha had realised

that he might, if he pleased, then and there cut off the roots of life and cease to be. "But why," he thought to himself, "should I attain deliverance alone? I will embark on the ocean of existence in a ship that will convey men and *devas*."<sup>1</sup> To this purpose of rescuing the perishing he had devoted himself through the long passion of successive existences till the hour arrived which opened to him the solemn secret, and secured for him the power of imparting it to others. This was the task of primitive Buddhism: to make saints, like the first Christians, by the preaching of the word. The Buddha, indeed, had announced that, like all human things, his religion would be exposed to corruption and decline. What provision would then be made for its renewal? Would the Path of release disappear amid the distractions of the world, and the call to salvation be heard no more? An answer was found for a time in the expectation of another Buddha, dwelling now in the Tusita heaven, the Bodhisat (or Buddha-to-be) Metteyya, impersonation of that *mettā* which was the Buddhist parallel to love or charity. When the time was ripe, he would descend like his predecessor, and continue upon earth the sacred line. The teaching of the Pāli tradition looked no further. Its work was done when the saint had perfected his holiness. But a whole people of saints could do no more for the world when they died, except bequeath to posterity the memory of their example.

Meanwhile the leaven of the great idea of deliverance never ceased to work. It impelled Asoka, the first Buddhist king, whose dominions are said to have exceeded those of the British empire in India to-day, to dedicate his son to the cause, and send him, with a branch of the sacred tree, to plant the new truth in Ceylon. In the midst of incredible perils it was carried by a long succession of teachers, Brahmins, princes, nobles, men of various races and conditions, moved

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the Introduction to the Jātakas, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, vol. i. p. 13.



(as the chronicler has it) by a desire to convert the world—for when the world's welfare was concerned, who could be slothful or indifferent?—over the great mountain barrier through Eastern Asia. Under this potent impulse vast new developments took place. The old idea of the saint, weaned from the world's temptations and enjoying his own peace, proved too narrow. Were there not beings in other realms, above, below, who needed the saving knowledge just as much as the children of men? Must not they, too, have the opportunity of hearing the word? Had not the Buddha himself ascended to the Tusita heaven to preach the saving tidings to his mother? His purpose, therefore, must embrace all orders of existence, and extend itself from heaven to hell. So a new type of Buddhism appeared which called on the disciple to devote himself to something more than his own sanctity, his personal escape from the sorrows of transmigration. He must take his part in the vast process of the whole world's release, and share the labours of universal deliverance. For this end he, too, must tread the far-stretching path to Buddhahood, and prepare to enter the ranks of the long warfare with ignorance and suffering and sin. In new and grandiose scenes the Buddha was presented in the midst of multitudes of Buddhas-to-be, countless as the sands of nine Ganges. They belong to the system known as the Great Vehicle, because its aim was to embrace others, in contrast with the Little (or Low) Vehicle, in which the saint rescued himself alone. The disciple now aspires to join their ranks. When an eminent teacher named Jina was converted from the doctrine of the Great Vehicle to the earlier type, it was considered an essentially selfish change. One of the semi-divine forms in which the new Buddhism incorporated so many popular devotions, the sweet-voiced Mañjuçrī, came to him (so Yuan Chwang relates) to expostulate. Wishing to arouse him to the truth, and to awaken him in a moment, "Alas," he said, "how have you given up your great purpose, and only fixed your mind on your own personal benefit, with narrow aims,

giving up the purpose of saving all?"<sup>1</sup> There were those for whom this tension was too great. The price of universal salvation was to know the pain wrapped in the lot of every rank of being.

Out of such impulses arose the story of the mighty vow of the future Buddha Avalokiteṣvara, "the Lord who looks down from heaven." The origin of this beautiful figure is unknown, nor is the interpretation of his name quite certain. He first appears (according to our present knowledge) in the texts about the beginning of our era. His face is turned in all directions that he may see all and save all. He is the Lord of special mercies, the Lord of the pitying glance. In different books and schools he holds a varying place till he becomes the God or Providence of all the living; and in the Kāraṇḍa Vyūha (one of the Sanskrit Scriptures of Nepal) he makes the famous vow not to enter Buddhahood until all creatures in all worlds shall be in possession of the saving knowledge. From age to age, from Buddha to Buddha in the endless series of manifestations, he passes from heaven to earth upon his mission of deliverance. He sets free even the worms and insects from their low estate. He reclaims the sinners, provides food for the famine-stricken, heals the diseased; but mostly is he to be found in the hells, rescuing the wicked from their guilt and pain. In China he is worshipped as Kwan-yin, and the devotion is popular in Japan under the name Kwan-non. Still does the believer make his confession in the terms of a Chinese liturgy published in 1412 with a preface by the Emperor Yang Loh:

"We and all men from the very first, by reason of the grievous sins we have committed in thought, word, and deed, have lived in ignorance of all the Buddhas, and of any way of escape from the consequences of our conduct. We have followed only the course of this evil world, nor have we known aught of Supreme Wisdom; and even now, though enlightened as to our duty, yet with others we still commit grievous sins which prevent us from advancing in true knowledge. Therefore in the presence of Kwan-yin and the Buddhas of the ten regions, we would humble ourselves and repent of our sins. Oh that

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<sup>1</sup> *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. Beal, vol. ii. p. 220.



we may have strength to do so aright, and that they may cause all obstacles to be removed ! We would separate ourselves from evil and pursue good ; ever remembering the blessedness of heaven, and the power of all the Buddhas to deliver and rescue us and all men from evil. O great compassionate Kwan-yin, fit to deliver every sort of creature, may all emerge from the wheel of transmigration and be saved ! ” <sup>1</sup>

This is the prayer of pious aspiration ; it is not a prophecy or an assurance. But Kwan-yin (Avalokiteçvara) is not, after all, supreme. He stands now on the right, now on the left, of one mightier than he. This is Amitâbha, the Buddha of boundless light, who bears yet another name, Amitâyus, Buddha of boundless life, for life and light are the highest symbols of Deity. In this supreme figure, already named in the “ Lotus of the Good Law ” about the beginning of our era, <sup>2</sup> the Buddhist doctrine of universal salvation culminates. The nature of this wondrous being and of the heavenly life in the Pure Land to which he guides the believer, was revealed, it was supposed, by Çākya Muni as he sat upon the Vulture’s Peak, near Rājagaha, one of the traditional scenes of Gotama’s teaching. <sup>3</sup> Long ages before, as a mendicant named Dharmākara, he had reached the holiness which would have enabled him to pass at once into Nirvāna. But he looked out upon the world, and saw his fellow-beings sunk in their ignorance and sin. How could they tread the long and arduous path which he had traversed ? Might there not be some simpler way through which the blessed life could be attained ? His meditations took the form of a vow or prayer that he might not attain the highest perfect knowledge unless he could avail to deliver those who put their trust in him. When, after long striving, he found himself at the goal of supreme enlightenment and holiness, he knew that his vow was fulfilled. He founded the Paradise in the radiant west, where the saints, shining more brightly than the sun, lived in

<sup>1</sup> Beal, *Catana of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, pp. 407–9.

<sup>2</sup> Tr. Kern, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxi. pp. 178, 389, 417.

<sup>3</sup> See “ The Larger Sukhāvati-Vyūha, ” tr. Prof. Max Müller, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xlix.

the happiness of benevolent, serene, and tender thought. Here there was no idea of "self or others." With love unlimited they resembled the all-embracing sky. By patiently bearing the good and evil deeds of all beings they were like the enduring earth.<sup>1</sup> They dwelt in the presence of infinite light; they had reached the goal, and could "enjoy God for ever."

The new way of salvation had many attractions, and imagination looked eagerly forward without fear to the hour of death when the Lord would himself come with a host of the glorified to conduct the believer to the Pure Land of the West. Not by works could men enter into the scene of bliss: no merits would avail to earn admission. The joy of communion with the ineffable Light and Life depended upon spiritual conditions. Trust in the Great Vow was the saving power, and by faith was the heart enlightened and made clean. When, in the sixth century A.D., Buddhism was carried into Japan, two ideas of the Lotus exerted a vast influence: the conception of the moral order working through the Deed, and the spiritual union of all beings. Under the principle of Karma eternal damnation was unknown. Sin must indeed draw down its punishment. But as the offender belonged to the finite order of time and change, so did the penalty; and the adjustment of guilt and suffering followed with the utmost precision in the train of wrong. This principle of extreme individualism, however, was allied with another of an opposite type. A mystic unity knit all beings in the finite order into one community, folded within the central purpose of the Buddhas. Within this sphere all influences for good were incalculably diffusive; and from the labours of the Buddhas-to-be down to the humblest disciple's lowly acts of piety and love there streamed forth perpetually energies of righteousness making for the great aim of universal deliverance. Had not the Buddha himself declared in the Lotus that he appeared in this world to save? Like a great rain-cloud which refreshed the earth so that

<sup>1</sup> *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xlix. pp. 55-57.



grasses, shrubs, and trees were all vivified according to their several capacities, so did the Buddha pour out the rain of the Truth, promoting the everlasting weal of the whole world, where the moral and the immoral, those who held sound views and those who held false, could all benefit alike.<sup>1</sup> And as the sun and moon shone over all the earth on the virtuous and the wicked, on the high and low, with equal beams, so did the light of the Buddha and the saints penetrate with equal enlightenment among all beings in all stages of existence,<sup>2</sup> for the Buddhas are always working and embrace all individuals in their infinite wisdom.

Out of such thoughts arose the faith in universal salvation, preached by the votaries of Amida (the "Infinite") in Japan in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of our era, Honen, and his disciple Shin-ran. While Bernard and Francis were calling men to the discipline of the Cross, the teachers of the Far East were holding up the mercies of Amida in the Great Vow, and preaching the doctrine of Salvation by Faith. It was no new conception, for more than a thousand years before Nāgārjuna (from Southern India, about 120 A.D.) had declared that "In the great sea of the Law of Buddha faith is the only means to enter."<sup>3</sup> But at the hands of the Japanese revivalists it received far-reaching applications. The literature of the Jodo Shin-Shu, the True Sect of the Pure Land, founded by Shin-ran, is full of parallels to Western teaching of a later date. Here are the familiar phases of evangelical experience, the conviction of sin, the repudiation of all personal claims, the worthlessness of works, the efficacy of trust in the merits of another, the promise of deliverance to the weary and guilt-laden. Here is the condemnation of pride, for those who professed to be enlightened and resolute were warned that nothing was harder than to lay aside their self-

<sup>1</sup> *Sacred Books of the East*, xxi. pp. 119, 123 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 136.

<sup>3</sup> *Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, tr. Bunyiu Nanjio, Tokyo, 1886, p. 113.

reliance, and submit to be saved by another. Here, too, is the assurance that such faith is not self-wrought. It is produced within the soul by the action of Amida himself. It is a divine gift, not a human attainment; and it brings with it the serene calm of present peace and of final perseverance. When each man's *karma* has made him ready to receive the heavenly grace, the watchful eye of the great Deliverer will beam upon him, and the saving faith will be bestowed. And with this faith comes love, which will overcome all the frowardness and hostility of others. For when we consider, says a modern Shin-Shu preacher,<sup>1</sup> "that the Father of mercies forgives us freely for those sins the contemplation of which makes us tremble, and that he takes us just as we are and saves us: if we have been thus forgiven, should not we forgive others? It is the will of the Buddha who forgiveth all men that we too should forgive as he has forgiven." When it is realised that (in the words of another teacher<sup>2</sup>) "we are all embraced in the light of Amitâbha and living under his loving guidance, our life after the confirmation of faith is filled with joy unspeakable, which is a gift of the Buddha." And in the world to come "those who are born there enjoy a life everlasting, free from the bondage of birth and death. Not only this—they are then able to manifest themselves over and over again in the world of suffering, in order to deliver their fellow-beings from sin and ignorance. All these innumerable happinesses come from no other source than the grace of Amida."

Such is the faith of the most vigorous teachers of the Far East. It represents the natural evolution of the principle of salvation. It issues out of another culture than our own; it is founded upon a different world-view; but its analogies with Christian thought are full of suggestion. It represents the

<sup>1</sup> *The Praises of Amida*, by Tada Kanai (trans. by Rev. Arthur Lloyd), Tokyo, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> *Principal Teachings of the True Sect of the Pure Land*, by Yejitsu Okusa, Tokyo, 1910.



eternal demand of the human heart for the resolution of the contradictions which our present life involves. It has its answer for the great problems of physical suffering and moral evil. It has its prophecy of the ultimate victory of good. It is not a little significant, however, that while it rests upon a Scripture attributed to the historic Buddha towards the close of his long career, the personality of Gotama fades away in the light of the believer's own experience. Worship may be offered to Amida alone, and his grace suffices for every need. Criticism has not yet assailed the record, or attacked the validity of the story of the Great Vow. But it is really received, not on the strength of a past revelation so much as on the testimony of its actual saving power. When the sinner is converted, and joins in the process of deliverance going on around him, the witness of antiquity is no longer needed. He is already living in the light.

It is to that goal that we slowly tend. No student of the history of religion will assert that all forms of experience are of equal worth; but he will be at the same time clear that none can possess a monopoly of truth. The distinctions of an older day between "revealed" and "natural" will drop away, and with them will disappear the exclusive claims of dogmatic churches and the pleas of lordship and authority. And if something precious seems to vanish with them, the loss will be compensated by an ampler gain. Instead of a world of darkness irradiated only by one spot of light, we see the whole progress of human thought slowly advancing along divers paths towards clearer truth, and the immense resources of the moral experiences of the race converging on a common testimony.

J. E. CARPENTER.

## THE NEW SPIRIT IN THE DRAMA.

JOHN GALSWORTHY.

THERE is a maxim, peculiarly suitable to those who follow any art: "Don't talk about what you do!"

And yet—once in a way—one must clear the mind, and put into words what lies at the back of endeavour.

What then is there lying at the back of any growth or development there may have been of late in our drama?

In my belief, simply an outcrop of Sincerity—of fidelity to mood—to impression—to self. A man here and there has turned up who has imagined something true to what he has really seen and felt, and has projected it across the footlights in such a way as to make other people feel it. This is all that has lately happened on our stage. And if it be growth, it will not be growth in quantity, since there is nothing like sincerity for closing the doors of theatres. For, just consider what sincerity excludes: All care for balance at the author's bank—even when there is no balance. All habit of consulting the expression on the Public's face. All confectioning of French plays. All the convenient practice of adding up your plots on the principle that two and two make five. These it excludes. It includes: Nothing because it pays. Nothing because it makes a sensation. No situations faked. No characters falsified. No fireworks. Only something imagined and put down in a passion of sincerity. What plays, you may say, are left? Well, that is the present development in our drama.

Sincerity in the theatre, and commercial success, are not necessarily, but they are generally, opposed. It is more or less



a happy accident when they coincide. This is a grim truth which it is no use—not the slightest use in the world—blinking. Not till the heavens fall will the majority of the Public demand sincerity. And all that we who care for sincerity can hope for is, that the supply of sincere drama will gradually increase the demand for it—gradually lessen the majority that has no use for that disturbing quality. The burden of this struggle is on the shoulders of us dramatists. It is useless and unworthy for us to complain that the Public will not stand sincerity, that we cannot get sincere plays acted, and so forth. If we have not the backbone to produce what we feel we ought to produce, without regard to what the Public wants, then good-bye to progress of any kind. If we are of the crew who cannot see any good in a fight unless we know it is going to end in victory; if we expect the millennium with every spring—we shall advance nothing. Our job is to set our teeth, do our work in our own way, without thinking much about result, and not at all about reward, except from our own consciences. Those who want sincerity will always be the few, but they may well be more numerous than now; and to increase their number is worth a struggle. That struggle is the much sneered-at, much talked-of, so-called “new” movement in the British drama.

Now it has been the fashion to dub this “new” drama the “serious” drama; the label is deliberately unfortunate, and not particularly true. If Rabelais or Robert Burns appeared again in mortal form and took to writing plays, they would be “new” dramatists with a vengeance—as new as ever Ibsen was; and assuredly they would be sincere; but could they well be called “serious”? Can we call Synge, or St John Hankin, or Mr Shaw, or Mr Barrie serious? Hardly! Yet they are all of this new movement, because they are sincere. The word serious, in fact, has too narrow a significance, and admits a deal of pompous stuff that is not sincere. While the word sincere, though it certainly does not characterise all that is popularly included under the term “new drama,” as

certainly does characterise (if taken in its true sense of fidelity to self), all that is really new in it, and excludes no mood, no temperament, no form of expression that can pass the test of ringing true. Look, for example, at the work of those two whom we could so ill spare—Synge and St John Hankin. They were as far apart as dramatists well could be, except that each had found his form—the one a kind of lyric satire, the other a neat, individual sort of comedy, which seemed exactly to express his spirit. Both forms were highly specialised, in a sense artificial, but both were quite sincere; for through them each of these two dramatists, so utterly dissimilar, shaped forth the essence of his broodings and visions of life, with all their essential flavour and peculiar limitations. And that is all one means by—all that one asks of—Sincerity.

Then why make such a fuss about it?

Because it is rare; and an implicit quality of any true work of art, realistic or romantic.

Art is not art unless it is made from what the artist himself has felt and seen, and not what he has been told he ought to feel and see. For art exists not to confirm people in their tastes and prejudices, not to show them what they have seen before, but to present them with a new vision of life. And if drama be an art (which the Great Public denies daily, but a few of us still believe), it must reasonably be expected to present life as each dramatist sees it, and not to express things because they pander to popular prejudice, or are sensational, or because they pay.

If you want further evidence that the new dramatic movement in this country is marked out by a struggle for sincerity, and by that alone, examine a little the various half-covert oppositions with which it meets.

Why is the commercial manager against it?

Because it is quite naturally his business to cater for the Great Public; and, as before said, the majority of the Public does not, never will, want sincerity; it is too disturbing. The commercial manager will answer: "The Great Public does



not dislike sincerity, it only dislikes dullness." Well! Dullness is not an absolute, but a very relative term—a term likely to have a different meaning for a man who knows something about life and art, from that which it has for a man who knows less. And one may remark that if the Great Public's standard of what is really "amusing" is the true one, it is queer that the plays which tickle the Great Public hardly ever last a decade, and the plays which do not tickle them occasionally last for centuries.

Why are so many actor managers against the new drama?

Because their hearts are quite naturally set on such insincere distortions of values as, unfortunately, are necessary to a constant succession of "big" parts for themselves. Sincerity does not necessarily exclude heroic characters, but it does exclude those mock heroics which actor managers have been known to prefer—not to real heroics, perhaps—but to simple and sound studies of character.

Why is the Censorship against it?

Because Censorship is quite naturally the guardian of the ordinary prejudices of sentiment and taste, and quaintly innocent of knowledge that in any art fidelity of treatment is essential to a theme. Indeed, I am sure that this peculiar office would regard it as fantastic for a poor devil of an artist to want to be faithful or sincere. The demand would appear to it pedantic, extravagant, bad form.

Some say that the Critics are against the new drama. That is not in the main true. The inclination of most critics is to welcome anything with a flavour of its own; it would be odd indeed if it were not so—they get so much of the other food! They are, in general, friends to sincerity. But the trouble with the critic is the *idée fixe*. He has to print his opinion of an author's work, while other men have only to think it; and when it comes to receiving a fresh impression of the same author, his already recorded words are liable to act upon him rather as the eyes of a snake act upon a rabbit. Indeed, it must be very awkward when you have definitely labelled an author this or

that to find from his next piece of work that he is the other as well. The critic who can make blank his soul of all that he has said before may indeed exist—in Paradise!

Why is the Greater Public against the new drama?

By the Greater Public I in no sense mean the Public who do not pay income-tax—the Greater Public comes from Mayfair as much as ever it comes from Bermondsey. And its opposition to the “new drama” is neither covert, doubtful, nor conscious of itself. The Greater Public is like an aged friend of mine, who, if you put into his hands anything but *Sherlock Holmes*, *Mr Dooley*, or *The Waverley Novels*, says: “Oh! that dreadful book!” His taste is excellent, only he does feel that an operation should be performed on all dramatists and novelists, by which they should be rendered incapable of producing anything but what will amuse my aged friend. The Greater Public, in fact, is either a too well-dined organism that wishes to digest its dinner, or a too hard-worked organism longing for a pleasant dream. I sympathise with the Greater Public! . . .

A friend once said to me: “Champagne has killed the drama.” It was half a truth. Champagne is an excellent thing, and must not be disturbed. Plays should not have anything in them which can excite the mind. They should be of a quality to just remove the fumes by eleven o’clock, and make ready the organism for supper at eleven-thirty. As for sincerity—great heavens! Another friend once said to me: “It is the rush and hurry and strenuousness of modern life that is ‘doing for’ the drama.” It was half a truth. Why should not the hard-worked man have his pleasant dream, his detective story, his good laugh? The pity is that sincere drama would often provide as agreeable dreams for the hard-worked man as some of those reveries in which he now indulges, if only he would try it once or twice. That is the trouble—to get him to give it a chance.

The Greater Public will by preference take the lowest article in art that is offered to it. An awkward remark, and,



unfortunately, true. But if a better article be substituted, the Greater Public very soon enjoys it every bit as much as the article replaced, and so on—up to a point that we need not fear we shall ever reach. But from this it is not to be inferred that “new dramatists” are consciously trying to supply the Public with a better article. Not those who are sincere, anyway. No, no! A man could not write anything sincere with the elevation of the Public as incentive. If he tried he would be as lost as ever were the Pharisees making broad their phylacteries. He can only express himself sincerely *by not considering the Public at all*. This is said quite without desire to flout, simply because it happens to be true. The mockers, of course, cry: “Cant!” Having fixed their eyes on the Public’s face with the intention of serving its every nod, they have no notion that there exists a type of mind which cannot express itself in accordance with what it imagines is required; can only express itself for itself, and take the usually unpleasant consequences. This is, indeed, but an elementary truth, which since the beginning of the world has lain at the bottom of all artistic achievement. It is not cant to say that the only things vital in drama, as in every art, are achieved when the maker has fixed his soul on the making of a thing that shall seem fine to himself. It is the only standard; all the others—success, money, even the pleasure and benefit of other people—lead to confusion in the artist’s spirit, and to the making of dust castles. To please your best self is the only way of being sincere.

Most weavers of drama, of course, are perfectly sincere when they start out to ply their shuttles; but how many persevere in that mood to the end of their plays, in defiance of outside consideration? Here—says one to himself—it will be too strong meat; there it will not be sufficiently convincing; this natural length will be too short; that end too appalling; in such and such a shape I shall never get my play taken; I must write that part up and tone this character down. And when it is all done—effectively, falsely—what is there? A prodigious run, perhaps. But—the grave of all that makes the life

of an artist worth the living. Well, well! We who believe this will never get too many others to believe it! Those heavens will not fall; theatre doors will remain open; the heavy diners will digest, and the over-driven man will dream!

And yet, with each sincere thing made—even if only fit for reposing in a drawer—its maker is stronger, and will some day make that which need not lie covered away, but reach out from him to other men.

It is a wide word—Sincerity. *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is no less sincere than *Hamlet*, *The Mikado* as faithful to its mood of satiric frolicking as Ibsen's *Ghosts* to its mood of moral horror. Sincerity bars out no themes—it only demands that the dramatist's moods and visions should be intense enough to keep him absorbed; that he should have something to say so engrossing to himself that he has no need to stray here and there and gather purple plums to eke out what was intended for an apple tart. Here is the heart of the matter: You cannot get sincere drama out of those who do not see and feel with sufficient fervour; and you cannot get good sincere drama out of persons with a weakness for short cuts. There are no short cuts to the good in art. You may turn out the machine-made article, very natty, but for the real hand-made thing you must have toiled in the sweat of your brow. In this country it is a little difficult to persuade people that the writing of plays and novels is work. To many it remains one of those inventions of a certain potentate for idle hands to do. To certain gentlemen in high life, addicted to field sports, it is still a species of licensed buffoonery, to be regulated by a sort of circus-master with a whip in one hand and a gingerbread-nut in the other. By the truly simple soul it is thus summed up: "Work! Why! 'e sits writin' all day!" To some, both green and young, it shines as a vocation entirely glorious and exhilarating. If one may humbly believe the evidence of one's own senses, it is not any of these, but a patient calling, glamorous now and then, but with fifty minutes of hard labour and of yearning.



to every ten of satisfaction. Not a pursuit, maybe, that one would change; but then, what man with a profession flies to others that he knows not of?

Novelists, it is true, even if they have not been taken too seriously by the people of these islands, have for a long time past respected themselves; but the calling of a dramatist till quite of late has been but an invertebrate and spiritless concern. Whipped by the Censor, exploited by the actor, dragooned and slashed by the manager, ignored by the Public, who never even bothered to inquire the names of those who supplied it with digestives—it was a slave's job. Thanks to a little sincerity, it is not now a slave's job, and will not again, I think, become one in this country.

From time to time in that vehicle of Improvisatoreism, that modern fairy tale—our daily paper—we read words such as these: "What has become of the boasted renaissance of our stage?" or "So much for all the trumpeting about the new drama!" When we come across such words, we remember that it is only natural for daily papers to say to-day the opposite of what they said yesterday. They must suit all tastes and preserve a decent equilibrium!

For there is just one new safeguard of the self-respecting dramatist that no amount of improvising for or against will explain away. Plays now are not merely acted, they are read, and will be read more and more. This does not mean, as some say, that they are being written for the study—they were never being written more deliberately, more carefully, for the stage. It does mean that they are tending more and more to comply with fidelity to theme, fidelity to self; and are therefore more and more able to bear the scrutiny of cold daylight. Drama is again taking rank as literature. And for the first time perhaps since the days of Shakespeare, there are dramatists in this country, not a few, faithful to themselves.

Now this concurrence of atoms is not, perhaps, altogether fortuitous. For, however abhorrent such a notion may be to

those yet wedded to Victorian ideals, we are undoubtedly passing through great changes in our philosophy of life. Just as a plant keeps on conforming to its environment, so our beliefs and ideals are conforming to our new social conditions and discoveries. There is in the air a revolt against prejudice, and a feeling that things must be re-tested. The spirit which, dwelling in pleasant places, would never re-test anything is now looked on askance. Even on our stage we are not enamoured of it.

It is not the artist's business (be he dramatist or other) to preach. Admitted! His business is to portray; but portray truly he cannot if he has any of that glib doctrinaire spirit, which, devoid of the insight that comes from instinctive sympathy, does not want to look at life, only at a mirage of life compounded of Authority, Tradition, Comfort, Habit. The sincere artist has not, cannot have, by the very nature of him, anything of this spirit; he is bound to be curious and perceptive, with an instinctive craving to identify himself with the experience of others. This is his value, whether he express it in comedy, epic, satire, or tragedy. Sincerity distrusts Tradition, Authority, Comfort, Habit; cannot breathe the air of Prejudice, and cannot stand the cruelties that arise from it. And so it comes about that the new drama's spirit is essentially, inevitably human—humane—humanitarian, if you will; essentially distasteful to some professing followers of the Great Humanitarian, who if they were but sincere would see that they secretly abhor His teachings, and in practice continually invert them.

It is a fine age we live in!—this age of a developing social conscience; it is worthy of a great and fine art. But, though no art is fine unless it has sincerity, no amount of sincere intention will serve unless the expression of it be well-nigh perfect. An author is judged by what he has written; and criticism is innately inclined to remark first on the peccadillo points of a person, a poem, or a play, and in remarking on them to forget the play, poem, or person. If there be a scar on the forehead; a few false quantities or weak endings; if there is an absence in the third act of someone who appeared



in the first—it is always much simpler to complain of this than to feel or describe the essence of the whole creature. But this very pettiness in our criticism is fortunately a sort of safeguard. The French writer Buffon said: *Bien écrire, c'est tout ; car bien écrire c'est bien sentir, bien penser, et bien dire. . . .* Let the artist then, by all means, make his work impeccable, clothe his ideas, feelings, visions, in just those garments that can withstand the winds of criticism. But he himself must be his cruelest critic. Before cutting his cloth, let him very carefully determine the precise thickness, shape, and colour best suited to the condition of his temperature. For there are still playwrights who, working in the full blast of an *affaire* between a poet and the wife of a strong silent stockbroker, will murmur to themselves: “Now for a little lyricism!” and drop into it. Or when the strong silent stockbroker has brought his wife once more to heel: “Now for the moral!” and give it us. Or when things are getting a little too intense: “Now for humour and variety!” and bring in the curate. This kind of tartan kilt is very pleasant on its native heath of London; but—hardly the garment of good writing. Good writing is only the perfect clothing of mood—the just right form. Shakespeare’s form, indeed, was extraordinarily loose, wide, plastic; but then his spirit was ever changing its mood—a true chameleon. And as to the form of Mr Shaw—who was once compared with Shakespeare—why! there is none. And yet, what form could so perfectly express Mr Shaw’s glorious crusade against stupidity, his wonderfully sincere and lifelong mood of sticking pins into a pig?

We are told indeed, *ad nauseam*, that the stage has laws of its own, to which all dramatists must bow. Quite true! The stage has the highly technical laws of its physical conditions, which cannot be neglected. But even when they are all properly attended to, it is only behind the elbow of him who feels strongly and tries to materialise sincerely what he feels, that right expression stands. The imaginative mood is a tricky comrade, coming who knows when, and staying none

too long. Be true to her while she is there, and when she is not there do not insult her by looking in every face and thinking it will serve. These are the laws of sincerity, which even the past-master in the laws of the stage cannot afford to neglect. For, in playwriting, I venture to think, against a considerable body of opinion, that anything is better than resorting to moral sentiments and solutions simply because they are current coin; or to decoration because it is "the thing." And—as to humour: If an author's characters or his idea inspire him with that genuine topsy-turvy feeling which underlies the precious article, real humour—good; but nothing appears to me so pitifully unfunny as the dragged-in epigram or dismal knockabout that has no connection whatever with the persons or philosophy of the play.

But there is nothing easier in this life than to think one is, and nothing much harder than to be—Sincere. Imagine the smile, and the blue pencil, of the Spirit of Sincerity, if we could appoint him Censor. Ah! if only we could—just for a year! That is a censorship I would not lift my pen against, though he excised—as perhaps he might—the half of my work. Sometimes one has a glimpse of his ironic face and his swift fingers busy with those darkening pages. And once I dreamed about him. It was while a certain Commission was sitting on the censorship that still so admirably guards insincerity.

The Spirit of Sincerity was sitting in a field, speaking to the flowers, who were standing round him in their accustomed attitudes.

"Flowers!" he was saying, "you wish to learn of me what is Sincerity. I shall be very happy to inform you. Look into yourselves; and when you feel that what lies deepest within you is not up in arms against what lies outside you, then you will have found a feeling that you may perhaps dignify with the word Sincere. But do not expect to find Truth in Life and Nature immutable, as you find it in mathematics; for, since each living thing varies from every other living thing, each has its own angle of vision, and never twice



are there quite the same set of premises from which to draw conclusion. Give up, then, asking of any but yourselves for the whereabouts of truth ; and if someone says that he can tell you where it is, do not believe him, for he is as one laying a trail of sand, and thinking it shall stay there for ever."

Having thus spoken, the Spirit of Sincerity covered his eyes with his hand, and I could see him looking through his fingers to see what effect he had made upon the flowers. But the flowers remained without sound, as if they had not heard him. Then, dropping his hand from before his eyes, the Spirit of Sincerity remarked : " Flowers ! I perceive that you, at all events, do not care what effect you make on other people. It is I who must learn of you what is sincerity ! . . . "

But there is one very common answer to all this : " I entirely deny that this ' new drama ' you speak of is any better than the old drama, cut to the pattern of Scribe and Sardou. You may just as well say that these post-impressionist painters are better than what went before them, which is absurd. What you have gained in one way you have lost in another. Novelty is not necessarily improvement. "

Very true ! Novelty is not necessarily improvement. And all that anyone, who believes in this so-varying " new drama, " which has in common but the one main struggle for sincerity, can answer is : That comparison must be left to history. But it is just as well to remember that we are not born connoisseurs of plays. And, certainly, without trying the new we shall not know if it is better than the old. To appreciate even drama at its true value, a man must be educated just a little. I remember that when I first went to the National Gallery I was struck dumb with love of Landseer's stags and a Greuze damsel with her cheek glued to her own shoulder, and became voluble from admiration of the large Turner and the large Claude hung together in that perpetual prize-fight ! At a second visit I discovered Sir Joshua's " Countess of Albemarle, " and Old Crome's " Mousehold Heath, " and did not care quite so much for Landseer's stags.

And again and again I went, and each time saw a little differently, a little clearer; until at last my time was spent before Titian's "Bacchus and Ariadne," Botticelli's "Portrait of a Young Man," the Francescas, Da Messina's little "Crucifixion," the Ucello battle picture (that great test of education), the Velasquez "Admiral," Hogarth's "Five Servants," and the immortal "Death of Procris." Admiration for stags and maiden—where was it?

This analogy of pictures is not used for the purpose of suggesting that our "new drama" is as far in front of the old as the "Death of Procris" is in front of Landseer's stags. Alas, no! It is used for the purpose of enforcing the suggestion that taste is encouraged by an open mind, and is a matter of gradual education.

A certain gentleman lately appointed to assist in the control of the exuberance of plays has stated in public print that there have been no plays of any value written since 1885. To every man his sincere opinion! But before we share it, let us walk a little through our National Gallery of drama, with inquiring eye and open mind, to see and know for ourselves. For, *to know*, a man cannot begin too young; cannot leave off too old. And always he must have a mind that feels it will never know enough. In this way alone he *will* perhaps know something before he dies.

And even if he require of the drama only buffoonery, or a digestive for his dinner, why not be able to discern good buffoonery from bad, and the pure digestive from the drug?

I am, I suppose, prejudiced in favour of this "new drama" of sincerity, of these poor productions of the last ten years or so. It may be, indeed, that many of them will perish and fade away. But they are, at all events, the expression of the sincere moods of men who ask no more than to serve an art, which, God knows, has need of a little serving in this country.

JOHN GALSWORTHY.



## DOES CONSCIOUSNESS "EVOLVE" ?

L. P. JACKS.

"THE Idealist only insists," says Dr Ritchie,<sup>1</sup> "that . . . we are justified in looking back from our vantage ground and seeing in the past evolution the gradual 'unrolling' of the meaning that we only fully understand at the end of the process."

What is conveyed by these words, "*the gradual unrolling of a meaning*" ?

Pressing hard upon the words I find myself in the presence of absurdities. It is absurd to say of any *meaning* that it "unrolls" either gradually or suddenly: not less absurd than to say it "unties," "unbuttons," "uncorks." Do *meanings* behave in that manner? Are they rolled up to begin with, as they needs must be if they are to be subsequently unrolled? Surely not.

One would hardly have thought of trying this experiment of hard pressure had not Dr Ritchie used the word "unrolls." Had he retained its Latin equivalent "evolves," suspicion might not have been aroused. Plain Anglo-Saxon invites pressure. Say, for example, that the jelly-fish has "unrolled" into Shakespeare, that the code of a savage has "unrolled" into the Sermon on the Mount, and you will be condemned out of your own mouth. But say instead that the jelly-fish has *evolved* into Shakespeare, the savage code *evolved* into the Sermon on the Mount, that my consciousness of this or that

<sup>1</sup> *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 76.

has *evolved* into a consciousness of that or this, and instantly a light seems to fall on the origin of Shakespeare and the wonderful ways of the mind. But the light should not be trusted too far.

"The mind," says Professor Wallace,<sup>1</sup> expounding Schelling, "is the necessary outcome of a process of development. We must see thought grow up from its simplest element, from the bare point of being, the mere speck of being which, if actually no better than nothing, is yet a germ which in the air of thought will grow and spread. . . . [The mind] is a mediated unity which has grown up through a complex interaction of forces and which lives in differences through comprehending and reconciling antagonisms."

Let us try to do what it is said we *must* do. We must *see* the mind-germ growing; the unity breaking into differences and the differences returning to unity. Well, up to a point, there is no difficulty in obeying this behest. Told to see a germ, or the growth of a germ through all the stages from first to last, I readily respond. I can see the story step by step; and, what seems to be the essential matter, I can see the story as a whole. Whether in detail or in sum the movement, the story is apprehensible enough. But what I cannot *see* is the *mind*, which is said to be doing these things or passing through this process. There is no trouble with my seeing of the germ; but by no manner of means can I see a germ *of consciousness*. I can no more see consciousness as a germ than I can see it as an egg or a baby—or as Dr Ritchie's "roll." True, having seen a germ of some sort I can mentally label it "mind": I can see the various stages of growth with my label hanging to each; I can see the growth as a whole with the label still there; but when all is done it is not "mind" that I have seen but only a label, with "mind" written upon it, attached to a germ which is neither mind nor thought nor consciousness. It is the label alone which saves this language, when put under pressure, from turning into rank materialism. A slender

<sup>1</sup> *Logic of Hegel*, p. 265.



safeguard. Frankly, I know not what is meant by a speck of *mind*.

I can find no difference in principle between the description of the mind as a growing germ and the description of some great sorrow as a "broken heart." Suppose we were told that in order to understand the sorrows of Lear we must "see" a developing heart-break starting from a mere speck of a fracture on the surface, actually no better than nothing, yet a beginning which, when once introduced into the heart-substance, grows and spreads, until we "see" the heart split clean in two and then become a whole heart again by the union of the two halves. Here, we should say, is a metaphor whose legitimate function is to awaken a faint, far-off echo of resemblance, but which, by hard pressure, has now been turned into a formula *pour rire*. Such a formula I find myself constructing when I try to see *thought* as a germ or mere speck which grows and spreads until, etc., etc.

Let us turn to the work of the Cairds and Green, the classical exposition in English of the doctrine of an evolving consciousness. In certain crucial chapters of Edward Caird we find the phrases "germinating consciousness," "the germinal form of consciousness," with their equivalents and cognates, present on every page. We read of a consciousness involved (rolled up?) in a wider consciousness,<sup>1</sup> and of an unconscious "movement" from implication to explication. Green assures us that the "life of primitive humanity expresses a consciousness in germ,"<sup>2</sup> and he speaks of "the developed consciousness which is ours." The process from the germ to the developed consciousness is governed by "operative ideas" which are present in the mind, though not present to it, and which "act unconsciously" (par. 241); and these ideas that act unconsciously are defined in a footnote (par. 153) as the "immediate object of the mind in thinking."

<sup>1</sup> "The religious consciousness is involved in all our consciousness of the universe and of ourselves" (*Evolution of Theology*, i. 38).

<sup>2</sup> *Proleg. to Ethics*, par. 204.

They have to be "ideas" in order that they may fulfil the spiritual end assigned them; they have to be "unconscious" in order that there may be an end as yet unfulfilled; when the former need is prominent they are frankly called "ideas"; when the latter, they usually appear as "principles" or as "presuppositions."

Now, in reading all this are we intended to press lightly or to press hard? Gladly will we relax the pressure if suffered to do so, and content ourselves with such faint, far-off echoes as reach us when we hear the horns of elf-land faintly blowing. But we are not suffered. This is the language of metaphysical science and has to be taken seriously. These thinkers are constructing formulæ, not writing poetry, and formulæ cannot be made out of words "thrown out" at their objects. *Aut Cæsar aut nihil.* Taken lightly the theory has no theoretical value.

For not only have we to understand it; we have to "re-produce" the whole "movement" in our own consciousness; to reproduce it step by step and as a whole; nay, our understanding of it is nothing less than this reproduction. This is a difficult mental feat; it involves, as Professor Wallace insists, an almost superhuman tension of mind; and it can be performed, if at all, only by following our directions to the letter. Reading between the lines, so often needed in the study of great philosophers, is here out of the question. So we find ourselves compelled against our will to press hard—to press with all our might. We envisage the "germ" of consciousness with all the intensity of mental vision we are able to command. We learn the story of consciousness by heart; see all we are told we must see; reproduce the movement so faithfully that the rhythm of it comes into our dreams. And suddenly we wake to a discovery. Pressing hard upon the story, as we evidently must, we find that it has ceased to be the story of consciousness; pressing hard upon "consciousness," we find it impossible that consciousness should have this *story*. Pressing hard upon both, we have the double difficulty. Pressing hard



upon neither, we catch only a faint, far-off echo, as though we were reading of a "broken heart."

The reader may try his own experiment on the following instance. Caird<sup>1</sup> argues that, just as the science of Grammar is implied in a child's or savage's use of language, so the idea of an Absolute Unity embracing all difference is implied in his simplest consciousness of an object. The savage who says "I will kill you" is ignorant of the controlling grammar of his sentence; but the grammar is "there all the same"; and I suppose that he needs only to reflect sufficiently upon his words to become a grammarian. In like manner his consciousness of any object is unaware of the unity of subject and object which is its "controlling idea"; but that idea is *in* his consciousness "all the same," even as the grammar is in his speech. Both the grammar and the unity are "presupposed." For unless there were grammar he couldn't say anything; unless there were a unity of all differences he couldn't be conscious of anything.

So far from confirming the theory of mental evolution, this analogy seems to me to betray it. When you tell me that the *idea* of the Absolute Unity is implied in the *idea* of the simplest object, I understand that the former idea is the deeper meaning of the latter; and, indeed, you tell me that I have only to reflect on my idea of the simple object and lo! it will "evolve" into a consciousness of the Absolute Unity. Now turn to the savage and his grammar. Surely it cannot be contended that his deeper *meaning* in "I will kill you" is that "I" is a personal pronoun, "kill" a verb, and "you" the object; it cannot be contended that reflection on his first meaning will lead him to parse the sentence instead of splitting your skull. And yet this is what the analogy ought to mean if it is to hold good. Truly the grammar "is there all the same" whether he knows it or not. But *where*? Not in the consciousness of the *savage*; but in that of the *grammarian*. So too the idea of the underlying unity may be "there all the same." But

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Religion*; i. 70.

*where?* In the theory of the philosopher; not in the mind of the savage. Could anything betray more effectually than this analogy does that what we have to do with here is a theory of the fact made to do duty for the fact itself?

It would appear that in modern thought the word "evolution" has acquired the efficacy of an incantation, so potent that none of us can wholly escape from its spell. That there is some witchery in the term is suggested on the one hand by the extraordinary loss of power which current expositions undergo when for the magical "evolution" we substitute Dr Ritchie's plain "unrolling," and on the other by the sudden revival of argumentative interest which takes place on "evolution" being restored.

This word, or the idea which it connotes, seems to have inspired some thinkers with a genial faith that there are no wrong roads in history. What appear to be such are in fact right roads which have not yet reached their goal; and they only need "completing" to bring this to light. You must not say the worshipper of Mumbo Jumbo is in the errors of heathen darkness; for "the completed totality is the truth of the whole movement of the process"; and Mumbo Jumbo has his place in that truth along with the Eternal God. "In the consciousness of the simplest and most uncultured individual," says Caird, "there are contained all the principles that can be evolved by the wisest philosopher of the most cultivated time; and even the rudest religions have represented in them—though, no doubt, in a shadowy and distorted way—all the elements that enter into the highest Christian worship." The trouble with the bad man, again, is not that he turns aside from the right road; it lies in the incompleteness with which he has realised the implications of his moral nature. "The standard of morality in a circle of horse-dealers," says Professor Muirhead, "is different from that recognised by a Christian congregation. . . . In the case of the horse-dealer the higher standard is rather latent than non-existent,



as is shown by the fact that it is possible to convict him of inconsistency and convert him." All conduct, we are assured by Green, "whether virtuous or vicious, expresses a motive consisting in an idea of personal good which the man seeks to realise by action." Thus the distinction between right and wrong is a distinction between the "degrees of adequacy" with which the idea is presented by the subject to himself; and I presume Professor Muirhead would say to the dealer who had sold him a foundered horse precisely what he says to M. Bergson about the work of thought, that his moral standard only needs "completing" in order that it may become all that it should be.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, we are told by Caird that the only distinction in man's view of the world "is between the world as imperfectly conceived and the world as more adequately interpreted."<sup>2</sup> Thus our seeming errors about the world only need completing to become truths. So once more the only differences, in thought as in conduct, are differences of adequacy; if ever we seem to be on the wrong road, we have only to go a mile or two further and we shall find it coming right.

Most persons, however, who have not been initiated into these Mysteries would be inclined to think that the certain result of "developing" the standard of the horse-dealer would be to make him worse to deal with than ever before. "The penalty of the unjust man," says Socrates, "is that he becomes more unjust." Macbeth "developed his implications," with the result that instead of washing his hands of blood he dyed them deeper. According to Shakespeare the line of Macbeth's evolution went from bad to worse; according to the system above quoted it should go from bad to good. The latter may assure us that Macbeth's mistake was in not developing his implications *enough*; but I think that most people will be glad that he didn't develop them any more. The "move-

<sup>1</sup> "The error is to be corrected not by cancelling the work of thought, but by completing it." *Hibbert Journal*, ix. 902.

<sup>2</sup> *Evolution of Theology*, i. 362.

ment" of his consciousness so far as it went—and it went pretty far—showed no sign of approximating to the Sermon on the Mount: the direction was plumb opposite to that.

No, horse-dealers are not made honest by leaving their consciousness to develop its latent implications. "The most violent revolution to which human nature can be subjected," says Caird,<sup>1</sup> "can never be more than the emergence into light of something that has been growing for a long time beneath the surface." But this statement, even if true, helps us not a whit; for it is as good a description of the honest soldier (Macbeth) who develops into a bloodthirsty assassin as of the horse-dealer who develops into a saint. Here is no ground for "confidence in the universe," nor for the assurance that the good will prevail. Men do not gather grapes of thorns nor figs of thistles; and unfortunately thorns and thistles "grow for a long time beneath the surface" as well as grapes and figs.

A closer scrutiny of the doctrine I am venturing to examine will confirm these objections. Two short quotations will indicate its outline. "The completed totality," says Lord Haldane, in words already quoted, "is the truth of the whole movement of the process." "The end," says Professor Muirhead, is "the principle of unity which harmonises and explains the successive steps."<sup>2</sup> It is obvious that these two statements mean the same thing. They show us that the theory is dominated by the conception of an "end"; and this "end" is actually present in any consciousness which has grasped the principle of unity which harmonises the steps of the process. Evolution is thus admittedly circular, for its "end" is nothing else than a revelation of the principle of unity which makes it a process; in other words, the process "returns upon itself" in becoming conscious of its own principle. In so becoming conscious of its principle the process becomes an object to itself, *i.e.* it becomes self-

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, i. 200.

<sup>2</sup> *Elements of Ethics*, 239.



conscious; thus the "end" is reached. It is a curious performance; but it has the sanction of great authorities.

Apparently this process does not take place in time; though a reader who studies the literature of the subject will find that the process is placed by different writers, and by the same writer in different passages, either in or out of time according to the momentary exigencies of his argument—a procedure as bewildering to the mind of the student as it is trying to his patience. "It is not only in time," says Lord Haldane, "that you have evolution; you have evolution in thought, in the stages of comprehension, when what comes last in time is first in thought." In Dr Caird's more detailed exposition the various stages of the evolution of consciousness are represented as following one another in historical order, like any other secular process, and the reader constantly awakens with a shock of bewildered surprise on discovering that what he has been reading is not history but metaphysics, or rather logic, and that he must forthwith transport a series of successive events into a changeless universe *sub specie æternitatis*. To do justice to his author he must, at one and the same time, take what is given him as a completed picture and as a moving story; if he criticises the picture he is bidden remember the story; if he finds fault with the story he is told to remember the picture. This, to say the least of it, gives him an uncomfortable feeling that he is in the toils.

Nor is that feeling relieved by the constant reminder that we must "translate the evolution in time into the timeless evolution of thought."<sup>1</sup> The word "translate" as here used is wholly misleading and merely serves the purpose, of course unintentional, of loading the dice in favour of the operator. To "translate" is to reproduce the *same* meaning in other terms; to "translate" time into the timeless is to put *opposite* meanings into the same terms. The "translation" is therefore the grossest possible mistranslation, and the injunction to

<sup>1</sup> "Philosophy translates an evolution in time into a process of thought which transcends time." John Caird, *Introduction*, p. 298.

“translate” amounts to this: “When you find yourself in a contradiction, get out of it by substituting the opposite meaning for one of the terms.”

The “end” of this process is attained, as I have said, when the mind grasps the principle of unity which explains the process, for that principle, as we are expressly told, *is* the end. And here a simple question will occur to most minds—and not only to those who are making their first acquaintance with this subject. If the story before us is that of the evolution of *consciousness*, and if the “end” of that story is conscious recognition of the principle of unity implied in its successive phases, what *further* story remains to be told of any consciousness which at last has become conscious of the principle? Apparently none. The evolution of consciousness should *stop* with our attainment of this insight. Accepting the definition of the “end” as given, then, as soon as my consciousness is at the “principle of unity” I am fully entitled to claim *that I am at the end of all things*, and the question “What next?” cannot arise. “We who have reached the present stage of religious thought,” says John Caird, “have all the essential elements of the historic movement in our own consciousness.”<sup>1</sup> History can bring no further enlightenment, and is henceforth meaningless.

To overcome this simple objection Green labours through some portentous paragraphs. Speaking of the Moral Ideal, which of course is only an *alias* for the “principle of unity,” he says that *what* that Ideal in its fullness is we can never fully know, but the conviction *that* it is, is the moving spring of Moral Evolution. But is the recognition *that there is such a principle* equivalent to that conscious recognition *of* the principle which these thinkers hold out as the “end” of evolution? How would a principle of which we know only *that* it is, but cannot say with any approach to fullness *what* it is, set about “explaining and harmonising” the entire series of steps in the history of the Cosmos up-to-date? And if it should turn out, as Green has everywhere to admit, that the “end” of which

<sup>1</sup> *Intr. Phil. of Rel.*, p. 298.



we have become "conscious" has still to be "realised" in some other way than that of merely becoming conscious of it, is it not obvious that such an "end" has parted with all the significance by possessing which it has enabled the Finalist to conduct his argument up to this fatal point? I do not know what, for example, would become of Professor Muirhead's statement that the standard of morality is supplied by the conception of an "end," were he to add, that the "end" in question serves a double function by being also a beginning; in short, that it is not an "end" at all. The sweet savour of the term evaporates when it is thus rudely turned inside out.

As the "end" turns out to be the name for a new beginning, the *πὸν στῶ* of moral development, so too we shall find that the alleged *beginning* of the evolution might, with equal fitness, be designated an end. In the account of the evolution of consciousness given by Caird we find, perhaps to our surprise, that the movement described takes place between a definite beginning and a definite end. It has three stages: it begins with the consciousness of the object; passes thence to the consciousness of the subject; and ends in the consciousness of the underlying unity of the two. We are, however, expressly and repeatedly forbidden to suppose that the three stages follow in such a way that the one is completed before the next begins. Along with the first consciousness of the finite object there goes a little consciousness of the self, and somewhat less consciousness of the underlying unity. The evolution is thus the "explication of a confused totality in which the three factors are *at first* merged and mingled, but is never the sudden emergence of any quite new factor."<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere the progress is described as the "coming into prominence" of some elements, and the sinking into the background of the others.<sup>2</sup>

Now, we read in another place: "The essential characteristic of development is that nothing arises in it *de novo*, which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning."

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, i. 186.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

What then of the *beginning itself*? Is that not *de novo*? Then it is not a beginning.

The force of this simple difficulty is, as before, apt to be overlooked owing to a fast-and-loose handling of the word "beginning." We are not allowed to treat it as indicating merely the first member in a series of events. On the contrary, the "beginning" is charged with all that is to follow; it contains within itself, as a germ is said to do, the whole of its posterity; it is in short nothing but the entire process in germ. It is one of the delightful conveniences of this mode of thought, that *any* stage of the process is convertible at will into the whole process at that stage. This enables you to treat any stage as end, middle, or beginning according to your point of view; which is all very well so long as your point of view, being *sub specie æternitatis*, requires the process to have neither end, middle, nor beginning; but is highly inconvenient when you have to *tell the story* of evolution, inasmuch as all three words have now lost the meanings which are indispensable to the purpose of the story-teller. To tell the story you must start somewhere; you must have your "at first"; and to justify the words you must start with something which in some way is different from what comes next. It matters not the least that what you begin with is the confused totality in a high degree of confusion. However confused the totality may be at the point where you first pick it up, your principles require you to admit that it has issued from a state of confusion still greater. Hence, strictly speaking, you can never begin. There is of course no fixed point at which confusion commences its march to order. All this, therefore, of what mind does "at first," or "in the first instance"; all this of the "earliest" forms of the religious or other consciousness, is violent and arbitrary. An evolution which admits nothing *de novo* declines to allow you to "begin" its story.

"At first," we are told, man "goes outward to the object." But before man went outward to the object he must have done something else; and you have no better reason to begin at the



point when he went out to the object than you would have to begin at the point when he went in to the subject, or round to the principle of unity. The evolution of mind up to the point when it goes outward to the object needs accounting for no less than any subsequent stages of its development; hence you are merely depriving us of an interesting chapter of the story by thus starting, *in mediis rebus*, at the point where consciousness is preoccupied with the finite.

It seems to me, in addition, that to speak of man's consciousness "as at first confused" is misleading. The consciousness of the savage is just as "clear" about its own business as ours is about our business; the difference is that it is concerned with other things. The savage might with equal propriety describe the consciousness of the modern Finalist as being "confused" with regard to many things that are "clear" to him, *e.g.* the flight of a boomerang, or the value of a scalp, or the presence of water beneath the surface of the ground, or the malignancy of the Big Fetish. The simple fact is that the savage and the civilised man are conscious of different objects; not that one is confusedly conscious and the other clearly conscious of the same.

Thus our philosophers are asking a hard thing when they claim a licence to strike in at the consciousness of the object, ruled by "inchoate" ideas of a subject and an underlying unity, as the absolute "at first"—the point where the evolution of mind necessarily and properly begins. If you plant yourself in imagination at the point so selected, you see at once that though the point is "at first" in relation to what follows, it is "at last" in relation to what has gone before; in short, that wherever you begin, you strike into the course of a history and encounter ideas which, however "shadowy and distorted," are already, on this theory, the evolved products of a process.

Up to this point the theory involves a twofold disappointment. It bases our faith on an end which turns out to be a beginning, and it starts our speculations from a beginning

which turns out to be an end. Seeking to relieve our disappointment, it introduces the conception of a "whole," which strictly speaking has neither beginning nor end, but which nevertheless begins by being a confused totality and ends by being an ordered system. Is this thinkable? Is it consistent with itself?

The next difficulty, which is perhaps even more serious, arises from the combination of these two.

The reader, who peruses this evolution-story needs to give himself a stern reminder, at the end of almost every sentence, that it is the evolution of *consciousness* that is being related. If he forgets this and, misled by the constant introduction of biological metaphor, permits the image of an acorn, or some such *unconscious* germ, to guide his thoughts, he may easily overlook the swarming difficulties of the theory. For instance, with the acorn in mind he will probably accept without much demur the statement that evolution of consciousness is controlled *by ideas* of which the subject is at first *unaware*; and that these controlling ideas are present *in* consciousness without being present *to* consciousness. But let him banish the acorn and remember *consciousness*, and such a statement will become a mere nest of confusion. What are these ideas, he will ask, which remain ideas even when the subject, in whose *consciousness* they are, is unaware of them? Again, with the acorn still in mind, let him contemplate the innumerable instances of arrested development in the history of the human mind, and of religion, and these instances will present no difficulty at all. The growth of acorns (and other germs) is subject to arrest; so that when we hear of men who stick fast at an early point of their spiritual development, as savages often do, or of others who, like Spencer, having reached an advanced point suddenly decline to take the step which next follows, we at once suppose that they resemble those acorns which for some intelligible reason have failed to become oaks.



But now let him give himself the needed reminder and reconsider the position. The evolution of consciousness, as presented by the Finalist, is determined by the necessities of an inner logic from the impetus of which there is no escape. John Caird speaks of the process as one in which "the human spirit is forced onwards by an immanent logic" (*Introduction*, p. 296). It is "a necessary process" (p. 294). There are no alternatives. Consciousness *must* evolve in that way and in no other. There is no room for any option, contingency, mistake, arrest, or failure. This is confirmed emphatically by T. H. Green. The process, he declares, is "a development of the intelligence in a direction which it does not rest with the individual to follow or no" (*Prolegomena*, par. 63). How, then, we ask, did Mr Herbert Spencer manage to develop in another direction? Nay, more. The theory not only leaves the failures unaccounted for; it refuses equally to provide for the different rates of progress by which the "end" is reached in different individuals or races which are alleged to have reached it. What have the eternal necessities of logic to do with the course of time; with gradual and sudden; with slow and quick; with retardation or promptitude?

It is therefore most perplexing to the docile student, who has done his best "to translate the evolution in time into an evolution in thought," to receive a solemn reminder that this latter process is necessarily a "slow" affair. This word is seldom absent for long from any exposition of the evolution of consciousness.<sup>1</sup> "The slow and cyclical movement," says John Caird. "The idea of God is of slow and late growth," says Ritchie. "The human mind is from the beginning moulded by ideas of which it can become directly conscious only by a slow and gradual process": "from the nature of the case [the process] must be long," says Edward Caird.

What, then, is the process whose nature is to be "slow"

<sup>1</sup> I have noticed, however, that Green avoids it: whether accidentally or deliberately, I do not know.

and "long" and [blessed word!] "gradual"? The word "cyclical," which J. Caird combines with "slow," gives the key. It is the life of reason translated into its timeless evolution; the process in which the human spirit is "forced onward by an immanent logic," the direction of which, and I suppose the rate also, "it does not rest with the individual" to choose.

Now what has the epithet "slow" to do with this process? Why must it be "necessarily" long? Why should anybody—the savage or the civilised Agnostic—have to *wait* for its results? What wonderful power is that in the savage which enables him to keep the "inner dialectic" of his consciousness at a walking pace for thousands of years? What accident of climate, geography, or race has rendered the immanent logic so active in India and so torpid in the Solomon Islands? Is "consciousness" in the latter place bereft of its immanent logic? Have not the Solomon Islanders made a good start by "letting their consciousness go out to the object"? Why, then, do they fail to rehearse the rest of the programme—and to rehearse it *at once*? And what, once more, of Mr Herbert Spencer? How is it that he, having accomplished the process of reflection up to the point from which the next step would take him to the "end," suddenly sheers off, in defiance of all "inner necessities," evolutionary formulæ, and warnings that it rests not with the individual to choose the way he will go? To *confute* Mr Spencer is one thing; but to *account for* him, on this theory, is another.

In short, the thesis that every higher form of consciousness has been evolved from a lower form, even if well established, is not to the purpose. What the theory we are criticising requires is obviously the converse, viz., that every lower form evolves into a higher. It must do so if controlled by "inner necessities." We ought to see, therefore, a universal, nay, an instantaneous, submission of consciousness to the evolutionary programme. We see nothing of the sort. Oftener than not the worshipper of Mumbo Jumbo gets no further. His



consciousness sticks fast, and ever faster, at the "objective" stage; and it is not until the arrival of St Paul at his islands that he gets a new start.

Nor is the situation to be saved by the assertion, so often made, that "on the whole" consciousness evolves according to the programme assigned by these thinkers. "On the whole," like many other phrases used in this connection, is little else than a verbal contrivance for saving a fallacious argument from being brought to book, and merely serves to confuse the issue. The authors of this theory have appealed to history, and to history they must go. By what right, then, logical or other, can it be claimed that the particular movement of thought which "ends" thus is representative of the mode in which consciousness, "on the whole," evolves or must evolve? Many movements have ended otherwise. In spite of Green's ruling, the human intelligence has followed other directions in the past and is following others now, not to speak of innumerable arrested races whose consciousness, in the sense assigned, has not "moved" at all. Might we not say with equal truth, or with equal error, that consciousness "on the whole" does *not* evolve according to the formula under consideration? Consciousness, in the person of Bergson and James, and others who need not be named, has "leaped over the wall." Some, like Professor Pringle-Pattison, after reaching the "end," have subsequently deserted it. Plainly this one movement has no claim to stand as a privileged representative of how consciousness evolves "on the whole." And should not the philosopher feel embarrassed when, after decreeing how mind *must* evolve, he finds himself compelled to argue with a mind which has *not* evolved as he says it must?

At this point I am again reminded of Professor Muirhead's horse-dealer. It is tempting to apply these last considerations to the evolution of the moral consciousness—with the emphasis once more on the last word. For the theory which the higher standards of conduct develops out of the lower suffers from the same difficulty, viz. that it can exhibit no necessity. It

may be true that high standards or high qualities are developed out of low ones, but it is not true that the low invariably develop into the high.

It is not without the dread of presumption upon me that I proceed to name the fallacy which seems to me to underlie the argument of the distinguished thinkers whose words I have quoted. I believe it to be the familiar pathetic fallacy, against which, sure enough, the school to which they belong has been foremost in protesting, but which has here invaded the very citadel of their metaphysics. Not, however, till he views the theory as a whole is the presence of this fallacy suggested to the student's mind. Then he will become aware of it; not indeed in a form which is easy to bring to book, for it appears under many disguises, and enters into the argument by steps so gradual that the reader is hardly aware of the road along which he is being led. Turning round at last to consider his steps, he may, however, suddenly discern that throughout the whole of this fascinating and ingenious argument the process of reflecting on consciousness has been put back into the consciousness reflected upon, and the whole process of mental evolution has thus been turned into a *consciously acted logic*.

This will be understood if we consider the paradoxical problem which the evolution theory of consciousness sets out to solve. If the story you are going to tell is that of the evolution of *consciousness*, then it is plain that the ends which are being evolved must be *in* consciousness from the first. On the other hand, if the story is to be one of the *evolution* of consciousness, it is equally plain that the mind cannot be conscious of them all to begin with; for in that case there would be nothing to evolve. Thus a mode of statement has to be contrived which shall represent these ends (or stages) as at first present in consciousness though not consciously present. But here a great difficulty presents itself. If you lay emphasis on the fact that the ends are not consciously present, you are



open to the retort that it is not the evolution of *consciousness* you are talking about. If, to escape this, you emphasise their presence *in* consciousness, it would seem that the mind is conscious of them already, and no story of how it *becomes* conscious of them remains to be told. Thus there arises a perpetual see-saw of emphasis between the words evolution and consciousness. So far as evolution is needed there can be no consciousness; so far as there is consciousness there need be no evolution.

To meet this difficulty a step is taken which I cannot but regard as a wholly illegitimate compromise. "To begin with," the mind is represented as neither totally unconscious nor completely conscious of the ends to be evolved. A doctrine of betwixt and between is set up, according to which the mind along with a clear consciousness of the stage already reached, has a dim consciousness of the stages to come. The sharp distinction "present in *but not* present to" is thus qualified by an understanding that "present in" means *dimly* "present to." "It cannot be," says Caird (*italics mine*), "but that in *some form or other* the elements which belong to fully developed rational consciousness should present themselves *to* the mind of the savage."<sup>1</sup> And further on,<sup>2</sup> "he could not go out of himself unless there were present *in* his consciousness the idea of an absolute unity which embraces all difference." The words "in some form or other" thus become a means of reconciling these apparently inconsistent views. Indeed the vocabulary which Caird employs to describe the twilight region in which the two views are mingled is peculiarly rich. The main adjectives are "dim," "inchoate," "obscure," "latent," "confused," "incoherent," "implicit," "shadowy," "vague," "distorted," "incomplete," "imperfect," "anticipative," "haunted," "masked." With one or other of these words the mouth of the objector is instantly closed when he raises the difficulties aforesaid; and over the whole group broods that other word against the seductions of which every

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, i, 219.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

student of evolution should be religiously on his guard—the word “gradual.”

Now here, I venture to submit, the psychologist's fallacy is easily detected. It consists, of course, in treating a consciousness of what is dim to the person who is being studied as though it were a dim consciousness of what is clear to the person who is studying him; a consciousness of what is confused as though it were a confused consciousness of what is orderly; a consciousness of an evolving world as though it were the evolving consciousness of a world; a consciousness of low gods (or goods) as though it were a low consciousness of high gods. In short, “consciousness of degrees” is converted into “degrees of consciousness,” and the idea of development becomes the development of the idea.

No one needs to be told that if two sheets of metal, one of dull lead, the other of burnished silver, were hung on the wall before him, it would be flagrantly absurd to treat his perception of the dull lead as though it were a dull perception of the bright silver. Nor will he make the mistake of supposing that his perception of the lead can by any process of development be turned into a perception of the silver, as though the one thing were the germ of the other. The more he develops his consciousness of the lead, the more lead-like, if I may so say, and the less silver-like that consciousness will become. Self-evident, too, is the statement that the idea of a confused crowd is not a confused idea of an ordered regiment; and that no amount of “reflection” on my idea of a crowd will ever convert it into an idea of a regiment. And may we not be forgiven for asking what difference there is between these easily detected fallacies and a mode of statement which represents the savage's clear conceptions of Mumbo Jumbo as though they were dim conceptions of the Eternal God and the horse-dealer's code of ethics as though it contained a “latent” Sermon on the Mount? Is it not plain that the philosopher has here put back his own interpretative consciousness into the mind he is studying?



The doctrine of evolution as presented by the great thinkers I have named illustrates the degree to which, in modern times, metaphysics has fallen under the heel of biology. Our philosophers must not be described as having assimilated that science, which it was their duty to do; it should rather be said that they have succumbed to it, just as their predecessors succumbed to mechanics. Of the two masters, were a forced option put upon me, I would choose mechanics; for that is a master who, with all his crudities, at least allows us to make plausible explanations. In succumbing to biology we have burdened ourselves with all its difficulties, which are many, and failed, at the same time, to acquire the precision of its methods. The doctrine of an evolving consciousness is not only biology, but bad biology. It is easy enough to see that behind the entire treatment of mind, to which this servitude has led, there lurks the notion that mind is a *thing* with a hidden structure like the living body, or even with hidden works like a church clock—for the mechanical obsession is not altogether extinct even in these high latitudes. Consciousness becomes an envelope which wraps up or "implicates" certain secrets and keeps them there in the darkness, until by a "gradual" evolution it brings them into the light. But the moment we remind ourselves that it is consciousness we are talking about, all this imagery of implications and explications, of wrappings-up and unfoldings, of masks and disguises, of shells and kernels, acorns and oaks, becomes as inapplicable to the facts before us as the crudest of mechanical metaphors.

Before "evolution" can be used to explain consciousness or anything else an agreement must be reached as to what the term conveys. As yet philosophy is far from such agreement. It is not enough to say that the meaning of the word is obscure. Contending schools are using it in senses diametrically opposed to one another, each affirming it to mean precisely what the other excludes from its meaning. Hence the application of the word to the Life of Reason is in any case premature; thinking will never consent to be dominated

by a concept which has no defined status in the world of thought.

A comparison of the parallel passages quoted below will show this, and may possibly serve as a warning against the hasty use of "evolution" as a key to all the mysteries:—

EDWARD CAIRD.

1. "The essential characteristic of development is that nothing arises in it *de novo* which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning."—*Evolution of Religion*, i. 182.

2. "The idea of development excludes anything like an absolute break between one stage and another. The identity of a being that lives and develops is shown, above all, in the fact that, though it is continually changing in its whole nature, nothing absolutely new is ever introduced into it."—*Ibid.*, 199.

JOHN CAIRD.

"The whole future of the religious life is given in its beginning, but it is given implicitly as a principle which has yet to unfold its hidden riches and its all-subduing power. . . . Consciousness is a unity of difference which has developed by a necessary process."—*Introduction to Phil. of Rel.*, 281, 294.

HUXLEY.

"If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, . . . it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour, and that a sufficient intellect could, from a knowledge of the properties of that vapour, have predicted, say, the Fauna of Great Britain in 1869, with as much

JAMES MARTINEAU.

1. "It is a contradiction of the idea of growth or evolution that the adult should have no characteristic predicates absent from the nature in its germ. . . . The very essence of the process is that it is made up of old and new. It brings the surprise of something fresh and incalculable."—*Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. 355.

2. "When an animal takes a step of evolution, the unity splits up into a plurality, the members of which are not alike, and among them are some (at least one) never present before. . . . In every instance the *new* elements contributed by evolution are the *true* elements."—*Ibid.*

JAMES MARTINEAU.

"The growth of the human mind is not like a process . . . in which ingredients are compounded and under every transformation may be recovered by analysis without anything over: as it advances it is not only *other* than it was, but more; and . . . *conscience* is a fact altogether fresh."—*Study of Religion*, ii. 27.

BERGSON.

"Of course the evolution of the organic world cannot be predetermined as a whole"; . . . "hence the unforeseeable variety of forms which life, in evolving, sends along its path."—*Creative Evolution*, pp. 91, 102.

"Most often when experience has finally shown in how life goes to work



certainly as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath on a cold winter's day."—Quoted by Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 40.

to obtain a certain result, we find its way of working is just that of which we should never have thought."—*Ibid.*, x.

"Even a superhuman intelligence would not have been able to foresee the simple indivisible form which gives to these purely abstract elements their concrete organisation."—*Ibid.*, p. 6.

#### HEGEL.

"The time-difference has no interest whatever for thought."—*Natur-phil.*, 33.

#### BERGSON.

"The flux of time is the reality itself, and the things we study are the things that flow."—*Ibid.*, p. 363.<sup>1</sup>

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read before the Aristotelian Society.

## TELEPATHY AND METAPHYSICS.

THE RIGHT HON. G. W. BALFOUR.

IN a well-known passage in the Introduction to his *Elemente der Psycho-physik*, Fechner comments on the apparent impossibility of observing at the same time the psychical process and the brain-process which seems so inseparably connected with it. This impossibility, Fechner thinks, must have its ground very deep in the nature of things. He compares the case to that of the curve of a circle seen alternatively from within the circle or from outside of it; or, again, to the different aspects of the solar system according as it is viewed from the earth or from the sun. The same observer will never be able to see both aspects at once; yet the two aspects belong inseparably together, and are, in fact, but different appearances of the same thing seen from different standpoints.

These illustrations are, however, confessedly inadequate to represent the nature of the relation between mind and brain as Fechner conceives it, and he continues as follows:<sup>1</sup> “What appears to you, who yourself are spirit, when at the inner standpoint as spirit, appears from the outer standpoint as the bodily substratum of this spirit. The difference of standpoint is whether one thinks with one’s brain, or looks into the brain of another thinker. The appearances are then quite different; but the standpoints are very different—there an inner, here an outer standpoint; and they are indescribably

<sup>1</sup> The passage has been translated in Mr M'Dougall's *Body and Mind*, and I avail myself of his version.



more different than in the foregoing example [of the circle and the solar system], and just for that reason the difference of the modes of appearance is indescribably greater. For the double mode of appearance of the circle, or of the solar system, is after all only obtained from two different outer standpoints over against it; at the centre of the circle, or on the sun, the observer remains outside the line of the circle or outside the planets. But the appearance of the spirit to itself is obtained from a truly inner standpoint of that underlying being over against itself—namely, the standpoint of coincidence with itself; while the appearance of the bodily self is obtained from a standpoint truly external to it—namely, one which does not coincide with it.

*“Therefore no spirit perceives immediately another spirit, although one might suppose that it should most easily apprehend a being of like nature with itself; it perceives, in so far as the other does not coincide with it, only the bodily appearance of that other. Therefore no spirit can in any way become aware of another save by aid of its corporeality; for what of spirit appears outwardly is just its bodily mode of appearance.”*<sup>1</sup>

If we supplement this statement with another favourite doctrine of Fechner's, that of pansychism, it is evident that a long step has been taken towards the Parallelistic view of the Universe in its most modern form. This modern form of Parallelism, which Professor Strong calls “Psycho-physical Idealism,” and Mr M'Dougall “Psychical Monism,” may be summed up in three fundamental propositions:—

- (1) Consciousness is the only reality.
- (2) No consciousness can directly apprehend another consciousness in its true nature as consciousness, but only as material phenomenon.
- (3) The relation between reality and phenomenon is such that physical process is everywhere the exact, complete, and sufficient counterpart of psychical process—a counterpart so exact, complete, and

<sup>1</sup> The italics are mine.

sufficient as to make it possible to explain all the processes which constitute the Universe in terms of the physical laws of matter.

It is important to bear in mind that these propositions, however naturally one may seem to lead on to another, are not connected by any logical necessity. Proposition (1) does not necessarily imply proposition (2); and propositions (1) and (2) might both be true without carrying proposition (3) as their inevitable conclusion.

If we start by excluding the hypothesis of solipsism, we may legitimately infer from the proposition that consciousness is the only reality the conclusion that matter is the phenomenal appearance of *some* other consciousness to our own consciousness. We cannot legitimately infer that *all* consciousness, so far as it is apprehended by other consciousness, must be apprehended solely in the form of material phenomenon. And, similarly, even if the truth of this latter proposition be granted in its fullest extent, it is evident that bodily form may be the only possible mode of apprehension of one consciousness by another, and yet essentially inadequate as an exact counterpart of the consciousness apprehended.

It is against the assumed adequacy of bodily form as the correlative phenomenon of consciousness in general that the opponents of Parallelism have for the most part directed their main assault. Proposition (2), which is the equivalent of Fechner's dictum that no spirit can immediately perceive another spirit, has, until within quite recent years, been allowed to remain practically unchallenged. In fact, not only Parallelism but the whole course of philosophic speculation has hitherto rejected the notion that one consciousness can directly apprehend another, or that the contents of different consciousnesses are in any way communicable otherwise than by signs or symbols which are in their nature physical. This imperviousness of mind to mind has for the most part been treated as self-evident and indisputable. I might give many quotations to illustrate this, but I content myself with one, which I take



from William James's *Principles of Psychology*. It has an interest of its own, because James in his latest writings adopted a view quite inconsistent with the one which he here treats as too obvious to be seriously controverted.

"The only states of consciousness," he says,<sup>1</sup> "that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and you's. Each of these minds keeps its own thought to itself. There is no giving or bartering between them. No thought ever comes into direct *sight* of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being owned. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature. Everyone," he goes on to say, "will recognise this to be true, so long as the existence of *something* corresponding to the term 'personal mind' is all that is insisted on without any particular view of its nature being implied."

This may sound decisive. Yet a doubt still lingers. "One might suppose," says Fechner, "that a spirit should most easily apprehend a being of like nature with itself." Considered as an abstract proposition, this is just what one *would* suppose. Moreover, the religious beliefs held by the mass of mankind certainly seem at first sight inconsistent with the denial of it. The religious consciousness, at all events in its higher developments, has never accepted mutual exclusiveness as a true account of the relation between the human mind and the Divine mind. In prayer on the one side, and inspiration on the other, it sees, not a mediated, but a direct communion between God and man. Not only are our thoughts supposed to be directly known to God, but the human mind, according

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 266.

to its measure, is regarded as capable of directly apprehending the thoughts and purposes of the Divine mind. This conception has of course also had its philosophic expression in more than one metaphysical system.

What both religion and philosophy have in view, however, is the relation between the finite mind and the infinite—a relation which it is natural to treat as something absolutely *sui generis*, and having nothing in common with the relation between one finite mind and another. Leibnitz, for instance, while admitting real interaction between the finite monads and God, expressly refused to recognise any interaction between one finite monad and another; and not altogether dissimilar is the doctrine held by Berkeley and others that we see all things in God.

Is there any reason to believe that between one finite mind and another there exists anything analogous to the direct communion which is assumed alike by religious and philosophic thought to exist between the human mind and the Divine mind?

An affirmative answer to this question is, in my opinion, forced upon any candid inquirer who will take the trouble to make a thorough study of the steadily accumulating evidence in favour of what is known as Telepathy.

Telepathy is commonly defined in a non-committal way as “the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense.” Taken thus broadly and without any ulterior implications, the case which can be made out for it is in my judgment overwhelming; but this case rests upon a multitude of details, covering so wide a field of observation and experiment that for the purpose of the present paper I must be content to assume that telepathy in the above sense is an established fact.

As to the significance of the fact, there is no doubt room for difference of opinion. Is telepathy essentially psychical in its nature, or is it physically mediated throughout? On our answer to this question must depend any estimate we may



form of its importance as a factor to be taken account of in psychology and philosophy. If it will allow of a physical explanation—for instance, if the transmission of an idea from one mind to another is to be ascribed to ether waves, as suggested by Sir William Crookes—the phenomenon, however remarkable and interesting, would not require us to accept any principle of action hitherto unknown to science. The alternative view is that telepathy involves direct apprehension by one mind of the contents of another. In that case we are in presence of a far-reaching discovery, the importance of which in the general scheme of things has, I believe, been very insufficiently appreciated. For my own part, having regard to the nature of the communications, and the great distances often separating the communicating minds without apparently affecting the result, I am unable to accept as even plausible any suggestion of a physical explanation that has yet been put forward. In this matter I am glad to find that I have the powerful support of Mr M'Dougall. In his recent work on *Body and Mind* he has expressed his views on the subject with an emphasis and a vigour of conviction which is quite refreshing:—

“So long,” he writes, “as we consider only the evidence of telepathy between persons at no great distance from one another, it is possible to make the facts appear compatible with the mechanistic assumption by uttering the ‘blessed’ word ‘brain waves.’ But the strain upon the mechanistic assumption becomes insupportable by it when we consider the following facts: Minute studies of automatic writings, and especially those recently reported under the head of ‘Cross-correspondences,’ have shown that such writings frequently reveal knowledge of facts which could not have been acquired by the writer by normal means, and could not have been telepathically communicated by any living person in the neighbourhood of the writer. In short, the evidence is such that the keenest adverse critics of the view which sees in these writings the expression of the surviving personalities of deceased persons

are driven to postulate as the only possible explanation of some of them the direct communication of complex and subtle thoughts between persons separated by hundreds and even thousands of miles. . . . There is good evidence also that in some cases three persons widely separated in space have taken part in expressing by automatic writing a single thought. Unless, then, we are prepared to adopt the supposition of a senseless and motiveless conspiracy of fraud among a number of persons who have shown themselves to be perfectly upright and earnest in every other relation, we must recognise that we stand before the dilemma—survival or telepathy of this far-reaching kind. The acceptance of either horn of the dilemma is fatal to the mechanistic scheme of things. For, even if the hypothesis of ‘brain waves’ be regarded as affording a possible explanation of simple telepathic communication at short range, it becomes wholly incredible if it is suggested as an explanation of the co-operation of widely-separated ‘automatic’ writers in the expression of one thought.”

I hope the importance of this statement of opinion, coming as it does from so competent a psychologist, may excuse the length of the quotation. The dilemma is, I think, exactly what Mr M'Dougall states it to be. Telepathy between the living “of this far-reaching kind” involves some very strange suppositions concerning the capacities and moral character of the “secondary selves” of the automatists. But no other sufficient account can be given of the cross-correspondences in some of the cases referred to save by calling in the agency of spirit communication. For my present purpose it is indifferent which alternative is adopted. Either of them would seem to imply a direct apprehension by one mind of the thought of another. In what follows I shall use the term telepathy in this distinctively psychical sense, *i.e.* as implying a communion of mind with mind which, if established, would carry with it a refutation of Fechner's dictum, that no spirit perceives immediately another spirit, but only the bodily appearance of that spirit; and of William James's, that no personal conscious-



ness comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness.

It is only right to say that much has been learnt on this subject since Fechner's day, and even since James published his *Principles of Psychology*. In James's later works the "absolute insulation" view was gradually given up. Already in his Gifford Lectures, published in 1902, on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, he had come to doubt whether the phenomena of Religious Mysticism, in which the Mystic appears to himself to pass over into direct communion with some higher Spiritual Power, and in a manner even to become one with it, are entirely subjective. "It must always remain," he says, "an open question whether mystical states may not possibly be . . . superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world." He does not, indeed, himself accept this view, preferring to regard such states as a merging of the "supraliminal" in the "subliminal" self; but there is still room, he holds, even so, for the possibility that the subliminal self may on its part be merging in some spiritual influence beyond it.

In his Lectures on *A Pluralistic Universe*, James goes yet further. He has now come fully under the influence of Fechner's theory of the compounding of consciousnesses, and affirms that the drift of all the evidence we have seems to him to "sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious."

All these mystical experiences I claim to be allowed to gather within the telepathic net. Whether you describe them as the merging of one consciousness in another, or the interpenetration of one consciousness by another, or the interaction between two or more consciousnesses, they are all cases in which one consciousness does perceive immediately another consciousness, and not its bodily appearance; they are all cases in which the supposed absolute insulation and impermeability of the personal self is broken down.

I maintain that this is the essential character of mystical experiences, even if we abandon the idea of a superhuman consciousness altogether, and ascribe them, as James does in his Gifford Lectures, to a merging of the supraliminal consciousness in the subliminal. Two consciousnesses cannot merge into each other, so as to produce these experiences, unless they are in some sense distinct from each other to begin with. Nor, if this be the true explanation, can we reasonably stop at mystical experiences. Once admit that there can be co-conscious selves or distinct psychical centres, associated together in the same human organism, it is hardly possible to resist the conclusion that their interaction must determine a large part of the normal psychic life of every one of us. And once admit that telepathy, in the sense of direct psychic interaction, actually takes place between one individual and another, it becomes at least plausible to conjecture that the interaction between co-conscious psychical centres in the same human organism is also of the same nature.

This view was maintained by me in a Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research more than six years ago; and I see no reason to abandon the main conclusions there set forth.

That the human individual is *polypsychic*, that an indefinite number of streams of consciousness co-exist in each of us which can be variously and in varying degrees associated or dissociated, is now a doctrine widely accepted even by "orthodox psychology." The evidence for it is strong: on the other hand, there is the direct certitude that each of us seems to have of his true self as a strictly unitary consciousness. How are the two conceptions to be reconciled? How are we to conceive the relations of this true self to the organism as a whole and to the subordinate streams of consciousness associated with it, in such a way as to do justice at once to the unitary character of the personal consciousness and to the multiplicity of the factors which appear to constitute it?

This is perhaps the most fundamental problem of psycho-



logy. The answer I gave to it in the address above referred to is substantially the answer I give now. The true self of which we have immediate certitude is neither the organism as a whole nor any grouping of psychical centres within the organism. It is a single psychical centre, whose field of consciousness at any given moment is the expression of its interaction with its entire environment. In the larger sense its environment is the whole Universe other than itself. In the narrower sense its environment is the physical organism, and every psychical centre associated therewith, other than itself. With the physical organism and with these other psychical centres it is in a state of continual interaction of a more intimate kind than that which goes on between it and all other existences; and I see no reason to suppose that the interaction between it and the other concurrently active streams of consciousness within the organism, as well as between these streams of consciousness themselves, is not essentially of the same character as that which, as between distinct living organisms, we call telepathic.

If the views so far presented are well founded, the field of telepathic action must be regarded as a very wide one. It includes interaction between one embodied consciousness and another; between embodied consciousness and disembodied consciousness, if disembodied consciousness there be, and *a fortiori* between one disembodied consciousness and another; and last, but not least, between the different conscious elements associated in a single organism.<sup>1</sup> If all these forms of intercommunication really exist, we are clearly within sight of Frederic Myers' conception of telepathy as

<sup>1</sup> Interaction of the latter kind would naturally include the case of parent and offspring during the prenatal stage. The problems of heredity and embryonic development seem to be requiring ever more and more the assumption of a psychic element for their solution; and I venture to commend the above suggestion to Professor James Ward and others who uphold the "mnemonic theory" of heredity, but are dissatisfied with a purely physical explanation of the *modus operandi* (see Professor Ward's Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture for 1912 on "Heredity and Memory").

occupying "in the spiritual world some such place as gravitation occupies in the material world," and as lying, to use his expression, "at the very centre of cosmic evolution."

But the moment we begin to conceive of telepathy, not as something which occurs now and again in exceptional circumstances, but as the fundamental law of conscious life, many insistent questions arise; and with one of these, at all events, I will try to deal here.

If telepathy is the fundamental law of conscious life—in other words, if it belongs to the very essence of minds to interact with each other and in this way to reflect, in a greater or less degree, each other's content of consciousness—how comes it that the phenomena to which we can appeal as direct evidence of the law are comparatively few and far between? How comes it that it was not until the latter end of the nineteenth century that any such interaction began to be suspected?

On the hypothesis we are considering, the general answer to this question must be that, though the interaction is universal, the cases that force it upon our notice are exceptional. And if we examine the matter more in detail, I think we shall see that this was to be expected. Telepathy implies a modification of our consciousness arising from a cause in some sense extraneous to it, and yet not affecting us through the channels of sense-perception. The cases likely, in the ordinary course of things, so to arrest our attention as to lead us to assume such a cause, must satisfy one of two conditions. The first of these is that the modification of consciousness should come to us with a coercive force analogous to that which, in the case of sense-perception, carries with it to the unsophisticated mind immediate conviction of an external reality as its cause. The second condition is that there should be an observed coincidence between the contents of two minds which we find it difficult to regard as accidental or to explain in any mechanical fashion. The mystical experiences already referred to—ordinary hallucinations, specially vivid dreams, im-



pressions felt to be mysterious and unaccountable—are examples of the first case. Experimental telepathy, coincidental hallucinations and impressions, and cross-correspondences between automatic writers, are instances of the second.

None of these phenomena, with the exception of dreams, are of very common occurrence. But in addition to that, experiences of the first class, however convincing to those immediately concerned, are so easily explained away as “purely subjective” that it was not until the second class of cases began to be studied that the possibility of any other explanation was thought worthy of scientific attention. Now, however, in the light of the accumulating evidence for telepathic communication between persons at a distance, and of that afforded by certain of the phenomena of hypnotism and abnormal psychology, we are driven to face the possibility—which I believe to be more than a possibility—of a hidden telepathic interaction even in the normal everyday flow of ideas which we are accustomed to regard as wholly subjective and devoid of all cognitive significance.

But even when all this has been said, we shall probably feel that, if we are here dealing with a cosmic law, the rarity of what I may call evidential cases of telepathy between living human beings is greater than we should have expected, and calls for some further explanation.

I venture, therefore, to offer the following suggestions on the subject:—

Let me, for shortness' sake, call the spiritual interaction which, on my hypothesis, is continuous between different psychical centres directly associated with the organism, *intra-corporeal telepathy*; and that which takes place between different human beings, *extra-corporeal telepathy*. It seems to me that we have good grounds for supposing that the relative activity or intensity of intra-corporeal telepathy greatly exceeds that of extra-corporeal. Indeed, having got thus far, it would be not excessively rash to conjecture that one of the purposes served by the organism is to create and

maintain a special rapport between the psychic centres attached to it, and that, the field of clear consciousness being limited, the increased *internal* rapport thus produced would of itself operate to diminish the external rapport with other minds. Save in exceptional circumstances, therefore, the only external reality we are in conscious rapport with is that which affects our bodies, and which we cognise through the senses. Yet the interaction between mind and mind may be going on all the time, although its effects fail to reach the level of clear consciousness, and remain nothing more than an obscure modification of the total psychical content.

This speculation I pluck up courage to supplement by another, not put forward now for the first time, but possibly new to the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL.

Evidential cases of extra-corporeal telepathy depend for their cogency upon coincidence beyond what chance might produce. Such coincidences must, from the very nature of the case, be coincidences of particular with particular, and the more detailed they are the more convincing they will be. But detailed coincidences must, again from the nature of the case, be confined to a limited number of minds; and in practice, in what we call evidential cases, the observed telepathic correspondence is confined to two or at most three individuals. On the other hand, if telepathic interaction is universal, as we have supposed, the number of minds between which it takes place is unlimited. What form can we most easily conceive the expression of such general reciprocity to take?

I suggest that if an all-embracing psychical interaction is a reality, it is in the region of *universals* that we must expect to find it most clearly present. It will express itself in widely pervading general ideas; still more, perhaps, in the ultimate constitutive forms and categories which lie at the foundation of all cognition, and make a common universe for our common reason. Much stress has been laid of late years on the *intra-subjective* aspect of our conceptions, but this has usually been traced to the fact that we are not isolated individuals but members of



a society, communicating with each other not directly, but indirectly, after the familiar external fashion. My suggestion is that there is an intra-subjective intercourse that goes much deeper than this—namely, a direct intercourse of mind with mind; and that it is this latter intercourse which makes us, in a far more intimate sense, to be truly members one of another. *Evidential* cases of telepathic communication are rare, because *particular* telepathic impressions rarely reach the level of clear consciousness. When they do, they are generally accompanied by indications of what is known as psychic dissociation, of which trance is an extreme form. But cosmic telepathy may none the less be universal, only it is in universals that it finds its clearest expression.

Let me now turn back to the Psycho-physical Idealism which I made the starting-point of the present paper.

As we have already noted, the characteristic doctrines of this variety of Parallelism are, first, that all reality is of the nature of consciousness; secondly, that all reality other than our own consciousness is directly apprehended by us only in the form of material phenomena. I have no quarrel with the first of these doctrines, if taken in a sufficiently general sense. Broadly interpreted, it is not peculiar to Psycho-physical Idealism. No doubt, for many Idealists consciousness implies a conscious entity or soul, an implication which Psycho-physical Idealism is careful to exclude. But this is a distinction which need not trouble us for the moment. We may ignore it and still hold the view that that which we apprehend as physical phenomenon is in its real nature psychic and not physical.

But because *some* reality, although in its true nature psychic, may nevertheless appear to us as physical, it by no means follows that *all* reality must so appear. That this is the form in which all consciousness must appear to all other consciousness is a proposition forced on Psycho-physical Idealism by its third fundamental doctrine—namely, that the

physical Universe, though phenomenal, is an exact counterpart of the real or psychical Universe, which latter, therefore, can be adequately represented and explained in purely mechanistic terms.

Paradoxical and untenable as the dogma of a point-to-point correspondence between the psychical and the physical world appears to me to be, I do not propose in the short remainder of this paper to argue against Parallelism, but rather to use some of the Parallelistic positions in order to illustrate, if only by way of contrast, certain ideas of my own.

Let us consider, then, how Psycho-physical Idealism meets the central argument of Animism—the contention, namely, that the human consciousness, as we know it, runs in personal streams, each constituting a unity *sui generis* to which no collocation of the material particles composing a brain can possibly afford a complete correlative.

Fechner's answer practically comes to this, that the human individual is polypsychic (a view which I accept), and that his consciousness consists of many consciousnesses fused together into one. The answer seems to me to fall very short of what is required by the doctrine of a point-to-point correspondence between consciousness and the brain; for, whatever else may be said of the material elements composing the brain, there is no sense in which they can be said to fuse together into a unity. But, passing this by, let us look a little more closely at this conception of the compounding of consciousnesses. We are expressly told that, though the unity resulting from the composition is itself nothing but the components, nevertheless the components retain their separate individuality inside the larger unity, and may even serve as components not of one merely, but of many larger unities.

The logical perplexities attaching to this conception are notorious; but the way in which I would put the difficulty for my own purpose is this: If the fusion is complete, the individuality of the components is *ipso facto* destroyed; if the individuality of the components is in any degree maintained,



the fusion can only be partial. But a partial fusion of component consciousnesses is, I contend, only another way of expressing what I have employed the term telepathy to describe: it is a direct apprehension of one consciousness by another.

From this point of view we can see, I think, what Fechner meant by certain qualifying words which he added to his dictum that "no spirit perceives immediately another spirit"—words included in the quotation already given, although for the moment I passed them by without notice. Let me quote the passage again: "No spirit," says Fechner, "perceives immediately another spirit, although one might suppose that it should most easily apprehend a being of like nature with itself; it perceives, in so far as the other does not coincide with it, only the bodily appearance of that spirit." The qualifying words are: "in so far as the other does not coincide with it." I think this language must be taken to imply that in the compounding or fusion of one consciousness with another there are no degrees. Either the fusion must be complete, in which case the two consciousnesses coincide and become one; or else they remain external to each other, in which case the one can apprehend the other only in corporeal form.

Thus the Parallelists' assertion that the one consciousness *is* many consciousnesses, and that many consciousnesses *are* one consciousness, simply leaves us with an unsolved problem. They still conceive their unity with an absoluteness that excludes multiplicity, and their multiplicity with an absoluteness that makes unity unintelligible.

The result is, as it seems to me, that Parallelism loses all the advantage which its conception of a pampsychie Universe, consisting of consciousnesses graded down from the highest to the lowest, is capable of yielding. All immediate knowledge is, for Parallelism of this type, either of the absolutely real or of the absolutely phenomenal, and there is no middle term. Either we *are* what we know, and knowledge and being

coincide; or we are distinct from what we know, and then our knowledge is not of reality but of its phenomenon—a phenomenon as widely sundered from reality as extension is from thought, although nevertheless conceived as in some mysterious manner an exact counterpart of the psychic reality of which it is the phenomenon.

Now, if once we admit that one consciousness can apprehend another consciousness directly, and as consciousness, all these rigid distinctions go by the board. It is true that Parallelism and the assertion of the sufficiency of a mechanistic interpretation of the Universe go with them. But this is a loss which for my part I should contemplate without regret or misgiving.

I go with Psycho-physical Idealism so far as to conceive the Universe as consisting of psychical unities—let me call them centres of consciousness. These centres, however, I hold to be neither fused completely into one consciousness, nor yet to be isolated and independent of each other. Each reflects all the rest in different degrees of perfection like Leibnitz's monads. Only, unlike Leibnitz's monads, the relation between them is not one of pre-established harmony; it is a relation of real reciprocity. The relation may be variously described as interaction, interpenetration, merging, partial fusion, and the like, but its fundamental nature is *awareness of other*. As between the higher centres of consciousness this awareness of other is *telepathy* in the sense given to the term in this paper. As between *our* consciousness and the lower centres of consciousness which constitute the reality underlying material existence, the awareness (on our side) takes the form of perception. What it may be from the side of the lower centres themselves, and what the psychic relation of these centres *inter se* may be like, we have no means of imagining. But between telepathy and perception there is no unbridgable chasm. Awareness of other is the essence of both. And in both cases the knowledge which comes of this awareness is a knowledge of *appearance* in the sense that



it is knowledge arising from *interaction*, partaking therefore of the nature both of that which apprehends and of that which is apprehended. But we have no reason to suppose it to be *mere* appearance, or wholly unlike the content of the apprehended consciousness, as we should have to suppose if the human brain is the appearance to us of the human consciousness. This idea I reject *in toto*. In my way of looking at things, the brain is an assemblage of lower psychic existents, standing in a peculiar and special relation to human consciousness, modifying it and at the same time serving as its instrument, but certainly not to be identified with it. If the consciousness of the lower psychic existents which appear to us as matter could become known to us as it is in itself, we might after all find that the difference between the reality and its phenomenon was not so great as we are led to conceive it when we take human thought as the type of the reality and extension in space as the essence of the phenomenon.

The foregoing remarks, fragmentary as they have been, will perhaps suffice to explain why I have coupled together Metaphysics and Telepathy in the title to my paper. Telepathy, the reader will have noticed, has grown and grown until, under the name of "awareness of other," it has threatened to extend to the entire field of Being. It can only cease where the fusion between two minds is so complete that they cease to be two and become one. Fechner (if I understand him rightly) assumes the complete fusion to take place even in the human consciousness, although, illogically, as I think, he claims a continued existence for the many as such, notwithstanding their fusion into one. It was easy for him, therefore, to postulate a hierarchy of super-souls, culminating in a Pantheistic Absolute. William James recognised that Fechner's conception was incompatible with logic; but he required it, or at all events thought he required it, for his Pluralistic Universe. He accordingly threw logic deliberately to the winds, encouraged by the Bergsonian doctrine that reality is essentially

illogical, or at least alogical. But in this James seems to have had the worst of the bargain all round. If "the Absolute," *i.e.* the Pantheistic Absolute, had been the goal of his metaphysical speculation, the sacrifice of logic might have been a price worth paying in order to attain it. But James rejects "the Absolute," and ultimately presents us with a *Weltanschauung* which is rather pluralistic and theistic than pantheistic. This humbler goal, I believe, he might have reached without giving up logic, and even without being forced to accept that (to him) still more unpalatable alternative, namely, the hypothesis of a soul as an entity distinct from its passing conscious states. For myself, I am a believer in the Soul-theory; but in the language I have used I have sought to avoid raising this question, because, for the purpose of my argument, it appears to me that "personal streams of consciousness" will serve as well as "souls."

I may be wrong in imagining that my own view can be held without the sacrifice of logic, except of that type which James calls "vicious intellectualism"; and in any case I admit that it points to conclusions in other respects not so far from his—that is to say, to pluralism and theism rather than to monism and pantheism. For although it may be the final destiny of the individual consciousness to lose its individuality by becoming absolutely one with, and merged in, the Divine consciousness, I conceive this to be only the last stage in a progress of the individual from the lowest to the highest—a progress itself conditioned throughout by the interaction of all the psychic existences which together constitute the sum of things.

G. W. BALFOUR.



## DOES RELIGION NEED A PHILOSOPHY ?

PROFESSOR W. R. SORLEY.

THE philosophy of religion has no monopoly of its topics. The questions concerning the being of God, the destiny of man, creation, providence, freedom, and the like belong to the philosophy of religion, but not to it only. They are the time-honoured subjects of discussion in many theological works whose writers would certainly object to being mistaken for philosophers; and they also occupy a prominent place in investigations which are purely historical or descriptive. To a large extent, at any rate, the philosophy of religion shares its subject-matter with other studies which do not profess to be, and are not, philosophical. If it is possible to vindicate for it an independent position of its own, it must have some characteristic point of view, or some characteristic method, which distinguishes it from the inquiries into the same topics carried out by the scholastic theologian or by the modern anthropologist.

How, then, shall we define the philosophy of religion ? The question is not an easy one to answer. We are familiar with theology, which ought to mean—and I suppose does mean—the doctrine of God, whether as creator and providence of the world, or as its inner nature and essential reality; and theology, it may be held, is simply one branch—the highest branch—of philosophy. But then, if philosophy of religion simply means theology, it would seem better to keep to the old name. Again, we know that religion is a fact both of

the individual consciousness and of the social order ; and inquiries into the history of religion and the various forms which it has assumed are by no means a new thing, although new impetus has been given to them in our own day as a result of the larger range and exacter methods of historical and psychological investigation. This branch of inquiry also, therefore, belongs to a well-recognised science or pair of sciences, for which no other names than anthropology and psychology are needed. If, then, it may be said, we wish to know the true doctrine of God and set about seeking it, we are engaged in the study of theology ; on the other hand, if we are interested in human ideas about God as they rise and change in the development of races and individuals, we must seek an answer to our questions from the sciences of society and of mind. Theology we know ; and we know anthropology and psychology ; they are recognised fields of investigation ; but where is the place for this new department—philosophy of religion ? Or is it just a new name for the old studies or for some amalgam of them ?

It is indeed a new name ; and this fact is itself significant. However familiar the name is to us at the present day, it is still relatively new. In our terminology the term “theology” dates from Aristotle ; but I doubt whether the term “philosophy of religion” will be found in any writer previous to Kant. It does not seem to have been used even by Kant himself in his published writings ; but his work on *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* is divided into four parts, each of which is described in the title as a portion of the “philosophical doctrine of religion.” The term “philosophy of religion” seems to have been used for the first time as a title for books or articles in the last decade of the eighteenth century ; it was common in the first decade of the nineteenth century ; and in 1821 a *Zeitschrift für Moral und Religionsphilosophie* began to appear.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Krug, *Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd ed., 1833, iii. 507 ff.



The term, therefore, may be said to have come into use through the influence of Kant; and Kant was the destroyer of speculative theology. Towards the close of his *Critique of Pure Reason* he summarised all the interests of the human reason in the three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? and in a letter written in 1793, at the time of the publication of his *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, he speaks of these three questions as covering the whole field of pure philosophy—the field which it had long been his ambition to cultivate—and he assigns the first question to Metaphysics, the second to Morals, and the third to Religion.<sup>1</sup> Religion, accordingly, is regarded by him as the third and final part of pure philosophy; and its problem, like the two other problems, is stated in a characteristically human form: not, What is *God*? but, What may *I hope*?

In religion, accordingly, as in metaphysics and in morals, the problem is made to arise out of and depend upon the consciousness of man. The point of view is shifted from the nature of the object as something independent of the subject, to the capacity and interest of the subject himself. The change is characteristic; it is, of course, an expression of the critical revolution which began by substituting theory of knowledge for the traditional ontology. It is nevertheless worthy of note that it is carried out in this complete fashion—that it is made to apply to morality and religion as well as to metaphysics.

The change was not specially great as regards morals, for the purely objective treatment of ethics was rare even before Kant's day. But for theology it is salient and striking: both the method of approach and the method of treatment are altered. The older theology had, in various ways, offered proofs of the existence of God, and then gone on to investigate the divine attributes and the relation of God to man and the world. Kant proceeds in a different manner. He begins with the human consciousness, its interests and needs, and

<sup>1</sup> *Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, viii. 791.

makes them his point of approach towards an interpretation of life as spiritual. Just as his ethics starts from an analysis of the moral consciousness, so, in his theory of religion, he may be said to make everything follow from an analysis of the religious consciousness.

This emphasis on the religious consciousness, or on the facts of religious experience generally, is a characteristic of the philosophy of religion which has succeeded Kant's own inquiry, even when that philosophy has diverged most completely from Kant's own estimate of speculative theology. Accordingly, philosophy of religion is a new name, because it has to express a new thing—a method and point of view which differ from the old. In this lies the primary distinction between philosophy of religion, as it has been studied for the last hundred years or more, and the theology which preceded it, and which, needless to say, has survived in spite of the Kantian criticism, although not unaffected by it. The traditional theology was a doctrine of God, much as physical science is a doctrine of nature; philosophy of religion starts with an inquiry into certain features of human experience—the religious consciousness, to wit; it does generally rise to a conception of God and to certain theorems regarding his nature and relation to man; in content it covers a great deal of the same ground as the older study; but the difference of initial standpoint affects its method of dealing with the problems, even when the problems are the same.

The speculative theology which Kant criticised had formed the climax of mediæval thought; it had been systematised anew by Wolf, in whose hands the doctrines of Leibnitz had assumed the shape of a neo-scholasticism. The origin of the scholastic doctrine can be traced ultimately to two influences very different in kind from one another, both of which left upon it their mark. On the one hand there was the influence of Greek metaphysics which culminated in Aristotle, from whom the term "theology" comes. This theology or metaphysics was the result of an effort purely intellectual—an attempt to



understand the nature of reality—and it found the explanation of the universe in mind or reason, from which all life and movement proceed. On the other hand, into the forms of this system of thought there had been thrown the content of Christian experience. This content had little in common with the material of Greek metaphysics. It was not primarily intellectual, and it did not trouble about the analysis of concepts. It had its roots in the historical tradition of the Jews, whose whole national consciousness was a consciousness of their race as chosen and controlled by a personal God; and this consciousness had, for the Christians, culminated in the life and death of Christ, chosen, forsaken, triumphant. His followers lived through his experience in their own lives; their religion lost its racial character; but their consciousness of God as the source and guide of their lives gained in inwardness and in fitness for universal application.

How these two factors became united and issued in Western theology is a long story; and, although the result concerns us, we need not linger over the historical process. Indeed, the process was no mere result of historical accidents; it had its roots in the fact that the two elements which interacted and united were derived from different aspects of a common life; they represented two interests which appealed to the same consciousness and could not have been kept permanently apart.

Theism is arrived at in two different ways, and the creed varies according as one or other of these ways is taken. From one point of view it is a philosophical theory meant, like any other philosophical theory, to explain the universe. It gives a solution of the question which materialism, idealism, and agnosticism have, each of them, its own way of dealing with; and it has on occasion been allied with each. But its own essential characteristic is the doctrine that the universe as a whole must be interpreted in terms of that which is highest in the universe as known to us—in terms, that is, of mind or consciousness. It investigates the traces of intelligence in

the order of the world; it follows out the principles, such as causality, which make knowledge of detail possible, and passes thereby to a view of the whole; it elaborates the thought or idea of a perfect being. In this way it supports its conclusion by the well-known teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments. It is a theory of the universe derived from a criticism of the conceptions by means of which things in detail and as a whole admit of explanation. It appeals to the same test as other and conflicting theories of the universe do; and the test is this: Do the conceptions which it introduces fit the facts, and fit them better than other and competing conceptions do? Theism, therefore, is a philosophical theory; it has the same purpose in view as other philosophical theories, must submit to the same tests as they, and be justified by its superior ability to satisfy these tests. Once accepted, it may affect the emotional and active attitude of a man, just as materialism or agnosticism might do, though in a different direction, were they accepted; but this result is a consequence of the philosophical theory, not its essence.

This is one way of theism; and it appeals to a purely intellectual interest—the reason's interest in attaining a harmonious view of reality. But there is another way in which theism appears and in which it expresses primarily an attitude of the personal life as a whole. Reference to another topic may illustrate the difference. We can imagine, though it may be difficult to do so, a solipsist, that is, someone who thinks that he is the only conscious being in the world, and that everything else, including what we call other men and women, are simply modifications of his own consciousness. Or, better, we can imagine someone who, on intellectual grounds, is attempting to decide between the theory of solipsism and the theory that there are other centres of conscious life than himself, and similarly embodied to him. He weighs the arguments for and against solipsism in order that he may decide which theory gives the more satisfactory account of his experience. If he conclude in favour of the view that



there are other conscious beings like himself, he is not likely to behave towards others just as he would have done if he had come to the conclusion that they were only unconscious appearances. He is like the philosophical theist who has been convinced by argument that there is a Supreme Conscious Being, whose creation or manifestation the world is, and by that argument has had his practical and emotional attitude, as well as his intellectual convictions, profoundly modified. But in the case of most men (or rather of all men) it is not by any such process of reasoning that they reach the belief that there are other minds than theirs, and that they themselves are members of a society. On the contrary, they find the consciousness of others bound up with the consciousness of self, and they never need to question its validity.

What holds of most or all in the recognition of the conscious lives of others holds also of many as regards belief in God. It is not the solution of an intellectual puzzle, but the recognition of an object bound up with their own self-consciousness. The life of the spirit is not primarily an affair of the intellect; knowledge enters into it, but theory is in the interests of life. As a man's spirit awakens and expands, he experiences division and discord in his own nature and in his attitude to life; and, in his search for satisfaction or harmony, the more salient features of the religious consciousness emerge: he becomes conscious of a spiritual power not his own in which he can trust, which reconciles him to the purpose of life and gives him confidence of victory. This consciousness appears in many different forms, and perhaps no general description will fit them all; a satisfactory definition of religion is perhaps hardly possible, for religion is a principle of growth. Its cognitive aspect also varies greatly. At times the consciousness of God would appear to be as immediate and vivid as our consciousness of other men, and even more immediate and vivid than that consciousness, so that the spirit of man holds intimate communion with the spirit of God. At other times, and perhaps for the majority of religious people, there is no

such clear and intimate consciousness, but a trust in a spiritual power less distinctly grasped, and yet sufficient to sustain the will and transform the attitude to life.

This form of theism is of the nature of a personal attitude—a belief in something near and present—rather than a philosophical theory of the universe. But once adopt this personal attitude, and the world can no longer bear the same aspect as it might have done before. It cannot be a purposeless play of atoms, or the stage-furniture of some tragic-comedian, or the veil of an unknowable. The power that transforms the personal life transforms the world also for the believer. He sees all things in the light of a divine idea, and as fitted to achieve a divine purpose. If he thinks of the world at all—and he must think of it—the religious man brings to it an interpretative conception: he too has his theory of the universe.

These two ways of theism may be illustrated by a quotation borrowed from Dr Ward: "Suppose the earth were wrapped in cloud all day while the sky was clear at night, so that we were able to see the planets and observe their movements as we do now, though the sun itself was invisible. The best account we could give of the planetary motions would still be to refer them to what for us, in accordance with our supposition, would only be an imaginary focus, but one to which was assigned a position identical with the sun's position."<sup>1</sup> To adapt this example to the present purpose. For the first way of theism, God is the imaginary focus, hidden by the clouds of day, but postulated to account for the behaviour of objects which are seen by the clear though pale light of the night-time. But for the man of religious vision it is not so. The heavens are clear by day as by night, and he can see God plain—see Him in the very position of the philosopher's postulated Deity, the focus about which all wandering souls revolve. The distinction, however, is not absolute between the philosopher and the man of divine vision. Our illustra-

<sup>1</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, p. 230.



tion, indeed, might suggest so much. It is not often, at least in this climate, that no mist or cloud obscures the light ; but the mist is seldom so opaque as to prevent some rays of the sun from shining on our path ; and the drifting clouds alternately hide and reveal the source of day. It is the same with the religious consciousness : sometimes shrouded in utter darkness, sometimes wrapped in the glory of God, but more often seeing darkly as in a glass, or alternating between hours of gloom and moments of vision.

The two ways of theism start from different sides, but they tend to meet and overrun each other's path. The theism of philosophical theory passes on to affect a man's active and emotional attitude ; and the theism of religious experience, in its turn, tends to produce a world-conception of its own. It would be strange indeed if the two ways did not overlap, different as they are in their inception : if religion were a mere matter of personal experience, and had no influence on one's view of the nature and purpose of the world-movement, or if theism were simply a philosophical theory which left the imagination cold and the springs of action untouched. Yet the mind of man is complex enough to admit of this strangeness happening—if only on occasion. Religion may be little more than an emotional experience, and the subject may turn his eyes away altogether from the riddles of life ; or, on the other hand, the theistic proposition may be kept so strictly within intellectual bounds that life is never quickened by it. Something like this is the case when God is represented as “afar off,” and only related to us as the creator of the world and the author of the laws of nature. This view, which represents Deism in its extreme form (as defined by the tradition of the historians of philosophy and theology), does not involve any logical contradiction ; but it betrays a certain incompleteness of understanding which amounts almost to incoherence. God is, no doubt, according to this view ; and He is a spiritual being ; but by His own original act in creating a world He is prevented from having any direct influence on the spiritual beings

whom He has also made. They cannot know Him ; they can only know about Him by inference from the world and its laws ; spirit and spirit do not meet, but are sundered by material things.

Thus it comes about that the two ways of theism—the philosophical way which arrives at and uses the concept God for the purpose of constructing a theory of reality, and the religious way which starts from the facts of spiritual experience—do each of them spread outwards over the whole realm of thought, so that they combine and conflict. The history of theology is, to a large extent, the history of their interaction. Christian theology is a particular example of it. The purely speculative or theoretical framework came originally from Aristotle ; the religious impulse from Christian experience and the doctrines in which that experience was first expressed. This expression, however, had certain marked and enduring features : it was embodied in early records of the Christian life and teaching, and it was controlled and directed by the organisation of the Church. It was in formulating their doctrines that the leaders of Church thought came gradually under the influence of the conceptions already current in Greek speculation. There was sufficient affinity between them to admit of the old philosophy giving its form to the new doctrines whose basis and content were due to Christian experience. But the wealth and directness of this experience, and the teaching of the writings in which its earlier manifestations were recorded, resulted in a system of doctrine which diverged notably from the purely theoretical speculation of the Greek philosophers. Nevertheless, the latter's general conceptions were sufficiently flexible to give form to the new thought, and to make it possible to elaborate a complete doctrine of God and His relation to the world and man, which could be presented as derived from the Scriptures, and which could receive the imprimatur of the Church.

Accordingly, ecclesiastical theology was put forward as a system of revealed doctrine—not arrived at by mere reason,



but communicated by divine authority. It is certainly clear that, apart from the facts of Christian experience as recorded in the Scriptures, this system of theology could not have been arrived at. At the same time it was obvious that it included a number of doctrines which were common to it with alien, purely theoretical systems, which took no account of Christian experience and made no claim to any special revelation. In the interests of clearness a need thus arose for a discrimination between doctrines of the former sort not peculiar to Christianity and its special and characteristic tenets. Long before scholastic times there were many anticipations of the scholastic distinction between Natural Theology (which consisted of all the doctrines that could be arrived at by the "unaided" human reason) and Revealed Theology (which included both these doctrines and others which could not have been discovered without a special revelation). This is the traditional distinction between two kinds of theology, which has taken the place of the two ways of theism (and consequent two types of theology) of which I have spoken. Instead of the deeper distinction of the theism of philosophical thought and the theism of religious experience, we have the familiar distinction between reason and revelation. But this latter distinction, though familiar, is not really fundamental. Revealed Theology adheres to the interpretation of documents (or perhaps of the decisions of the Church). The special concern of this type of theology with the facts of the religious consciousness is, in this way, often obscured. But behind the Scriptures and behind the Church lies the experience which they express; and it is to this experience—not to the documents, and not to the ecclesiastical organisation—that revelation applies.

Both Hume and Kant, the great iconoclasts, were chary of references to Revealed Theology; it was against Natural Theology, or Speculative Theology, that they, and especially Kant, directed their criticisms. The validity of this criticism I do not discuss at present; but it is notorious that Kant's

criticism has completely changed the prevailing attitude of philosophers to the old natural theology. In more recent days a corresponding attack has been made upon the whole structure of Revealed Theology: it has been undermined by historical criticism of the documents on which it rests. How far these critical results are correct, and whether they imply the conclusion drawn from them, are questions which may be left without formal discussion; indeed I have no claim to enter upon such a discussion. But this at least is true, that they have produced upon the mind of the time a conviction that there is not—and even cannot be—in written documents or in the decisions of bodies of men, any valid ultimate authority for belief whether in the things of daily life or in the final meaning of the universe.

Both Natural Theology and Revealed Theology have thus fallen at least into comparative discredit. And I think that this fact is to some extent responsible for the shifting of interest from theology to philosophy of religion, and thus even for the currency of the latter term.

Here, again, we may be faced with the questions, After all, is there any real distinction between the two except the name? Is not this new-fangled philosophy of religion just the old theology dressed up in modern fashion? An opponent of the whole type of thought might complain that he is being confronted with two rogues in buckram suits, where there is only one real enemy. And a sympathiser with the old ways may suspect guile in the change of name, and fear that, in return for a light which is new and strange, the "candle of the Lord" is being snatched from his grasp. "If there is no such stratagem," it may be said, "why should theology with its definite doctrines be supplanted by a subject whose name is suggestive of barren dialectics?"

Perhaps there is some reason in this complaint. It would certainly be absurd to suggest that the term theology should be dropped; and there is not the remotest probability that it ever will be. But theology has suffered from the tendency



of theologians to imitate the distinctions and precision of the departmental sciences. First we have the division into Natural and Revealed, and the limitation of the former to a philosophical inquiry in which religious experience has no place; and then we have Revealed Theology treating documents and not experience as the revelation. Apart from this historical circumstance, there might be no reason for the distinction between theology and philosophy of religion; but the latter term is useful because it indicates a certain difference from the method and scope of the traditional theologies.

The preceding discussion may enable us to formulate certain general characteristics of the philosophy of religion.

1. In this way of looking at it, the philosophy of religion is brought into line with other departments of philosophy, if we regard philosophy as an interpretation of experience. It is not the whole of philosophy, for not all our experience is religious; but it has to do with that portion of our experience which may be regarded as the highest and most comprehensive: for in it our life is brought into relation not with particular facts only or immediate issues, but with the ground and meaning of reality. Thus we may distinguish, within philosophy, a theory of knowledge which has to do with the intellectual attitude to things; theories of morals and æsthetics which are concerned with the values which we seek or find in experience and which we describe as good or beautiful; and a theory of religion, which starts from the specifically religious experience and rises from this and other data to inquire into the significance of man's life in the cosmos, and of the nature of that cosmos which contains within it man and his ideals.

The older metaphysics had also its three departments. These were commonly enumerated as Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology or Natural Philosophy, and Theology—theories, that is to say, of the soul, the world, and God, regarded as separate objects of knowledge. The characteristic distinction between this doctrine and the method of treatment

which I have indicated is that the latter begins in each case from experience, from consciousness. By its very name the philosophy of religion makes a more intimate and human claim than theology—the doctrine of God. It too must rise, if it can, to a doctrine of God ; but it begins with man. When a purely agnostic position is adopted, theology ceases to exist ; but even for the agnostic religion must rank as a fact of mind and history, and as such it claims recognition and interpretation.

2. This explicit recognition of a region of experience as its basis is a second characteristic of the philosophy of religion. The facts of the religious consciousness, it is true, were not altogether neglected in the traditional theology. The idea of God was the starting-point of the ontological proof ; the feeling of dependence had been often appealed to in theistic argument ; and theologians possessed in the Bible the most complete record in literature of the religious experiences of a race and of individuals. But these experiences tended to occupy a secondary place in theology as compared with the doctrines about them laid down in, or inferred from, the Scriptures ; and the recognition and treatment of the facts themselves, whether as in the record or as in the consciousness of present worshippers, were apt to be unsystematic and incomplete. The philosophy of religion, in the modern sense, makes a deliberate effort to estimate these facts, and to estimate them in their entirety—whether they are of the nature of personal experiences revealed by the inquirer's own consciousness or recorded by others, or whether they are in the larger sense historical : displayed on the stage where nations play their parts, and exhibiting religion as a world-force, both in the continuous march of human development and at those unique epochs when men have seen a special revelation of the divine spirit.

3. An objection may easily arise at this point which will bring out a third characteristic of the philosophy of religion. "All this emphasis," it may be said, "on facts and on the



religious consciousness is so familiar as to leave us cold. We have seen in our own time sciences of this subject arise and flourish; but they have told us nothing which we wished to know on the questions to which the old theology at least professed to give an answer. They provide us with an abundance of facts, but have nothing to say about the significance of these facts for our own belief."

This objection leads up to the distinction which marks the true place of the philosophy of religion. It is true that the whole doctrine is based upon facts of experience; that, among these, the facts of religious experience occupy the central place; and that anthropology and psychology deal with the same region of facts. But the latter sciences only describe the nature and history of these facts; it is the business of the philosophy of religion to interpret them and estimate their validity. The distinction is one between description and interpretation. Religious belief is a fact which points beyond itself and beyond antecedent and consequent facts of like nature; and its significance consists in this further reference. The problem of interpretation requires us both to give precision to this significance—Does it, for instance, involve consciousness of a special relation between the self and a higher power, or belief in God? or in immortality? or in freedom?—and also to investigate the validity of this reference to something beyond itself.

4. In this way the question of the interpretation of religious experience allies itself with the old questions of speculative theology. If the religious consciousness points to God, the question also arises concerning the moral consciousness and our consciousness of the world: do they also point in the same direction or in a different? Even if we may not assume, as a postulate of method, that inquiry along each line must lead to the same kind of final explanation, we are certainly not at liberty to make the opposite assumption and to treat experience as a chaos which may be expected to suggest different explanations according to the

point from which one begins the investigation. We are at least justified in being on the look-out for harmony; and the philosophy of religion must bring its special results into relation with the results of metaphysical and ethical philosophy before it can regard its answers as complete to the questions of the significance and validity of religious experience.

If the religious consciousness were the sole ground for a spiritual interpretation of reality, and all other evidence were hostile or neutral, any philosophical solution would be blocked. For philosophy must seek an explanation of experience as a whole. This point has been already brought out in distinguishing the two ways of theism. For the theism which is based on religious experience alters the meaning of the world for the man who possesses that experience: he cannot be conscious of the presence of God in his soul and yet look upon the universe as the materialist looks upon it. If he attempt to do so, in the supposed interests of religion on the one side and science on the other, he sunders his experience arbitrarily into two discordant parts and satisfies the claims of neither. For each has interests across the frontier which is looked upon as dividing it from the other. Religion implies a faith that the values which it cherishes will be manifested in the real world; and it is impossible to fix the limits of science and exclude it from any department of human experience, even the religious. The philosophy which starts from religion and the philosophy which is based on science have had many conflicts in the history of thought. The former has nearly always allied itself with some form of idealism; the latter has frequently tended towards a materialism or naturalism in which the religious consciousness may be recognised as a fact but its claims to validity are set aside. Consequently, in the controversy between them it is impossible for the philosophy of religion to avoid taking part.

W. R. SORLEY.



# INCIDENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LIFE OF THE RUSSIAN CLERGY, PAST AND PRESENT.

N. JARINTZOFF.

ONE sometimes finds statements in the English press about the "true piety" of the Russian. As a proof one is told, for instance, that the word *peasant* in Russian means a *Christian*. It does not. The Russian for "Christian" is *hristianin*, while the "peasant" is *krestianin*. Young children mix up the spelling of these two words, and teachers in lower forms constantly have to explain that "*krestianin*" *does not mean* "Christian." It approaches the meaning in this way: The root of the word—*krest*—means a *cross*; with the picturesqueness of our language, it conveys the idea of the hardships of a Russian peasant's life—which are plentiful enough, Heaven knows, but scarcely a proof that Christianity is flourishing in Russia.

The religion of a Russian peasant is akin to fetishism. The miracle-working ikons, for instance, are strictly classified: the Holy Virgin of one place is "good for having children"—and childless people come from hundreds of miles to kneel before her nights long to "pray out" a child; while the Holy Virgin of another place is "good to keep childbirth away."

Similarly, one St Nicholas is the image to pray to for rain, and another St Nicholas is known for producing sunshine; and so on. Strangely enough, people know that both images are

meant to represent the same saint; yet the two different pieces of canvas are supposed to produce opposite effects.

The ordinary ikons can be seen in all houses except those of "unbelievers," and people—even belonging to "society"—are in the habit of crossing themselves and bowing to the ikons both before and after meals. It is a mere act of magic ritual. One often sees a man from the upper merchants' class (supposed to be very pious) crossing his chest with a dozen quick gestures of the bejewelled hand, keeping his cigar between his fingers all the time. Merchants as well as workmen often cross themselves before "overturning" (*oprokinut*) a glass of vodka into their mouths. Many pious people cross their mouths whenever they yawn. This is to prevent the Evil Spirit from entering one's soul through the aperture. These actions are typical of Russian "piety."

Thousands of babies have perished simply because, when the child is in any kind of fit, the women of the poorer classes have a habit of throwing a thick shawl over it and making the sign of the cross, which they continue to do until, often, the child is suffocated. As another instance of the same kind I recall a rich lady who has spoiled her grandson; when the boy—nearly ten years old—flings himself on the floor kicking and screaming in a fit of temper, she piously bends over him and crosses him again and again, repeating the words: "In the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost! . . . In the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost!" Only the other day the present writer received a letter from Russia which began with a common short prayer and went on thus: "You must copy this prayer and this letter nine times and send them to nine friends of yours. If you do, you will have a joy in the course of the next seven days. If you don't, a disaster will happen to you." Such is Christianity in Russia.

Every Russian is meant to wear all his life the little cross that is put round his neck at the sacrament of baptism. Only the "unbelievers" dare to take it off. But those who believe in its power most—peasants, soldiers, sailors—very often wear



on the same chain or silk cord a *ladouka*: this is a piece of cloth with something sewn into it—a bit of incense (*ladon*) against the powers of darkness, or a fish-tooth for luck, or a certain kind of grass to attract a lover, or another kind to make the beloved hate a rival.

The priests never argue against all this: it does not occur to them to do so. Of course, exceptions are found, but I speak of what is typical. Usually, the clergyman would not be listened to even if he did interfere; he would be deliberately told to “stick in his cassock” (*Znaï, batiushka, svoi podriasnik*).

Certainly there is religious feeling in the hearts of millions of Russians, but it is not due to any influence on the part of the degenerate clergy. The form of religion with which the Church has to do is a blend of fetishism, ignorance, superstition, mingled with traces of artistic feeling. Educated society is drifting away from the ignorant clergy, who now in consequence begin to demand reform. But nothing will reform them until fresh currents of intellectual life flow freely in their midst.

A glance at the history of the Russian clergy will help us to understand the conditions now existing.

In the ninth century some Bysantine priests came to Kiev, “the mother of Russian towns,” and, according to the wish of the energetic Prince Vladimir, baptized the unsophisticated people all over his country. They knew next to nothing about Christianity, and in some places literally fought against the party of priests and the Prince’s soldiers who assisted in the mission. “Throwing off their boots, they ran out of their town gates to meet the intruders, and fought with them for two days and two nights vigorously,” says the history of the ancient trade-republic Novgorod.

This party of the Bysantine clergy, having won their position, gave a tone of superiority to their class in Russia at the very start, especially as they were really educated people, while the Russian folk were absolutely ignorant. The grandson

of Vladimir gave the clergy all judicial rights, and the ecclesiastical class in *his* time seems to have been fairly intelligent.

But later on, by a natural course of things, the clergy became purely Russian. All that was left of the Bysantine influence were the outside picturesque character of all Greek Church rites, the fascination of them over the poetical and emotional Russian nature, and the stamp of official significance which the monastic clergy had acquired. Neither the Russian hermits and monks nor the parish clergy had any moral or intellectual education, but the mutual help of Church and monarchy helped Moscow to attain absolute autocracy. The great Princes, later Czars, would bend their heads only to receive the benediction of the "Patriarchs of all Russia."

Many causes account for the dominant position of the monastic clergy—so-called *Black Clergy*. They had all possible support from the princes, owned monasteries and lands which flourished thanks to the gifts of the pious rich, and were free from taxation. Besides, every bishop received parish dues, victuals, and labour from the *White Clergy* (secular clergy) of his diocese. The monks received instruction in Scripture and in old Slavonic, which remains the language of the Church. The prominent monks took a notable part in the affairs of the principalities, and the Black Clergy thus grew into a superior caste.

The White Clergy was a caste too—through the custom that the son should inherit the profession, the post, and the parish of his father. But their condition was miserable. The caste had to provide for itself. The secular priesthood never had any regular pay, nor even casual support, from the government, and had to make its living from the voluntary donations of the parishes, while the parish churches mostly owned no land, and had to pay money and labour for the use of their grounds to the landowners. What is more, the White Clergy were treated by the government on equal lines with the peasantry: each priest and curate had to pay the humiliating *podushnaya podat*, which means so much "for each living



soul." They were relieved from the latter tax only by Peter the Great (1711). No system of regular pay was introduced till 1886, and it is only lately that a scheme of regular payment has been partly carried out. Only the "military," "naval," and "foreign" Russian clergy get a regular pay, because they are in the Civil Service. The parish churches occasionally own some lands, and the parish priesthood gets a casual support from the government for keeping their under-staff. But chiefly it still depends on the *Treby*—the rites performed on private demands of the parish. The only definite thing is "the pension for thirty-five years of irreproachable service," which amounts to £13 a year. The widows of the secular vicars receive £9 a year; the widows of the curates £6.

What can a Russian workman or peasant afford to pay his village priest for his services? What can he spare for building and keeping his village church? As to his private need of the clergyman's services, the *Treby*, he pays literally coppers for them, whatever they are: baptisms, funerals, marriages, reading the "passing-away prayers" over the dying, or "singing off the expiring," reading the Bible aloud through the three nights while the dead are left in the house, or giving benediction to a new hut or to a scanty Easter meal.

In towns, where the parishes largely consist of the merchants' class, the White Clergy are safe; but in small villages they were—and often are—actually harassed by want as much as the peasants themselves.

The state of constant need makes them fellow-sufferers, and causes the Russian peasant to look upon his instructor and spiritual leader with good-natured compassion, very often with humour. Few things can be more pathetic than the slight, dingy-looking figure of a hungry *batiushka* in his long, shabby robes, with his long hair made into a thin plait, treated by an equally hungry peasant with a philosophical good-humour. . . . "You stick to your psalm-book, batiushka, and don't you interfere with my business. Come along and

have a drink." And the dishevelled, thin figure is oftentimes seen of a night—rather embarrassed by the length of his robes—carefully led to his home by the stronger arms of his sturdy though melancholy companion.

On his Easter benediction round, the village priest has refreshment in each hut he visits, and carries home to his "old popadia" all little bits of eatables he cannot manage himself, wrapped up in scraps of paper. This is always done, and the peasants smile with satisfaction, and also with apprehension, when the poor man gradually becomes "jolly" and has to be helped or carried home, together with his bag of simple but sympathetically given presents.

It would be unfair to exact from these "spiritual leaders" a higher level of life than that of the rest of the country-folk. Each of them is struggling to get some sort of a parish; for centuries they were all of them left as ignorant as their flocks. Right up to the eighteenth century there were no organised schools for theological or any other teaching; the majority of the White Clergy could not read or write, and took the service by heart; those who could read had learned it privately, thanks to some lucky chance, and were teaching it only occasionally in their turn. How they managed the task of teaching can be seen from the fact that, less than a century ago, it usually took two years for a boy to learn his alphabet from his private tutor, some curate or psalm-singer.

Up to Peter the Great's time, the only educational centres for the clergy were the small schools at the monasteries, called academies, and the secular schools at the "bishops' homes and yards." These places were simply large inns belonging to the bishops, with churches attached to them. The bishops used to stay there on their rounds and take the services. Dozens, often hundreds, of people—everyone who liked—stayed there waiting for months to see and to hear the bishop, spending their money meanwhile on board and lodging, donations to the Church, and gifts to the numerous staff of the Black Clergy, monks and novices. There were small and quaint schools for



boys in these "yards," which were supposed to give ample education to the future priests.

Some of these places still exist, although they have lost their educational purpose. For instance, the "yard" of the well-known Father John of Cronstadt used to be, in the last decades of the last century, overfilled with religiously hysterical women. They came from the hungry peasantry as well as from the well-fed tradesman class. They did not ask for any teaching, but they were pining to see Father John's "miracles," and waited there for their chance to touch his robes and to be one of the suffocating crowd through which he squeezed himself while blessing it. To have him for a few minutes in one's own room in this inn cost a great deal of extra money; only gorgeously dressed women could afford it, while the poor, dirty peasantry breathlessly flocked outside the doors and down the staircases.

But cases of personal influence (good or bad) are rare in the history of the Russian priesthood. It needs some exceptional personal power to make the simple and yet independent Russian mind want a religious leader or instructor in his private beliefs and difficulties. This power of attraction is rare, and hence that striking absence of any moral bond between the clergy and the rest of the population—an absence which was hotly discussed by the two great statesmen, Count Witte and Pobiedonostzeff (in 1905), and which is now openly brought forward as an indication that "the Russian Church needs reform."

Besides, the lack of influence is certainly due to the lack of education amongst the mass of the priesthood. The general intellectual and spiritual standard of the White Clergy in the past can be illustrated by the fact that till the eighteenth century groups of priests who had their rank bestowed on them officially used to stand on the crescents and in the squares of the towns "looking for jobs." There were not enough churches in the land to provide posts for all of them, yet they did not like to leave their caste, as this meant either

soldiering or serfdom. They would even take monastic orders to avoid taxation and starvation combined. There is no need to add that this did not raise the standard of enlightenment in the monasteries. The unemployed White Clergy were so numerous that they were officially acknowledged as the "Crescent Clergy," and wandered about freely—ready to perform marriage, to bury anyone for a pittance in money, or to make monks of all who wished.

Besides the inheriting of the ecclesiastical posts, there existed a system of elections by village parishes; but towards the end of the eighteenth century this was announced by the government to be too "worldly" and was prohibited. True, the election system did work in a "worldly" way: those candidates would get the parishes who asked the lowest fees for the *Treby*.

Once a parish was obtained, it was usually *fixed* for one of the priest's sons beforehand; this was done officially by the bishop of the district. The other sons had to look out for parishes for themselves. When there were no sons in the family, it was the usual thing to have the post *fixed* in favour of the priest's daughter: this meant that the parish was to come into the hands of any man from the ecclesiastical caste who would marry the girl. This state of things lasted till the intellectual upheaval of the sixties, and was abolished only in 1869. On the other hand, a young man of clerical education (whatever that might mean) had no chance to get a post as a curate or vicar if he was married to a "worldly girl"—not a priest's daughter; but marry he must, because a bachelor could not and cannot become a priest in the Greek Church.

Needless to say, no trace of "holiness" was to be found in such marriages. One of the Russian writers of the last century, Pomialovsky, published in the sixties a series of reminiscences. Himself the son of a curate in the suburbs of Petersburg, he was sent to one of the elementary ecclesiastical boarding-schools, called Bursa, near the capital. Most of its



pupils became, on leaving, curates, under-curates, or psalm-readers, who are the undergraduates in the scale of ecclesiastical rank; the less fortunate Bursarians became shepherds, scribes, or vagabonds.

Like many other schools of this class, the Bursa existed on voluntary contributions of the district—but its nine hundred pupils were indeed the nightmare of the local donors! The details of the appalling squalor and filth, and the cruel, stupid, ugly, fiendish relations between the ignorant masters and their pupils, were such that it would be utterly impossible to offer them to an English reader. Dickens's picture of the old work-houses is a light thing in comparison. No imagination could depict the horrors of such a place. It must suffice to say that most of the boys remained there as long as fourteen years, and emerged from this hell when they were nearly thirty. In this period of time they were flogged four hundred times on the average. All human and humane aspirations were crushed out of them; and the knowledge knocked into them, at best, amounted to bad reading, a little spelling, some Scripture, odds and ends of rhetoric, geography, and arithmetic, and Slavonic for use in the church-services: all this was learned in one way only—by heart.

It was due to an exceptionally lucky chance of a friendship with the Samson of the school that Pomialovsky had the possibility of preserving his brain clear. Although he was himself turned by the horrors of the surroundings into a "sung-off-one" (hopeless, dead), his intellect helped him to observe things, and even to retain the capacity of feeling—which was next to impossible. The result was a minute description of these fourteen years of schooling, or, rather, of degrading the boys morally and physically. Pomialovsky's account created a sensation, and the general social movement of our "epoch of great reforms" finally made the existence of the Bursa itself impossible. Yet, one century has not elapsed since the time when the following incidents were common.

Some old and shabby woman would appear in the gloomy

buildings of the Bursa and, first of all, throw herself down on her knees before the inspector (headmaster), presenting him with dried mushrooms, or eggs, or a suckling pig, or plum-paste. With tears of humiliation she would ask him to "be a father" and to send some bridegrooms to see her orphan daughter, who had a parish fixed for her future husband, but nothing to eat until she was married.

The moment she was gone, a jovial cry would rise like a thundering wave and fill the foetid atmosphere of the immense building—a place of miasma and insects: "Bridegrooms! Bridegrooms wanted! Who is ready to marry? The inspector wants to see the bridegrooms at once!"

Queer individuals would answer to that call. They would emerge from the back benches—the so-called Kamchatka (remotest corner of Siberia for the criminals). On those benches they slept in their everlasting sheepskin coats, dressing-gowns, and old under-robcs inherited from their fathers, the village curates; there they drank and tortured each other for the sake of sport, year in and year out; and thence they were summoned "to the threshold" every day, to be flogged by their comrades or by the watchmen to the order of the infuriated instructors.

But now a dramatic situation would come, the whole place throbbing with excitement and joy. Those who came forward were the eldest, and therefore the possible candidates. The day was theirs! They were the centre of the school, envied by all the rest.

Several of them would go to the inspector, while nine hundred of their comrades remained eagerly waiting for the decision: who of the candidates would be permitted to go and see the fiancée on the next day?

Back they came to the evil-smelling classes (there were no other rooms to live in)—some of them only to be flogged for their impudence, others with the inspector's blessing, just according to his whim at the moment.

On the following day the heroes were rigged out by their



comrades' zeal and generosity. Off they would go, with five hours' leave for the interview. Pomialovsky says that some of them would find the expectant fiancée "too much of an old hag," and the resources from the parish too thin, and—brutes as they were—proudly decline. Others actually thought more of having a lark than of matrimonial considerations, and were content with the interview, the tea-party, and with "borrowing" some silk handkerchiefs which were on show, or pipes, or coppers. But the least exacting would marry on such occasions just to break the monotony of the abominable existence at school. Once married, they would receive the parish and the post of vicar or curate as the girl's "dot." Such marriages took place constantly, and were treated as a matter of course.

Let us pass from the middle of the last century back to the beginning of the eighteenth, when Peter the Great first took the question of both the White and Black Clergy in hand.

With the upright and public-spirited nature of a tyrant-reformer, he did not hesitate to apply his own measures. He ordered the foundation of numerous elementary schools at the monasteries, besides those depending on voluntary contributions, like Bursa. He founded secondary ecclesiastical schools, improved the "academies," and introduced a regular, though narrowly scholastic, programme of theological education. The village priests henceforth were to be examined by the bishops personally, before being appointed. But all the same he acknowledged the inheriting of the profession, which made the secular clergy a regular caste more definitely than ever.

Peter freed it from the soul-tax, but he made up the loss in other ways; thus the White Clergy had to provide villages and country towns with night-watchmen, the barracks with workmen, the prisons with instructors, and the cities with fire-brigades. All these odd duties continued to exist for a number of years after Peter's reign. His creative imagination breathed

life into everything he approached — more often than not a most unexpected sort of life.

Peter was most concerned with the Black Clergy: the more enlightened monks, their treasuries and lands, their habit of interfering with the Czar's power, their luxurious manners of life in their seclusion, and their want of any spiritual influence over the masses.

It may be added here, referring to the last point, that Peter himself was typically Russian in this respect, and did not differ from any peasant. It usually happens that the Russian is fond of the atmosphere of church, of its imposing beauty, of the really beautiful singing (without any organ accompaniment), even of the Byzantine gorgeousness of the service; but, as we have seen, he dislikes any form of private preaching and personal instruction, any moralising and interfering with what religion he has in his heart. Save as he is influenced unconsciously by elevating surroundings, he minds his soul himself, and the church forms only a poetical framework to his own thoughts. A Russian peasant prays his own prayers, which he never read or learned, without books or music of any description in his hands. Everyone stands for hours in the Russian churches—there are no seats in them; and one can easily see how individual are the prayers of the people as they kneel and cross themselves and touch the floor with their foreheads, in all sincerity and simplicity of mind, whenever their spontaneous prayer prompts them to do so. No one takes any prayer-books or psalm-books to church; hardly anyone has them.

This characteristic of Russian piety explains the quaint way in which the clergy are treated: their performance of the ritual and all the ostensible part of their work is in demand, but the interference with private life and private beliefs is not wanted. In the ancient times, the women, children, and servants in the well-off houses would find it a pastime in their seclusion to entertain the wandering monks of any degree, and have pious chats with them over a refreshment. But a



Russian priest of the last half-century, especially in towns, takes care *not* to “go round and see how the people in his parish are getting on.”

When a vicar is quite sure that the members of some family are not unbelievers, he will call with his curate and under-curate just to give his benediction to a new home, or to a young mother with her baby, or to an Easter meal after the seven weeks of Lent. But he will be tactful enough not to go beyond his formal duties: he will slip on his golden brocade robes the moment he enters the hall, smooth his long hair, cover it with a tall purple-velvet hat, at once proceed to the corner of the sitting-room where the ikons are hanging on the wall, and start the special service without delay. His curate, in similar garments but without the velvet hat—his usually glorious mass of long hair forming a brilliant display—will assist the vicar with his enormous bass voice, which is the ambition and the pride of all good curates, and will fill the room with the blue smoke of the incense coming from his silver censer. The under-curate (psalm-singer) will light the incense and the wax candles which he gives to all those present (oh, the oppressive awe of all that in childhood!), and then will do his part in a high tenor. Whatever the hour of the day, all three of them will be offered refreshments after this service, and will have the money gently slipped into their palms at the handshaking when parting. But no vicar will ever think of giving moral advice or influencing his erring flock, even if he “knew all about them!” outside his official church sermon. The clergy are as far from this as from the Western way of organising village clubs or lectures, or funds for the poor. Their work is—ritual. Their flock is the source of their own living. The Russian mind is not inclined to listen to religious moralising, and it needs an exceptional personality to attain any influence over it.

In 1869 the bonds of the White Clergy as a caste were broken, the inheriting of the ecclesiastical posts was abolished, and these are given now to anyone who has the special clerical

education (which never includes a university course); the sons of the modern clergy enter any profession, their marriages to "worldly girls" are not exceptional, and no objectionable Bursa-matches take place any longer.

But there still remains a pathetic stamp of narrowness about the masses of the White Clergy—whether hopelessly poor in villages or well-off in big towns. Those parish priests who go beyond the sphere prescribed to them are promptly disrobed: instance the brilliant religious philosopher Father Gregory Petrov, in St Petersburg, whose sermons attracted all educated society in the nineties.

As to the Black Clergy, of whom all the higher ecclesiastical administrative centres consist, they still retain a distinctly official and reactionary character. When bestowed by Peter the Great, the official character represented a radical reform; but two hundred years have elapsed since, and modern reform, whenever it comes, will have to affect the "Spiritual Calling" in a somewhat different way.

N. JARINTZOFF.



## HOW IS WEALTH TO BE VALUED?

JOHN A. HOBSON.

A SCIENTIFIC valuation of anything can only proceed by way of quantitative analysis. A standard of valuation which should regard qualitative differences as ultimate would not be scientific at all. It might be æsthetic or hygienic or ethical, according to the nature of the qualitative differences involved. A strictly scientific valuation of wealth, or of cost, or of utility, or of life itself, must apply a single standard of measurement to all the various objects it seeks to value, *i.e.* it must reduce all the different objects to terms of this common denominator. It can measure and value all forms of purchasable goods or services, however various in nature, through the market processes which reduce them to a single monetary equivalent. It can measure and value labour-costs of different sorts, either by a monetary standard or by some measure of fatigue or vital expenditure. It can measure the utility of various sorts of food or of fuel, by comparing the quantities of working-power or output which upon an average they yield. It can ascertain the vital values of different towns and occupations, incomes, races, in terms of longevity, fertility, susceptibility to diseases, etc.

This method, essential to scientific analysis, carries an assumption that £1 worth of bad books is of the same value as £1 worth of good books. This assumption is true for the purpose to which it is applied, that of a market valuation. It assumes that a year's life of an imbecile or a loafer is worth

the same as a year's life of a saint or a genius, and so it is for the purpose of vital statistics.

This is, of course, universally admitted. Science proceeds by abstraction; it does not pretend to describe or explain the individuality or particular qualities of individual cases, but to discover common attributes of structure or composition or behaviour among numbers of cases, and to explain them in terms of these common characters.

So far, then, as the so-called value of anything, or any happening, consists in its uniqueness or idiosyncrasy, this value necessarily evades scientific analysis. It is only the common properties, the regularities, the conformities, that count for scientific valuation. Nay, more. So far as science takes account of individual qualities, it is in the capacity of eccentricities, *i.e.* it measures *the amount* of their variation from the average or normal. It cannot entertain the notion that there is any sort of difference which is inherently immeasurable, *i.e.* that there is difference in kind as well as in degree.<sup>1</sup>

A scientific analysis treats all differences as differences of degree. So-called differences of quality or kind it either ignores or seeks to reduce them to and express them in differences of quantity. This endeavour to reduce qualitative to quantitative difference is the great stumbling-block in all organic science, but particularly in the departments of psychology and sociology. The difficulty is best illustrated in the recent extension of quantitative analysis into economics by the method of marginal preferences. Not content with the assumption that the particular costs, consumable qualities, etc., of any two articles selling for £1 each may be disregarded, and the single property of their market value abstracted for consideration, the mathematical economists now insist that the

<sup>1</sup> It was precisely on this rock that J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism split. He tried to incorporate in the quantitative calculus of Benthamite pleasure and pain distinctions of the quality or worth of different sorts of pleasure and pain, and failed to furnish any method of reducing them to common terms.



study of marginal preferences discloses important laws of the psychology of individuals and societies.

The whole process of expenditure of income appears to be replete with instances of the capacity of the human mind to measure and apply a quantitative comparison to things which seem to be different in kind. It might seem as if my desire to help the starving population of India in a famine and my desire to attend a Queen's Hall concert this evening were feelings, not merely of different intensity, but of such widely different nature that they could not be accurately measured against each other. And yet this miracle is said to be actually performed when I decide upon due consideration to divide the 7s. 6d. in my purse so as to give 5s. to the Famine Fund and to buy a 2s. 6d. ticket for the concert, instead of the more expensive ticket I should have bought had I not been lured to the famine meeting. I might have given the whole 7s. 6d. to the Famine Fund, and missed the concert. Why did I not? I must have performed the very delicate spiritual operation of reducing my humanitarian feeling to common terms with my love of music, and to have struck a balance which can only mean that I consider the additional satisfaction I would have got from giving another 2s. 6d. to the Famine Fund to be a little less than the satisfaction I would get from the concert. But this, of course, is a single crude instance of a far more elaborate process of comparison which underlies the whole expenditure of my income. After the routine expenditure upon necessities and comforts, which may be said to represent my habitual standard of consumption, has been defrayed, there are various attractive uses to which every other sovereign and shilling may be put. All sorts of different appeals of pleasure, duty, pride, press their claims through a thousand different channels. In order to apportion my expenditure as I do, I must be conceived as reducing all these claims to some common standard of desirability, and deciding how much to lay out on this, how much on that. That physical satisfactions can be compared with

one another by the application of some standard of pleasure may appear intelligible. But that a sense of moral duty can be brought into direct comparison with a physical pleasure, or that various duties can be compared in size or strength with one another, would seem almost impossible. Yet this seems to be done incessantly and quickly, if not easily. Even when it is claimed that some duties are so paramount that a good man will refuse to "weigh" any other claim against them, assigning them a value which, he says, is "infinite," the marginal economist will not admit the claim to exemption. "This only means that to him the total difference between the command of things in the circle of exchange that he already enjoys, and an indefinite or unlimited command of them, *does not weigh as heavy in his mind* as the dishonour or the discomfort of the specific thing he is required to do. It does not mean that his objection is 'infinite.' It merely means that it is larger than his estimate of all the satisfaction that he could derive from unlimited command of articles in the circle of exchange, and this is a strictly, perhaps narrowly, limited quantity."<sup>1</sup>

For though there are men whose honour is so incorruptible as always to "outweigh" other considerations, the ethics of bribery make it clear that a weaker sense of honour can be measured against material satisfaction, and that is all that seems necessary to support the view that such qualitative distinctions can "be reduced to questions of quantity." Nor is it merely a matter of the monetary valuation through expenditure of incomes. Precisely the same problem arises in the disposal of one's time or energy. How much shall be given to the performance of this or that personal or family duty, to recreation, or to study? In what proportions shall we combine these activities? If a curtailment of money or of time is necessary, how much shall be taken from this, how much from that employment?

<sup>1</sup> P. H. Wicksteed, *The Common Sense of Political Economy*, p. 405. The italics are mine.—J. A. H.



But it is needless to multiply examples. When any scientific valuation is taken, all qualities are abstracted and quantities only are compared and estimated. As in economics, so in ethics. The moral struggle to resist a temptation is nearly always set in scientific psychology as a mechanical problem, for when the ethicist professes to introduce some imponderable "freedom of the will" he has to throw overboard his science. A "conflict of duties," as Mr Wicksteed recognises, implies that "duty itself is a quantitative conception."<sup>1</sup>

Similarly with the scientific politician who seeks to make full use of quantitative analysis. He too is compelled to visualise and represent the psychological operation through which a political judgment is reached as a mechanical one, conceived in terms of size, weight, strain, or intensity. In his *Human Nature in Politics*, Mr Graham Wallas gives a very interesting example of the scientific valuation of a process of political thinking, viz. the process by which Mr Gladstone, in the autumn and winter of 1885-6, must be conceived to have arrived at his Home Rule policy, "thinking incessantly about the matter" and "preparing myself by study and reflection."

After describing, with the aid of Lord Morley's *Life*, the various studies and courses of reflection employed, the "calculations" of the state of feeling in England and Ireland, the examination of various types of federation, as found in past and current history, the statistical reports upon finance, law, and other concrete issues, considerations of the time and opportunity, the play of the emotional valuations, "the irresistible attraction for him of all the grand and external commonplaces of liberty and self-government," Mr Wallas sees the results of all this acquisition of knowledge and reflection gathering and being co-ordinated into a problem in which the factors are quantities and the solution "a quantitative solution," "a delicate adjustment between many varying forces."<sup>2</sup> "A large part of this work of complex co-ordination

<sup>1</sup> P. 409.

<sup>2</sup> *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 153.

was apparently in Mr Gladstone's case unconscious," an operation, he declares, "rather of art than of science." Now, since "the history of human progress consists in the gradual and partial substitution of science for art," it is desirable to bring out with clearer consciousness, and fortify with greater accuracy of knowledge, the processes of political thinking. "Quantitative method must spread in politics and must transform the vocabulary and the associations of that mental world into which the young politician enters. Fortunately, such a change seems at least to be beginning. Every year larger and more exact collections of detached political facts are being accumulated; and collections of detached facts, if they are to be used at all in political reasoning, must be used quantitatively."<sup>1</sup> Since the problems of political conduct are thus essentially quantitative, they can, in theory at any rate, be "solved" by science. "The final decisions which will be taken either by the Commons or by Parliament in questions of administrative policy and electoral machinery must therefore *involve* the balancing of all these and many more considerations by an essentially quantitative process."<sup>2</sup>

Now, how far is it true that any political problem is essentially quantitative and soluble by a quantitative process? It is, of course, to be admitted at once that the science of statistics will feed a statesman's mind with a variety of ordered and measured facts. But will this mind, working either scientifically or artistically, consciously or subconsciously, go through a distinctively mechanical process of balancing and measuring and register a quantitative judgment? A scientific setting of the process must indeed so present it. But then a scientific setting of any process whatsoever sets it thus in purely quantitative form. The real issue is how far this scientific setting is competent to interpret and explain the facts, and to deliver a judgment which shall be authoritative for the conduct of an individual or a society.

In order to test the scientific claim, let us take what seems

<sup>1</sup> P. 156.      <sup>2</sup> P. 159. The italics are mine.—J. A. H.



to be a very different sort of action from that of the politician or the business man—that of the artist. Follow the mind of the painter as he plies his art. Each of his operations, too, *involves* considerations of quantity and measurement, scope and focus, adjustment, co-ordination, balance, the application of definite blends of colours; optics, anatomy, and other sciences feed his mind with exact knowledge. A delicate adjustment of quantities in line and colour is *involved* in every part of his artistic operations. But does the operation consist of these quantitative arrangements, and can it be understood or “appreciated” by analysing them? Evidently not. Why not? Because in such an analysis or explanation the essentially qualitative or creative action of the artist, which gives unity and artistic value to the whole operation, escapes notice. Science kills in order to dissect. So in the case of every other art. A poem *involves* certain ordered arrangements of sound which may be expressed in quantitative terms of rhythm and prosody. But any attempt to “resolve” it into these forms loses its spirit, its unity, its value as poem. Students of the drama have sometimes explained or interpreted a tragedy of Sophocles or Shakespeare in terms of the gradation of intensity of the various emotions involved; the length of pauses or suspense; the balancing, relief, and interlacing of the plots or episodes; the relative strength or height of the climaxes and subclimaxes; the growing rapidity of movement towards the catastrophe. But can it be pretended that this “mechanics” of the drama can furnish a standard of appreciation, or supply laws according to which a “good” drama may be constructed or appreciated? No. An artistic operation is essentially organic, creative, and qualitative. None of these characters can really be reduced to quantity. Science by quantitative analysis can only account for the skeleton, not for the life that informs it.

I think this eternal inability of science adequately to interpret artistic value, or explain a work of art, will be generally admitted. It is due to the fact that this work and its value are inherently incapable of being expressed in quantities. The

difference between one picture and another, one poem and another, is a difference of quality. It is, of course, true that by a merely linguistic necessity we often speak of a picture as being "much" finer than another, and compare the "greatness" of one poet with that of another. But we are aware all the time that we are really comparing unlikes, dealing with qualitative differences. On no other supposition, indeed, can we understand the valuation set upon a work of genius as compared with one of talent.

"A little more, and what a difference !

A little less, and oh ! what worlds apart !"

What, then, do economists mean when they insist that qualitative differences, the desires and satisfactions which have such widely diverse origins and natures, can be weighed and measured against one another, and that problems of industry are essentially and ultimately quantitative ? Our examination of artistic activities has shown that in each case quantities are involved, and that in no case do quantities constitute the problem of action. But how, it may be said, do you dispose of the admitted facts that by means of monetary valuations these diverse desires and satisfactions are reduced to a common standard, are compared, and that a course of conduct is apparently based upon these quantitative considerations ?

The answer is that this is an entirely illusory account of the psychical process by which a man lays out his money, or his time, or his energy. He does not take the several uses to which he might apply the means at his disposal, reduce them, in thought or in feeling, to some common term, and so measure the amount he will expend upon each object that the "marginal" or "final" portion of each use shall be exactly equal in the utility it yields. The "marginalist" is correct in saying that the utility imputed to the last sovereign I expend on bread during the year must be considered to be neither greater nor less than that imputed to the last sovereign's worth of tobacco or books, holiday or charitable subscriptions. In precisely the same sense it is true that the last brushful of



green and brown and turkey-red expended on a picture has the same art-value to the painter.

Perhaps the issue can be made clearer by reference to an art usually considered less "fine" and more closely affected by quantitative considerations than painting—the culinary art. The composition of a dish is here expressed in proportions of its various ingredients: so much flour, so many ounces of raisins, so many eggs, so much sugar, etc. The marginalist would dwell upon the crucial fact that the last pennyweight of the flour, raisins, eggs, and sugar, taken severally, had an equal value for the pudding; and that these marginal or final increments were in some way causal determinants of the composition of the pudding, because, in using the ingredients, the cook took care to use just so much of each, and neither more nor less. And it is quite true that the delicacy of the culinary art will in fact be displayed in deciding whether to put in another handful of raisins, another egg, or a spoonful more sugar. But, from the standpoint of trying to appreciate the virtue or worth of the dish as a culinary creation, it cannot be admitted that any special importance or causal determination attaches to the last increments of the several ingredients. For it is evident that the "how much," and therefore the "margin," of each ingredient is itself determined by the conception of the *tout ensemble* in the mind of the creator or inventor.

And this evidently applies to every form of composition embodying some unity of design or purpose, whether the treatment of a subject in pictorial or dramatic art, the making of a new dish, the construction of a machine, the arrangement of a business, or the laying out of a garden or a fortune. So far as an economical use is made of materials or means of any kind for the attainment of any end this marginal equivalence is *implied*. The scientific analysis of any composite arrangement—mechanical, organic, conscious—involves this marginal assumption. It is an axiom of all "economy" whatsoever.

But it explains nothing. Nay, in dealing with any organic

being on any plane of action, it darkens counsel. It does so in several ways. First, by assuming or asserting that the human mind can and does get rid of qualitative differences by referring them to a quantitative standard; secondly, by assuming or asserting that organic unity can be broken up into its constituent parts and explained in terms of these measured parts; thirdly, by assuming or asserting a uniformity of nature which conflicts with the "novelties" in which creative energy expresses itself. All these fallacies are just as much involved in the attempt to explain the expenditure of an income as a purely quantitative problem, as in the attempt to explain the art-value of a picture in terms of the respective quantities of space and colour. In each case the root-fallacy is the same, the illicit substitution of the abstract "quantity" for the actual stuff, which is always qualitative, and is never identical in any two cases or at any two times.

In laying out my income, I do not, in fact, compare all my several needs or tastes, and, having assigned so much utility or desirability to each, plan my expenditure so as to spend on each just as much as it is worth, equalising all expenditure at the margins so as to maximise the aggregate. Even Benjamin Franklin or Samuel Smiles would not really do this, though they might think they did, and perhaps draw up schedules to enforce the notion. So far as I act like a free, rational being, not a creature of blind custom or routine, I employ all my personal resources of knowledge, taste, affection, energy, time, and command of material resources in trying to realise my ideal of a good or desirable life. In the execution of this design, however it be regarded, self-realisation or career, I utilise my various resources in a manner strictly analogous to that in which the artist employs the materials and instruments of his art. Upon the canvas of time I paint myself, using all the means at my disposal to realise my ideal. Among these means is my money income. Its expenditure goes into the execution of my design. So far as I am justified in separating my expenditure of money from the expenditure



of my time and other resources, and in regarding the design as an "economic picture," I can readily perceive that the unity of my artistic purpose involves and determines the expenditure of my income in definite proportions upon the various objects whose "consumption" contributes to the design. But these proportions are not determined by a calculation of the separate values of the various items. For, strictly speaking, they have no separate value, any more than have the lines or colours in a picture. Only by consideration of what we may term indifferently the artistic or organic purpose of the whole can a true appreciation or valuation be attained. The full absurdity of suggesting that anything is learned, either in the way of valuation or of guidance, by the quantitative analysis, or the wonderful discovery of equivalence of value at the margins, will now be apparent. This mathematical analysis can do no more towards explaining the expenditure of income than explaining the expenditure of paint. Of course, the expenditure at the margins appears to produce an equal utility; that truth is obviously contained in the very logic of the quantitative analysis. But that quantitative analysis, necessarily ignoring, as it does, the qualitative character which the organic union of the whole confers upon its parts, fails to perform the psychological interpretation claimed for it.

So far as it is true that the last sovereign of my expenditure in bread equals in utility the last sovereign of my expenditure in books, that fact proceeds not from a comparison, conscious or unconscious, of these separate items at this margin, but from the parts assigned respectively to bread and books in the organic plan of my life. Quantitative analysis, inherently incapable of comprehending qualitative unity or qualitative differences, can only pretend to reduce the latter to quantitative differences. What it actually does is to ignore alike the unity of the whole and the qualitative-ness of the parts.

Nor is this all. It is not even true that an application of

quantitative analysis does find exact equivalence of values at the margins. Taking a concrete instance, it is not true that the last sovereign of my expenditure in books equals, or even tends exactly to equal, in utility that of my last sovereign's expenditure on bread. This would be the case if the future tended precisely to repeat the past. In that event my experience of the economy of last year's expenditure would progressively correct any errors, and I should come to employ my resources with greater economy or exactitude to the attainment of the same design. But I am not the same this year as last, my environment is not the same, my resources are not the same, and the plan of life I make will not be the same. This awkward factor of novelty, involved in organic nature, enters into every creative art, being indeed of the very essence alike of art and of creation, and impairs to an incalculable extent the quantitative calculus and its marginal interpretation. An addition of £100 to my income this year cannot be laid out by calculation so as to increase each sort of expenditure to an extent which will secure marginal equivalence of utility. That is to say, I cannot tell what will be the best employment of my larger income until I have tried. The larger income will produce nowhere a strictly proportionate increase of expenditure on a number of several objects. It would shift my economic plan of life, making a new kind of life, and involving all sorts of changes in the items, which follow as consequences from the changed organic plan. This new plan I cannot accurately calculate or forecast. It will work itself out as I proceed. Its execution involves, no doubt, elements of forethought and even calculation; but the central and essential change will proceed from some novelty of conception, some qualitative change of purpose. In a word, it is the creative power of man, the artist, that is ever at work, and the art faculties of inspiration, faith, and adventure will lead him to experiment anew with his resources. As a man gains more intelligence, undergoes some new critical experience of his outer or his inner life, encounters some new personal



influence, his entire mode of living will change, and innumerable alterations in the outlay of his income will take place. Some articles of earlier expenditure will disappear, new articles will take their place, and the respective importance of many articles remaining in the expenditure will be shifted. A change of residence from country to town, a "conversion," religious or dietetic, a transfer from an outdoor manual to an indoor sedentary employment, marriage, or any other critical event, must bring about some such large complex organic alteration. A comparison of the items of expenditure before and after will shed interesting light upon the results of the psycho-economic change of which they afford a quantitative register; but it cannot be regarded as an explanation of the change of heart or of outlook which is the determinant act from which these shifts of values flow.

The life of a society presents this same problem on a larger scale. On the plane of economic conduct which directly concerns us, every one of the innumerable and incessant alterations in methods of production and consumption ranks as an organic novelty, and, in so far as it is novel, necessarily baffles qualitative analysis and scientific prediction. It would, of course, be incorrect, either in the case of an individual or of a society, to represent any change as entirely novel. Organic growth itself is largely a quantitative conception: the changes are proportionate in size to former changes, and are in definite quantitative relations to one another. The doctrine of continuity thus enables us to go far in calculating the character of future changes. So far the scientific interpretation of uniformity of nature carries us. But quantitative growth, or any other set of quantitative changes, however calculable, always carries some qualitative and essentially incalculable elements of change. These are what we signify by novelty. It is their occurrence in evolution that baffles the clean logic of the geologist, still more of the biologist, and far more of the psychologist. Whether they show themselves as "faults" or "sports" or "mutations," they represent

the disability of past experience to furnish "laws" for their calculation, and the practical importance which attaches to these incalculable or qualitative changes is very considerable. Though they may be comparatively infrequent and may appear on first inspection almost negligible breaks in the otherwise calculable continuity of the evolutionary process, their determinant importance is receiving ever greater recognition. In human conduct, individual or social, these mutations seem to play a larger part, chiefly by reason of the operation of the so-called "freedom" of the human will. For whatever philosophic view be held regarding the determination of the acts of the will, its operation scatters mutations thickly over the realm of human conduct. Hence it remains true that science can do so much less in explaining and predicting human history than in any other department of nature. No doubt here, as elsewhere, science hopes to apply quantitative analysis of such increasing accuracy as to enable it to determine and predict a larger and a larger number of such mutations. Since there doubtless exist quantitative conditions for every qualitative change, it may seem theoretically possible for science some day to catch up with "the art of creation." This supposition, however, assumes that the number of permutations and combinations in "nature" is limited, and that, therefore, in some extensive run history does repeat itself. The final victory of science thus seems to depend upon the adoption of a cyclical view of the history of the universe. But, for all present practical purposes of social processes, science is so far removed from this perfection that the economist and the sociologist are continually compelled to allow for unpredictable changes of such frequency and of such determinate importance that their claim to direct "the general will" and to mould the conscious policy of a society must be very modestly expressed.

Such laws of causation as they derive from past observation and experiment must usually be conceived as laws of tendencies, seldom endowed with any rigorous authority of close deter-



mination, and still more seldom with accuracy of quantitative prediction.

It is sometimes supposed that this hampering effect of the uniqueness, irregularity, novelty, and freedom of the individual and social organisms can be got rid of by a process of multiplication in which particular eccentricities will cancel. To economists, in particular, there is a strong temptation to fall back upon the average man, in the belief that scientific determinism justifies itself through averages. Now, the radical defect of measurement by averages, as a mode of social valuation, has already been disclosed. The ascertained fact that the average money income, or even the average real income, of the British people had risen 10 per cent. within the last decade disables itself, *by the very process of averaging*, from informing us as to the effect of this increase of national wealth upon national welfare. For this effect depends upon the distribution of the increase, and the process of averaging consists in ignoring this vital fact of distribution.

This defect of averages for purposes of interpretation, of course, involves a consequent defect for purposes of guidance in economic conduct. The calculation that a given course of national conduct—*e.g.* the expenditure of so many millions upon improved transport—will raise the national or average income by so much, loses all the worth of its superficial exactitude unless we know how much of the increase is going to the landlord in rising rent, how much to the labourer in rising wages.

This, of course, involves no repudiation of the true utility of averages, but only of the spurious accuracy which their forms suggest. The exact statement that the average income of an English family has risen 10 per cent. in the last decade does imply a reasonable probability that an increase of total national welfare has taken place.<sup>1</sup> But it gives no information

<sup>1</sup> Professor Pigou, in his *Wealth and Welfare*, discusses with skill and precision the measurable influences of an increase of the general dividend upon general welfare, but omits to take into consideration the "cost" factors which enter into welfare, however that term be defined.

as to the amount of that increase, and is consistent with the fact that there may have been a decrease, owing to a worsening of the distribution of the growing income, or of the labour and other costs involved in its production.

So far upon the supposition that welfare is a quantity. It will occur to statisticians that the information to be got from averages of income may be justified by nicer discrimination. If, in addition to learning that the average income of all families has risen 10 per cent., we discovered the different percentages which had been added to rent, interest, profits, and wages, or, better still, the ratio of increase for the different income levels, we should surely then, by this extended use of averages, get nearer towards a quantitative estimate of the increase of welfare that had been achieved!

This must certainly be admitted. By the nicer and more complex application of these measures we should approach a more accurate account of welfare, so far as it is ultimately expressible in terms of quantity. If we discovered that a proposed course of national policy would not only increase the average income by 10 per cent., but would increase the lower incomes of the population in a higher ratio, we should seem to have got a scientific warrant for the policy. But even this degree of scientific authority would be purchased to some extent by an artificial simplification of the actual problem of social economy. To the statesman no problem of actual finance is capable of being set in such distinctively quantitative terms. Not merely cannot an earthly Chancellor of the Exchequer know how much can be added to the incomes of the several classes by the expenditure of so many millions upon transport, or upon any other single service; but, if he could, he would not be much nearer to the standard he requires. There are many different ways of raising the revenue in question and an infinite number of combinations of these ways. The same holds of expenditure. To take the simplest case: The ten millions that he raises may be applied to transport, or to education, or to defence—all the sum, or any proportion, to



each. Each expenditure claims to be beneficial, an outlay for public welfare. But the benefit in the several outlays is not equally presentable in terms of money income, and, so far as definitely economic gains accrue, they are not equally immediate or equally assured. It is evident that no amount of possession of statistical knowledge can possibly reduce the problem entirely, or even mainly, to one of quantitative calculation. It is equally true that when the problem is solved, its solution will appear in quantitative shape, *i.e.* so much money for transport, so much for education, so much for defence. It will seem to have been worked out by reducing the three forms of desired benefits to common terms, and then dividing the ten millions among them so as to secure an equivalence of gains at the margins. Economists will point out triumphantly the alleged fact that the last £100 spent on education produces a national return of welfare exactly equal to that obtained by the last £100 spent on gunboats, though the assertion remains inherently insusceptible of proof. In truth, the Chancellor's mind does not work in this way. So far as his statecraft is disinterested, or even allowing for every form of bias, his mind forms an ideal of social progress, of a happier or better state of things, and allots the outlay of his ten millions in an endeavour to assist in realising this ideal. Now, the ideal itself is not chiefly a product of quantitative calculus, but of his more or less informed imagination and his more or less wholesome sympathies. His views as to the means of realising this ideal can never be purely scientific, though science may here be of considerable assistance.

If, treating expenditure more widely as an act of public policy, we consider it as an operation of the general will of the community, a true act of political economy, the problem remains essentially the same. When looked at through scientific spectacles, it is a purely quantitative and mechanically ordered act, because the scientific method by its very *modus operandi* ignores the qualitative factors. So the nation is supposed to balance this gain against another, and to lay out

its revenue so as to get the largest aggregate of some common homogeneous stuff called "welfare" in such a way that the last £100 spent on education is equivalent in its yield of this "welfare" to the last £100 spent on the latest super-Dreadnought or the last line of electric trams in London. In truth, the common will no more functions in this fashion than the personal will of the Chancellor. In each case statecraft is an art, and the financial policy is an artistic or creative work in which quantities are used but do not direct or dominate.

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## A CENTURY OF CHANGE IN NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

PROFESSOR B. W. BACON.

ONE hundred years ago the science of biblical criticism showed more of chaos than of order. It was still occupied with the primal struggle for existence. Semler had demanded "free investigation of the canon," but encountered a tradition little less despotic than a dogma: that the canon had been determined by divine authority. As in most disputes there was right on both sides. Had the traditionalists controlled the situation, historical inquiry, with all its light upon religious development, would have been suppressed. The religious perception that a given writing—the Fourth Gospel, let us say—is of supreme value to spiritual life would have predetermined the historical question of its date and authorship. Rational understanding and appreciation would have been precluded. Had the critics, on the other hand, had their way, the almost self-evident right of the church to determine the contents of its own literature of edification, irrespective of dates or authorship, might have been denied. For even Baur continued to define biblical 'introduction' by the term "criticism of the canon"; as if better knowledge of the historical origin of a given writing could qualify me to say to my neighbour, You ought, or you ought not, to use this book in your devotions.

There was false definition of the issue. Apologists were defending traditional dates and authorships as if Tertullian's definition of canonicity were infallible, and no Scripture could

have religious value unless it had an apostle (directly or indirectly) for its author. Critics conducted their polemic as if they too accepted Tertullian's definition and had no further concern save to prove—or more often disprove—the church's theory of origins. The result was an era of negation. The apostolic authorship traditionally attributed to all the New Testament writings, and assumed to be indispensable to canonical standing, was denied in all cases save the greater Pauline epistles. In most cases it was disproved. In admitting only Galatians, Romans, and First and Second Corinthians as certainly Pauline, questioning the authenticity of First and Second Thessalonians, Philippians, Philemon, Colossians, and Ephesians, and denying the relation of the other New Testament writings to their supposed apostolic, or quasi-apostolic authors, Baur represented the current trend of criticism. Negatively he went very little beyond other critics of his time. He differed from them, as from modern liberals, only in his greater scepticism regarding First Thessalonians, Philippians, Philemon, and Colossians. But destruction was the smallest part of his work. His name really marks an epoch in New Testament science as the inaugurator of constructive criticism. With Baur system began to prevail over chaos.

Before the formulation of Baur's theory criticism had already undermined the church's claim to possess a single document from the hand of a personal follower of Jesus. Baur's rejection of some of the smaller and later letters of Paul was a far less vital matter. It was to his mind merely a discrimination necessary to the absolute security of his positive foundation. In the four greater, undisputed, and (to his mind) indisputable, Pauline epistles Baur found his *πουν στῶ*. If he would proceed rationally from the known to the unknown the critic must make this his point of departure. Instead of contenting himself with adding a few more to the *dissecta membra* of the traditional canon by further disproofs of assumed dates and authorships, the critic must set about rebuilding the literature of the primitive church into an ordered whole. He



must pass from the literary to the historical phase of his subject. Baur undertook this reconstruction, using as the principle of unity the historical relation of each writing to the development of the nascent institution. He found for each its niche—so to speak—in the background of known events. He left to the ecclesiastic the theological standard of measurement, with its inference from edification value to apostolicity, and substituted the historical. Baur, in short, gave criticism its true place as the handmaid of history. He left the mere “critic of the canon” to debate with the apologist, and started the historian of religion on the great inquiry, What is the nature of that transition in religious thought of which these writings are the product, and to which, as such, they bear witness? As everyone knows, he followed almost in the footsteps of Marcion, the second century anti-Semite and Paulinist. He defined the transition to be that from particularism to universalism. The gospel preached by the Galilean apostles had been no more than a transcendental Judaism. The independence it achieved over limitations of race and nationality was due to the anti-legalistic application given it by Paul.

Baur, of course, did not follow Marcion into Gnostic docetism. He did not posit a divine revelation in Jesus, supposed to have been perverted and misunderstood by Peter and the Jewish party in the church and restored by Paul. But in taking the greater Pauline epistles as the real archives of the faith, more especially in appealing to Galatians, with its record of the collision of Paul at Antioch with Peter and “those who came from James,” for the indisputable proof of the great transition, Baur was only modernising upon Marcion. Paul became the real founder of the faith, whether Paul or Peter were the better exponent of Jesus. The small but radical school of critics, principally confined to Holland, who make Paul the only founder of Christianity, who ignore all relations with Palestine, and appeal to the relatively small traces of the influence of Paul during the age of evangelic tradition (A.D. 70–135) when Jerusalem was the seat of

authority as a ground for seeking the real origins of the faith at Rome in A.D. 120-140, have some justification for their claim to be followers of Baur. But it is his weaker side which they emphasise. Their relation to him is that of Marcion to Paul.

It is superfluous here to point out the overstatements into which Baur was led in the attempt to apply in detail his theory of the relation between church literature and church history. His own followers and disciples receded from his extreme scepticism regarding the later epistles of Paul. Critics of to-day recognise that Paul's first great battle for the faith, that against the Jewish legalists, was by no means his only one. Against an opposite tendency bent on assimilating the nascent faith to current types of theosophy, making of it only another of the Hellenistic religions of soul-redemption, Paul took the attitude which a Jew loyal to the hope of the prophets might have been expected to take. The later epistles exhibit Paul's own antipathy to a type of syncretistic Jewish theosophy, the forerunner of Gnosticism. Baur's rejection of these as post-Pauline was an error big with misconception. Nobody now holds to Baur's theory of the Synoptic writings, or to his extravagant dates, separated by an entire century, for Revelation and the other Johannine writings. We have one sure result of a century's criticism of the Synoptic writings. It is the dependence—I might almost say the mutually independent dependence—of Matthew and Luke on Mark. This reverses Baur's opinion. We have one surely datable writing in the New Testament outside the greater Pauline epistles—the Revelation of John. Extremely ancient tradition concurs with current criticism in dating it in 93-95 A.D. The other writings of the Ephesian canon which tradition has added to Revelation, as also writings of John, are (for their substance) not more than twenty years later. Baur dated Revelation in 66 and the Fourth Gospel a full century later. Here again was abundant room for misapplication of his theory. As already said, Baur was not primarily a critic. He never



attempted an introduction to the literature of the New Testament. He was a church historian; and his great service in both fields was to show their true relation, to lift New Testament criticism out of mere barren polemics against the despotism of tradition, into the creative service of history. It is the critic who labours in this interest, humbly loyal to the service of the history of religion, not he who applies a perverse and obstinate ingenuity to sustaining the lost cause of the priority of Matthew, who truly follows the leadership of Baur.

But church historians as well as critics have reaped some harvests in seventy-five years. Just as it is easy to-day to see the fallacies of Baur's theory of *Tendenz* when applied to the authorship and dating of epistles and gospels, so it is also easy, standing on the shoulders of Ritschl and Harnack, to criticise his theory of the interaction of parties in the church. The situation was much more complex than Baur conceived it; moreover, his idea of the opposition of Peter and Paul was extravagantly exaggerated. Galatians and Acts are quite agreed as to the complete friendliness and mutual satisfaction of Paul and the "pillar-apostles" at the critical interview in Jerusalem. On this point Baur's opponent, Lechler, was much more nearly right. Those whom Paul called "false brethren," "super-extra-apostles," "ministers of Satan" representing themselves as "ministers of Christ," are not the Galilean apostles; not Peter, not James, nor even "those who came from James." The aggressive Judaisers were really repudiated by the "pillars," as Acts declares. Paul did quarrel with Peter at Antioch; but it was not because Peter was consciously false to his previous concession—made along with John and James—of unqualified freedom from the law for Gentile Christians. One cannot seriously imagine the "pillars" assuming so self-stultifying an attitude. Peter never consciously joined in the propaganda of circumcision. Had it been so, Barnabas, joint founder with Paul of the churches of Galatia, and fellow-champion with him at

Jerusalem of Gentile freedom, could not possibly have been "carried away with the hypocrisy." The speciousness of the plea of "those who came from James" lies in the fact that it really did represent the intention of the "pillars," and on the surface seems only a reasonable inference from the mutual compact. They only asked that the Gentile shall not "compel the Jew to Hellenise," as would inevitably result if the Christian Jew ate with his Gentile brother regardless of "distinctions of meats." Paul really stood for this compulsion, demanding at the same time that the Jew should *not* "compel the Gentile to Judaize." He does not accuse Peter of joining the "false brethren." His real complaint is only of the indirect effect on the Gentiles of Peter's vacillating conduct. The delegation "from James" had persuaded Peter and "all the rest of the Jews" at Antioch, including Barnabas, that they themselves, *as Jews*, were not personally at liberty to disregard the law. That is precisely the standpoint of Acts. We should infer it to be that of the "pillars" from Paul's own account. We have every reason to accept the Lukan representation that it was, and remained, that of Jerusalem, and of Antioch, and of the apostles generally. The error of Acts is simply in representing it to be also Paul's. It made certain concessions "necessary" from Gentile Christians when Jewish Christians were among them. But because Peter and his followers asked consideration for their own scruples from the strong-minded followers of Paul, Paul did not call them "false brethren." He called them "weak." Even the concessions of abstinence on the part of "the strong" he was willing to observe himself and to enjoin upon his followers, so long as they were not made to rest upon the permanent validity of the law, and imposed as "necessary" by apostolic decree. To admit the permanent obligation of the law on those who "being Jews by nature had sought to be justified by faith in Jesus Christ," to Paul's mind "made the cross of Christ of none effect." But the failure of Peter, Barnabas, James, and "all the rest" to see this could not result in the irreconcilable conflict Baur



imagined between Paul and the older apostles. The obnoxious propaganda of circumcision came from a wholly different quarter. Reconciliation with "those of Peter" was not only practicable within the lifetime of Paul, but even from his own epistles we have every reason to believe that it actually took place, very much as represented in Acts, on Paul's last visit to Jerusalem. It is only the interpretation Acts puts upon Paul's ritual performance in the temple which is necessarily wrong. Paul cannot possibly have performed it to prove that he himself set an example *among the Gentiles* of "walking orderly keeping the law," thus acknowledging its permanent obligation upon Jews. He may very well have performed it to prove that he so walked *among the Jews*, just because of its complete indifference.

Neither the extreme Judaizing party nor the extreme Hellenistic has any direct representation in the literature of the canon. The New Testament writings are either "catholic" or Pauline. For examples of the extreme right and left we must look to the Ebionite and Gnostic literature of the second century. Baur's historical theory, like his critical deductions, was quite too vigorous and rigorous. The polemic literature of the first century survives only in the form of the Pauline letters because Paul had creative genius, while his opponents were commonplace traditionalists. But the post-apostolic generation, conscious as it was of their greatness, was also aware that they required careful handling as 'high explosives.' They contained "things hard to be understood, wrongly interpreted by the ignorant and the perverse." Relative neglect of Paul outside his own special mission-field, during the post-apostolic age, when Christianity as a whole required consolidation on the basis of apostolic (*i.e.* Syro-Palestinian) tradition, should occasion no surprise. The doctrine of great men requires dilution at the hands of the disciple and interpreter before its currency becomes assured.

What, then, remains of Baur's great antithesis of the Petrine against the Pauline conception? This: that Paul's

own religious experience led him to make the utmost of the distinction in *time* marked by "the manifestation of Jesus as the Son of God by the resurrection," while correspondingly obliterating geographical and racial distinctions; whereas the Galilean apostles admitted no new "economy" of God "changing the relation" of mankind to Himself from that of servitude to sonship, and correspondingly saw no objection to a "divided Christ," a "seed of Abraham" by descent and legal observance as well as grace, side by side with a seed of Abraham by grace and adoption only. The latter would, of course, be expected to make any concessions required for mutual fellowship. On the side of "the apostles" was the authoritative Scripture, which could only be violently wrested to fit Paul's theory of enactment for mere temporary discipline. On the side of Paul was his profounder appreciation of the religious value of the consciousness of "sonship" which had been the legacy of Jesus to the world.

Luke-Acts stands with the post-apostolic church in practically ignoring the great Pauline doctrine of the new epoch, the changed divine economy introduced by the sending of the Son and the Spirit. It takes to itself the utmost possible of Old Testament revelation, interpreting the remainder not as superseded in time, but as *racially* limited. The *ceremonial* law was meant for Jews to observe—perpetually if they saw fit—but did not concern the rest of the world. In the sub-apostolic age the breach with Judaism was continually widening. Christian Jews could be tolerated if they did not seek to impose Mosaism on their fellow-Christians. Unbelieving Jews were the murderers of the Lord.

Baur's theory of New Testament literature is fundamentally right in making the Pauline doctrine of the freedom of sonship the touchstone of classification. The true method would be to divide primitive Christianity into Apostolic and Pauline, especially if geographical boundaries were taken into account. After the great collision at Antioch Paulinism remained dominant only from the Taurus to the Adriatic, centering on



the coasts of the *Ægean*. Syria and Cilicia, Palestine and Egypt thenceforth looked to Peter and "the Apostles" as supreme authority. In the "East" Paul was accepted, even glorified; but—harmonised. The "apostolic" point of view is that of the Antiochian writer of our third Gospel and Book of Acts. It is not hostile to Paul, but it is utterly without understanding either of his gospel of grace and sonship by the indwelling Spirit, or of his apostleship from God. From the Taurus to the Nile Peter was supreme (or "Peter and James"). Rome and the West were debatable ground. They belonged naturally, as Paul claims, to his province; but his opportunity to occupy it was inadequate, and "they of Peter" had partially forestalled him. After Paul's death even Asia found it hard to preserve the Pauline gospel. The deeper developments of Paulinism, after Paul's death, were at Ephesus, the domain which, after the acceptance of Revelation, gradually passes from under the name of Paul to that of John. Loyalty to the great doctrines of Paul struggles with the endeavour to throw off ultra-Pauline Greek theosophy on the one side and to approximate "apostolic" standards on the other.

Baur's theory, then, of the development of Christianity was epoch-making neither for the correctness of its application in detail to problems of the origin and historical interpretation of primitive Christian literature; nor even for its masterly seizure of the great outstanding facts of truly historical significance, as the basis of a consistent view of Christian origins. These facts were the collision between Peter and Paul at Antioch, the subsequent opposition, and the consolidation of the great church in the second century under pressure of persecution without and erratic teaching within. Centralisation under apostolic authority is the inevitable note of the age, and the condition of such authority is harmonisation. That is, as Baur perceived, the characteristic of the post-apostolic age. Catholicism as we see it in Justin, Irenæus, and Clement rests upon this consolidation. Still Baur's greatest service was not in the creation of the famous formula of thesis, antithesis,

synthesis. It was, as already said, in subordinating criticism to history. But here, too, new times call for sweeping advances. As a *church* historian Baur thought of the great transition represented in the advance from a Petrine to a Pauline type of gospel, and the coalescence of both in the "higher unity" of second-century catholicism, as in the main a transition from particularism to universalism; and indeed there was an emancipation of Christianity from the swathing bands of Jewish legalism, to have free course and be glorified as the religion of the Empire. But there was something more and greater. It was the progressive evaluation of the religious significance of Jesus.

To-day our concern as biblical critics is with the history neither of church nor state, but of *religion*. Its course appears in the phenomena of religions. For us too the contrast between Old Testament and New, between "apostolic" Christianity as proclaimed in the name of Peter at Jerusalem and Antioch, and Pauline Christianity as developed in the Greek cities around the Ægean, marks an epoch. But the change is not geographical. It is not the mere breaking down of barriers to the spread of one of the existing religions. It is a qualitative change in human *religion* due to intermingling currents from various *religions*. It is intensive rather than extensive. There is indeed a widening, a transfer of the keys of the kingdom from Hebrew to Greek, and from Greek to Roman. But the change of religion itself from the political to the personal type is more significant. The epoch-making transition is the advance of the human mind from that type of religion which by emphasising the social ideal exalts moral obligation, to that type which by emphasising the individual ideal exalts mystical aspiration.

There is no more perfect type of the national religion than Judaism. The prophets made deliberate war upon the hope of personal immortality in the interest of national redemption. It could not be suppressed. After the Persian domination, and the subsequent sweeping influx of Greek influences, the



new party of the Pharisees formally admits the doctrine. But the transcendentalising of Israel's messianic hope in the later Pharisaism did not alter its fundamentally social character. Pharisaism reduced all the interests of life to the two categories of the here and the hereafter. Here to know the will of God and obey it; hereafter to enjoy the rewards of obedience. Such, to the Pharisee, was "all the Law and the Prophets." Judaism in this its dominant development was itself tending strongly to individualism, responsive to Gentile influence. But "the Kingdom of God" remains as ever its *summum bonum*, and this is a social ideal of the distinctly national type.

Elsewhere national religions had broken down. We know now, as Baur could not know, how, coincidently, the awakening sense of individual personality was throwing men back throughout the Græco-Roman world upon more primitive faiths. The welter of pantheons, philosophies, mysteries, theosophies, fell back upon the ancient chthonic cults, because these give symbolic expression to the longing of man's frail individual life for sustenance in the bosom of the divine. Hellenistic religion reduced human interests not to the categories of the here and the hereafter, but to those of the inward against the outward, the apparent against the real, "the things which are seen and temporal against the things which are, not seen and are eternal."

From the viewpoint, therefore, of the historian of religion, the beginning of our era marks indeed an immense transition. It is this new development in religion which makes it an era, the first era of world-wide acceptance. With Baur we may speak of the development as proceeding by the Hegelian norm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. But it is far more than a mere geographical expansion, a liberation of developed Judaism through the opposition of Paul to legalism, followed by a later mutual adjustment. We should take Eusebius' *Preparatio Evangelica* as our guide-book, rather than Marcion's *Antitheses*. We stand confronting the epoch-making development of a new world-faith by fusion of the Hebrew,

social-ethical type, with the individual-mystic type of the Hellenistic religions, the "mystery" cults of personal soul redemption. Islam marks only a great reaction toward the Semitic type where the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of the Greek. Thesis and antithesis were present long before the irrepressible conflict of Peter and Paul at Antioch. The synthesis was not the work merely of Paul's peace-making journey to Jerusalem. That was only a milestone at its beginning. Neither was it the work of Western ecclesiastical diplomats, like Irenæus, who founded catholicism in the joint names of Peter and Paul at Rome. That was only one of the milestones toward the end. A greater and deeper work of synthesis had been done meantime by a nameless follower of Paul at Ephesus. It is the author of the Fourth Gospel who first showed the world how Apostolic Christianity could be transfigured by infusion of the spirit of Paul. He seeks to conserve the values of both the Apostolic and the Pauline gospel by a new interpretation of Jesus, the Christ—the Son of God. The creative epoch of Christian literature, the epoch of the New Testament, is fitly closed by the Gospel and Epistles attributed to John.

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## THE EFFECT OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM IN THE WORK OF A CHRISTIAN PASTOR.

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WHAT is Biblical Criticism? (1) First, it is the scholar's lens through which the Bible is seen to be not, as to the naked eye it appeared, a compact, heavenly pronouncement, marked from cover to cover by supernatural sameness; but a gradual, expanding literature, marked from origin to climax by human fallibility and spiritual growth. (2) Secondly, Biblical Criticism is the historian's field-glass through which he, surveying the wide landscape of human achievement, can locate the Bible, can connect it with its Semitic kindred and antecedents, can compare it with the scriptures of other races and religions; so that the Bible ceases to be a lonely and unrelated portent, and has taken its eminent place among the sacred writings of mankind. Thus has Biblical Criticism wrought havoc and renewal. Verbal finality is gone, detailed and immaculate certitude is gone, the old inspiration—prodigious and singular—is gone, and with it the old outward authority; gone is the old detachment, aloofness from our common human story. But with the shedding of these faded attributes there have been unfolded in the Bible new glories and immensely fecund significance; and the very Spirit of the Book is perhaps beginning for the first time to break through its envelope into freedom.

For our purpose, therefore, Criticism has knocked from

the hand of the Christian Pastor the Bible in its literal domination, as a weapon of infallible reference; but has left the Bible in the Christian Pastor's hand as a treasury of supreme religious experience. Exact sayings, exact deeds may, many of them, be slipping out of the Pastor's reach, may one after another be silently passing beyond the frontiers of historical certainty into the vast surrounding regions of the dimly known, or the vaguely surmised, or the mythically narrated. But the great, central, saving *facts*, *e.g.* the Passion of our Lord, survive that exit and dispersion; they stand up more than ever sharply prominent and fixed. And the great, vital, spiritual *words*, issuing from the depths of the soul of the seers—for us Christians, issuing in ultimate disclosures from the depths of the soul of our Saviour; these luminous and mighty utterances charged with command and destiny, strangely adequate to the heart's desire, corroborated from age to age in their religious validity; these words, proof against critical corrosives, are found, we think, to tell the abiding secrets of the Eternal. That is Biblical Criticism.

What is the work of a Christian Pastor? It has varied from generation to generation even in this our native land. In the fourteenth century, Chaucer's "poor Parson of a town," devoutly teaching his parishioners, visiting the sick in his wide parish with the "houses far asunder," not let by "rain nor thunder"; or, on the other hand, Wyclif's carnal Priest, who is "covetous of worldly muck" and "a fiend of hell" and "no part of holy church"—in the seventeenth century, Mr Palmer, of the *Colonel Hutchinson Memoirs*, the Nonconformist Minister in Nottingham, who, continuing each week to preach from the grated window of the gaol, was locked therefor every Lord's Day in the coalhouse—in the eighteenth century, Thackeray's Anglican Chaplain Sampson, a reverend rake, a two-bottle evangelist—in the nineteenth century, George Eliot's Mr Irwine, Rector of the sweet old English village life in Hay-slope, kind, unpretending, a religious Clergyman even before



the Oxford Movement; or her Methodist preaching woman, of rapt vision and unearthly gentle attraction, Dinah Morris; or, to glance for a moment beyond our shores, Victor Hugo's good Bishop, Ibsen's *Brand*, Fogazzaro's *Saint*—these Christian Pastors, belonging to the same species, discover a good deal of heterogeneity in function.

A man must speak of that he knows. The present writer knows the work of an Anglican Clergyman in large rich and poor parishes of London. For our inspection that work may be cut into the following sections: (1) Preaching the gospel, (2) administering the sacraments, (3) conducting other public services of the Church, (4) teaching the young, (5) guiding individual souls; and in each section "the effect of Biblical Criticism," *i.e.* the effect of assumption by the Clergyman of the critical positions, will be noted. Observe that the entirely temporal side of a Pastor's duties, *e.g.* management of a workmen's social club or of a children's penny bank, is for our purpose rightly ignored.

1. To begin, then, with preaching the gospel. Subsections at once are needed, according as the sermons are delivered (*a*) to the educated,<sup>1</sup> (*b*) to the uneducated, (*c*) to the very poor in the streets, (*d*) in parochial missions.

(*a*) Educated people want—not sermons about Biblical Criticism, but sermons whose underlying assumptions are critical.

About ten years ago one hundred and sixty people of the professional and business class—lawyers, doctors, merchants, etc.—were cruising together for six weeks on a yacht in the Mediterranean. There were twelve Clergymen on board; eleven of them more or less conventional and strait, one a theological Liberal. The Sunday services, conducted first by

<sup>1</sup> The term "educated" here carries its light and conventional meaning, by which an ordinary public schoolboy or University man, an ordinary banker or doctor, or one of us ordinary clergymen is, in the wonderful clemency of words, said to be "educated."

one Clergyman then by another in the saloon, together with many private conversations, acted during those six weeks as a test or selective agency among those twelve clergy. The result was that on the last Sunday the Liberal Clergyman alone, without any assistance from any of his clerical brethren, was invited to conduct the farewell service. This indicated that he met needs which the other clergy missed. He was cognisant of the passengers' perplexities and religious confusion; he knew that the older theological prescriptions would not cure the passengers' present malady; while he found that the essential purifying, balms, and tonics of Christianity, appropriately mixed and applied, were, as ever, profoundly grateful to the souls of this average company.

The case of sermons is probably so throughout educated England. The accredited, orthodox teachers of religion stand at the entrance of the great national life. They knock at the doors of the hearts of the people, and they cry: "Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors: and the King of glory shall come in." But the great puzzled nation, through its educated voices, replies: "Who is the King of glory?" And it is only in the light of heaven *to-day*—only when we have learnt, in some humble measure according to our poor ability, the intuitions of *modern* feeling, the corrections of *modern* intellect, the mandates of *modern* conscience, that we can find in the old rejoinder its latest growth, its new vitality and content, its living grandeur and everlastingness, and can say: "*The Lord of hosts, he is the King of glory.*"

The effect, therefore, of Criticism in the preaching of a Christian Pastor among the educated classes is to make him more effective and acceptable. This rule is impaired by two exceptions. Two classes of educated persons do not welcome the Liberal Pastor's gospel. On the one hand, the hard and established orthodox dislike this loose evangelist; they sniff destruction; the rivets of the ark are giving away; the planks are parting; and unknown waters yawn. Where are we?



Where are the old securities? "Where," cries the High Churchman, "are 'definite Church teaching,' and 'the first six Geneva Councils'?" "Where," cries the Low Churchman, "is 'the language of Zion'?" "Let us throw this Broad Church Jonah overboard." This orthodox taste for blood is, however, actually not common; it is found mainly among curates of a Dominican aspect and ravenous theological laymen, occasionally showing its crimson tooth in the visage of authority. What is common among orthodox persons annoyed by the Critical Pastor's gospel is more silent and more serious; it is pain felt by gentle, old-fashioned Christians; it is disturbance wrought among sisters, mothers, friends, of a piety which is unreflective but often fruitful in lovely life and deeds. Ah! we share in heart their hurt; but it is the price of advance; *per crucem itur ad regnum*. The fixed and satisfied orthodox, then, on one side break the rule that the educated classes incline to a critical evangel. There break the rule, on the other side, the offended and absent heterodox. These do not, as the phrase is, "go to Church." They have given up that particular mode of motion as hopeless. They are by no means irreligious; but their spiritual thirst is not slaked, sometimes even is aggravated, with the aridities often held to their lips from the Anglican pulpit.<sup>1</sup> They have heard of Biblical Criticism; that preacher apparently has not. They share in the religious convulsion, the reverend expectancy, the awful new-birth of our age; that preacher does not share in this august experience, but dwells apart in some small dogmatic chambers of his own. And so these average Englishmen, thoughtful and numerous, renounce

<sup>1</sup> We are engaged on an inquiry which, however humble, is scientific, and which must not be deflected or mitigated by sentiment. I will try to tell the severe truth. But the Church of my fathers is to me an object of altogether unspeakable attachment. Her clergy, even when they appear to be backward and exasperating in their doctrine, are often forward and saintly in their practice. And her genius, her corporate spirit surmounts the worst defects of us her Ministers, breathing over the lives of her children her own peculiar and (for us) surpassing benediction.

the Christian Pastors, good and bad—"renounce them all." On the whole, then, the two said grave exceptions modify, but do not annul, the rule that among educated people accepted Biblical Criticism enhances the virtue of the preacher.

(b) Among uneducated people the conditions change. Biblical Criticism here is a non-conductor. The Critical Preacher here is at a disadvantage. He does not suit his company. They crave for doctrinal colour and detail which he cannot supply. They want something definite and vermilion; he seems to offer them something hazy and grey. In the huge structure of theology he is concerned with the foundations, which he knows to be secure; they prefer the pinnacles, which he sees to be tottering. The homiletic taste of a working-class congregation is sometimes an affliction. A thoughtful preacher comes, and, in words of dignity and calm, narrates to the worshippers the divine, tender, elemental story of our most holy faith. They remain untouched and neutral; or, at best, they yield a mild, an almost condescending approval. A rampant young rhetorician arrives, straight from a theological college; a cheap-jack dealer in the questionable; he conducts a clearance sale of his wares—theological remnants and confident incredibilities; and he does a roaring trade, and his customers are delighted. Such incidents, whether of success or of failure, are, however, exceptional. In the long run only the religious temper, only spirituality tells. It tells among the uneducated sooner and more, if it approach them along the conventional theological channel; it tells among the uneducated later or less, if it approach them along the critical theological channel. But tell, sooner or later, more or less, here and everywhere, the religious spirit will. That, in our day of transition, is the Critical Pastor's hope. At heart the people want religion, not words. If, in the name of Christ, and in essential continuity with the inherited Christian experience of the eternal, the Critical Pastor, himself inwardly religious, offers to the people true religion, then the people will recognise it, even though to them the



language be strange and the messenger uncongenial. Schleiermacher discovers for us the secret and the method of teaching religion with one luminous remark : *Reality knows Reality.*

(c) Thirdly, pass to the very poor; and observe street-preaching in the slums, which sometimes is the duty of a Critical parish Pastor. Here his disability culminates. Here is a dirty, ignorant, candid, kind-hearted, spitting, swearing, sweating crowd. They gather round you — benevolent, puzzled, amused, ready for any new sensation, ready to listen. An ambassador of Jesus Christ ought to have something to say to them. I sometimes wish that writers in learned religious reviews could test their creed and their humanity with this experiment. Every man, of whatever erudition and mental distance from the mob, ought, if ever those brother men should surround him with their inquiring gaze, with those eyes so living, intent, pathetic, full of spirit, full of dumb and moving kinship with himself—every man ought then to draw from the depths of his own humanity and to impart to his hearers some word of help, some wave of charity. The Critical Preacher must overcome his own demerits here. From behind and through his own critical apparatus he can speak to them something human, something from “heart to heart” as they say; and, as Schleiermacher says, *Reality knows Reality.*

(d) Parochial missions demand a special kind of sermon, to agitate attention and to capture the hidden and determining purposes of men. Such preaching has sometimes been held to be alien from the Critical Pastor's disposition, and even to be precluded from his endeavours. A modest experiment in disproof of that assumption was lately made in a large Northern town. In the combined Anglican mission preached there a Critical Clergyman was invited to join, expressly as a Liberal Churchman free in certain important respects from the confinement of the old orthodox constraints. His conduct of the mission in an important parish was reputed to have justified the attempt, it being declared on behalf of this Evangelical

congregation that "many had found courage to forsake cherished sins and inspiration for new tasks; that they had received a fresh and wholesome ideal of the Christian life, and an enlarged and purified vision of God."

2. In administering the sacraments the individuality of the Pastor dwindles almost away, and the power of the institution rules the imagination and the facts. The specific task of the Critical Pastor here is to help in gradually weeding out from these services of his church statements or implications which affront modern knowledge. In the services themselves he is the mere organ of the society. The little child is held in the minister's arms, and the waters of heavenly potentiality are poured on its brow; the weary pilgrim kneels at the altar of the Lord, and the bread of life is placed in his hands. The minister is nothing—critical, uncritical, hypercritical; rashly radical, or implacably conservative; it matters not. The Great Mother Church is embracing her children, or is feeding them with manna from above; and that is enough.

3. Like considerations obtain in conducting other public services of the Anglican Church; it is the institution which speaks, not the individual. In morning or evening prayer, in the marriage office, in the burial of the dead the minister must voice the spirit of the Christian centuries which breathes through the liturgy. The Critical Pastor, indeed, must strive to purge that consecrated and sublime utterance of anachronisms, of dead thought and language, and to make it the living tongue of the heart of Christendom to-day; but this duty lies on him as a Church Reformer rather than as a Christian Pastor. As a Christian Pastor he must harness himself to the use of the existing formulæ of piety.

4. In teaching the young, the aforesaid *pros* and *cons* of Criticism in preaching apply. For instance, the children of an educated home individualise, without being aware of it, that common enlightened consciousness; the children of an uneducated home insensibly partake of that educational



defect; in their religious training they must be accordingly treated. But with the young the work of the Critical Pastor has one prime merit. Those children are the adult Christians of the time to come. He, if he be true to his vocation and to the vital discriminations of his day, will plant the faith of those little souls in the rich and stable soil of Christian experience, and not in a thin, sandy layer of theological convention. In teaching the young, as, indeed, elsewhere, authority there must be, but it should be the authority of the Holy Spirit which awakes within the listening child a spiritual response and appreciation; dogma there must be—not blind, compelling, ending in itself, but such as gradually and softly opens to the child's eyes within the dogmatic wrappage hidden spiritual jewels and pearls of great price. The young are more spiritually alert, perhaps, than we think. A youth in my Bible-class may have spoken wiser than he knew, who, on being asked what was his favourite verse in the 119th Psalm, with a twinkle in his eye replied: “No. 99, *I have more understanding than my teachers.*” That stammering impeachment it especially lies on the Critical Pastor to refute.

5. The interview with single souls equals, in immediacy and moment, any part of a Christian Pastor's work. (a) A young man in your choir comes of age to-day. You send for him in the evening, and he sits there opposite to you in your study, with a look full of confidence and a life trembling with possibilities. “Charlie, my lad, you step out from boyhood into manhood to-day; you cross the line to-day. I want to remind you to be true to the holy lessons of your early years. You have had a good home; you have been well brought up; the Heavenly Voice has spoken to your heart, and you have heard it. Live out as a man those holy resolutions you made as a child. Let life be to you *that*. And may God Almighty bless you.” In this interview Criticism is not a determining factor; Criticism is a negligible factor. The determining factors are faith, prayer, and sympathy. (b) You visit a sufferer on the bed of sickness. I once read to a poor old

man in pain in a Westminster garret the parable of the Prodigal Son. He sat up, leaned on his pillow, and, gazing at me, said, "That's as pwitty a little thing as ever I 'eard i' my life: where did yer get it?" Here was a freedom from critical prejudice which might have been the envy of Van Manen. Or duty may take you to the sick chamber of a savant, a politician, a millionaire. In all cases the office for the visitation of the sick has its appropriate and marvellously adaptable meaning; and as to the Pastor, it is not his critical, but his spiritual, temperature which tells. (c) You stand beside a man facing death. As you stretch forth your hands toward the mystery, with hidden and perhaps incommunicable instincts of trust and hope, you find (in my experience) two chief instruments of insight, strength, and reconciliation, for that soul entering the dark portal: (i.) The service of the communion of the sick; (ii.) the recitation of simple Evangelical hymns, such as "Rock of Ages, cleft for me, Let me hide myself in Thee." You touch bottom here. The Pastor, critical or uncritical, can do no more than so to lay the parting spirit, troubled or peaceful, in the arms of Eternal Security.

Finally, and in brief, in the Church of England the Liberal Clergyman is clerically unpopular, is subjected, at the hands of his fellow-clergy, to quiet, conscientious, immutable repugnance and depreciation. His chief trials are loneliness and the antipathy of good men. His peculiar hope is that he is serving them in spite of themselves; that he is saving for his detractors their religion; that for many an English Christian home he is breaking the shock of startling critical disclosures; that he is bearing the critical cross ahead for the sake of his fellow-pilgrims.

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## SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 7.

### THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT.

CAPTAIN W. CECIL PRICE.

WHILE lawlessness, joined with the periodical strike, pursues its brisk career, nurtured by thoughtless sympathy and delicate regard for "the sacred rights of man" as belonging to the few, while they are engaged in violating the rights of the many—it will help to an understanding of the human error in this outbreak to reflect that nine-tenths of such lawlessness is committed by persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

According to an unwritten rule of all fraternities which on occasion find it opportune to employ some sort of force not sanctioned by law, disloyalty to their code is a crime, while disloyalty to law and order is only, at the worst, a misdemeanour justified by necessity. Youth is more responsive to the idea of loyalty than to any other human sentiment, because youth is social and susceptible; but the things it will be loyal to are a matter of training. If youth is not taught that family and country are the highest objects of loyalty it will be in danger of devoting loyalty to objects inimical to family and country. Lack of proper training in this elemental principle is a crying fault of to-day, and it is a lack which accounts largely for the widespread growth of sportive, wilful, and associative lawlessness.

But a means has been found to repair in part the lack of home-training for youth in the Boy Scout movement. Applicable to boys of all classes, it appeals to every natural

youthful impulse, brings every faculty into healthful action, and at the same time enforces the principle that subordination is a real happiness in human association. It teaches also that loyalty belongs first to country, and that country is only a general name for law and order.

This, the most promising association of our time, is an outgrowth of the dozen boys whom General Baden-Powell showed how to play at Indians and Knights of King Arthur. He took them into camp and taught them woodcraft, and how the birds could be distinguished one from the other, and what great secrets Nature revealed to those who would study her. Two forces combined to make the Boy Scout movement something larger and more far-reaching than its originator had ever conceived—the greatness of the idea and its appeal to our boys. Unlike the various boys' brigades, it is not a military movement. The Scouts are peace Scouts. Within a year of its inauguration there were 100,000 Boy Scouts. Now there are—nobody knows how many. They are seen everywhere—in the slums of the East End of London, in the lowliest country parishes, in every town and hamlet from Land's End to John o' Groat's. The movement has caught on in a way which has never been equalled in the case of any similar appeal to our boys. Like a wave of enthusiasm it has swept over all Europe. It has found its way into far colonies and continents, it has overspread the islands of the Seven Seas. In Malta, Gibraltar, Singapore, Fiji, Honolulu, or Calcutta you will find Boy Scouts. In Canada they can be counted by thousands. In Australia and South Africa the Governors-General are the Chief Scouts. In France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Servia, Japan, China, and Siam—everywhere the idea has taken root. Scouts of one country make it their business to call upon their brethren in other countries—the craft has united them in one colossal brotherhood. Thus a new method has been found for cementing the brotherhood of man. The broomstick is reft from its evil association as the magical steed of witches or the Pegasus of



the spirits of darkness. We begin to regard it as a knightly lance, gracious and potent, the legacy of one of King Arthur's blood, a kind of plebeian Excalibur. At any rate, it is the badge of a young gentleman, though he come from the slums; and just as an overhanging bush told the wayfarer that a tavern was near, these long bare branches are familiar on the dusty road to bespeak help and hospitality.

It is all so simple and yet so wonderful that it is surprising the idea was not thought of years and years before. Now, the question uppermost in the mind of the average person is, How will the Scout movement influence our future manhood? To appreciate this correctly let us examine the material as it is being fashioned in the hands of the master potter.

A lad—usually at the instigation of his “pal”—presents himself at the Scout headquarters in his locality. He is at once made heartily welcome, and forthwith his initiation begins. But there are certain things he must learn before he can be enrolled and sworn in. He must know the Scout law, the Scout signs, and the Scout salute. He must understand the composition of the Union Jack, and the right way to fly it. And he must be able to tie some of the many useful knots of which the Scouts are masters. Thus, having passed as a “Tenderfoot,” he is subjected to the test of the Scout law. On Scout law depends the whole glory of the Boy Scout idea. Scout law is a creed of honour and chivalry, a magnificent code, a true and trusty guide to life; it is the heart and soul of the movement, and is in fact the articles of every faith made fascinating.

Here are the Scout's ten “articles of faith” :—

1. A Scout's honour is to be trusted.
2. A Scout is loyal.
3. A Scout's duty is to be useful, to help others, and to do a kind action every day.
4. A Scout is a friend to all, and a brother to every other Scout, no matter to what social class the other belongs.

5. A Scout is courteous.
6. A Scout is a friend to animals.
7. A Scout obeys orders.
8. A Scout smiles and whistles under all circumstances.
9. A Scout is thrifty.
10. A Scout is pure in thought, word, and deed.

Ten laws, and the most cherished of them all is the "good turn" every day. We all do our good turns daily more or less, but Scouts are trained to think of doing them—and to do them. The natural boy loathes ostentatious piety, but the appeal to his chivalry goes straight home. There is an element of the "very perfect, gentle knight" even in the worst young hooligan, who at any rate has the soul for adventure.

Again, take Scout law number 4. The Scout of Hampstead must hail him of Southwark. Tooting joins hands with Whitechapel, Brixton no longer turns up its nose at Bethnal Green. Class distinctions are sent shivered into the scrap-heap: none the less heroic a performance because the last half-century has cleared the issue for its accomplishment.

With Scout law the boys are taught the Scout signs. These are mysterious marks with meanings. All boys love to make chalk-marks, but Scouts are trained to rub them out when made. An arrow-mark points the way of the trail to be followed. A cross means "This road not to be followed." A circle within a circle means "I have gone home." At night sticks with wisps of grass round them or stones are laid on the road in similar forms so that they may be felt with the hand. The boys are taught not only to make signs but how to put a signature to them. Each patrol has its name and its call. Foxes bark, bears growl, stags roar, storks cry "korr," plovers whistle "pee-wit," hyenas make a laughing cry, boars grunt, cobras hiss, and owls hoot. All Scouts in a patrol practise the patrol call and so may communicate with each other when in hiding. The patrol leaders carry little flags, with the head of the patrol animal or bird shown in red cloth. The Scout is taught to draw his patrol animal's head, then when he makes



a Scout sign on a road he can put his signature to it: the outline head to show his patrol, and a number to show his place in a patrol. Thus his friends, finding the sign and the signature, know who made it.

Those who may still be disposed to sneer at the agile Scout when they see him in the street fully dressed and accoutred for the pursuit of one or other forms of Scoutcraft, little know the enthusiasm that lies behind the movement. The genuine Boy Scout is really never idle. All his spare time is given up to learning or to practising some of the things that scouting has taught us. Night after night he is at it, and occasionally before breakfast as well. Take at random the weekly programme of any one troop. It utilises not only every weekday evening, but two mornings in addition. On Monday there is a lecture upon some Scoutcraft topic; Tuesday is given over to physical development exercises; on Wednesday there is another lecture on some such subject as signalling; Thursday is a sort of club night; on Friday there are gymnastic exercises; and Saturday is held for outdoor practice, cooking, tent-pitching, or the like. One morning of each week is dedicated to an observation ramble in one of the parks or open spaces, and the other is set apart for swimming practice in the local public baths. Not a bad week's work, surely!

The ceremony of "swearing in" a Scout is picturesque. The lad, having mastered the elementary details which fit him to take his place in the troop, is called upon to take the Scout pledge, really a simple promise, but as binding as any oath, because it is a promise on honour. He promises: "On my honour to do my best to do my duty to God and the King; to help other people at all times; to obey the Scout law." Saying these words the boy stands at the salute—three upraised fingers of the right hand. These are to remind him of the three obligations in the oath. Thus sworn in he is enrolled as a Tenderfoot and is accordingly entitled to wear a badge and to don the Scout uniform. And so the lad pro-

ceeds from Tenderfoot to Second-class Scout, always learning something new, mastering fresh details of his craft until he qualifies as a First-class Scout, which means that he can swim fifty yards, has at least one shilling in the Bank, and is able to signal at the rate of sixteen words a minute. As a test in self-reliance he is sent on a two-days' journey alone or with another Scout. On his return he must write an intelligible report of what he has seen. Then he must know how to render first-aid in common accidents. He must understand how to stay a runaway horse. He must prove that he can make a damper, cook a hunter's stew, skin and cook a rabbit, or pluck and cook a bird. He must be able to read a map and draw sketch-maps, use an axe for felling timber, judge distance, area, size, numbers, height, and weight within twenty-five per cent. error.

He continues to qualify until he attains the proud distinction of King's Scout, which means that he has won badges of merit in such branches of Scoutcraft as seamanship, ambulance work, and signalling, and has passed a stern test in the general craft of the guide. Another important part of a Scout's curriculum is that he may qualify in almost any calling. Thus a boy gains a badge because he has passed the Scout test as a poultry farmer, as an engineer, gardener, plumber, aviator, fireman, blacksmith, dairyman, electrician, printer, interpreter, photographer, woodman, naturalist, coastguard, horseman, leather-worker, bee-farmer, etc. Other badges of merit are awarded for proficiency in other branches of work. Accordingly, employers of labour seeking trustworthy boy service will look first among Scouts, knowing that they will find boys broken to discipline and of manly spirit. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the headquarters of the organisation have formed an employment bureau in conjunction with the Labour Exchanges, where Scouts will be assisted in securing skilled occupations when in need. The training also includes, for those boys who live near the water, organised practice of seafaring. It is not intended necessarily to send them to sea



as a profession, but to give them something of the hardiness and pluck of the seaman, again through a medium which thoroughly appeals to them. "Sea Scouts" — of whom Admiral Lord Charles Beresford is the chief—are divided into two branches—Coastguard Scouts and Seaman Scouts, and their training follows on those lines. When vessels are available for training there is no doubt that there will be a rapid development in the numbers and efficiency of the Sea Scouts. Hulks have been fitted up as guardships, and barges have been brought into service. But far too many patrols have had to content themselves with a room, or even a shed, ashore.

The ordinary naval routine practised by Boys' Naval Brigades is not the training Sea Scouts receive. They are taught to make sails, make and mend clothes, besides the manifold acts of seamanship which go to make the complete and perfect "handyman." There are three ranks of Sea Scouts:—

Waterman is a Sea Scout who has obtained badges for "boatman" and "swimmer."

Coastwarden is a waterman who has obtained badges for "signaller" and "rescuer."

A King's Sea Scout must be a First-class Scout and a coastwarden, and in addition must have a badge as "watchman" or "pilot" or "sea fisherman."

Perhaps it ought to be explained that the patrol is the unit of organisation in the Boy Scout scheme. It consists of some six or eight boys under a senior boy as patrol leader. A troop consists of at least three patrols, and to each patrol leader is given full responsibility for the behaviour of his patrol at all times. The patrol is the unit for work and play, and in camp it is usual for each patrol to be encamped on a separate spot. Responsibility and competitive rivalry are thus at once established, and a good standard of development is ensured throughout the troop. Corporate sentiment, or *esprit de corps*, is the essential condition of sportsmanship. General Baden-Powell, by means of devices at once simple and ingenious,

established that condition. The member of a corps will do for the common cause what cannot be done by himself alone. It is extraordinary how powerful a tradition has been established among the Boy Scouts during the few years since they came into being. The fact offers a remarkable proof of the inherent capacity of the race for self-organisation and its natural respect for the rule of law. The English boy or the English man is seldom at his best unless he is under discipline—it might almost be said, indeed, that in default of discipline he is at once useless and troublesome; but it must be a particular brand of discipline, which is founded and maintained on the principle of fair play, which, again, is a very different thing from the Latin conception of social equality, or the Teutonic notion of enforced obedience to an iron rule. Sir Robert Baden-Powell's idea was not new, but it was the application of an old idea to new conditions. The Church, the Navy, the Army, the Civil Service, the learned professions—all these corporate societies are held together by law and tradition, written or unwritten. General Baden-Powell has imposed the same eternal principle upon those among the youth of England who would never enjoy the opportunity of learning it at a public school.

And what is this magical movement which has so completely captivated the boyish instinct in many lands? The answer is easy enough. It is not so much the goal to which it aspires as the means by which it seeks to reach it that has made the Boy Scout movement the wonderful success it has proved. Its primary object is to cultivate all those qualities which make for good citizenship—truthfulness, integrity, honour, self-reliance, trustworthiness, discipline, and loyalty to God and country. Other organisations have similar objects in view, but the pride of the Boy Scout movement is that it endeavours to foster those attributes through channels that appeal directly to a boy's own peculiar interests. Everything prosy or dull, everything that tends towards boredom, is ruthlessly excluded. Upon his boyish hobbies and aspirations are engrafted the old



code of honour of the knights, and out of the combination the boy is gently led on to the cultivation of those qualities that go to the making of a sturdy, loyal, self-reliant citizen—not a helpless creature whom the first mischance overwhelms, but a handy, resourceful individual whom difficulties do not daunt, who can turn the humblest materials to account, who is as courteous to those beneath him as he is loyal to those set over him, who has disciplined himself to face difficulties cheerfully, who has ever before him the Scout motto, "Be prepared."

Most of us are familiar with the terrible boating accident which befell a party of Boy Scouts recently in the Isle of Sheppey and which resulted in the loss of nine boys, stout-hearted little Britishers, who showed every promise of growing up to a fine and worthy manhood. Some of them had been rescued from the slums of South London, and drilled and shaped by the Dulwich Mission into sturdy types. Tragic and pathetic to the last degree as was their death, it was not in vain. It will sow the seeds of heroism among their comrade Scouts in all parts of the country. For such a death opens the door for others to a deeper life.

It is through the Scouts that a boy is led on to the paths of success, and is enabled, instead of striving after the unattainable, to make the best use of the material at hand. Scoutcraft contains that element of romance, combined with a suggestion of possible danger, which boys love. It is helpful because it is no half-hearted scheme. It does not deal with a boy on a Sunday only, as if he had a soul with a body of no importance, or with the blissful forgetfulness of the influence of the body on the soul. The very novelty of the method of the Scout movement impressed the boyhood of the land as much as anything. Boys found that the movement fostered their natural habits of observation, encouraged all sorts of manly exercises, taught them to read the stars, to follow the tracks of animals, to note the habits of birds, to tie the knots that seamen use, to kindle camp fires, to improvise bridges across streams, to find their way

by maps, to fashion all sorts of natty articles with their hands, and to do the hundred-and-one other things that a boy loves to do if you will but show him the way.

The red-letter day in the history of the movement was when King George, who willingly consented to act as Patron of the organisation, inspected the Scouts at the Royal Review at Windsor in July 1911. The rally was a marvel of organisation; thirty thousand healthy youngsters coming from all parts of the Empire required some superintending, and it is to the lads themselves that credit must be given for the remarkable facility with which they were marshalled, cared for, and for the success of the review. Never before was there such a sight or such enthusiasm.

And so on, from the highest in the land, all have shown a keen desire to become in some way attached to the movement. Lords-Lieutenant serve as Presidents of County Associations, retired officers take up the duties of Commissioners, lords and commoners alike all evince a great desire to assist in the reclamation of the "slum child." In Germany autocratic noblemen delight in raising their own special troops, made up usually of the poorest lads they can find; the Tsar has approved of the idea; whilst the movement is hailed with enthusiasm in every quarter of the civilised world.

As to the point of view that the movement is valuable because the lads assimilate lessons in patriotism, one has to use more guarded language, since that aspect of the movement has been mischievously misinterpreted. The statement is made by a good many people that the creation of a body like this is a direct incentive to militarism, and that Sir Robert Baden-Powell is responsible for giving birth to that swashbuckler spirit which sets nations by the ears. How ludicrous this assertion is has been demonstrated over and over again, on platforms and in the public press. The movement in its essence is strictly non-military. All its ideals are peace ideals—so much so, that there are people who are ready to regard the growth of the movement in many lands



as an influence tending towards international peace. That the movement is also non-political scarcely requires to be stated, although certain Socialists have been known to look upon it with disfavour, possibly because it is not sworn to abolish or destroy anything. The very fact that men of all creeds have actively interested themselves in the movement proves beyond cavil that it is absolutely non-sectarian in its character. No doubt, the authorities at the head of the movement are all the better pleased with a Scout if he regularly attends the church in which he has been brought up; but it does not interfere in the least with a boy's religious upbringing. It leaves that to the clergy and to parents. At the same time it directly and strongly inculcates the moral virtues of truthfulness, honesty, forbearance, kindness; and were it for no more than the influence it exerts in favour of temperance and against the smoking habit, the Boy Scout movement would deserve well of the whole community. The general public have been quick to recognise the advantages of the Boy Scouts' training. There is room, however, for public aid in committee work, and in providing men who have the time and the ability to acquire and impart the varied knowledge comprised in a Scout's studies. A medical man will find a sphere of usefulness in relieving the Scoutmaster of the work of giving instruction in first-aid; a member of a swimming club may superintend the acquisition of an accomplishment which is obligatory on all Scouts, and which should be followed up by tuition in the methods of the Life Saving Society for rescue and resuscitation. Without that knowledge the would-be rescuer's life is in peril, and his gallantry is in vain if he knows not how to fan the spark of vitality.

By a recent development in the formation of Scoutmasters' training corps it is hoped that the problem of how to obtain good Scoutmasters is in a fair way towards solution. Scoutmasters, many of them workers in connection with lads' clubs, find the scouting work of unique interest. They have more

than their reward as they watch the developing intelligence of their charges, see evidence of the growth of chivalry in their hearts, and know that they have changed boys who were good for nothing into Scouts who are willing and ready to undertake anything.

By an act which met with universal public approval and sent a thrill of delight through the ranks of this great organisation, the Boy Scouts obtained a Royal Charter of Incorporation last January. Henceforward the body is known as the Boy Scouts' Association, and thus official countenance and approval is extended to the movement, which has outlived the last traces of any possible hostility or ridicule.

As to the movement itself, it stands in need of no justification. On many grounds, but chiefly on the grounds of educational training and patriotic welfare, the creation of the Boy Scouts has grown to the dimensions of a national event. Sir Robert Baden-Powell's foresight has been amply rewarded by the steady development of a scheme big with important issues, which in the eyes of those who come after us may very likely appear one of the capital enterprises of the early years of the twentieth century. The movement is essentially a training, a discipline, a suppression of unregenerate instincts, a first education in the difficult school of unselfish citizenship. Let any close observer of the habits and customs of our young people ask himself if he does not think the habits of obedience inculcated by this and similar movements are just what is necessary for the rising generation. The boys and girls of to-day are the men and women of to-morrow, and because the Scout movement is helping to build up a brave and self-reliant race in this country it should commend itself to the whole-hearted approval of the people. It is a great work, and General Baden-Powell will be famous as the originator of the Boy Scout movement at some period when the defence of Mafeking is but a memory.

W. CECIL PRICE.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### "THE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF GOD."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 394.)

PROFESSOR OVERSTREET has given a very fair indication of the tendency of much of the thought of the present time. Whether it is to become the ultimately prevalent one is a question of much wider moment and of greater issue. We are shown in the article how in human society the care of the pack changed into the importance of the class and then into the value of the individual. Through action and reaction, Society is reshaping itself. In former times the few were masters, the many obeyed; but we are tending to a period when there shall be free scope for all, and in that full equitable society, where each individual shall enjoy abundant life, God shall be found in the spiritual unity of the mass life. That this law of evolution extends throughout the Cosmos, including the so-called inorganic elements, the author aims to show. Life is movement, God is in the making, man as the self-conscious part of Nature has to help in the progress, and in the end he will recognise God as himself. That there is any perfect Being to whom man can lift up his eyes will be discovered to be an error. Well, some of us have heard the same gospel from Mr Bernard Shaw.

Now, it is quite possible to agree with the whole trend of Professor Overstreet's argument, and yet demur to the conclusion because some very important factors have been overlooked.

We are not told whether there is any will in the universe apart from man's. We may ask, therefore, whether this law of evolution, considering its already achieved results, must not be deemed purposive? And can we think of a purpose without postulating will? Unless that will be intelligent, how can we account for its results and look forward with assurance to the great consummation presented to us? Limiting our outlook at the moment to Nature apart from man, we must all recognise that law prevails there which is not of man's making. The law of gravitation did not come into being when Newton discovered it, nor were the lands round the South Pole called into being as Amundsen journeyed there. However we may fine down the laws of matter to a process of action and reaction, for all practical

purposes Nature and man have stood apart and will continue to do so. Nature becomes man's servant in so far as he learns her laws and can harness her. But only in obedience lies his safety. One false step, one act of inadvertence, and with, it may be, terrible results to himself, she asserts her independence.

Now, when we turn to man himself we must ask, From whence does he derive that urge in his nature which continually prompts him to develop better conditions? In other words, How does he come by his ideal? No man has ever said, "Go to, let me make an ideal." He could not have coined the word had not the thing itself been given him first.

Take another faculty of humanity, such as the perception of beauty. Is not the pleasure we feel derived from a sense of something given, something which lifts the soul to the height of ecstasy which could never be derived from the self? In the silent Arctic night, when the stars shine with a brilliancy that can hardly be imagined, and the mystic rays of the Aurora Borealis flash their beams as from an unseen hand into the still firmament, the consciousness of the presence of an unseen power can hardly be resisted. And if that feeling be changed into terror, as a floating palace representing man's last word in mechanical inventiveness meets destruction against an iceberg, does not the conviction become overwhelming that man must always reckon with the laws of another?

These arguments may be old-fashioned, but they are not exhausted, though they may be overlooked in crowded cities. But if they do not appeal to all, it is through insensitiveness and not because they have arrived at a higher range of thought. Whether we look at man's environment or at his own nature, we find something given and not created by him. But that does not debar him from possessing the creative faculty within limits.

Then, again, the conception of God as the spiritual unity of the mass life has its own difficulties. We are not told, for instance, that the individuals themselves will have attained perfection, but in the unitary life which they enjoy will reside their God. As I follow the argument, the combined life may not be perfect, but it will be higher than themselves, and as such will be *objective*. It is difficult to see how the whole can be greater than its parts, especially when we are dealing with individual souls, every one with an independent will. But, to take an illustration, of which, so far as it favours the Professor's argument, I make him a present: in a musical piece played by an orchestra each part may be harmonious in itself or otherwise, but there will be a harmony of the whole which depends upon the combined action; I am not certain that the players themselves are conscious of that harmony to the extent that a listener at a distance may be, in which case, as we all have our parts to play in the orchestra of life, no one will see his God. But, in any case, before that piece of music can be played, some one mind must have conceived the whole. If we say that has been by Society, we are faced again with the problem of the origin of ideals.



But is there any evidence that Society will form and be obedient to such an ideal unless it feels the constraining influence of a power which makes for righteousness? Is not every human invention applied to evil purposes as well as good? And are we so certain that the worth of the individual which later times are said to have developed is going to be respected if man is sole master of his destinies? In the United States it is becoming recognised that the power of a few super-wealthy men is greater than the State, and might be used for evil. Year by year brings fresh evidence of the power of capital to draw the riches of the earth to itself and to nullify any rise in wages by raising the price of materials. The simple law of action and reaction is just as likely to lead to a new serfdom as to the full enjoyable development of the individual.

If such a disaster does not occur, it will be because there are factors at work which the author of "The Democratic Conception of God" has not brought to the front. All that the writer says can have our fullest assent, but only when we put it in its proper focus, and regard it as the work of an immanent God who is also transcendent and self-revealing. Through His transcendence we believe in His reserve of power to make the crooked paths straight and the rough places smooth, and through His self-revealing we believe He makes Himself known to man just so far as the mind of man is prepared to receive Him. It is not through a blind law of evolution that humanity will rise to its goal, but by obedience to the law of righteousness and the revelation of the spirit. As in the material world, so in the moral and spiritual, perfect freedom is only to be obtained through perfect obedience. And transgression means more or less destruction. It is in the power of such a belief that men and women have worked for the redemption of Society.

In the theory of a God in the making, nothing is said of the destiny of the countless souls whose lives have helped to build the edifice though they have not seen the vision. It is therefore imperfect.

The kingdom of the Spirit is at hand, we are told, and we give our joyful assent—the qualities of the Spirit were defined of old. But neither the kingdom of the Son nor the Father has passed. The kingdom must be the reign of goodwill which was incarnate in the Son; without goodwill the kingdom cannot come, and faith in the Father's power is the guarantee of the kingdom. Through it was the Son perfected, and without its check the Judases of Society will be ever ready to betray. And if with Paul we believe that God is He "in whom we live and move and have our being," so let us also believe with him that in the final consummation "we shall know even as we are *known*."

EDWARD CAPLETON.

LONDON.

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## "MODERNISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONSCIOUSNESS."

*(Hibbert Journal, January 1913, p. 329.)*

MR COORE fails to distinguish between the two aspects of dogma which relate severally to the intellect and the religious sentiment. Yet such distinction is vital.

The claim of dogma to be the expression (as far as it goes) of absolute intellectual truth can no longer be maintained, except its historical origin and development are ignored and the claim be based on philosophical and theological assumptions which will not bear the test of criticism. On the other hand, religious sentiment requires no such absolute support, regarding dogma merely as symbolic. The first part of Mr Coore's paper bears eloquent testimony to the fact that such deep, underlying sentiment is the real basis of religious ideas.

The potent spell which the Mass exercises upon all who have come under its influence depends upon a complex of such sentiments, some very primitive. But what Catholic, when he kneels before the altar, troubles himself about questions of Metaphysics or History? Transubstantiation may symbolise the close interrelation between the material and the spiritual, the seen and the unseen, the temporal and the eternal. In any case it will represent the Real, perpetual and worshipful, Presence of Christ in His Church, in its double aspect as an extension of the Incarnation and of the Atonement. Both these great ideas owe their power, not to the irrational rationalism of dogmatic theology (seen especially in the various theories of the Atonement), but to the strength of that appeal: "*Sic Deus dilexit mundum.*" It is undeniable that these, as all other sentiments, have their intellectual counterpart, and the ideas to which they correspond are equally wide, and therefore common to all great religions; while, so far as those ideas are capable of being stated in terms, they are neither dogmatic nor final. But, in relation to mere theological propositions or dogmatic definitions, it is sentiment which supplies the real life of the religious idea at the base of them. If this is so, it is surely fatal to seek to defend the faith by identifying it, as does Mr Coore, with a particular dogmatic interpretation of history. For, without entering at all into questions of "Higher Criticism," it is quite evident that, with our imperfect knowledge of events as they actually occurred in the past, it is often possible to interpret early records in more ways than one. Under these circumstances, to claim for a particular interpretation the absolute truth denied to its rivals is tantamount either to an assumption of personal infallibility (as in Anglicanism and other forms of Protestantism), or to the less unreasonable, because more modest and undivided, claim that it resides in the official Head of the Church. The latter, of course, is Mr Coore's position. It is one which, as an orthodox Catholic, he is quite justified in maintaining. Where, however, he makes an undoubted and great error is in writing as if he imagined that



such a claim could "share" a divided empire with scientific method (p. 347). This last can be reconciled with "the Catholic consciousness" regarded as religious sentiment. From this aspect, that "consciousness" cannot be shaken by historical criticism, but, on the contrary, receives support from it; for, even though Christ did not (as a dry historical fact) institute the Mass, it has developed (with assimilation of Hellenic elements) from the farewell meal, and its unbroken stream of liturgical tradition and worship is the outcome of the original impulse and influence of His whole life and teaching.

But, from the point of view of science, there can no more be dogmatic history than dogmatic mathematics or chemistry. Science concerns herself not with what ought to have happened from the standpoint of a religious, a materialistic, or any other "consciousness," but with what actually did happen. This may be, and often is, very difficult to determine, but it is the only question which interests Science, whose methods, while indifferent to sentiment, are the exact antithesis of infallibility, whether the latter be personal or ecclesiastical.

H. C. CORBRANCE.

HOVE.

### "CONSCIOUSNESS AS A CAUSE OF NEURAL ACTIVITY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 378.)

THE author of the above article says: "The whole of mental therapeutics depends on recognising consciousness as an efficient cause." He then refers to "faith-healers" and "hysterias." There are, however, the so-called "magnetic" healers, who require no "faith" on the part of their patients and need use no "suggestion" on their part. Where should they be classed? The present writer has two friends who have done an immense amount of good by the wonderful healing powers they possess. The patients often come as a last resource, having been given up by doctors.

Similarly, in the very interesting article by Mr F. Carrel in the *Nineteenth Century* (December 1909, p. 1076), the opinion is given that "the supposed curative effects (vainly evoked by Mesmer) have not been proved unless it be in the form of suggestion."

One of the two has been good enough to answer some questions as to the character of his power and what it has effected. He has replied as follows below. The patients referred to are all living, and either they or many others would verify Dr T. D'Aute-Hooper's statements about them if desired. I will only add that, knowing him very well and being in frequent correspondence with him, I am quite satisfied that he is writing in perfect good faith and that what he here says is true.

It was with the view and hope of advancing scientific knowledge of this remarkable phenomenon, that I prevailed on him to allow me to publish this communication in reply to my questions.

"Yes, I have had a good deal of experience extending over nearly twenty years. Literally, thousands of cases have passed through my hands. They have come from all parts of England.

"As to 'suggestion,' I very rarely use it, except in mental cases where I feel it is necessary.

"My curative powers require no 'faith.' Patients have not minced matters in telling me beforehand that they have none. Yet in spite of this lack of faith I have cured them. Twelve months ago a Mr — came. He had a most painful form of paralysis in his right hand and arm. He had had six months' daily massage treatment; his hand and arm had been useless for sixteen years. He did all his writing with his left hand, as he could not hold a pen with his right. He was terribly hard-headed and sceptical, and told me he had no faith whatever, but had come as he had been very strongly urged to do so. I gave him treatment *without contact*. He was amazed at the influence and sensation, which he had never experienced before with the previous treatments he had had. I have his first attempt to write after the first treatment, and each week afterwards. After only *four* treatments his writing was perfect.

"Another case was Mr Thomas —, who came to me from Cheltenham. He had seen sixty specialists and had had 1028 massage and electrical treatments without any beneficial result. Yet in twenty minutes, after magnetic passes, I gave him a useful arm in place of a useless one. He was an ex-pugilist. There was not much material there for suggestion!

"Yesterday a Mr — came to see me. He had been a terrible cripple for about five years, and had been operated upon and had seen the best specialists he could. He also told me he had no faith; but that his sister, who was a school governess, insisted upon his coming. Well, all I can say is, he is a credit to magnetic-therapeutic treatment.

"The above cures will show that neither 'faith' nor 'suggestion' is by any means necessary; for the patient *feels* the influence proceeding from my finger-tips. If they do *not* feel it, then nothing can be done for them.

"You next ask as to the nature of the cures. I believe I have treated pretty well every known disease with beneficial results. I have cured warts with a single touch. They take two or three weeks to die away. I have cured many different kinds of tumour, paralysis, rheumatism, liver, kidney and stomach troubles, fits, insanity, skin diseases, ulcers, blindness, deafness, and even cancer.

"I do *not* treat malignant cancer, as I am afraid of contracting the complaint myself. Some years ago, after treating a case, my arms broke out with sores, because I omitted to wash my hands immediately after the treatment.

"I have had a great number of cases that were *really incurable*; but magnetic treatment always eased the pain and has given sleep.

"Your next question was, 'How does the power seem to act in myself?' However cold my hands may be, a few minutes after commencing a treat-



ment they get very hot, and my body *seems* to be filled, as it were, by some power from an *external* source, and the magnetic 'fluid' pulsates, something like this — — — — —, the blanks being pauses. The influence does *not* pass in a continuous stream, but pulsates, as stated. This action seems to last twenty minutes and then gradually subsides, until I know that I cannot do any more good and I regain my normal condition; or, if it has been a hard case (low in vitality), my temperature is below the normal for some hour or so.

"Within five minutes after commencing treatment I can tell if I can do any good; as there is an (shall I say) unifying or intermingling or sympathetic intermixing of magnetic forces.

"I always like to leave my patients as soon as possible after treatment; as, if I do not, the magnetic force seems to return to me.

"With regard to the patient's sensations, if I am treating a painful or acute case he complains of an intense cutting pain the moment my finger-tips come directly over the injured or diseased part. This I find to be very useful, especially in obscure cases, in locating the mischief—which quickly changes to a warm, soothing glow pervading the whole body, and generally accompanied with the desire to sleep.

"Some describe the influence as being like a cool and soothing breeze; others say it is as if I were spreading cobwebs over them and gently pulling.

"If I am treating the spine for paralysis, the patient sways as if the magnetic influence were pulling him.

"With regard to mesmerism and hypnotism, I have had a good deal of experience with them, but I have made no use of them for several years, as I had such peculiar effects myself that it made me timid. In one case, if the patient was in one room and I in another, I could put up my hand without a word and produce catalepsy in her, although she still retained her mental faculties. I have, in fact, had many similar cases. I will give one more case of paralysis.

"A baker fell from his van and injured his spine; he became deprived of all movement from the shoulders downwards, nor could he sleep. He left the hospital after eight days, still very weak and suffering great pain. I then saw him; after sponging the back with vinegar and water, I made passes, *without contact*, from the head down the spine and off the hips, taking every third or fourth pass off the heels.

"Immediately my fingers came directly over the injured part, the force proceeding from my finger-tips made him groan. I made many passes with my hands *closed*, but when over the injured part no effect whatever was produced; this, therefore, proved that the pain was not produced by the imagination, as it was quite impossible for him to see if my hands were open or closed, as he was helpless and lying upon his face.

"After magnetising him for fifteen minutes he spoke of a soothing influence and a warm glow pervading his whole body. Two minutes afterwards he was fast asleep, and remained so whilst I finished magnetising,

bandaging, and turning him over—he did not awaken during the whole process, nor for seven hours.

“I treated him every night for a week, then every other night for a fortnight. At the end of three weeks he was able to sit up; in a month he got about with sticks, and afterwards the progress was most rapid.”

My other friend, living in South Wales, and High Sheriff of his county, has much the same curative powers. He simply cures by “passes” of his hands over the patient. I asked him if he would cure my servant of chronic neuralgia in the head. He “treated” her twice. She has never had any return since; that is now upwards of two years ago.

I myself was troubled with gastritis and much abdominal pain. I wrote to ask if he could cure me at a distance. In a few days I received a letter asking me, “Did you feel free from pain on Saturday?” I had noticed that the pain *did* leave me on that day, and wrote to tell him so. He replied that he *had* been treating me, and felt for some time *all my pains himself*!

This “cure” took place half a year ago, and I have had no trouble since. I find it is of common occurrence for the operator to have to bear the pains of his patients!

In his last letter he tells me of a remarkable cure of his servant’s foot. It is as follows:—

“Our cook upset some boiling gravy and scalded her foot badly. Blisters were formed, one being as large as a four-shilling piece. I made passes over the foot, when she felt it become quite free from pain. She worked her foot about and then walked across the room.

“Next morning she actually forgot she had a bandage! On removing it the blisters were all gone, the flesh being free from inflammation and quite normal.”

This is only one of very many patients he has cured.

In all these cases, sometimes the patient *knows* that the healer is making passes, though there may be neither faith nor suggestion: yet in others the patient is quite unconscious of his efforts, so that “consciousness as a cause of neural activity” may be totally absent.

GEORGE HENSLOW.

BOURNEMOUTH.



# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

I PROPOSE to devote attention, in the present issue, first of all to a number of works dealing with the philosophy of religion. Leaving aside the second volume of Dr Bosanquet's great book, which will be dealt with by another pen, there have been recently many contributions to the subject that call for notice. In the forefront may be placed the two volumes of Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1910-12 by Professor John Watson, well known by his works on Kant and other writings, entitled *The Interpretation of Religious Experience* (Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, 1912). The ten lectures comprising the first volume are historical, and discuss the speculations of Plato and Aristotle, of the great Christian theologians, of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, of Kant and Hegel. Interspersed with the exposition is much acute criticism. Aristotle's conception of "matter" as the persistent element which prevents the perfect realisation of the "form" leads logically, it is argued, to the severance of any real connection between God and the world; a world which from an ultimate point of view is imperfect cannot be the product of a perfect being. In reference to Spinoza, the author maintains that, whilst it is true that intellect and will in God ought not to be conceived as separate, it does not by any means follow that they cannot be distinguished, and that the denial of such distinction leads to a denial of self-conscious intelligence. As against Leibniz, it is contended that the nature of God must involve his relation to the world, and the nature of finite beings their relation to one another and to God. The criticism of Hegel is made use of in dealing with the Kantian philosophy, and the latter is blamed for first reducing reality to pure being, and then condemning the concrete system of nature because it is not identical with this ghost of abstraction. Hegel himself holds not that all particular things must be minds, but that all particular beings exist, and can only exist, in a universe that is in itself intelligible or

rational, without implying that every thinking being must be even dimly and blindly aware of this fact. The second volume contains thirteen lectures, the aim of which is to present a constructive theory based upon what the author takes to be the essential principles of Hegel's speculation. The ground is prepared by an examination of the position of radical empiricism and of that which is called the new realism. By the former, the fallacy is committed of first admitting, under the guise of particular facts, the unity and intelligibility of the world, and then plausibly denying such unity and intelligibility just because it has been assumed. The objections urged against the "new realism" seem to me to miss the mark. For example, it is laid down, as though it were an incontestable fact, that "'green' has no existence apart from wave-lengths of ether in contact with the ocular nerve," which is just exactly the dogma most of the thinkers referred to would call in question. According to the idealism developed by Professor Watson, the religious interests of man can be preserved only by a theology which affirms that all forms of being are manifestations of a single spiritual principle in identification with which the true life of man consists. I think the main difficulty confronting this mode of philosophising is exhibited when one asks for explanation of a term which is constantly recurring in the pages of the present work—the term *manifestation*. What precisely is meant when it is said that an infinite self-conscious being *manifests* himself not only *to* but *in* the realm of finite minds and of nature? No idealistic writer, so far as I am aware, has ever come seriously to close quarters with this question, and until that is done the whole idealistic construction is left hanging in the air. From the pen of Professor Josiah Royce there has been published a thoughtful and suggestive little book, *The Sources of Religious Insight* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912). Defining religious insight as insight into the need and into the way of salvation, Professor Royce discusses individual and social experience, reason, will, life, and sorrow, as sources of such insight. Particularly valuable, in view of some current controversies, is the chapter on "The Office of Reason," in which it is shown that abstract conceptions are, in the living and actual work of thought, a preparation for intuitions and experiences that lie on higher levels than those which, apart from abstract conceptions, we men can reach. The way too in which the thesis is defended that sorrow and evil ought not to be abolished but to be idealised is distinctly fresh and helpful. A different point of view is presented by Dr G. F. Barbour in a carefully written essay on *The Ethical Approach to Theism* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1913). The chief characteristic of theistic, as contrasted with pantheistic, religious thought, is, he urges, that it finds the final reality in the Good rather than in the Whole. Its method is selective and teleological, and it discerns the answer to the problem of the universe less through an induction than through an imperative,—the imperative of the Good upon the will of man. Dr Barbour calls to his aid in developing this position the doctrine of "degrees of truth and reality," but unfortunately he does not attempt to grapple with the many



perplexities that beset that doctrine. The essay concludes with an interesting treatment of Aristotle's theology, and an attempt to show how transcendence and immanence may be seen to be two phases or moments of man's deeper experience. In the volume of essays by Professor G. Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine* (London: Dent, 1913), several religious problems are discussed, but somewhat slightly and contemptuously. "What," it is asked, in dealing with "Modernism and Christianity," "is this whole phenomenon of religion but human experience interpreted by human imagination? And what is the modernist, who embraces it all, but a freethinker, with a sympathetic interest in religious illusions?" Modernism, we are assured, is an ambiguous and unstable thing. "It is the love of all Christianity in those who perceive that it is all a fable. It is the historic attachment to his church of a Catholic who has discovered that he is a pagan." To any reader of Tyrrell's *Autobiography* this will appear a singularly inept and unwarranted judgment. The essays on the philosophies of Bergson and Bertrand Russell contain some well-said things, but do not get within sight of the main principles of either of these philosophers. This is the way in which Mr Russell's ethical doctrine is rendered: "In the realm of eternal essences, before anything exists, there are certain essences that have this remarkable property, that they ought to exist, or at least that, if anything exists, it ought to conform to them. What exists, however, is deaf to this moral emphasis in the eternal; nature exists for no reason. . . . This good, however, is somehow good notwithstanding; so that there is an abysmal wrong in its not being obeyed." The essay on Shelley seems to me the best in the book. The author has evidently here a congenial theme. Shelley's own nature, he thinks, was the purest, tenderest, richest, and most rational nature ever poured forth in verse. Principal W. B. Selbie's monograph on *Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1913) will supply a want that has long been felt. Whilst drawing chiefly from the *Glaubenslehre* and the *Reden*, Dr Selbie makes use also of the other works in his very careful account of the philosophy of religion and the theology of his author. Emphasis is laid upon Schleiermacher's conception of religion as an original endowment of human consciousness as such, upon his method of taking actual religious experience as the subject of his investigation, and of building upon the data which it provides. The way was thus prepared for a psychology of religion and for the comparative study of religions. As an interesting piece of psychological analysis one may refer to Professor Royce's paper on "George Fox as a Mystic" in the *Harvard Theological Review* (January 1913). Professor Royce tries to show the place that the experiences of silent worship occupied in the mental life of Fox himself, and why Fox found this form of what is technically called mysticism a valuable feature of his religious consciousness. I would call attention also to Canon Hastings Rashdall's treatment of "The Problem of Evil" in the *Interpreter* for January. Canon Rashdall seeks a solution of the problem by means of the conception

of an internal or original limitation of power on the part of a perfectly righteous divine will. Just as it is not necessary to the omnipotence of God to suppose that He can change the past, or render the equation  $2+2=4$  false, so it is not necessary to His omnipotence to suppose that He can bring about, in the world of existing fact, anything or everything whatsoever. In short, if God is creatively active, He necessarily and *ipso facto* limits Himself.

The appearance of the remaining volumes of the new edition of Renouvier's *Essais de critique générale* has to be recorded. The second essay, *Traité de psychologie rationnelle d'après les principes du criticisme* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1912), fills two volumes. The book is divided into three parts. In the first, which deals with man and his constituent functions, the subjects handled coincide more closely with those that are commonly described as psychological; in the second, which is concerned primarily with the problem of certitude and its foundation in liberty, there is worked out the doctrine, characteristic of Renouvier, of contingency, and a theory of the classification of the sciences; and in the third, which treats of the probabilities touching the moral order of the world, the themes discussed are immortality, liberty, and God, where Kant is followed in taking the practical reason as the clue to the unseen world, but is departed from in regard to the non-phenomenal nature of that world. The third and concluding essay, *Les principes de la nature* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1912), occupies one volume, and in it Renouvier develops his theory of matter, of life, and of the origin and destiny of man. The new edition of *Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke*, edited by Professor Paul Deussen, of Kiel, is making steady progress, and Band ix. has just appeared in two separate parts (München: Piper & Co., 1913). It contains the *Philosophische Vorlesungen*, now for the first time collected together and published in complete form. Much of the material of these lectures was incorporated in Schopenhauer's various treatises, but the lectures have an interest of their own which quite justifies their inclusion in Professor Deussen's sumptuous *Ausgabe*. The first part presents a "Theorie des gesammten Vorstellens, Denkens und Erkennens," and the second part a "Metaphysik der Natur, des Schönen und der Sitten." Another volume of the valuable *Neudrucke seltener philosophischer Werke*, undertaken by the *Kantgesellschaft*, has been issued—namely, Salomon Maimon's *Versuch einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens*, edited by B. C. Engel (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1912). Maimon was an acute critic of the Kantian philosophy, and in this book, which was originally published in 1794, stress is laid upon many of the difficulties which have been pressed by writers of quite recent times. In the current number of *Logos* (iii. 3) there is contained an elaborate article on "Salomon Maimons theoretische Philosophie und ihr Ort in einem System des Kritizismus," by Friedrich Kuntze, in which justice is done to Maimon as a thinker and writer.

Now that Nietzsche's books have been translated into English, it is, I suppose, inevitable that there should appear expositions of his teaching and



estimates of its significance. For myself, I cannot see that his productions belong to the literature of philosophy at all. But that opinion is not shared by those who find in them what I cannot find. An enthusiastic admirer, Dr G. Chatterton Hill, has given to the press a goodly volume, entitled *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (London : Ouseley, 1913), which will no doubt reach a large circle of readers. The author considers Nietzsche's idea that our concepts of knowledge, and the categories of the understanding, are empirical in origin, and take their rise as instruments of the Will to Power of the species in the struggle for existence, to be certainly more rational than Kant's theory of the origin of the categories. The central thought of Nietzsche he takes to be that the Superman has the task of creating new values, and must look on the masses as *Werkzeuge*, as tools, which he, the sculptor, needs in order to shape an ideal for humanity in the coming generations. Dr F. C. S. Schiller writes in the *Quarterly R.* for January also on "The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche," and maintains that both in his theory of knowledge and in his theory of morals Nietzsche is immensely suggestive, and even by his very errors stimulates to further progress. The theory of knowledge is apparently this. Truth itself is false; all the objects that the intellect respects are illusions. Truth is merely that kind of error without which a certain species of living beings cannot exist. But one wonders wherein either the novelty or the suggestiveness of this kind of thing is supposed to lie. The little volume by M. A. Mügge, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, in "The People's Books" (London : Jack, 1913), deserves to be mentioned. In four chapters on "Nietzsche's Life," "Beyond Good and Evil," the "Antichrist," and the "Superman," there is given a carefully written account of Nietzsche's doctrines. As an antidote to those doctrines, perhaps one can hardly do better than read Professor Rudolf Eucken's article on "Knowledge and Life" (*Phil. R.*, January 1913), written, as he tells us, to introduce his new book, *Erkennen und Leben*, to his American friends. Eucken protests against a conception of life that is centred upon the natural conditions and welfare of man, and denies that from this point of view knowledge, especially a theory of knowledge, can arise at all. In order to explain knowledge, he argues, a life is demanded which is not merely the fulfilment of man's desires, but which transforms and ennobles him, freeing him from the narrowness and littleness which pertain to his natural species. Such a life-principle he believes to be inherent in the spiritual nature of man, and to be involved in the history of the human world. All the possessions of the spiritual life—the social, the ethical, the æsthetic—are not mere means to human well-being, but ends in themselves. By their very nature they are separated as widely as possible from utility, and reveal the nature of reality.

The most important paper in the current number of *Mind* (January 1913) is the first part of an exhaustive article by Professor S. Alexander on "Collective Willing and Truth." Proceeding from the position previously elucidated by him that every mental process is a form of conation, Professor Alexander advances here to the consideration of good-

ness and truth in their affinity to one another—a problem which emerges when collective willing is taken into account. Good conduct and true thinking are departments of right willing in general, and both imply the stripping off from the individual will of personal idiosyncrasy. Both goodness and truth depend in the first place on the recognition by one man of consciousness in others, and secondly upon intersubjective intercourse. The recognition of other minds as conscious subjects depends on *direct* experience to that effect. The clue would seem to be furnished in those elementary experiences, on the level of instinct, where co-operation, reciprocation, or rivalry, is necessary in order that the experience should have its full flavour. We cannot *contemplate* even our own minds, much less the minds of others, and while we *enjoy* our own we do not *enjoy* the mind of another (contemplation and enjoyment being understood in the author's technical sense). We know *that* there is a foreign mind, something of our own rank, not a mere physical thing; but our knowledge of *what* it is is symbolic. We transfer the contents of our own enjoyment to this foreign being, and thus obtain assurance of it grounded on direct experience. Intersubjective intercourse does not account for the *objectivity* of knowledge; it accounts only for its impersonality. The fully known object is a contribution from many minds which bring their various information about the same or like or unlike things into a common stock. But the objects in question are recognised from the beginning as extra-mental. Goodness is the coherence of wills of real persons, and its result is the coherence of persons into a moral society with the attendant disapproval of divergent action as evil. Correspondingly, truth consists of coherent beliefs—coherence both in the collective speculative will and in the individual. Just as, in practice, coherent willing submits to the limits of social welfare, so truth consists of propositions cohering in certain ways determined by real existence.

In the same number of *Mind* there appears an interesting article by Mr G. H. Langley on "The Metaphysical Method of Herbart." The writer shows very clearly how Herbart's method leads him to the assumption that the Real is made up of a plurality of simple elements, in the manifold groupings of which our experience is founded, and adds some pertinent criticism of Herbart's procedure. I hope Mr Langley will continue to work at Herbart, a thinker whose writings have been unduly neglected, although from them I believe there is much to be gained that would be helpful in regard to our present speculative problems. The two articles on "Hegel's Criticism of Fichte's Subjectivism" (*Phil. R.*, September 1912 and January 1913) by Professor E. L. Schaub are written to show that Hegel's strictures are in substance valid. Fichte's highest principle, it is contended, may be described as subjective subject-object, but the *an sich* aspect of things falls entirely beyond it; the ghost of the thing-in-itself was not laid. Infinite striving, as conceived by Fichte, clearly presupposes not only what Hegel calls a "want" or "need," but even something foreign against which it strives and which guarantees that its activity is genuine



and not a hollow show. Professor G. Simmel's article in *Logos* (iii. 3), on "Goethe's Individualismus," is full of suggestive reflection. One can, he thinks, describe Goethe's *Weltanschauung* as the most gigantic attempt ever made to comprehend the unity of the cosmos as immediately and in itself *wertvoll*. God is for Goethe the name for the *Wertmoment des Seins*, nature the name for the *Wirklichkeitsmoment*, and both these live together as one reality.

The Sidgwick Memorial Lecture at Newnham College was delivered last year by Professor James Ward, who took for his subject *Heredity and Memory*, and the lecture has been published by the Cambridge University Press. Professor Ward maintains that, provided we look at the world from a spiritualistic and not from the usual naturalistic standpoint, psychology may show us that the secret of heredity is to be found in the facts of memory. Individual progress, it is shown, implies habit, and habit means that function perfects structure. For a solitary immortal individual without ancestry, structure would be wholly the result of function. But for the many mortals—who have a racial history as well as a personal history—function will be the result of structure, so far, that is, as the embryonic stage of their existence is concerned. Further, in the life of the individual the latest acquisitions will be the least automatic and the least fixed; in the race, therefore, the specific characters, which are acquired later, rather than the generic, upon which they are superposed, will be peculiarly liable to variation. Those who reject the theory of the inheritance of acquired characters often lose sight of the last-mentioned circumstance. Weismann and his followers, it is contended, have produced no conclusive evidence against the old theory of inheritance. Even admitting the *modus operandi* of the transmission to be at present inconceivable, yet there are other actual operations almost as mysterious (e.g. the adjustment of skin-coloration to ground-surface brought about through the organs of sight). Moreover, Weissman's counter-doctrine of germinal continuity, involving as it did in its first form of presentation complete isolation of the germ-plasm from the body-plasm, fails altogether to render intelligible the way in which the higher levels of life are reached. Weismann's later theory of intra-germinal selection virtually surrenders his whole position. Assuming, then, that the body does influence the germ-plasm, Professor Ward holds it to be highly probable that in the germ-plasm the cell-nucleus plays a part analogous to that of the brain in the body-plasm, and that ontogeny—the building up of the embryo—is actually and literally a habit. But this mnemonic theory, as it is called, requires not merely physical records, but living experience or tradition, i.e. minds. It will only work for those who accept a monadistic interpretation of the beings that make up the world.

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## THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

It would require more than the entire space at our disposal to review with any adequacy the fifth volume of Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, but some of its contents may be selected to form a convenient starting-point for our survey this quarter. In the sphere of comparative religion, to begin with, it contains articles on the Chinese Feng-shui (a geomantic and spiritualistic faith which is said to underlie most Chinese religion), the Indian Dravidians, Egyptian religion (by Mr Flinders Petrie), Etruscan religion (by Dr Gustav Herbig), and the Druids (by Canon MacCulloch), besides notices of less central items. The worship of Mother Earth by the Northern Dravidians is of particular interest, in view of recent discussions upon the tinges of this belief in Hebrew religion. In describing ecstasy (p. 157) Dr Inge speaks of the dancing and howling dervishes as belonging to the lower forms of religious ecstasy; but in the preface to his *Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark), Dr F. J. Bliss acknowledges he has learned that, "in spite of the wild demonstrations which travellers witness for a fee in Constantinople and Cairo, the controlling motive of the dervish life is the hunger and thirst after righteousness." This, by the way, is only one instance of the fresh corrections which Dr Bliss's valuable volume necessitates in many of our Western views of the East. It is written not only from first-hand knowledge, but with a true catholic spirit, like Professor E. C. Moore's essay on the "Relation of Liberal Theology to Missions."<sup>1</sup> The same spirit characterises two shilling monographs on comparative religion which have recently appeared: one by Dr F. B. Jevons in the Cambridge Manuals, the other by Dr Estlin Carpenter in the Home University Library. Zoroastrianism, to which Dr Jevons devotes his chapter on "Dualism" (the *Encyclopædia* article covers a much wider field, naturally), also forms the subject of an essay by P. Dhorme in the *Revue Biblique* (pp. 15-45), though, as its title indicates ("La religion des Achéménides"), it deals rather with the primitive forms of the Persian religion than with the later. Dr Carpenter's manual, whose value is out of all proportion to its size and price, has not, as Dr Jevons's has, a special chapter on Buddhism, but Indian religions are prominent in his pages. The Jains, to which he twice alludes, are described by Mrs Stevenson in the Hastings *Encyclopædia* (875-879) under the heading of "Festivals and Fasts"; which may be supplemented by Mr Herbert Warren's *Jainism* (Madras, 1912), a shilling pamphlet designed to represent the teachings of this curious sect in Western garb. The Theosophist office at Adhyar has also issued two pamphlets, one by A. Mahadeva Shastri on *The Basic Truths of Vedic Religion*, and one by J. Shrinivasa Rao on *Some Forgotten Truths of Hinduism*; the latter is a defence of the Theosophical Society's propaganda against Indian critics

<sup>1</sup> In the *American Journal of Theology* (January 1913), pp. 22-46.



who accuse it either of consolidating or of evaporating the caste system. Among the forgotten truths which the Society is held to revivify are the brotherhood of religions and the expected advent of the world-teacher or Jagat Gurū. The former pamphlet protests against the debasement of sacrifice and of womanhood in the conventional religion, and charges the specialisation of caste with the physical and moral degradation of the Hindus.

"Eschatology" in the *Encyclopædia* is written by Canon MacCulloch; in this connection we may note a second edition of Professor Charles's *Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, and Mr C. W. Emmet's paper, originally delivered at the recent Leiden Congress,<sup>1</sup> on "Is the Teaching of Jesus an Interims Ethik?" (*Expositor*, November, 423-434). The question is answered in the negative. The *Encyclopædia* article on "Eternity," by Professor J. S. Mackenzie, is one of the most remarkable in the volume. It suggests that "time is simply the form of succession in a developing process" which may be eternal, not in the sense of being timeless, but as including the whole of time; and then, in the concluding paragraph, declares that "if philosophy is to escape from those difficulties and self-contradictions which have been brought out in the course of its history, it must, we think, return to something more or less akin to this doctrine of the Trinity [*i.e.* the Johannine doctrine, *e.g.* in ch. viii. 58]." The author ends by saying that the further pursuit of this theory would involve a consideration of the being of God and of His relation to the world, which lies beyond the scope of the article. We hope the editor will give Professor Muirhead some opportunity later on of developing his thesis.

In the article on "Extreme Unction," Father Thurston observes that the Papal decree *Lamentabili sane* condemned the modernist error of refusing to see any sacramental unction in Jas. v. 14 f. This condemnation forms part, though only an incidental part, of the defensive policy of the Papacy, as readers of M. Albert Houtin's new *Histoire du Modernisme Catholique* (Paris, 1913) will readily understand. The history leaves a somewhat depressing impression on the mind. The author writes with characteristic verve, but he has lost faith in more than modernism, and the prospects of the latter movement, which he calls more than once "sentimental," within the Roman Church are depicted as gloomy in the extreme. The reactionary propaganda, headed by the Jesuits, is said to have crushed practically all the life out of it. M. Houtin traces modernism mainly<sup>2</sup> to the theological school founded in Paris in 1878; he describes the early suspicions which fell even upon M. Duchesne; then he traces the movement in various countries, along its biblical, sociological, and philosophical lines. He endeavours to be fair to the authorities of the Roman Church, but his pages disclose a sorry state of matters even to

<sup>1</sup> Summaries of the work done at this Congress are furnished in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (1912), 610-619, in the *Revue de l'histoire des Religions* (1912, pp. 233-252, by M. Alphonse), and in the *American Journal of Theology* (1913, January, pp. 80-89, by Professor Bacon).

<sup>2</sup> It is decidedly curious that "moderniste" was first used by Rousseau, as a synonym for "materialiste."

those who are familiar with the treatment of Tyrrell and Loisy. The propaganda of panic against liberal theology is analysed with a candour which sounds all the more deadly as it comes from one who now takes the attitude of an outsider both to modernism and to the Papacy. M. Houtin's fears are unfortunately corroborated by the recent attack, instigated by an Italian Jesuit, upon the great French scholar Lagrange, whose commentary on Mark, one of the best in any language, naturally did not square with the subsequent assertions of the anti-modernist Biblical Commission. It is a satisfaction to learn from the latest number of the *Revue Biblique* that this admirable journal is not to be stopped meanwhile. We may still hope that Lagrange will be permitted to continue his contributions to it and to theological literature. But the Biblical Commission has decided that all these synoptic gospels were written before 70 A.D., that Mark is not prior to Matthew, that the appendix to Mark is authentic, and, among other things, that there is to be no recognition of any document like Q among Roman scholars. The last-named pronouncement will be a sad blow to the worshippers of Q, but they will probably survive it, at least if they breathe outside the Roman Church. Even inside, they may perhaps say, as Baur is reported to have said in similar circumstances, "As dying, and behold we live."

The general principle underlying such ecclesiastical conflicts is discussed by Professor Dunkmann in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* (1913, pp. 65-81), and by two writers independently in the *Biblical World* (1912), where an editorial article on "The Relation between Religion and Freedom" is followed by a paper on "Theology and Biblical Criticism," in which Professor G. B. Smith points out that "as one traces the history of the experience portrayed in the biblical books, one becomes aware that a virile theology was never produced merely by the repetition of an authorised message, but that, on the contrary, the greatest books of the Bible owe their origin to a determined attempt to find an adequate expression for a living faith in opposition to a dead formalism." This is the thesis which illustrates the aim of a notable study of *Schleiermacher*<sup>1</sup> (London: Chapman & Hall) by Dr W. B. Selbie. The volume appears in a new series called "The Great Christian Theologies." The author, in his treatment of Schleiermacher, has considered the interests of doctrinal reconstruction; it would be unfair to call Schleiermacher's theology dynamical in opposition to the static theologies of the Roman and Anglican Churches, but his conceptions of faith and revelation contain elements which are vital to any successful advance upon traditionalism (although this is denied by Troeltsch, for example), especially his insistence upon the independent reality of Christian experience as a response to the divine spirit.<sup>2</sup> Dr

<sup>1</sup> Schleiermacher is also prominent in Professor W. P. Paterson's Baird Lectures on *The Rule of Faith* (Hodder & Stoughton), a volume which deserves special notice for its dogmatic grasp.

<sup>2</sup> M. Eugène Ménégoz, in a recent number of the *Revue Chrétienne* (Nov. 1912, 929-944), makes the same point in defending "Fidélisme" against its critics. Cf. also the *Encyclopædia* article on "Faith" (p. 693).



Selbie, in a series of penetrating arguments, restates the value and limitation of this break away from the formal conception of faith as the result of an intellectual process in the region of doctrine. His monograph is thus valuable, not simply as a historical study, but as an indication of the spirit in which healthy reconstructive work in modern theology must be carried on. Dr H. S. Nash in the *Harvard Review* (1913, pp. 12 f.) singles out Schleiermacher also in this connection.

One of the salient contributions of Schleiermacher was his restatement of the doctrine of election. He was confronted by much the same dogma as that which had already stung the youthful Shelley, his contemporary, into satirising the Christian God by attributing to him this plan of salvation:—

“I will beget a son, and he shall bear  
The sins of all the world; he shall arise  
In an unnoticed corner of the earth,  
And there shall die upon a cross, and purge  
The universal crime; so that the few  
On whom my grace descends, those who are marked  
As vessels to the honour of their God,  
May credit this strange sacrifice, and save  
Their souls alive: millions shall live and die,  
Who ne’er shall call upon their Saviour’s name,  
But, unredeemed, go to the gaping grave.”

The German theologian recoiled, like the English poet, from the thought of final reprobation. Schleiermacher, in the *Glaubenslehre*,<sup>1</sup> argued that election involves the purpose of God ultimately to redeem the whole race, and that the election of the Church is simply a means to this end. A position, not essentially different from this, seems to be taken by Professor W. P. Paterson (*op. cit.*, pp. 307 f.), and by Mr A. S. Martin in an article on “Election” in the Hastings *Encyclopædia*, with which Wernle’s discussion of Troeltsch’s strictures on Calvinism (*Zeitschrift für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1913, 33 f.) should be compared. In an article on “The Fall,” Professor Denney discusses frankly the cognate problem raised by Paul’s use of the Genesis-myth (*Encyclopædia*, pp. 701–705). Theoretically, as he points out, Paul does not really transcend the problems presented by the theodicy of 4th Esdras. “Sin in its unity and universality may be taken for granted, and it may be also overcome; but not even on the basis of the Bible—O.T. or N.T.—will its origin ever be explained.” When Paul said that “as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive,” he disregarded the fact that the connection in the last case is entirely different. The modern interpretations, which appeal to heredity and evolutionary ethics, are set aside by the author as inadequate to Paul’s view. These interpretations, however, may have their own value, in the absence of any light thrown on the problem by Paul, and they are restated by Professor J. Y. Simpson, tentatively though incidentally, in his thoughtful *Spiritual Interpretation of Nature* (Hodder & Stoughton; see especially

<sup>1</sup> A new edition of the *Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik* has just been issued by Schiele, at Leipzig.

chapters xii., xv.), and by Mr S. A. M'Dowall in *Evolution and the Need of Atonement* (Cambridge, 1912). The former is written from the standpoint of a trained biologist.<sup>1</sup> The latter study, which has some unconscious and independent coincidences with Bergson's theories, appeals specifically to the data of personality, and finds sin in the refusal of the will to co-operate with the creative growth which impels man to union and likeness with the divine spirit of freedom. Theology recognises not only purpose, but divine purpose, in the universe. Man must co-operate with this purpose, and Christ, it is argued, by his death and resurrection "somehow" made it possible for men to be reunited to the will of God. The essay uses "consciousness" in several different senses, but it ranks as a suggestive contribution to the statement of the modern problem on the scientific side. For a somewhat similar emphasis on the need of conceiving God as purpose rather than in terms of substance, Professor H. R. Mackintosh's recent study of *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* (Edinburgh, 1912), one of the outstanding contributions made last year to speculative theology, is criticised by Professor Warfield in a long, incisive review (*The Princeton Theological Review*, 1913, pp. 141-156). Professor Warfield's learning and uncompromising Calvinism are shown at a more genial if not more congenial task, however, in his article on Jonathan Edwards and the New England Theology, in the Hastings *Encyclopædia*, which is a model of sympathetic, historical appreciation.

In a volume on *Die Christliche Schöpfungsglaube* (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht), which discusses from the theological side some of the problems handled by Professor Simpson, Herr R. Eckhardt emphasises the paramount significance, for a Christian philosophy of the universe, of the person of Jesus Christ. The experience created by the historical Jesus affords the norm by which the Christian views the world as containing a continuous, divine process. Christ is his guarantee for this belief, and the appearance of Christ in history is held to afford the only basis for a Christian conception of creation and providence. This is presupposed by Professor Adams Brown in the section on the Christian doctrine which he contributes to the composite *Encyclopædia* article on "Expiation and Atonement." He finds two main types of interpretation in the Church, one making the death of Christ an incident in his incarnate life, the other regarding it as the end of the incarnation. "The former is characteristic, on the whole, of the theology of Greek Catholicism; the latter, of that of Roman Catholicism and of Protestantism."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the sceptical side-wind still blows in puffs from the school of Drews and W. B. Smith. Thus a Dutch pamphlet, by Dr G. A. Van den Bergh van Eysinga, has been translated under the title *Radical Views about the New Testament* (London: Watts & Co.). The writer believes that Paul's epistles were

<sup>1</sup> Another first-rate statement is that of Professor Punnett in the *Encyclopædia* article on "Evolution (Biological)."

<sup>2</sup> In this connection the chapters on "The Gospel of Protestantism" and "The Genius of Roman Catholicism" in Professor Paterson's volume (already mentioned) are of special value.



the product of a second-century gnostic circle, and that therefore their evidence in favour of a historical Jesus is worthless. The main polemic of the book is against the liberal theologians whose "Ecce Homo" is met by an "Ecce Deus" which tallies only in name with the motto of the orthodox school. In addition to Professor Shirley Case's reply, which was noted in our last survey, a careful refutation of this Drews' theory has been published by Dr T. J. Thorburn (*Jesus the Christ, Historical or Mythical*) along rather more orthodox lines than those followed by Professor Vischer's acute *Jesus Christus in der Geschichte* (Tübingen), and Professor Denney states what he conceives to be the Christian position in the *Expositor* for January (pp. 12-28). Like Vischer, he insists that Christianity is to be judged in the light of its history as a *datum* which implies historical facts in connection with Jesus Christ, but, unlike Vischer and Troeltsch, he sees more in the historical Jesus than such a personality as might be inferred from the Sistine Madonna or Beethoven's Sonatas. "It is not a matter of opinion, but a matter of fact, that to read Cæsar's Commentaries is one thing, and to read the gospels another; the relation of the reader to Cæsar is a relation to a person who is historical and no more; his relation to Christ is a relation to a person who is historical, certainly, and who certainly died, but who is certainly not 'as dead as Julius Cæsar.' He is far more living than that. In some way or other he belongs as truly to the present as to the past." In the *Biblische Zeitschrift* (1912, pp. 370), Dr Ludwig Schade patiently refutes Erbt's extraordinary attempt (*Das Markus-Evangelium: eine Untersuchung über die Form des Petruserrinerungen und die Geschichte der Urgemeinde*) to apply Winckler's astral mythology to the Marcan narrative.<sup>1</sup>

The date of the Fourth Gospel is incidentally discussed in two articles in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for January; Mr C. H. Turner (pp. 161-195), writing on the Gospel of Peter, argues that this gospel (which he dates between 115 and 130 A.D.) presupposes the Fourth Gospel as well as the synoptists; Mr H. J. Bardsley (pp. 207-219) restates at length the conclusion which the present writer outlined in his *Introduction the Literature of the New Testament* (pp. 577-579) that the Ignatian epistles as well as Polycarp's epistle presuppose the Johannine writings. In the *Biblische Zeitschrift* (396 f.) Dr H. J. Vogels writes upon the spear-thrust in John xix. 32 f., not only from the point of view of textual criticism, but in the light of the patristic tradition, which goes back to Origen and Chrysostom, that the lance pierced Jesus before his death.

Comparatively little has appeared on the theology of the New Testament. There is a constant stream of articles on Paul and Paulinism, most of which are second rate. But a refreshing exception to this will be found

<sup>1</sup> In the eighth number of the Freiburg Theological Studies another Roman Catholic scholar, Dr Edmund Kalt, has been engaged upon a similar task. His *Sumson: Eine Untersuchung des historischen Charakters von Richt. xiii.-xvi.*, is a learned and uncompromising refutation of the mythological theories; he amasses data to prove the early date and reliable character of the story, then discusses its interpretation by the later church, and finally deals with the legendary or so-called legendary aspects of the narrative.

in the series of papers which Professor H. A. A. Kennedy has just completed in the *Expositor* upon "St Paul and the Mystery Religions." The conclusion is that already reached by critics like Von Dobschütz and Schweitzer, but Dr Kennedy differs from Schweitzer in the estimate of Paul's eschatology,<sup>1</sup> and the special value of his papers lies in the carefully weighed statement of evidence against the fashionable theory which postulates a predominating influence of the cults upon the sacramental views of the apostle. The second volume of Father Prat's work on *La Théologie de Saint Paul* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne) is more learned than suggestive. Ample account is taken of most modern researches, but the dogmatic standpoint of the writer tends to prevent him from seeing Paulinism except through the windows of the Tridentine formulas. His representation of "faith," for example, in the Pauline soteriology has nothing that is not familiar to readers of Newman's *Lectures on Justification*. Heitmüller's article on the problem of Jesus and Paul (*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1913, 320-337), and Dr G. Vos' learned essay in *Biblical and Theological Studies* (Princeton) on the relation of Paul's doctrine of the Spirit to eschatology, are of more critical significance. Dr Vos approximates to Professor Kennedy's position on eschatology. The Marburg professor lays stress upon the influence of Hellenistic Christianity, such as was developed in the church of Antioch, upon Paul; it is through this rather than through Paul's relation to the primitive Jerusalem church, that the apostle's attitude to Jesus is to be understood. Dr Machen's article, in the Princeton volume, on "Jesus and Paul," however, makes Heitmüller's article seem slight. At the close of a popular lecture on *Die Papyrus Urkunden der jüdischen Gemeinde in Elephantine* (Töpelmann, Giessen), Professor August F. von Gall notes that while the papyri are a warning against exaggerations of literary criticism such as the theories of the unauthenticity of the Ezra and Nehemiah literature, they confirm the fact that "the Law is later than the prophets, νόμος δὲ παρεισηλθεν, as Paul had already felt by his religious intuitions."

In the *Princeton Theological Review* (1912, 529-589) Mr J. G. Machen shows that belief in the Virgin-birth of Jesus was deeply rooted in the early years of the second century, and argues that the subsequent denials of it were due to dogmatic or philosophical prepossessions rather than to any basis in genuine tradition. Mr A. R. Stark, in his thesis on *The Christology of the Apostolic Fathers* (Chicago), finds that the subordination of Christ to the Father is characteristic of writings like Clement's epistle, the Didache, and the Papias fragments, in contrast to the development of Christological interest in Ignatius, Polycarp, and 2 Clement; in Barnabas, Hermes, and Diognetus he traces the rise of the cosmological functions which are ascribed to Christ, although, as he admits, these are implicit, and even partially explicit, in the earlier literature. The evolution is

<sup>1</sup> Unlike Windisch who, in reviewing some recent manuals on New Testament theology (*Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1912, 289 f.), laments their failure to "eschatologise" Paul sufficiently.



carefully described, but it is hardly possible to differentiate the stages with much precision, or even to classify the extant literature genetically when a writer like Justin is left out. The anti-gnostic interests of the later second century are discussed in a French monograph upon the Acts of Paul.<sup>1</sup> The quality of Dr Émile Amann's edition of the *Protevangelium Jacobi* raised great hopes of the new edition of these Acts which M. Léon Vouaux was announced as preparing in the new French series of the N.T. Apocrypha, of which Dr Amann is one of the editors. The edition fulfils these hopes. It is a critical, competent piece of work, which fills a real gap. In an appendix, the originals of the epistles to the Laodiceans and the Alexandrians, together with the correspondence of Paul and Seneca, are printed, with French translations and notes; but the primary interest of the volume lies in the introduction and notes to the Acts themselves. M. Vouaux regards them as the work of a Catholic priest in Asia, perhaps in Pisidian Antioch, and ventures to date them approximately about 160–170 A.D. He attaches little or no value to the efforts made by Lipsius, Corssen, and Sir W. M. Ramsay, from various sides, to discover some historical nucleus in the Acts. The English critic's attempt is dismissed with special disapprobation. "La méthode de Ramsay est tout simplement arbitraire, elle repose d'abord sur une simple supposition. . . . Elle permet à chaque critique d'exercer sur ce texte, suivant son caprice, toutes les mutilations qui lui conviennent" (pp. 94–95).

The New Testament "Acts" have been edited by Dr E. Preuschen<sup>2</sup> in Lietzmann's *Handbuch* (Tübingen; Mohr), the main interest naturally lying in the linguistic rather than in the historical aspect of the book; and we may further chronicle two volumes which have been added to *The Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges*, an edition of Jude and 2 Peter by Dr M. R. James, and an edition of Romans by the general editor Mr St John Parry. Dr James has produced a readable commentary. He inclines to accept the authorship of Jude, c. 75–80 A.D., but he sums up in favour of its priority to 2 Peter at any rate, and of the latter's position among the pseudepigrapha of the second century. It is a little alarming to find Mr Parry devoting a section in the introduction to "Imperialism," but he fortunately resists the temptation to read statesmanlike plans into Paul: "We do not think that a case is made out for attributing to St Paul far-sighted views of the relation of the Church to the Empire." The notes are clear, and seldom too abstruse for their audience; from a theological point of view, they would have been all the better for a study of the two short and brilliant commentaries on the epistle by Professor Jülicher and Professor Denney.

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<sup>1</sup> *Les Actes de Paul, et ses lettres apocryphes. Introduction, textes, traduction, et commentaire.* Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1913.

<sup>2</sup> Norden's *Agnostos Theos* (*Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede*), to which he refers in the preface, is reviewed warmly by Reitzenstein in *Neue jährbücher für das klassische Altertum* (1913, pp. 146–155). The first part opposes Harnack's theory of Acts.

## REVIEWS

*Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought.*—By seven Oxford men: B. H. Streeter, R. Brook, W. H. Moberly, R. G. Parsons, A. E. J. Rawlinson, N. S. Talbot, W. Temple.—Macmillan & Co., London, 1912.

THE publication of volumes of essays by a number of writers connected with one or other of the Universities has become the recognised method of registering and presenting to the general public the main results of theological thought and study. It cannot exactly be said that each volume of such essays makes a distinct advance on its predecessors, if "advance" is to be used in the technical sense of the word; for the first of such volumes, *Essays and Reviews*, has not been surpassed in the boldness of its rather vague and negative and at times rather aggressive Liberalism. But, if we put aside *Essays and Reviews*, the present work undoubtedly represents a steady growth and development in general theological opinion, whatever may be thought as to the exact position of individual writers in the two series. In *Contentio Veritatis* it was necessary to defend and apologise for critical views which the writers of *Foundations* can take for granted.

The series opens with an article by the Rev. N. S. Talbot. It is chiefly occupied with a gloomy picture of the present religious situation, together with some rather contemptuous and patronising criticism of the religion of the Victorian age. The point which the writer apparently wishes to establish is that the illogical compromises of the Victorian age are now impossible. The present generation can no longer be Liberal and yet Christian, or retain Christian morality when it has parted company with Christian theology. The Liberals and the Agnostics of the Victorian age were kept comparatively respectable by "the *Nachschein* of Evangelical piety." The present age has to choose between "Christ" and some very black and immoral form of infidelity, the nature of which is not precisely indicated, but is apparently something of the type represented by Mr H. G. Wells. The writer does not very clearly indicate his own theological position, but from his general tone it would seem to be something very different from that of the other writers. The essay is impressive in its



way, but it seems to have been written as an introduction to some quite other work—such a volume of Apologetics, for instance, as might have been produced under the editorship of Dr Figgis or Professor Orr. It forms a most unsuitable introduction to what (with no desire to affix a party label to the book) is a volume of quite progressive theology.

I confess I should like to have it made a little plainer who are the people who in the Victorian age failed to find Christ because they “did not need Him.” Mr Talbot can hardly mean the disciples either of the original Oxford Movement or of the *Lux Mundi* aftermath of it to which his own father belonged. It is clearly “Liberals” of some kind against whom the attack is directed, but I cannot make out what sort of Liberals. I can hardly believe that he would so speak of the more liberal theologians of that age—the Maurices, the Robertsons, or the Stanleys, or of such characteristically Victorian poets as Tennyson and Browning. If he means merely the agnostic men of science, I very much doubt whether he is right in expecting that their successors will be more favourably disposed to Christianity because some of them have given up belief in morality as well as in theology. Nor can I see any but a psychological explanation of his conviction that things are going to be better simply because they are worse. “The times of the impotence of Jesus Christ are passing. He was ever powerless with those who did not need Him.” The “impotence of Jesus Christ” does not strike me as either a particularly orthodox or a particularly just expression. If Christ was impotent in the days of Newman and of Maurice, of Dale and of Spurgeon, of Lord Shaftesbury and of General Booth—in the age which witnessed the regeneration of the Church of England, an enormous extension of missions and a long course of social reforms promoted on the most definitely Christian grounds, and in large part by definitely Christian agencies,—I confess I do not know where in history (at least since the conversion of Constantine) to look for an age in which Christ was not impotent. If Christ is to be considered impotent in any age in which He is not universally obeyed, surely the most sanguine of Christians will hardly expect the twentieth century to differ in that respect from any previous century. Mr Talbot will attract many readers by his unquestionable earnestness and his vein of prophetic, if somewhat “slangy,” eloquence; but I am afraid I must confess myself too hopelessly “Victorian” in my ideas to appreciate or even to understand this essay.

Mr Brook’s essay on “The Bible” supplies the most remarkable testimony to the theological progress of the last fifteen years. The usual critical positions are not proved or apologised for, but simply presupposed. We fear, in view of the recent explosions at Church Congresses and a recent vote in the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation, that Mr Brook is assuming a somewhat more rapid advance in Church opinion on the subject than has actually taken place; but he is probably right in deciding that it is not worth while trying to convert a generation that elects to be led by the Dean of Canterbury and Canon Newbolt; and he

prefers to address himself to men under fifty. He assumes the critical conclusions, and goes on to ask, "What in the light of these conclusions is the religious value of the Bible?" On the whole, the task is well performed. Degrees of inspiration in the Bible and the existence of inspiration outside the Bible are duly recognised, and a very reasonable view is taken as to the meaning of the term. To my own mind (though to many this will be no defect) the weak point of the essay is that it is based on an extreme view as to the "immediacy" (in the strict philosophical sense) of the knowledge of God possessed by religious minds. In one place he actually goes so far as to speak of a "perception" of God. It may be thought pedantic to insist that "perception" is a term which should only be applied to what can be apprehended by the senses. But, without pressing this point, perception surely stands for a kind of direct and immediate vision which is hardly reconcilable with the declaration that we know God by faith. It is admitted that this kind of experience belongs to the few rather than to the normal human consciousness: average men must depend on the proofs afforded by reason or rely on the experience of the few. Mr Brook hardly seems to realise the possibility that what would be claimed as immediate knowledge by the unphilosophical person may nevertheless really depend upon unconsciously accepted traditional beliefs or involve a certain element of inference. He seems to suppose that we know of the existence of our friends immediately or intuitively. In this he will find some philosophers in Oxford to agree with him, but I very much doubt whether one of the great classical philosophers can be quoted in favour of such a view. Those who think that communion with a friend may be close and intimate enough in spite of the fact that our belief in the friend's existence rests on inference, will not assume that even very religious minds must necessarily have arrived at their knowledge in a strictly intuitive way. Mr Brook quotes the famous passage in which Newman speaks of God and his own soul as the "two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings."<sup>1</sup> It will be observed that Newman did not suppose himself to know other souls intuitively, and a study of *The Grammar of Assent* will show that Newman (like many others who use such language upon occasion) must not be understood too literally. It is clear that Newman thought the knowledge of God to rest upon a sort of inference—an inference necessarily, spontaneously, and (in a sense) unconsciously, made but still quite distinctly an inference, an inference mainly from the existence of conscience. The same disclaimer of immediate knowledge is to be found in many, perhaps most, of the great religious thinkers.

Mr Streeter's essay on "The Historic Christ" is on the whole the most remarkable, as it is the boldest, in the volume. Mr Streeter writes with a mastery of his subject which can hardly be claimed for all the contributors. He accepts the usual analysis of documents. About the historical value of

<sup>1</sup> So Newman writes in the printed volume, but he must have written, or at least ought to have written, "absolutely." Even Newman's loose philosophy can hardly have recognised two (and inferentially countless other) "absolute beings."



the introduction to Matthew and Luke, we are told only that it is "hotly debated." As to the Fourth Gospel, Mr Streeter feels "that the mystical and theological interest of its author dominates, if it does not swallow up, the biographical." It "should primarily be regarded not so much as an historical authority as an *inspired meditation* on the life of Christ." His acknowledgments to the recent eschatological theories are all that the most modern of Modernists can demand: he accepts apparently—to my own mind too easily and too confidently—all the more explicit sayings of Jesus as to His coming at a certain date in the near future; he admits that they were intended literally, and he recognises that they have had, and (by implication) that they are destined to have, no literal fulfilment. Our Lord deliberately rejected the political conception of Messiahship and accepted the apocalyptic conception, and He eventually came to think that the kingdom was to be established by His death, and went up to Jerusalem facing the probability of death, but without any attempt to "force the hand" of the heavenly Father. The psychology of Christ's attitude towards the apocalyptic conception is very delicately and skilfully handled, but I shall not attempt to summarise it here. Mr Streeter regards it, very much in the way in which moderate Eschatologists like Professor von Dobschütz have done, as the husk in which a conception of eternal truth and value was embodied; but exactly what that truth was, is not, I confess, made very plain.

The part of the article which will attract most attention is the treatment of the Resurrection. Mr Streeter regards the story of the empty tomb as historical, but adds:

"The discovery of the empty tomb, assuming the story to rest on adequate historical evidence, which personally I believe to be the case, is often supposed to determine the decision in favour of the traditional theory. This, however, is not really so, for with a little ingenuity it is not difficult to imagine more than one set of circumstances which might account on purely natural grounds for the tomb being found empty" (p. 134).

It is clear that Mr Streeter believes that the body which was buried did not rise again. At the same time he tries to avoid accepting the "Subjective Vision theory," and offers the following suggestions:

"Only if the possibility of personal immortality be dogmatically denied can there be any real difficulty in supposing that the Master would have been able to convince His disciples of His victory over death by some adequate manifestation;—possibly by showing Himself to them in some form such as might be covered by St Paul's phrase, 'a spiritual body'; possibly through some psychological channel similar to that which explains the mysterious means of communication between persons commonly known as telepathy; or possibly in some way of which at present we have no conception. On such a view, the appearances to the disciples can only be styled 'visions,' if we mean by vision something directly caused by the Lord Himself veritably alive and personally in communion with them" (p. 136).

Many of us who will agree with Mr Streeter in (1) accepting the historicity of the Vision while denying the miraculous disappearance from the tomb, (2) leaving the nature of the Vision an open question, will feel that in suggesting that the only possible "difficulty" as to the acceptance of his theory must spring from the doubt or denial of personal immortality, he does less than justice to other views. He scarcely seems to recognise the existence of the difficulty of proving by historical evidence a real violation of the laws of nature. Surely his own maxim, "When a natural explanation of an event is at all possible, there must be very special reasons for falling back upon an explanation of a supernatural character," must apply to other theories besides that of a literal resuscitation of the body laid in the tomb. No doubt that admission does not exclude the possibility that the Vision may not be subjective in the sense of being caused merely by the eager longing and excitement of the disciples. One of his illustrations—what we may call the "telepathic" explanation—need involve no violation of the laws of nature, though we may have to admit that we do not know fully the conditions under which such manifestations occur; but the idea of a "spiritual body," in the sense in which doubtless St Paul himself must have used the term (*i.e.* a body of some attenuated material substance, though not of "flesh and blood"), would surely involve a physical miracle no less signal than the reanimation of the material body. A writer who does not think the evidence for the latter sufficient can hardly claim that the historically established facts require anything more than the telepathic explanation.

On the more general issues raised by Mr Streeter's paper my only complaint is that it is so short. He is emphatic in rejecting the theory of an *Interimsethik*, but he has told us very little about the moral and religious teaching or about the character of Christ, and (strange to say) the subject is not dealt with by any other of the Essayists. We are familiar, of course, with that view of Christ's "Person and Office" according to which His whole function was to be supernaturally born, to work miracles, to fulfil the Messianic prophecies, to offer a substitutionary sacrifice by His death, and to rise again in a manner stupendously miraculous. Such a view is hardly open to a writer who passes over in silence the miraculous birth, who admits that there was an element of delusion in the Messianic and eschatological ideas of Jesus as understood by Himself, who apparently thinks that He died for sins in the sense in which other men have won benefits for mankind by self-sacrifice, and who is not clear that the Resurrection may not be explained by something like telepathy. Surely from this point of view the chief significance of Christ's life and personality must lie in His revelation of the Father by His teaching, by His example, by His character. Yet about these little is said, though what little he does say is excellent—certainly not enough to explain the unique place which Mr Streeter, as it seems to me quite rightly, claims for Christ in the religious history of the world. Would an intelligent Hindu or Japanese who wished to know why Christians thought so much of Christ



find his question satisfactorily, however briefly, answered by what Mr Streeter tells us about Him? I very much doubt it. Mr Streeter would probably claim that this was not the subject of his essay. The omission—not merely in this essay but in the whole book—is none the less significant. In spite of all their critical modernism, Mr Streeter and most of his colleagues seem unwilling to recognise that, on their view of the historical facts, the unique Divine Sonship of Jesus must be justified and explained mainly by the moral and spiritual influence of Christ rather than by His own claims to Messiahship, however clearly and however justly made by Himself, or by any supernatural accompaniments of His earthly career. Mr Streeter is so preoccupied with the attempt to find a permanent meaning in the Messianic and eschatological elements in the teaching of Jesus that he has no room for what is of much more importance. This does not, however, destroy the value of his most sober, reasonable, and reverent handling of the problems with which he actually deals. Those who are puzzled and perhaps distressed by the new eschatological ideas will perhaps get more help from Mr Streeter than from anyone else who has written upon the subject.

The essay on "The Interpretation of the Christ" by the Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson and Prebendary Parsons sketches in a very scholarly way the development of Christological ideas in the New Testament. The writers are, indeed, more anxious to discover the vital and permanently important truths in the teaching of St Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Johannine writings, than to reduce the theories of their writers into coherent intellectual systems: but there is no attempt to disguise the difference between their intellectual outlook and ours. At the same time I think the writers are disposed to underrate the element of intellectual theory which was involved in the doctrine of the early Church and especially in the characteristically Pauline teaching. "It is of the last importance," they say, "to recognise that the development which is traceable in early Christian ideas about Christ was not the product of abstract speculation in the study" (p. 152). "Thoughts and beliefs alike sprang out of their experience." Quite true—but not, I venture to say, the whole truth. The writers are far from denying that the interpretation of the experience was expressed in the categories supplied by the thought of the time: but they hardly seem to realise the possibility that the expression in some cases went somewhat beyond, or failed wholly to correspond with, the experience, or even that the experience itself was to some extent produced or modified by the theory. They hardly recognise what seems to me the determining influence exercised upon the early theology of the Atonement by Jewish prophecy. They contend, for instance, that it was by the Resurrection and the coming of the Spirit "alone that the disciples were finally convinced that Jesus was verily, and indeed the Christ." By these mainly, and in the deepest way, no doubt; but surely what was regarded as the exact fulfilment of the prophecies about the Messiah had its share even in producing this conviction—still

more in the development of the theory that the death of Christ had brought about the forgiveness of sins and (in St Paul's view) the abrogation of the Mosaic law. The writers are confident—more so perhaps than Mr Streeter—that the disciples' faith certainly involved not merely the sight of the Risen Lord, but also the knowledge of the empty tomb. They hardly face the possibility that the belief in the emptiness of the tomb may have grown out of what was originally their theoretical explanation of the experienced Resurrection Vision, and that the detailed stories may be the eventual embodiment of this conviction. This is the more curious inasmuch as they are willing to admit the possibly subjective character of St Paul's greatest experience—the vision on the road to Damascus. “The vision of the Christ on the Damascus road, for all its apparent ‘objectivity,’ might quite well turn out to be more or less explicable along psychological lines, as a product of auto-suggestion induced by the inner conflict of Saul's spirit” (p. 166); and here they add some words of high wisdom which are worth transcribing: “It may be remarked in passing, that it is high time that a protest was made against the prevalent notion that we ought not to see the work of God in the processes of the human mind, such as go to bring about a great spiritual crisis. God is not a God of disorder—the words are St Paul's own,—and the laws which govern human thought and affection and work themselves out in character are just as much God's laws as are the laws by which the flowers grow or the stars move in their courses” (p. 167). This represents a principle of profound importance; only it must be remembered that if experiences are due to psychological laws, while they *may* be vehicles of a real divine revelation, they *need not* be so; and we cannot trust to subjective emotional experiences as necessarily revelations of absolute objective truth, nor can we refuse to recognise that the experiences themselves may have been in part due to pre-existing intellectual beliefs—that, for instance, St Paul's sense of being released from the burden of the law by the death of Christ was in part produced by intellectual ideas which made the law a burden to him, and by a theory about the necessity for the Messiah's death which he derived from the study of prophecy. The two writers hold that “St Paul was not a strictly logical thinker, still less a theologian constructing a system,” and they fully admit, or rather perhaps assume, that we are not bound to accept all St Paul's intellectual theories. Their account of the modern meaning contained in St Paul's teaching, and in the other early writers dealt with, is excellently done; my only criticism would be to suggest that St Paul was rather more of a theorist than they admit, and that it is possible to discriminate rather more sharply than they do between the intensely Jewish theoretical apparatus of his teaching and the element of eternal truth which it embodies.

No positive judgment is pronounced as to the authorship of the Fourth Gospel; but the idealising element is fully, if soberly, admitted: “His work, even if it be regarded as history, is surely history as seen through a medium of Christian experience and reflexion; a ‘spiritual



Gospel,' as Clement of Alexandria called it long ago, the work of one of those 'men of the Spirit' in whom the early Christian communities recognised a peculiar faculty of insight and illumination" (p. 203). After this it seems to me a little difficult for the author to say "it is emphatically not the case that the writer is consciously idealising." It may be quite true that he "does not deliberately substitute parable for history, neither is he indifferent to historical truth" (p. 205). I have always myself been indisposed to admit that the historical elements of the Gospel, where they go beyond the Synoptists, are pure, deliberately invented romance; but if the writer expresses the results of his own "experience," "all that wealth of meaning which Christians had discovered in His Person and in His work" (pp. 204-5), in the form of objective fact, by means of incidents which may not have occurred and speeches which were certainly not delivered, "because they were sure that all this was actually implicit from the beginning in the historical facts of His life and mission," what is this but idealising, and an idealising of which the writers could hardly have been wholly unconscious? If idealising means "deliberately seeking to make the Christ seem greater or better or holier than he believed Him as a matter of history to have been," then no doubt "conscious idealising" would be an unsuitable phrase; but this is surely not what is meant by at least many of the writers who have used that expression. Here and there many of us will differ from the writers in points of emphasis or detail; but it would be hardly possible to give a better account of what the Fourth Gospel is and of what it is not in the same number of pages. Their judgment that the Apocalypse "as a whole . . . is the record at first hand of an immediate personal experience" (p. 199) will strike many readers as more surprising and as quite opposed to the results of recent researches in apocalyptic literature.

When we come to Mr Temple's article on "The Divinity of Christ," we come to the most ambitious article in the volume. There is assuredly no lack of boldness about his attempt to express in modern language what is meant, or what ought to be meant, by modern Christians in calling Jesus Christ "divine." Perhaps it is the boldest attempt that has ever been made by one who is quite enthusiastic and ungrudging in his acceptance of the doctrine. With much in the article I find myself in sympathy. But at the same time I find it rather difficult to put together in my mind all that Mr Temple tells us about the person of Christ. Such a statement as the following seems exactly to hit the mark: "The wise question is not, 'Is Christ Divine?' but 'What is God like?' And the answer to that is 'Christ.'" But wise practical religious utterances like this are mixed up with metaphysical theories of a very much more disputable character. Mr Temple, as it seems to me, reads the theology of the Early Church a great deal too much, or too exclusively, with the eyes of Harnack. He, on the whole, prefers the Western theology to the Eastern. Such an attitude is natural enough in Harnack, who habitually judges the Fathers by the degree of their approximation to Luther: consequently he

hates philosophers like Clement of Alexandria and Origen, prefers Athanasius to the other Greeks, and loves Augustine as a not unintelligent anticipator of Luther, a little spoiled by the ecclesiasticism of his environment. I doubt whether Mr Temple—being a philosopher and not being a Lutheran—would really agree with Harnack, if he had read large masses of both Greek and Latin Fathers with his own eyes. He greatly exaggerates, I cannot but think, the extent to which the Eastern theology is made unavailable to modern minds by being a “substance-theology,” and still more undeniably he exaggerates the extent to which this was not true of Augustine and other Westerns. There is as much dubious philosophising about Substance in St Augustine’s *De Trinitate* as in any of the Greeks: for instance, in his attempt to show that the Love of the Father for the Son is a “substance.” Mr Temple accuses the Greeks of a “relative neglect of the moral problem” (p. 232). This seems to me an astounding assertion. It is true that they try to give a really ethical meaning to their doctrine of the Atonement, but this is simply a proof that the ethical interest was always uppermost in them. “Western theology,” Mr Temple continues, “represents a very real advance on the Eastern, because it is always consciously concerned with the moral problem.” It is true that the Westerns, especially St Augustine, were always preoccupied with the Atonement; but when we remember the very unethical character of their theories of Original Sin and Justification, it is questionable whether this can fairly be described as a pre-occupation with morality. Mr Temple’s own theory about the Divinity of Christ, though he declares he will be “psychological,” is really metaphysical in the extreme. It is true that it centres in the Atonement, but his theory of the Atonement is itself intensely metaphysical. It all turns upon the very disputable doctrine that Christ was “not generically but inclusively,” or, as we may paraphrase the words, ‘Christ is not *a* God (or *a* Divine Being) but God; Christ is not only *a* man but Man’ (p. 247). If this last assertion means that He represents “the highest ideal of manhood,” few who are prepared to recognise in any sense the Divinity of Christ will be disposed to quarrel with him; but it appears to be meant in a strictly metaphysical sense. And if that is the case, we are bound to ask what it really means, and what is the evidence for it. Mr Temple shrinks from the well-known thesis that Christ was man, but not *a* man at all. But in either form the doctrine seems at bottom to involve precisely that bastard-Platonic and mediæval-realist doctrine of Substance which the writer elsewhere treats as the main cause which makes the traditional theology of the Church in so much need of re-interpretation to modern minds. Yet Mr Temple seems prepared to stake the whole of his theology on this piece of metaphysic. “We can only regard Him as Divine and supreme over the world, if we can regard Him as somehow including in His Personality all mankind” (p. 146). I am afraid that most modern readers of this work—whether among metaphysicians or among “plain men”—will find Mr Temple’s new scholasticism almost as much in need of



interpretation as the old. Moreover, they will find one difficulty about this scholasticism which is absent from the old. The old scholastic always gave us their premisses—passages from authoritative writers from which the doctrines were deduced. Mr Temple has not told us what are the premisses of his doctrine, so far as it rests upon anything but a quotation from Dr Moberly's *Personality and Atonement*. Mr Temple does not believe in the final and absolute authority of the passages in St Paul upon a very liberal and at the same time a very literal interpretation of which such a doctrine might possibly be based. It will hardly be pretended that such a doctrine is involved in any well-attested saying of our Lord about Himself. Mr Temple would possibly say, "It is a hypothesis which is necessary to explain Christian experience." But can any experience prove a doctrine which so obviously goes beyond what any individual can properly be said to "experience," and can it be said to be "explained" by a doctrine which is really unintelligible? For at bottom the doctrine implies that a Universal can be entirely present in one of the particulars in a sense in which it is not present in all of them, and, further, that not only the universal qualities of the genus may be present in that one particular but all the *differentiæ* of each individual. Is this intelligible? In another passage Mr Temple talks about a "Particular (Jesus of Nazareth) which is a perfect instance of its own Universal (the Deity)" (p. 252). The view seems to imply that the universal "humanity" and the universal "Deity" are really the same, but even if a meaning could be found for such an assertion, it does not help us to understand how, if Christ represents ideal humanity, Judas Iscariot and Cæsar Borgia can also be said to be "included" in Christ, except in the obvious sense in which *all* individual men may be said to be partakers in one and the same universal "humanity." Mr Temple, following the lead of Harnack and all the Ritschlians, is very contemptuous about the theology of Chalcedon. "The formula of Chalcedon is, in fact, a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek Patristic theology" (p. 230). But there is nothing in the Chalcedonian doctrine of a union of two "natures" in Christ half so difficult as this, even if that doctrine is understood in a very strict metaphysical sense. Something of the same metaphysical doctrine underlies the theology of Mr Moberly, but this is going beyond Mr Moberly. Mr Moberly (like many other philosophers) regards God as a Mind which includes all other minds, but Mr Temple boldly transfers this conception to the human soul of Christ. The philosophers who will most agree with the idea of an all-inclusive Absolute are those who will probably feel least at home with the idea of a single human Being who includes all others. I have profound sympathy with the general spirit in which the essay is conceived, and a great admiration for much that Mr Temple has written—including parts of this essay; but I am bound to say that there is much in it which I do not understand. No doubt there will be many who will be prepared to accept Mr Temple's views without any very close scrutiny in view of his obvious earnestness in trying to unite a cordial adhesion to the central

doctrine of traditional Christianity with an open-minded attempt to face modern problems; while even those who cannot believe that the ultimate "restatement" that we all desire will be effected exactly on Mr Temple's lines may recognise that he has indicated the spirit and tone in which the subject should be approached.

Mr Temple contributes another article to the volume—one on the Church, and this it is possible to praise almost without qualification. We find here what we so seldom find in the treatment of this subject—a combination of the large-mindedness which refuses to identify the Church in its highest, ideal sense with any single visible organisation, and a due and adequate appreciation of the fact that the idea of the Church is useless and ineffectual except so far as it can be realised in some actual, visible, institutional form. Mr Temple fully appreciates the fact that religion is social, and all the practical consequences which follow a recognition of that truth. A philosophical conception of God, as is shown in another essay, requires us to regard the world and its history as essential to the very life and being of God. The Church is "a community, whose life is nothing less than the life of God." Yet "we cannot limit the pre-Christian Church to Israel any more than we can deny the presence of Christ's Spirit in persons and bodies other than Christians and the Church. Abraham and Isaiah, Socrates and Phidias [this strikes us as no very happy conjunction], Buddha and Confucius, must all be reckoned as, *each in his degree*, a representative and organ of the eternal Church" (p. 341, *note*). And the relation between the different branches of Christ's Church is conceived in a very similar spirit. What Mr Temple says about the authority of the Church is quite reasonable in principle; still, when he writes, "It is always possible that the Church is wrong, but the weight of probability is always on its side," I am not sure that he does not go a little too far. If he is thinking of *purely* ethical or spiritual matters, the statement might perhaps be accepted; still more so, if we think of some solitary, perhaps ignorant, individual, maintaining a thesis of his own against a united Christendom. But that is not commonly the way in which these collisions between private judgment and authority occur, and there is an unreality in pretending that it is. When on some question of history or science we have the majority, or a considerable body of scholars, or men of science, at issue with the Church in any of its visible and tangible expressions—whether general council, bishops, clergy, convocations, or a simple majority of lay believers, the number of occasions on which "the Church" in this sense has been wrong in the past would certainly warrant a considerable hesitation in assuming even an *a priori* probability that it will be right now. Mr Temple will plead that he is thinking of really religious questions; but the difficulty is that the representatives of conservatism always insist that every new collision between science and authority involves a religious question; though, when the battle has been fought and lost, they are ready enough to admit that it was after all a mere question of science. It is to be feared that the Church, if appealed to



to-morrow in any of its visible expressions, would decide by an overwhelming majority against many things in *Foundations*: yet if he knew nothing about the authors except that they were seven young Oxford men engaged in teaching theology and philosophy in that University, would not "the man in the street" be justified in attaching more importance to their opinion about critical and historical questions than to that (say) of a majority in the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation?

On Mr Temple's treatment of the Sacraments I will only remark that he seems hardly to appreciate the weakness of the critical foundations upon which his rather strong assertions rest. "It is the whole point of the Sacrament that Christ gives and we receive. No other 'aids and helps' can ever take the place of these, because they are the means appointed by Himself, and carry us back to the moment of His supreme revelation of the Father in the Passion" (p. 345). What evidence is there of that "appointment" or of a promised "gift"? In view of the discrepant versions of the words of institution, can we really say that we know historically that Jesus ever prescribed the perpetual celebration of the Eucharist, to say nothing of attaching any particular effects to it? These historic doubts do not, of course, affect the spiritual value of these ordinances, provided that these effects are rested simply upon experience and the tradition of the Church, but Mr Temple sets up a theory which presupposes an express command by our Lord Himself of a perpetual celebration by His followers. I cannot believe that Mr Streeter or Prebendary Parsons would admit that this fact was established by good historical evidence, even apart from the question whether our Lord made arrangements during His earthly life for the regulation of a Church of indefinite duration—a view expressly repudiated by Mr Rawlinson in the next essay. In another place Mr Temple speaks of the "prayer in which the Lord Jesus dedicated Himself for the final sacrifice," as though we really had a verbatim report of it: surely no portion of the Fourth Gospel has less ground to be so regarded, even upon the assumption of the Johannine authorship. But this tendency to build up theories upon uncritical assumptions represents almost the only serious defect in this excellent essay. Mr Temple has many high qualifications for the philosophical interpretation of Christian doctrine, but I cannot help feeling on almost every page of his work that he has never really thought himself into the critical attitude which he would perhaps nominally accept.

The most startling—I am not sure that it is not the ablest—essay in the volume is Mr A. E. J. Rawlinson's on "The Principle of Authority," with an appendix on "The Historical Origins of the Christian Ministry." It is startling not in itself, but as coming from one who would, I suppose, still claim to be in some sense a High Churchman. His defence of the principle of authority in general, and its relation to truth, is conceived on the most philosophical lines. He clearly distinguishes authority from infallibility, and he insists most rationally on the fact that "the average man, if he is religious at all, accepts his religion 'on authority'—

whether the authority in question happens to be that of the parish priest, the nonconformist preacher, or the 'naked Bible'—as inevitably as he imbibes his political views from the leading articles of his favourite newspaper" (p. 374). But he adds that "normally all educated persons ought, in their measure—in religious as in secular matters—to emancipate themselves from tutelage *pari passu* with advancing knowledge and experience" (p. 375), and recognises the duty in some cases for the discoverer of new truth to publish and maintain it against the decisions of authority. As to the ministry, the idea of the apostolical succession, as a matter of historical fact, is entirely abandoned. Episcopacy is defended merely as representing the principle of "historical continuity," and the author parts company still more decidedly and emphatically from ordinary "Catholic" ideas by the admission that "a close critical examination of the New Testament documents is making it more and more difficult to conceive of the Master as having definitely and explicitly *legislated* upon this or any other matter with regard to His future Church" (p. 385). Mr Rawlinson tries, indeed, to differentiate himself from the ordinary Protestant view by treating the Protestant conception of the ministry as essentially "prophetic," and the Catholic as primarily priestly or sacerdotal. He admits that the true conception ought to include both, but he is himself disposed to treat the priestly as the more important. My only criticism upon this view is that it is difficult to say exactly what functions are left for the "priest," from a point of view which so completely gives up all magical conceptions about orders and sacraments, except those pastoral functions and that leadership in worship which certainly enter into the most strictly Protestant conception of the ministry. No doubt Mr Rawlinson would like his parishioners to come to confession—perhaps habitual confession—which the Protestant pastor might deprecate; but the difference between them would be—on Mr Rawlinson's view of the nature and source of priestly authority—merely a difference of opinion as to the expediency of this particular ordinance, or as to the frequency of its use. Mr Rawlinson seems to me to have brought out in a quite admirable manner the truths underlying the usual High Church doctrines about the Church and the Sacraments (though others have attempted to do the same thing on much the same lines who would never dream of calling themselves High Churchmen), but the doctrines themselves—everything for denying which Evangelicals and Liberals have hitherto been regarded as "bad Churchmen"—are completely abandoned. If the better educated among the younger High Church clergy follow the lead so courageously set them by Mr Rawlinson, the appearance of this essay will indeed represent a turning-point in the history of the Church of England. For some time to come there will probably remain differences of taste, of tone, and of emphasis between High Churchmen of the new school and other sections of the Church, but difference of principle there will be none.

Mr Moberly is the philosopher *par excellence* of the group, and his essay on the Atonement is a serious piece of thinking on a high level.



Seldom, indeed, has a writer on such subjects more definitely faced the philosophical issues involved, and seldom has a philosopher written in a more religious spirit. I may add that seldom has a young Hegelian written with so much modesty. His method of dealing with the subject is to set forth on each division of the subject—the nature of sin, “the conditions of a solution,” and the efficacy of Christ’s work—what he calls the Conservative view and the Liberal view, and to state with great clearness and definiteness how far he agrees with each. I am not sure that the presentation of the two cases is quite fair, since he takes as a representative of “the Liberal view” so very extreme an exponent of Liberalism as Sir Oliver Lodge with his doctrine that the man of to-day is too busy to think of his sins and has really no occasion to do so. Nothing like this has ever been defended by anyone who can claim to be regarded as a Liberal *theologian*. The Conservative, on the other hand, represents by no means the most extreme or irrational type of opinion which has been maintained in the name of orthodoxy. The “inclusive view,” by which Mr Moberly hopes to combine the elements of truth in both extremes, contains, up to a certain point, much more of the Liberal than of the Conservative solution: and the appearance of the contrary is brought about chiefly by crediting the “Liberal” with all sorts of absurdities and treating anything that corrects these absurdities as “Conservative.” In so far as Mr Moberly insists that the “Atonement would seem to consist in the thoroughgoing moral regeneration of the sinner,” and that this is brought about by the effects of Christ’s whole work upon the sinner’s consciousness—including His death but not His death only, there is little that would not be heartily followed by such representatives of the liberal view as Abelard, Maurice, Westcott, Ritschl. All these would substantially agree that it is the love of God exhibited by the death of Christ which causes sorrow for sin and produces that change of character which can alone constitute real reconciliation with God. And, as far as it goes, Mr Moberly accepts this view. But he seeks to combine this (*a*) with his father’s theory of “vicarious Penitence,” and (*b*) with a revival of the old view—which dates from Irenæus and has a long history in the writings of Fathers and Schoolmen—that the solidarity of the human race is such that in Christ’s sufferings the whole human race has really, and not on a mere legal fiction, suffered too.

The last of these theories I have already touched upon in connection with Mr Temple’s essay; but I should like to say something about the first, which he thus defends: “How is vicarious penitence saving? It is by doing more perfectly what punishment does imperfectly; namely, destroying the sin-taste in the sinner by ‘showing up’ sin and so producing such an intense realisation of the true nature of sin and goodness as must find outlet in action. This happens best in our experience when we come to see our sins through purer eyes than our own, and this is made possible by mutual affection. Thus, when we see the trouble and suffering that our faults have brought on those whom we love, our eyes are most likely to be

opened to a true understanding of spiritual values. And this will be so most when the trouble and suffering thus produced is least the accidental or external consequence of sin, but just the shame which mere knowledge of our sin produces in those who love us" (p. 309). There is little in all this which could not be covered by the language which has been used by those who have rested the Atonement upon the subjective effects of Christ's death, except that Mr Moberly employs (as they have not done) the, to my mind, quite unsuitable term "vicarious penitence" for the sorrow which Jesus may no doubt reasonably be supposed (though, after all, there is little direct historical evidence of this) to have felt for the sins of the whole world. But Mr Moberly is not satisfied with such an explanation. He insists upon an objective or "intrinsic necessity" for Christ's death. I have read through several times the pages (pp. 310-316) in which he tries to explain this "intrinsic necessity," but I have wholly failed to understand them sufficiently to venture on reproducing their drift in any words but his own, and for that there is no space. I can only notice isolated points.

Mr Moberly insists that not merely the voluntary surrender to death, but death itself, was necessary to perfect the character of Christ. That the *suffering* was necessary to perfect the character of Christ is a thought which will seem bold to the modern orthodox reader, though Hebrews v. 8 can be quoted on its side. But that an actual death can be necessary to the perfection of character is a very difficult contention. I fail to see upon what the necessity can rest. That there is no such effectual way of convincing another of the sufferer's love ("Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends") is intelligible enough; but here we have only to do with the subjective effect on another, not an effect upon his own character. Then Mr Moberly goes on to insist that the fact of Christ's divinity gives a peculiar efficacy to His death, but I cannot see that he has explained why there should be any intrinsic efficacy in the death even of God, unless he is really meaning to adopt Anselm's view of the superabundant volume of merit accumulated by the voluntary death of One who possessed such value. There are phrases which would seem to point in that direction—"It is rather true that death 'counts' uniquely; and that, in spite of the apparent paradox, death is the most fruitful experience in life,"—but such an interpretation would hardly be in harmony with the general tenor of Mr Moberly's thought. The words at which Mr Moberly seems to come nearest to stating a definite theory on the subject are as follows: "The spectacle of Jesus bearing the sins of His persecutors, and, by so bearing them, initiating their overthrow, is the guarantee that God is bearing the sins of the world; that sin exists only to be caught up and transmuted in the love of God; and that such a heart-subduing, world-conquering sacrifice is an eternal 'moment' in the Divine Life, an essential part of the activity whereby God is God" (p. 315). Now, if what is meant is that the suffering of Christ assures us of His love, that is precisely the theory which Mr Moberly regards as so insufficient;



and it has often formed part of this theory that in some sense the sufferings of Christ may be regarded as actually the sufferings of God. I cannot stay to discuss the difficulties involved in this thought (which were fully appreciated in the patristic period); and will only say that, so far as it is accepted, we can understand how the contemplation of such sufferings by the sinner should serve as a "guarantee" of God's love: but we are still as far off as ever from understanding what can be meant by saying that "God is bearing the sins of the world." This was the very point which Mr Moberly set out to explain, but he has left it as dark as ever. The explanation is circular. The "objective" necessity is really due to a subjective effect on the mind of the sinner, while the explanation given of that subjective effect postulates an objective necessity. And, after all, Mr Moberly has never told us what are the premisses of his theory. Granted that such an objective "Atonement" is thinkable, what are his reasons for believing that it has taken place?

Mr Moberly has in general attempted to state with fairness the position of the "Liberal" whom he criticises, but there is one remark against which I must enter a respectful protest. "It is natural," he tells us, "that the Liberal should not easily accept any distinctive doctrine of Atonement, for he does not feel the need of salvation" (p. 333). With another view of "salvation" than that which Mr Moberly adopts, there might be some excuse for such an assertion; but with a writer who distinctly recognises that salvation means essentially "moral regeneration" the remark is really quite inexcusable. The Liberal may be no less conscious of such a need because he does not believe in the possibility of such a regeneration being effected by any sort of magic. Does he really mean to say that men like Maurice or Ritschl or Hermann or Bishop Westcott—all of whom must be considered "Liberals" as against Mr Moberly—felt no such need?

Mr Moberly's other essay, "God and the Absolute," could only be at all adequately criticised in a long article. It shows the same power of philosophical writing which characterises the essay on the Atonement, and the same tendency, as it seems to me, to attempt the fusion of wholly heterogeneous and incompatible modes of thinking. His philosophy is avowedly the "Absolutism" not of Hegel (who may be interpreted in many ways), or of Green or Caird (whose general attitude was not only religious but specifically Christian), but that of Mr Bradley and Professor Bosanquet, between whom he seems to see only resemblances and no differences. He is aware that the conclusions of those writers not only fall short of but in some ways contradict what he would himself regard as the requirements of Christian Theism. And yet Mr Moberly's own attitude is uncompromisingly Christian. By what process are the conclusions of Orthodoxy grafted upon the premisses of Mr Bradley? Chiefly or entirely, it would seem, by an appeal to "Christian experience." Lack of space compels me to say no more than that the attempt, in spite of all Mr Moberly's ability and earnestness, is singularly unconvincing. If anyone could perform such a feat, Mr Moberly would have done it. As it is, he hardly

attempts to put the reconciliation into words. It must be felt that a theory of the universe which does not admit of being explained in articulate language can hardly be called philosophy or theology. And if we are asked to accept the reconciliation on the strength of Mr Moberly's personal experience, we should find it hard to account for the fact that most of those who would claim something like Mr Moberly's "experience" would emphatically repudiate his philosophy as pantheistic and profane. And then I cannot help remarking that this appeal to "an immediate experience," this acceptance of a theory of the universe on the strength of some isolated "immediacy" (be its nature what it may), is opposed not merely to the ultimate conclusions of Mr Bradley's philosophy but to the fundamental principle of the philosophy which is professedly accepted.<sup>1</sup> Mr Bradley expressly distinguishes between the Absolute and God, and refuses to invest the Absolute with the moral predicates which the Christian creed has always attributed to God. Mr Moberly expressly identifies the Absolute with God, and yet deliberately regards the God who includes in Himself the minds of Cæsar Borgia and Napoleon Buonaparte as a Person who was revealed in Jesus Christ. This seems to me to leave nothing of the Bradleian philosophy standing. You cannot accept the "supermoral" Deity of Mr Bradley and yet believe that God is Love. The two points of view are declared to be both true—"somehow," perhaps Mr Moberly would add; but to my mind they are simply left standing side by side without any reconciliation at all.

Mr Moberly's blind reliance upon an "experience," the nature of which is not anywhere explained, examined, analysed, or even described, seems to me—from an intellectual point of view—the great defect of the whole book. A tendency towards it characterises all the writers more or less, though some much less than others. The situation is all the graver since we were promised by Mr Brook that this last essay would state the grounds upon which one who, like Newman or Martineau, does not claim any immediate intuition of God can rationally be a Theist. Yet, after all, Mr Moberly gives us no grounds which do not presuppose just this experience. In one sense, no doubt, all religion which does not rest on external authority may be said to rest on some kind or other of "experience"; but one ought surely to be told what sort of experience it is which is constantly invoked to prove things otherwise unprovable, and even to explain things otherwise unintelligible. An examination of what "experience" can and what it cannot prove should surely have formed part of a book in which so much rests upon it. A very significant feature of the writers' thought is that conscience or the moral consciousness is mentioned comparatively seldom. Little importance appears to be attached to it, and its relation to the specific "Christian experience" is quite undetermined. The effect of the

<sup>1</sup> "A metaphysical theory which warrants us in an intuition of His [*i.e.* God's] existence, we take to mean some kind of unreasonable appeal to an uncritical conviction. . . . And that suggestion is *prima facie* an intellectual offence to us."—Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 22.



omission on one in whose religious belief the particular experience called moral experience plays a large part is to make him feel less at home in their work than when he is reading Origen or St Thomas, Kant or Green, Newman or Martineau, Maurice or Ritschl, or even (in this particular respect) the writers in *Lux Mundi*.

There are some questions of great importance on which the writers are silent, and on which—in view of the state of opinion in the Church of England and of the divisions in their own ranks—their silence is probably quite wise. The Virgin Birth is not once touched upon; nor is there any declaration on the subject of miracles which would commit the authors to positive agreement or disagreement with such a position as that of Mr Thompson. To be silent about these things in a book which is expressly put forth as “a statement of Christian belief in terms of modern thought” was perhaps the best way of meeting the petty persecutions and the fulminations of the Bishop of Winchester and the Bishop of Oxford. The authors are probably not in entire agreement with one another, and the fact that, without being so, they can regard the book “as, in the main, the expression of a corporate mind” puts these problems into their proper place.

I am sorry that I have been compelled to be so critical in my notice of a work with the aims and (within limits) even the conclusions of which I feel in so much sympathy. Serious criticism is the best compliment which one can pay to a book which deserves to be treated very seriously. The ability of the individual writers is of a high order, but the importance of the work as a whole is much greater than that of any individual essay in it. And that importance is not merely intellectual but religious. For these men have a following which will be ready to welcome this book. They are in very close touch with practical religious work. Many of them, for instance, are closely identified with the Christian Student Movement; they have had great influence over it and have been influenced by it. The strength of the writers lies in an intense religious earnestness which cannot but appeal even to those who are generally disposed to assume that “Professors” are as a rule godless persons whose opinions may be disregarded by serious Christians. Their weakness consists—I must confess—in a somewhat excessive eagerness to think themselves, not merely into the religious attitude but even into the theories and the formulæ of circles whose general intellectual outlook they are far from sharing. This attempt may occasionally have interfered with perfect intellectual lucidity in some of the writers; but from the practical point of view it will give them an enormous advantage. They will be accepted by thousands who would be repelled by a more avowed sympathy with the previous liberal theology to which the book owes so much. If a large body of young men are prepared to take holy orders in the Church of England as missionaries or home clergymen, or to engage in lay religious work, on such lines as these, then we shall see a movement which will be at once liberal and religious to a degree quite unequalled in the previous history of

the Church of England, and the influence of which will not stop with the Church of England. The fact that some at least of the writers have based even their Theism upon a philosophy which will seem to many destructive of their strongest beliefs is the most serious deduction from the usefulness of this book. But it will be far easier for others to correct the intellectual deficiencies of their theoretical position than to originate a really religious movement of equal promise. *Foundations* is a real attempt to construct a theology which shall be at once liberal and constructive. It is one of its best features that it would be difficult to characterise the whole book, or even each individual writer, as distinctively high, low, or broad. It may be that this book will constitute a turning-point in the history, not of a party, but of the Church of England and of the Church in England.

HASTINGS RASHDALL.

HEREFORD.

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*The Meaning of Christianity.*—By Frederick A. M. Spencer.—  
Fisher Unwin, 1912.—Pp. 420.

THIS book is an attempt to outline a Christian theology as determined by modern knowledge and ways of thinking. It is doubtful whether the attempt has ever before been made on so comprehensive a scale. In spite of the difficulty presented by the mere scope of the undertaking, the result may at once be pronounced interesting and suggestive. It is evident that theology has again entered upon the constructive stage, and there is perhaps no sufficient reason why a positive and highly organised system of religious truth should be more difficult of achievement than it was in the last great constructive era which culminated in the thirteenth century. If science and revelation were not then in such acute conflict, the passage from Neoplatonic to Aristotelian conceptions of reality in the interests of religion was none the less difficult to negotiate. Then as now the critical period had lasted some centuries. There seems no reason why the critical preparation should not be followed now, as then, by a period of successful constructive synthesis.

Every Christian theology must be founded on the theology of the Bible. But our present need is of a theology which, as Mr Spencer puts it, will discriminate between that in the theology of the Bible "which arises out of religion and religious experience," and "that in it which is the product of the beliefs and ways of thought of the time." And it will be the function of a living contemporary theology "to develop the former by means of the best science and philosophy we can obtain." But here at the outset the question presents itself: Is a theology possible? "Is it possible to make valid inferences to such realities as those with which theology is largely concerned?" Mr Spencer's answer is that it is possible on the assumption which is at least tacitly present in all religious experience, that there are in our own personalities analogues of those realities.



Mr Spencer begins by establishing the existence of the spiritual as a realm of being which constitutes man's fullest consciousness. This realm penetrates and utilises his conceptual or mental consciousness, just as this latter penetrates and utilises the perceptual consciousness, and it again the merely physical. But how are we to conceive of the evolution of the lower realms of existence into the higher? How for instance did chemical existence develop into organism or organism into consciousness? The conditions of such development would seem to include at least a potentiality of the higher and as yet unattained type of being in the lower. But they must include more than that. For all chemical atoms, for instance, might be conceived as possessing separately a latent potentiality of organic life, but organism depends on something more, viz. their due combination. It is easier, therefore, to assume that a supreme spiritual Consciousness has presided over the different stages of the development of reality, and that creation is as it were the living of this supramundane Consciousness in and with the different forms of mundane life. Thus all grades of being are related from within and are finally included in their Source, the Spiritual Reality whose consciousness transcends and is independent of matter, and whose fullest expression is the love of spirit for spirit, the perfect communion of soul with soul—in other words, God.

Mr Spencer's Christology is a bold attempt to appraise the merits and defects of the traditional Christological doctrine and to suggest a conception which will include all the values which it has preserved while eliminating what was necessarily temporary and defective in its form. He holds that all the defects of the early Christology are traceable to an inadequate conception of personality, while none of the positions maintained by the early Christian thinkers, even of those who were definitely branded as heretical, was without value as a witness to some essential element in the nature of Christ. Briefly, his own view is that "the spiritual nature and life of souls are Christ"; that "all these units of life belong to a great process of Divine incarnation, and, potentially at least, are spiritually interconnected"; that this life which eternally proceeds from God and was "typically incarnate in the Jesus of history" is extended downwards from the historical Jesus into all the souls who have communion with Him in the fullest spiritual life, and upwards from Him into the Divine nature so that He is the revelation of God's suffering in and with His creatures. He holds, too, that the traditional view that Jesus pre-existed in a heavenly state, and that He has exerted a directly personal influence on mankind since and in virtue of His resurrection, may be held without establishing more than a difference in degree between Him and other human souls. Mr Spencer finds in the spiritual communion between God and human souls as made possible by the Christ-life, by the life of Divine suffering in and with humanity, the typical experience which shaped the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. So the doctrine of the Trinity "symbolises the truth of the Universe considered as purposive and growing," but symbolises also the Eternal as comprising within Itself purpose

and growth. It is a doctrine of the Divine nature determined not merely by its various activities and effects in time, but by its own necessary and eternal activity. "The Eternal Love fulfils Itself in love working and developing and coming to blissful fruition."

The conception of the Atonement is in the same way to be determined by the experienced exigencies of the spiritual life. The realised fact of sin leads to a craving for the Divine mercy which has its perfect fruition in a confident faith in the Divine forgiveness. But this sense of forgiveness demands abandonment of the merely personal will and self-consecration to the Divine Will. And again through union with the Divine Will that will gains content for man and becomes devoted service of the Divine life in men. This is the atonement of man to God wrought by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ—in His teaching, in His life of suffering and death, and in His resurrection. But the Atonement is also the symbol of a "change" wrought in the will of God towards men. "Since God loves souls, He must enter into their experience of suffering and limitation, and in virtue of that intimacy in suffering and limitation He is victorious in love."

Mr Spencer's appreciation of the institutional element in Christianity as the supreme expression of the spiritual life in mankind is sane and balanced. As the Church of the Creeds, the Holy Catholic Church in which we profess our religious faith, is the intercommunion of the human and the Divine, so the actual churches of history are the necessary instruments of preparation of that communion, the societies which educate and discipline mankind towards the fulness of the spiritual life in Christ. The ministry is not only entrusted by the community with the function of religious teaching and exhortation and the conduct of its common worship, but is also the special guardian of the Christian tradition. "Christianity grows through fresh revelations and through applying itself to the growing life of humanity. It grows through combination of old and new. Now, in general, the ministry, or men so far as ministers, are pre-eminently the guardians of the old; while the laity, or men so far as laymen, bring new elements of experience whereby the old is developed." To the Sacraments Mr Spencer does not deny an "invisible sanctifying influence" attaching to the consecrated elements, but he considers that such influence is subordinate to their character as *efficacia signa*, as "signs that assist in producing and maintaining that of which they are the signs."

The remainder of the book is occupied with a speculative but deeply interesting and suggestive treatment of the doctrine of the "last things," of which it need only be said that it justifies itself as the necessary pendant of that view of the spiritual life as the Divine destiny of man which Mr Spencer has made the central motive of his re-thinking of Christian theology.

A. L. LILLEY.



*Within: Thoughts during Convalescence.*—By Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E.—London: Williams & Norgate.—3s. 6d. net.

"THE Kingdom of God is within you" are the words prefixed as a motto to this modern Book of Job, in the course of which the author tells us how he came to discover their truth for himself, and to attach to the words a pregnant meaning not commonly suspected by the orthodox. A year or so before the publication of the volume Sir Francis Younghusband, as his many known and unknown friends learned with regret, was run down and severely injured by a motor-car. His leg was badly broken, besides other injuries, and he had to lie up for eight months, to undergo several operations, and to suffer prolonged and intense pain. Out of this experience the book was written—out of the helplessness and the torment, out of the yearnings of the spirit for any prop, any belief, to fortify it against the irrational cruelty with which he seemed to be tortured, and also out of the love and sympathy with which the sufferer was surrounded, and which revealed to him something in humanity which he had never realised before. The value of this sincere and courageous book lies just in the fact that it is not a philosopher's attempt to theorise about the mystery of evil—the author appears to have read scarcely anything on the subject—but comes, as it were, raw from life. It shows us a man of great practical intelligence, of proved capacity and courage, suddenly compelled to turn his eyes not on the world without, where he had worked so long with confidence and success, but on the far more difficult problems of the world within, and to find for the riddle of the universe an answer by which a man might live, and love, and work, without, on the one hand, propping his spirit by impossible superstitions, or, on the other, resigning himself in angry or cynical contempt to the futility of the whole performance.

The starting-point of the book is the question, Why am I suffering all this? Can there be any good reason for it—for it, and for all the other agonies, defeats, and frustrations of the world? Why do the monsoons fail in India and cause untold suffering to millions? Why did Gordon fail and die miserably in the Soudan? Why does a *Titanic* run on a submerged iceberg? Why does a man like the author's friend, Major Bretherton, after doing more work than any other man for the success of the expedition to Lhasa, get drowned in the Sampo River three days' march from his goal? All these "whys" amount to an indictment of the order of nature, on the assumption that there is some responsible Being to make answer. Answers have been made on his behalf, and the author reviews some of them and rejects them. Could a personal Ruler of the Universe, omnipotent and righteous, have created such an order of things as we actually see? Colonel Younghusband concludes that he could not. There is no such being. If there were, he could and would have made us perfect without recourse to the chastening and strengthening influences attributed to pain and loss. By his mere will every desirable endowment might have been given to humanity. But the author clears away the Judaic conception of

the Deity only to substitute for it the conception of another Power which is neither irrational nor blindly cruel. This Power, of which we ourselves are manifestations, is to be apprehended by us as endeavouring to express or fulfil itself through Nature; even as an artist, with pain and effort, with many failures and rejections, endeavours to express himself in creative art :—

“Whether we look within ourselves, whether we observe other individuals, and masses of men, or whether we trace the history of mankind, the animals and the plants, we see everywhere the evidence of an inherent, impelling spirit, and evidence that that impulse strives for what is good.

“The existence of an outside Providence who created us, who watches over us, and who guides our lives like a Merciful Father, we have found impossible longer to believe in. But of the existence of a Holy Spirit radiating upward through all animate beings, and finding its fullest expression, in man in love, and in the flowers in beauty, we can be as certain as of anything in the world.

“This fiery spiritual impulsion at the centre and the source of things, ever burning in us, is the supremely important factor in our existence. It does not always attain to light. In many directions it fails: the conditions are too hard, and it is utterly blocked. In others it only partially succeeds. But in a few it bursts forth into radiant light. There are few who in some heavenly moment of their lives have not been conscious of its presence. We may not be able to give it outward expression, but we know that it is there. And where it comes most perfectly to light may not be in the great men of the earth or in the most renowned, but in simple unknown lovers.”

It is the privilege of man to further with conscious will the mighty impulse towards life and love of this divine Power, mysterious in its nature, profoundly obscure in its relations to the world of sense, but abundantly revealed in the phenomena of physical life, and still more to those who seek it “within,” in the heart and conscience of man. The latter half of the book is taken up with a discussion of the definite ways in which, at the present day, civilised man can bear his part in this life-movement. He is to widen the bounds of liberty—especially in the relations of the sexes—to foster the spirit of love, the appreciation of beauty, the capacity for toil and endurance.

There is, of course, nothing very new in the author's creed either on the negative or the positive, the philosophic or the ethical side. But a summary such as we have given conveys no idea of the quality of the book, which is extraordinarily vital, close to fact, abounding in personal reminiscence—headlong very often, with none of the scholar's timidity about involving himself in verbal contradictions, and naïve to a degree that sometimes provokes a smile. The affair of Major Bretherton, for instance—with what simplicity it is assumed that a God, if a God there were, would naturally be a British tribal deity with no sympathy for the Tibetan view of the expedition to Lhasa! The remark about the Queen Victoria Memorial in St James's Park is another case in point. To have “felt and known” the beauty of this work is, we are told, to have “reached something which is pure good.” The author has probably never dreamed that there could be two opinions about the value of the kind of art of



which this platitude in gilt and marble is a representative. It is a piece of British official art: that is enough to give his natural taste—which would probably have taught him better—no fairplay.

But these are trifles. A critic who really wanted to confute Colonel Younghusband—which is not at all the position of the present reviewer—would probably address him in some such fashion as this: If you are convinced that this is not the kind of universe which a Deity, at once intelligent, beneficent, and omnipotent, would have provided for us, what kind, then, do you want? Do you want a universe in which a Gordon will always be victorious, a *Titanic* never go down, a Bretherton always go forth into an unknown land with the certainty of safe arrival at his goal? Would the author himself think such a universe worth living in—a universe in which faith, fortitude, and daring, would be conceptions more strange and unintelligible than are the ideals of Sir Francis to an Andaman Islander? For that which gives zest to the drama of life—which in truth makes it drama, heroic, tragic, humorous, or what we will—is precisely the fact that we live in an order of nature which does *not* reflect the aspirations and moral ideals of man. If it did, it could not breed men, as we understand the word. It is idle to reply that omnipotence could create and endow them as it chose. Omnipotence conceived in this abstract, unconditioned manner, is not to be invoked in relation to a world of fact. It is futile to discuss what unconditioned omnipotence might do, since the moment it does anything whatever it creates a condition.

But this objection to Colonel Younghusband's argument is perhaps more captious than really effective. Men, as we know men, may be possible only in the world as we know it, but why should omnipotence have created men at all—especially if omniscience were present to suggest the desirability of leaving well alone? Colonel Younghusband's conception of the divine Power, though it will be anathematised by the orthodoxies both of religion and of science, is one to which many minds are turning in this age. As against the religious orthodoxy it appears to them to harmonise far more fully with the order of things than does the conception of an anthropomorphic Ruler; while as against the orthodoxy represented, let us say, by Professor Schäfer it harmonises more closely with the spiritual experience of man than does the conception of a mechanical universe in which consciousness is but the ineffectual by-product of blind material energies. That it has satisfied, sustained, and inspired a man of the type of the author of this book is a fact in itself well worth putting on record.

A word may be added on one of the author's suggestions for social reform. He deals at considerable length with the marriage question. He demands a social order in which the freest play will be given to the principle of love. To this end he would do away with every obstacle which the laws and conventions of to-day impose on the union of lovers. One of these he finds in the irrevocability (under ordinary circumstances) of the union. Regarding a monogamous and enduring union as the ideal, he would have everyone "free to unite and free to part"; and while urging

that the laws must, where necessary, enforce the responsibilities of parenthood, he inconsistently declares against any public pledge or ceremony such as would form, at least for one party, the only sure evidence of the assumption of these responsibilities. This seems to us the weakest part of the book. It theorises *in vacuo*—it has no foundation in the facts of life and of human nature. If a monogamous marriage is the ideal, then those who cherish that ideal, recognising the enormous strength of the sexual impulse, will assuredly fence their ideal and themselves with conventions and prohibitions much like those which obtain at the present day. Outside that fence, on the whole, will be kept those people who do not in some way or other pledge themselves to the ideals of those within. Whatever exceptions may be made, or ought to be made, for “hard cases,” it will always prove impossible to have things both ways at the same time; every ideal, if it is seriously pursued, means a surrender of some liberty. One must, however, cordially agree with everything which Colonel Younghusband urges in favour of early marriages, marriages for love, and the simpler social conventions which might facilitate such unions.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

IFIELD, HAMPSTEAD.

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*Gitanjali (Song Offerings)*.—By Rabindra Nath Tagore.—Printed at the Chiswick Press, London, for the India Society.—10s. 6d. net.

FEW works of poetry published in English during recent years have made so deep an impression on the minds of thoughtful readers as this collection of translations from the Bengali, made by the author from his own published writings. Rabindra Nath Tagore comes of a Bengal family which for several generations has produced men of distinction in various spheres of Indian life. His father was one of the earliest and most influential adherents of the Brahmo Samaj, and was author of a kind of spiritual autobiography of remarkable interest. The poet himself, though one of the most simple-minded and unpontifical of men, is the centre of a fervent cult extending wherever Bengali is spoken; his poems, often before they are printed or without ever being printed, are circulated on the lips of disciples through thousands of hearers and learners, and are one of the most powerful influences, of a purely spiritual kind, in modern India. And many English readers have now found that their appeal to the Western mind, even in the medium of a prose translation, is hardly less deep and compelling.

The edition which is here reviewed<sup>1</sup> has for frontispiece a portrait of the author by Mr William Rothenstein. It shows the head in profile, and therefore does not fully render the expression of sweetness and dignity conveyed in the look of this remarkable man. But the likeness so far as

<sup>1</sup> The edition in question was exhausted shortly after publication and is no longer obtainable by the public. A new edition will shortly be issued by Messrs Macmillan & Co.



it goes is admirable, and the portrait adds much to the attraction of the volume. There is also an eloquent introduction by Mr W. B. Yeats, largely in the form of a conversation about Tagore between Mr Yeats and an Indian friend. Perhaps the most noteworthy thing in it is a remark of the Indian : "He is the first of our saints who has not refused to live, but has spoken out of Life itself, and that is why we give him our love." That is very true ; it is part of the secret of Tagore's special influence on the young minds of the present generation. After Walt Whitman and Nietzsche, it is useless to ask them to listen to any philosophy which denies life. Not even the East will do so now. And so the latest of her sages writes :—

"Deliverance is not for me in renunciation. I feel the embrace of freedom in a thousand bonds of delight.

"Thou ever pourest for me the fresh draught of thy wine of various colours and fragrance, filling this earthen vessel to the brim.

"My world will light its hundred different lamps at thy flame and place them before the altar of thy temple.

"No, I will never shut the door of my senses. The delights of sight and hearing and touch will bear thy delight.

"Yes, all my illusions will burn into illumination of joy, and all my desires ripen into fruits of love."

This poetry is so closely in contact with the fundamental things of life that its thought and even its imagery have a universal significance, just as have those of the Gospels for the very same reason. But it is the poetry of a saint. Every one of these lyrics portrays some mood of the soul in its meditation upon God. As Mr Yeats writes :—

"The traveller in the red-brown clothes that he wears that dust may not show upon him, the girl searching in her bed for the petals that have fallen from the wreath of her royal lover, the servant or the bride awaiting the master's home-coming in the empty house, are images of the heart turning to God. Flowers and rivers, the blowing of conch shells, the heavy rain of the Indian July, or the parching heat, are images of the moods of that heart in union or in separation ; and a man sitting in a boat upon a river playing upon a lute, like one of those figures full of mysterious meaning in a Chinese picture, is God Himself. A whole people, a whole civilisation, immeasurably strange to us, seems to have been taken up into this imagination ; and yet we are not moved because of its strangeness, but because we have met our own image, as though we had walked in Rossetti's willow-wood, or heard, perhaps for the first time in literature, our voice as in a dream."

It would not be surprising if this book became a kind of landmark in our literature, because it is one of the first and the finest expressions of a pure religious fervour which has not needed for its passion and its inspiration the attachment to some intermediate object, some physical incarnation of deity, some human or semi-human personality, some definite historical or national channel of access to the divine. It shows us that these avenues lie everywhere. After this book it can never again be said that a religion has need of superstitions to keep it from being bloodless and coldly intellectual.

To illustrate the quality of these poems by quotation is no easy matter. In each of them part is joined to part in the bond of so strong a design that one cannot easily make extracts. But here is one poem, a short piece of characteristic and striking beauty which may be given entire:—

“The day was when I did not keep myself in readiness for thee; and entering my heart unbidden even as one of the common crowd, unknown to me, my king, thou didst press the signet of eternity upon many a fleeting moment of my life.

“And to-day, when by chance I light upon them and see thy signature, I find that they have lain scattered in the dust mixed with the memory of joys and sorrows of my trivial days forgotten.

“Thou didst not turn in contempt from my childish play among dust, and the steps that I heard in my playroom are the same that are echoing from star to star.”

That the author is a master of English will be sufficiently apparent from these quotations. He has already won a grateful and attentive audience in this country. He has something to say to us which we need perhaps more than his own countrymen. But though he may have something more to say to us hereafter, his message is complete enough in this slender book. It will give us something to think over and to make our own for many a day to come.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

IFIELD, HAMPSTEAD.

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*Life: its Nature, Origin and Maintenance.* An Address to the British Association at Dundee.—By E. A. Schäfer, LL.D., D.Sc., M.D., F.R.S.—London: Longmans, 1912.

*The Mechanistic Conception of Life.* Biological Essays.—By Jacques Loeb, M.D., Ph.D., Sc.D.—University of Chicago Press, 1912.

*The Making of the Earth.*—By Professor J. W. Gregory (Home University Library).—London: Williams & Norgate, 1912.

*The Evolution of Living Organisms.*—By Edwin S. Goodrich, F.R.S., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford (The People's Books).—London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1912.

AMONGST modern evolutionists there are three distinct theories as to the nature of life. There is (a) the vitalist theory, held by Sir Oliver Lodge, Dr A. R. Wallace, and the progressive biologists; (b) the biotic energy theory, which asserts that life is a form of energy and that the cell is an energy transformer; (c) the mechanist theory—advocated in the Dundee address—which postulates that all the phenomena of life can be explained in terms of its material and mechanical manifestations, that the physical and chemical condition of the protoplasm and its environment are sufficient to explain all the changes that take place in living cells. The advocates of the last two theories say that any other explanation but theirs is unscientific. It is a magic word—this word “scientific”—and, like charity, it may be made to cover a multitude of sins. To be scientific really means



that you are to be guided solely by the results of observation; that your conclusions must be in accordance with your experiment; that the accuracy of your conclusions is commensurate with the accuracy of your methods of investigation; that you are justified in going a little—very little—beyond the limits of observation and only in a suggestive and not in a dogmatic manner. In a word, to be scientific means that there must be complete harmony between what you see and what you say. How far are these mechanistic biologists true to their principles? Take, first of all, one of Professor Schäfer's statements—which really forms the pivot on which the whole theory of the mechanists turns. "The problems of life," he says, "are essentially problems of matter. We cannot conceive of life in the scientific sense as existing apart from matter." Another biologist expresses the same idea thus: "There is no protoplasm apart from life, and no life without protoplasm." These are not scientific statements; they are merely dogmatic assertions which have no foundation in fact. For Professor Schäfer has not defined what he means by life except in the sense that it does not include "soul"—a term which he likewise leaves undefined. If he means life in the universal sense, then it is not in accordance with experience to say that we cannot conceive of life as existing apart from matter, for that means that problems of mind and spirit, of consciousness and intuition, are not problems of life. If, however, he merely applies the term "life" to the material manifestations of vitality—that is to say, to the physical and chemical changes taking place in living things, then the statement is meaningless. Further, it is not scientific, and therefore not in accordance with experience, to assert that there is no protoplasm apart from life; for there is such a thing as dead protoplasm—the only kind of protoplasm that the chemist has ever been able to analyse. Take another instance of this sin of false reasoning. Referring to the chemical constitution of protoplasm and its possible synthesis by the chemist, Professor Schäfer maintains that "when the chemist succeeds in building up this compound, it will, *without doubt*, be found to exhibit the phenomena which we are in habit of associating with the term 'life.'" It is a statement, this, which reveals at once the weakness of the mechanist's position. A more cautious and more logical way of putting the point would be to say that if the chemist ever succeeds in bringing together the various elements in the proportion and under the conditions found in protoplasm, the manufactured compound may exhibit the phenomenon of life. That, however, would by no means signify that the chemist had manufactured life. Professor Goodrich goes even further and asserts that "if any stage in the development of living substance were artificially made, it would probably be so different from the protoplasm of modern plants and animals that we should scarcely recognise it as living at all, even if we had it before us."

Professor Tyndall, in his Belfast address, pointed out that many of the organic compounds which are the by-products, so to speak, of vitality have been successfully produced by the chemist in the laboratory. We have made practically no advance in this respect during the last forty years

except in increasing the number of such compounds and in getting slightly more reliable analyses of protoplasm. But, to quote from *Recent Advances in Physiology and Bio-chemistry* (edited by Professor Leonard Hill), though "many organic compounds have been synthesised by the chemist, all proof is wanting that this is done by the same process as the cell does it. The conditions in the cell are widely different, and at the temperature of the cell, and with such chemical materials as are at hand, no such organic syntheses have ever been artificially carried out."

Another favourite argument of the mechanists is to draw out a list of *special characteristics of living matter*, and then to take these one by one and show that they are also characteristic of dead matter! Hence, they conclude, there is no essential difference between living protoplasm and dead matter. For example, Professor Schäfer says: "The most obvious manifestation of life is spontaneous movement. We regard such movement as indicative of the possession of life; nothing seems more justifiable than such an inference. But physicists show us movements of a precisely similar character in substances which no one can regard as living. It is therefore certain that such movements are not specifically 'vital,' and that their presence does not necessarily denote life." In a similar way the advocates of the mechanist theory enumerate other "characteristic and essential properties of life," and then proceed to infer that, since these properties are shared by inorganic matter, they are not characteristic of living matter. For instance, they point out that living cells grow by assimilation of matter from their environment—that is, by feeding—and reproduce themselves, transmitting all their powers and character to the young cells so formed. They show that crystals perform very similar operations. All this is, of course, very true, but the reasoning cannot be called scientific. For it simply deals with the properties of matter associated with life, and surely one would not expect matter to lose its ordinary properties under those conditions, though it might possibly develop new ones. All that these observations prove is that molecules of matter keep their properties even when they are the vehicles of vital manifestations.

The fundamental basis of the mechanist theory, and of the biotic energy theory, is the principle of the conservation of energy. In terms of this principle Herbert Spencer endeavoured to work out a complete theory of Evolution and had to admit that, owing to his failure to account for the connection between mind and matter, the world of thought and spirit was "unknowable." The mistake which he made, and which his followers make, is to suppose that this principle accounts for even purely material phenomena. Physicists know that the theory of the conservation of energy is inadequate to explain the properties even of dead matter. Some other principle involving the interaction of matter and its environment is always necessary to give a complete solution. The fundamental error of the mechanist theory of life is to refuse to admit the influence of this second principle. And it is in this respect only that they differ from the vitalist school represented by Dr Alfred R. Wallace, Sir Oliver



Lodge and others. It is this second guiding principle which the latter understand by the term "life." The manifestation of it in living things these thinkers call "vitality." Perhaps it were better to adopt the term "life-force," or "vital-force," for that elusive but substantial something which gives direction and purpose to the physical and chemical changes characteristic of living matter.

What is the nature of the problem we have to solve? Here is an illustration—an analogy, which will present very similar features. Imagine some huge extra-terrestrial being—from Mars, or anywhere else—to be studying this world by observing it through his microscope and analysing bits of it in his crucible. Suppose the limit of his vision to be such that any town or city like London would appear to him just as a single cell from a plant or animal appears to us through a microscope. Suppose that his idea of time was such that our days were like minutes to him. Then he would notice very peculiar features in this cell life. He would observe that this city-cell was full of activity and had a definite outline. The cell-wall would be gradually increasing in size, and the cell would presently by a budding process produce a new cell—a suburb—presenting the same features as the parent cell. He would see that when no sunlight fell on it, a beautiful glow emanated from it which he would interpret as a phosphorescence. For this glow would immediately disappear during the day and could only be seen at night. Having probably studied the phosphorescence of luminous paint and such-like substances on his own planet, he would at once conclude that the glow he observed on this terrestrial cell was due to the same cause. "It is entirely due to atomic reaction," he would say, "such reaction being produced by response to the stimulus of sunlight. There is no need to invoke the aid of any intelligent unseen power to explain the fact." Now, of course, *we* would identify the immediate cause of the phenomenon as the conscious act of an intelligent lamplighter or electrical engineer. This giant is in exactly the same position as the advocates of the mechanist theory of life, and it is surprising that they do not see the trap into which they have fallen. For they know hardly anything at all about the physical properties of the living cell. Professor Schäfer makes much of the phenomenon of osmosis and says that it obeys the same laws exactly as hold in non-living matter. This certainly has not been experimentally proved. The laws of osmosis have been deduced by studying the passage of certain solutions through a dead membrane. Is it not certain, however, that osmosis in a living cell is a different thing—a more complex phenomenon and, possibly, a purely molecular one? Physiologists have not investigated the matter thoroughly, and there are any number of physical properties of cells about which they know next to nothing. And as to the chemical composition of protoplasm—the various analyses are those of dead protoplasm, and Professor Schäfer himself states in his treatise on physiology that the molecular state of living protoplasm is probably very different from that of the dead substance. Why, even the very methods used to examine

living cells under the microscope—the usual methods of staining—produce violent molecular changes which may obliterate the actual physical characteristics of the substance under examination.

Fortunately there are men who still possess the mystic sense; who can see the significance of symbolic things; who through the visible form can perceive the potent directing power of an invisible vitality. As to the origin of life they say nothing, for knowledge of the ultimate origin of life or matter can never be attained by the ordinary methods which are at present at our command. Everyone knows that the pressing of an ivory button will cause an electric current to flow through the wires connected with a bell and cause that bell to ring. Whence is the energy of the electric current? Physicists will tell you that it can all be accounted for by the chemical action that occurs in the battery. But ask them why that chemical action does not start until the button is pressed though the chemical agents are all present, and no scientist can answer you. Further, there are half a dozen entirely different ways of generating an electric current. It would be easy to generate a current at a remote distance from a room, convey it there along wires and cause it to ring a bell, and you could defy any scientist present on the spot to indicate the origin of that current. So it is with regard to life: only the mystery is deeper. We have no direct knowledge of the immediate cause of vitality in matter, and it is quite possible that life may have originated in many different ways under as many different circumstances at different times and in different places.

Personally I am much attracted by Mr Bernard Shaw's Life-Force theory—taking it as a very convenient and satisfying way of describing the ways of nature; and remembering always that the description is from our point of view and not from that of the Life-Force. The Life-Force is something which has been always striving for a fuller expression of itself. It first created forms of inanimate matter, and perhaps the phenomenon of crystallisation was one of its unsuccessful attempts at finding a means of producing vitality. By the process of inorganic evolution, one or more peculiar agglomerations were evolved which seemed suitable for the manifestation of vitality. Ever since the Life-Force has specialised in this particular branch of evolution, and its latest triumph is man. What the future has in store, we do not know. All that the theory entitles us to say is that there is some directive purposeful influence at work which is capable of producing different forms of life from the same material substance. Matter is the medium chosen and made by the Life-Force for the manifestation of vitality, and the properties of matter as such remain, and its means and power of acquiring and transmitting energy remain, the new element introduced being the guidance and direction of that energy. The cells in a seed are divided into two similar portions. Both are exposed to the same stimuli, and one becomes a root, the other a stem. What is the cause of this differentiation? The closest histological examination fails to discover any difference in the ova of different types of mammalia. There is very little difference between the animal and



vegetable cell originally, and yet what a marvellous divergence there is in their subsequent history ! The singular power of adaptation to environment, the wonderful ways in which obstacles and difficulties are overcome, the peculiar and intricate organisation of particular functions all working towards the one common end of perpetuation of the species—all the exquisite activity associated with the various forms and phases of life—compel us to look beyond the range of mere uncontrolled mechanical action. The existence of the Life-Force seems to me as essential to the successful explanation of the phenomenon of life as the presence and intelligent action of the driver of an express train are essential for the successful guidance of the train to its destination. A complete scientific theory of the train is impossible if you deliberately ignore the driver, and it is equally absurd to attempt to describe or explain the much more complex train of living things by ignoring altogether the spiritual guiding, controlling, and driving influence without which there is no life. As Mazzini says in one of his essays : “Because certain manifestations of life are displayed before us, shall we confound them with life itself? No, life is immortal : through the indefinite series of its manifestations it assumes form after form, according to the intermediate and secondary aim which it has to reach in the course of its journey towards the supreme final aim.” The beautiful lake of Gwynant rests calmly and peacefully in the exquisite bosom of the Gwynant vale, and under the immediate protection of the towering heights of Snowdon—that majestic emblem of eternal steadfastness. But I have seen all that inspiring panorama dissolved out of view by a drenching rain and a driving mist. It had put on its cloak of mystery ; and the mountain, which had brought down the mist, had abandoned its passive stolidity and become an aggressive power. The beauty of the lake—no more to be seen—was a thing to be felt like the beauty of a soul. Life, in all its various perplexing moods, is very much like that ; calm, beautiful, complex, powerful, elusive, and mystically aggressive. The process of its progress is baffling, and the cause of its mystery is the stupendous loftiness of “its supreme final aim.”

O. W. GRIFFITH.

CRICKLEWOOD, LONDON.

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*Heresy and Schism : A Plea for Universalism.*—By T. F. G.—Bristol : Arrowsmith ; London : Simpkin, Marshall, Kent & Co., 1911.—1s. 6d. net.

THE writer of this unassuming little book—less than one hundred pages—refers to the present failure of organised Christianity with charity and breadth of view, and deals with the cause and the remedy. It is therefore a book that will not appeal to the narrow-minded of any sect or creed, but it will call forth a response from the hearts of many devout men and women who are wistfully dissatisfied with the so-called orthodoxy and religious life of to-day ; it is valuable also as showing the trend of thought that is quietly deepening and spreading among thinkers of all classes ; and

for such the book seems to be meant. As it is written in homely language, at times is even lacking in grace and dignity of style, it is neither a scholarly appeal to scholars nor a literary essay for the learned; but it is written with a force which is the direct outcome of earnest conviction, and for this reason, and for the truth that lies behind it, it will call forth many an answering echo.

In the Introduction the writer questions what there is in theology that should make it able to stereotype the Truth and to deny it any development or evolution for nineteen centuries; whole-hearted seekers have found that Truth is ever evolving; the scientist of 1911 is nearer the truth than he of 1511; the theologians of to-day have, in the same way, a larger field for deduction, and are nearer the truth, than they of the time of the Reformation, who in their turn knew more than the early Fathers, as they in theirs knew more than David the Psalmist. The writer points out that there are innumerable souls who never have been, and never will be, able to fulfil the conditions necessary to salvation as laid down by priestly authority or orthodox community, and questions what of these souls? where are they now? and he demands that those who profess to teach religion give answer, and that the truth or error of such answers be open to test by anyone, scientifically, doctrinally, historically, theologically, and experimentally.

Universalism, or the ultimate redemption of every one of the myriads of souls born into this world, is upheld as the religion of the future, and the ground for belief in it is based upon a Scriptural consideration of the Godhead, under the aspects of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and upon the fuller light now vouchsafed to inquiring souls, to whom is being imparted a deeper and more perfect knowledge of the attributes of the Godhead, of His methods and of His mind towards us. Further, Universalism satisfies as the old concepts failed to satisfy, gives rest in place of unrest, and in the future an explanation of the eternal "why?" of to-day. There are objections to Universalism, writes the author; "let them be stated as fully and freely as possible, for the matter is a very crucial one, and more depends on it than the mere upsetting of yet another heresy." The objections are stated, criticised, and answered; and the failure of the old orthodoxy to appeal to that God-given spark of the divine implanted in every human soul is contrasted with the incentive to Christlikeness of a belief in Universalism. The question at once arises, The sacraments, the rites, and the ceremonies of the sacerdotalist, are they then of no value? Their place and value are briefly shown as helps, but not as essentials.

Under the head of Schism, the writer lays the responsibility of the division of soul from soul, and of soul from its God, on the clergy and ministers of all denominations, more especially "the priesthood of the sacerdotal party"; but a few pages further on we find: "Nor can Non-conformity show a much better record, with trust-deeds that confine the truth to old, musty, worn-out creeds and conventions, where political



exigencies and the need to placate an arbitrary diaconate force the preacher to . . . cramp his message. . . . How is divine truth to struggle to the light through the mass of material refuse and energise as the Truth of the Holy Spirit of God?" But the hopeful, optimistic tone rings out again in the words: "Yet the true Church of Christ—that nobler, grander concept that worthily merits the name 'Church Universal'—is not so riven asunder"; the Roman Catholic, the Anglican, the Non-conformist, the one of no denomination, are each and all recognised as separate stones being utilised in the building of the true Church.

In Part III., entitled "The Priesthood of the Laity and Tolerance," we find: "Not a more harrowing parody of the all-embracing Christ . . . could be found than in the mutual want of charity and fellowship obtaining among those peculiarly exclusive communions of latter-day Christianity, which pride themselves on their catholicity, and represent to the world that sad mixture of hatred, strife, malice, and all uncharitableness depicted by Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Nonconformity"; and the priesthood of the laity is unknown among them, "they all unite in claiming a divinely appointed exclusiveness for the performance of sacramental acts of their own priesthood, and any endeavour to extend the prerogative to lay members would be met by varying intensity of refusal." As there is no recognition of the priesthood of the laity, and the power of excommunicating has been so much used and abused—"No priest, no sacrament; no sacrament, no salvation; no salvation, no hope of eternal blessedness"—it becomes a necessity to inquire outside professional channels how much of divine sanction lies behind this claim of the priesthood. This the writer proceeds to do concerning the two chief sacraments of the Churches. The attitude of the worshipper is shown to be the essential factor in the one service, and the simplicity of its institution stands out in startling contrast with the modern celebration; but he recognises at the same time the difficulty that "the trained ecclesiastic" has in seeing "these facts whole and without prejudice. . . ." "The Church may still excommunicate and issue its ban and its threatenings, but, thank God, it has lost its power universal. The growth of education and the knowledge of science have taken from it, for ever, its ancient, deadly, and satanic power. Light, divine light, has flooded the earth, . . . and the true power of the inward Spirit of Christ is the dominating force of the future, not the official utterances of an effete oligarchy dependent on material ordinances for their authority."

Part IV. is a strong plea for Unity, based on the fact that, face to face with a still "submerged tenth, grinding poverty, slow starvation, despairing suicide, and hideous crime," Christianity, as organised to-day, and after nineteen centuries, appears a failure, and this failure is due to a straining after uniformity rather than unity. There follows a beautiful passage describing the spiritual unity between the Red Indian, the Roman Catholic ecclesiastic, and the Quaker maiden, who are all feeling out into the unseen after the Divine Reality; all real worshippers of the one

Divine Majesty reach Him from every quarter by different means and different routes, so widely apart as, to quote but a few, "soft music, traditional ritual, priestly authority, solemn mass, the quiet words, the shades of evening, an infant's prattle, a flower, a loving word"; the different worshippers all "feel in their hearts a sacred touch from a live altar, and know that they have worshipped in a very real Presence."

The Conclusion is a plea that we should discard the old ways which have led to so much division, to so much failure; that we should cease from arrogantly exalting our own as the only right way, should hold fast to the relationship as children of one Father, even God, with the Divine Brotherhood of Christ, and the energising of the Holy Spirit, as further bonds of Unity.

RACHEL FAIRBROTHER.

BOURNEMOUTH.

*Vital Lies.*—By Vernon Lee.—London: John Lane & Co.—  
Two Volumes.—1912.—Pp. 262 + 211.

In the past there have always been reformers who would corrupt the world to establish one good custom. In the future such benefactors, if there are any, will be the more dangerous that the field of their work is bound to be less restricted. To-day they are in vigorous action in many directions. The vote or the general strike, as the case may be, is the one thing in the universe that is of any worth, and no goodness or happiness achieved apart therefrom is desirable or even conceivable.

Of the large, vague, mystic *idées fixes*, or, as she calls them, dynamo-genetic ideas, which are hypnotising great numbers of people in the present generation, Vernon Lee has discussed the most important at some length in these volumes; but she has given her exposition of them a historic background, and shown how there have always been potentialities for evil in every doctrine that has commanded the reverence of mankind. In bygone times these ideas took the form of a command or a symbol which at first, but only at first, had a definite and literal meaning. Formally and seemingly the same as they were at the outset, they have been differently interpreted by every individual who has adopted and worshipped them throughout the ages, and are therefore the creations of later times masquerading as the "eternal truths" of earlier ones. "Commandments and ideals," writes the author, "are among the automatic mechanism (*sic*) of an unceasing, unintentional transformation of desires and efforts. And by the associative virtue of mere words, the drum-or-church-bell-power of often-repeated phrases, sophisms have acquired the utility of promissory notes; lying statements if taken literally, but with a humble use of eking out credit among a race of beings still very lacking in the substantial wealth of knowledge and self-control."

She demonstrates "not only the unchanged emotional and practical



powers of symbol," but also "its continuous and often increasing dynamo-genetic property"—or its power, as the devotees of the various religions would themselves say, of

"Sweetening and gathering sweetness evermore,  
By beauty's franchise disenthralled of time."

But our philosopher is determined to expose the ungracious partiality and pretension of the cherished survivals of past beliefs in God and immortality, predestination and providence. They are due, she complains, "to life's roundabout practicality, the brutal need, the stupid barbarous hurry" of everyday life. "They sacrifice a portion of truth, they blink some part of reality, and every such disregard of truth entails a sacrifice of many individuals and their powers for good: the Magdalen, had she been duly stoned for her adulteries, would neither have brought her ointment for Christ's feet, nor watched, as we see her on the frescoes, by the side of the cross."

Over against the idols and fictions into which the worshipper "magnifies but also distorts the solid, small, decent realities of life" she sets "the facts which take none of our habits and likings into consideration"; and in so doing she deeply deplores William James's truth in so far forth as it is useful or impels one to action, Father Tyrrell's sacramentalism, the anthropologist's belief in religion as a providential agency for promoting vitality and tribal unity, the syndicalist faith in class warfare, the mystic's "emotionally irradiated mental void" which he identifies with the whole universe, and the Tolstoian fusion of all science into morality. In particular she deprecates James's pragmatism as a perversion of the doctrine which Mr Charles Peirce originated and first called by that name, and which was a rather dull method of "making our ideas clear" by reference to the consensus of opinion at which all men would arrive on all points if they could carry their investigations far enough. She points out that dogma is, after all, the life and soul of symbol and sacrament, and that when that has become invalid, no ritual, no elemental need, and no authority will ultimately suffice to maintain them. She mentions the dramatic breakdown of religious revivals, Napoleonic outbursts of glory, and enthusiasms like Garibaldian patriotism and Renan's truth, light and reason which answer neither to "the multiplicity and complexity of reality," nor "to the permanent energies and organised habits of the individuals and the crowds" who are intoxicated by them. It is to excitements like these that, in words that are well worth very serious consideration, she attributes the cynicism into which religion has merged in France, the administrative incapacity of the Italians in the face of national danger or disaster, and the base anti-clericalism into which the moral splendour of the Dreyfusard movement has died down.

She maintains that art supplies all the benefits and satisfactions of religion without the disingenuous reasoning and unwholesome frenzies to which the devotional temperament is apt to give rise. She advises the

man who cannot live by bread alone to exercise "the will to contemplate" the works which the artist creates, not as evidences of truth existing apart from the human mind, but as ideals made without supernatural aid "to suit the heart's desire." Free from the utilitarian magic on which prayer and sacramentalism are based, for her these ideals represent the spiritual element in religion. Dynamogenetic they are in a high degree, but not dangerously so, because they are due to "the permanent and co-ordinated preferences" of those who cherish them, and who dwell on, or rather in, them, not in order to translate them directly into action, but to find in them the delight and repose which are a necessary though an indirect preparation for rational action. For the rest, she would trust for the salvation of humanity to "the gradual, steady impinging of fact on fact, interest on interest, and will on will, which infinitely slowly, but inevitably, rolls away the various loads of human horror."

Both in style and argument this work reminds one of Carlyle, for the former sometimes becomes rugged and picturesque, and not infrequently the latter degenerates into scolding. Emphatic protests are made throughout against the truth which William James describes as the outcome of the will to believe. But had the writer read his essay on the subject less angrily, she would probably have come to the conclusion that that brief piece of work had contributed more to the destruction of private truths and idolised falsehoods than the entire literary output of the empiricist press and the intellectualist philosophy. In that essay the great pragmatist expressly rejects such guarantees of truth as revelation, the *consensus gentium*, and the inconceivability of the opposite; and states that the pragmatists treat every one of their beliefs as hypotheses. Had *The Will to Believe* never been written, it is quite possible that there would have been but few people armed with enough courage and scorn of mere conviction to read *Vital Lies*.

Nevertheless, the book is a timely warning against the realistic idealism of the priests of mankind who would neglect, or even create, a hundred evils to cure a single malady of the body politic; and their mistakes and infirmities are set forth with a humour and pathos which give the work a high rank not only as philosophy, but also as literature.

M. E. ROBINSON.

UPPER CLAPTON, N.E.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

RABINDRANATH TAGORE.

THE question, Why is there evil in existence? is the same as, Why is there imperfection? or, in other words, Why is there creation at all?

We must take it for granted that it could not be otherwise; that creation must be imperfect, must be gradual, and it is futile to ask the question why we are.

But the real question is, Is this imperfection the final truth? is evil absolute and ultimate? The river has its boundaries, its banks; but is the river all banks? or are the banks the final facts about the river? Do not these obstructions themselves give its water an onward motion? The towing-rope binds a boat; but is the bondage its meaning? Does it not at the same time draw it forward?

The current of the world has its boundaries, otherwise it could have no existence; but its meaning is not in its boundaries, which are fixed, but in its movement, which is towards perfection. The wonder is not that there should be obstacles and sufferings in this world, but that there should be law and order, beauty and joy, goodness and love. The idea of God that man has in his being is the wonder of all wonders. He has felt in the depth of his life that what appears as imperfect is the manifestation of the perfect; just as a man who has the ear for music realises the perfectness of a song while in fact he is only

listening to a succession of notes. Man has found out the great paradox that what is limited is not imprisoned within its limits; it is ever moving, thus shedding its finitude every moment. In fact, imperfection is not a negation of perfectness; finitude is not contradictory to infinity. It is completeness manifested in parts, infinity revealed within bounds.

Pain, which is the feeling connected with our finiteness, is not a fixture in our life. It is not an end in itself as joy is. To meet it is to know that it cannot be the principle of permanence in the creation. It is like what error is in our intellectual life. To go through the history of the development of science is, among other things, to go through the maze of mistakes it made current in different times. Yet there is none who really believes that science is the most perfect system of disseminating mistakes. The principle of ascertaining truth is the most important thing to consider in the history of science, not its innumerable mistakes. For error by its nature cannot be stationary; it cannot fit in with truth; like a tramp it must quit its lodging when it cannot pay its bill to the full.

As in intellectual error, so in evil in any other form, its essence is impermanence, for it cannot fit in with the whole. Every moment it is being corrected by the totality of things and is changing its aspects. We exaggerate its importance by imagining it as at a standstill. Could we collect the statistics of the immense amount of death and putrefaction to be found every moment in this earth they would appal us. But evil is ever moving; so with all its incalculable immensity it does not effectually clog the current of our life, and, on the whole, the earth, water, and air remain sweet and pure for living beings. All statistics consist of our deliberate attempts to represent statically what is in motion; so by this process things assume a weight in our mind which they have not in reality. This is the reason why a man, who by his profession or for other reasons, is specially concerned with any particular aspect of life, is apt to magnify its proportions, and by giving undue stress upon facts to lose hold upon truth. A detective



may have the opportunities of studying crimes in details, but he loses his bearings as to their relative place in the whole society. When science collects facts to illustrate the struggle for existence that goes on in the kingdom of life, it raises a picture in our minds of "Nature red in tooth and claw." But in these mental pictures we give a fixity to the colours and forms which are really evanescent. It is like calculating the weight of the air on each square inch of our body to show that it is crushingly heavy for us. But with this weight there is the adjustment of weight, and we lightly bear our burden. With the struggle for existence in Nature there is the reciprocity, there is the love for children, for comrades; there is the sacrifice of self, which springs from love; and love is the positive element in life.

If we throw our bull's-eye light of observation upon the fact of death, the world will appear to us like a huge charnel-house; but it is surprising to think that in the world of life the thought of death has the least hold upon our minds. Not because it is the least apparent, but because it is the negative aspect of life; just as, in spite of the fact that we shut our eyelids every second, it is the openings of the eyelids that count. Life as a whole never takes death seriously. It laughs and dances and plays, it builds and hoards and loves in its face. Only when we detach an individual fact of death we see merely the blankness and are dismayed. We lose sight of the wholeness of life whose part is death. It is like looking at a piece of cloth through a microscope—it appears like a net; we wonder at the big holes and shiver in imagination. But the truth is, death is not an ultimate reality. It looks black as the sky looks blue, but it does not blacken existence, as the sky does not leave its stain upon wings of birds.

When we watch a child trying to walk we see its countless failures; its successes are few. If we had to limit our observation within a narrow space of time the sight would be cruel. But we find that, in spite of its repeated unsuccesses,

there is an impetus of joy in the child which sustains it in its seemingly impossible task. We see it does not set store by its falls so much as by its ability to keep its balance even for a moment.

Like these accidents in a child's attempts to walk, we meet with sufferings in various forms in our life every day, showing our imperfection in knowledge, power, and application of will. But if it only revealed our weakness to us, we should die of utter depression. When we take for observation a limited area of our activities, our individual failures and miseries loom large in our minds; but our life instinctively takes a wider view, it has an ideal of perfection which ever carries it beyond its present limitations. Within us, we have a hope which always walks in front of our present narrow experience; it is an undying faith in the infinite in us; it will never accept any of our disabilities as a permanent fact; it sets no limit to its scope; it dares to assert that man has his oneness with God; and its wildest dreams become true every day.

We see truth when we set our mind towards the infinite. The ideal of truth is not in the narrow present, not in our immediate sensations, but in the consciousness of the whole which gives us a taste of what we should have in what we have. Consciously or unconsciously we have in our life this feeling of truth which is ever more than its appearance, for our life is facing the infinite, it is on the move. Therefore its aspiration is infinitely more than its achievements; therefore it always finds that no realisation of truth ever leaves it stranded on the desert land of finality, but carries it on to a further beyond. Therefore evil cannot stop the course of life altogether on the highway and rob it of its possessions. For the evil has to pass on, it has to grow into good; it cannot stand at a fixed point and ever remain at war with all. If the least evil could stop anywhere indefinitely it would sink deep and eat into the marrow of existence. As it is, man does not really believe in evil, just as he cannot believe that violin chords have been purposely made to create the most



exquisite form of torture in discordant notes, though by the aid of statistics it can be mathematically proved that actual possibilities of discords are far greater than that of harmonious notes, for where one can play a violin there are thousands who cannot. Potentiality of perfection outweighs actual contradictions. Of course, there have been people who asserted existence to be an absolute evil, but man can never take them seriously. For our pessimism is a mere pose, either intellectual or sentimental; our life itself is optimistic, it wants to go on. Pessimism is a form of mental dipsomania, it disdains healthy nourishment, indulges in the strong drink of denunciation, creates an artificial dejection to fall back upon a stronger draught to drink. If existence were an evil, we should wait for no philosopher to prove it. It is like incriminating a man of suicide while all the time he stands before you in the flesh. Existence itself is here to prove that it cannot be an evil.

An imperfection which is not all imperfection, but which has perfection for its ideal, must go through a perpetual realisation. Thus, it is the function of our intellect to realise the truth through untruths, and knowledge is nothing but continually burning up mistakes to set free the light of truth. Our will, our character has to attain perfection by continually overcoming evils, either inside or outside us, or both. Our physical life is burning bodily materials every moment to maintain the life fire, and our moral life has its fuel to burn. This life process is going on—we know it, we have felt it, and we have a faith which no individual instances to the contrary can shake, that the direction of humanity is from evil to good. For we feel that good is the positive element in man's nature, and in every age and every clime what man values most is his ideal of goodness. We have known the good, we have loved it, and we have paid our highest reverence to men who have shown in their lives what goodness could be.

The question will be asked, What is goodness? What does our moral nature mean? My answer to that is, that when a

man begins to have an extended vision of his self, when he realises that he is much more than what he is at present, he begins to grow conscious of his moral nature. Then he knows that what he is yet to be, the state not yet experienced by him, is real, more real than what is under his direct experience. Necessarily, his perspective of life changes, and his will takes the place of his wishes. For will is the wish of the larger life, life whose greater portion is out of our present reach and most of whose objects are not before our sight. Then comes the conflict of our lesser man with our greater man, our wish with our will, the desire for things that are before our senses with our purpose which is within our mind. Then we begin to distinguish between what we desire and what is good. For good is that which is desirable for our greater self. Thus the sense of the goodness comes out of the truer view of our life, which is the connected view of the wholeness of the field of life, that takes into account not only what is present before us, but what is not, and perhaps never shall be. The man who is provident feels for that life of his which is not yet existent, feels much more for that than for the life that is with him; therefore he is ready to sacrifice his present inclination for the unrealised future. In this he becomes great, for he realises truth. Even to be efficiently selfish one has to recognise this truth, and has to curb his immediate impulses of selfishness; in other words, he must be moral. For our moral faculty is the faculty by which we know that life is not made up of fragments purposeless and discontinuous. This moral sense of man not only gives him the power to see that his self has a continuity in time, but it also enables him to see that he is not true when he is only restricted to his own self. He is more in truth than he is in fact. He truly belongs to individuals who are not included in his own individuality and whom he is never likely to know. As he has a feeling for his future self which is outside him, so he has a feeling for his greater self which is outside his limits of personality. There is no man who has it not to some extent, who never sacrificed his selfish



desire for the sake of some other person, who never felt a pleasure in undergoing some loss or trouble because it pleased somebody else. It is a truth that man is not a detached being ; he has a universal aspect, and when he recognises it, he becomes great. Even the most evil-disposed selfishness has to recognise this when it requires power to do evil ; for it cannot ignore truth and yet be strong. So, in order to claim its aid from truth, selfishness has to be unselfish to some extent. A band of robbers must be moral ; by this they are made into a band ; they may rob the whole world, but not each other. To make immoral intention successful some of its weapons must be moral. In fact, very often it is our moral strength which gives us the power effectively to do evil, to exploit other individuals for our benefits, to rob other people of their rights. The life of an animal is unmoral, for it is aware only of an immediate present ; the life of a man can be immoral, but that means that the life of a man must have a moral basis. What is immoral is imperfectly moral, just as what is false is true to a small extent, or it cannot even be false. Not to see is to be blind, but to see wrong is to see only in an imperfect manner. Man's selfishness is a beginning to see some connection, some purpose in life ; and to act accordingly requires self-restraint and regulation of conduct. A selfish man voluntarily takes trouble for the sake of his self, he suffers hardship and privation without murmur, simply because he knows that what is pain and trouble, looked at from the point of view of a limited area of time, is just the opposite when seen at a larger perspective. What is a loss to the smaller man is a gain to the greater, and *vice versâ*.

To the man who lives for an idea, for his country, for the good of humanity, life has an extensive meaning, and to that extent pain becomes less important to him. To live the life of goodness is to live the life of all. Pleasure is for one's own self, but goodness is happiness for all humanity and for all time. So from the point of view of the good, pleasure and pain must appear in a different meaning ; so much so, that

pleasure may be shunned and pain may be courted in its place, that death may be made welcome as giving a higher value to life. So there is a standpoint, which is the highest standpoint of a man's life, and from that standpoint of the good, pleasure and pain lose their absolute value. Martyrs prove it in history, and we prove it every day in our life in our little martyrdoms. When we take a pitcherful of water from the sea it has its weight, but when we take a dip into the sea itself a thousand pitcherfuls of water flow above our head and we do not feel its weight. Our self is the pitcher, we have to carry it with our strength; so on the plane of selfishness pleasure and pain have their full weight, but on the moral plane they are so much lightened that the man who has reached it appears to us almost superhuman in his patient cheerfulness under crushing trials and his forbearance in the face of malignant persecution.

To live in perfect goodness is to realise one's life in the infinite. This is the most comprehensive view of life which we can have by our inherent power of the moral vision of the wholeness of life. And the teaching of Buddha is to cultivate this moral power to the highest extent, to know that our field of activities is not bound to the plane of our narrow self. This is the vision of the heavenly kingdom of Christ. When we attain to that universal life which is the moral life we become freed from bonds of pleasure and pain, and the place vacated by our self becomes filled with an unspeakable joy which springs from measureless love. In this state the soul's activity is all the more heightened, only its motive is not in desires, but in its own joy. This is the *Karma-yoga* of *Gita*, i.e. the way to become one with the infinite activity by the exercise of the activity of disinterested goodness.

When Buddha meditated upon the way of releasing mankind from the grip of misery he came to this truth, that when man attains his highest end by merging the individual in him in the universal, he becomes free from the thralldom of pain. Let us consider this point more fully.



Man comes to grief at every step when he tries to walk in this world as if it were specially made for him. His complaint against Nature is that she takes no heed of his individual desires and needs. He seems to think that if he had a world all to himself, where he could enjoy sun when he wished and rain when he would, where there would be no law, but only his wish, he would be satisfied. But this is an illusion. For, leaving aside the question that he could have no wish if there were no obstacles to his wishes, we must keep in mind that his finite individuality is not his highest truth; there is that in him which is universal. If he were made to live in a world where his own self would be the only factor to consider, then that would be the worst prison imaginable to him. Man's deepest joy is in growing more and more by perfecting his union with the all. Which would be an impossibility if there were no law common to all. Thus, only by discovering the law and following it we become great, we realise the universal; and so long as our individual desires are in conflict with the universal law we suffer pain and are beaten.

There was a time when we prayed for special concessions, we expected that laws of Nature could be held in abeyance for our own convenience. But now we know better. We know that law could not be set aside, and in this knowledge we have become strong. For this law is not something apart from us, it is our own. The universal power which is manifested in the universal law is our own power. It will thwart us where we are small, where we are against the whole current of things; but it will help us where we are great, where we are one with the all. Thus, through the help of science, as we come to know more of the laws of Nature we gain more in power; we seem to attain a universal body; our organ of sight, our organ of locomotion, our bodily strength become world-wide; electricity and steam become our nerve and muscle. Thus we find that, just as throughout our bodily organisation there is a principle of relation by virtue of which we can call this entire body our own, and can use it, so all

through the universe there is that principle of uninterrupted relation by virtue of which we can call the whole world as our extended body and use it accordingly. And in this age of science it is our endeavour fully to establish our claim to this our world-self. We know all our poverty and sufferings are owing to our inability to realise this legitimate claim of ours. Really, there is no limit to our powers, for we are not outside the universal power which is the expression of universal law. We are on our way to overcome disease and death, to conquer pain and poverty; for through scientific knowledge we are ever on our way to realise the universal in its physical aspect. And as we make progress we find that pain, disease, and poverty of power are not absolute, but that it is only the want of adjustment of our individual self to our universal self which gives rise to them.

It is the same with our moral life. When the individual man in us chafes against the lawful rule of the universal man we become morally small and we must suffer. In such a condition our successes are our greatest failures and fulfilment of our desires leaves us poorer. We hanker after special gains for ourselves, we want to enjoy privileges which none else can share with us. But everything that is absolutely special must keep up a perpetual warfare with what is general. In such a state of civil war man always lives behind barricades, and in civilisation which is selfish our homes are not real homes, but artificial barriers around us. Yet we complain that we are not happy; as if there were something inherent in the nature of things to make us miserable. The spirit universal is waiting to crown us with happiness, but our individual spirit would not accept it. It is our life of the self that causes conflicts and complications everywhere, upsets the normal balance of society, gives rise to miseries of all kinds, and brings things to such a pass that to maintain order we have to create artificial coercions and organised forms of tyranny, and tolerate infernal institutions in our midst where humanity is humiliated every moment.



We have seen that in order to be powerful we have to submit to laws of the universal forces, and thus to realise that they are our own. So, in order to be happy, we have to submit our individual will to the sovereignty of the universal will, and thus to feel that it is our own will in truth. When we reach that state, when the adjustment of the finite in us to the infinite is made perfect, then pain itself becomes a valuable asset to us. It becomes a measuring rod with which to measure our true joy.

The most important lesson that man can have from his life is not that there is pain in this world, but that it depends upon him to turn it to good account, to transmute it into joy. That lesson has not been lost altogether to us, and there is no man living who would willingly be deprived of his right to suffer pain, for that is his right to be a man. One day the wife of a poor labourer came to me and complained bitterly that her eldest boy was going to be sent away to a rich relative's house for a part of the year. It was the kind intention of trying to relieve her of her trouble that gave her the shock, for a mother's trouble is a mother's own by her inalienable right of love, and she was not going to surrender it to any dictates of expediency. Man's freedom is never to be saved troubles, but it is freedom to take trouble for his own good, to make it an element of his joy. It can be made so only when we realise that our individual self is not the highest meaning of our being, that in us we have the world-man who is immortal, who is not afraid of death or sufferings, and who looks upon pain as only the other side of joy. He knows that it is the pain which is our true wealth as imperfect beings, and this has made us great and worthy to take our seat with the perfect. He knows that we are not beggars, we have to pay with the hard coins of pain for everything valuable in this life, for our power, our wisdom, our love; that in pain is symbolised the infinite possibility of perfection, the eternal unfolding of joy; and that the man who loses all pleasure in taking pain sinks down and down to the lowest depth of

penury and degradation. It is only when we invoke the aid of pain for our self-gratification that she becomes evil and takes her vengeance for the insult done to her by hurling us to misery. For she is the vestal virgin consecrated to the service of the immortal perfection, and when she takes her true place before the altar of the infinite she casts off her dark veil and bares her face to the beholder as the revelation of supreme joy.

RABINDRANATH TAGORE.



## CHRISTIANITY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS HISTORY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR A. C. M'GIFFERT.

WE distinguish Christianity from Judaism and call it another of the world's great religions. But we do so without warrant from Jesus. It was no new faith he taught and no new Church he founded. He lived and died a loyal Jew, steeped in the traditions of his race, proud of its heritage, devoted to its ideals. The last and the greatest of the long line of Hebrew prophets, his aim was to fulfil rather than destroy. He drew his inspirations, not from the literature of India or Greece or Rome, but from the sacred books of Israel. His experience was nourished upon the experiences of his own people; his hopes and theirs were one. Had they heeded his message of faith, of repentance, of righteousness, of charity and mercy, there would have been no Christianity. Enriched by his ethical idealism, by his moral inwardness, by his spiritual insight, by his enthusiasm for humanity, and by his devotion to God, Judaism would have entered upon a new period of enlarged influence and Jesus would have been but the greatest of its many seers and sages.

But the leaders of Jewish thought and life had other ideals for the nation, and he fell a sacrifice to them. Only after his death did Christianity arise. When Judaism would have none of him, his figure was made the centre of an independent cult. The Apostle Paul, seeking escape from his corrupt nature, found in the risen Christ, as he believed, a redeemer

from flesh and sin and death, and the principle of a holy and eternal life. In this experience of his the new faith was born, and as a result of his labours a new religion took its place among the great religions of the world.

Like most of the religions of antiquity, Judaism was a State affair. In it the life of the people as a nation found expression. Religion and patriotism were synonymous. God was the Father of Israel, and only as a member of the chosen race could the individual enjoy his favour and enter into communion with him. In a formal and established ritual the religious life of the nation voiced itself, and in its punctilious observance the religious needs of the individual were commonly met and his religious aspirations satisfied. Jesus found no fault with national religion and entered no protest against the joint utterance of the people's faith and devotion in public worship and sacrifice. But religion meant much more to him than this. It involved, as he understood it, a direct and personal relationship between man and God which must in the very nature of the case be expressed in other than merely public and conventional ways. The old forms might still be observed and the national worship might still be found congenial, but they no longer made up the whole of the religious life. Nor could they continue binding as before. In immediate and personal communion with God the individual could hardly fail to gain a freedom and independence in religion not otherwise attainable.

This was the experience of Jesus himself, and it gave him a new point of view, enabling him to distinguish between the important and the unimportant in the traditional cult. It did not make him an iconoclast, but it freed him from that bondage to the letter in which many of his countrymen lived, and made it possible for him to dispense when need was with many things essential to them. Because of it he could declare that the Son of man is lord of the Sabbath, and could venture to correct even the great lawgiver Moses, with the simple and confident words, "But I say unto you."



Jewish as it was, the religion of Jesus, whether we call it Christianity or not, was at heart the assertion of personal religion as distinguished from merely external, formal, public, and national religion.

This character Christianity bore for many a day. To the Holy Spirit supposed to be present in the hearts of believers, primitive Christians looked for instruction, for guidance, and for inspiration. If commanded by the Jerusalem magistrates to cease preaching Jesus as the Messiah, Peter and John could reply, as many another has replied, "We must obey God rather than men"—the experience of the individual ready to assert itself, if need arose, against the combined force of official authority and public opinion, the inspiration of the present outweighing the wisdom of the past.

Their Christian faith did not make the early disciples radicals. Even less than Jesus were they disposed to neglect or modify traditional practices and ceremonies. But when in the experience of Paul, the missionary to the Gentiles, the new religious principle came into conflict with the old, there was nothing left but to break with the past and to launch upon the Roman world a new religion of the Spirit, free from all bondage to race, to nation, to cult, and to established law and custom.

Christianity was not the only new faith challenging the attention of the Empire. Coming from Egypt, from Syria, from Phrygia, from Greece, new forms of old cults, or cults never seen before, were attracting multitudes of devotees in the provinces and were even penetrating the walls of Rome itself. It was an age of religious emotion and aspiration on an unprecedented scale. The traditional faiths were no longer satisfying the awakening religious needs of the worshippers of the old gods. They might still engage loyally in the established family and national worship, but the time was fast passing when Cato's ideal of religion as an exercise in which the head of the house engaged for wife and children and servants, thus dispensing them from all religious observances,

could satisfy the mass of men. With the breaking down of national barriers and the disappearance of racial customs and prejudices within the one great empire, individualism was fast taking the place of nationalism. Religion was ceasing to be a merely State affair, and was more and more called upon to meet personal needs hitherto little felt.

Into this situation Christianity was abruptly thrown, and it found it altogether congenial. Beginning as an expression of the individual religious life rather than a public cult, condemned and cast out by the nation within whose bounds it took its rise, it was free to minister to the most diverse needs, and to adjust itself to all sorts of conditions. Within the bounds of the Christian Church manifold doctrines and cults early developed according as this or that need was dominant. A vast expression of religious individualism as primitive Christianity was, no wonder its faiths and forms were legion, and its sects almost as numerous.

But the tendency of all institutions is to grow stereotyped. Whether against internal nonconformists or external foes, every community instinctively organises and arms itself to prevent its own disintegration and destruction. The Christian Church was no exception to this rule. In the very fact that the Church was formed the stereotyping process was begun. Man of the Spirit as he was, and devoted to the principle of liberty, the Apostle Paul was obliged to instruct the exuberant Corinthians that everything should be done in an orderly fashion and individual inspiration yield to general edification. And Clement of Rome, writing to the same Church but a generation later, felt compelled to insist upon authority and rule and law, declaring that "the Master commanded the offerings and ministrations to be performed with care, and not to be done rashly and out of order, but at fixed times and seasons. And where and when he would have them performed he himself ordained by his supreme will. They therefore that make their offerings at the appointed seasons are acceptable and blessed. Unto the high priest his proper services have been assigned,



and to the priests their proper offices appointed, and upon the Levites their proper ministrations are laid. The layman is bound by the layman's ordinances. They, therefore, who do anything contrary to the seemly arrangement dictated by the Master receive death as the penalty."

Nothing could well be more stereotyped than this. Thus Christianity became, in its turn, what Judaism and many another religion had been before it, a public and formal cult with fixed orders of worship, rules of conduct, and even formulæ of belief. Nor did it stop there. The national character which it lacked in the beginning, and the lack of which had enabled it to meet the individual needs of persons of every race, it finally acquired through its establishment in the fourth century as the State religion of the empire. One of many rival claimants to the honour, its victory was fairly won. No other contemporary faith possessed so many elements of power and made so varied an appeal to men. Nor was it an empty victory. The Christian Church became in course of time so thoroughly a Roman institution that when the hegemony of western Europe passed from the Romans to the Goths and then to the Franks, it inherited the traditions of the empire, and enjoyed throughout the Middle Ages the prestige belonging thereto.

The dominance which the Catholic Church finally attained over the peoples and nations of western Europe was due not so much to its Christianity as to its Romanism. Already in the episcopate of early generations imperial principles were beginning to find play, and in the growing papacy of the fourth and following centuries, and still more patently in the papal supremacy of the Middle Ages, they were completely in control. Not the ideals of Jesus, but of Rome, were realised in this development. Roman absolutism, Roman genius for government, Roman law were exhibited in it and commanded assent by their very masterfulness. The individual religious life, whether Christian or something else, would never have produced such an institution as the Catholic Church. In it the life of

the community exhibited the legal and authoritative side of communal existence in ways congenial because familiar.

In becoming a public cult, and particularly in fulfilling the external and formal function of a State religion, Christianity departed far from its original purpose, and it was no accident that its organisation was borrowed from the Roman empire and its rites and ceremonies from existing cults. Instead of developing its own native character, in becoming public and national, Christianity simply entered into the heritage of other and alien faiths. New meaning might be given to the foreign forms, and Christian experience thus express itself through them; but the old moulds, as is almost invariably the case, proved more enduring than the new interpretations, and the religious life of the Christian Church in the later days of the Roman empire and throughout the greater part of the Middle Ages was largely pagan in its essence rather than Christian.

And yet it was not wholly so. Over and over again we catch glimpses of lives dominated by the principles of Jesus and moulded by his experience. Fortunately, for all the paganism of the cult, the Gospels kept the figure of the Master before the eyes of Christians, and ever and anon he came into his own. His example was all too commonly obscured and his teaching distorted by being read in the light of a sacramental system of Jewish and pagan antecedents; but now and again the influence of his human personality made itself felt through the confining shell of doctrine and ritual, and Christianity enjoyed a revival in the life of an individual or a community. All the great religious revivals of the Middle Ages were due wholly, or in large part, to the influence of his figure. Always the re-discovery of Jesus meant a re-birth of Christianity. Such re-discoveries were never the affair of the Church, but of the individual, and in every case the reformations which followed were protests more or less conscious and explicit of the personal religious life against the outwardness and artificiality of mere public and official worship. Sometimes they involved a break with the existing system, those who had



caught the vision of the simplicity of Jesus finding the old ecclesiasticism too burdensome and cramping to be endured. Oftener the new and the old went on peacefully side by side until the old institutionalism once more obscured the new insights and silenced the fresh messages from the heart of personal Christian experience.

In many cases the Church, with a natural instinct of self-preservation, distrustful of all disintegrating tendencies, summarily crushed its seers and prophets, and one after another devout soul seeking his own way of living his own religious life and meeting his own religious needs suffered martyrdom for his faith. And not only isolated individuals but whole groups and communities succumbed to the weight of common sentiment and belief. The Marcionites, the Paulicians, the Albigenses, the Waldenses, the Lollards, the Hussites—effort after effort to express new religious impulses or old impulses in new ways—were suppressed, until Church History seems sometimes little else than a graveyard of blasted hopes and lost causes.

But the Church has not always been so blind. The standing witness to its wisdom and tolerance is monasticism, with its long and varied history, a history, like that of the Church itself, of mingled glory and shame. Beginning in the third or fourth century, when the Christian Church was fast becoming imperialised and preparing to sell its freedom for the price of State support, monasticism represented not simply the ascetic impulse so common in all ages, but also the individualistic, the need of finding an independent expression for the personal religious life. It might break altogether with the Church and become a substitute for it, or it might co-exist with it, recognising the place in the life of the nation of the established religion with its laws and ceremonies and sacraments, as Jesus recognised the place of the historic Jewish cult. But in either case it was a new opportunity for religious individualism, and supplied a much-needed outlet for it. It offered a haven for all varieties of experience. It by no means

followed because a Christian sought the seclusion of a convent that he felt the need of renouncing the pleasures of the world and crucifying his fleshly desires and passions. The cloister became at an early day the natural resort of many a one to whom the ascetic impulse was quite foreign. The unconventional, the radical, the nonconformist spirits—those who wished to be themselves and live their own natural lives, those who felt the need of untrammelled utterance for religious devotion and aspiration—devout seekers after God and earnest inquirers after truth,—all these turned instinctively to monasticism and found in it freedom and expansion.

Nearly all the important reformations in the history of the Church began in monasticism. Benedict, Hildebrand, St Bernard, St Francis of Assisi, Martin Luther, one after another of the great innovators to whom Christianity owes much of its progress, matured in cloistral retirement the principles which were later to stir the Christian world and modify the course of history. However rigorous monastic discipline might be and however irksome its inflexible routine, as a rule it left men much alone, and gave them opportunity if they cared to use it for independent religious exercises and meditations. Encouraged thus to develop their own ideas and follow the guidance of their own experience, it is not surprising that the geniuses among them should be led on to fresh insights and to unfamiliar enterprises.

Fortunately for the Christian Church it had the good sense to recognise the legitimacy of the new movement and to place upon it the stamp of its approval, thus preventing it from becoming a dangerous rival or a fatal enemy. There was doubt for a time what its attitude would be. But the new way of life appealed so strongly to the best Christians of the day, and exhibited so accurately the other-worldly character which had always attached to Christianity, that it came ere long to be recognised not only as legitimate but even as the most truly religious life.

With all its unfortunate distortion of human values, the



worth of monasticism to the Catholic Church has been simply incalculable. Quite apart from the services it rendered in the Middle Ages to civilisation, education, and Christian missions, it has offered from the beginning an opportunity for the personal religious life to find its own individual expression without breaking with the Church or organising new sects. Deprived of monasticism, the Catholic Church must have split to pieces long ago. The outlet offered by the monastery for the individual religious life was one of the secrets of the century-long existence of a single Catholic Church in western Europe.

To be sure, monasticism itself became soon enough formal and stereotyped, a great institution rather than a mere manifestation of individual impulse and experience. But, fortunately both for it and for the Catholic Church, no one organisation ever got control of the whole movement. Over and over again new orders arose, or new chapters of existing orders were formed, meeting better than the old the needs and aspirations of this or that monk or group of monks. Benedictines and Cistercians and Dominicans and Franciscans and Augustinians and Capuchins and Jesuits—all of these have served Catholicism as so many different forms of the religious life, enabling it to retain within the one fold the most earnest and devout spirits, many of them just the ones to find congenial expression for their own religious experience necessary, and so just the ones most apt to chafe under the rigidity of a single ecclesiastical institution.

It was a sorry day for Catholicism when Martin Luther broke with monasticism. Had he been moved only by impatience with the low tone of religion and morals in his day, or had he chiefly felt the cramping influence of existing forms of worship and discipline, he might have done what many an equally devoted Christian had done before him: he might have formed a new monastic order, and the Lutheran friars might have gone forth to reform the world with the same zeal and efficiency as the Franciscans before them. But

when he condemned monasticism itself, and pronounced the monastic vow unchristian, he drove multitudes of earnest spirits out of the Catholic fold. The old resort became inaccessible to them, as to him, and Catholic unity was made permanently impossible. So long as monasticism with its multiform orders remained an outlet for religious individualism, unity was safe. But when monasticism itself was declared illegitimate, the old Church became intolerable to many a devout soul.

The existing lack of unity within Protestantism is not due to a difference of human nature between Protestants and Catholics. The latter are not racially more docile and submissive than the former. But the zealous and passionate souls, possessed by their own fresh vision of divine things and driven to walk in new ways, who in Protestantism have started one after another of the historic denominations, in Catholicism have been the founders of the great religious orders. Both Protestant denominations and monastic orders have served a similar purpose. We may well rejoice in the great progress religious unity has made in recent decades, and may well hope it will prevail even more widely in days to come—unity of Protestants with Protestants, of Protestants with Catholics, of Christians with Jews. It means a growing charity, a growing sanity, and a growing ability to distinguish between the important and the unimportant, the essential and the unessential, upon which our age may justly congratulate itself. But it may also fairly be hoped that the great creative days which gave the world its Christianity, which gave Catholicism its Benedictines and Franciscans, which gave Europe and America their Protestantism, their Puritanism, and their Evangelicalism, are not for ever gone—that new visions are yet awaiting religious men, and new and hitherto untrodden paths are yet to be opened by the geniuses among them. Christianity, old as it seems, is still but young, and neither our fathers nor we have seen or known all that is yet to be.

From the beginning, one of the extraordinary things about



Christianity has been its great variety. To the Apostle Paul, to Ignatius of Antioch, and to thousands of believers since, a religion of redemption, releasing men from the trammels of the world and sin and death, and giving them the power of an endless life. To Justin Martyr, to Pelagius, to Socinus, a revelation of God's will which we have abundant ability to obey if we but choose, and obeying which we reap the fitting reward. To Clement of Alexandria, to Scotus Erigena, to Frederick William Hegel, to speculative thinkers of every age, a philosophy of the universe, explaining the whence and the whither, the beginning and the end of all things. To the schoolmen, both Catholic and Protestant, the acceptance of a series of propositions, supposed to contain final and absolute truth touching God and man and the universe. To St Bernard and Fénelon and William Law, to the mystics of all generations, the transcendence of human limitations in oneness with the divine. To St Francis of Assisi and Thomas à Kempis, and many a lovely spirit of our own and other days, the imitation of Christ in his life of poverty, humility, and love. To Cyprian and Augustine and countless Catholics, the one holy, apostolic Church, an ark of salvation, alone providing escape from eternal punishment. To Hildebrand and Innocent, as to modern ultramontanists in general, the papal hierarchy, ruler of the nations of the earth. To Benedict of Nursia, to Boniface the Saxon apostle, to not a few missionaries of these latter days, a great civilising agency, raising whole peoples from ignorance and savagery to culture and humaneness. To the rationalist of the eighteenth century, the religion of nature always one and unchanging, the worship of God and the pursuit of virtue. To a growing multitude of Christians of our own day, humanitarianism, the service of one's fellows in the spirit of Jesus Christ.

These were not simply different phases of the same faith; these were often altogether different faiths. They were not the mere development of an original principle, the life and work and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth: they were many of

them fresh creations. Their secret lay in the fact that Christianity has always been the vital faith of individuals, and not merely a public or national cult. Out of varied human experiences, determined by character, by temperament, by education, by example, the new ways of looking at things arose. Often forces entirely alien to Christianity had their part in producing them, and few of them would have been recognised by Jesus himself as an interpretation of his own faith or of his own ideals.

Even the Apostle Paul, who understood him best and did most for the spread of his influence, drew his Gospel largely from an experience and a philosophy wholly unlike his. The feverish effort to keep the law, the terrible struggle with sin, the despair born of failure, the conclusion, confirmed by the dualistic metaphysic of the day, that human nature is necessarily evil, the discovery of a redemptive significance in the birth and death and resurrection of Christ—this was no mere unfolding of the teaching of Jesus, no mere interpretation of his Gospel. Paul himself was in it, and Paul was an original centre of creative force as Jesus had been before him.

And who shall say that in the moralism of Justin Martyr, in the philosophising of Clement of Alexandria, in the Catholicism of Cyprian, in the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, in the mysticism of St Bernard, we have merely a reproduction of the Gospel of Jesus fitted to the needs and experiences of a particular age or community or individual?

Who can say, indeed, that even in the social gospel of the present day, in which many Christians see the nearest approximation history has to show to the spirit of Jesus Christ, there is only the unfolding of the germ planted by him, only the interpretation in modern terms of his original message? As a matter of fact this, too, is the result of many and diverse influences, and, for all its kinship with Jesus' Gospel, it is characteristically different in not a few essential features. He expected the speedy end of the world, and was interested to relieve present misery rather than to rearrange the social



fabric. He sought to promote the spirit of brotherliness and to sweeten the existing relationships of life rather than to reconstruct them. He had no idea of a political democracy. He would render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. A benevolent paternalism was nearer his ideal, in which the good householder might give of his free grace to those working but a single hour the wage of those who had borne the burden and heat of an entire day's toil.

Does this mean that our modern social effort is un-Christian or anti-Christian? Not at all. It was once thought necessary to find a justification for everything Christians thought or did in the teaching of the apostles or of Jesus himself. By the past the present was to be judged. In their lack of historic imagination—the most recently developed of all the forms of imagination—our fathers commonly thought of the past as an unchanging whole. The effect of distance was to obscure its immense variety until it appeared little more than a flat and unbroken surface. Events were there to talk about—the rise and fall of nations, wars and treaties, the doings of great men—but of real spiritual development there was little conception. And so they could speak of the prophets as if their religion was one, and of the apostles as if their faiths were identical. Now we know there has been no stable past, as there is no stable present, whether in religion or in life.

And even if there were, to test the living and growing present by it were the height of folly. The true test of the present is the future. Not whether we agree with the fathers, but whether we so live that the world we hand on to our children, the new world whose creators in large measure we are, is the better for our living. All questions of orthodoxy are out of place in a living and growing organism. Not to be true to its own past, which means orthodoxy, but to be true to its opportunities—this is Christianity's business as it is the business of every religion and of every institution now and always.

Christianity has not come ready made from the hand either

of God or man. It has had a long development. And development never means the mere unfolding of an original germ, a process in which the end is already given in the beginning. It involves the play of new forces, the addition of something original and unforeseeable. Creation always has a part in it as well as conservation. Much is truly Christian which in its origin had nothing to do with Christ, as much is truly Jewish which in its origin had nothing to do with Moses. All the varied phases of Christianity are as truly an integral part of it as the successive experiences through which we pass are a part of our life-history. No one has a right to set up a definition of Christianity, whether it be old or new, and condemn as unchristian everything which fails to correspond therewith. Christianity lives and grows and therefore changes. It is many things, not merely one—many things in the past, many in the present, still more, doubtless, in the future. It cannot be embraced within the compass of a single formula. It has no unchangeable essence, no static form, by which we may test its every varying aspect.

Is Christianity, then, to be pronounced a mere congeries of disconnected particles? Being the religion of many men of many minds, a personal affair rather than merely a public and formal cult, is it therefore to be viewed as only a chaos of diversities and contradictions? As a matter of fact, with all the variety there is a real and continuing unity suggested by its very name. The figure of Jesus Christ, made by the Apostle Paul the foundation of the new faith, has retained ever since, if not always a dominant, at any rate a prominent place in it. The attitude of Christian men towards Christ and their views of him have been and are still very different. They may worship him as divine, or regard him simply as one of the world's many prophets; they may slavishly imitate him, or correct his judgments and depart from him at various points. But in calling themselves Christians they always explicitly or tacitly recognise him as in some sense their master or their leader.



The unity thus given to Christianity is a vital rather than a formal unity. It is not inclusive but pervasive, the pressure of a continuing or continually recurring impulse. It cannot be defined; it is spiritual, not material, and spirit is too elusive to be defined. Nor can it be adequately described; it is at once too familiar to need description and too mysterious to admit of it. When we seek in it for a principle by which to test men and movements and determine whether they be Christian or no, it slips through our fingers and is gone. It belongs to the sphere of life rather than of logic, and it comes to highest expression not in formulæ but in enthusiasms. The moment we try to say just what Jesus was, the moment we try to state his principles and purposes, to give an account of his life, to explain him and assign him his place in history, we meet with all sorts of difficulties, and may be assured we shall at best find only a part of the Christian world in agreement with us. When we attempt to say what the Christian attitude toward Christ or the Christian doctrine of Christ is or should be, our difficulties only multiply. In fact, as a principle of theological definition the figure of Jesus Christ is and always has been wholly impracticable. But when by any means and through any agencies he has gained the attention of men, Christianity has won its greatest victories. That under the influence of ideas prevailing in the community and age in which they live Christians frequently distort his figure and misrepresent his character and purposes, does not destroy his power. Sometimes, indeed, it increases it for that particular community and age. In any case, he brings to those who believe in him the inspiration of an ideal, and invites them to that they count the best, whatever it may be.

Even Christ himself is not static and unchanging. Into any picture of him that may be traced Christians put somewhat of themselves. By no effort of critical scholarship or of historic imagination can they see him simply as he was. Interpret him they must, whether they will or no, in the light of the heritage into which they have entered. And is it

unfair to suppose that the experiences of these many hundred years have enriched their appreciations and put meanings into their portraiture of him which his original disciples did not dream of? If Christianity owes much to Christ, he owes much to Christianity. And just because of this, because like the world itself Christianity is living not dead, growing not stationary, the motto "Back to Christ," which has formed the war-cry of many of the older reformations, is out of place. History itself justifies us in saying that no backward-facing movement or institution can permanently serve this constantly changing world of to-day and to-morrow. The watchword of the modern Christian, if he believes in the permanent leadership of Christ, should be, not "Back to Christ," but "Forward with Christ."

Faith is in the venture. And this is where the difficulty lies, whether in religion or in politics or in economics or in any other department of life. Men know measurably what the past was. They feel secure in it, and in their timidity would like to go on reproducing it to the end of time, repeating the old formulas, believing the old truths, doing the old things, walking in the old paths. The future is an untracked country, and their hearts often fail them. The great business of Christianity, the great business of any religion worthy of the name, is to give men faith—not faith in the past, but faith in the future,—to strengthen their confidence, to steady their purposes, to increase their courage, as they look and labour for better things to come.

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## A NEW LIGHT ON THE RELATIONS OF PETER AND PAUL.

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IT is now generally recognised by liberal scholars that considerable portions of the gospels are unhistoric. Alfred Loisy's brilliant demonstration<sup>1</sup> that the Fourth Gospel is a purely speculative work, without independent historic tradition, resting on the Synoptics and yet freely altering and contradicting them, has cast a strong reflex light on the first three gospels. If it were possible thus to write and get accepted as historical what may be described (without offence, I hope) as a fictitious life of Jesus, what guarantee have we that the earlier Evangelists were not equally free in their method? That they really did treat their subject with great freedom is demonstrable. Since Strauss it has been the fashion to disregard the miracles. Very many scholars also reject the stories of the infancy. Harnack describes Luke's "third source" (containing all not found in Q and Mark) as one "whose authenticity is almost entirely dubious, and one which must indeed be described as for the most part legendary."<sup>2</sup> Loisy rejects much more. According to him, Luke was "not a scrupulous historian," and the best that one can say of him is that he saved "some elements of the primitive tradition."<sup>3</sup> Many of the miracles, says the same authority, had their point of departure in

<sup>1</sup> *Le Quatrième Evangile*, 1903.

<sup>2</sup> *Luke the Physician*, 1907, p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, i. 167.

symbolism, the preoccupation with which is sensible in certain parts even of Mark.<sup>1</sup> Nay more, it is quite probable that Mark invented an anecdote in the interest of a theory.<sup>2</sup> Solomon Reinach argues strongly against accepting the passion as a fact,<sup>3</sup> and W. B. Smith has proposed an "immensely clever"<sup>4</sup> hypothesis to account for the whole gospel story without assuming the historicity of the central figure. It is distinctly not my purpose to canvass these arguments. I merely quote them to show that a theory to explain two anecdotes in Mark on the grounds of that writer's known sources and tendency rather than on that of their literal historicity, will not be without good company. The thesis of the present essay need involve nothing beyond the immediate facts dealt with; it may stand or fall without supporting or discrediting the work of other scholars.

The anecdotes I mean are the two about Peter; the first telling of the rebuke he received from Jesus, the second relating his denial of the Lord. Surely it is a strange rôle assigned to the Prince of the Apostles, of whom almost nothing else is told save these two highly regrettable facts. Loisy puts it very mildly when he says that "Mark almost seems to have taken part against the Galilean disciples, so anxious is he to show their lack of intelligence and courage."<sup>5</sup> In the first passage (ix. 31-34), Jesus not only predicts his death at the hands of the chief priests and scribes, but also alludes to the cross—a plain anachronism.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, is it conceivable that any man, and particularly Jesus, should have turned on a follower whose only fault was deprecation of his master's anticipation of a cruel death with the really terrible

<sup>1</sup> *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, i. 166.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.

<sup>3</sup> *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, ii. p. vi.; iii. pp. 16 ff.; iv. pp. 174-206.

<sup>4</sup> *Ecce Deus*, London and Chicago, 1912. This characterisation of his book is from the review of the earlier German edition by an unsympathetic writer in the *New York Nation*, 1911.

<sup>5</sup> *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, i. 116.

<sup>6</sup> "Il ne semble pas qu'aucune d'elles [les diverses prophéties de la passion] se fonde sur une parole du Christ traditionnellement gardée," *ibid.*, 92.



rebuke: "Get thee behind me, Satan"? That these words were early felt to be incongruous is shown by the fact that Luke omitted them altogether, while Matthew (xvi. 21-28) placed immediately before them the flattering comparison of Peter to the Rock.

The second story is hardly less extraordinary (Mark xiv. 66-72). Here, again, Jesus prophesies his death (30). There is a minor, though significant contradiction in the statement (50) that "all forsook him and fled" and the assertion that Peter followed. If, as on other grounds seems probable, the first statement belonged to an earlier tradition, it is unlikely that the second one did. Furthermore, is not the whole story intrinsically improbable? Is it likely that one who was brave enough to follow would be cowardly enough to deny? Is it not strange that the very chief of the twelve should, at the most tragic moment in his master's career, deny him? Now let it be noted that these two passages instead of supporting each other, only make the difficulty of accepting them at their face value all the greater. Neander endeavoured to explain the death of Ananias as the natural effect of a bad fright on a superstitious man. Such a solution of the problem is not made more easy, but immensely more difficult, by the consideration that the same highly extraordinary event happened twice within a few hours, to Ananias and to Sapphira. If in an early life of Luther there are anecdotes both intrinsically improbable and reflecting in the same way upon the Reformer, they do not support each other but merely indicate the writer's bias. The case of Mark is exactly parallel; the two stories about Peter, as will be shown in this article, reflect exactly the same point of view on the part of the writer, a bias which, moreover, he can be otherwise shown to have possessed. I repeat that a hypothesis which will account for the passages from the known facts of the Second Gospel's sources and theology, will have greater claim to acceptance than that of their literal historicity.

Where, then, did Mark get the stories? The idea, origin-

ating in a conjecture of Papias, that he received them, along with the rest of his gospel, from Peter himself, has been pretty well discredited. According to Loisy, the notice of Papias, taken in its natural sense, is false.<sup>1</sup> Mark could not possibly have been a disciple of Peter;<sup>2</sup> the most that can be said is that it is possible, or even probable, that one of his sources represents Petrine tradition.<sup>3</sup> Professor B. W. Bacon more emphatically says: "Sight by hypnotic suggestion has few more curious illustrations than the discovery by writers under the spell of the Papias tradition of traces in Mark of special regard for Peter. . . . We cannot imagine the most virulent Paulinist wishing Peter's part here to be more subordinated than it is."<sup>4</sup> In this sentence Professor Bacon also reveals the bias that gave rise to the stories; it was that of the "virulent Paulinist." The strong Pauline tone of the Second Gospel, as well in many minor points as in the whole conception of Christ, is generally accepted and easily accounted for. Mark wrote at Rome,<sup>5</sup> perhaps during Paul's sojourn there, certainly under his influence. The temporary difference of the two, perhaps exaggerated by Luke,<sup>6</sup> had long been reconciled.<sup>7</sup> Mark was indeed the most Pauline of all the Gospels, more so than Luke, according to Loisy,<sup>8</sup> who thinks Mark quite capable

<sup>1</sup> *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, i. 25 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 114. With strange inconsistency, Loisy picks out the story of Peter's denial of Christ as one of the few possible elements in Mark which may be due to Petrine tradition. The whole present paper is an argument against this position, but it may be added here, that when Papias is rejected, and very slight elements of the Second Gospel are referred to Peter, it is really too much to suppose that that Apostle put into circulation only one anecdote about himself, and that the worst possible. Loisy rejects the historicity of Peter's rebuke by Jesus altogether. *Ibid.*, ii. 19 f.

<sup>4</sup> *The Beginning of the Gospel Story*, 1909, p. xxv.

<sup>5</sup> The ancient testimonies to this effect, and the date of Mark, discussed by Harnack, *The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels*, 1911, pp. 126 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Harnack, *Luke the Physician*, p. 159, says: "Mark was the only apostolic man of whom Luke told anything discreditable," and also that Luke had a poor opinion of him and his work.

<sup>7</sup> Col. iv. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, ii. 19. On Mark's Paulinism, cf. Bacon, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii; Harnack, *Sayings of Jesus*, p. 248.



of inventing anecdotes in the interest of the Apostle of the Gentiles.<sup>1</sup> In view of these generally recognised facts, is it not safe to assume an *a priori* probability that the source of any given incident recounted in the Second Gospel is to be found in Pauline tradition, and that this probability is greatly strengthened if the given text reflects a known tendency of Paul?

Now the tension existing between the two chief Apostles is also generally recognised, though since the time of Luke most historians have done their best to minimise it. Ferdinand Christian Baur,<sup>2</sup> one of the few exceptions to this rule, seems not to have exaggerated the importance of this controversy, in which he finds the key to the whole of the earliest Church history. It is therefore a safe induction that the stories in Mark reflect at least the general mood of Paul. But notwithstanding the Apostle's occasional violence and unscrupulousness,<sup>3</sup> we cannot accuse him of deliberately inventing stories to blacken the character of his rival. What, then, was the historical reminiscence back of these data handed on by him to Mark? Paul apparently had little special information about the life of Jesus, but he did, on several occasions, meet Peter, and it was surely at one of these times that he heard words which he construed as a denial of the Lord, or a deprecation of the passion, and which were later worked into the earliest gospel in the form now standing.

To ascertain exactly what this historical basis was, it is necessary to arrive at a clear conception of the whole cause and nature of the quarrel between the two chief Apostles. The most prominent element of it was certainly the question

<sup>1</sup> Loisy, i. 117.

<sup>2</sup> *Paul*, English translation, 1876, vol. i., Introduction and Part I., *passim*. A modern critic says of Baur, "Die grosse Tat des Tübingers besteht darin, dass er die Texte reden liess, wie sie lauteten." A. Schweitzer, *Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung*, 1911, p. 10. Cf. also the high estimate on p. 194, where it is said that the problems in Paul's life and theology will be solved by the disciple of Baur.

<sup>3</sup> If reference is needed for this: W. Wrede, *Paul*, English translation, 1908, pp. 32 ff.

of observing the Jewish law. Naturally, the abrogation of a divine code would cause difficulty, and at the time of the composition of the four principal letters their writer was evidently spending most of his time and thought in carrying through his programme of freedom. But without underestimating the extreme importance of this problem for the Early Church, it was surely not the only point at issue. This is indicated with perfect clearness in such passages as the following: "If he that cometh preacheth another Jesus, whom we have not preached, or if ye receive another spirit, which ye have not received, or another gospel, which ye have not accepted, ye bear it admirably!"<sup>1</sup> "But though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema. As we have said before, so say I now again, If any preacheth unto you any gospel other than that which ye received, let him be anathema."<sup>2</sup> "Every one of you saith: I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ."<sup>3</sup>

Now all these indications of differences among the primitive Christians certainly do not point exclusively to the controversy over the law. That alone would never constitute "another gospel"; still less under those circumstances would the Jesus of the Jerusalem Church be called "another Jesus." These words prove that there was an important divergence, or important divergences, among these earliest theologians over the person of Jesus, and such a conclusion is strongly borne out by turning to Acts xviii. 24,<sup>4</sup> where we learn what the gospel of Apollos actually was. Here we read that this

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. xi. 4, *καλῶς ἀνέχεσθε*, translated in the R.V., "Ye do well to bear it." But the *καλῶς* is ironical, as often, according to Liddell and Scott.

<sup>2</sup> Gal. i. 7 f.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. i. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. W. B. Smith, *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, ch. i. Professor B. W. Bacon is only able to answer that Luke's meaning is as interpreted by Smith, but that Luke was mistaken, HIBBERT JOURNAL, ix. 748. Professor S. J. Case (*The Historicity of Jesus*, 1912, p. 115) says that this passage shows that Apollos was "Paulinised—not Christianised—by Priscilla and Aquila." Certainly, but Paulinisation meant an even greater change, for, as Wrede puts it, Paul and his theology completely pushed Jesus and his life into the background.



mighty man in the Scriptures "taught carefully the things concerning Jesus, knowing only the baptism of John" until he was taken in hand and given Paul's doctrine by that Apostle's converts, Priscilla and Aquila. Other indications of wide differences in the Christologies of the early Christians are not wanting both in the New Testament and other early literature.<sup>1</sup> The Johannines often glance at Docetism,<sup>2</sup> as well as other heresies about the person of Jesus.<sup>3</sup>

One of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies (xvii. 13) relates a lively altercation between Peter and Simon Magus over the point, who would know Jesus better, he who had seen him in the flesh or he who had received a revelation of him in vision. Baur<sup>4</sup> quite rightly recognised in this an allusion to the antagonism between Paul and Peter, but he did not see that the kernel of this controversy is the person of Christ. A careful comparison of the Christology of Paul with that of the Jewish Christians will show exactly what the point at issue was, and how startlingly different were the views of the two parties about the founder of their religion.

Now for Paul, as will presently be shown, practically the whole content of Christ's redemptive work was his passion and resurrection. But while he "knew nothing save Christ and him crucified,"<sup>5</sup> the Church of Jerusalem apparently knew much else of Christ, but nothing of this. No critic will look for a first-hand and authentic report of their views in this matter to the late and thoroughly Pauline writings of Luke. The Acts is so apologetic that it does not hesitate to distort facts<sup>6</sup> in the interest of piety, seeking to produce a picture of perfect harmony in the early community, and that wholly as a partisan of Paul, with whose views the author was thoroughly

<sup>1</sup> Eg. the Epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians, vi. 1, xi.; To the Smyrnæans, v. 2; Polycarp to the Philippians, vii. 1.

<sup>2</sup> John xx. 24 ff., with S. Reinach's comment, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, 1906, ii. p. vii.; 1 John iv. 2 f.; 2 John 7. Perhaps, as W. B. Smith suggests, these later heresies were quondam orthodoxies.

<sup>3</sup> 1 John i. 22, v. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, i. 85 ff.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Compare Acts xv. with Galatians ii.

indoctrinated.<sup>1</sup> Nor can the late, spurious, and Paulinised Epistles of Peter be adduced as good evidence for the opinions of that Apostle. Even Matthew, strongly Jewish as he is in sympathy, is too late and too dependent on Mark to allow the expression of ideas directly counter to what was for this source the most important factor in the redemption. But there are two documents giving authentic information as to the opinions of the primitive community on this point. Whether very early, as Zahn believes, or quite late, as commonly thought (and it certainly seems to be later than Romans), the Epistle of James represents a real Jewish-Christian point of view. Now James apparently knows nothing of the passion of Jesus; he never mentions it even where reference to it would seem unavoidable. He exhorts the brethren (v. 10) "to take for an example of suffering and of patience, the prophets who spake in the name of the Lord," particularly Job. Now it is incredible that, had he really known anything of Christ's sufferings, he should not have spoken of them in this connection. His silence is, however, in perfect agreement with the testimony of another document of vastly greater importance, namely, Q, perhaps the one source for the origin of Christianity known to us, uninfluenced by Paul. Though written a generation after the supposed date of the crucifixion,<sup>2</sup> this earliest account of Jesus knows absolutely nothing of his passion. This may well strike Harnack as an "extraordinary circumstance," though it is one "from which we cannot escape." Indeed, quite naturally, he foresees the use that will be made of this circumstance as an argument against the historicity of the passion, though he ridicules the reasons which he himself furnishes for drawing this conclusion. But we must let the facts speak for them-

<sup>1</sup> Nothing better has been said on this subject than by Baur, *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> A. Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus*, English translation, 1908, p. 248. Harnack dates "not too long before Mark." The reference to Zacharias (Matt. xxii. 25; Luke xi. 51) compared with Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* lib. iv. cap. 5, tit. 4, would seem to date Q about 67. I have seen various attempts to explain this fact away, including a very recent one, but none are satisfactory.



selves. *Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas.* We need not notice the Berliner's argument, for it has been far more strongly presented by S. Reinach,<sup>1</sup> save as drawn from the silence of Q, which was unknown to the French savant. As Harnack points out, instead of the crucifixion, a mysterious disappearance of Christ (perhaps in some scene like the Transfiguration, though this has survived only in the form originally given by Mark) is pointed to in the words, "*Ye shall not see me henceforth until ye shall say: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.*"<sup>2</sup> He might have added that this mysterious vanishing was in agreement with the mysterious appearance of Christ at his baptism, heralded by the words from above: "*Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee.*" This, according to Harnack,<sup>3</sup> was the original form in Q of the voice from heaven, later changed in Matthew and some MSS. of Luke because it contradicted the story of Jesus' conception, birth, and childhood narrated by these Evangelists. It is, however, enough for our present purpose to observe that the only records left by the pre-Pauline Christians are totally silent on what was by the Tarsan regarded as the most important part of Christ's work.

In glaring contrast to this testimony we find that Paul literally "knew nothing save Christ and him crucified."<sup>4</sup> What for his predecessors had been a blank was for him everything. His very insistence on this point is suspicious, as if he knew that he were introducing a novel conception which must be urged with the more vigour in proportion as it was strange.

Eight of his ten genuine letters<sup>5</sup> are full of this doctrine of

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, ii. p. 6; iii. pp. 16 ff.; iv. pp. 174-206.

<sup>2</sup> Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 233 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 310 ff. This form, attested by the Fathers, is found in some MSS. at Luke iii. 22.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 2.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Thess. i. 10, iii. 14; Gal. i. 1; 1 Cor. ii. 7-12, v. 7, xv. 12; 2 Cor. v. 15, xiii. 3; Rom. i. 4, viii. 34; Eph. i. 20, v. 2; Phil. ii. 8; Col. i. 14. This list is not exhaustive, and does not include the testimony of Acts (*e.g.* xvii. 31), which is better for Paul, whom Luke personally knew, than for Peter.

Christ to the practical exclusion of all else—taking as a whole, the eucharist, the passion, and the resurrection. Of the two letters which say nothing on this point, one, Philemon, is very brief, and the other, 2 Thessalonians, is an exception strongly proving the rule. Harnack has brilliantly demonstrated<sup>1</sup> both that this letter is genuine, and that it was written, at the same time as the first, to the Jewish Christians of Thessalonica, whereas the first letter was directed to the whole Church, but particularly to the predominant Gentile element. Now, although Paul addressed these Jews as the “first-fruits”<sup>2</sup> of his work at Thessalonica, it is highly probable that they, like the Jewish Christians at Antioch, Corinth, and other places, had become indoctrinated with the conception of Christ current among the Palestinian Jewish Christians, and this letter proves it. In it the writer “to the Jews became as a Jew”;<sup>3</sup> he would not bring up a contentious point.

That Paul really got his conception of Christ from a source independent of the primitive community is repeatedly and emphatically asserted by himself. “The gospel which was preached by me is not after man. For neither did I receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came to me through revelation of Jesus Christ.”<sup>4</sup> Indeed, had Paul’s religion been dependent on the “historic Jesus,” his actions would have been the strangest possible: “Immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem to them that were apostles before me.”<sup>5</sup> So persuaded is Paul of the superior quality of his special revelation to the information of the other Apostles derived in the ordinary way from mere personal intercourse, that he says he would not have taken advantage of that method of instruction even had he been able to do so: “Yea, though we had known Christ

<sup>1</sup> *Sitzungsberichte d. könig. preuss. Akademie d. Wissenschaften*, 1910, pp. 560 ff.

<sup>2</sup> ἀπαρχή; this reading preferred by Harnack.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Gal. i. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Gal. i. 16 f.



after the flesh, yet now henceforth would we know him so no more."<sup>1</sup>

These, and many other expressions of the Apostle, collected and explained by Reitzenstein, prove conclusively that Paul set up his own mystically evolved conception in direct opposition to all human tradition, which was treated by him as of inferior, indeed of negligible value. His revelations, so often appealed to, extended not only to the controversy over the law, but to all departments of his theology. Note, for example, the words with which he introduces his account of the institution of the eucharist: "For I received of the Lord that which I also delivered unto you."<sup>2</sup> Almost the same formula is used at the beginning of Paul's story of the death and resurrection of Jesus: "For I delivered unto you first of all that which I received."<sup>3</sup> Apparently this, too, was not learned of men in the ordinary way, but "received" of the Lord, as a mystic doctrine,<sup>4</sup> to be "delivered" to others. Loisy rightly estimates the historical value of such testimony: "Paul represents as real his description of the last supper, but he does not hesitate to say that he gets it from Christ himself. After this certain and definite case we may conjecture what happened in other less important ones."<sup>5</sup> Again, even when Paul alleges as the source of his information

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. v. 16, with the excellent comments of R. Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, 1910, pp. 48 ff., 195 ff. I translate ἐγνώκαμεν, "had known," instead of "have known," according to Reitzenstein's suggestion that this is "blosse Annahme, nicht Tatsache."

<sup>2</sup> 1 Cor. xi. 23, and on this Reitzenstein, p. 51, who says that Paul seems to be asserting something different from the tradition of the first community.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 3. It is not in point to object here that Paul says that Jesus appeared first to Peter, then to the twelve, then to above five hundred brethren, then to James, then to all the Apostles, and last of all to himself. Even if we suppose that Paul here repeats something he had heard, and is not stating as fact his own induction as to what the course of events must have been, there is not the slightest reason to believe that these "appearances" (supernatural or spiritual ones like Paul's own; cf. R. C. Bowen, *The Resurrection in the New Testament*, 1911) guarantee the identity of the Christology of Paul with that of the other Apostles.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 7-12.

<sup>5</sup> Loisy, *op. cit.*, i. 195.

the tradition of the first witnesses, "it is certain that a part of his assertions concerning the person, the earthly career and the immortal life of the Christ, do not proceed from faithfully transmitted historical indications, but from the *a priori* speculations of Paul's own faith and doctrine."<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, scholars are coming to see ever more clearly that the Tarsan's central doctrine was evolved quite independently of historical tradition, or, as Wrede<sup>2</sup> puts it, that his Christology was pre-Christian. Martin Brückner has supplemented Wrede's suggestions by showing what elements in the Pauline theology may be traced either to Jewish apocalyptic<sup>3</sup> or to Oriental myths.<sup>4</sup>

The decisive element in Paul's consciousness at the time when he worked out his momentous dogmas was assuredly the primitive and widespread vegetation or initiation myth of the dying and rising god, common to both Oriental religions and to the Greeks. In adopting this view Professor Gilbert Murray has but endorsed the work of many distinguished scholars. In his last book<sup>5</sup> he informs us that among many pre-Christian Gnostic sects some were established at Tarsus and Antioch before the time of Paul; that their Saviour, like the Jewish Messiah, was established in men's minds long before the Saviour of the Christians; that the names of this deity varied, and were gradually superseded by "Jesus" or "Christ"; that in some sense this Saviour was both perfect Man and God, also the Son of Man and the Son of God; that the method by which he performed his mystery of redemption varied, haunted by the memory of the primitive suffering and dying God, and also vividly affected by the ideal righteous man

<sup>1</sup> Loisy, *op. cit.*, i. 8.

<sup>2</sup> W. Wrede, *Paul*, English translation, Boston, 1908, p. 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie*, 1903.

<sup>4</sup> *Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland in den orientalischen Religionen und ihr Verhältnis zum Christentum*, 1908. A review of recent German literature on the subject (the English works are completely ignored, the French barely mentioned) is given by A. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, ch. vii.

<sup>5</sup> *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 143 f.



of Plato,<sup>1</sup> "who shall be scourged, tortured, bound, his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every evil, shall be impaled or crucified." Elsewhere<sup>2</sup> Professor Murray has shown that the ritual of a dying and rising God, coupled with the *σπαραγμός*<sup>3</sup> (or breaking of the body of the god) in the mysteries of Dionysius, is at the basis of all Greek tragedies, and is particularly evident in Euripides.

Professor J. G. Frazer and Miss J. E. Harrison supplement the work of Professor Murray with even more convincing proofs. The former assures us that in Paul's own city of Tarsus the two principal deities worshipped, identified by the Greeks with Zeus and Hercules, were commonly called the Father and the Son, and that the death by fire and the resurrection of the latter were annually celebrated: further, that this was but one form of similar very widespread cults.<sup>4</sup> The myth about the god in all these cases is but a projection of the mystic ceremonies performed by his worshippers. The old way of Euhemerus of explaining the gods as but deified men, though specious, was in fact false.<sup>5</sup> Miss Harrison gives a satisfactory explanation<sup>6</sup> of the psychological process of myth-making of this kind. In the first instance the belief in the god is due to the intensification of the emotions under the stimulus of the crowd and of the mystery. "The process of projection, of deification, is much helped by what we may perhaps call the story-telling instinct. The god, like his worshipper, must have a life-history. We hear much of the sufferings (*πάθη*) of Dionysius. They are, of course, primarily

<sup>1</sup> *Republic*, 362A. The translation is Murray's, *loc. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> In the lectures I heard him deliver at Amherst in the spring of 1912. The same argument more briefly in his chapter than in Miss Harrison's *Themis*, 1912, pp. 341-363.

<sup>3</sup> This was originally the tearing to pieces of the god by his worshippers to eat him in communion. In the Greek tragedies the eating is omitted, but the peculiar form of the hero's death, which always consists of being torn limb from limb, is a survival.

<sup>4</sup> *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 1906, pp. 36 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Gilbert Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 141.

<sup>6</sup> *Themis*, pp. 46 ff.

the projected *πάθη* of his worshippers; the worshippers have passed through the rite of Second Birth, have endured the death that issues in resurrection, therefore the god is Twice-born. But once the life-history is projected, it tends to consolidate the figure of the god and define his personality." Another source of divinity is none other than the sacrifice itself; "the victim is first sanctified, sacrificed, then divinised. *Le dieu, c'est le sacré personnifié.*"<sup>1</sup> If we explain the elaborate and intensely human story of Hippolytus as but an emanation of a primitive rite of communion, may we not most easily explain the story of Jesus' crucifixion in the same way?

If it is objected that had Paul really originated so important an element of Christianity, the earlier Apostles would have had nothing to do with him, but would have accused him of "heathenising the gospel"<sup>2</sup> even more strongly than they did attack him for abrogating the law, several satisfactory answers can be given. Even were it not so, we should not be justified in rejecting the proofs offered that Paul actually did introduce a momentous new element into early Christian theology. It is coming to be more and more recognised,<sup>3</sup> even by those who accept the maximum of gospel history, that Paul's theology is not deducible from the life of Jesus; that there is somehow an unbridgable gap between them. According to Wrede "the second founder of Christianity" has almost completely thrust the first founder into the background, has exercised incomparably the greater influence, and, whatever inspiration he felt from the "historic" Jesus, "the kernel of his gospel lay elsewhere," namely, "in the doctrine of the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ," which Wrede cannot avoid calling a "myth."<sup>4</sup> I do not quote the great German scholar as being the final word in Pauline research, but because I believe his views, in a more or less modified form, represent a large and growing opinion of

<sup>1</sup> *Themis*, p. 148.

<sup>2</sup> A. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Schweitzer, *Einleitung*, and last chapter.

<sup>4</sup> W. Wrede, *Paul*, pp. 164, 178, 180.



competent scholars, who, however they may explain it, feel strongly the wide chasm between Jesus and Paul.

In answer to the legitimate question why Paul's new conception of Christ did not arouse more antagonism than his opposition to the old law, I believe that several considerations may be urged. In the first place, let it be remembered that we have only one side of the question presented to us in the New Testament. As the Pauline views prevailed they exterminated every other variety of opinion; yea, though it were preached by an angel from heaven it was declared anathema. Q was suppressed for this reason; all other early non-Pauline literature was suppressed, with the exception of James, which does not broach the delicate question of Christology. The writers who had become imbued with the Tarsan's doctrines, after these had been imposed on Christianity as the orthodox ones, could not allow, could hardly conceive, that there had ever been any different views. It is only accidentally, as in Luke's description of the preaching of Apollos, or John's polemic against those who denied that Christ had come in the flesh, that we learn that there really were diametrically opposite teachings on this important point. Anyone who compares Luke with his sources, as far as these have survived, namely, Mark and the Pauline Epistles, will be convinced that the apologetic motive outweighed all others with him; that he omitted, altered, added, with utter disregard of history, when the facts contradicted his idea of edification. In fact, according to Harnack, the main motive of his writing his gospel was to supersede the insufficiently edifying Mark, of whom he had the poorest opinion.<sup>1</sup> But we must remember that there was a longer interval between Mark and the events he purports to record, than between Luke and Mark, and therefore a greater chance for manipulating facts according to preconceived ideas. Believing that Paul's ideas, vouchsafed him by special vision, were divinely guaranteed, they naturally could not imagine

<sup>1</sup> *Luke the Physician*, 158 f.

or report that there had ever been, in the heart of their religion, contradictory opinions. Hence it is vain to look for any conscious assertion by writers in the New Testament of the real tradition of the Jerusalem Church, supposing that tradition out of harmony with the supreme dogma of the reporters' faith.

Secondly, it is quite likely that to the primitive Jewish Christians the observance of the law really seemed a matter of more vital importance than any doctrine about Christ. They had been taught to regard the code delivered on Sinai as divine and eternal; the alleged facts about Jesus were but recent occurrences subject to a variety of interpretations without scandal. Where there was as yet no dogma there could be no heresy. Moreover, I believe that a careful study of Church history will show that the customs and traditions of the elders, in short, ecclesiastical law, is far more strenuously adhered to than matters of mere opinion. Speculative heresy was rife in the Middle Ages, but, save when it caused some breach in the polity of the Church, it frequently passed unnoticed. The Reformation, in which a very slight alteration of dogma was accompanied by a trenchant reform of ecclesiastical organisation and a large renunciation of the existing Church government, caused far more of a stir than the silent revolution, which, within the last century and a half, has completely changed the creed of a large part of Christendom, humanising and desupernaturalising Jesus.<sup>1</sup>

Thirdly, the indications that we have seem to show that there was an agreement to differ between the two leading Apostles; a treaty by which the territory was divided into spheres of influence in which each might propagate his own ideas: the gospel of the circumcision was committed to Peter; that of the Gentiles to Paul.<sup>2</sup> Probably Peter and

<sup>1</sup> E. C. Moore, *Christian Thought since Kant*, 1912, and E. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*, 1912, recognise that Christian doctrine has been more deeply altered in the past two centuries than in the preceding twelve.

<sup>2</sup> Gal. ii. 7.



his friends cared little what Paul taught so long as he taught only the heathen, with whom they would have nothing to do; and the tolerance of the new gospel was made easier by the promise of its propagator, faithfully kept, to send money to the saints at Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup> Paul also honourably observed the agreement not to touch on controversial points of Christology in evangelising Jews—at least, if we may judge by his second epistle to the Thessalonians.

Finally, we have, in such passages as those with the consideration of which we began this article, proof that the altercation was really much more bitter than appears on the face of the later harmonising records. Peter, indeed, has not left his opinion of Paul's gospel, but to the latter, if we may judge from these texts, the doctrine of Peter seemed the very denial of his Lord. According to our interpretation, at once supported by and supporting the argument just set forth, these texts in Mark represent real reminiscences of the Apostle to the Gentiles. Either at Antioch, where he had a sharp controversy with Peter (Gal. ii. 11), or at one of the conversations at Jerusalem, the two men compared their ideas of Christ. The chief of the twelve denied the fact of, or at least Paul's interpretation of, the passion. The Tarsan showed him how "the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders, and of the chief priests, and scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again. And he spake that saying openly." Note this last phrase, suitable to our exegesis, but so contradictory to the privacy with which Jesus was supposed to be talking to his disciples, that it made Loisy reject the historicity of the whole pericope.<sup>2</sup> "And Peter took him and began to rebuke him." To Paul this denial of what was for him the essence of Christ's work seemed the suggestion of Satan, "savouring not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men,"<sup>3</sup> or, as he put it in his epistles,

<sup>1</sup> F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals*, 1909, p. 11, puts this in his usual piquant way.

<sup>2</sup> *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, ii. 19 f.

<sup>3</sup> Mark viii. 33.

knowing Christ after the flesh, not after the divine revelation. As the conversation continued, or at another time as it took the same turn, Peter denied with great emphasis: "I know not this man of whom ye speak."<sup>1</sup> To Paul this appeared in the light of a denial of the Lord, and as he passed the anecdotes on to his faithful Mark, the Evangelist, true to the symbolic<sup>2</sup> method of which he was so great a master, worked them over into the form in which we have them, and appropriately placed them, the one at the first mention of the passion, the other at the crucifixion itself.

#### PRESERVED SMITH.

AMHERST.

<sup>1</sup> Mark xiv. 71.

<sup>2</sup> On Mark's symbolism, Loisy, *op. cit.*, i. 166; W. B. Smith, *Ecce Deus*, 108 ff.



## IMAGINATION IN UTOPIA.<sup>1</sup>

T. C. SNOW, M.A.

QUITE apart from any disputed questions of ethics or eschatology, I suppose we all acknowledge the duty of promoting the undoubted welfare of human beings in this life, and that most of us hope that the efforts of mankind in that direction will, in some remote future, be more or less successful. But when everybody is comfortable and virtuous and intelligent, when there is no wickedness and no disease, and no unendurable poverty, and no cramping ignorance, will not something be missing that we have in the present imperfect condition of the world, something which makes it worth while to keep all our present miseries, lest with them we should lose it? Stevenson thought there would. In "The Day After To-morrow,"<sup>2</sup> he arraigns socialism because its future will be so dull.

"Danger, enterprise, hope, the aleatory, are dearer to man than regular meals. . . . Pinches, buffets, the glow of life, the shoals of disappointments, furious contention with obstacles; these are the true elixir for all vital spirits; these are what they seek alike in their romantic enterprises and their unromantic dissipations. . . . The aleatory, whether it touch life or fortune, or renown—whether we explore Africa or only toss for halfpence—that is what I conceive men to love best, and that is what we are seeking to exclude from men's existences. . . . Much, then, as the average of the proletariat would gain in this new state of life, they would also lose a certain something, which would not be missed at the beginning, but would be missed progressively and progressively lamented."

Stevenson was thinking of the natural man's lust for adventure, simply for the fun of it. Mr Masterman desires

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Oxford Philosophical Society.

<sup>2</sup> *Lay Morals*, pp. 121-123.

tragedy, always ready to happen, and now and again happening, for the sake of higher needs of the spirit.<sup>1</sup>

“With the coming of this gospel of decency and good manners there has (*sic*) vanished those ardours and agonies of the soul whose interest now appears mainly pathological. . . . Weariness will come of the ‘impracticable hours’ of life divorced from passion, and emptied of high, spiritual enterprise. However excited, those concerned with the soul’s development rather than with the attainment of material comfort will be prepared to welcome the change.”

It is eight years since he wrote those words. Perhaps, since then, his experience at West Ham and at the Local Government Board has taught him a less contemptuous estimate of “material comfort.” But his prophecy, like Stevenson’s, requires an answer from us who trust to the coming of Utopia, whether we place it in this life or in another, or in both. For in heaven also, if we believe in heaven, sin and disaster must be necessary for the perfecting of the spirit, if they are necessary for it on earth; and we must go back with Blake and Hinton to the Ophites and the Naassenes.

Of course, it is not an immediate question for to-day and to-morrow. The youngest of mankind now living will not see tragedy disappear. But it is an ultimate question that must be faced. If Mr Masterman is right, all his heroic work is self-stultifying. If we are only working to a goal that we shall despise when we have attained it, τί δέῃ με χορεύειν; I believe that that danger will be met by the constant growth of the imagination. It will have more and more power to reproduce emotional and intellectual conditions of life which have become quite obsolete in practice. The main work of the Utopian future will be the study of the past; and the past, with all its passions and its sins and its miseries, will be realised with an intensity and precision which will take the place of any similar interruptions of happiness in contemporary life.

“But how will imagination be possible? How can people understand *King Lear*, when there are no ungrateful daughters?

<sup>1</sup> *In Peril of Change*, pp. 169, 172.



What will they make of Falstaff, when they have never tasted wine?" (as they certainly will not, if their Utopia is to be complete).

One may answer hastily and at first sight: "Even now, there are many experiences which we apprehend by imagination, without having gone through them or even seen them in practice. I have never had an uncle who murdered my father and married my mother. If any of my friends have been more fortunate, I do not acknowledge that their sense of *Hamlet* is more intimate than mine, especially when I bethink myself that, so far as research has yet discovered, the same disqualification was shared by Hamlet's creator."

But the objector answers: "All that does not go to the root of the difficulty. It is true that the modern man has not lived through, for himself, a case like Hamlet's; but he lives in a world where things with more or less analogy to it do occasionally happen. In the experience of his neighbours, if not in his own, he knows the frettings and bafflings of circumstance. He feels in himself the germs of possible tragedy, even when a happy nature and kindly discipline have kept them merely germinal. He knows the impulses of the natural man, the seeds of fight and jealousy and lust and revenge, which, 'but for the grace of God,' would have blossomed out in 'John Bradford.' But that will not be the way with the Utopians. They will have no power to interpret the old, unhappy, far-off things by new, unhappy, present things, and battles long ago by battles close at hand. Even their inward germs of lawless emotion will have been tamed and purged out under the pressure of their evolution, whether by inherited disuse or natural selection or environmental modification. With the possibility of experience they will have lost the possibility of imagination."

It seems very cogent, but consider some of the facts of our present experience. In my youth, I accepted as an orthodoxy that the imagination of an experience is the physiological beginning of having it, that when you think of a motion you

are beginning to move, and when you think of a sight you are beginning to see. In the same way, on the ethical side, I was taught that imagination and action go together in practice, that I ought not to let myself think about ways of life that I did not desire to make my own, even for the purpose of condemning them, lest imaginative familiarity should make me fall into them; in the phrase of nurses when children make faces, "You will be struck so." Now, I have heard that the physiological doctrine is overthrown, or at least greatly impaired, that the having and the imagining of experiences differ much more in the brain than the mere inception and completion of the same process. However that may be, everyday life shows that the ethical doctrine is not true without very large qualification. Reasonable people, who have attained a certain maturity, can and do keep imagination and action in perfectly water-tight compartments. That means that they keep two kinds of emotions: personal emotions that belong to their personal life, and dramatic emotions that belong to their imaginative life. Perhaps the poet who said *Lascivast nobis pagina, vita proba* was not very sincere, but he meant something quite true, or how could we allow ourselves to read Aristophanes and Juvenal? I am confident that Mr Marett knows the emotions of a cannibal even better than the cannibal himself, but he has never been tempted to share his diet.

It is even possible to suppose that the Utopians will have artificial means of producing emotion *ad hoc*. We know what we can do by hypnotism, by drugs, by surgical operations, even now. Suppose that the Utopians can work with hypnotic methods of which ours are only the infancy, with drugs that can exhaust their effect when the clock strikes the predicted hour, even with direct manipulation of regions in the brain ("Dr Haidenhoff's Process"), all of them free from all after-consequences. Perhaps the man will say to his physician: "I am going to read Dumas; make me feel the feeling of fighting a duel. I am going to see *Antony and Cleopatra*"



(if they still keep up the rather unimaginative habit of wanting to see events reproduced before their bodily eyes); "make me feel what it is to be a serpent of old Nile." But that expedient does not appeal to me. I hope that the trained imagination of Utopia will do its work without such base mechanic aids.

If you doubt what imagination can do in the future, consider how it has grown with knowledge. Every one of the changes that we call "civilisation" has increased the burden of knowledge on the individual mind. Every man lives in the midst of an imagined picture of his surroundings in space and time, and that picture is suffering a constant enlargement. With writing came in the memory of the past, to be added to the memory of the present, but a certain limit to the preservation was imposed by the perishability of writing. Then printing abolished that limit. Commerce and conquest enlarged the picture with distant places and foreign peoples and alien tongues. In these last days the new arts of locomotion and communication have come to enlarge the enlargement, till it is conterminous with the earth. *Multi pertransierunt et aucta est scientia*. As we get further from the past, the materials for understanding it continually increase. I suppose the time when people seriously began to think of re-creating the whole past of mankind, not merely the selected fragments of it that they called "sacred" or "classical," was about two hundred years ago, when Gianbattista Vico published the *Scienza Nuova*. When one thinks of what has been done in those two hundred years, most of it in the last hundred, it is impossible to set any limit to what will be done by our posterity. Just when one field of evidence seems exhausted, genius opens out another. Where our ancestors had only books to teach them history, we have pots and pans and skulls and graves. When I was at school, solar myths were the last word on primitive religion, the patriarchal family was the last word on primitive society. Just when their last drop of inference seemed to have been wrung out of these, animism

and totemism and matrilinear descent came, not to supersede them, but to subsume and transform them. Now that even bull-roarers and churingas are beginning to be sucked dry, who knows what the next prehistoric revelation will be? Utopia may know the eighteenth millennium before Christ as well as we know the eighteenth century after.

All the time that this enlargement was going on, people have been afraid that their minds would sink under its burden, from the day when Ammon warned Theuth<sup>1</sup> that writing would destroy memory, to the latest bishop who laments that children are "crammed with information, and we think they are being educated." But our minds have not broken down. As the new particulars of history and science have tumbled in upon us, we have developed new organs for dealing with them, minuter divisions of intellectual labour at one end of the scale, larger generalisation at the other. But the generalisation and the division of labour together would both have been a mere futile weariness, if they had not been fused together by a growing imagination, and made alive by a growing capacity for disinterested emotion. Did anybody before the nineteenth century ever know the past like Renan? did anybody ever feel it like Carlyle?

It is true that masters of imagination have often chosen to disparage their gift. Again to quote Stevenson:<sup>2</sup>

"To 'compete with life' whose sun we cannot look upon, whose passions and diseases waste and slay us, to compete with the flavour of wine, the beauty of the dawn, the scorching of fire, the bitterness of death and separation; here is, indeed, a projected escalade of heaven; here are, indeed, labours for a Hercules in a dress-coat, armed with a pen and dictionary to depict the passions, armed with a tube of superior flake-white to paint the portrait of the insufferable sun.

"Life goes before us, infinite in complication, attended by the most various and surprising meteors; appealing at once to the eye, to the ear; to the mind—the seat of wonder; to the touch—so thrillingly delicate; and to the belly—so imperious when starved. . . . Music is but an arbitrary trifling with a few of life's majestic chords; painting is but a shadow of its gorgeous

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Phædrus*, 275A.

<sup>2</sup> "A Humble Remonstrance," *Longmans' Magazine*, December 1884, p. 141.



pageantry of light and colour; literature does but drily indicate that wealth of incident, of moral obligation, of virtue, vice, action, rapture and agony, with which it teems."

So, Charles Reade said:<sup>1</sup>

"The man whose knowledge all comes from reading, accumulates a great number of what? facts? No, of the shadows of facts, shadows, often so thin, indistinct, and featureless, that when one of the facts themselves runs against him in real life, he does not know his old friend, round about which he has written a smart leader in a journal, and a ponderous trifle in the Polysyllabic Review. But this sailor had stowed into his mental hold not fact-shadows, but the glowing facts all alive, oh."

For the present generation and the near future, we must partly agree with these despisers of their own craft. We are still in the imperfect stage where it is necessary to have had some approach to an experience actually before you can apprehend it emotionally. But even in our days, it is wonderful how often the people of most adventurous and tumultuous life are the most humdrum and conventional thinkers,—not only thinkers, in the strict intellectual region, but their imaginative sense of their own adventures is the least adequate. That has to be supplied for them by the stay-at-home poet or novelist. The Cellinis and Trelawneys, who can have adventures and write them too, are the exceptions. Even in the sporting columns of the newspapers, how much less idea of the game you get from the famous player who is asked to write for the sake of his name than from the journalist who may never have held a bat in his life. Charles Reade exalted the eye-witness, as we have heard, and then he wrote the fight of Captain Dodd with the pirates from the recollections of a friend who had been to Australia. Has Mr Kipling ever been in a Russian prison with *The Man Who Was*, or ridden into the Valley of the Curse with *Morrobie Jukes*? We know, even now, how

" . . . such a price  
The gods exact for song,  
To become what we sing ";

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<sup>1</sup> *Love Me Little, Love Me Long*, chap. iii.

how, to the poets who see Tiresias and the Centaurs,

" . . . the gods  
Who gave them vision  
Added this law :  
That they should bear too  
His groping blindness,  
His dark foreboding,  
His scorned white hairs,"

and

" then they feel,  
They too, the maddening wine  
Swell their large veins to bursting ; in wild pain  
They feel the biting spears  
Of the grim Lapithæ and Theseus,  
Drive crashing through their bones." <sup>1</sup>

And every Utopian will be a poet.

And for that reason, Mr Masterman need not be afraid that the Utopian will be too monotonously happy. In fact, I wonder sometimes how he will endure the completeness of his own imagination, his perfect realisation of the travail of the ages that will have gone to make him. "The sharpest of us are well wadded with stupidity," and he will have no wadding. Even to us, it often happens to doubt. We may have the firmest faith that it is the function of the universe to explain itself to itself, but are we always sure that the explanation is worth its price ? Professor Murray says : <sup>2</sup>

"The poet actually sees in the great misery some element of beauty, which is really there, but which we stupid people have not seen. He discovers it by some rare sensitiveness ; and then by that secret power which lies in most forms of art, of 'making great things small and small things great,' he selects this small and precious element, and fosters it, till it has spread its influence over the whole. Out of misery and shame and evil, he makes Tragedy. The comforting power of sheer Tragedy, a reality half mystical, always hard to grasp, yet plainly existing . . . when of the faint lights in the sky, ray after ray goes out, and the darkness is absolute—then, in some mysterious way, the darkness itself which was so dreadful, proves to be a friend. . . . The magnificence of her fate and Troy's ; the glory and beauty that must abide in such intense suffering. . . . The search for an answer to the injustice of suffering in the very splendour and beauty of suffering."

<sup>1</sup> Matthew Arnold, *The Strayed Reveller*.

<sup>2</sup> "Trojan Women of Euripides," *Independent Review*, December 1904.



Just so, Helen said to Hector, "We, on whom Zeus hath set an evil portion, that we may be sung in the songs of the after-time." But do we really mean that that is the justification of all the misfitting of things, the cruelties of men and the long agony of the world—just to be a spectacle for somebody to understand, the procession of the ages "butchered to make a Utopian holiday," Sir Walter Raleigh's "central fire which bursts through the thin crust of civilisation, and makes a splendour in the sky above the blackness of ruined homes"?<sup>1</sup> Helen and Hector might snatch a fearful joy from their tragic immortality; but all the nameless hosts of Trojans and Achæans, the parents at home that never received even the tiny urn of ashes from the money-change of Ares, was it enough for them that they went to make the Iliad? These sheep, what had they done? If these thoughts are too oppressive for us, what will they be to the Utopian, with his infinitely finer sense for all the suffering of his predecessors?

And not only they will know what suffering was. They will know what sin was. They will have lived in the hearts of Goneril and Iago and Caligula and Nana Sahib. Even our blunted consciences have some sense of that most intolerable of horrors, the sympathetic feeling of wickedness by the innocent. "He made Him sin, who knew no sin." The Apostle meant those words in a transcendental application, but beyond all doubt they embody a plain human experience, by which alone the transcendental application can be verified, if it is to be verified at all.

But the Utopians must be left to construct their own theodicy. Perhaps they will conclude that the demand for a theodicy is *ipso facto* a theodicy in itself, perhaps that a theodicy which human beings could construct would not be a theodicy at all, perhaps that without our construction it has been once delivered to the saints.

That will be their greatest pain of the spirit, the infinite horror of the past. But also, they will know, for themselves

<sup>1</sup> Raleigh, *Shakespeare*, p. 197.

and not vicariously, the great transforming experience of human life. When all the outer hindrances to the course that never did run smooth have been removed by eugenics and paurogenics and wise economics, love will always have its own inward frettings and chafings; it will always reach the harbour, we may trust, but it must pass through its billows and tempests first, or it will not be love.

So we need not be afraid that the Utopians will be too happy. And also, we need not be afraid that they will suffer the moral degeneracy which comes of having nothing to do. People say, "The end of man is not to think or to dream, but to do. Thinking is only a by-product of the active life." With all my heart; but what is "doing"? The "doing" of our days has been bodily; the doing of Utopia will be spiritual. That is Maeterlinck's theory of future tragedy, that it is to concern itself less and less with external, and more and more with purely internal catastrophes. The Professor in *Sylvie and Bruno* asked,<sup>1</sup> "Why should you always have *live* things in stories? Why do not you have events, or circumstances? 'Once a coincidence was taking a walk with a little accident, and they met an explanation—a *very* old explanation—so old that it was quite doubled up, and looked more like a conundrum.'" Keats complains of the women who "would like to be married to an epic, and given away by a novel"; but really, what better could they want?

For in truth, all this perfecting of the imagination will require an immensity of work, and that will be the moral safeguard of Utopia. In the world as we have known it, most of our time and labour has had to be spent in the mere brute effort of keeping ourselves alive, and the "play-activities" (which include knowledge and religion and love and everything that makes life human) have had to come in where they could. And yet experience has seemed to show that the effort was wanted to save us from worse things. When favoured people here and there have escaped from

<sup>1</sup> *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded*, pp. 375-376.



the brute effort by happy gifts of climate or ingenuities of social devolution, the results have not been uniformly admirable. The beach-comber and the slave-holder and the millionaire and the suburban old lady with dividends have not always spent their time in impassioned contemplation of the ages. Satan has found some mischief still for idle hands to do. Only a few happy natures have had the sense to keep themselves straight, if they have not had to work for their living.

“Only a few happy natures.” That is just the point. Every Utopian will have a happy nature. (What is the use of having discovered heredity, if we cannot make it produce the kind of people that we want? The only difficulty is, to make everybody want to produce the right kind of people, and *ex hypothesi*, the course of events is doing that.) They will not have to work for their living as we have had to work, but their hands will not be idle. In place of the effort to keep themselves alive, they will have the effort to imagine the life of mankind. Nobody will be overworked by it, but nobody will be exempt from his share of it. Everybody will have to be an expert in some minute portion of work that nobody can do so well as himself: the English Law of Easements in the seventeenth century, or the types of Caribbean Arrow-heads, or the Formulæ of Proposal in the penny novelettes of the twentieth century. But only a little of his time will be given to polishing his own bit of intellectual mosaic; in the rest he will be looking at the growing picture.

But if activity and contemplation are predominantly mental, that does not mean that there will be no other activity, of the kinds that we call “bodily” and “sensuous.” With the most boundless and yet economical command of natural resources, a little work will still have to be done to keep the Utopians alive, and everybody will take his turn at it. Their bodies will not be dominated by the insatiable need for exercise, and corresponding appetite, that make the Northern European a burden to himself and his neighbours, unless he

wastes half his time in muscular metabolism ; but just for the pleasure of it they will go through enough exertion to know for a few minutes what twentieth-century people meant when they said they were tired. And so with the visual and auditory aspect of life. It will certainly be subordinated to the mental and imaginative aspect—as I should put it, to the literary aspect. But that need not mean that it will disappear. Although a book about a thing is generally more interesting, and always more intelligible, than the thing itself, our present imaginations are so imperfect that we now and again want to see the thing with our own eyes. And, of course, imagination never will be perfect. For brevity's sake, I have gone on speaking as if it would, but of course its perfection will only be an asymptotic progress. The Utopian will probably have to go to look at his mountains as well as to read about them, to hear his music as well as to cast his eye along the score.

I shall be told that I am preparing for a race of “bloodless pedants,” and “thin-lipped prigs,” and “superior persons.” Well, I have known some of the pedants and prigs, and they have been very good fellows. If I wanted help or sympathy or forgiveness, I would go to one of them with much more confidence than to one of the “virile hearty sinners with red blood in their veins,” whom it is the fashion to admire. I have no sympathy with the modern preference for the naughty boy over the good boy. There is more to be said against the “superior person,” but he is a product of deficient imagination, and in Utopia there will be no deficient imaginations.

And again, we are warned against “an Alexandrian age, all taste and reminiscence and scholarship, dreading a touch of contact with the teeming, reeking mother earth.” Well, I think the Alexandrian age must have been very nice to live in,—for the Alexandrian scholars. If (unfettered by chronology) I could get Aristarchus to show me his notebooks, and Callimachus to tell me what he thought of his friends, and Plotinus to reveal me mysteries, and Meleager to sing me songs, the absence of any more strenuous emotions would have



been fairly endurable,—if one could have forgotten the fellahin pumping their shadufs outside.

“If one could have forgotten,” and I suppose the historical Alexandrians did forget. The “ages of culture” and “ages of rest” have made themselves an ordered and peaceful life at the expense of a common herd that had to be shut out of it, and that shut-out herd avenged itself on the culture. Their “Alexandrianism,” in the bad sense, was not due to their living on reminiscences; it was the effect of not taking in reminiscences enough. They had to shut their eyes to all the rough and violent and sordid reminiscences, because they had to escape the rough and violent and sordid side of the contemporary life. And so it will always be, till we have abolished cruel and mean and spiteful things from actual human experience. We shall always be tempted to construct little high-walled gardens of imagination where they are all shut out, and the free, wide-ranging imagination will be starved. But Utopia will be able to re-create horrors where they are wanted in imagination, because there will be none in practice.

It is quite possible that in Utopian conditions there will be fewer and fewer works of creative genius, as we generally understand “works,” that is, that their genius will not be spent on new poems, or stories, or pictures, or sonatas, simply because it will have so much more urgent work. The universality of their Shakespeares and the radiance of their Shelleys and the intensity of their Dantes will be all too little for the full re-creation of the past. Why should anybody want to write new poems, when it takes all his strength to feel the old ones? But, on the other side, creative genius will be strained to its utmost by the task of interpretation. Is not that the reason why the Homers and Shakespeares have never invented their own stories, but always re-told those that were given them ready-made?

I know what a prejudice there is against what is called in contempt “the purely literary view of life.” (It sounds to me like disparaging “the purely political view of government,”

or "the purely religious view of God.") But who are the mouthpieces of the prejudice? Walt Whitman, with his "powerful uneducated persons"; FitzGerald deserting poets and scholars for his fisherman; Samuel Butler calling to the world, "Do not believe in me. I am damned because I write." Mr Jacks says of his "Mary":<sup>1</sup>

"Life existed for the purpose of providing clever people, like herself, with the opportunity of viewing, criticising it, and, in the case of very clever people, of making fun and money at its expense. . . . According to her philosophy—I mean the unconscious part of it—views were not made for life, but life for views."

Miss Macaulay makes her Mrs Bunter discover:<sup>2</sup>

"How the Rich did love words! They exalted them, made them fulfil too high an office. The Poor, too, love words, but they keep them to their proper, lowly place, to describe things concrete, physical, external. The Rich think to use them to elucidate emotions and ideas, and the facts of the spirit; so they pour them out and pour them out and nothing is achieved; and, sublimely independent, the facts of the spirit persist, unaltered and unrevealed."

I am not greatly perturbed by these masters of expression, turning their backs on their own prerogative. If they meant it, it would be treason to their allegiance, *læsa maiestas litteraturæ*. But they do not mean it. It is only a lover's quarrel, the self-inversion that comes at moments to all strenuous devotions.

Beware of the glorification of the inarticulate, the "strength of silence," the "powerful uneducated persons," the "depths that never come to expression," and so on. We did not need Bergson to tell us that life transcends our apprehension of it, but we have learned from older prophets that life is not truly life until it is conscious, and consciousness is not truly conscious until it is expressed. Not, of course, that life can ever be all known or expressed. If experience was not inexhaustible, it would be a poor sort of world. We need not deny the possibility of an intelligence which somehow transcends the antinomy between an ever-widening experience

<sup>1</sup> *Among the Idol-makers*, pp. 191-192.

<sup>2</sup> *Views and Vagabonds*.



and an omniscience that has nothing to learn; some of us may even surmise that our own experience is only explicable with such an intelligence as its background; but, beyond all possibilities or surmises, such an intelligence is not ours. The mine of the inarticulate is inexhaustible. But it is useless until it is converted into the articulate, just as coal is useless until it is burned. It is beautiful because it is potentially articulate, just as virginity is beautiful because it is potential marriage. But the exaltation of the inarticulate is the same error as the exaltation of celibacy.

Of course, self-consciousness sometimes trades on too small a capital of inarticulate experience, and then it must retire and save. A philosophy becomes an orthodoxy and a vision becomes a fashion. But these seasons of over-trading do not alter the truth, that the end of the universe is to express itself in self-conscious beings.

Of course, again, speech is not the only form of self-consciousness; still less are writing and printing the only way of recording speech. Only, in our history, as far as it has gone, speech is such a pre-eminent form of consciousness, and writing is such a pre-eminent form of speech, that we do no harm by subsuming all other forms under these, and making "consciousness" and "speech" and "literature" synonymous. "Other heights in other lives, God willing," but for human beings as we know them, sight and hearing, knowledge and emotion, love and worship, are but rudiments of themselves until they are perfected in speech. Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος.

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## THE FALL OF LUCIFER.

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THE generally accepted doctrine that the Power of Evil is a personal being who was once an exalted angel, but, having wickedly renounced his allegiance to the Most High, was in consequence cast down out of Heaven, the blissful region somewhere among the stars, is one of those extra-Biblical beliefs which obtained currency at an early date, apparently under Persian influence. I am far from questioning the truth of the doctrine embodied in this popular belief. On the contrary, though but little is revealed in Scripture on the subject of Satan, "the Enemy," his existence seems a reasonable postulate, which best helps to explain the mysterious problem of evil and its origin. My object in the present article is not so much to discuss the doctrine, as to throw some light on the phenomenal form in which it has always been invested in popular beliefs. It is the setting of the picture, which tries to visualise a fact of the unseen spiritual world, which is to engage our attention. And I purposely call my paper "The Fall of Lucifer," as that title will serve to withdraw it from the domain of theology, and claim it for the lower and perhaps more intelligible region of folklore and popular religion. In brief, I propose to adduce reasons for thinking that the particular occurrence in the natural world which envisaged and first suggested the belief to the Semites was that phenomenon which is beyond doubt the most startling and awe-inspiring ever seen in the cope of heaven—a falling star.



One of the most obvious indications of life is motion, and to man in the animistic stage of belief everything which moves seems to be a living creature endowed with intelligence and self-determination. If this held true of rivers and winds and clouds, still more did it so of those bright ever-circling creatures which traverse the firmament with such marvellous regularity—the stars. In the steadfast obedience with which they pursued the course laid down for them, rising and culminating and setting, night after night, year after year, age after age, without the slightest aberration in this constant drift from east to west, men recognised a perfect obedience to law, the highest exemplar of righteousness. The central point around which these bright and animated beings revolved was conceived as the throne of their Lord and Ruler, and to that they ever kept their faces turned. This beautiful harmony and heavenly conformity to cosmic law and order, called *Rita* by the Aryans, or “course of Nature,” is thought to have first inspired them with love and admiration for right and good government. And so in the Old Testament “the laws of the heavenly bodies were made a chronometer for arranging the theocratic ordinances and festivals that the harmony of the laws of Nature with the laws of the Covenant might be manifested.”<sup>1</sup>

“The sun, the moon, the stars . . .

Are not these, O soul, the vision of Him who reigns?”<sup>2</sup>

Among the ancient Babylonians stars were divinised as living beings, and *mul*, a star, was adopted as the ordinary symbol determinative of a deity. Once these heavenly bodies were regarded as animated and law-abiding, it was but a step further to believe that they were rational and spiritual beings endowed with consciousness and will, which enabled them to yield willing obedience to the ordinances of their great Creator. “There is a spirit in the stars,” says Tatian, an Assyrian by

<sup>1</sup> Oehler, *Theology of the O. Test.*, ii. 72.

<sup>2</sup> Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism*.

birth, "as there is in the angels."<sup>1</sup> The learned Greek Father, Origen, expressed his belief that "the stars are animated beings, capable of virtue and endowed with intelligence."<sup>2</sup> His argument is: "They may be called living creatures because they have received commandments from God, which implies that they are rational beings. For the Lord says in Isaiah (xlv. 12), 'My hands have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded.' These commandments are that each star in its order and course should give forth the amount of splendour which has been entrusted to it, and not wander from its appointed orbit. Seeing then that the stars move with such order and regularity, that their movements never appear at any time subject to derangement, would it not" (he asks) "be the height of folly to say that so orderly an observance of method and plan could be carried out by irrational beings?"<sup>3</sup> The idea that the heavenly bodies were intelligent and responsible servants of their Creator was generally held by the Hebrews. "At the commandment of the Holy One they stand in their order," like soldiers in their ranks (Ecclus. xliii. 10). He gave laws to them which they cannot transgress (Ps. cxlviii. 6). "For sun, moon, and stars being bright and sent to do their offices, are obedient" (Ep. of Jeremy, 60). "When He calleth them they say, 'Here we be'; and so with cheerfulness they show light unto Him that made them" (Baruch iii. 34). It is in no mere figurative sense that they offer up prayers and praise to their Maker.<sup>4</sup> It followed that if the stars were moral agents endowed with free-will they would be held responsible for their conduct, and would be punished for any transgression of the laws prescribed to them. When it is said in Job (xxv. 5), "the stars are not clean in His sight," it is implied that they may be subject to sin, and are actually not free from the guilt of it. Origen,

<sup>1</sup> *To the Greeks*, ch. xii.

<sup>2</sup> *De Mundi Opific.*, § xxiv.

<sup>3</sup> Origen, *De Principiis*, bk. i. ch. vii. § 3.

<sup>4</sup> Ps. cxlviii. 3; Origen, *Adv. Cels.*, v. 11. See the *Acts of Callistratus*, xi. on the exemplary obedience of the stars (Conybeare, *Monuments of Early Christianity*, 330).



accordingly, infers that since the stars are living and rational beings, there will undoubtedly appear among them both an advance and a falling away.<sup>1</sup> An apostasy in their ranks may be apprehended. "Many of the leaders of the stars will err," says the Book of Enoch (lx. 6), "and they will change their paths and deeds."<sup>2</sup>

A defection of the stars from the assigned path of righteousness was contemplated as a possibility by the earliest Semites. The Babylonian Creation Tablets mention the precautions taken by Anu, the God of Heaven, to prevent any star from wandering from its appointed place:

"He founded fast the station of Nibiru [the central Pole Star] to define their boundary;

That none (of the stars) might do wrong or go astray" (Tab. v.).<sup>3</sup>

The ancient Sumerians regarded the planets, *i.e.* "the wandering stars," as perverse "sheep" (*lubat*) which had escaped from the safe fold of the steadfast stars and gone wilfully astray in search of strange pasture.<sup>4</sup> These lost sheep were transgressors of the divine law, and doomed to be punished. Tatian similarly draws a contrast between the one immutable Lord who wanders not, and the planets which are unstable wandering demons.<sup>5</sup> And in the Book of Enoch, the seer, observing "how the luminaries which are in the heavens do not depart from their paths, but each one rises and sets in order, each in its time, and do not depart from their laws," holds them up as an example to men who have transgressed.<sup>6</sup> Quite in the same spirit, Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch (A.D. 170), remarks: "The disposition of the stars is typical of the order which is observed by righteous and pious men who keep the law and commandments of God, while those stars which wander from their places and are called 'planets'

<sup>1</sup> *De Princip.*, i. 7, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> The conscious stars, as a rule, "keep their oath" of fidelity (Enoch xli. 5). They are "the watchers" of the skies (Dan. iv. 17; cf. Jer. xxxii. 35).

<sup>3</sup> Ball, *Light from the East*, 12; Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, 389.

<sup>4</sup> Maspero, *Dawn of Civilisation*, 670.

<sup>5</sup> *Address to the Greeks*, ch. ix.

<sup>6</sup> Chs. xli., xliii., xliv.

are typical of those men who have wandered from God and abandoned His law and commandments.”<sup>1</sup>

We may compare in the dualism of the Persian Zoroastrians the opposition between the fixed stars and the planets which took the form of a conflict ever going forward between the good and constant stars of order, banded under Tistrya (Sirius), on the side of the Good Spirit Ahura-Mazda, against the wandering stars of disorder which were governed by Angra Manyu, the Spirit of Evil.<sup>2</sup> In the Zend-Avesta the *Pairikas* or planets are represented as the enemies of law and order.<sup>3</sup> In the Babylonian mythology the Seven Evil Spirits, authors of ill, which seek to bring confusion into the region of heaven, seducing the stars from their obedience and impeding their movements, are meteoric demons which sweep down upon the earth in lightning and tempest.<sup>4</sup> There may be an allusion to some such “war in heaven” of the celestial powers between themselves in Job xxv. 3: “He maketh peace in His high places.”<sup>5</sup>

Sometimes, according to Hebrew belief, it came to pass that the stars, being of imperfect goodness, disobeyed the decrees of their Maker, and, instead of coming forth to shine at the time appointed them, deserted their post and rebelled against His sovereignty. The Book of Enoch makes frequent reference to a fall or act of sin on the part of the stars of heaven in thus transgressing the commandments of God.<sup>6</sup> For their offence “the bad revolting stars”<sup>7</sup> are committed to a prison, where they are kept bound in fetters for a future judgment. An obscure and difficult verse in Isaiah (xxiv. 21) refers to such a judgment on certain rebellious members of the host of heaven, when they shall be brought to account, com-

<sup>1</sup> *To Autolykus*, ch. xv.

<sup>2</sup> Darmesteter, *Avesta*, i., xxiv.; *Ormazd et Ahriman*, §§ 223–226.

<sup>3</sup> *Tir Yasht*, vi. 33.

<sup>4</sup> *Trans. Soc. Bib. Arch.*, iii. 458.

<sup>5</sup> Whether the seven wandering stars or planets may be identified with the Egyptian “Children of Rebellion,” seven in number, who resisted the rule of Rā, the Sun-god, and the seven evil spirits sent against men by Beliar (*Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs*, Reuben, 2), I do not presume to say.

<sup>6</sup> Chs. xviii. 14, 15; xxi. 3; xc. 21, 24.

<sup>7</sup> Shaks., 1 Henry VI., i. 1.



mitted to a dungeon, and punished: "It shall come to pass in that day that Yahveh shall hold visitation upon the host of the height in the height, and upon the kings of the earth on the earth. And they shall be gathered as captives are gathered into the pit, and shut up in the prison, and after many days they shall be visited" (Cheyne).<sup>1</sup> Similar mysterious references to this old semi-mythological idea are found elsewhere.

When Marduk, the Babylonian god of light, was victorious over Tiamât, the primeval monster of chaos and disorder, he imprisoned certain of the starry host who had abetted her in the struggle, to be visited and punished. Enoch was shown the place where heaven and earth come to an end, and the angel told him, "It is a prison for the stars of heaven and for the host of heaven" (xviii. 14). "The stars that roll over the fire are they who transgressed the command of God before their rising, because they did not come forth in their time" (15). "And the judgment was first over the stars, and they were judged and were found to be sinners, and went to the place of judgment and were thrown into an abyss filled with fire"<sup>2</sup> (xc. 24). There is a manifest allusion to these passages in the Epistle of Jude, where certain reprobates are denounced as "wandering stars to whom the blackness of darkness is reserved for ever" (13); "erring sterris" in Wyclif's translation. Another statement of the liability to judgment of the celestial bodies occurs in the Apocalypse of Peter, which says that at the day of judgment "the earth shall be judged along with the heaven which encompasses it"; for "every power of heaven shall be melted . . . and all the stars shall fall like leaves from the vine and as leaves fall from a fig-tree."<sup>3</sup> The third-

<sup>1</sup> So in the Book of Enoch: "I saw that they [the stars] were weighed on the scales of justice, according to their light" (ch. xliii.). Some of these were shooting stars (ch. xliv.).

<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere the Book of Enoch speaks of "judgment upon the stars cast down from heaven and imprisoned in the abyss," especially the seven stars from heaven (xxi. 2, 3), and the star which fell first (lxxxvi. 1, 3).

<sup>3</sup> So Isa. xxxiv. 4; Luke xxi. 26; Robinson and James, *Gospel according to Peter*, 71.

century poet Commodian has an echo of the same idea in the line,

“The stars of heaven fall, the stars are judged with us.”<sup>1</sup>

The falling of the stars is evidently regarded as the visible proof of their judicial punishment.

At this point of our inquiry it is important to remember that in the early Hebrew books the stars were so closely associated with the angels that they were hardly differentiated from them, if at all. The same functions of praise, worship, and active service were attributed to both denizens of the heavens alike. The stars and the angels were regarded as the two great squadrons which together constitute the army or soldiery (*militia*) of Him who is Yahveh Sebaôth, “the Lord of Hosts”;<sup>2</sup> the word Sebaôth being akin to the Assyrian *sâbu*, a soldier. The parallelism of a passage in Job (xxxviii. 7) shows how easily they were identified. In the universal jubilation at the creation it says:

“When the morning stars sang together,  
(Then) all the sons of God [the angels] shouted for joy.”

Here the stars are conceived as belonging to an earlier creation, like the angels, and as, equally with them, intelligent worshippers of the Most High. Many proofs of this assimilation are to be found in the Jewish apocryphal literature. It may suffice to note that in the passage quoted above from the Book of Enoch, the place in which the offending stars are confined is called interchangeably “the prison of the angels.”<sup>3</sup> These passages serve to throw some light on the obscure allusion in the Second Epistle of Peter (ii. 4) which mentions the incarceration of some fallen spirits, “angels that sinned and were cast down to Tartarus, and committed to pits of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment”; and the very similar allusion in Jude (6) to “angels which kept not their own principality,

<sup>1</sup> *Carm. Apol.* 1004.

<sup>2</sup> Ps. cxlviii. 2; Isa. xl. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Chs. xviii. 14, and xix. 10. See also Maimonides, *More Nevoch.*; J. Lightfoot, *Works*, iv. 199; Tylor, *Prim. Culture*, i. 291.



but left their proper habitation [in the heavens], which He hath kept in everlasting bonds under darkness unto the judgment of the great day"—not different probably from the "wandering stars to whom the blackness of darkness is reserved" in the same chapter (v. 13).<sup>1</sup>

We now turn to the physical phenomenon which we have reason to think was the ultimate *motif* and suggestion of these apocalyptic symbols.

Let us by an effort think ourselves back into those primeval ages.

The idea that would be most deeply impressed upon the minds of those early gazers as they scanned the star-peopled heavens would be that of unerring obedience to law—the faithfulness and peaceful harmony with which the bright runners of the sky pursued their courses as ever of old. But behold! suddenly they are startled and dismayed to see one of those ancient steadfast stars, to all appearance, abandon its place in heaven—"rush madly from its sphere"—and precipitate itself headlong towards the earth with amazing swiftness, till it was quenched in darkness. The strange phenomenon of a falling star as it shot athwart the dark vault would be a terrifying prodigy which seemed to introduce an element of disruption and disorder into the peaceful harmony of Nature. Such an unaccountable breach in the cosmic order of the universe would appear nothing short of a dereliction of a spirit from its appointed post, a revolt against the laws and ordinances established by the Creator. What could these pre-scientific observers conclude but that one of the heavenly host, which hitherto had kept its orbit with blameless regularity, had suddenly rebelled and broken loose from the bonds which from eternity had held it in its place, and in lawless disobedience had plunged into perdition.

<sup>1</sup> Shooting stars are meant. Clement (xli.) says that "wandering" here means "apostates," and that "stars of this kind were those which fell from the seats of the angels." See "Fall of the Angels" in Professor J. B. Mayor, *Epistle of Jude*, clviii. seq.; he thinks "lights" in James i. 17 may refer to star-angels.

Charles Kingsley helps us to realise the alarm which the sight would inspire. Writing to Professor Adams a description of the awe-inspiring meteor shower of 14th November 1866, he says:

"The most striking (and to me) awful phenomenon was the point of departure in Leo, where, again and again, meteors appeared and hung for a moment, their tail so much foreshortened as to be wholly or almost wholly unseen. These must have been coming straight at us. . . . I tried to picture to myself the thought and feelings of a medieval observer, however rational or cool-headed he might have been, in presence of that star shower; and when I thought of the terror with which he had a right to regard it, and the fantastic explanation which he had a right to put upon it, I thanked astronomers for having 'delivered us by science from one more object of dread.'"<sup>1</sup>

The negroes often show signs of abject terror at the sight of falling stars, and implore God to save them from destruction;<sup>2</sup> and it will be remembered that this catastrophic phenomenon is frequently employed in the Bible as an apocalyptic and eschatological symbol of disaster and approaching judgment: "The stars of heaven fell unto the earth as a fig-tree casteth her unripe figs" (Rev. vi. 13; so Isa. xxxiv. 4; Matt. xxiv. 29). The Tarahumaris of Mexico scream with terror and think that the meteor is a dead sorcerer coming to kill someone who had injured him;<sup>3</sup> and in a way curiously similar, an Australian tribe hold it to be a *kundri* or medicine-man flying through the air, and dropping his fire-stick to kill somebody,<sup>4</sup> and the Mohammedans conceive that the *shibáb* or shooting star is a firebrand hurled by the angels at the devils who listen at the gates of heaven to discover its secrets; and on seeing it they exclaim, "May God transfix the enemy of the faith!" (Eblis).<sup>5</sup>

As we might expect, a phenomenon so mysterious and inexplicable as falling stars has in all countries aroused feelings of superstitious dread, as foreboding some calamity to the

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Charles Kingsley*, 1877, ii. 240.

<sup>2</sup> *Victoria Inst. Trans.*, i. 422.

<sup>3</sup> C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, i. 324.

<sup>4</sup> Howitt, *N. Tribes of S.E. Australia*, 429.

<sup>5</sup> Lane, *Thousand and One Nights*, i. 29, 59; *Koran*, sur. iii. 31; xxxvii. 7.



human race in the shape of pestilence, war, or drought. The Hindus believe that it betokens the death of the Rajah of a country,<sup>1</sup> as, indeed, they observed in the case of Queen Victoria. The same notion prevailed formerly in England. Shakespeare says of the downfall of Richard II., that when

“Meteors fright the fixed stars of heaven, . . .  
 Lean-look’d prophets whisper fearful change. . . .  
 These signs forerun the death or fall of kings. . . .  
 I see thy glory like a shooting star  
 Fall to the base earth from the firmament.”<sup>2</sup>

The Spartan had the same belief that it was an evidence that the gods were manifesting their displeasure with some earthly ruler.

In Welsh folklore a falling star threatens death to one of the inmates of the house over which it falls.<sup>3</sup> Almost always the appearance is believed to indicate some event or catastrophe in the world of spirits.

The Hindu belief, shared by some of the Australian tribes, is that the descending stars are spirits coming down as sparks of fire to take rebirth and animate men’s bodies. Sometimes they are outcasts from heaven. The Provençal shepherds think that they are “the souls which the Great God does not want to keep with Him.”<sup>4</sup> Generally, falling stars are considered, as in this instance, to have a malign and sinister significance. The German peasant thinks them so ominous that he averts their evil influence by saying the Lord’s Prayer, no doubt laying emphasis on the clause, “Deliver us from the Evil (One).”<sup>5</sup> The Andaman, Baronga, and other uncivilised peoples are consternated at the flashing of these meteors from the sky, as an omen of evil. The Esthonians and Norsemen alike regard them as little dragons or wicked spirits flitting through the air; while the Provençals call a shooting star *serp-roulanto*,

<sup>1</sup> *Vasáh Sanghata* (on Hindu astrology).

<sup>2</sup> *Richard II.*, ii. 4, 9 *seq.* and 19, 20.

<sup>3</sup> M. Trevelyan, *Folklore of Wales*, 42.

<sup>4</sup> A. Daudet, *Lettres de mon Moulin*, 61.

<sup>5</sup> Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, 722, 1801.

a flying serpent or dragon.<sup>1</sup> In Vedic India it was believed to be the incarnation of a demon, and was warded off with certain incantations.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, in the Zend-Avesta the Pairikas, or demons in the shape of "worm-stars" [snake-stars or shooting stars], fly between the earth and the heavens.<sup>3</sup> For the Mordvines, a Finnish tribe, these meteors are serpents of fire; for the modern Greeks they are manifestations of the *telonia*, or toll-exacting demons, which arrest the souls of sinners in their upward flight.<sup>4</sup>

The instances just given, showing how frequently the falling star came to be associated with the spirit of evil, will serve as a point of transition to our immediate subject for which they were adduced. But we turn aside for a moment to notice a very remarkable nature-myth of a primitive people, which bears a curious resemblance to the Hebrew tradition.

It is a story which the Ainus tell of "how the Serpent came down from Heaven." When the Creator determined that the goddess of fire should descend from heaven to be the governor of this world, the serpent resolved to bear her company. He came down with her in a flash of lightning, and here he has been ever since. "This serpent, descending as he did in the lightning, came down with such mighty force that his fall [evidently conceived as that of an aerolite] made a large hole in the ground. Even at this present day some of his offspring who were left behind in heaven [meteors] and have a longing to visit their father, likewise descend in lightning, and the force of their fall also makes holes in the ground. These holes, when known to exist, should by no means be approached, for they lead down to Hades, which is now believed to be the true home of the serpent kind. The original father-snake has his place there, and there reigns as king over all his tribe."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Notes and Queries*, 11 S., i. 383.

<sup>2</sup> Oldenberg, *Religion des Vedas*, 267.

<sup>3</sup> Ed. Darmesteter, ii. 95.

<sup>4</sup> M. Müller, *Contributions to Mythology*, 252; J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore*, 286.

<sup>5</sup> J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folklore*, p. 358.



The evil spirits of the Assyrians may be compared, the creation of hell, which as great worms are let loose from heaven and fall with the waters of the sky.<sup>1</sup> In the cosmogony of Pherecydes of Syros, of Phœnician (Semitic) origin, the Seven Evil Spirits, sons of Anu the Sky-god, in the beginning sought to bring confusion into the regular order of the movements of the stars, established by Marduk the Creator, by impeding them in their course. These rebels of disorder under the leadership of Ophioneus, the ancient Serpent, made an assault on Sin, the Moon-god, who was leader of their harmonious order. But Marduk, as champion of the gods, delivers Sin, and hurls the Seven Sons of Anu into the abyss.<sup>2</sup> Later writers say that the god of heaven struck down Ophioneus with a thunderbolt; and Origen compares the downfall of Hephæstus in Homer "hurled headlong from the ethereal height,"<sup>3</sup> adding that Zeus "banishes any of the gods who became disorderly" to Tartaros, which lies beneath the ocean.<sup>4</sup>

These seven disorderly spirits which dart forth from heaven as lightnings may very well be intended for the meteors which "fright the fixed stars of heaven," or less probably the planets or "wandering" stars in their apparently retrograde movement from west to east, which were thus, in Zoroastrian belief, at enmity with the fixed stars. I suggest, too, that we may find here the original *motif* of an extremely curious, but unfortunately fragmentary, poem, preserved in a Babylonian tablet, which has been called "The Revolt in Heaven."<sup>5</sup> While the host of heaven, it records, were assembled and were all engaged in singing hymns of praise to the Creator (the harmony of the spheres), suddenly some evil spirit gave the signal of revolt. Instead of hymns burst forth loud curses and imprecations on their Creator. In his wrath he sounded a loud blast of the trumpet, and drove them from his presence never to return.

<sup>1</sup> Maspero, *Hist. Ancienne, Assyrie*, 231.

<sup>2</sup> Lenormant, *Beginnings of History*, 545.

<sup>3</sup> *Iliad*, i. 590; Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, 463.

<sup>4</sup> *Contra Cels.*, bk. vi. ch. xlii.

<sup>5</sup> *Records of the Past*, 1st ser., vii. 123.

Traces of this ancient belief in a rebellion of a portion of the host of heaven against the Supreme Deity are found in other Babylonian documents. The Tablet of the Seven Evil Spirits has the following reference :

In the first days the evil gods  
The angels who were in rebellion  
Who in the lower part of heaven had been created  
. . . . Caused their evil work  
Devising with wicked heads.<sup>1</sup>

The punishment of these rebel spirits, who had sided with Tiamât, primordial Chaos, by the good Creator Marduk, is also described :

They bear their sin, they are kept in bondage. . . .  
He fettered and laid the yoke on his foes. . . .  
Over the gods in bondage he strengthened his watch.<sup>2</sup>

And their nature as fallen stars is suggested in the lines :

Like lightning they darted  
Descending to the abyss of waters.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, the Book of Enoch asserts that some of the stars become lightnings, *i.e.* shooting stars (ch. xlv.).

The earliest mention of a "war in heaven," in which a rebellious spirit of evil conceives the unlawful ambition of raising himself to the supremacy of heaven, occurs in the mythology of the Sumerian Babylonians. A bird-like<sup>4</sup> monster, called Zû, "the Subtle One," originally a personification of the baneful south wind, plays the part of "a kind of arch-Satan"<sup>5</sup>—"Zû, the worker of evil, who raised the head of evil." He "conceives in his heart the desire to be Bêl," the chief deity, and revolts against his authority. To accomplish his purpose, he appropriates and carries away "the Tablets of Destiny," which give him control of the laws of

<sup>1</sup> G. Smith, *Chald. Genesis*, 106 ; *Assyr. Discoveries*, 398.

<sup>2</sup> Sayce, *Higher Crit. and Monuments*, 68, 69.

<sup>3</sup> G. Smith, *Assyr. Discoveries*, 399.

<sup>4</sup> So a bird is a symbol of Satan in Matt. xiii. 4, 19, and with the Yezidis.

<sup>5</sup> Jastrow, *Rel. of Babylonia*, 538.



Nature on which the order of the world depends. Thus aiming at the sovereignty of the skies, he says :

“ I will take the Tablets of the gods,  
And I will direct the oracles of the gods.  
I will establish my throne and dispense my commands,  
I will rule all the Spirits of Heaven.”<sup>1</sup>

Vanquished, however, and overthrown by Marduk, the god of light, he swoops down to the earth in a tempest with the gleam of lightning, and imparts to men forbidden knowledge which he had stolen from the gods.

An obscure allusion to a similar revolt in heaven against the Creator and Sun-god occurs in the Egyptian Papyrus of Ani: “ O Rā . . . Thine enemy the serpent-fiend Sebau hath fallen down headlong; his arms have been bound in chains; and the sons of impotent revolt shall never more rise up against thee.”<sup>2</sup> Dr Petrie refers to an Egyptian work (B.C. 500), the *Korê Kosmou* (Virgin of the World), as giving a long account of the creation of souls and their rebellion, before the world was made.<sup>3</sup> Still more explicit was the Old Persian belief :

Headlong down from heaven fell he,  
He of demons the most lying,  
Angra Mainyu many-slaying.<sup>4</sup>

To the Semites, as to every other people, the striking phenomenon of falling stars was an object of awe and veneration,<sup>5</sup> and was invested by them with a religious significance. It was a cosmic drama of celestial denizens being cast out of heaven, enacted before men's eyes in the vault of the sky. The appearance of a star—the very symbol of constancy and immutability—suddenly abandoning its post, its “ first estate,” as Jude (6) expresses it, in defiance of all the laws of heaven,

<sup>1</sup> L. W. King, *Babylonian Rel.*, 193; Jastrow, 538; Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, 293–299.

<sup>2</sup> Budge, *Egyptian Rel.*, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> *Egypt and Israel*, 135.

<sup>4</sup> *Zend-Avesta, Yasht*, iii. 13 (Moulton).

<sup>5</sup> To the Jewish Rabbis the appearance remained mysterious and inexplicable. “ Known to me are the ways of heaven,” says Rabbi Samuel, “ but what a falling star is, that I know not ” (Schiaparelli, *Astronomy in the Old Testament*, 128).

and plunging into the abyss of darkness, could not be witnessed without deep and solemn emotions. It was the visible downfall of a bright angel, nothing less than the apostasy of one of the heavenly host which the Lord of Sabaoth in his anger was hurling down to Tartaros. It was a manifestation of evil, which began in rebellion and was terribly punished. If many of these fiery descents occurred simultaneously, then the lawless one who began the rebellion had partners in his wickedness. It was Satan and his angels raining from heaven,

Io vidi piu di mille . . .  
da' ciel piovuti,<sup>1</sup>

The Book of Enoch makes this distinction between "the one star" and "the many stars which fell from heaven and were thrown from heaven near that first star"; and "that star which had first fallen from heaven an archangel took, and bound it hand and foot and put it in an abyss, deep and dark and terrible."<sup>2</sup> The being referred to in this passage is Azāzēl, the leader of the evil demons, which in the Apocalypse of St John is identified with Satan: "I saw a star from heaven fallen into the earth, and there was given to him the key of the pit of the abyss";<sup>3</sup> and again more fully: "The great dragon was cast down, the old serpent that is called the Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world, he was cast down to the earth, and his angels were cast down with him."<sup>4</sup>

As the orderly stars which kept their first estate were the good angels, so the lawless star, which broke away and transgressed from the path of right, was the apostate and fallen Satan, the first to do evil.<sup>5</sup> George Meredith well brings out

<sup>1</sup> Dante, *Inferno*, viii. 83.

"Lucifer, with guilt of pryde,  
And all that held with him that tyde . . .  
They fell from heaven to hell pitt  
As thick as hayle in thunder lights."

MERLINE, ll. 568-575, *Percy Fol. MS.*, i. 440.

<sup>2</sup> Chs. lxxxvi. 1, 3, and lxxxviii. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Rev. ix. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Rev. xii. 9.

<sup>5</sup> An analogous conception is the Vedic *nirriti*, that which is contrary to *ritā*, the orderly course of nature, transgression personified as a power of evil. M. Müller, *Rig-Veda-Sanhita*, i. 72.



this aspect of the Fallen One as the Lord of Disorder in his sonnet, "Lucifer in Starlight":

"With memory of the old revolt from Awe  
He reached a middle height, and at the stars,  
Which are the brain of heaven, he looked, and sank.  
Around the ancient track marched rank on rank  
The army of unalterable law."

That the natural phenomenon of the skies was highly suggestive of the angelic overthrow has not escaped the poets.<sup>1</sup> Archbishop Trench, in a quatrain entitled "Falling Stars," represents them as saying:

"Angels are we, who once from heaven exiled,  
Would climb its crystal battlements again;  
But have thus keen-eyed watchers not beguiled,  
Hurled by their glittering lances back again."<sup>2</sup>

Milton similarly finds an apt simile for the swift descent of Satan in the fall of Mulciber:

"How he fell  
From heaven they fabled, thrown by angry Jove,  
Sheer o'er the crystal battlements: and . . .  
Dropp'd from the zenith like a falling star."<sup>3</sup>

And the angel Uriel came gliding through the even

"Swift as a shooting star  
In autumn thwarts the night."<sup>4</sup>

Christ Himself, it will be remembered, so far complied with the current belief of His time as to envisage the casting down of Satan at a later day under imagery very similar to the precipitation of a falling star, when He compared it to a bright flash of lightning darting from the sky: "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven" (Luke x. 17). A medieval tradition that the rebel angel, before the Lord cast

<sup>1</sup> A Mohammedan tradition tells of the beautiful temptress Zuhra (Venus), who seduced the angels into sin, that she was changed into a shooting star and then annihilated (E. Sell, *Faith of Islam*, 143). Burns similarly feigned that the sight of a falling star would strike terror into the devil:

"Ae dreary, windy, wintry night,  
The stars shot down wi' sklentín light,  
Wi' you, mysel, I gat a fright."

*Address to the Deil*, ll. 37-39.

<sup>2</sup> *Poems*, p. 222 (ed. 1865).

<sup>3</sup> *Paradise Lost*, i. 740-746.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, iv. 556.

him down headlong, was one of the Seraphim,<sup>1</sup> seems to have been founded upon this passage, as the word *seraph* meant originally a fiery serpent, and became a personification of the snake-like lightning twisting and turning in its earthward flight<sup>2</sup>—a conception shared by the Ainus as we have seen, the American Indians, and other primitive tribes.<sup>3</sup>

We have here also, I suspect, the explanation of a quaint Rabbinic story, that when the evil spirit Sammael or Satan descended to tempt Eve he came “riding upon the serpent,”<sup>4</sup> the probable meaning being that he made the lightning his vehicle. Other parallels are not wanting. Azi Dahâka, “the fiendish snake” in the Zend-Avesta, is the mythical personification of the serpentine lightning issuing from the dark storm-cloud.<sup>5</sup> In a Babylonian incantation against an evil spirit of disease, “like lightning it flasheth . . . like a star of heaven it flasheth down”;<sup>6</sup> and it is interesting to find a modern Arab at Nippur, the most ancient site of Babylonian worship, being frightened at a flash of lightning as the descent of an evil spirit of the air, and trying to charm it away by reading passages from the Koran.<sup>7</sup> It is curious, moreover, to note with what unanimity men everywhere have regarded lightning as the instrument of the devil’s punishment.

The Seneca Indians say that the evil spirit was like a great serpent as long as twenty arrow-flights. When Hinun, the spirit that rules the clouds and air, found him, he struck him with lightning and killed him.<sup>8</sup> The modern Greek, on seeing a flash, exclaims, “He [God] has burnt up some devil!”<sup>9</sup> and the Welsh folk sometimes say that thunder is caused by His

<sup>1</sup> Thoms, *Early English Prose Romances*, iii. 184.

<sup>2</sup> See my article “What were the Seraphim?” in *The Nineteenth Century*, October 1909, pp. 691, *seqq.*

<sup>3</sup> G. de Rialle, *Myth. Comparée*, 317, 322; Brinton, *Myths of New World*, 134.

<sup>4</sup> R. Eliezer, *Capitula*, xiii.; Maimonides, *More Nevochim*, ii.; Buxtorf, *Lex*, 749.

<sup>5</sup> *Avesta*, i. p. lxxiii.; ii. 60, n. 2 (ed. Darmesteter).

<sup>6</sup> Pinches, *Old Testament and Assyrian Records*, 55.

<sup>7</sup> J. P. Peters, *Nippur*, ii. 75.

<sup>8</sup> M. C. Judd, *Wigwam Stories*, 128.

<sup>9</sup> J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore*, 73.



pursuing the Evil One and dashing him down to the underworld.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the Indian Bhrigu, the Lightning, the Fire-god, was believed to have been hurled into Tartaros for pride and insurrection against Zeus.<sup>2</sup> A curious reminiscence of this casting down of Satan survives in the popular belief that, like Hephaistos and Vulcan, he is lame. Thus the Finnish name for the Devil is Lempo, *i.e.* "the Lame" or "Limping One," the German *hinke-bein*, lame-leg; Esthonian *lämp-jalg*, lame-foot; French *diable boiteux*.

A popular misunderstanding, arising out of an early but too literal interpretation of a fine poetical passage in the Book of Isaiah, led to the identification of Satan, as a fallen luminary, with one particular star, the planet Venus. The prophet of the exile, exulting over the humiliating overthrow of the King of Babylon, when in his overweening pride he had exalted himself to the height of heaven, compares it to the downfall of the bright morning star as it sinks from its pride of place in the sky to be extinguished in the darkness of the under-world:

"How art thou fallen from heaven, O Day-star, son of the morning!

How art thou cut down to the ground, which didst lay low the nations!

And thou saidst in thy heart, I will ascend into heaven,

I will exalt my throne above the stars of God;

And I will sit upon the Mount of Assembly in the uttermost parts of the north:

I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High;

Yet thou shalt be brought down to Sheól [Hades], to the uttermost parts of the pit."<sup>3</sup>

The imagery of the nature-myth suggested here seems to be taken from the fading of the stars at sunrise—"rediens fugat astra Phœbus"<sup>4</sup>—combined with the falling of meteors. *Hêlel*, "the Bright One," *i.e.* the Morning Star, which in the LXX. appears as *Heôsphoros*, "the Dawn-bringer"—"fairest of the stars that are set in Heaven," *Iliad*, xxi. 317—in the

<sup>1</sup> M. Trevelyan, *Folklore of Wales*, 42-3. "The Apostate Serpent" is the Greek rendering of "the fleeing serpent"—Job xxvi. 13, which God slays in the sky (? the lightning).

<sup>2</sup> Goldziher, *Myth of the Hebrews*, 373.

<sup>3</sup> Isa. xiv. 12-15.

<sup>4</sup> Horace, *Odes*, iii. 21, 24.

Vulgate, *Lucifer*, "the Light-bringer,"<sup>1</sup> is personified as the rebel of the skies. Become too ambitious, the brilliant star of the early dawn thinks to retain its pre-eminence when the Sun, the Most High (*Elion*) has risen, and dares to dispute his sovereignty; but utterly vanquished he fades into invisibility, like a falling star cast down into darkness, in the more potent splendour of the King of Heaven.

"Thou, infernal serpent, shalt not long  
Rule in the clouds; like an autumnal star,  
Or lightning, thou shalt fall from heaven."<sup>2</sup>

Ishtar (Astarte), who is also the morning star, is represented on a cylinder seal with expanded wings and beams of light hovering above the mountains when Shamash, the Sun, is on the horizon; and in later accounts she is said to have descended in the form of a fiery star.<sup>3</sup> It is interesting, too, to note, as illustrating the personifying of the day star, that on the Blacas Krater stars setting at sunrise are depicted as so many youths casting themselves down head-foremost from a height,<sup>4</sup> as Hêlél is represented in Isaiah (xiv.).<sup>5</sup> A similar phenomenal metaphor for the downcome of the Assyrian king occurs later in this same chapter, when he is called a "fiery flying serpent" (*Saraph*, v. 29), *i.e.* the lightning striking downwards; and in Ezekiel (xxviii. 12-18) the overthrow of the king of Tyre is figured as the casting-down of a luminary who once dwelt in the northern region of the sky, where is the Holy Mount of God, amidst the thunderbolts ("stones of fire") and lightnings. A spectacle to all eyes, he fell pre-

<sup>1</sup> Old English *Ligber*, "light-bringer"; Breton, *Loquifer la grand* (Villemarqué). See Schiaparelli, *Astronomy in the Old Testament*, 48. The Arabs worship the morning star as a deity (W. R. Smith, *Semites*, 57, 264-5). The Babylonian Ishtar, who descended into Aralu (Hell), was identified with the morning star.

<sup>2</sup> Milton, *Paradise Regained*, iv. 618-620.

<sup>3</sup> L. W. King, *Bab. Rel.*, 182; W. R. Smith, *Semites*, 159, n. 5.

<sup>4</sup> H. B. Walters, *History of Ancient Pottery*, ii. 78, pl. 53.

<sup>5</sup> "*Beni Helal*," "Sons of Lucifer" (or the Morning Star), is the name which the modern Arabs give to the evil giants to whom all colossal works in stone are attributed (C. M. Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 388), just as in England dykes and prehistoric erections are ascribed to the Devil.



cipitously, consumed to ashes and lost to sight for ever. Tertullian, commenting on this, says, "Thus Satan also fell from the height of heaven and was cast down like lightning, dwelling no longer amidst the stones of fire and the glittering rays of the burning stars."<sup>1</sup>

The earliest writing which interprets the passage in Isaiah as referring to Satan seems to be the Slavonic *Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, which says, "Satanail would make his throne higher than the clouds and be equal to the Most High, and was hurled from the heights with his angels . . . and he was flying in the air continually above the abyss" (xxix. 4; first century A.D.). Justin Martyr, a little later, interprets the passage in Isaiah as referring to Satan, and suggests that Homer had it in mind when he wrote in the *Iliad* of the casting down of Atê (Mischief) by Zeus:<sup>2</sup>

"Then Atê by the glossy locks he seized  
In mighty wrath; and swore a solemn oath,  
That to Olympus and the starry Heaven  
She never should return, who all misleads.  
His arm then whirling, from the starry Heaven  
He flung her down, to vex the affairs of men."<sup>3</sup>

Remembering how apt the ancient Hebrews were to associate the angels with stellar phenomena, we can readily understand that the marvellous spectacle presented when stars fall headlong from the midnight sky would inevitably suggest

<sup>1</sup> *Adv. Marcion*, ii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Address to Greeks*, ch. xxviii.

<sup>3</sup> *Iliad*, xix. 126-131 (Lord Derby). Still closer is the parallel in the down-casting of Hephæstus (*Iliad*, i. 590-4), and the lines (*Iliad*, viii. 10-16) spoken by Zeus:

"Whomsoever of the gods I shall perceive  
Apart conspiring, on him I shall lay hold  
And hurl to gloomy Tartaros far hence,  
Where lies the deep abyss beneath the earth."

So Phaethon, "The Shining One," was hurled down like a shooting star for presuming to take the place of the Sun-god:

"But Phaëthon, while flames his golden locks  
Consume, down headlong plunged, and left behind  
Long trail of light, as sometimes in the sky  
Serene, a star, although it falls not, seems  
To fall." OVID, *Met.* ii. 319-322.

Cf. also Menætiſ in Hesiod, *Theog.*, 507-520.

the casting down of Satan and his angels out of heaven. And one circumstance would doubtless tend powerfully to confirm them in their belief—the observed fact that these falling meteors almost invariably issued forth from the vicinity of the North Pole. They have their radiant or point of departure in the constellations Leo, Perseus, and Andromeda. It is well known that the circumpolar stars represented the powers of evil and darkness; and that the North was believed to be the peculiar region of Satan, where he had his habitation. There the huge constellation of the Serpent (*Nachash*), of sinister meaning, wound around the Pole, between the Great and Lesser Bears. “In the North,” says a Jewish writer, “demons, earthquakes, evil spirits, and Sheddim dwell, and thence they come forth to the world, as it is said, ‘out of the north evil shall break forth’ (Jer. i. 14).”<sup>1</sup>

From that quarter it was, according to the Phœnician account, that Baal Tsephon, “the Lord of the North,” having the form of a serpent, cast himself from heaven down to earth in the semblance of an aerolite or thunderbolt. And it was in the north, as we have seen, that Lucifer

—“So by allusion call’d  
Of that bright star to Satan paragon’d”—<sup>2</sup>

attempted to set up his throne before he was sent hurtling to the nether-world. There is, indeed, no natural phenomenon under which the downfall and judgment of the Evil Spirit for his rebellion in heaven could be more fittingly envisaged than that of a falling star. The once Bright One cast down into darkness.

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<sup>1</sup> *Chronicle of Jerahmeel*, (twelfth century), i. 7 (ed. Gaster.) The old serpent which guards the North Pole was conceived as coming down to earth in one of the shooting stars which emanates from that point, and is identified with Ophiôn, the serpent demon, which was struck down by Zeus with a thunderbolt.

<sup>2</sup> *Paradise Lost*, x. 426.



## OCCASION AND OBJECT OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

THE REV. JAMES DRUMMOND, D.LITT., LL.D.

AMONG the Pauline Epistles that to the Romans occupies a place apart. It is addressed to a church which Paul had never visited. It consequently has a greater resemblance to a treatise than those which are addressed to familiar friends. Even if we accept Deissmann's dictum that letters are not literature, we may be inclined to make an exception of this elaborate composition; for though it is undoubtedly a letter, it pursues through the greater part of its contents a single theme, which is laid out in clear and carefully planned divisions. For this reason its occasion and object are not so obvious as in the case of other Epistles; and though the question has frequently been brought under critical discussion, a fresh survey of some of the grounds of judgment may prove not to be devoid of interest.

The Reformers and their successors in Germany cared little for the historical conditions under which the letter may have been written, and looked upon it as a systematic exposition of Christian truth. Baur rendered the great service of recalling attention to the circumstances of the time, and seeking an historical occasion for the composition and the contents of the Epistle. In accordance with the whole Tübingen hypothesis, he thought it was a contribution to the great controversy between Jewish and Pauline Christianity. He was thus led to the conclusion that the Church was composed mainly of

Jewish Christians, who were opposed to Pauline universalism, though the controversy had reached a less acute stage than we find in the letters to the Galatians and the Corinthians. This conclusion makes it necessary to explain away the clear evidence afforded by particular passages that the Church consisted mainly of Gentile Christians, who were in sympathy with Paul, and only required to be confirmed in their faith.<sup>1</sup> These two main directions of opinion led to various combinations, on which it is not necessary to dwell; and we may at once proceed to examine the indications of its object which are presented by the Epistle itself.

Before we go into detail, it seems quite clear that the course of the letter is largely determined by the circumstances of the time, and that, if Paul were writing now, his exposition would assume a very different form. A large part of the argument is a polemic against the saving efficacy of the law, or deals with the relations between law and faith; and though it enters with wonderful insight into the spiritual psychology of the universal human soul, it does so in connection with a controversy that has passed away. It also endeavours to show that the gospel stood in the direct line of the history of the Israelites; and though it rejected Jewish pretensions, and left the mass of the Jewish nation outside, it did not deny the fundamental truths of the Old Testament, but, on the contrary, marked the spiritual line of their continuity and development. All this would undoubtedly possess a strong and immediate interest for Jewish Christians; but whether it might not be equally interesting to Gentile Christians, whether it might not even be needed by them either as a warning against Judaising influences or as a correction of one-sided anti-Judaic tendencies, depends on the manner of its statement and the reasons which appear to have guided the writer in presenting it. The assumption that Gentile Chris-

<sup>1</sup> See especially Rom. i. 5, 6, 13-15; xi. 13; vi. 19; i. 8, 11, 12; and the general tone of other passages which assume a full concurrence in the Pauline gospel, and even a possible danger of misusing the freedom which it claimed.



tians knew and cared nothing about the Old Testament and Judaism, that they were in no danger of extreme views, on the one side or the other, in regard to them, and that the great battle which their own Apostle waged on their behalf never attracted their attention, is, in my opinion, as improbable as it is baseless. Though the truth of this statement does not perhaps seriously affect our main discussion, it may be well to subjoin the evidence on which it rests.

From the earliest times in which we have distinct historical information down to our own day the Old Testament has been a part of the sacred canon of Christendom. The fathers were as familiar with the ancient Scriptures as with the new, and attached to them the same Divine authority; and those who, like Marcion, spurned all dependence upon Judaism were scouted as heretics. The teachings of the Prophets took a prominent place in the conversion of the heathen. Justin Martyr, notwithstanding his contempt for the Jews, sums up Christianity as the things learned "from Christ and the Prophets that went before him";<sup>1</sup> and he finds the "greatest and truest demonstration" of the gospel in the predictions of the Prophets.<sup>2</sup> His disciple Tatian was first led to Christianity by his happening to read "certain barbaric writings, older than the doctrines of the Greeks, and more divine than their error."<sup>3</sup> Athenagoras, if he does not say that he was indebted for his own conversion to the Prophets, appeals to them as affording an irrefutable proof of Christianity, and adopts the extremest view of their inspiration.<sup>4</sup> Theophilus of Antioch owed his conversion, at least in part, to his having met with the "sacred writings of the holy Prophets," whose predictive power established his faith.<sup>5</sup> Clemens Alexandrinus summons the Greeks from Helicon and Cithæron and the poets to the "holy mount of God and the holy prophetic band," and declares that the Saviour converts those who have ears "through the all-wise Moses, and the

<sup>1</sup> *Apol.*, i. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 31 *seq.*; and see *Dial.*, 7, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Orat. ad Græcos*, 29.

<sup>4</sup> *Supplicatio pro Christ.*, 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ad Autol.*, i. 14.

truth-loving Isaiah, and the whole prophetic band.”<sup>1</sup> If this was the practice and the language of Gentiles at a time when the Gentile church had fully entered on its independent career, and had adopted its own methods of appealing to its own compatriots, are we to suppose that at a time when it was still necessarily dependent on Jewish teachers, and when some of its most fundamental doctrines, such as the unity of God and the administration of the world by his righteous will, could hardly be thought of except as the traditional dogmas of Judaism, it totally ignored the Old Testament, and passed into an unwritten Christianity, detached from all its historical antecedents, and careless of its earthly cradle as some foundling washed up by the ocean from an unknown wreck, as though it was not confronted on every side by the Judaism out of whose soil it sprung,—that Judaism which was still potent, though politically subject, through its unviolated national unity and the fervour of its national hopes, with its ritual still untarnished, bringing together as to a Divine centre the aspiration of the devout, the enthusiasm of the fanatical, the wealth of the rich, with its ramifications extending into every part of the Roman empire, and testifying in its countless synagogues against the surrounding idolatry, with its varied, long and wonderful history, with its ancient promises, its sublime law, its hymns that touched every chord of the human heart, its prophets’ inspired call to righteousness and truth and glowing anticipations of a glory yet to come? Such a supposition I cannot but think too extravagant for credence. The essential doctrine of the Messiahship of Jesus could not be made intelligible without reference to Jewish expectations, or established without an appeal to the Jewish Scriptures; and it is most probable that the early Jewish, like the later Gentile, teachers approached the world holding in their hands an open Bible, which, however they might receive it in the spirit and not in the letter, they regarded as “the oracles of God,”<sup>2</sup> and handed on as the most precious heirloom to the Church which

<sup>1</sup> *Cohort. ad Gentes*, c. i. pp. 3 and 8, Potter.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. iii. 2.



was in their eyes the true spiritual posterity of Abraham. Accordingly, Paul himself, in writing to Gentile churches, does not hesitate to quote the Old Testament, whenever occasion serves, and to assume their familiarity with, and their reverence for, its contents.<sup>1</sup> If it be said that in such cases the disciples had been tampered with by Judaisers, and therefore required a Judaic argument, still we have an example of the ease with which this great traditional authority could fling its impressive shadow across the dawning light of Christianity; and where shall we so readily find the source of its influence as in those very scriptures which Paul, no less than Judaisers, revered as the word of God, and which, with his own interpretations, he had placed in the hands of his Gentile converts? I think, therefore, that the assumption that the members of Gentile churches were familiar with the Old Testament, and felt an interest in the fortunes of Judaism and in its relation to Christianity, and that this was an inevitable result of their Christian training, is not only intrinsically probable, but rests upon sufficient evidence to entitle it to our belief.

If the foregoing remarks be correct, it follows that whether Paul desired to convert Judaisers, or to confirm and clear the faith of Pauline Jews, or to strengthen and balance the convictions of Gentile believers, or to repel the attacks of Jewish zealots on a Gentile church, must be determined, not by the general subject of his treatise, but by its special character and tone. In judging of these we may usefully compare the Epistle with that to the Galatians, to which, by the tenor of its argument, it is most nearly related, and in contrast with which its peculiarities will be more distinctly seen. We must remember that the Epistle to the Galatians is addressed to a group of Gentile churches which had been suddenly and strongly influenced by an inroad of Judaising doctrine. The following points deserve particular attention:—

1. In Galatians Paul addresses his readers with coldness,

<sup>1</sup> See especially Gal. iii., iv.; 1 Cor. x. 6, 11; 2 Cor. iii.

almost with asperity. He writes simply "to the churches of Galatia,"<sup>1</sup> and expresses his astonishment that they are so quickly removing from him who called them in the grace of Christ;<sup>2</sup> but in Romans the readers are "called of Jesus Christ," "beloved of God, saints that have been called," and the Apostle thanks God that their faith is reported in all the world.<sup>3</sup> In both Epistles, Paul expresses a wish to be amongst his readers; but how different the tone! To the Galatians he says: "My children, with whom I am travelling again until Christ be formed in you—but I should like to be present with you now, and to change my voice, because I am perplexed in your case."<sup>4</sup> But to the Romans he says that it was his continual prayer to be allowed to visit them, "for I am longing to see you, that I may communicate to you some spiritual gift of grace with a view to your being confirmed—that is, to be comforted together amongst you, each of us by the other's faith, both yours and mine";<sup>5</sup> and his desire is, when his troubles in the east are over, to come and have rest with them.<sup>6</sup>

2. We have next to inquire whether there are any indications that the Epistles were called forth by particular and pressing wants in the churches. In regard to Galatians there is no uncertainty. The disciples were going over into a different gospel, and certain persons were troubling them.<sup>7</sup> Someone had bewitched them, so that their conduct was marked by folly.<sup>8</sup> They were turning back to weak and beggarly elements, and observing special seasons.<sup>9</sup> They were courted by a party, to their disadvantage.<sup>10</sup> They were submitting to be circumcised, and seeking to be justified by the law,<sup>11</sup> and prevented by some evil leaven from obeying the truth.<sup>12</sup> Equally plain indications occur in the letters to the Corinthians; with this difference, however, that there several questions are dealt with. Analogy would lead us to expect

<sup>1</sup> i. 2.<sup>2</sup> i. 6.<sup>3</sup> i. 6-8.<sup>4</sup> iv. 19, 20.<sup>5</sup> i. 10-12.<sup>6</sup> xv. 32.<sup>7</sup> i. 6, 7; v. 12.<sup>8</sup> iii. 1.<sup>9</sup> iv. 9, 10.<sup>10</sup> iv. 17.<sup>11</sup> v. 2-4; vi. 12, 13.<sup>12</sup> v. 7-9.



similar appearances in Romans; but the mere existence of the problem which we are examining shows how completely the analogy breaks down, and how futile it is to appeal to it. The fact that it was written to a church which Paul had not visited, and which he did not personally know, is in itself as wide a departure from the analogy of Corinthians and Galatians as any that can be suggested. On every hypothesis this Epistle is unique, and must be judged by a standard of its own. But if we are to be influenced by the analogy of the other Epistles, the reasonable argument is surely this, that since in these Paul distinctly specifies the wants in the churches with which he proposes to deal, when he fails thus to specify he must be writing upon general grounds, and not with a view to particular needs of his readers. Now, the Epistle to the Romans is entirely without any statement such as we have found so abundantly in the short Epistle to the Galatians. It deals, indeed, with certain dangerous tendencies, but these are not presented in such a way as to suggest the motive for the whole composition. The threatened division of feeling between the strong and the weak<sup>1</sup> is postponed till the main argument, which it in no way affects, is over. The warning against the antinomian abuse of the doctrine of grace<sup>2</sup> comes in only as a necessary step in the development of the subject; and the same may be said of the advice to the Gentiles not to be overbearing towards the Jews.<sup>3</sup> We must observe, however, that these particular indications of the readers' requirements all point to a Gentile and Pauline church.

3. We have already seen that in Galatia there were men actually engaged in disturbing the churches and perverting the gospel; and these men are repeatedly alluded to.<sup>4</sup> We have nothing which properly answers to these allusions in Romans. Appeal may be made to iii. 8, "Some affirm that we say, Let us do evil that good may come." These "some" were, no doubt, ill-disposed towards Paul; but there is nothing

<sup>1</sup> xiv. 1 *sqq.*

<sup>2</sup> vi. 1 *sqq.*

<sup>3</sup> xi. 17 *sqq.*

<sup>4</sup> i. 7, 9; iv. 17; v. 10, 12; vi. 12.

to show that they were at Rome, that they had any influence on the church, or even that they were professing Christians. If it be said that "we" must include the readers, and that therefore the "some" must at least have been acquainted with the Romans, then we may remark once more that the readers must have been Pauline. But if the "we" be limited to Paul, in order to escape from this conclusion it becomes mere assumption to suppose that the "some" were endeavouring to injure Paul in Rome. It is quite as probable that Paul had heard this objection raised at different times, and that he had no one particularly in view. The only other passage that can be referred to in this connection is xvi. 17-20. The men here mentioned may have been already in Rome; but as Paul does not insert "among you," it seems likely that he either alludes to the probable arrival of such men, or that he has nothing in his mind beyond the possible presence of men of this low stamp in the Roman as in other churches. It is generally assumed that these people were bigoted Jewish Christians; but this notion rests wholly on extraneous considerations, and is not even suggested by anything in the passage itself. The "smooth and fair speech," and the words, "I would have you wise unto that which is good," remind one rather of showy and rhetorical Greeks, strutting about with airs of superior wisdom, and scoffing at the pure and simple morality of the Christian teachers as behind the age. Such Græculi in Rome, lovers of fine talk and good dinners, may very well, when they had failed elsewhere, have sought to impose on the guilelessness of the Christians. But however this may be, the passage is far too subordinate and parenthetical to allow us to suppose that these miserable creatures had the honour of calling forth the magnificent refutation contained in our Epistle.

4. In Galatians Paul has to vindicate his apostolic authority, evidently against the attacks of Judaisers. A large part of the first two chapters is devoted to this defence, with which we may compare 2 Corinthians in the tenth and following chapters. But in Romans, although the subject is alluded to, the polemi-



cal features are wholly wanting. Paul quietly assumes that he is an apostle to the Gentiles, and nowhere even implies that his title was called in question. What a contrast there is between the openings of the two Epistles! In the one a vehement assertion of his Divine, in opposition to a human, commission; in the other a quiet statement of his apostolic call. There is, however, one passage where Paul alludes at greater length to his missionary vocation.<sup>1</sup> It is where he excuses himself for having written so frankly to the Romans, on the ground that he was called to be a ministering priest for the Gentiles. In justification of this claim he briefly refers to the evidence afforded by his past labours. But not only is this statement exceedingly brief compared with the long and elaborate defence in the other epistles, but it contains no hint of any kind that it was intended to meet an attack, or even to allay a suspicion. It is simply the apology of a highly sensitive man, who feared that he might seem to be stepping a little beyond his province in giving such plain apostolic admonitions to a strange church, and who desired at the same time to explain how it was that he had been prevented from gratifying his long-cherished wish to visit it, and thus acquiring a nearer claim to its regard.

5. Throughout Galatians Paul is vindicating the gospel which he preached in contradistinction from a "different gospel,"<sup>2</sup> a phrase which occurs also in 2 Corinthians xi. 4. But in Romans I know of nothing which even suggests that he is defending his own view of the gospel against someone else's. He is set apart unto the "gospel of God."<sup>3</sup> He is not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone who has faith, both Jew and Greek.<sup>4</sup> He does not say, "the gospel which I, Paul, preach in opposition to Jewish Christianity," but, to all appearance, refers to the universal gospel, accepted by all Christians, Jews and Greeks alike, in opposition to Judaism and heathenism. And it is this latter antithesis that is maintained throughout the Epistle.

<sup>1</sup> xv. 15-21.<sup>2</sup> i. 6.<sup>3</sup> i. 1; xv. 16.<sup>4</sup> i. 16.

When, having reviewed the shortcomings of previous religions, he says, "But now apart from law God's righteousness has been made manifest," he seems to be laying down not a Pauline, but a Christian doctrine.<sup>1</sup> When he says, "We consider that man is justified by faith apart from works of law,"<sup>2</sup> there is nothing to show that he is not speaking in the name of universal Christendom; and the supposition that he is doing so is confirmed by his appeal to the same principle in Galatians as a thing equally known to Peter and himself.<sup>3</sup> So, again, he places Jewish and Gentile Christians together, making no distinction between them, but setting both over against the vessels of wrath.<sup>4</sup> He does, however, mention "my gospel," and this phrase might imply something special in his doctrine. But in ii. 16 the doctrine which is thus qualified is that "God will judge the secrets of men through Christ Jesus." It is the latter words alone which are marked by the phrase "according to my gospel"; and therefore the antithesis would seem to be between Christianity and other systems which equally taught a future Divine judgment. We have no reason to suppose that this form of Christian doctrine was peculiar to Paul, and at all events it has nothing to do with the controversy between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. It seems probable, therefore, that the "my" means no more than that the topic in question was one which entered frequently into Paul's preaching, and that no emphasis is to be laid upon it. Similarly in the doxology<sup>5</sup> the "my" is without emphasis, and, if there is any antithetic term, we must find it in "to him that is able to establish you." The words are an ascription of praise to him who alone could make his preaching successful.<sup>6</sup> We may fairly say, then, that, if the Epistle to the Romans stood alone, no one could suppose that there were two forms of the gospel, a Pauline and an anti-Pauline; and this is a most singular fact if the letter was intended to be a

<sup>1</sup> iii. 21.<sup>2</sup> iii. 28.<sup>3</sup> Gal. ii. 16.<sup>4</sup> ix. 23, 24.<sup>5</sup> xvi. 25.<sup>6</sup> Compare 2 Tim. ii. 8, the only other place where the phrase occurs, and where there can be no contrast with another gospel.



polemic against Jewish Christianity or to present in opposition to it, though in a conciliatory way, a higher doctrine.

6. It is only an extension of the foregoing remark to observe that the Epistle to the Romans contains no attack upon the conduct of Jewish Christians. In Galatians it is perfectly clear that the "other gospel" was preached by a Jewish-Christian faction, and that men of that class were the objects of Paul's animadversion.<sup>1</sup> In Romans whatever attack is made upon Jews is made upon the nation, and not upon the believing remnant.<sup>2</sup> If Jewish Christians are alluded to in xvi. 17-20, the Apostle has expressed himself with studied obscurity, and we cannot suppose that these few verses betray the secret object of his letter. The "weak" party of xiv. and xv. were to all appearance Jews, but there is no evidence that they were representatives of a distinctive Jewish Christianity which stood in opposition to Paulinism. On the contrary, Paul treats their scruples as a matter of perfect indifference, and in no way affecting their Christian standing. How different the gentle plea for mutual tolerance from the indignant rebuke and bitter sarcasm directed against the Jewish faction in Galatia! It is not too much to say that, if the Epistle to the Romans were our only witness, we should not know, except in the case of these innocent ascetics, that Jewish and Gentile Christianity were separated by any differences of doctrine and practice.

7. In Romans there is no intimation that the readers or any party among them boasted of their national descent as though it conferred superior privileges. But in Galatians it is clear from iii. 7 *sqq.* that the disturbers did so. In the parallel argument in Romans iv. the principal stress is laid, not on descent from Abraham, but on the fact that faith was Abraham's characteristic, and that faith like his must justify; and Jewish and Gentile Christians are conceived as alike walking by faith, and therefore standing together as Abraham's

<sup>1</sup> See especially ii. 11 *sqq.*, but the Epistle throughout bears an indubitable testimony.

<sup>2</sup> See ii. 17; iii. 1 *sqq.* 9; ix. 31 *sqq.*; x. 19 *sqq.*

true heirs, in opposition to οἱ ἐκ νόμου, who must in consequence be regarded primarily as unbelieving Jews. The argument of this chapter might no doubt be applied to a Judaising party, but it does not in itself betray the existence of such a party, but rather wears the appearance of a *Christian* answer to a *Jewish* attack.

8. In Galatians we find that the readers were not only in danger of falling away, but that many of them were actually falling away, not indeed from the profession of Christianity, but from the Pauline principle of faith.<sup>1</sup> In Romans no such danger is apparent. Paul, indeed, is anxious to "confirm" his readers, but there is nothing to limit this expression to a threatened lapse into legalism. In vii. 1-6 the law is treated as wholly dead and gone; and an immoral licence seems to be the evil of which Paul was most apprehensive.

9. But if the readers were Jews and observers of the law, there would of course be no question of their lapse. Is there, then, any allusion to their trust in the law? None whatever. In Galatians an undue respect for the law is plainly rebuked in passages already referred to; but in Romans, though Paul argues at length against the efficacy of the law, he never admonishes his readers as though they might be under it. In fact, he says explicitly that they are not under it.<sup>2</sup> We may also contrast the mixture of polemic with exhortation in the hortatory part of Galatians<sup>3</sup> with the peaceful flow of Romans xii. 1 *sqq.*

10. Further, there is not even any reference to the question whether Christians ought to place themselves under the law or not. This is the subject of the Epistle to the Galatians;<sup>4</sup> but though in Romans Paul uses similar arguments about the inadequacy of the law, we could never learn from it that there was any difference of opinion on the subject among Christians. The gospel stands over against Judaism, not a Pauline gospel against a Jewish-Christian gospel.

<sup>1</sup> i. 6; iii. 3; iv. 9, 10, 21; v. 1-8.

vi. 14.

<sup>3</sup> v. 1 *sqq.*

<sup>4</sup> See iv. 21; v. 2-4; and the Epistle generally.



11. Neither is there any allusion to the more limited question whether Christians ought to be circumcised. This was evidently a leading point with the Judaisers in Galatia.<sup>1</sup> Where in Romans the question of circumcision is touched upon, the argument is directed against unbelieving Jews.<sup>2</sup>

Now, when we consider all these facts together, it is surely the natural inference that Paul did not intend to maintain his own personal doctrine and practice in opposition to any other *Christian* doctrine and practice, but wished to defend what he believed to be the one gospel of God against those who rejected it altogether. No assumption of a conciliatory aim, no unworthy supposition that this ripest fruit of Paul's mind was not its purest,<sup>3</sup> will explain the total absence of direct reference to a controversy which imperilled the very existence of the church, an antagonism which threatened to make the western mission nugatory, if the Apostle really supposed that these things had extended their baleful influence to the Roman community. To him the question was one between the truth of the gospel and falling away from Christ;<sup>4</sup> and though he might properly abstain from using the language of expostulation in addressing a strange church, it would be more irritating than conciliatory, in the circumstances supposed, to speak throughout as if there were no fundamental difference of opinion between himself and his readers. But if the question of imposing the law on the Gentiles was settled, and the Roman antagonism to Paul rested on theocratic claims to superiority, we have not only to account for his curious failure to give any explicit intimation of his subject, but we have to explain why he devoted so large a space to proving the inferiority of the law to the gospel, and thus slaying the dead. I am therefore quite unable to see from the general tenor and mode of argument of the Epistle that the writer was combating the Jewish-Christian prejudices of his readers.

Must we, then, return to the old view that the letter is a

<sup>1</sup> See Gal. ii. 3; v. 2, 3, 6; vi. 12, 13, 15.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 25-29.

<sup>3</sup> Holsten.

<sup>4</sup> Gal. ii. 5; v. 2-4.

systematic exposition of Christian truth? This view is exposed to some obvious difficulties, which Godet points out, and endeavours to meet.<sup>1</sup> Such important subjects as Christology and eschatology are left without treatment. Godet explains this startling fact by the supposition that Paul confined himself to the doctrines which he had himself received "through the teaching of Christ, without the intervention of any man"; and since the delineation of the person of Christ belonged more particularly to the Apostles who had lived with him, and eschatology was the common property of the apostolate, Paul omitted them from his general course of religious instruction. But surely, if Paul wished to give his readers the benefit of apostolic instruction, which they had not yet received, it is inconceivable that he should consider himself debarred from unfolding topics which were the common property of the apostolate, or from speaking fully of the person of Christ simply because he had not known him on earth, when to have known him as the risen Son of God was a far higher qualification. In his mode of referring to his subject no such limitation is suggested. He does not say, "I am not ashamed of *my* gospel," but "of *the* gospel," and one who was "set apart unto the gospel of God" would consider himself entitled to proclaim it in its entirety. But, waiving this, it is a more weighty objection that the Epistle is not, in fact, a systematic exposition of Christian truth, even if limited to Paul's "dogmatic and moral catechism." Things which we know on his own authority formed a portion of his teaching are either not mentioned at all in the Epistle to the Romans, or are not treated at any length or with any system.<sup>2</sup> There is, indeed, a continuous argument running through the first eight chapters; but this very fact is opposed to the hypothesis, for we should rather expect a series of arguments appended to successive propositions. There is, however, no attempt to group a series of doctrines in any kind of logical dependence, nor are the

<sup>1</sup> In the Introduction to his *Commentary*.

<sup>2</sup> See 1 Cor. xi. 23; xv. 1-3: the Lord's Supper and the Resurrection.



doctrines which are advanced always stated with the precision which we look for in a dogmatic treatise. It seems clear that the Epistle is addressed to those who are already acquainted with the fundamental teachings of Christianity, and is rather a defence of doctrines assumed to be known than an exposition of doctrines either unknown or imperfectly known.

What, then, is the scope of the Epistle? So far as its main subject and argument are concerned, I see no occasion to go beyond the object which Paul himself says that he had in view in desiring to visit Rome. He wished to confirm the Christians there in the faith which they already possessed; and his letter is a defence of the gospel, in a form shaped by the conditions of the time, and intended for the comfort and support of believers.

In applying this view as a solvent of our difficulties, we must ask, in the first place, whether a Gentile church at Rome can have required to be thus confirmed. In reply we may point out that not only were Christians everywhere subject to persecution and social obloquy which might shake their faith, but in Rome they might seem to be a kind of forlorn outpost in the midst of a hostile world, and to have received less than their due from the leading authorities of Christendom. Paul might well, then, send them an encouraging word, and point out, in his own fervid way, the superiority of their faith to the great systems of the past. The Epistle itself is not without indications which point in this direction. It begins with a thanksgiving on behalf of their faith, and a desire that it might be confirmed. It speaks of boasting in afflictions, which carried the mind up to the love of God.<sup>1</sup> It says that we are fellow-heirs with Christ if we suffer with him, and that the sufferings of the present time are not worthy to be compared with the coming glory.<sup>2</sup> It asks what form of persecution can separate us from the love of Christ, and intimates that even death might have to be encountered for Christ's sake.<sup>3</sup> In fine, it exhorts the readers to rejoice in

<sup>1</sup> v. 3-5.<sup>2</sup> viii. 17, 18.<sup>3</sup> viii. 35, 36.

hope, to be patient in tribulation, to bless those that persecute them.<sup>1</sup> When we consider these passages, and remember that a few years afterwards some of the recipients of this letter were lighting the streets of Rome with their flaming bodies, we shall see that Paul was right in supposing that a spiritual gift tending to their confirmation would not be altogether amiss; and we can well imagine that some of the Neronian martyrs sang amid their agonies, "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?"

We may next observe that if Paul desired for any reason to write a friendly letter to the Romans, which was not demanded by the special needs of the church itself, it was perfectly natural for him to select the defence of Christianity as his main subject. Not being minutely acquainted with the particular wants of the Roman Christians, and not having been consulted by them—assuming, too, that they had been instructed in the doctrines of the gospel and were convinced of their truth,—what could he do better than point out the deep spiritual roots out of which the universal religion sprang, and the relation in which it stood to an older system admitted to be at once Divine and transient? In such a defence he might omit the standing historical proofs, which must have been already known and would be more properly addressed to unbelievers, and confine himself to a line of thought which, while rebutting objections and clearing up difficulties, tended to exalt and purify the existing faith. By thus throwing himself upon the general wants of Christendom he conferred a "spiritual gift of grace," not only on the community at Rome, but on the whole Church of Christ.

Again, this view precisely suits the announcement of the subject, "I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone who has faith." This proposition must have been accepted equally by Jewish and Gentile Christians; but both might have their insight into its meaning deepened, and their faith in it placed on a firmer

<sup>1</sup> xii. 12, 14.



spiritual basis. But why should Paul say that he is not ashamed of the gospel if he did not refer to his own special opinions? There is no very recondite reason. It required much courage and faith not to be ashamed of it and its band of mean disciples amid the pomp and pride of Rome, and Paul may have thought that the frequent postponement of his visit might possibly be ascribed to a want of bold confidence in his cause.

Lastly, the general course of thought is conformable to this supposition. It is a very important point that heathenism is dealt with as well as Judaism, for this would have been quite out of place in a dispute between Christian parties. Indeed, the whole of the first part of the argument, the proof of the sinful condition of Gentiles and Jews alike, would be quite irrelevant, but it was necessarily the first step in demonstrating the need of Christianity. But it may be asked why, if the church was principally Gentile, the great bulk of the argument is directed towards Judaism. The answer is to be found in the fact that Judaism was at that period the one formidable rival of Christianity, and the two religions were at the same time so intimately connected that it was necessary to adjust their relations, and to guard against the two extreme tendencies to an excessive absorption of it and an excessive contempt towards it and its history. We learn from Acts that the unbelieving Jews were the persistent enemies of Paul's preaching. At Corinth they charged him before Gallio with persuading men to worship God contrary to the law.<sup>1</sup> At Antioch, in Pisidia, the women who were proselytes were stirred up by the Jews, and aided in the persecution which drove away Paul and Barnabas.<sup>2</sup> The Gentile Christians, therefore, though they were not likely to fall back into idolatry, and did not require much confirming against heathenism, might be persuaded that Christianity was only a spurious Judaism, and that in embracing it as representing the true line of spiritual revelation they were feeding themselves with

<sup>1</sup> Acts xviii. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xiii. 50.

false hopes ; and short of this they might feel perplexed as to the relation in which they stood to the Old Testament, and have a difficulty in finding a logical mean between accepting Judaism in its entirety and maintaining that God had rejected Israel, and the blessings of the ancient promises had been finally forfeited. The one tendency would expose them to the attacks of Judaising Christians, as in Galatia ; the other would give rise to the contempt and haughtiness towards Jewish believers who retained any of their national peculiarities, and to an antinomian temper, of which there were evidently symptoms in Rome. Paul, therefore, in giving such a defence of Christianity as this Epistle contains, had regard to the necessities and dangers of the time, and, while exhibiting the superiority of Christian faith over the systems of the past, and defending it against attacks from without, he indirectly fortified the minds of his readers against Judaising assaults, and adjusted the relations of new and old, within the church itself.

We have only to add a word as to Paul's reason for writing to Rome at all. This is sufficiently explained by his long-cherished desire to visit it, by the apparent termination of his labours in the east, by the opportunity which presented itself of forwarding a letter, and by the postponement of his visit, which at last entered so definitely into his plans, through an uncertain and dangerous errand which might finally disappoint his hopes. He therefore wrote to the Roman disciples, not in consequence of their immediate necessities, but out of the fulness of his own heart ; and, while not negligent of such local colouring and particular wants as he was acquainted with, he chose a subject which must be interesting to all churches, and in defending the gospel he loved so well he interwove with his argument a beautiful and permanent expression of truths which had lately engrossed his thought, and of which the clear apprehension seemed needful for the welfare of Christendom.

JAMES DRUMMOND.



## FRAGMENTS OF AN ANCIENT (? EGYPTIAN) GOSPEL USED BY THE CATHARS OF ALBI.

F. P. BADHAM AND F. C. CONYBEARE.

IT is many years since Ignatius von Döllinger brought out in 1890, at Munich, the second volume of his history of the sects of the Middle Ages. It is a stout volume of 736 pages, and is entitled: *Documents for the History of the Valdenses and of the Cathars*. The book has hardly received the attention which it deserves from historians of the European Reformation; for there can be no doubt that the Hussites, the Lollards, and the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century derived a great deal of their inspiration, through channels which we cannot trace to-day, from these sects. It can be no mere accident that the district of Nîmes and Albi was in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries the focus of the Cathar movement, and in the seventeenth the home of the Huguenots. In the present paper, however, I do not desire to draw attention to this aspect of the Cathar movement, but to the documents which seem to have been in their possession. It has long been known that the Cathars were in possession of the early document known as the *Ascensio Isaïæ*. They also seem to have used some early gospel, possibly re-echoing a second-century document.

In Döllinger's volume, page 239, there begins what is called the confession of Guilielmus Babilus of Monte Alione. It is part of the records of the inquisition in Languedoc at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and is taken from a MS.,

Codex Vaticanus 4030, in the Pope's library at Rome. Babilus was a renegade from the Cathar Church, and we have here the confession which he made before the inquisitors, and in it we have frequent mention of the tenets and teaching of a certain Heresiarch named Belibasta. A good deal of what he heard from Belibasta we recognise as having been drawn, if somewhat indirectly, from the Canonical gospels. To begin with, I will give a selection of such passages, reserving what is new to the end. Thus on page 247 it is related by this witness that "he heard from Belibasta that a certain woman came to the Son of God, and said that her daughter was frenzied; and the Son of God placed his hand on her daughter's head and healed her, which healing was nothing else than this, that the soul of the daughter went forth from her body, and that he healed the soul, for the Son of God did not liberate them from corporal infirmities, but only from sins which are infirmities of the soul. And this was why the Son of God was a good healer, because he drew souls to salvation, as the Cathars themselves did."

In the above we readily detect the Manichean detestation of matter. The Redeemer's power did not work directly upon it, but the soul had to be brought out of the body before he could heal it. But the interest of the passage is this, that whereas Matthew and Mark represent this particular act of healing as having been wrought from a distance, it is here wrought by immediate contact of the sufferer with Jesus, and as the effect of his laying his hand upon her head. It is difficult to see, except on the theory of a pre-existent tradition, how the story could have taken the shape which it here has. We may therefore infer that the Cathars had some form of gospel in the South of France, in which the cure was narrated with this difference.

Let us take another passage. It is still the teaching of Belibasta which is presented to us. It comes on p. 222:

"And although it seemed to the Jews that the Son of God was dead, and that after death they had placed him in a



sepulchre, nevertheless he was not truly dead, nor was he buried, although he seemed to be so; and no sooner had those who buried him retired from the tomb, than he appeared to a certain woman who was mourning for him, and told her to approach him, because it was he himself whose deposition in the said tomb she was deploring, to whom he also said that he had never been dead nor sustained any suffering or affliction, although Satan and the Jews had put it in his power for them to kill him and ill-treat him."

The Acts of John recently published in the *Texts and Studies*, vol. v. No. 1, furnish an exact parallel to the statements contained in the above paragraph; for in this document Christ appears to the Apostle John at the very moment of the Crucifixion, and explains that what is going on below amidst the murmur of the crowd is merely an illusion. The saying to the woman—namely, Mary Magdalene—that she should approach Jesus, contrasts in a curious way with John, ch. xx. v. 17, "Touch me not."

Here is a third citation from the document. Belibasta said that the twelve apostles who descended from heaven with Christ were spiritual beings, and that afterwards in the State of Samaria there were twelve baskets of fragments left over from five loaves, and he knew not how many fishes; and the above-mentioned apostles gave the said twelve baskets to twelve men, and so were created the carnal apostles, who had the same power as the spiritual; and whenever one of the spiritual apostles died, a carnal one replaced him.

And again we have the passage:

"And he was in Samaria with the blessed Peter, and there they ate bread and fishes, that is to say, God himself and the blessed Peter did so, and from the table were taken up twelve baskets."

Accordingly, in one of the Eucharistic prayers of the Cathars we have the phrase:

"O Lord Jesus Christ, who didst bless five barley loaves and two fishes in the desert, bless this bread, this fish and wine."

We can easily understand the source of the reference to the twelve baskets or *cophini*, but it is curious that there is no mention made of the five thousand. But why is such special prominence given to the presence of Peter alone unless there is some ecclesiastical implication? And why the mention of Samaria, as the scene of the occurrence? The only parallel we have is the insistence in the *Acta Pilati* (indebted probably at this point to the Gospel according to the Hebrews) upon Mount Mamilch—that is to say, the mountain of the Amalekites—as the scene of the greatest and most imposing of Christ's appearances. Unless we assume wanton invention, there seem to be traces here of some ancient tradition. We may note in passing that the spiritual significance here attributed to the twelve baskets suggests an interpretation of the statement made in the Sibylline poems, that the twelve baskets were reserved “for the Virgin.” The Virgin referred to is, of course, the Church, as in the inscription of Abercius. The mountain of the Amalekites, mentioned in Judges v. 14 and xii. 15, was situated in the north-west corner of Ephraim—that is to say, between Samaria and Galilee. It is not impossible that, in consequence of the threats of Herod, Christ made that locality the scene of His activity.

Here is another passage (p. 167) which seems to be taken from an old form of gospel :

“The Son of God said that a man should in no wise swear, neither by heaven, for a man could not make one star in it, small or great ; nor by his own head, because a man could not make one hair of his head, white or black.”

The additions which we have in the above are clearly taken from some apocryphal gospel.

On p. 181 we have the following citation : “Pharisees, hypocrites, who stand in the gate of the kingdom, and entered not the kingdom, nor permitted that those who wished to enter should enter.”

The above is clearly an actual citation, for it appears in almost identical words some pages lower down (p. 205) as



follows: "Such as stood in the gate of the kingdom, and entered not the kingdom, nor permitted those who wished to enter."

On p. 206 we have another citation from this lost gospel as follows:

"The Son of God said when he had returned to Heaven: My little ones, be ye not sad on account of this, because ye who stand in truth and justice and not as other men, because ye shall return otherwise to the Kingdom of my Father. There are three kinds of flesh: one is of men, and another of beasts, and a third kind is of fishes, which is born in the water. You, my little ones, shall not eat except of that flesh which is born in water, because such flesh is created without corruption, but other kinds of flesh are produced with corruption, and cause the flesh to be over proud. . . . And having said the above, the Son of God said to Barjona: Let no one put his hand to my plough, unless he wishes to grasp it firmly; for he shall be blessed who shall give a cup of water to my little ones, for he shall receive a hundredfold and more. See ye therefore, if the holy Father promises us much, nevertheless he who shall have deceived my little ones in the matter of a single obol, his soul shall not be worth another obol."

This explanation of the Catholic rule of fasting meets us elsewhere in Cathar documents, but is very rare in patristic literature. The Cathars clearly kept alive among themselves an understanding of its original import.

On p. 210 there is another citation of this lost document, as follows. It consists of words attributed to the Saviour:

"Where there was one who was his little one, he would himself be with him, and where there were two likewise, and where there were three in the same manner."

This somewhat reminds us of the Logion preserved in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus: "Where there are two, they are not without God; and where there is one alone, I am with him."

On p. 221 we read that one of the heretics, another disciple, it would appear, of the same Belibasta, being cross-

examined by the inquisitors on the point whether he believed that Christ really ate and drank, transformed the orthodox narrative as follows:

“He had often heard,” he said, “that Christ distributed among the disciples fishes and an honeycomb.”

The passages which we have hitherto collected are too different from the Canonical gospel for us to suppose that they were directly drawn from it; and they point rather to some Manichean gospel—I call it for convenience Manichean, but it was probably prior to Mani. We now come to a lengthy passage which may possibly throw a little light on a very confused episode, namely, the history of the Resurrection. It is plainly drawn from some source independent of the documents preserved by the great churches. For the sake of clearness it will be better to transcribe the passage almost in full. The witness has been narrating the story of the fall of the angels, and then (pp. 160, 161) he continues as follows:

“Thereupon the Father began to write a book, which he composed in the space of forty years, in which book were written in full the sufferings, privations, affections, the poverty, infirmity, contumely, injuries, envy, hatred, malice, and generally speaking all the penalties which can befall men in this life. And it was contained therein, that he who was willing to sustain all the aforesaid penalties, and to teach that he would sustain the penalties in question, should be a son of the holy Father. And when the said holy Father began the book, Isaiah the prophet began to prophesy, that a branch or bough was to come, which should redeem human spirits. And when the holy Father had composed the said book, he placed it in the midst of the heavenly spirits, that had remained in the heaven with him, and said: He who shall fulfil the things which are written in this book, shall be my son. And many of the heavenly spirits, wishing to be sons of the holy Father and to be honoured above the rest, went up to the said book and opened it; but when they read the penalties contained therein, which he must needs suffer, who should



desire to come among men and honour the human race, after reading a little in the book in question, they fell fainting in a swoon, and none of them was willing to forfeit the glory which he possessed, and to subject himself to the penalties of this life, in order to become the son of God. And the holy Father seeing this said: And there is not then one of you, that desires to be my son? And then one of the spirits standing by, who was called Jesus, rose up and said, that he himself was willing to be son of the Father, and to complete all things which were written in the book aforesaid. And he went up to the said book and opened it, and read therein four or five leaves, and fell in a swoon beside the book, and so remained for three days and nights. And then having awakened from his swoon, he grieved much and mourned; and, because he had promised that he would complete these things which were contained in the said book, and because it behoved him not to lie, he told the Father, that he himself desired to be his son and to complete all things which were written in the said book, however grievous they might be; and he descended from heaven, and appeared as a newly born boy in Bethlehem."

The Latin text in the above passage reads, as it is printed by Döllinger, not *Jesus* but *John*. It is our conviction that the name John is here a misreading either of the copyist of the MS. or of the editor. And we have accordingly printed it. The context and sequel make it quite certain that some compendium of the name *Jesus* has been misread as *Johannes*. If we retain the name John, there is no alternative but to assume that we have here an echo of those disciples of the Baptist who, as we shall see below, claimed Messiahship for their master as late as the fourth century. But that is in the last degree improbable. The origin of the whole idea is apparently supplied by Rev. v. 1, etc., and Ps. xl. 7, 8:

"Then said I, Lo, I am come;  
In the roll of the book it is written of me:  
I delight to do thy will, O my God."

After a brief résumé of the life of Christ, in which we may notice that, after his baptism by John, the devil conveyed Christ to the mountain hanging "on his neck," in true Arabian fashion, the witness continues his narrative before the board of inquisitors as follows :

"He said to them that he was going to his Father, and that he would return to them on a certain day, which he fixed for them, between the third hour and noon, and that he would find them in the house of Simon Barjona : and when he had said this the Pharisees appeared on the scene, together with children of the devil who were working with them, and apprehended him. And all the injuries and the insults which they were able to inflict upon him, the said Pharisees and their servants did inflict upon the Son of God, so much so that a certain leper spat in his face, and he forbore from all resentment. And when he was thus spat upon by the leper in question, and derided and abused, he said : Father, I only know that I am thy son, because thou didst promise me this when thou sendest me, to the end that I should be abhorred by all men, that is, that I should be a reproach to abjects among men. Then after they had mocked at him and threatened him, they set him on a cross and wounded him, and inflicted many wounds on him. And when this had been done, he himself, without death intervening, because the Son of God could not die, ascended to the holy Father, kneeled before him, and said : Holy Father, I have completed all things which were written in the book, which thou didst write, in obedience to thy will. And the Father replied to him : Whereas thou hast done all things which I wrote in the book, thou shalt be my son. To whom the Son answered : Father, and what wilt thou give, that I may give myself to my friends and to those who believe in me ? And the Father himself replied that he was desirous that the same power which he had given to him, he himself should be able to give in turn to his friends, and they to others, in such a way that the power in question should pass



from hand to hand among the good men, and also that what he gave to them should be this, that whatever they themselves did upon earth should be done by the Father himself in heaven. These words having been uttered, he quitted the Father's presence, and came down, so that on the appointed day he might appear to his friends ; on which day, when Mary Magdalene and another woman were walking together, they saw an old and decrepit man coming along, coming quickly in their direction ; whereupon they feared exceedingly, and hid themselves in two bushes which were beside the highway. And when the old man in question had passed by, Mary Magdalene put her head out of the bush and called the old man in question, who seemed to be a stranger. And when the old man said to her that he could not wait, because he had much to do, and when she pressed him to return and converse with her, he then returned to her, and she asked him if he had any news of the prophet. And he answered, Yes, because on the day designated to his friends he himself would be with them, in the house of Simon Barjona, between the third hour and noon. And when she asked him if this were certain, he replied, Why, yes ; and departing from her, he immediately disappeared. And thereupon Mary Magdalene knew that the old man was the Prophet. And she herself, and the Prophet with her, gathered together the friends of the Prophet in the house of Simon Barjona, the Apostle Thomas only excepted. And when they were all gathered together in the said house, and already the appointed hour appeared to be passing by, Peter said to the others, who thought that they had been deceived : Either we are sinners, or we make a mistake about the day, for the Prophet is no liar. And when they answered him, that they had made no mistake about the day, Peter replied : Then it is we who are sinners, and it is because of our sins that the Prophet comes not. And then he said to the rest : Seeing that we are sinners, let us try to see in what manner any one of you believes in him. And thereupon

they composed the symbol, or creed of the Apostles. Which creed, nevertheless, William the heretic declared that, although the Apostles composed it, he himself knew nothing about it; nor, as he said, did he care about it, because he only cared about the words of the Father, and of the Son, and of John the Evangelist, and not at all about other people; because he himself had as much power as the Apostles had, and even as much as he had, of whom it is said that he was the son of the Blessed Mary. And when, as he spoke, the Apostles stood waiting for the Prophet as we have described throughout one evening, the said Prophet did come in the form of fire. And by that fire they were all illuminated, and those who were ignorant of letters became so cognisant of them that none could excel them in knowledge. It was also given to them that they should talk in the tongues of all races. And Thomas came in, who did not believe that the Prophet could come; and when he had come, he said, that as for himself he would not believe that the Prophet could come to them, unless he should put his own hand in his wound. And thereupon the Prophet said to Thomas that he should put his hand in his wound. And when Thomas had done so, he said to the Son of God that he must be indulgent to him, because he now believed that he existed, and would believe for the future. To whom the Son of God replied: Let indulgence be made to thee, and for the future thou shalt not be incredulous. To whom Thomas replied, that he would not be. And the Son of God said to all of them: Preach my words throughout the whole world, and guard yourselves from false prophets, who will thrust themselves among you; and as a false prophet entered the kingdom of my Father and plunged it in confusion, so also will false prophets who will make their way among you, throw you into confusion. . . . Nevertheless, they shall be heavily punished for this, because the holy Father said: He that shall deceive me, it shall be pardoned him; and he that shall deceive the Son, it shall be pardoned him; but he that deceiveth the Holy Spirit shall not have



peace, nor end. And then Peter Maurina said to the witness who was speaking, by way of setting forth the Holy Spirit, that William Belibasta was the Holy Spirit, and added : Alas for me, who have received the Lord, meaning the heretic, it is better that I had never been born. Whereupon the said William, looking at him as he spoke, said : Arnald, take care of thyself, lest thou be one of the false prophets. . . . And the said heretic then continued his narrative by saying as follows : The Son of God said to his Apostles that they should ask of him and he would give unto them. . . . And this said, he divided their preaching, designating the country in which each one of them was to go and preach. But to Peter he committed the Church, and then he ascended into heaven, and thereafter the Apostles preached throughout the world ; but, according to the statement of the witness, the authority of Peter, to whom Christ had committed the Church, came to an end after Peter, by reason of the fact that the Roman pontiffs, who have succeeded Peter, lack that authority which he had, because they do not preserve and hold to the faith and the way, which they duly preserve in their sect, who keep to the faith and ways of the Son of God."

It will be observed that in some respects the above narrative agrees with the gospel of Matthew—for example, in the statement that Mary Magdalene was accompanied by one other woman—and in some respects with the Fourth Gospel. It is particularly remarkable that the women are declared to have encountered the risen Christ when they were on their way to the tomb, and when he was on his way from the tomb. In the Canonical gospel, they do not meet him as he is coming from the tomb, but they themselves have visited the tomb, found it to be empty, and encounter him as they "depart quickly" from it (Matt. xxviii. 8). The story, as the Cathar told it, possesses most verisimilitude.

Constant familiarity with the gospels of Luke and John has in the case of ordinary readers blunted their perception of the discrepancy between them in regard to the date of the

Ascension, and of the coming of the Holy Spirit. Both narratives agree that the advent of the Holy Ghost was in some way the direct result of the Ascension;<sup>1</sup> but whereas in the book of Acts the Ascension takes place some forty days later than the Resurrection, and the coming of the Holy Spirit occurs ten days later still, the Fourth Gospel represents the Ascension and the advent of the Holy Ghost as immediately following upon the Resurrection.<sup>2</sup>

Let us consider, therefore, the words uttered by Christ to Mary Magdalene hard by the tomb. They are: "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father." Now, however we interpret the words, "Touch me not"—whether we regard them as being equivalent to "Do not detain me," or as a prohibition against touching his body because it was in a transitional state—the import as regards the second half of the sentence of his words is identical: it can only mean that the Ascension was to take place immediately; and this point is clinched by the next sentence: "Go tell thy brethren that I ascend." These words would be purely otiose if the writer had thought that the Ascension only took place forty or fifty days later, and that Christ was to appear to the apostles that very evening. And again, as regards the purpose of his appearance, we read in the same gospel that he breathed on them and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." The turn of the narrative here surely leaves no room for the descent of the Holy Ghost as depicted in Acts ii.

All the same, it was a bold guess of Graetz in his *History of Judaism*, when he tried to identify the phenomena of Pentecost with one of the recorded appearances of Christ himself, namely,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Acts ii. 33: "Being exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this which ye see and hear."

Ephesians iv. 8: "When he ascended on high, he bestowed gifts of grace upon men."

<sup>2</sup> In the Syriac Teaching of the Apostles there is no ten days' interval; for the author, working apparently upon a primary document, passes straight from Acts i. 14 to ii. 1, without any episode of Matthias intervening, and as many as six times assures us that the Ascension took place on the fiftieth day.—Ante-Nicene Library, pp. 36, 37, 38, 40.



with his appearance to the five hundred at once ; and it is here perhaps that we can derive the most important results from our investigation of this Albigensian gospel. The author does identify the Pentecostal fire and the phenomena of the tongues with an appearance of the Lord, and narrates them as part and parcel of such an appearance. If it be the case that the Cathar gospel echoed in this respect the ancient gospel according to the Egyptians, then it may be the case that we have one more flicker of light upon a matter which is so obscure. Nor is there, as we have pointed out above, anything improbable in the supposition that such an ancient document may have survived among the Cathars of Albi. We find them in possession, as we have said, of the *Ascensio Isaiaë*, a document which in the Middle Ages was almost entirely lost to the rest of Christendom. We find, moreover, when we examine their eucharistic rite, that it presents us with a very early and otherwise lost stage of the Roman rite. Their rite of consolation was itself a survival of the deferred baptism of the age of Tertullian. Why therefore should they not have preserved the gospel according to the Egyptians ? Among other facts pointing in that direction, we may notice various signs of antiquity, such as that John the Baptist is regularly referred to as a great “demon,” and Jesus as “the Prophet.”

Over and over again in the Albigensian gospel (*Sekten-Geschichte*, ii. pp. 175, 215, 216, 235, 246, 248) the doctrine of transmigration, and of the ascent of the soul through animals to man, is inculcated. There is reason to believe that the gospel according to the Egyptians enforced the same teaching, for the Acts of Philip and those of Thomas, both encratite works of the last half of the second century and quoting this gospel (see *A.P.*, ed. Tischendorf, p. 90 ; *A.T.*, ed. Wright, p. 282), imply such transmigration when they use such words as “from tunic to tunic.” In the *A.P.* a leopard and a kid accompany Philip and are scourged along with him, and he gives dying injunctions that they be permitted to enter the church and be buried in the porch (pp. 91, 92). In the *A.T.* an ass, which

has rendered the Apostle signal service, forthwith dies; and when the bystanders express their wonder, Thomas explains that "death is a benefit to it" (p. 182). In the Acts of Thecla, as Jerome knew the story, the saint baptizes the lioness that had protected her; and though we cannot prove this document, like the two above mentioned, to be dependent on the Egyptian gospel, yet the encratite precepts it puts into the mouth of St Paul have been supposed to be derived therefrom. Such comparisons as that of Christ to an old man and to fire also harmonise well with all we know of the Egyptian gospel. They occur, however, in Gnostic documents. It is a fair guess, therefore, that the Cathars used the Egyptian gospel.

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## ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES, THE BRILLIANT MADMAN.

R. B. TOWNSHEND.

ANTIOCHUS IV., surnamed Epiphanes or The Brilliant, and known from his savage persecution of the Jews as the first of Anti-Semites, offers in his own person a singular blend of East and West. The Seleucid House, of which he was the eighth king to reign over Syria, sprang originally from the marriage of Seleucus, the greatest of Alexander's generals, with the beautiful Oriental princess, Apama, and this mingling of the blood was repeated in later generations of the Seleucid family. Yet the face of Antiochus as shown on the coins pictured in Mr Bevan's admirable work, *The House of Seleucus*, reveals nothing of the Oriental, but appears purely Greek. His upbringing was of a no less mixed character than his pedigree. Born amidst all the luxury of a despotic Syrian Court, he found himself suddenly transferred to Rome as a hostage for his father, Antiochus III., the last friend and protector of the defeated and outlawed Hannibal. Here in the victorious Republic, so lately emerged from her struggle with Carthage, he was received on friendly terms by the families of the leading patricians, great Hannibal's conquerors. Among them the Asian-bred youth enjoyed the new and bracing experience of the society of equals instead of dependents, of freemen instead of courtiers. He learned to appreciate the strength given by the Roman training and the Roman discipline, and adopted for his special deity, or, as we

might say now, his patron saint, not the Zeus Olympius to whom later on he gave his allegiance, but the war-god of Rome. The death of his father suddenly destroyed his value as a hostage, and he presently found himself exchanged for his nephew Demetrius, whose father had duly succeeded to the kingdom of Syria as Seleucus IV., and perfectly at liberty to quit Rome and carry on his education elsewhere. Antiochus was always a man who knew what he wanted, so he went to Athens, where he could dabble in Greek philosophy as much or as little as he chose, but where the thing that really tickled his fancy was the novelty of posing as a free citizen naturalised in a free state. In Rome he had been always an Outlander; he might mix there on friendly terms with the proudest patricians, but consul and senator of Rome he could never have hoped to be, were he to live to the years of Methuselah; in Athens he was hardly of age when he was elected by his admiring fellow-citizens to the office of στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα. He seems to have taken his Athenian career as a sort of university course, and doubtless enjoyed the excitement of canvassing for the office as much as any Oxford undergraduate to-day who succeeds in being elected President of the Union. The enthusiasm of Antiochus for Greek life generally, and for life at Athens in particular, is not hard to understand. He found there the cleverest men in the world to talk to, and the best art in the world to admire, while he enjoyed the social prestige of a young prince of a great house.

Then came another turn of Fortune's wheel. In 176-5 B.C., Seleucus IV. was assassinated by his minister, Heliodorus, whose ambition sought thus to get the sovereign power into his own hands. Lawfully, of course, the young Demetrius now became the rightful heir; he, however, was a hostage far away in Rome, and crafty Heliodorus preferred to make another son of Seleucus, a mere infant, his puppet-king. But the crime of Heliodorus was the opportunity of the boy's uncle, Antiochus, who speedily shed his scruples, if he ever



had any, and was lucky enough to find an invaluable backer in King Eumenes of Pergamus. Eumenes, by Roman help, had come in for a large slice of what had formerly been the Seleucid Empire, and now, for reasons of his own, was ready to supply the pretender with men and money; so that by his timely aid Antiochus was ere long seated firmly on the throne of the Great King; Heliodorus and the infant nephew were dead, buried, and done with; and the Syrian world lay at his feet. The new king had gambled for high stakes and stuck at nothing to win; having won, he now proceeded to enjoy himself. His unfortunate brother, a thrifty monarch, had left money in the treasury, and Antiochus began to spend it royally. Extravagant pageants, wild practical jokes, and grand public buildings were his most dearly loved hobbies, and he rode them all hard. Naturally, like other tyrants, he had his private vices in the shape of mistresses and minions, but his extravagance, as a rule, inclined to ostentatious public expenditure and took a distinctly practical turn. He liked building the city of Antioch a regular Greek *βουλευτήριον* or Senate-house and presenting the citizens with a parody of the Athenian constitution. He liked giving to a Roman architect the commission to complete the great temple to Zeus Olympius under the Athenian Acropolis, with such magnificence that it was styled one of the Seven Wonders of the World. He liked to hear himself called not only *Ἐπιφανής*, the Brilliant, but even *Θεὸς Ἐπιφανής*, the Manifest God, though there did not lack sarcastic punsters to make his title *Ἐπιμανής*, or the Madman, and the pun was justified by his actions. His idea of a joke was often no more than a mischievous schoolboy's, to slip out of his palace alone, or with some boon companions, and have, as we might say, "a regular rag," hustling respectable citizens in the street, or throwing handfuls of money to the mob to be scrambled for. But his jokes were only too apt to take a more reprehensible form. He would drop in suddenly on a party and play such pranks, shockingly indecent some-

times, that the guests took to their heels. He would pay a surprise visit to the public baths and scatter precious unguents on the floor just for the fun of seeing the bathers slip and tumble all around him. Anon he would order a formal election at Antioch, parade himself publicly in a Roman toga, and go through the solemn farce of canvassing the electors for an office. Once he gave a marvellous pageant there, one of the finest ever seen, and then amused himself by getting on a little pony and galloping in and out of the procession so as to throw it all into confusion. When he was in Rome his cruel nature had gloated over the gladiatorial shows; he now introduced them at Antioch, and it pleased him so to debase the taste of his subjects that they grew to enjoy the butcheries which at first disgusted them. In short, the Brilliant Madman combined the free and easy manners of a Western republican with the wanton freakishness of an Eastern despot, and thus satiated his craving both for notoriety and for mystification. As Livy says: "Some imagined he did not know his own mind; some thought he assumed the character of a fool on purpose; while others roundly affirmed he was mad." But if he were mad, there was, after all, a method in his madness, for he had the dominant idea of spreading Hellenism through Asia, and his assumed title of the Manifest God helped him to find the money for his mission. In the character of Zeus Olympius he claimed and asserted by force his divine right to what treasures he could lay his hands on in the temples of all the other gods Olympian or Oriental. With the plunder he founded new cities and called them after his own name, planting new Antiochs everywhere, and adorning them with works of Greek art, and giving them Greek constitutions; while in cities already founded and named he encouraged and sanctioned the formation of societies of "Antiochians." In short, he constituted himself the missionary of Greek civilisation, as he understood it, and he met with an immediate and flattering response. Greek ideals are extraordinarily attractive, even from the hands of a tyrant, and the cities of Asia wel-



comed the novelty. The pagan East was polytheist, and could see nothing shocking either in the addition of new gods to their pantheon or even in the giving of new names to old deities. Only the Jews, with what seemed to the Greek mind their narrow monotheism, were likely to resent it seriously, and now, even among the Jews, there promptly arose a strong party of Hellenists. As the writer of Second Maccabees puts it: "Yea, many of the Israelites also consented to his religion." This was the beginning of a party strife in Israel that was to bear blood-stained fruit during more than two centuries until the final and irreparable disaster of the destruction of Jerusalem. The bane of the Jewish race was ever "*discordia demens Vipereum crinem vittis innexa cruentis.*"

"Demoniac Discord with ensanguined bands  
Twined in her snaky locks."

The leader of the Hellenisers at Jerusalem was one Joshua, or Jason, to give him his Hellenised name, brother to the High Priest, Onias III. He came to Antiochus and did two things, both highly gratifying to the king: he offered that spendthrift monarch a large sum of money; and he begged leave to change the Jewish laws and way of life into the Hellenic fashion, including the formation of a society of "Antiochians" in Jerusalem. Antiochus gladly consented, dismissed Onias, and made Jason High Priest and chief ruler instead, and the great revolution in manners and morals was initiated at Jerusalem. Greek customs were everywhere established, a gymnasium was opened on the Acra, near the Temple, where the Jewish youths, stripping off their clothes, ran and wrestled and leaped and threw the discus; and even the young priests, leaving the Temple services, hurried out to share in the sports. But if this emancipation was welcomed by one party in the state, it came as a grievous and terrible shock to another, that of the Chasidîm, the "godly" or "pious" people. They were more scandalised by their Hellenising countrymen than ever were Cromwell's

“saints” by the most roystering cavaliers. For the present, however, they were helpless, seeing that the apostate Jason and his party had the support of the king and held the reins of power. And so time went on, and the emancipated Jewish ἑφῆβοι, revelling in their new-found freedom, indulged in many of the preposterous pranks that human beings who have just got their necks out of the yoke are prone to. The laughter-loving Greeks made wicked fun out of some of these silly performances, but it hardly lies in our mouths to reproach them, seeing that in India the Anglicised Babu, attempting to assimilate our ideas, has only succeeded in making himself the laughing-stock of a scornful Western world.

Neither could progressive ideas exorcise Demoniac Discord in the Jewish nation. The Hellenising Progressives themselves fell to quarrelling, and enthusiastically cut each other's throats with a ferocity like that of the Coreyræan factions in ancient Greece or the Girondists and Jacobins in modern France. The head of one Hellenising party was Menelaus, a man of the tribe of Benjamin and not of the priestly race; nevertheless, by outbidding Jason with Antiochus, he got himself installed by the king's authority as High Priest; with the result that Jason, breathing rage and fury, was cast out, and he and his adherents had to flee for refuge to the Ammonite country. Meantime Antiochus, who really had an ambition above pageants and plays, had turned to what has always been the true sport of kings and made war on his neighbours. His great desire was to gain possession of Egypt, and by a dexterous combination of policy and arms he succeeded in making himself master of the whole of that rich country with the sole exception of its capital, the city of Alexandria, which he laid siege to and seemed likely to take. But Ptolemy, the king of Egypt, had appealed to Rome, and Rome's hands being now at last freed by the fall of the Macedonian Empire, Antiochus saw one day a newly landed party of Romans approaching. The king recognised a former friend in their leader, the consular Pompilius Lænas—we have



the story in Livy—and held out his hand. Pompilius, instead of taking the extended hand, offered him a decree of the Senate. “Read this first,” he said. The decree was an order to quit Egypt. Antiochus read it, and replied that he would consider with his council and then answer. Pompilius had in his hand a vine-stick, the Roman centurion’s magic wand. He drew a circle with it in the sand round the Syrian king, “*Ἐνταυθα Βουλευέου*,” he said, so Appian tells the story, “Consider there.” Antiochus had not spent his youth in Rome for nothing, and realised what a refusal might mean. He paused, still inside the circle, and then said slowly, “The Senate shall be obeyed.” Pompilius instantly gave him his hand as the friend and ally of Rome, and the dramatic scene ended in Egypt being finally relinquished by the Brilliant Madman. Baulked of his prey he looked round for a substitute, and he had not far to look. The report had reached Judæa that Antiochus was dead. The Chasidîm, the “pious” Jews, rejoiced greatly at the news, hoping that this would stop what was to them the abominable Hellenising movement; while the exiled Hellenising party of Jason thought they now saw a chance to get their innings. Back the latter trooped to Jerusalem with Jason at their head; they defeated their hated rivals who supported the Seleucid House and its nominee Menelaus; they slaughtered them by thousands in the city and drove Menelaus and the survivors to take refuge in the citadel. Unfortunately for them and for the “pious” Jews, Antiochus was by no means dead, and returning full of wrath he speedily turned the tables on Jason and took a bloody vengeance on the city. Thousands more were slain, while Antiochus himself was conducted by the rescued Menelaus into the very Temple, and to the intense horror of every “pious” Jew the Holy Place itself was violated and sacked. Antiochus took away the veil as well as the seven-branched candlestick; and all the rich vessels of gold became the booty of the plunderers. A heathen altar was set up over the altar of Jehovah, and as a last insult sacrifices of swine were offered

upon it. This was indeed what Jewish writers call the abomination of desolation.

From this time forward the process of Hellenisation was to be no longer a matter of "peaceful penetration"; it was changed into a furious and vindictive persecution of the old religion. All Jewish rites and customs, including circumcision, keeping the Sabbath, and refusing to eat swine's flesh, were made punishable with death. Antiochus himself did not remain there long, but he left Jerusalem in charge of a man on whose severity he could rely to see that the work of outrage and torture was carried out in all its grim and grisly reality.

And now persecution woke a new spirit, the martyr spirit, in the tortured Jews. The story of the heroic protagonists, Eleazar, and the Seven Brethren, and the Mother, who are known as the Maccabean martyrs, has come down to us in the Second and Fourth of Maccabees, the books that take their name from Judas of Modin, the warrior who led the fighting in the field, and was surnamed Maccabee or The Hammer. Neither book can claim to be contemporary history, and the two differ in various details, some of which may be more or less fictitious: we have scarce any independent authority except Josephus by which to check their historical statements, and Josephus is silent on the martyrs' story. But substantially the fact that there were such martyrs is unshaken; the memory of the sufferers is still kept among the Jews by a special service on their anniversary, and, strange to say, their names have likewise been enrolled in the list of Christian martyrs. Doubtless they were in the mind of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews when he said, "Others were tortured, not accepting deliverance; that they might obtain a better resurrection." And of them also the Latin Church declared, "*Christianum nomen postea divulgatum factis antecesserunt.*" "By their deeds they anticipated the name of Christian which later on became known among men."

The martyrs suffered unresisting. But there were some among the Jews whom their heroism roused to draw the sword



against the tyrant. Led by Mattathias of the House of Hasmon and his great son Judas, the Maccabee, and his four valiant brothers, the "pious" Jews rose against Greek rule and all that it stood for. The odds against them were appalling, but they proved the truth of what the world grudgingly admits, that, given a great leader, religious enthusiasm may raise common men to be a match for professional soldiers. The fortunes of war changed more than once, and the Maccabees again and again suffered heavy losses, but they reconquered Jerusalem. The 25th of Chisleu (Chisleu is our December) had seen the desecration of the Holy Place, and another 25th Chisleu, three years later, saw the Temple cleansed and a new altar dedicated to Jehovah. The struggle indeed was not yet at an end. It was destined to be prolonged for a whole generation, and all five of the brave Maccabean brothers fell in the course of it, but the ultimate result under another king, Antiochus Sidetes, was to establish John Hyrcanus, son of Simon the last of the brothers, as High Priest. The politic Sidetes recognised the autonomy of the Jewish state, and this hard-won independence lasted during the next two generations; a period torn by turbulent party strife, for the horrid cruelties of the Jewish factions against each other still continued to rival those of Antiochus Epiphanes himself. But the feelings of the "pious" Jews were satisfied by the fact that the Law of Moses reigned supreme and the regular services of the Temple were carried on without ceasing. And even when at last the Roman steam-roller came on the scene and reduced Syria to subjection, so that Judæa was ruled by a Roman procurator instead of by a king of the Hasmonean or of the Herodian House, the "pious" Chasidim could still boast that the Mosaic Law and the Temple and the Temple-service survived, until the final blow of the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in A.D. 70.

To return to Antiochus. He left Jerusalem, his mind busy with other and greater projects than the forcible conversion to Hellenism of what to him, doubtless, was a petty though a

most perverse Oriental clan. Baulked in Egypt, he now dreamed of the conquest of the East and the restoration of that part at least of the Empire of Alexander. He left the crushing of Jewish revolts and Jewish religion to the care of his generals, and with a strong army plunged into his great Eastern adventure. He began with Armenia and reconquered it successfully. He then turned his arms against Persia, and seems from the scanty information we have to have been victorious there also. He founded yet another city of Antioch in the lowlands beyond the Tigris, near the Persian Gulf, and he gave to Ecbatana the new title of Epiphanea after his own name. And then in the full tide of success he was struck down. Just how it happened we do not know.

“ His fall was destined to a barren strand,  
A petty fortress, and a dubious hand.”

Josephus says that he attacked a Persian city, Elymais, and was beaten off; and that hearing that the Jews were in revolt again, he turned back to punish them, and died. Josephus admits (but minimises) the importance of the fact that the historian Polybius differs in his explanation of the cause of Antiochus' death. The latter author also records that Antiochus attacked the temple of Artemis or Ishtar at Elymais and failed, but he alleges that he died on his return at Tabæ in Persia, “driven mad, as some say, by a manifestation of divine wrath in the course of his wicked attempt on this temple.” Jewish writers, however, aver that, like Herod, he was eaten of worms; a death which would appear to be the allotted end of the enemies of their nation. The author of Second Maccabees places the scene of the defeat of Antiochus at Persepolis, and attributes his fall not to the wrath of any heathen idol, but to the God of Israel. True to his traditions, he declares that Antiochus recognised the hand that smote him, and quickly repented of his horrid cruelties to the Jews, and vowed that if he were restored to health he would even become a Jew himself and give back their liberty to the nation



and restore all the treasures of which he had despoiled the Temple. With a fierce joy the Jewish writer declares that this tardy repentance was too late. He dwells insistently on the unspeakably gruesome symptoms of the tyrant's mortal disease, and ends on a note of triumph: "Thus the murderer and blasphemer, having suffered most grievously, as he entreated other men, so died he a miserable death in a strange country in the mountains." This was the end of the Brilliant Madman, who, seeking to immortalise himself as the Manifest God, has succeeded only in handing himself down to posterity as the worst as well as the first of Anti-Semites.

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## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COERCION.

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LAW carries with it the implication of force sufficient to compel obedience to its demands. This coercion, like law itself, has a twofold aspect. Law arises in a homogeneous family group on the basis of the parental care of the immature. But it also arises out of relations between rival groups of nearly equal power whose co-operation is regulated by treaty. The alternative to the treaty is war, and the logical outcome of successful war is the extermination of the defeated rival, or the complete subordination of his purpose to that of the victor, as in slavery.

The two types of jurisprudence that now dominate the world illustrate in a measure these two kinds of law. English common law arose in a family homogeneous group. Its basis is the unwritten equity of kinship and group feeling. The Roman law rose as the result of tribal federation, and the Imperial purpose demanded a constant written formulation from the Twelve Tables to Gaius and Justinus. England's Imperial situation has modified her common law basis, and the Magna Charta was a beginning of a codification made necessary by class alienations within the group. So also in Roman experience equity began to play an enlarging part as codification failed to meet the delicate requirements of an increasing complexity of social adjustment. So that although the history of the two origins shines through in an interesting manner,



the end aimed at by both has imparted similarity to the two great types.

For the ends aimed at originally by the two types of coercion which are in the background of the two types of law are distinctly dissimilar. In the one case the coercion of war involved in the treaty relationship has as its sole interest self-maintenance. The group that carries on war has cut all ethical bonds between it and the warring group, and in the last analysis will do anything that enables it to carry out its life-purpose. Logically it has no interest in the purposes of the opposing enemy. This same interest of self-maintenance may, however, lead to treaty relationship. Contending Hebrew tribes or rival Roman groups may sink their differences in the face of common danger or, inspired by common ambition and on the basis of a written code, come together. In that case a *lex talionis* is a distinct ethical advance. When a fellow-tribesman by treaty injures me I do not kill him, as I would before a treaty relationship, but my primitive reaction is limited to the injury he has inflicted upon me: eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth. The normal outcome of all angry primitive reactions is extermination. On low levels of culture this is clearly seen. The most trivial injury demands the killing of the one inflicting an injury. Even on high levels of culture traces of this stage of feeling may be seen, as in Mitford's *Tales of Old Japan*.

The social philosophy of Bismarck and Treitschke reflects this underlying group sense that self-maintenance knows no ethics, save only as a letter of treaty law with sufficient force to compel obedience establishes an ethics. Diplomacy therefore lies without shame, and betrays allies without a blush. Force is, in the last analysis, from this point of view the only foundation upon which rests a national life, and self-maintenance and expansion are the only national duties.

If, then, the coercions of a group organised as a political unit have as their interest self-maintenance, and are essentially untrammelled by ethical considerations, another situation

emerges when we look within the group. Here also are coercions, sometimes as sudden and as painful as the angry primitive reactions of an insulted group upon its enemy. At the same time they differ *in toto* in fundamental purpose. These reactions are no longer directed solely to self-maintenance; they are the disciplinary reactions that prepare the immature for maturity. They differ wholly from the coercions of the first type in that the interest of the one who is coerced is always prominent, if not the predominant element in the situation. The stag will push very roughly the doe that lingers dangerously long on the sunlit pasture; but he intends to save her, not to hurt her. The preservation and expansion of the other-self is the dominant end and goal of the family type of coercion. Unsocial conduct will provoke angry discipline, which in its outward expression differs not at all from retaliation, but which is essentially different in that the prevention of such unsocial conduct and the reclaiming of the member of the group is consciously or unconsciously the underlying impulse, and not the extermination of the offending one.

The dire confusion of these two types of coercion in our theology and criminal jurisprudence has wrought untold injury to the effectiveness of our social reactions. Retaliation has no logical limits on this side of extermination. If a man injures me, no term of imprisonment or pecuniary fine is really adequate retribution. Pain and a moral offence are incommensurate quantities. The social injury done by a thief cannot be measured in terms of lonely hardships in prison. There is no expiation of guilt possible, for the hands of history's clock cannot be set back, and there is no equivalent in pain or anguish for a social wrong. It is done, and cannot be undone. You can kill the offender, but you cannot, even in eternity, measure that wrong in terms of his pain and suffering. They are simply incommensurate. As well might we try to measure a picture by weight or music by quantity.

Evangelical theology has been very largely lost in this



primitive moral quagmire. Middle-Age theology had uncritically accepted the feudal symbolic vindications of honour as permanent moral attitudes, and evangelicalism has equally thoughtlessly accepted Middle-Age theology. The "Wehrgeld" of Germanic law or custom was in effect a bribe to the injured group not to pursue their right of blood revenge to the bitter limit of extermination. And feudal vindications of honour all bear the marks of such compromises. These vindications—the duel, etc.—had no disciplinary or educational inspiration. They were treaty compromises to prevent the internal weakening of groups which were bound together for defence. Anselm's explanation of the Atonement moves in the realm of feudal honour, and the legal compromises made to save that honour at some less cost than the extermination of the offender. There can be, in logic, no expiation of sin short of the elimination of the sinner.

Once, however, the conception of God given us by Jesus begins to organise our thought, the whole series of notions of "revenge," "expiation," "retaliation," "vengeance," become immoral and unreal. A father on the highest plane of fatherhood cannot consciously seek "revenge" upon his erring child. There may be punitive reactions, but even in so far as they are angry they are immoral, because the goal of the punitive reaction is the redemption to social relation of the offending one, which social relations have been injured or destroyed by the offence, and anger is a hindrance to such restoration. There is no such thing as an abstract righteousness. That notion is mythological. Righteousness is a relationship between concrete personalities and must always remain relative, and in the last analysis is determined by the social character of that relationship.

The older theologies and penologies proceed on the basis of a relationship between persons which we now realise was essentially immoral. They assume a hostile attitude as that of the group to the offender or of God to the sinner. Whereas a group should never be in a hostile attitude to a member of

the group; and God is never in a hostile attitude towards one of His own children, if Jesus has not misrepresented Him. We may, by unsocial conduct, cut ourselves off from God or our group, and punitive reactions may be our deserved portion, but their end is the conservation of a complex interest, of which one element is our restoration to social fellowship.

Punitive reaction seeks to conserve the life of the group in all its aspects, and has in view the several interests involved. The interest of the offending one is ever involved in the life of the group. His exclusion in any way is a weakness: his restoration to a normal social status is a strength. Punitive coercions, then, in order to be moral, must be undertaken with the interest of the coerced one in view: they can never be taken in a hostile attitude towards the offender. These punitive reactions are disciplinary coercions of one kind or another with the intent to restore an offender to the status of ethical maturity which has been lost by his offence. Even if the group despairs of one of its members, and permanently excludes him from social relationships (capital punishment or life imprisonment), it should not do so in anger, and, if really thoughtful, realises that the exclusion is not retaliation or revenge, but simply conservation of the unity of social purpose. The blot on lynch law is the anger and passion that marks its coercion. It is essentially immoral because of the hostile attitude toward the poor offender. He would be a moral pervert who helped lynch his brother or his son. Yet all men are in theory our sons and brothers.

On the other hand, the philosophical anarchist who rejects all coercion can never really accept the logic of his own position. He cannot refuse to lovingly coerce a child, for instance, to save its immaturity from leading to the child's death. What anarchy really should reject is unloving and angry coercion, and there any moral man should gladly acquiesce. The criminal should be treated as a morally immature member of the group, and all punitive reactions should have as their goal the conservation of all interests



involved in which the interest of the offender is vitally prominent. Righteous indignation on account of unsocial conduct should never mislead us into a hostile attitude toward the offender, although it may prompt us to protective punitive reactions, for the conservation of life and the redemption of the unsocial sinner.

Thus a redemptive goal should mark all really moral punitive coercions. The reaction is aimed at the conservation of the group's interest as well as the interest of the punished one ; but because of the sense of membership one in another the conservation of the offender to the life of the group can never be lost sight of, and this inclusion of his interest in the punitive reaction gives any coercion its claim to moral character. And as we rise to higher and larger sense of fellowship with one another and with God, we will take up seriously the task of moralising our penology and our theology.

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## THE CHILD AND THE CINEMATO- GRAPH SHOW.

THE REV. CANON H. D. RAWNSLEY.

*WITH A NOTE BY THE HEADMASTER OF ETON.*

THERE appears to be passing over the land a real craving for scenes of horror. The Salome dance with the head of John the Baptist in a charger seems to appeal to spectators at one end of our social scale, and the other end is supposed to take delight in such a disgusting exhibition as was chronicled for us in the daily press of the 15th of March, where at a music hall in London an Indian fakir, Sulieman Ben Said, entertained the audience by piercing his cheeks and arms and neck with a long needle, by dancing on broken glass, and driving a sword through his abdomen.

It is true that when the said fakir went round the stalls exhibiting his mutilations several people in the audience are said to have fainted; but that it should have been possible for the management to have admitted such a display for a "variety turn" shows that the horrible or the sensational is a paying concern, and the public expect it.

It is not improbable that the cinematograph film has a good deal to answer for in this matter of the public demand for horror and sensation. On many of the hoardings near the cinematograph halls or pavilions, beneath the sensational programmes are written such words as "nerve thrillers," "eye-openers to-night," and when we turn to these programmes we cannot



help noticing that it is the horrible that draws. "Massacre: a terrific tragedy, 2000 feet"; "The Wheel of Destruction"; "The Motor Car Race: the car when going at prodigious speed overturns and buries its living occupants. Don't miss this." "Dante's Hell," the Devil film, with a huge invitation beneath it, "Don't miss this opportunity of seeing Satan—Satan and the Creator; Satan and the Saviour, 4000 feet in length": all these are signs of a downgrade pandering to a sense of horror which is being fostered throughout the length and breadth of the land by the downgrade film.

I spoke to a boy about twelve years old who had attended a cinematograph show in a little country town a week or two ago, and he positively trembled as he reported what he had seen. He said, "I shall never go again. It was horrible." I said, "What was horrible?" He said, "I saw a man cut his throat."

As I write, a friend tells me that a week or two ago his neighbours, seeing pictures of Sarah Bernhardt advertised as the chief item in a cinematograph show, visited the hall with their little daughter. They found to their disgust the bulk of the entertainment was sensational horrors of such a character that in consequence they were obliged to sit up all night with the child, who constantly woke with screams and cries.

Another friend gave an account of a programme to a mixed audience, the bulk of which were children, in a northern town, and amongst the items were the following: "Dogs killing rats in a rat pit," "Champion prize fight," "A public execution in the East."

Nor is this sense of horror alone appealed to. Many of these films prove to be direct incentives to crime. Clever burglaries are exhibited before the eyes of mischievous boys, who at once have their attention called to the possibility of the "expert cracksman's" life.

In the *Edinburgh Evening Dispatch* of 12th April, two schoolboys are reported as appearing in the Sheriff Court and pleading guilty to three charges of theft. The only

reason the parents could give why the boys had gone astray was the reading of pernicious literature and their attendance at picture houses.

At least the occasion was an eye-opener for the Sheriff; for to his innocent query, "I thought picture houses were of an educative and edifying character?" the answer came very straightly, "Some of them, my Lord, are not."

Before a large audience in a leading Lancashire town a little time ago, where ninety per cent. of those present were children, the experiences of a Parisian pickpocket were displayed. The culprit flung a packet of cayenne pepper into the face of a lady and robbed her of her purse. Her two little children, six and seven years of age, saw the crime and determined as they lay in bed that night to dress themselves as street singers and to proceed to some of the less reputable cafés in Montmartre. They found the pickpocket entertaining some of his lady friends, and whilst the assembly present applauded their singing and dancing they managed to pick the pocket of the pickpocket, and discover the handkerchief saturated with cayenne pepper and their mother's purse.

The extreme ease with which the pickpocket may begin a successful career would certainly not be lost upon that audience, and our police courts prove that the boy burglar is started out from the cinematograph hall on his new life of adventure. America feels this, and has determined, with national sagacity, that no living pictures of burglars shall be admissible unless the burglar has his back to the people and does not exhibit his tools.

Another film presented for the edification of the little school children on the same occasion represented the attempted lynching of a negro suspected of murdering a white man. The pictures showed a mob of lynchers attacking the prison while the sheriff attempted to defend the prisoner. The next scene showed the panic-stricken negro in his cell making agonised appeals to the sheriff, and the bursting into the cell of the mob. He was seen being dragged from the cell and



carried into the street more dead than alive, where he was rescued from the stake and the revolvers of the southern gentlemen by the sudden arrival of a witness to prove uncontestably that the white man had died an accidental death.

In an earlier scene one of these southern gentlemen, who were about to lynch the negro, had, so a witness of the film assures us, amused the children by seizing a dog which had annoyed him, and practically torn it to pieces before their eyes.

In face of the claims of the cinematograph proprietors that the exhibitions are for the moral improvement and amusement of the masses, and in opposition to all the tall talk about the educational value of the film to which the trade from time to time treats us, we have only to reply, "Look at your posters and the items of horror or fierce excitement or degrading sensationalism which, in spite of Mr Redford and his censorship, are still being exhibited up and down the country, to the detriment and discouragement of the nobler feelings of gentleness and compassion!"

The worst of it all is, that neither the police nor the agents of the cinematograph firms who are sent out as exhibitors, are sufficiently educated to know what is horrible and what is not. Thus, for example, when the mayor was appealed to in a town where the most terrible exhibition of the horrors of hell and the tortures of the damned were being visibly enacted as illustrations in gross caricature of Dante's *Inferno*, he in turn appealed to the police to visit the cinematograph hall and report. The officer, who was well up in the legal aspect of the case and was probably on the look-out for a criminally indecent film as a thing to be objected to, reported to the mayor that he could see nothing objectionable in this horrible Hell film, and therefore had not thought it necessary to speak to the exhibitor.

Again, not long ago I was appealed to by a film exhibitor to intercede for him with the manager of the hall, who had severely reprimanded him for allowing a certain film to be presented at an afternoon performance when children were

present. "Well," said I, "what was the film?" "There was no harm in it at all," he said; "it was the finest natural-history study of lions that children could ever see." Further inquiry elicited the fact that the scene really represented the terrible tragedy of a lion-tamer being torn to pieces in the den, above which his lady-love, as spectator of the tragedy, was hanging on a trapeze.

What the public really needs is, that in every town where cinematograph halls are springing up like mushrooms, there should be trained inspectors, men or women who should know at a glance a downgrade or demoralising film when they see it, and should at once report it to headquarters.

It is not only the sensational, cruel, or crime film that is sowing seeds of corruption among the people. The film manufacturers have invaded the most holy mysteries of our religious faith. There can be no question that in suitable surroundings, and with specially reverent treatment, pictures from the life of our Lord may be impressive and educational, but the idea of exploiting the life of our Lord as a commercial speculation, and the getting a troupe of actors to go out to Palestine and pose *in situ* as His disciples, and as impersonators of the scenes described in the Gospels, is in itself abhorrent; and the quickness of motion needed by the film takes away reverence and imparts a sense of what is artificial, and sometimes almost comic. A cinematograph theatre is not the place for an exhibition of pictures of this character. Child and adult alike will unconsciously put upon the same level for respect and reverence series of pictures which they see exhibited in the same hall and with the same surroundings, though one may be called comic and the other sacred, and though the one is intended to appeal to love of excitement and the other to the religious sense.

The ordinary film exhibition seems to lack all sense of proportion. Lately a Devil, or Satan film has been making a tour of the cinematograph halls in the North. The Durham people were invited to go to Newcastle, by large placards on



the hoardings assuring them that there were three thousand feet of this Devil film, and that they ought not to miss it. One might have been pardoned for the thought that it was an unnecessary journey to take. His Satanic majesty does not look on Newcastle as his only place of resort.

A clerical friend of mine who "went to see the Devil," told his congregation the following Sunday that "he had never been more ashamed or miserable in his life at the spectacle which, as a Lenten penance, he had undertaken at the request of friends to witness and report upon." This is what he said—his words are worth quoting, they are much to the point:

"It is a perfectly different thing to show lantern pictures of holy things in a church; they form part of a religious service, and the people come prepared to watch them in a reverent spirit. It has been our custom in this church, when we show a picture during Holy Week of our Blessed Lord kneeling in His agony of prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane, for the whole congregation to kneel down reverently while the picture is on the screen. We all feel that those moments in His life are so sacred that we ought only to look upon them as we humbly kneel upon our knees. Well, at the theatre the other night the audience had been talking and laughing as usual during an interval and discussing the weird contortions and stealthy plots of the handsome, up-to-date Satan. The lights were suddenly lowered, and the first picture to appear on the screen was our dear and holy Saviour kneeling in His agony in the Garden, and *Satan jumping out of the earth in a puff of smoke by our Saviour's side, like a clown shooting up through the stage at a pantomime.* Can that sort of thing be right? In another scene, when Satan brought a bad case—a man whom he himself had possessed—to test whether our Lord could or could not perform the miracles He claimed the power to do, Jesus cured the man, and, brethren, some of the audience in the pit clapped Him! I don't blame them so much as those who are responsible for presenting the Son of

God incarnate in such a position upon a modern stage that it is possible for people to clap Him.

“The cinematograph has become a great power in the world. It is one of the most pressing public duties of our day to see that the thousands of picture palaces which have come to stay shall be an inspiration for good in every way—and not for evil,—and, above all, that not the slightest opportunity shall be given for vulgarising the beautiful life and most precious death of the most sublime and glorious Son of Man, Jesus Christ our Lord and beloved Master. ‘Noli me tangere.’”

This Satan film scandalised the town where my friend lives, and the magistrates have determined that henceforth no pictures that touch on biblical history other than mere scenes in the Holy Land shall be permitted. The monopolies granted to the cinematograph hall proprietors do not warrant such outrage on religious feeling being tolerated in a Christian country.

It is not only the health of the religious and moral sense and spiritual understanding of the child which needs safeguarding. The time has come when the educationists of the country must realise that it is no use spending millions of money upon elementary education if children beneath school age are allowed to attend a cinematograph show till eleven o'clock at night, and then go home so overwrought and excited by the scenes they had witnessed that sleep is impossible.

I say overwrought advisedly, for it was reported in the press a short time ago that a child going home from a cinematograph hall pleaded piteously with a policeman to protect him from those two men with long beards that were following him. The two men with long beards were two ruffians that he had seen, and actually supposed to be living beings, in a cinematograph film that night.

This side of the educational question has roused the Liverpool magistrates to action. They were astonished to find, on inquiry, how large the child patronage of the cinematograph hall had become. A census was taken on a certain Saturday in November last, in Liverpool, with the result that it was proved



that there were 13,332 children below the age of fourteen present at matinées held in twenty-seven halls in that city, which appeared to cater especially for children so far as the price of entrance was concerned. The children's ages, so an official report of the special Committee appointed to inquire into this matter informs us, ranged from four or five up to thirteen, and they were viewing the ordinary films shown at the other performances during the rest of the week. Parts of the programme were composed of pictures of a sensational character, some showing crimes, others serious accidents, while not a few were suggestive of immorality.

The Committee, after most careful inquiry, which included the hearing of the cinematograph proprietors' side of the question, took counsel with the Director of Education in Liverpool, who furnished them with an important report upon the whole subject. In his judgment, the educational value, in the strict sense of the term, of the cinematograph show was very much exaggerated as regards children. He admitted the recreative aspect of the cinematograph, but called the attention of the magistrates to the fact that time after time boys were brought up for petty theft, and it had been found that the money had been stolen in order to secure admission to a cinematograph display. His chief quarrel, from an educational point of view, was that the cinematograph added one more to the temptations of city life, which kept children out of bed, and in a condition of excitement which is a serious obstacle to their physical and educational progress.

He urged that the magistrates, who had two years before refused to allow children under school age to be present after nine o'clock at these displays, should in future extend their rule to apply to all evening performances, whether the first or second house, and that the hour of seven should be substituted for nine o'clock.

He urged also with regard to Saturday afternoon matinées, where special films for children were offered, that the magistrates should exclude films depicting scenes in which there was any

suggestion of crime or immorality, or even of rough horse-play—which on occasion is hardly to be distinguished from assault—and should include on these occasions a certain number of films that may be accepted as having more educational value, such as scenes in foreign lands, historical incidents, Nature subjects, and the like.

The Liverpool Committee of Licensing Magistrates, after going thoroughly into the subject, determined to draft and issue new rules for all premises licensed for cinematograph exhibitions. They knew that the British Board of Film Censors had been established under the presidency of Mr G. A. Redford, and that an organisation called the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association of Great Britain and Ireland had also been formed, and they knew that most of the licensees in their city had joined the Association. But notwithstanding that Mr Redford would in future certify films (1) for public exhibition to adults, (2) for universal exhibition specially recommended for children's matinées, they felt, after the complaints that had been brought before them, that this form of censorship did not go far enough, and they determined that in future, on receipt of a complaint from any source, they would request the licensee to exhibit to them the film referred to, and in event of there being two or three well-founded complaints against the hall during the period for which the licence was granted, the justices should have power to order the licence to be cancelled or be suspended for such period as they should think fit.

In addition to this, the Liverpool Bench decided to demand that each licensee should, by noon on Monday in each week, send to the superintendent of police for the division in which the licensed premises are situated, their programme of performances, giving the names of the films intended to be exhibited, and if no such programme were issued, then a list of the films; and if it were necessary to substitute any film for those shown on the programme or list, they demanded that a notice should forthwith be sent to the police.



But their chief anxiety was on behalf of the scholar at the elementary school, and they determined that henceforth children under fourteen years of age should not be allowed to enter or be on licensed premises after the hour of 6.30 p.m. unless accompanied by parents or guardians. They also decreed that in the event of any department of an elementary school situated within a radius of a quarter of a mile being closed by reason of the prevalence of any infectious disease, the justices might, for such periods as they think fit, direct the licensee to exclude from the licensed premises all children under the age of fourteen years.

With regard to the evening performance, where children were admitted for 2d. or less, they determined that only such films as were specially suitable for children should be exhibited. With regard to the free tickets and prizes for children to induce them to attend, a system which has grown up owing to competition between the various cinematograph halls, the magistrates decided that no free tickets or reduced admission should be given except to persons who exhibited bills of the entertainment about their shops or premises, and in each case the number of tickets so given should be limited to two.

It having come to the notice of the magistrates that the darkness of the halls had administered to indecent behaviour, and that with a higher power of illumination in the lantern the cinematograph film could be quite easily shown in a hall that was not entirely darkened, they determined that "when licensed premises are open to the public there should be sufficient light in the hall of the premises to enable any person present to see clearly to all parts of the hall from any part thereof."

This is an important rule, for not only did the darkness minister to horseplay and give a chance to the pickpocket, but, as reported in the *Yorkshire Post* of 25th March, it actually allowed the long hair of a young girl at Hull to be cut off by some hair-stealer for his own purposes.

Of course the cinematograph trade is up in arms. The

holders of ten millions of money invested in the business which is virtually a monopoly for those who obtain licences, are crying out that under such restrictions profits will be impossible. The best answer to this is that there seems to be no diminution of applicants for the licensing of cinematograph premises, and the trade will find eventually that a large number of people who now, because of the possible vulgarity and horror of some sensational film, keep away and refuse to allow their children to attend, will, if these orders of the magistrates become general, no longer abstain from the pleasure or profit of a wholesome cinematograph display.

Since the Liverpool magistrates came to their decision, Middlesbrough and Carlisle, with some variations, have followed suit, and it is believed that educational authorities throughout the land are coming to agreement as to the need of protection for young children.

With regard to the pernicious post-card. Those of us who know the facts are all agreed that the comic post-card of to-day—with its crude colouring, its vulgarity, its suggestive letter-press, its immodesty, its verge sometimes on blasphemy, and sometimes its hardly veiled indecency—is a real menace to the morality and refinement of the young, for whose education, in elementary and secondary schools alike, the British ratepayer is now heavily taxed.

Why should he stand by and see this waste of public money, and this danger to the nation's well-being and morals, its sense of reverence and religion, its sense of art, its sense of humour, by tolerating for a week the open exhibition, in main streets and back streets alike, of these offensive post-cards?

One answer to this is that the Churches are asleep: that men who by profession and practice are religious, right-thinking, godly men, whether lay or cleric, have never troubled their heads to think about the matter or opened their eyes to see the scandal.

I spoke not long since to a worthy rural dean about the



atrocious vulgarity of the post-card window in his market town. He said, "I have passed that window twenty times in the last fortnight, and never noticed anything amiss."

But if *he* did not notice, the young Sunday scholars on their way to and from Sunday-school did, for the vendor carefully kept his blind up and went in for a Sunday show; and anyone who has listened, as I have listened, to the talk of quite young children about these abominable window exhibitions, will know how very early on in life the disgusting innuendo is understood and the foul suggestion made a note of.

Now, what can be done? This, first: we can acquaint ourselves with the state of the law, which ought to protect the public, but fails. We can urge that the recommendations of the Joint Select Commission on Lotteries and Indecent Advertisements, which published the result of its labours so long ago as 1908, shall no longer be a dead letter, but that the criminal laws shall be simplified and amended as was then proposed. We may take a leaf out of the Swiss Cantonal Law of Berne—and insist that in place of the word "indecent" the word "offensive" shall admit of prosecution by the police.

We may call attention to the working of the Hull and Bradford Acts, which enable the police to deal much more summarily with offenders; obtain search warrants on adequate grounds of suspicion that indecencies are offered for sale at shops, and instead of having to prove exposure for sale, are able to put the onus of proof to the contrary on the right shoulders, viz. the vendor. We can take the police much more into our confidence, and through our watch committees and vigilance committees urge them to greater activity in keeping an open eye on this demoralising trade.

But there is a more excellent way. The fact that ninety per cent. of these offensive vulgarities, banalities, and indecencies are of British manufacture, and that the firms are well known, make it possible for a *local* stationers' association, or trade association in friendly co-operation with the police, to

establish, without much trouble, a local censorship of post-cards. At Douglas, Isle of Man, practically the whole trade has agreed to leave the censoring of post-cards in the hands of three men; they informed the manufacturers that none but the post-card designs the censors had passed would be stocked or sold by the trade; and they not only communicated with the manufacturers as to what post-cards were passed and what were not passed, but also with the Chief Constable, who, with his officers, worked in hearty co-operation.

The work was not light. Seven thousand designs for one season were presented to the trade by the manufacturers, who sent on their samples before their travellers called; and it speaks volumes for the careful scrutiny, as it also opens our eyes to the carelessness or worse of the manufacturers, that twenty-five per cent. of all the cards that came before the censors were *not* passed.

The Isle of Man Censorship Committee have given attention also to the pedlars' licences, and the police have been able to considerably restrict these. The selling of offensive post-cards by pedlars needs attention throughout the country. The dealers in the worst class of cards are wastrel pedlars who frequent tourist resorts in the season.

What has been done so well at Douglas has been equally successful at Blackpool—where seven censors, from among the hundred and twenty-five stationers who have joined, are appointed to consider the post-card designs—at Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft. At Great Yarmouth the censorship of the trade in post-cards was called into being because of the two or three successful prosecutions by the police. An offender on that occasion pleaded that he really did not know in the present state of the law what was and what was not permissible; and I do not wonder, for the manufacturers know pretty well how near they may safely sail to the line of prosecution.

A noticeable feature at Great Yarmouth was that the Mayor himself convened the trade, that the Town Clerk attended unofficially, and the local censorship, in co-operation



with the police, was there and then fixed upon. The committee was formed of five members representing various types of traders. Unfortunately, this did not take place till July, just after the tradesmen had got their stocks in. The censors had a difficult task, and decided to deal leniently in this first season. Nevertheless they had to condemn thousands, and the tradesmen returned them to the manufacturers. Some of the firms indignantly threatened to sue for their value from the dealers, but they thought better of it. Only one or two tradesmen out of the two hundred and fifty dealers in post-cards in Yarmouth stood out. These soon came into line, for the police co-operated with the trade. The travellers submitted their samples of post-cards to the censors, as they had done at Douglas and Blackpool, and in a short time the town was cleared.

What is really needed is that a special and serious effort should be made by licensing authorities, vigilance and watch committees, local trade associations, stationers' and newsagents' associations, in this post-card censorship. So good an authority as Sir Adolf Tuck agrees with me that safety lies this way, and he asserts that the trouble has grown because of keen competition among vendors; but if the stationers' trade will only combine, this competition is dead, and the trade, anxious to rid itself of those vulgarities and worse, will be glad.

The press is with us, and the trade as a whole is with us, and I urge with might and main that the clergy, ministers, laymen and lay-women of all the Churches should be up and doing in a great cause—the cause of the moral health of the nation.

At the last meeting of Convocation of the Northern Province, I proposed the following resolution, which was unanimously passed:—

“With regard to pernicious post-cards, this House is glad to know that an Association of Picture Post-card Publishers has been formed to oppose the publication of vulgar, suggestive, and offensive post-cards; meanwhile it calls on all the

Churches to encourage the retailers of picture post-cards to establish, in co-operation with the police, a local censorship of these cards, as has already been successfully done at Douglas, Isle of Man, Blackpool, and Yarmouth, and thus safeguard the public from their offensive vulgarity and demoralisation."

Since that time I have been in correspondence with the chief constables, the newsagents' associations, and the mayors of most of our seaside resorts, and with the bishops of the Northern Province. There is a general consensus of opinion to the effect that a local censorship as above mentioned is the best solution of the difficulty. Meanwhile, Mr M'Crum, the Secretary of the Post-card Publishers' Association, is doing what he can to induce the manufacturers themselves to become their own censors. The difficulty seems to be that there are certain firms that make a speciality of the comic post-card, and that a great number of them are printed at private presses in our big cities. To a suggestion that an Act of Parliament should oblige all post-card manufacturers to give their names and addresses, I was assured that, as a matter of fact, there was no need for this, for the makers of the bulk of these offensive post-cards were quite well known to the trade.

There seems general agreement among police authorities that to deal with the offensively vulgar and downgrade comic card new legislation and a new definition of the word indecent is needed. We have all of us been expecting legislation to deal with this and kindred evils as the result of the Joint Select Committee on Lotteries and Indecent Advertisements, which reported the result of their labours in July of 1908. Long delay maketh the heart sick; but though it is known that such a bill is in draft and that the powers that be are friendly to such legislation, the answer to inquiry at headquarters is always the same, "We see no chance of such legislation this session." It is all the more necessary that we should take voluntary and combined action in the matter and get the police and the trade to act together in an attempt to rid our land of an intolerable nuisance.



For further information as to the method of starting a comic post-card campaign, I would advise your readers who are interested to write to Mr H. Hough, Walpole Avenue, Isle of Man; to Mr F. Sweeten, Continental Bazaar, Bank Hey, Blackpool; or to Mr E. J. Middleton, 73 Victoria Road, Great Yarmouth.

H. D. RAWNSLEY.

KESWICK.

#### NOTE ON THE EDUCATIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPH.

THE information supplied by Canon Rawnsley in the above article is disquieting enough, as it seems to show that the interests vested in the cinema movement are so powerful, or the public indifference so profound, that pictures indubitably pernicious in character continue to be shown. But it will not be long before a check is devised for these, and the example of the more wide-awake Borough Councils will be followed far and wide. All that is required is publicity. What is a far less assailable evil is the influence of so-called innocent pictures, as to which we have to clear our minds first on the difference between real and sham learning.

Moving pictures of historic scenes, etc., or those which are broadly called educational, are defended by the use of the magic-lantern, in schools of the most varied type, for the purpose of popular lectures. It is urged that if well-to-do folk can afford to pay lecturers, why should not the poor have the same instruction cheaply? But it ought to be known that magic-lantern slides are used very infrequently and with many restrictions in schools: the reason being that any competent teacher knows that they can do very little towards building up sound knowledge, but a good deal towards giving a feeling of learning without the reality. When they are used as subsidiary to a school lesson they are very carefully chosen, arranged in a rational order, and connected if possible with the

ordinary oral teaching: in any case, much depends on the explanations given by the exhibitor. When they are parts of an evening entertainment which professes to be instructive, they are probably divorced altogether from the school teaching, and are found to be quite valueless unless they happen to be related in some special way to the experience of the young folk. In short, as a means of instruction they are worse than useless unless they are reminders of knowledge previously acquired, or are used as illustrations of what has only been before apprehended dimly from the spoken or written word, and are so infrequently employed as to be something of a treat. Needless to say, all these conditions are carefully violated by the ordinary cinema show. Further, as it is found that pictures of objects out of the range of children's experience bore them, it is difficult for the companies to abstain from representations of scenes on the borderland of the criminal, or at least provocative of maudlin sentimentality or unwholesome excitement.

I am in hopes that when means have been found for banning the baneful pictures, our town children may discover that the others are to them simply wearisome, and so a wholesomer state of things come about automatically. But there is reason to believe that for a considerable period, and among masses of children who know no better, the intellectual influence of the cinema will be deplorable.

In all schools the theory that young minds are receptacles into which you can pour knowledge is firmly fixed, in spite of the reiterated contradictions to it which every teacher's experience affords. Some, however, have contrived to learn that new knowledge should be built up on previous knowledge, and this is called proceeding from the known to the unknown. These are quite happy in imparting information to languid boys, so long as it follows a certain progression. If it doesn't excite interest, then it must be because the boys are fools. Yet from time to time a gifted teacher arises and shows how fresh and natural a process learning is if children are



allowed to use their own activities and surmount their own little problems unaided. Whatever misgivings may be felt about some of its features, the Montessori system is indubitably sound in so far as it succeeds in inducing children to employ prolonged concentrated effort in the solving of difficulties of increasing complexity. It is impossible to conceive of two processes of mind more hopelessly unlike than that shown by children finding out truths for themselves by experiment, and that of the closely packed swarms in a darkened theatre gazing at rapidly changing pictures of every conceivable form of life all over the globe: the ruins of a Greek temple to begin with, a rustic love-story to go on with, followed by boot-making in Hong-Kong, then a lion hunt in Nairobi, then the dodging of a detective at Wapping Old Stairs, etc. etc. Is it really contended that the human mind can be battered into receptivity by being exposed to a deluge of unrelated and mostly unintelligible facts?

The truth is, the influence of the moving pictures is prejudicial to learning exactly in the same way as the reading of snippets of information in halfpenny newspapers, only to a much greater degree. It is deceptive as continuous unreflective reading of even good books is deceptive, and only differs from this last in being more deceptive and more pernicious. Somebody recently called attention to the fact that in ancient Greece, where intellectual training was uniquely successful, the young people read no books,<sup>1</sup> but heard first-rate stuff recited on occasions, and employed their abundant leisure in thinking on what they had heard and talking it over with their friends. Compare with this state of things the modern England, wherein we are told there are fifty books published daily throughout the year! Sensible people have long decried the reading of snippets. Why, then, is it that the same people make no stir about the cinema? Just as the snippets

<sup>1</sup> Readers of Freeman's *Schools of Hellas* may demur to this statement, but the intellectual pabulum must have been very scanty and very choice: cf. pt. i. ch. iii. p. 93.

predispose young people against serious reading, so does the cinema: the only difference being that it acts far more decisively.

At the back of this travesty of learning is the idea that there is some magic in unassimilated facts shoved somehow into the mind, irrespective of the question what happens to them subsequently. It seems to be believed that the reflective faculty requires them as material on which to work. But I have heard an extremely able critic of the human mind deliberately assert that he did not know a single living person who had not more facts in his mind than he (or she) was able to sort. I should unhesitatingly corroborate this statement. It anyhow requires attention, and, if judged to be sound, it ought to modify the prevailing belief not only in picture-shows, but even in serious lectures when attended by unprepared students.

Another force at the back of the movement is the ten millions of pounds sterling said to be invested in it in England alone. That means that any restriction of the insane debauching of the intelligence of our town children is likely to be opposed by serried hosts who differ from their antagonists in clearly knowing their own mind. I will therefore urge one more consideration which seems to have so far escaped notice.

There is no time when a young child's brain is so severely taxed as when he is looking at pictures. The faculties of putting two and two together, of recollecting, of discarding hypotheses, of collating and observing, are all active, and the effort for a five-year-old mind must be proportionate to that of an archæologist making out a half-obliterated inscription. If left to themselves, children never look at pictures for long together. Now, what must be the strain for them of trying to keep up with the shifting phantasmagoria before which they are huddled often for three hours at a stretch? If the English people wish to commit race suicide they can do it by overtaxing the brain energy of the very young; and never has human ingenuity invented a device more efficacious for this sinister



end than the moving pictures. Further, I have seen it stated by a scientific expert that one of the results we must look forward to is a development of a disease of the eye, already known as the moving-picture eye; and he incidentally mentions that one of the symptoms of this pleasing complaint is an increased activity of the lachrymal glands. If this is true—and it is quite credible,—let us contemplate the England of the next generation as peopled by men and women who have had their nervous systems spoilt, their imaginations ruined, their curiosity crushed, in order to learn one thing only, viz. how to weep at nothing at all.

*“Non his iuventus orta parentibus. . . .”*

EDWARD LYTTTELTON.

ETON.

## EVIL.

### A DISCUSSION FOR THE TIMES.

J. N. LARNED.

AT an uncertain time, not long ago, in a remote community, there was held a great council of thoughtful men, who sought a common understanding and agreement as to what relief from the evils that afflict mankind may, with reasonableness, be pleaded for to the throne of Heaven. Of their number, or of circumstances of their meeting, there is no discoverable journal or report; but, fortunately, some notes of the debate that occurred have come to light.

It appears from these notes that discussion in the council was opened by a question from the presiding officer, who asked: "Have we any supreme desire in our minds which claims consideration first?" An eager voice answered: "To have no more death in the world"; and other voices joined the cry. But they were hushed when one, venerable in years, who wore the flowing robes of the East, stood forth and spread out his hands, as though silence must come at his bidding. "Be not in haste, O my brother," he appealed, "to deliver yourselves from Death; to live may so easily be more dreadful than to die. Before we ask for the closing of the door of escape from life by the tomb, let us take care that we are not accepting a captivity which we cannot endure. How shall we dare to fling away our hope of a better world without assurance of some better state of existence in this? Oh, beware! The question concerning Death is not the first that we need to set



our minds upon, but the very last of all. Let it wait, I beseech you."

Quick assent to this appears to have been given by controlling numbers in the assembly, and an order of procedure was now adopted which brought first into debate this question: "*Shall God be asked to take away from men the afflictions of disease and pain that torment their flesh?*"

When two or three had spoken favourably of this, one arose who said: "We are commissioned, as we believe, to submit to the Divine Ruler of the universe such desires concerning the evils that afflict us as 'find clear approval in our minds,' after 'careful thought.' Can any among us have given careful thought to human suffering from ills of the flesh without learning that mostly, if not wholly, they are of man's own making? With every increase of our knowledge we find more and more of our maladies starting plainly from our own ill-dealing with ourselves. What we know of this already affords fair reason for believing that the bodily ills of humanity are wholly of its own creation and within its own control. What then? Shall we ask the Lord, not only to restore health and vigour to bodies that we have wrecked by abuse, but to keep them whole, though we abuse them still? If we herd a million human beings in some narrow city, multiply its walls and the shadow of its walls around them, veil the light of the sun with smoke, poison the air above and the ground beneath with foul secretions, shall we implore Heaven to stifle the fevers for which we are responsible? If the common carelessness of mankind leaves some filthy corner of the world to breed the winged germs of a deadly pestilence until they increase beyond control and are swept across the face of the earth, shall we ask for angels to stand in the way and turn back the plague? Shall we ask God's permission to be brutish, to be dissolute, to be improvident, to be needlessly ignorant, and then to suffer no harm?"

The speaker paused, and a voice from the assemblage cried: "Surely it is possible for the omnipotent author of our being to endow us with bodies that will not sicken, or with minds

more competent for safeguarding them. Why should we not ask for this ?”

“The omnipotence of God,” replied another, “is the omnipotence of perfect reason and righteousness. Its own inerrancy must set bounds to it. It cannot conceivably do anything other than the best. How then can we hope for any other deliverance from ills of the flesh than we now have—namely, the way of Death ?”

“But who knows,” rejoined the same contentious voice, “who knows that Death is a deliverance, and not an extinguishment and an end ?”

“In the common manner of knowing, no man *knows*,” was the reply. “But there are some among us who have a faith which is firm, and there are others who have a hope that is strong ; and those who find neither the faith nor the hope may not have looked for them with an open eye.”

“And if,” said another, “we have no more than the *hope* that life is not ended for us, but only changed, with some blessed enfranchisement, by the mysterious touch of Death, that hope is more reasonable than the sceptic attitude which refuses it. It has more to rest on ; for the feeling of life is solely in this conscious part of us which we call spirit or mind. We identify life with that, never with the bodily part of us which lies outside of every feeling in us that hints of deathlessness. We know that life is alien to its flesh, which lives while it lives by stress of something that is not in itself. We have, therefore, an expectation of decay and death for the body ; but why should we carry over that expectation to the spirit which dwells in the body ? Nothing that we know bids us do so ; no instinctive feeling in us leads that way. It seems to be a needless choosing of despair instead of hope, if we incline against belief in a future life of the soul.”

This was challenged by a questioner who asked : “Can you, with what you doubtless know of the functions of the brain, form a rational conception in your mind of conscious life without the agency of brain to produce it.”



“No,” was the reply; “nor can I shape a distinct thought of mind or conscious life as of something that issues *from* the ponderable and palpable substance of the brain and is extinguished by the dissolution of that substance. It is with me as I judge it to be with all of us. Our thought of this great mystery is indistinct. It lures us to a region of thought in which we find nothing for the shaping of defined concepts, and where we can use no formulas of the logic we apply in argument to tangible things. We bring then into action some superlogical power of the mind—intuition, insight, instinct, we call it—which is not of the essence of strict reason, but may sometimes be truer in judgment than reason.”

This point was questioned no further; but a voice from the more remote seats of the chamber was heard to ask: “If we may not petition for release from the ills of the flesh, what hinders us from asking, at least, that when our bodies are diseased we may be spared the torments of pain?” This drew quickly from another distant voice the counter-question: “What is pain? It is the outcry, is it not, of our sentient flesh when harm comes to it, its signal of distress, its call for help, the physician’s summons and his guide? Without its warning we should be consumed secretly by disease, and Death would steal on us unawares. Are we ready to invoke consequences like these?”

There was a moment of silence, until a new turn in the discussion was started by a speaker who said: “Thus far in our inquiry we have touched only one type of the maladies which oppress mankind. There are others, perhaps more numerous, to be considered. I mean the maladies with which men are born: the maladies which had a beginning, it may be, in the sins, or follies, or ignorance of generations long gone, and which have passed from father to son as a lasting heritage of the race. Since *we* suffer from these, and yet are wholly innocent of their cause, and have no more power to heal them than we have to save ourselves from them, it is reasonable, I am sure, to pray that they be taken from us.”

"This," said the President, "is one of many dark questions that are obviously awaiting us further on in our debate, if we follow the scheme of discussion that has been adopted. The mystery of our evil inheritances, in body and spirit alike, can be looked at in a clearer light, no doubt, when we turn to the moral side of the grave problems we have undertaken to study. I propose, therefore, that we put aside and pass by for the moment this whole question relative to the bodily ills of the human race, and return to it later, when the larger questions that it touches shall have been cleared in our minds."

This proposal was approved, and the council, after some interval of rest, gave attention to the question which came next in the scheme of debate, namely :

*"Does reason justify us in praying to the Divine Father for simpler wants and better ways of life among men, to the end that poverty, with all its suffering, may disappear from the world?"*

"But this," said one who arose quickly, "takes us back to ground which we have just learned we must leave behind us for a time. For man, not God, is the maker of human poverty. None are in want by the will of the Creator. The abundance He has given us surpasses the needs of all. The fruitfulness of our earth has no bounds yet shown. It yields to us more and yet more, without stint, according to the labour and the knowledge with which we make claims on it. Its bounty is priced to us only in toil, and the toil which pays that price to nature, and no more, is a blessing and a joy to them who give it."

"Yes," said a second speaker, "and along with the abounding riches of the earth God gives us the faculties to discover and the powers to command them. They increase with the growth of our needs, as we rise to higher conditions of life. We are masters, or may be, of more than all mankind can rationally use and enjoy. By God's appointment there is no place for poverty in the midst of this plenty, but it is man who has contrived, as much as lies in his power, to keep it from



the many, for the surfeiting of the few. It is man who has filled his world with the miseries of want.

“Two parties of mankind have divided between them the execrable work. The members of one have wrought through generations of vice, idleness, scorn of knowledge, and contempt for good, to destroy every useful faculty in themselves. These can do no profitable part of the work of the world, and their portion of the harvests which they neither sow nor reap is a dole to them from the pity of their fellows. The other party is composed of those who bring cunning and greed into their work; who are busier and more skilful in the garnering than in the tillage; who contrive to be bailiffs and factors among their simpler-minded neighbours, and who gather to themselves the common product according to their opportunities. The monstrous wealth which such men heap up lessens the portions of all others, and keeps great numbers so near to want that even slight misfortune brings misery.”

“True,” added a third speaker, “and even the suffering from poverty which innocent misfortune and calamities of nature may produce is commonly a fruit of wrongdoing among men. When its cause does not lie in the improvidence of the sufferers, it is most often discoverable in greed. If there remains some small residue of want, among the feeble and the helpless, for which men should have no blame, is there too much of it, do you think, for a wholesome and needed exercise of the kindly sympathies of mankind? Would we wish to have the offices of benevolence taken away from us altogether?”

The President now interposed to remark: “Enough, I judge, has been said on this point for the present. It cannot be doubted that in asking for the removal of want from the world we should be asking for a moral change in men; and that is the subject which we have placed last on our programme for discussion, so that all the problems which seem to meet in it may be considered together. We must now proceed to that.”

This final question was phrased thus: "*Is it fitting that we appeal for Divine Grace to purify the hearts of men; to extinguish the movings of evil thought and desire in everyone; to open their understandings to the light which will make them always wise unto righteousness, and so to cleanse the world of folly and misery and wrong and sin?*"

Two men stood forth at once, and there was debate between them for a time. Questions were asked by the one who spoke first.

"What we now think of asking," said this speaker, "is for a human nature that cannot be otherwise than righteous in conduct and pure in desire. But what is there in right conduct that makes it righteous, or in purity of feeling that makes it pure? Assuredly it is the conscious wish and purpose to be righteous and to be pure. Take that away and you have taken the living principle of rightness and purity out of all human action and feeling. Are we ready, you and I, to be bent to what is good by omnipotence—predestined to it in every act of our lives, with no will or willingness or striving toward it in ourselves; no gladness from it; no merit in it, more than belongs to the good instincts of birds when they feed their young? There is a rectitude like this in the faithful water-wheel, which turns as the stream pushes it, and in no other way. That is rectitude for a machine; it is not righteousness for a moral being. To shape human nature thus would end wickedness in the world, no doubt, and it would end goodness too. It would fill the stage of human life with puppets, sinless and soulless, to act on our earth a poor travesty of the purity and peace of Heaven."

"No," cried the opponent, who stood waiting for an opportunity to speak. "Our brother is mistaken. It is no travesty or mimicry, but the reality of Heaven itself that we would bring to the world if this prayer should prevail. That which we would ask for mankind is what God must have given to His angels. We suppose them to be, not sinless only, but incapable of sin. If our Lord is gracious to us, what shall



hinder the regenerating of mankind to that perfection of being? Will any of us fear to be lowered by a nature which the angels bear?"

"We know nothing of the angels," was the reply. "As we picture them in imagination—inhabitants of Heaven and companions of Deity—they are at a height of being which our understanding cannot reach. It is conceivable to us that in that supernal state the harmony of will with wisdom may become so absolute that freedom and necessity are reconciled and fused in it, and are one constraining fact. If, happily, we dare to hope for a lifting, some time, of the soul of man to that height, it cannot be in this body of flesh. The impossibility is plain. If, therefore, we mean to plead for men that they shall be endowed with the nature of angels, we must pray for their disembodiment and translation to the world of spirit; for not otherwise can we give a ground of reason to the plea.

"Even that, however, would be rash and questionable. For how do we know that any being less than divine can afford to lose the knowledge of evil, or to escape the warfare with it which this life affords? How do we know that Omnipotence, even, can temper a nature lower than its own to perfect righteousness by any gentler process? How do we know that the final wisdom in which evil is extinguished can be attained in any other way than through teaching and discipline which have their beginning in this hard school of sorrow and sin?"

The objector was not silenced. "Even yet," was his rejoinder, "I am not persuaded that the reasoning of our brother is wholly true. He grounds it on belief in the present moral freedom of man; but where is certitude of that to be found? A man who seems to pick his way as he will, at every step in life, is really being pushed at every step, this way or that, by conflicting influences of reason, passion, habit, heredity, and numberless other constraints, and it is the stronger among them which prevail and give their bent to his course. Every act of the man may be accounted for by the

composition of these forces. I see no function left for that imagined sovereign of the mind which we call Will.

“It does not suffice for me to be told that a man is master of his own passions, director of his own faculties, shaper of his own habits; for I find this to be but partly true. I find him born with so much mastery already lost or won for him, that his fate is mostly fixed before his own agency in it begins. Oh, tell me, my brother, where you find reason sufficient for your belief in the moral free agency of man?”

“The proof of my free will is, to me, like the proof of my existence, which I find where Descartes found it,” was the answer. “‘I think; therefore I am.’ In other words, thought involves a consciousness of self and of something which is not self, and can leave the thinker in no possible doubt of his own existence. I carry this a step further, and find that I think morally, being conscious of myself in various states of consciousness which contain the sense of responsibility, right, wrong, guilt, innocence, obligation, duty, and the like. Therefore I am a consciously responsible self, which I could not be without free agency—the power of self-control. This evidence, which I draw only from myself for myself, is convincing to me.

“But I am led to the same conclusion, and with even a stronger conviction, by what I may call the logic of the universe. The evils of the world become explainable if we assume that humanity carries its destinies in its own keeping, and is working out its own development, *with freedom*. Without that assumption the enigma of human existence seems insolent in its mockery of our understanding, and drives us to atheistic despair. I should fear, for my own part, to refuse the belief which has that for its alternative.”

A third disputant now entered the discussion, saying: “The surest knowledge that mankind has acquired is in what we call Science, and nothing in Science is surer than its ascertainment of the rigid reign of law in the universe; the inflexibility of an established order in it; the unbreakable



procession from cause to effect throughout its unceasing successions of change. How could there be that dominance of law and fixity of order if men were made free to disturb the order by exemption from the law?"

A quick answer came from the champion of free agency. "Science has taught us much," he said, "concerning the law that is inherent in the physical constitution of the universe, but little or nothing of the law that rules in the realm of mind. We have no warrant for supposing that the same law has force in both. It seems impossible, indeed, that any parallelism can exist between mental and chemical or mechanical processes; between concepts and molecules; between the association of ideas and the combination of material atoms; between exercise of reason and judgment and the performances of a calculating machine. Mind seems to use the nerve matter of the brain as we use the diaphragms and wires and electric batteries of our telephonic systems. In both cases the use of the physical instruments employed is conditioned and limited by the physical laws to which the instruments are subject; but within those limiting conditions there is presumably a freedom, on the part of the employing agent, as entire in the one case as in the other."

"But give attention for a moment," interposed another, "to that thinking—that process of deliberation out of which the volition comes! The mind gives a hearing, perhaps, to many conflicting persuasions, some for one course of action, some for another; some from ethical, some from practical considerations; some from selfish and some from generous impulses; and there may be affecting the mind varied bodily influences, such as those of age, health, fatigue, and the like, which are not argumentative at all, but which have a powerful effect on the decision to be given. All these factors of influence, as one who writes on the subject has said, 'owe their particular existence at any given moment simply and wholly to the natural course and sequence of events.' Now, what is to be seen in the working of these influences which determine

the man's action—what, I say, is to be seen but an inexorable driving of necessity, from the beginning of time?"

"Yes," was the reply, "that, undoubtedly, is what you must see when you speak of 'the influences which *determine* the man's action.' I will not dispute your statement that the factors of influence which come into the question 'owe their particular existence at any given moment to the natural course and sequence of events.' If I could go further with you and suppose that these influences were self-acting, and could, by some mystery of agreement, determine one's action, then I should believe with you that the decision is a product of necessity, as the influences behind it are. But that is to me an impossible supposition.

"If a suggestion of reason, or a plea of conscience, or a temptation of appetite, or the pressure of habit, could be thought of as being made up of atom-like elements, each charged with some measurable and invariable quantity of influential psychic force, then we might be able to conceive the possibility of some automatic reckoning of the persuasive powers they bring severally to bear on the volitional apparatus of our minds when we are conscious of their conflict, and the consequent possibility of automatic determinations of conduct, in which mind, as mind, would have no agency whatsoever—free or not free. Make the attempt, my friends, to frame such a conception, and see if you do not reject it! See if you are not driven to conclude that the hearings we have consciousness of giving in such instances to contending persuasions must be in their nature judicial; that there must be a tribunal of some nature in the mind which gives such hearings, and adjudicates the pleadings submitted to it; that this tribunal, however constituted, is what we call will, and that there is freedom in its decrees. The pleas before it may come from sources of necessity, but the freedom we feel in the judgment between them is a logical fact."

"Nevertheless," said a new adversary, "the question remains—How can the purposes and plans of God, so far as they



relate to this earth and to man himself, be fulfilled, if man can derange them by free action? If his action can never be contrary to them, then he is not free."

"It would not be difficult to believe," responded another, "that the powers God has given to His human creatures are so limited and the human nature so constituted that they cannot greatly disturb, much less thwart, the Divine purpose. Moreover, I, for one, feel rationally assured that a free action of the human intelligence and will, under the influences to which humanity is subjected, is among the agencies that serve the purposes of God, and for which, in His plans, allowance is made. In this view, Man is invested with a moral responsibility, which I cannot regard as possible otherwise; Creation can be thought of as having a moral object, and the Creator as having an eternal interest and pleasure in His work.

"In my conception of the Creator, His omniscience has been exercised in a perfect foreplanning of the ends of His creative work, and His omnipotence in the animating of forces and processes that will patiently and perfectly work out His design. Formerly men seemed to be required to believe that the creation of the universe was an immediate act, completed in its beginning. 'God spake and it was done,' as the Psalmist stated it. But now we are accepting from the revelations of science a different belief, which permits us to think of the Creator as having an eternal interest in the evolution of His systems of worlds, and of life upon them. We can reasonably think, for example, of the evolution of successive states of society on the earth, successive civilisations, successive races and nations, as all being the result of the working of the forces which execute the Divine design, without thinking that all the details of what became human history were already from the beginning and perpetually present in the Divine Mind, like a composed drama, with actors pre-appointed and stage directions set forth.

"Without the conception of some such large flexibility in the evolution of Man and his environment, it must seem

to us that God's interest and pleasure in His creation ceased with the planning of it, and that the infinity of His being would involve an eternity of *ennui*."

For a short interval there was silence, and then the President spoke, saying: "It is easy for me to believe that the Divine purposes in creation can be accomplished without denying to men such a measure of free agency as would make them responsible, moral beings, and not mere marionettes. If this belief prevails among us, we cannot approve the prayer proposed to us, asking for an exercise of Divine omnipotence to cleanse the world of sin and folly and wrong. It would be a doubtful supplication, even if we look to nothing but our preparation for another world. For I fear that we cannot afford to have one difficulty of right-doing diminished, one consequence of ill-doing shortened or taken away, one lust extinguished in us, one shadow of ignorance illuminated, except by ourselves and for one another."

On this one arose who had been silent hitherto. "I could be persuaded," he said, "to think and feel as you do, my brothers, if our warfare was only with the evil powers that rise against us in our own generation. But when men are struck down, as I see them daily, by some bolt out of the far past, I cannot feel in my heart that they have fallen in fair fight. I find myself more willing to suspect that a dreadful inequity in the operation of natural law has, in some startling way, escaped the notice of the great Ruler, than to believe that it bears His sanction and follows from His command. Therefore, I came to this council under pledge to appeal for the deliverance of mankind from penalties for which the past is responsible."

"Do you not forget," was asked in reply, "that gains of good as well as gatherings of ill are borne down from generation to generation on the same carrier-stream of heredity? Not taints and infirmities alone are transmitted from father to son, but every fresh invigoration of sanity in body or mind that one wins by a temperate, prudent, and virtuous life, is won



also for one's children and children's children. Every conquest one makes of an evil passion or appetite is a conquest that carries help through all coming time to one's descendants. We depend on this persisting heredity—so terrible in one of its aspects, but so benign and so full of great promise in the other—for human advancement. Shall we venture to ask that the stream of transmission be stayed? Shall we dare to renounce for our posterity its whole inheritance from the past, both good and ill? Or shall we pray to have that which is evil sifted out and extinguished, and that which is good made enduring? But this could have no lasting effect, unless freedom of conduct should be taken from man; for just as he now neglects due exertion to restore purity to tainted streams of heredity, so might he then neglect the preservation of a purity which miracle had brought about."

To this another added: "Do not think that our deliverance from these evils of inheritance may be got by crying to God for miracles that would wreck His universe! Rather let us look at them with the awe they command—these consequences, evil and good, which are the manifested truth and honesty of the constitution of the world; inflexible as the righteousness of God! Let us look at them with that light in our minds, and so set ourselves more earnestly to the ranging of our lives and the lives of our fellow-men, in harmony with the order to which they point. We are the keepers of our brethren, no less than of ourselves. All ignorance among them is our shame; all vices among them are our reproach; their sins are our shortcomings,—until we have wrought to the last of our strength for the teaching and uplifting of everyone."

A moment of impressive silence followed these grave words. Then the President arose and said: "The long day of our debate is waning. We have wasted none of it, I think, in useless words. We have looked straightly into the questions that were put before us, and have seen them in many lights. Possibly we are now prepared to decide this final one,

just discussed, which asks: 'Is it fitting that we appeal for Divine grace to purify the hearts of men; to extinguish the movings of evil thought and desire in everyone; to open their understandings to the light which will make them always wise unto righteousness, and so to cleanse the world of folly and misery and wrong and sin?' Those who would have this assembly address such a prayer to our Heavenly Father are asked to rise in their places."

A few arose; but so few from the great multitude that the general disapproval of the proposition was left in no doubt; and none questioned the conclusiveness of the decision as to all matters that had been discussed.

"What, then," said the President, "shall be our response to the gracious invitation, from Heaven, as we believe, which has brought us together? Manifestly we are most of us in agreement as to what the response must be. In conclusion, I will ask you to consider these words which I have written:

"We humbly acknowledge, O God, that there would not be disease in this world, or pain that is not beneficent, or untimely death, or sorrow, or any want that creates distress, or any wrong-doing or evil of any nature, if the reason and the moral consciousness and the faculties and forces which Thou hast given to Thy children of the earth had been used rightly and faithfully in all things by all. We discern, moreover, that Man could not become worthy of the spiritual nature Thou hast given him without the freedom which makes him responsible for his actions. Wherefore our minds make no appeal against any apparent imperfection in the ordering of the world, or for heavenly help in the struggles of human life save that of the strengthening spirit which has always come to those who strive faithfully to the utmost of their powers for the best."

This statement was accepted and adopted by the silent uprising of almost the whole assembly, and then the President, in a few words, declared its session ended.

J. H. LARNED.



## SOCIAL SERVICE. NO. 8.

### A PLEA FOR UNEMPLOYABLES.

THE REV. ARTHUR DALE,

Ancoats, Manchester.

AT the stations and round certain hotels of all large towns and cities there are usually numbers of lads ready to earn a few coppers by carrying parcels or doing any small service. Along the principal thoroughfares the same sort of youth is engaged selling flowers, novelties, or toys. The sale of evening papers, and specially of those which give racing news, is another way in which numbers of such youths get a living. At the police courts scarcely a day passes but some of such lads are sent to prison for petty thefts or loitering with that intent.

It is not difficult to predict their future.

There is a great army of men, and women for that matter, who in normal times are forgotten, but who appear like rats out of holes on occasions. Those who have had experience of soup kitchens in times of special distress will know that of those who apply for relief the majority are chronically unemployed—how they live is a mystery,—and whenever there is a strike or any disorganisation of any kind these people come out of their hiding-places. Numbers of them are registered at the Labour Exchanges, but it is impossible to get them work or to induce them to keep it when it is found. Their existence complicates the problem of unemployment. Many are hopelessly demoralised and spend their lives satisfied

with the minimum of existence, crouching before some lodging-house fire, sleeping in brick crofts, slouching along the streets, picking up refuse, sad, saddened, knowing no shame, having no ambition, passing in and out of prison or the workhouse, a danger to themselves, a burden on the community, and a shame to our modern civilisation.

Again, there are said to be 60,000 tramps in the country. There are many roads all over the country where year in and year out there is a constant procession of men and women on tramp from one casual ward to another. A man, foot-sore, in rags, begs a match or a pipe of tobacco; then comes a man and woman with perhaps two or three children, another man and another, and this goes on all day, all week, all the year. It may be said that the tramp enjoys that security for which kings are fighting, and that if he does nobody harm he has as much right to live in his way as we have in ours. But it is not a satisfactory mode of existence.

Our prisons, as is well known, are recruited largely from one class of the community alone, and it is the class which we are considering. Middle-class people occasionally go to prison, but nine out of ten prisoners are from the working classes: not the regular artisan classes, but those lower in the scale.

It is these classes which are being perpetually recruited from the youth of our towns and cities. I am sure people do not realise how many of these latter are already far on the road to ruin. A few years ago the writer had occasion to pay frequent visits to many common lodging-houses. One fact was impressed upon his mind, the number of youths, and even boys, to be found in them. These youths associated with the older men, and these were by no means desirable companions. He has had built in Manchester a lodging-house specially for lads under twenty-one, and during the past eighteen months at least four hundred lads have been lodged in the place. But this number does not represent the whole number of such lads in Manchester lodging-houses. Some



of the lads are orphans, or say they are. Some have been turned out by their parents to care for themselves. Some have drunken parents and have left home in disgust. Some have been in industrial schools and have never known even an apology for home. Some are prodigals. Few, if any, have ever had regular work. None of them have learnt any trade. Some get their living by hawking, some are shoe-blacks, some carry parcels at stations or deliver handbills, a few have jobs as labourers. They are without ambition and, apparently, without hope, and not even desirous of bettering their lot in any way. They live from hand to mouth. If they have a good day they have a feast, regardless of the certainty that bad days will follow. If they earn nothing, they sleep out somewhere and go without food. They make no attempt to save. They work only as much as they are obliged. All gamble, and gamble on anything, and make a practice of gambling. Some, but not all, are dishonest. A lad came one night and asked to be called at five o'clock, and walked off in a pair of his companion's boots and was not seen again. There are lads who make a practice of picking the pockets of men when in drink. Many are experts in the many ways of cadging. This picture is not over-coloured, though I am free to admit that any description would not adequately represent the truth. Every lad has a character and a history of his own, and requires separate treatment. There are many youths who, when very young, are thrown on their own resources. The difficulties for lads of poor parents of learning trades are in all cases greater than is usually understood. The boy may not want to learn; the parents may not be willing or able to make any sacrifice. And the temptations for young boys to earn good wages at some work which becomes only a "blind alley" is great.

Apprenticeship in many trades has broken down, and, even where this is not so, it is not always satisfactory. Apprentices are not always taught the trade, and sometimes are dismissed when they have served their time. There is suspicion, and a

growing suspicion, among parents about apprenticeship, and yet without it there is little chance of any trade being learnt.

Further, Trade Union leaders are not in the least enthusiastic about recruiting lads to learn their trades. The writer, a few years ago, started a Trades School with the object of inducing lads such as have been described to learn trades. There were five departments — carpentry, basket-making, picture-framing, printing, and upholstery. In each department a man, a member of a Trade Union, and two boys were employed. The man had, in addition to working himself, the duty of teaching the boys. This Trades School was opposed by the Manchester and Salford Trades Council on the ground that if more boys learnt their trades there would be less work for the present members. The Technical Schools are watched jealously that only apprentices shall be admitted on the same ground. I am not condemning the action of the Trades Unions, but I ask your readers, as I asked the Trade Union officials then, how is the boy in the gutter to resort to anything but casual work, which pays well for little effort but gives no security, when work which gives security is so hard to be obtained?

I appeal to readers of the HIBBERT to unite in a great and continued effort to get rid of this class of people altogether. Apart from the humanitarian side—everyone of this class is the victim of a disordered society,—their existence is a constant menace to others. The cost to the community is enormous: without them we should need less prisons, less workhouses, less sums spent in charity. It is not impossible. That there will always be bad men and women who defy the laws of nature and of God, and certainly will go to hell in this life, if not in another, is probably true, so long as men have a choice of their own actions; but I deny that the poor miserable wretches who frequent casual wards, prisons, common lodging-houses are anything but the victims of evil conditions, conditions made not by themselves, but by others for them, conditions preventable.



Thirty or forty years ago the late General Booth, be it recorded to his credit, stirred men's hearts by his appeal on behalf of the submerged tenth of Darkest England. He has failed to give the world the solution. We have still the vagabond and the tramp. He has failed, and his error arose from overlooking other elements than moral ones, and also because his work has been exclusively that of rescuing those already fallen. Others rapidly fill the gaps of those rescued.

Nearly at the same time that General Booth opened his campaign Blatchford began to preach socialism. Socialism, where it has gained adherents, has professed to be the one means for getting rid of the bottom dog. Many working men profess socialism not because they believe in universal nationalisation or municipalisation, but because the advocates of socialism are the only people who seem to realise the existence of social evils. The weakness of Blatchford was, and is, the total refusal to recognise any moral element in the matter at all. Is nothing to be learnt from both attempts?

A new prophet is needed now, and I believe such a prophet, were he to come forward, would receive support to a degree unprecedented.

The tramp problem is the key to the situation. Our modern civilisation rests upon the existence of certain numbers of destitute men. These men are the "strike breakers." If they were not available, workmen in combination could obtain all their demands. It is destitution which forces men to apply for work at any price. The professional tramp who is content to spend his days on the road is a class by himself, but before that type of man is eradicated satisfaction must be given to the destitute man who is honestly seeking regular employment. I suggest that one way out is for the State to undertake to find work and wages for all who apply for them.

The Labour Exchanges are now merely exchanges. They would need further powers and development. When a man joins the army he sacrifices his freedom because the State undertakes to pay him for services rendered. Why should

not the same conditions hold with regard to those who register themselves as unemployed? Those who so registered would be compelled while they accepted the benefits to accept the conditions. If no work of a remunerative character could be found, then let all the men, the 60,000 tramps as well as others, be drilled and disciplined for some hours every day.

Labour colonies and municipal workshops would follow, and possibly State Trades Schools.

I make this suggestion for what it is worth in all seriousness. If the State's aid is to be invoked, it is the only possible way.

But for myself I am doubtful about the efficiency of any State action in dealing with the problem. The State, which in our day means the Cabinet, is already overburdened. The administration of poor relief by the State has never been successful, and I doubt if it will ever be so.

It seems to me that so long as the ideals of life which prevail among people in general are no higher than those which now prevail, there is bound to be disaster. At present all classes are permeated with the one desire—to get rich, and getting rich to live in big houses, enjoy luxuries, and go one better than their neighbours. Many of the rich simply live for themselves, and spend what they have in keeping up big establishments, and entertaining largely and lavishly. The middle classes, while they condemn millionaires, would all be millionaires and live like millionaires if they had the opportunities. And the artisan, while he is dissatisfied with his wages and permeated with “unrest,” would, if he gained what he demands, simply copy “his betters.”

Our only hope, it seems to me, is in trying to get all, rich and others, to recognise the Christian ideal of life, which is not success but service to others; and it is because I believe there are many who are already weary of the present base ideals of life, and would be satisfied with a simple life if only that simple life includes all that is worth the having in the form of intellectual as well as physical activity, that I am not without hope of the future, in spite of the existence of 60,000 tramps



and hundreds of thousands of unemployables, and as many youths whose prospects are merely to grow up and become what they see their elders are now. The best individual is he who gives of his best to the community, and the best community is that which sees that all its members are in a state of efficiency, of comfort, and of wealth. And all State action will be fruitless unless people can be persuaded that to seek not one's own but others' wealth is the highest ideal of life.

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## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### "DOES CONSCIOUSNESS EVOLVE?" A REPLY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1913, p. 521.)

IN his lively and interesting article on the above subject in the April number of the *Hibbert Journal*, Professor Jacks raises two quite different questions. He accuses certain writers, chiefly the late Professor Edward Caird and Professor William Wallace, of committing themselves by the language they have used to what in the eighteenth century was known as the preformationist theory of evolution. This is an historical question of minor importance. On the other hand, he raises the whole question of the sense in which evolution is applicable to self-conscious life, and this, of course, is fundamental.

(a) I do not propose to waste time over the first. The writers referred to are known to all philosophers as the most reliable exponents of Hegel that we have, and it would be surprising if, on a point like this, they were under any misapprehension as to the teaching of their master. The classical passage is, of course, *Encyclopædia*, Section 161. So far from accepting the preformationist or *emboîtement* doctrine of evolution, Hegel there expressly rejects it. If, in the light of this, Professor Jacks will turn to the passages in Caird and Wallace on which he relies, he will find that what the former is arguing against is not the idea that in evolution nothing comes into existence that was not there before, but that the new existence cannot consistently with any doctrine of development at all be treated as a mere mechanical addition from without. Similarly, what Wallace is contending for is not that there is a "speck" or "germ" of mind containing everything that is to come after, but that, if we would understand the nature of mind, we must "see it as a result due to the in-growing and out-growing union of many elements"—precisely, one would have thought, the Bergsonian doctrine, except that Wallace adds what is hid from Bergson, "none of



which satisfies by itself, but leads outwards from abstractions to the meeting of abstractions in what is more and more concrete" (*Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel*, p. 265).

(b) This quotation brings me to the second and really important point. The type of philosophy represented by these and other writers quoted is certainly committed to the view that there is development in self-conscious as well as in merely conscious or in vegetable life. It holds that the child is father of the man, and that this involves at once change and identity. Herein it does not differ from rival philosophies, though one could have wished that Professor Jacks had expressed himself more clearly as to his own. What differentiates it is the theory as to the nature of the law or principle that underlies the development. This it holds in the last analysis to be logical. In other words, it rests on the intuition of an implied whole, and of a relation of elements to it of the same kind as that in virtue of which we perceive the relation between premise and conclusion. Just as in inference we have a principle of logical coherence, itself timeless, working in a psychical medium under the form of time, so in mental life in general we have always the two factors of the actual thoughts, feelings, volitions of the particular stage of development and the pressure of the ideal of something more complete and coherent to which the finite is by its very nature pledged. In knowledge, art, ethics, politics, religion, it is all the same. This is the real impelling force, the real *élan vital*, explaining at once the unity and the diversity of the actual forms of self-conscious life in all these departments. Acceptance or rejection of this theory must of course depend on the light it throws upon the actual facts of life. If its achievements in this direction, as set out in a world of philosophical literature, from Plato downwards, have failed to convince Professor Jacks that the whole point of view is more than a "tissue of absurdities," I am not likely, in a condensed statement like the present, to succeed. But as the points he raises are standing difficulties in the acceptance of the central doctrine of a logical principle working in a psychological medium, I venture to add a short comment on the most important of them. They will be found, I believe, to be "crucial instances" which all point the same way, but a different way from Professor Jacks'. I take them in a different order from his.

1. The compatibility of the theory with freedom and variety is an old difficulty. Logic is here an ominous word—how can freedom survive when everything has to conform to the same principle and fall into the same grooves like a syllogism? "The evolution of consciousness," writes Professor Jacks (p. 535), "as presented by the Finalist is determined by the necessities of an inner logic from the impetus of which there is no escape. It is a necessary process. There are no alternatives. Consciousness *must* evolve in this way and in no other. There is no room for any option, contingency, mistake, arrest, or failure. What accident has rendered the immanent logic so active in India and so torpid in the Solomon Islands? Is consciousness in the latter place bereft of immanent logic?" To

anyone who admits the above distinction, the form of the question suggests the answer. As a conclusion may be necessary in logic, but may fail to find an entrance because of ignorance or prejudice or want of the proper stimulus from without, so the "immanent logic" that makes for civilisation may be obstructed by racial, geographical, and other conditions. These it is the work of the historian to explain. Philosophy has done its work in pointing to a principle that makes history, as contrasted with mere record of change, possible at all. If it is asked why there should be these barriers, why should not the immanent logic have an open road? it is sufficient to reply that this is an arraignment of the universe and not of any particular philosophy of it. It is surely time we heard the last of the old misunderstanding, as though idealism were an attempt to develop the universe like the German's camel from the inner consciousness. Philosophy, according to this view, is not an attempt to construct facts after a logical pattern, but to show how in all the differences, arrests, and even retrogressions for which the density of the material and psychical circumstances are responsible, there are still discernible the outlines of the "stable and systematic universe" which William James (at other times as hostile as Professor Jacks to the immanent logic) when he comes to business finds himself forced to set before us as the ultimate end and standard of human progress.<sup>1</sup> So far from being the negation of freedom, the possibility of determination by an ideal of what is required by the "logic of human nature," as still another pluralist<sup>2</sup> finds himself driven to describe it, is the one guarantee of it. It is one of the ironies of present-day controversy that writers who, like Professor Jacks, are inspired with a zeal for human freedom, should spend it in a line of criticism which destroys freedom at the roots.

2. The difficulty of the *nature* of error is only another form of that raised by its existence. It is in this connection that I am myself held particularly responsible for confusion. If everything is immanent in the beginning, then truth is immanent in error, good in evil, and all that is required is to go far enough in the wrong track to come out upon the right one. "The word [evolution]," writes Professor Jacks, "seems to have inspired some thinkers with a genial faith that there are no false roads in history. . . . The trouble with the bad man is not that he turns aside from the right way; it lies in the incompleteness with which he has realised the implications of his moral nature. Thus our seeming errors about the world only need completing to become truths; if ever we seem to be on the wrong road we have only to go a mile or two further and we shall find it coming right" (p. 527). Taking the case of logical error, after all that has been written by our best logicians on its general nature, the impossibility of sheer error and the principle by which partial truth is supplemented and transformed, is there any real paradox here? To see our mistake we

<sup>1</sup> See *Will to Believe* (The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life).

<sup>2</sup> James Ward's *Realism of Ends*, p. 136. It is true Professor Ward is quoting Dr Bosanquet, but he is quoting him with approval.



have to carry it further, develop it, and see what it implies. Is not this just what we invite the erroneous thinker, like the erroneous traveller, to do? Go on, we say (whether in idea or in fact), on the way you are going, and see where it leads you and where it doesn't. It is precisely what Professor Jacks is asking me to do in the present instance. "Go on," he says, "I don't say with your psychological wrongheadedness, that is your own affair, but with the absurd logic to which you have allowed it to commit you, and see where you are." It is because logical error is like this, that, on the assumption that there is the will to go right, you can convince a man of his mistake. All proof in the long run is *reductio ad absurdum*. In conduct, on the same assumption, it is not different. What philosophy is committed to is not, as we have seen, that a man cannot go wrong, but that the moral world, like the world of thought, summons us to consistency. No more in the one case than in the other can you profess adherence to it at one point without committing yourself to the whole of it. The right is what you can will consistently, the wrong what immeshes you in all sorts of inconsistencies. This is common ground again with pluralist and idealist,<sup>1</sup> and again it is this which makes conviction and conversion possible. If the will is bad and defiant, things, of course, are different in life as they are in thought. Professor Jacks quotes the Platonic Socrates, "The penalty of the unjust is to become more unjust." This may well be, though Socrates himself, as we know, was only too definitely committed to the doctrine that virtue is a matter of knowledge *i.e.* of logic. He forgot that the will might be corrupted and that logic alone might be powerless. Yet I believe he would have defended himself by showing that, after all that can be said on the other side, injustice, if persisted in, means deeper discord and contradiction, and with it the danger of deeper restlessness and discontent—a deeper call to repentance. To Professor Jacks all this would be foolish optimism. Yet we have heard something like it from the believers in universal salvation in modern times, and idealism, at any rate, will not think the worse of them for believing that the resources of the moral universe in awakening the sinner may, for all we know, be inexhaustible.

3. The idealist use of "end" is again an old difficulty. "The theory is dominated by the conception of end, and this 'end' is actually present in any consciousness which has grasped the principle of unity which makes it a process; in other words, the process 'returns upon itself.' . . . And here a simple question will occur to most minds: What *further* story remains to be told of any consciousness which at last has become conscious of the principle? Apparently none. The evolution of consciousness should stop with the attainment of this insight" (p. 530). One confusion may be set aside at once. Professor Jacks writes as though idealists held that to recognise an end or purpose is to realise it. Unfortunately, things are not so simple as that. To know that we want a thing is not to have it. Put otherwise, the end is not to recognise the principle of unity in

<sup>1</sup> See Ward, *Realism of Ends*, p. 376.

life, but to realise it in will and intelligence. Our intellectual development, fortunately, doesn't stop when we learn the principle of the syllogism, nor our moral development when we learn from Aristotle or William James what it is we really want. The *end* here is far more likely to be only a new beginning. But the difficulty remains of the ambiguity of the word, and I am glad the question has been raised so definitely. It means a "cessation"; it further means a "purpose," with the implication that when this is achieved there is again a cessation. But the word has passed into philosophy as a translation of *τέλος*, and this is unfortunate, for *τέλος* is just not *τελεύτη*, the end or cessation, but the *perfection* of a thing. The difference is that the former immerses us in time, the latter raises us above it as that which gives value to the process in time by which the perfection is realised. Professor Jacks finds the passage in which Professor Green tries to explain all this portentous. If I have verified it rightly, it is in reality an attempt to guard against more portentous error. I have no desire to retain the word "end" if we can find a better. What I am convinced of is that, apart from the idea of a perfection which is never completely realised in time, yet which is the source of the value of all that is so realised, which is at once an end in the sense of an indwelling purpose, and a beginning in the sense of an inspiring and guiding principle, both philosophy and common-sense are entirely at sea in the interpretation of the world of experience. Professor Jacks warns us against the "thing theory" of the soul which he thinks (probably rightly enough) that some idealists have not escaped. But is there any other defence against this theory than the transference of the essence of the soul from the psychical to the logical? Apart from the value that accrues from the realisation in time of an ideal (if I may not say an "end") which is not in time, what is there to give reality to the soul except the exclusiveness of its feeling? Apart from this feeling, it is what Kant called a mere *Unding*; with it *alone* it is a mere atom of mind stuff—just the "thing" which all sound theory denies it to be. What is wrong about the "thing theory" is not that it assigns a *content* to mind, but that it assigns a content which shuts it up in itself instead of making it an expanding centre of attachment to all other things.

4. It is hardly necessary to trace the same confusion in the passage in which idealistic philosophy is accused of the psychological fallacy: of treating "what is dim to the person who is being studied as though it were a dim consciousness of what is clear to the person who is studying him; of what is confused as if it were a confused consciousness of what is orderly, a consciousness of low goods (or low gods) as though it were a low consciousness of high. . . . Whereas the simple fact is that the savage and the civilised are conscious of different objects, not that one is confusedly conscious of the same" (p. 533). If Professor Jacks means to maintain in this ominous passage that the child and the man, the savage and the Newton or the Darwin, have simply different



worlds before them, this is, indeed, to put an end to all talk of development. It has pleased Mr Shaw and other modern Platonists to maintain that we never see anything but what we have seen already or what we want to see. This is the opposite extreme and puts an end to the possibility of learning anything new even from Mr Shaw. But it contains at least the truth that all modern psychology is pressing upon us of the continuity of knowledge. Idealism, as I understand it, seeks to avoid both of these abstractions, and by doing so to establish the possibility of comparative science, which views like Professor Jacks's would cut up by the root. Mumbo Jumbo, to take his own illustration, is as different from the God of all the earth as a flint arrowhead is from the spear of Achilles or a modern bomb; but all comparative science consists in the attempt to show the identity that underlies the transformation.

5. Everyone must sympathise with the suspicion with which Professor Jacks in the last page of his article regards crude applications of biological conceptions in the field of self-conscious life. It is probable enough that idealists who have sounded this warning more persistently than most have not themselves wholly escaped the fallacy they have denounced in others. But to be on one's guard against the suggestions of stock biological phrases is one thing, to deny all continuity between life and mind is quite another. One might have expected thinkers who have so much in common with Bergson as Professor Jacks to be impressed with the approximation between that philosopher's conception of consciousness as something which at a certain stage of creative evolution is called for as an instrument of more effective adaptation to environment and such recent developments of idealism as we have in Bosanquet's *Principle of Individuality and Value*. The difference, as I understand it, is that while Bergson refuses the clue which the higher experience of self-conscious mind puts into our hand in the interpretation of evolution—preferring to exploit the biological conception of a "vital impulse"—Bosanquet finds no principle at all adequate which is not in essence logical.

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### "CONSCIOUSNESS AS A CAUSE OF NEURAL ACTIVITY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 378.)

In the April number of this *Journal* a correspondent asks me several questions about problems in a rather special department of therapeutics. I hesitate to call it "psycho-therapeutics" because the writer wishes it to be understood that persons cured or benefited by certain procedures which he describes were not influenced through their minds or consciousness. The point of interest, apparently, is that the patients were not asked to believe that they would be benefited by Dr D'Aute-Hooper's methods—

that is, faith-healing was out of the question, and no suggestion was used; while in some cases the influence was exerted at a time when the patient was quite unconscious that he was the subject of any therapeutic efforts.

Your correspondent seems to be under the impression that, because I believe that consciousness *can be* a cause of neural activity, all manifestations of neural activity (neuroses in Huxley's sense) must be due to consciousness. This is notoriously not so, a very large number of reflex actions (the excito-motor) being cases in point. The writer further seems to forget that many activities of the nervous system proceed on the subconscious plane, as the expression goes, or belong to the group of "unconscious umbrations."

Now, because I happen to believe that the psychic is, or may be, causal, I do not feel bound to explain alleged cases of cure or alleviation of diseases by agencies stated to be outside the patient's cognisance; but I shall try to throw some light on the problems propounded by the writer.

As far as I can make out, Dr D'Aute-Hooper is a so-called "magnetic" healer; that is, he requires no faith (in his own powers) on the part of the "thousands" of patients whom he sees, and he makes no suggestions to them that any specific treatment will produce any beneficial results. But all this is negative; what is a "magnetic" healer?

I understand that it has long ago been demonstrated that magnets have, *per se*, in virtue of their magnetism, no effect whatever on animal tissues, and that any curative effects subsequent to their use (so-called magneto-therapeutics) have been proved to be due to hypnotic conditions resulting from some form of auto-suggestion.

"Yet in twenty minutes after magnetic passes I gave him a useful arm in place of a useless one" is a sentence describing a cure typical of many others. Now, if this means that Dr D'Aute-Hooper passed a magnet up and down, either in contact or not in contact with his patient, then he used a discredited method without physical influence; and if his patient derived any benefit, that must have been due to the patient's belief that the magnet had curative powers. In short, it *was* a case of psycho-therapeutics, if not of "faith-healing"; in other words, the patient's consciousness could *not* be causally eliminated. Can auto-suggestion really be said to play no part in such alleged cures as these? But although the words "magnetic," "magnetic force" (and even "forces") are used, it would seem that no magnets were employed and that the passes were made by the doctor's empty hands. The use of "magnetic," then, is either metaphorical or superfluous.

But in what does making passes with the hands differ from the conventional procedures of hypnotists? Dr D'Aute-Hooper uses the phrase, "sympathetic intermixing of magnetic forces," which to me conveys nothing. It seems pure mysticism, and I cannot explain the incomprehensible.

Further, Dr D'Aute-Hooper writes as though mesmerism and hypnotism were two different things; he believes that "magnetic force" can leave him and return to him, that magnetism pulsates out of him, that his patients'



pains can be transferred to him, and so on mystically ; I greatly fear that Dr Braid has lived in vain for him.

But can we really make the concession that the patients who go to Dr D'Aute-Hooper, and have "passes" made over them, do not expect or hope, no matter how remotely, to be cured, or at least benefited?

They are very extraordinary patients if they do not. One can hardly suppose that they go merely for the pleasure of paying fees or to demonstrate the reality of neuroses through cerebral arcs without psychoses. As far as I can discover from the writer in the "Discussions," the expectant attention, as it used to be called, some psychic element at anyrate, is, after all, present in *some* of these cases, which would therefore fall into the category of the efficiency of consciousness as a cause.

Those cases benefited by procedures of which they were quite unconscious I must not presume to explain, but there is a place for them in that class of cases known to students of hypnotism as being *en rapport* with an absent and invisible agent. I submit that the questions raised in the "Discussion," whether interesting or insoluble, leave the truth of my thesis, consciousness as a cause of neural activity, entirely untouched.

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## "MODERN JUDAISM AND THE MESSIANIC HOPE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 366.)

### I.

IN the article which appeared in the January *Hibbert* under the above title, Mr C. G. Montefiore did me the honour of subjecting a paper of mine on "The Christian Messiah in the Light of Judaism Ancient and Modern"<sup>1</sup> to some drastic criticism. Restrictions of space prevent me from replying to this, as I should like to do, in detail. Here I must confine myself to one or two of the more material points. In doing so, I hope I shall be able to emulate the courteous tone of Mr Montefiore's criticism, which I fully appreciate.

Mr Montefiore objects to some remarks of mine with reference to the repudiation expressed in a Reform Jewish manifesto of the hope of a personal Messiah, and the assertion, in a later document of the same kind, that

"we recognise in the modern era of universal culture of heart and intellect the approaching of the realisation of Israel's great Messianic hope for the establishment of the kingdom of truth, justice, and peace among all men."

To me this language seems to dissipate the substance of the Messianic hope as expressed in the glowing words of the prophets and psalmists. The

<sup>1</sup> Published in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, April 1912.

essence of the hope, as they conceived it, lay in a real Divine intervention, whether through the agency of a personal Messiah or more directly. To this Mr Montefiore objects :

“Mr Box seems to think that the ‘substance of the hope’ resides in the manner of its accomplishment rather than in the content.”

I certainly think that the concept of a real Divine intervention is fundamental. It is not a mere subordinate question of detail, but involves the whole doctrine of God. God is not to be confused with His world, or with the world-process. No doubt the Divine power is immanent in the world ; but, in the orthodox theology both of Christianity and Judaism, this immanence depends upon the Divine transcendence. If we believe in a personal God who is at once transcendent and (by His Divine power) immanent, then we must believe that this God can intervene directly as well as indirectly. To ignore, minimise, or explain away the possibility of Divine intervention from outside seems to me to lead dangerously near to a doctrine of pantheism.

Next, Mr Montefiore quotes a sentence of mine :

“In place of a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world, Judaism offers to the sinner the Law, the Day of Atonement.”

On this he remarks :

“This is not so. In order to express correctly the true Jewish position, the sentence should run thus : ‘In place of a Saviour who has died for the sins of the world, Judaism offers to the sinner God.’ ”

Here Mr Montefiore seems to misconceive, at anyrate he mistakes, the Christian position. The antithesis between Saviour and God is as inapplicable to Christianity as to Judaism. The contrast I was endeavouring to express may in other words be stated thus : Christianity offers to the sinner God in Christ, *i.e.* God revealing Himself in and through Christ ; Judaism offers the sinner God as expressed in the Law and Day of Atonement. I do not think that this misrepresents the relative positions of the two religions.

Another sentence of mine to which Mr Montefiore takes grave exception does, I fully admit, require some further explanation. As it stands its language is, perhaps, somewhat unguarded. I said :

“Judaism has ever been deficient in sympathy with the unlearned, the ignorant, the weak, the fallen, the lost.”

I did not wish to convey the impression that Judaism has always harshly repelled members of these unfortunate classes ; but rather that by its very genius it was bound to be lacking in that eager, tender sympathy which hastens to help and uplift those who have failed to attain any tolerable standard of duty or life. Nor did I mean to restrict all the descriptive terms used to Jews. With regard to the “unlearned” and “ignorant,”



perhaps I can make my position clearer by quoting what I have said elsewhere:<sup>1</sup>

"To the Jew, Jewish learning is part of the Jewish religion. As a consequence, a certain amount of sacred learning is a necessary part of every true Jew's equipment. The good results that have flowed from this attitude of mind are that the intellectual level of the whole race has been raised. In certain places, for certain periods of their history, the Jewish people may, with very little exaggeration, be said to have produced a nation of scholars. This is, to-day, largely true of Poland. . . . The intellectual element in Jewish religion is thus very pronounced. . . ."

Mr Montefiore estimates that nine-tenths of the adherents of any religion must be called "unlearned." I venture to doubt the applicability of this estimate to historical Judaism, and therefore cannot admit that my words imply that Judaism "has 'ever' been, and still is, deficient in sympathy with nine-tenths of its adherents."

By the "weak" I meant the morally weak, not merely pious Jews who were the victims of misfortune, and who, as such, were the recipients of "Talmudic and mediæval Jewish charity." The "weak, the fallen, the lost" thus belong together. Mr Montefiore admits that sympathy with these unhappy ones was "a superb and novel note" struck, for the first time, in the teaching of Jesus. He adds:

"The note can be imitated by all who are earnest in the love and imitation of God. There is nothing in the sympathy with the 'lost and fallen' which is inconsistent with Judaism, whether orthodox or liberal."

I gladly acknowledge that modern Judaism in England is nobly exerting itself in rescue work, in fighting the "White Slave" traffic, and in efforts of a similar character. Here it is not difficult to see the influence of Christian ideals making itself felt. But these ideals are the fruit of belief in the "dogma" of "a Saviour who died for the sins of the world." And no amount of imitation will serve to get rid of this fundamental fact. It is this "dogma" which is the source of the power and energy developed in Christian efforts for saving the "lost" all over the world. Christianity, when it started its career, shared with Judaism the conviction that the masses of mankind were perishing in sin. But where in Rabbinical and later Jewish literature do we find sympathy expressed for the perishing masses? God's yearning over penitent sinners is nobly delineated; but one misses the note of tender yearning over the tragic fate of humanity generally. This note, it is true, is struck in the *Ezra-Apocalypse*; but that work belongs to pre-Talmudic Judaism, and is part of the literature which was banned by the later Synagogue. Sympathy with the tragedy and pathos of human life has always been central in orthodox Christianity; the "Cross" has been a fundamental element. It all rests upon a deep sense of sin. On these matters, historical Judaism has always taken an essentially different view. In consequence, and quite consistently from

<sup>1</sup> *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, vol. ii. p. 299.

its own point of view, it has devoted its energies rather to maintaining the standards of righteousness than seeking to "save that which was lost."

G. H. Box.

SUTTON RECTORY.

## II.

MR MONTEFIORE in his reply to Mr Box might have put his argument as to the Jewish method of dealing with unchastity more strongly and based on a more general principle.

The Hebraic method was based on the view, held by most of the virile nations before their strength had been sapped by luxury, that prevention was better than cure.

The same high ideal of the value of woman's chastity was held, *e.g.*, by the Ancient Romans as by the Jews. Not only was the ideal held, but it was enforced as a measure of practical sociology by making the penalty for a breach of the law so heavy as to act as a true deterrent.

But wealth and luxury incidental to an advancing civilisation had, by the time Christ appeared, sapped the strength of the old standards of conduct both in the Roman and Jewish world.

A decadent people had become so careless in the matter of chastity that a class had been allowed to creep into existence which imperatively demanded the consideration of a sympathetic reformer.

The earlier peoples had avoided the need for a gospel of love and tenderness towards the fallen Magdalene by preventing her existence.

The heavy penalty kept women in the path of virtue, where the milder views of the Christian period encouraged the weak to risk the chance of detection and punishment.

The "righteous" attitude of English people of last century in casting the fallen outside the pale of society was not "Christian"—it was, in fact, really the "Jewish" attitude; but it prevented to a large extent the evil which the more kindly, but less wise, tolerant attitude of to-day is doing nothing to check—nay, which it is in sad truth fostering.

It is better to prevent the existence of a class detrimental to the interests of society, than, with a weak sentimentalism, to offer pity and consideration to sinners whom society's own laxness has created. The former is the "Jewish," the latter the "Christian" attitude.

J. ALBERT GOLDSMID, M.B., Ch.M.

MURWILLUMBAH, N.S.W.

## III.

MR MONTEFIORE's paper in reply to Mr Box presents the crucial issue between Judaism and Christianity so acutely and plainly that it seems desirable to consider some other points which his treatment raises.

(1) Does Mr Montefiore hold that some atonement to God—as distinguished, *i.e.*, from repentance—is absolutely necessary before the Divine



Grace can take effect on men? If he does not hold this view—if he holds that sincere repentance in itself is sufficient to procure forgiveness—how does he justify the adherence of Judaism to, and its insistence upon, the idea of atonement, as this is expressed in its Day of Atonement?

(2) On the other hand, if (as seems more probable) he holds that an atonement is essential, without which the deepest repentance is inadequate to procure forgiveness, then we must go on to ask: Has any *adequate* atonement been made, either by the Jewish rites or by any other non-Christian religion? If the Jewish rites be regarded as symbolical, of what are they the symbols—wherein consists the actual and effective atonement they symbolise? If, on the other hand, these rites are regarded as adequate in themselves, we must ask: Can they, or can anything which man may do, constitute an adequate atonement for human sin? Are we not compelled to admit that such an atonement (assuming it to be necessary) is utterly beyond the power of humanity, both within and without Judaism? and that, consequently, if atonement be necessary, forgiveness is, so far as man is concerned, impossible and unattainable? Must we not recognise that any real and effectual atonement must be made, not at all by man, but solely by God? and that it must be morally commensurate with the sin of man and the righteousness of God which together demand it?

Christianity, of course, claims that such an atonement was made in the life and death of Christ, as being absolutely holy; and this central principle is too much lost sight of by emphasising other Christian principles which are, after all, subsidiary to it.

J. T. TURNER.

LIVERPOOL.

# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

"It is," said Lotze, "only inquiries conducted in the spirit of realism that will satisfy the aspirations of idealism." This dictum might suitably have served as a motto for the volume of essays recently issued, entitled *The New Realism: Co-operative Studies in Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), by the six American teachers who had previously in 1910 published in the *Journal of Philosophy* a statement of their "Program and First Platform." For, as Professor Cohen observes (*Journal of Philosophy*, 10th April 1913) the essence of idealism is that "the structure of the universe justifies certain values called ideals," and with that doctrine the authors of this volume have no quarrel whatsoever. What they are concerned to resist is the epistemological subjectivism according to which the objects of knowledge or experience are composed of groups of presentations, conceived as states or modifications of mind. Indeed, I am at a loss to understand why the author of the first essay, Professor Marvin, should be so anxious to emancipate metaphysics from epistemology. He seems to think the logical priority of the theory of knowledge in a systematic arrangement of the departments of philosophy would involve that one can by a direct study of the knowing process infer the limits of possible knowledge and, indeed, independently of all other sciences, offer a theory of reality. And in opposition to these claims, which, so far as I know, have never been made, he seeks to show that epistemology assumes the results of several of the special sciences, and comes lamentably to grief in trying to interpret the nature of reality. The neo-realistic movement is, he tells us, "a reaction against the whole enterprise of Locke, Kant, and their followers to get at a fundamental science, and not merely against their idealism"; it is a return to the method which Kant condemned as dogmatism. Some of the argumentation in the present volume does tend, I fear, to confirm this last contention, but I should be sorry to think that realism was committed to the position thus laid down. For, in spite of all that Professor Marvin



urges to the contrary, it seems to me that an inquiry into the quite general principles which knowledge of any kind involves must be regarded as, in logical order, prior to the study either of any one portion of the world of concrete reality or of reality as a whole. As a matter of fact, most of the essays that follow are very largely concerned with epistemological problems. Thus, Professor R. B. Perry works out a "A Realistic Theory of Independence," and seeks to purify the notion of independence of any suggestions of other-ness, remoteness, or inaccessibility. Independence, he maintains, does not necessarily mean non-relation; it means simply the absence of that peculiar kind of relation which constitutes dependence. The mere presence of knowledge as a relation cannot, therefore, be used to prove that things are dependent upon their being known. "The case for realism rests on showing that to be content of a mind is not to be dependent on a mind." In so far as physical phenomena are deducible from physical causes without reference to consciousness, we may, it is contended, conclude that they are independent of consciousness, even though consciousness be present. There are, however, in the author's view, certain complex objects that are as such dependent on consciousness. Value, for example, is a function of desire; works of art derive whatever there is of art in them from consciousness; and history and society imply consciousness as a component factor. The paper entitled "A Defence of Analysis," by Professor E. G. Spaulding, is a painstaking attempt to justify analysis as a method of knowing that discovers entities or parts which are real in quite the same sense as the wholes which are analysed. The author has throughout in mind the objections of writers like Bergson and Bradley, who contend that the parts yielded by analysis turn out to be contradictories of the nature of the whole out of which they have been analysed. Professor Spaulding examines in detail the different kinds of analysis—the analysis, namely, of aggregates, of classes, and of organic unities, and tries in each case to show that the objections cannot be sustained. For example, in dealing with wholes of the second kind, Bergson's argument that analysis breaks up space into points, time into instants, and motion into a series of rests, is dismissed as ill-founded because it does not do justice to the actual analysis against which it is directed. When continuous extension is analysed, it is shown to be identical with a series of points, each individual, and so distinct from every other, but related asymmetrically and transitively. If *both* the terms *and* the organising relations be taken into account, the analysis is adequate; it is only when the terms alone are taken and the relations neglected that Bergson's objection wears the semblance of plausibility. So, too, in regard to organic unities. With the exception of ultimate simple entities, all physical and chemical wholes, both living and non-living, are unities of this kind. Analysis is valid also in their case. For it reveals the parts, the organising relations, and the properties of the wholes themselves. The two succeeding essays are concerned with the problem of error, and I cannot say that I feel at all satisfied with the proposed solutions of

the problem. Professor W. P. Montague, under the heading of "A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error," propounds a theory of consciousness as the potential or implicative presence of a thing at a space or time in which that thing is not actually present—a formulation which leaves one gasping when one tries to put the parts of it together. The brain event is the "knower" and what it implies is the "known." When the implied possible cause of the cerebral state actually exists, there will be consciousness of a reality which constitutes true knowledge; when, on the other hand, the cerebral implicate happens not to have been the actual cause, or happens not to exist, we shall have apprehension of what is unreal, which is error. Unreal objects are subjective, and although not of necessity mental, act only on and through the mind that knows them. But how can unreal objects *act* at all? Professor E. B. Holt tries to determine "The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World," and regards illusory appearances as due not to consciousness, but to the physical relation between the sense-organs and the object. Secondary qualities are, he thinks, deducible from the frequency interval or nerve pulses or vibrations. But, in that case, objects never are what we apprehend them as being, and I do not know why it should be supposed that, on this theory, the difficulties inherent in subjectivism have been overcome. Finally, Professor W. B. Pitkin contributes an able article on "Some Realistic Implications of Biology," in the course of which he also deals with the problem of error, and arrives at the result that error is not a product of the nervous system, but that the nervous system is a contrivance to deal with a physical state of affairs of which error is only a very intricate instance. Altogether, the volume contains a great deal of genuine and resolute thinking, for which the somewhat journalistic "Introduction" scarcely prepares the way.

The Adamson Lecture for 1913, by Dr Bernard Bosanquet, on *The Distinction between Mind and its Objects* (Manchester: University Press, 1913), is occupied with a discussion of realism, chiefly in the form in which it appears in the writings of Professor Alexander. Dr Bosanquet takes as his guiding principle the idea of continuity in kind between mind and its objects. He argues that mind is never confronted by one object only, but at least by a complex of objects. He would compare consciousness rather to an atmosphere, than to a thing; for its nature is to include. A mind is a whole, an object is a fragment. Further, a sense-content such as blue, has unity; its parts confirm, support, and determine one another; it pulsates with feeling. It seems, therefore, whilst retaining the characters of blue, to have in it the life of mind. The genuine logical motive of idealism, it is contended, has been the insight that a universe severed from the life of mind can never fulfil the conditions of self-existence. If the universe could be anæsthetised, the conditions of its concrete reality and self-existence would be gone. A line of thought in essential agreement with that of Dr Bosanquet is followed by Professor J. S. Mackenzie in his article, entitled "A Sketch of a Philosophy of Order" (*Mind*, April 1913). Starting with the simplest facts of experience, the data of sense, he



endeavours to show that principles of order are involved therein, and that, by reflection on these principles we are gradually led to the recognition of a certain ideal order, which is the foundation of our moral aspirations, and which may perhaps serve as a basis for a spiritual interpretation of the universe. Such an idealism does not seem to him to be opposed to what is commonly called realism. An idealism of a very different character is developed by Otto Kröger in the *Archiv für system Phil.* (May, 1913), who writes on "Das Wesen der Dinge im Lichte des reinen Idealismus." He maintains that my knowledge is not an appearance foreign to things, but is a single thing amongst single things; it is formed out of the same substance as that in which all other individual things consist, and is stationed in the midst of the "Gedränge and Gestosse" of the individual things that constitute the world. Professor G. A. Tawney, in a paper on "Methodological Realism" (*Phil. R.*, May, 1913), points out that two sorts of relations are required by realism,—that of knowledge to its object, and that of the elements of the object to each other. Actually, he argues, the term "externality of relations" does nothing towards reducing these two sorts of relationship to common terms, and the concentration of interest upon the externality of relations ignores the problem of knowing as a mental *process*. In the same periodical, Professor G. P. Adams, dealing with "Mind as Form and as Activity," advances reasons for holding that mental activity is real although it never confronts us as an object. Ethical, social, and religious values are the products of such activity.

The second and concluding part of Professor S. Alexander's article on "Collective Willing and Truth" appears in the April number of *Mind*. Professor Alexander is led to the conclusion that not only are the materials of error real, as belonging somewhere in the real world, but that their connection also as it exists in the error is founded on a real connection in those materials in the real world. But the error itself is not real. The counterpart of error in the will is evil; that counterpart is erroneous believing and is a mental reality. The contrast of knowing and doing is a secondary one, and raises a false issue, since knowing is essentially willing. Truth is supreme over practice, because truth (the name for a body of *cognita*) is the object or the contents of all practical actions in which we are engaged upon reality or in which we are ourselves reality. The author goes on to discuss the relation of beauty to goodness and truth, and maintains that whereas the truth of external objects is non-mental and goodness is mental, the beautiful is an existence which implies a combination between mental and non-mental existence. When the connection between mind and its object is such as to be impersonal, when there is excited in the mental partner the impersonal feeling of pleasure, then we have the order of beautiful existence. Into æsthetic coherence or unity there enters a variety, of which one part comes from the object and one part from the mind; and these elements are so combined that the characters of the mere perceived object owe their unification to the characters supplied from the mind; they

are not unified in themselves. The Hermes is for truth a marble block of a certain form; it needs for beauty the addition of imaginative elements which are not in the block, though they determine the form of the block.

Dr H. Wildon Carr has written an interesting little volume on *The Problem of Truth* ("The People's Books," London: Jack, 1913), in which he seeks to make the problem clear to those who come to it with no previous study of philosophy. The question as to the nature of truth he takes to arise from the distinction between appearance and reality,—a distinction which is recognised by idealists and by realists. The view of truth as correspondence is first discussed, and it is contended that since ideas simply are the knowledge of realities, it is impossible that knowing is the discovery of a correspondence between mental ideas and real things. In considering the theory of truth as coherence, a chapter is devoted to the conception of the Absolute, in which a lucid account is given of the logical grounds on which that conception is rested. A good deal of space is devoted to pragmatism, and it is shown by illustrations of the way in which scientific truth is won that truth cannot be identified with utility. The author finds a solution of the problem along the lines of the philosophy of Bergson. The intellect does not make truth or reality; it makes reality take the form of spatial things, and intellectual knowledge is so far illusory. But intellectual knowledge is none the less true knowledge, for when once an illusion is interpreted, the interpretation becomes an integral part of the conception of reality. On the other hand, Professor A. O. Lovejoy, in discussing "The Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism" (*Inter. J. of Ethics*, April 1913), insists that *why* the intellect should work in so strange a fashion, and why a gratuitous misrepresentation of reality should be the necessary presupposition of action, is left by Bergson in obscurity. Professor Lovejoy finds no less than six different and irreconcilable descriptions given by Bergson of the reality which is revealed in intuition. A critical examination of Bergson's conception of activity is undertaken by the Rev. Oliver Quick in an article on "Bergson's 'Creative Evolution' and the Individual" (*Mind*, April 1913). Mr Quick argues that resemblances between particular activities can only be explained by reference to one original activity if that activity has some character. But characteristics are all, relatively at least, individual, since they all belong to special forms of life. The original activity would have, therefore, to be a special form of life, and in that case it could not be the unity underlying special forms. An activity which, so far as our experience goes, is only realised subjectively as individual and discontinuous cannot in any sense be represented as a universal substratum of unity permeating the whole stream of individuals. As bearing somewhat on the same theme, mention may be made of the paper by M. F. d'Hautefeuille, "Sur la vie intérieure" (*Rev. de Métaphysique*, May 1913), who contends, after the manner of Bergson, that the primordial intuition of being is at the foundation of all knowledge of reality.

Two noteworthy collections of addresses have just been published. The *Reden und Aufsätze* by Professor Wundt (Leipzig: Kröner, 1913) will



appeal to a wider circle of readers than his more technical writings. The volume opens with an address, *Ueber den Zusammenhang der Philosophie mit der Zeitgeschichte*, given on entering his year of office as Rector of the University of Leipzig in 1889, and closes with a *Festrede* on the occasion of the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the founding of the University, held on the 30th July 1907. The former presents an extremely interesting account of the course of ethical reflection in Germany during the nineteenth century, and of the way in which it was influenced by the political ideas that were at various times dominant. Two lectures on Leibniz and Fechner are full of acute observations upon the philosophical systems of these thinkers,—that on Fechner being all the more valuable by reason of the author's personal acquaintance with this remarkable man. Special emphasis is laid upon Fechner's religious conceptions and upon the prevailing religious character of his speculation. Under the title of *Social Powers* (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1913), Sir Henry Jones has put together three popular lectures on "Man and his Environment," "Journalism and Citizenship," and "Are Moral and Religious Beliefs capable of Proof?" In the first, Sir Henry Jones contends that the environment is neither wholly natural nor wholly mental, but is greater than either of these, its aspects, because it is both of them in one. The world in which we live is a natural scheme which comes into consciousness in man and reveals its full character only in the ideals of the finite souls in which it emerges. In the light of these activities, we discover that what we call Nature is a being which has gone out upon a spiritual adventure. In the last lecture, it is urged that the "hypothesis" of God is compared with the hypothesis of the uniformity of Nature,—the latter is proved by all the natural experience we have, because experience itself would be impossible without it. So, too, it is urged, the conception of God is the ultimate condition of all rational experience whatsoever. And the author concludes that the methods of science are applicable in the domain of religion, and that there is no need to have recourse to the treacherous subterfuge of denying the competence of reason.

A delightful little book on *Plato: Moral and Political Ideals* (Cambridge University Press, 1913) has been written by Mrs A. M. Adam for the *Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature*. Mrs Adam traces the way in which Plato's ethical theory was developed from the teaching of Socrates, and devotes a good deal of space to the problems discussed in the *Republic*. She expresses herself as unconvinced by the recent writings of Taylor and Burnet. She is not yet prepared, she says, "to reduce Plato's achievement to the glory of relegating Boswell to the second place among biographers." To the *Revue de Métaphysique* for March, M. L. Robin contributes an important article on "Platon et la science sociale," and finds in the Platonic writings one of the most remarkable efforts ever made to ground practical politics upon a positive social science. In the same number there is a very interesting account of the work of Paul Tannery, the author of *Pour l'histoire de la Science hellène*, by M. A.

Rivaud, who refers in detail to Tannery's many additions to our knowledge of early Greek philosophy. Mr P. H. Wicksteed's work on *Dante and Aquinas* (London: Dent, 1913) will be of value to students of philosophy no less than to students of literature. Mr Wicksteed expounds with great clearness and lucidity the theological and ethical views of Aquinas, and gives a careful account of scholastic psychology. In the first chapter he deals with the Greek antecedents of scholastic philosophy. "The Platonic 'kinds' or *Ideas*," he says, "exist apart from individual things, and are the perfect prototypes of which they are the imperfect imitations or reflections; the Aristotelian 'kinds' or *forms* are abstractions of the human mind that have no actual existence except in transient and concrete individuals." I think this statement is likely to give rise to misapprehension. The Aristotelian εἶδος was certainly not an "abstraction of the human mind." Lying in the background of all Aristotle's thought throughout was the conception of Nature as a system of fixed types of existence.

I conclude by drawing attention to the able treatment of *The Political Philosophy of Burke*, by Professor John Maccunn (London: Arnold, 1913). In a chapter on "Religion and Politics," the author discusses Burke's conception of civil society as resting on spiritual foundations, and his insistence upon the political value of religion. To Burke, it is pointed out, the secularisation of history and politics was nothing less than a conspiracy to denationalise the nation and to dehumanise the race.

G. DAWES HICKS.

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## THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

WE have to welcome the appearance of the *Constructive Quarterly*, edited by Mr Silas M'Bee. As the title indicates, and as the sub-title emphasises ("a journal of the Faith, Work, and Thought of Christendom"), the object of this magazine is to act "as a Forum where the isolated Churches of Christendom may reintroduce themselves to one another through the things that they themselves positively hold to be vital to Christianity," in the hope that this opportunity for frank statement may lead to a constructive and positive treatment of Christianity which will promote better relations between the Churches. There are one or two distinctively theological articles in the opening number. Mr Wilfrid Ward writes from the standpoint of the Roman Church on Christian union, and incidentally points out that it was Manning, not Newman, "who wrote in the early 'sixties the beautiful tract, 'On the Workings of the Holy Spirit in the Church of England,'" though he admits that Newman's essay on Development represents most effectively to the modern mind the rationale of



the Roman Church's claim to be the exclusive guardian of the Christian revelation. Almost simultaneously, M. Houtin, in a review of Ward's biography of Newman (*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 1913, 81 f.), complains of the failure to connect Newman with modernism, and also of the way in which Francis Newman is ignored. "Francis," says M. Houtin, "fut un saint dans le monde laïque, comme son frère en fut un, à sa façon, dans l'Église. Au point de vue de la force de la pensée, il fut infiniment supérieur à son frère, mais il lui manquer de savoir, comme lui, filer des phrases sentimentales." M. Goyau's contribution to the Quarterly on "The Church of France To-day" deals mainly with its economic position and organisation. He sees a sign of hope in the social energies of the Church amid the poverty caused by the legislation of 1905, but his view of Christianity in France is less penetrating and more sanguine than that of his fellow-countryman, M. Albert L. Guérard, in *French Prophets of Yesterday* (T. Fisher Unwin). M. Guérard attempts in this fine study to throw light upon the precise character of the modern position of Christianity in France. He recognises that the Roman Church is fast losing her hold over her eldest daughter. "Catholicism may still claim, nominally, the majority of the French people; the force of habit still leads to the old Church the steps of many passive Catholics who are at the same time active Voltairians: but the old exclusive dominion is gone for ever. France is drifting—or growing—away from Rome." Protestantism, on the other hand, makes no visible progress. The outcome of this situation is discussed in the light of the factors which have gone to its formation, and M. Guérard turns back to the Second Empire. His book is a careful précis of the various movements during that period. There is a particularly good account of Renan's influence, among other things, evidently written from a first-hand acquaintance with the sources. But M. Guérard admits that when Renan prophesied Catholicism was on the verge of a schism he prophesied falsely. Or else, as he puts it, Renan saw further than we do. In any case, the conclusion of the book is less lucid than its survey. The failure of Catholicism is not more evident, according to M. Guérard, than the failure of Humanitarianism and Positivism; and he wisely prefers analysing the past to forecasting the future of religion in his native country.

The comparative ineffectiveness of Protestant theology in France is admitted incidentally by a recent member of the French Protestant Church, who observes that the only two writers belonging to this communion who have exercised any appreciable influence upon intellectual people are Auguste Sabatier and Charles Wagner. This is one of the incidental remarks of M. Trial, a French pastor, arguing in *La Réforme des Études théologiques* (Paris) for improvement in the theological education of the French Protestant ministry. Such demands are usually made in the interests of a so-called "practical" view of theological training, which tends to a depreciation of serious study. M. Trial guards himself against this criticism. He wishes theological colleges to pay more attention to

practical theology, and to make their curriculum less rigid. But he refuses to exclude Hebrew and Greek, although the value of this refusal is somewhat discounted by the fact that he proposes to make these subjects optional. Let men with a special turn for languages and scientific theology take these subjects. Let the others, who have no aptitude for such studies, devote their time to a general course of theology which will equip them for preaching and teaching the Christian religion to those who occupy the place of the unlearned. M. Trial does not consider that the technical training of the ministry in Hebrew and Greek justifies itself either by the number of real theologians which it produces, or by the effectiveness of the ordinary ministry. His ideal for the latter is "un bon pasteur," and his contribution to the current controversy over ministerial training in France is a detailed argument that the future "pasteur" can acquire a knowledge of exegesis and theology, especially biblical theology, without mastering the original languages.

There are other reasons, however, for the ineffectiveness of modern theology and churches. One is the recurring difficulty felt by many with regard to creeds, and this forms the theme of *A Layman's Mind on Creed and Church* (Macmillan). A second edition of this work has just appeared. The author, Mr J. S. Templeton, is a man of wide culture, with a keen conscience for honesty in religion. As a Scotchman he is principally concerned with the relation of the Presbyterian Churches to the Westminster Confession of Faith, dissatisfied with the existing expedients for removing or ignoring its antiquated statements, and anxious for the formulation of "a new creed, such as intelligent men could honestly subscribe." But the principles of his argument affect all churches which adhere to written creeds, and his pages are a searching protest against anything like disingenuousness or equivocation in the matter of subscription. The fundamental conviction of the author is, to quote his own words, "that all the Evangelical Churches are approaching a crisis in their history, when old Confessions of Faith must be swept away, and our conceptions of the origins, structure, and nature of the Bible, upon which these confessions have been founded, must be revised." The book is remarkable not so much for the arguments in favour of its thesis, as for the moral force and breadth with which the writer urges it.

Mr C. A. Barry's *First Principles of the Church* (Longmans) is on very different lines. It is an ardent plea for the Church of England on familiar sacramental grounds. Mr Templeton's volume expresses the mind of a penetrating Scottish layman; Mr Barry voices the mind of "the Ecclesiastic—a way of looking at things which the writer believes to be very congenial to the characteristic temper and spirit of the English Church." *On the Track of Truth* (Bennett), by Mr C. F. Moxon, is free from such considerations. A whole page is given to the remark that "Jesus and Christ have two very different significations for me. When I speak of Jesus, all that is lovable and good is brought to my mind; when I say Christ, I think of all that is tyrannical and unholy in the Church."



Mr Moxon advocates faith in re-incarnation as essential to clear thoughts about God. His book is a series of somewhat heterogeneous chapters, but the underlying idea is that the religion of Jesus as a religion of love requires to be supplemented by Buddhism.

It is seven years since Dr H. B. Workman's monograph on *Persecution in the Early Church* appeared, and it is now followed by *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal* (London: C. H. Kelly). The two books are intended as successive chapters in a history of Christian renunciation, and the author proposes to add a third, upon the decay of the monastic ideal and practice after the attempt "to reform Monasticism on a democratic basis," which we call the coming of the Friars. It is to be hoped that he will be able to publish this sequel before long. Such an event as the dissolution of the English monasteries, for example, awaits treatment still. Dr Gasquet's work, as he points out, "is more that of a partisan than of a scientific student," and if there is one quality more than another which characterises Dr Workman's pages, it is scientific candour. The present volume is distinguished by the same thoroughness and originality as its predecessor. It would not be easy to find in English any monograph on Early Monasticism which contained the same wealth of apt detail and breadth of judgment; it maintains throughout that attitude of critical sympathy which is so essential to a proper estimate of any religious movement in history, and unluckily so rare. The need of such a book is proved by the persistence of errors about the monastic ideal, as in Mr A. G. Whyte's *Religion of the Open Mind* (Watts & Co.), which celebrates the salvation of man by Rationalism from the fears which cause religion, and from the "cowardly negation of life" in "the asceticism which flourished in the ages of faith, the monastic ideal which has been held up before man as his true apotheosis." Mr Whyte's book is a popular sketch of Rationalism as a philosophy of practical life and even as a religion. The "open mind" means that "judgment is entirely suspended on transcendental matters," except that the possibility of positive knowledge with regard to such matters is denied. This rationalistic position is roundly challenged by Mr Bertram Brewster in *The Philosophy of Faith* (Longmans, Green & Co.). The motto of his essay or inquiry is Fichte's saying: "Faith, voluntarily reposing on views naturally presenting themselves to us, because through these views alone we can fulfil our destiny, sees our knowledge, and pronounces that 'it is good,' and raises it to certainty and conviction." In six chapters on "Truth," "Beauty," "Virtue," "Optimism," "Freedom," and the "Highest Good," the author works out, with considerable skill, a case for Christian theism as the only adequate interpretation of life. Another book, on similar lines, is *The Coming Phase in Religion* (Nutt), by Mr M. D. Hennessy, although it propounds the narrower thesis that "instinct is the medium of our communion with God, and that this was the truth which the Master exemplified." Jesus depended on experience and life, not on dogmas. The fundamental instinct which characterises His religion is the inherent instinct of God's love. Where all orthodoxy goes wrong, accord-

ing to Mr Hennessy, is in attempting to read and state this from the imagined point of view of God, and this aberration goes back to the Apostle Paul. Such an ultra-Ritschlian thesis is argued from the Gospel records, and the author warns us that we have to choose between the essential spirit of love which the Master exemplifies, and the distorting dogmatic reproductions of this truth which are based on the apostolic theology.

Not all are prepared, however, to throw Paul aside. Professor Bacon, in the *Constructive Quarterly* (163 f.), distinguishes the substance of the Apostle's message from its form, and finds the former in "sonship through moral union with the Father" by the imparted spirit of Jesus. On the more general problem of Paul's epistles, we have to notice a convenient handbook by Mr E. Basil Redlich, *St Paul and his Companions* (Macmillan), a pleasantly written study of the apostle's friends and of their importance in his life. One or two articles on special points in the epistles may also be chronicled at this point. Thus, the ordinary view<sup>1</sup> that the Epistle to the Philippians was the swan-song of Paul, written from his Roman imprisonment, has been challenged by critics who pointed to Cæsarea as a more suitable place for its composition, and still more recently by one or two scholars who argue for Ephesus. This last theory is stated by M. Goguel in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* (1912, pp. 330-342). He dates the epistle about the end of 55 A.D., between the Thessalonian and Corinthian epistles, with which it is pronounced to have more affinities than with Ephesians and Colossians; points out that neither the allusion to the "prætorium" nor the mention of "Cæsar's household" is decisive evidence for Rome; and lays stress on the need for taking literally Paul's allusion to "fighting with beasts at Ephesus" (1 Cor. xv. 20 f.). The recent advocacy of the latter interpretation by J. Weiss certainly is a point in favour of M. Goguel's hypothesis. He has put the case for the theory without any of the fantastic opinions which handicapped some of its earlier advocates. In the *Revue Biblique* (1913, pp. 207 f.), M. A. Brassac concludes his study of the Pauline chronology in the light of the Delphi inscription. His results may be summed up as follows:—Paul's conversion probably in 36 (not earlier than 34, not later than 37); first visit to Jerusalem, 38-39; Council of Jerusalem, 49; arrival at Jerusalem, 58; imprisonment at Cæsarea, 55-60; imprisonment at Rome, 61-63. It is obvious that this chronological reconstruction varies considerably from Harnack's recent essay (in *Sitzungsberichte der kgl. Preussischen Akademie*, 1912, 673-682), which places the conversion probably in the autumn of 31. Harnack lays stress upon the combination of 1 Cor. xv. 8 with the primitive tradition that Christ was to remain in close touch with the faithful, after His resurrection, for 545 days (*Ascension of Isaiah*, ix. 16). In the *Irish Church Quarterly* (123-135) Dr J. H. Kennedy begins a restatement of the view that 2 Cor. x.-xiii. was written before i.-ix., in

<sup>1</sup> Stated recently by Knabenbauer in his posthumous *Commentarii in S. Pauli epistolas ad Ephesios, Philippenses, et Colossenses* (Paris, Lethellieus), though he is disposed to date Philippians prior to the other two.



the light of the recent commentary by Dr Menzies, in which the canonical structure of the epistle is defended as original.

Two years ago Dr F. Dibelius, in his work on *Das Abendmahl* (1911, p. 8), denied the right of historical critics to assume the existence of "two deep clefts in the history of primitive Christianity, one between Jesus and the Jerusalem community, and the other between the primitive community and Paul." He challenged the theory that "our whole tradition as to the life and words of Jesus has been strongly recoloured by the conception of Christ entertained by the primitive community and Paul." This position is occupied by Professor Warfield in a study of Schmiedel's "pillar-passages" (*Princeton Theological Review*, 1913, pp. 195-269), which attempts to show that "the two-natured Jesus," or the tradition of the divine Jesus living and moving in human flesh, is not peculiar to Paul but organic to the primitive Synoptic record. A similar conclusion is reached by Professor Lofthouse in the closing chapter of *Gospel Origins* (Duckworth). Professor Lofthouse distinguishes, in the critical part of his book, three strata in Mark's Gospel, and finds in Luke's Gospel traces of a special source, which may be attributed to Joanna. "Her relation through her husband both to Herod and to the Samaritans, her Jewish birth and education, and her association with the mother of our Lord, and her strong womanly sympathy, all combine to make the introduction of her name by St Luke significant." In *The Sources of Luke's Perean Section* (Chicago), Dr Dean R. Wickes argues from a comparison with Matthew and an analysis of the contents that two separate documents were before the author of this section, one of them a Judean document, interested chiefly in Jerusalem and the vicinity, the other a document which, unlike its fellow, was used by Matthew. In the *Theologisch Studien und Kritiken* (1913, 452-461), Herr K. Köhler investigates the Lucan features in Luke xii. 22-23, Luke's version of a Q passage, and concludes that xii. 25, along with *καὶ περὶ τὰ λοιπά*, represent a marginal note which did not belong to the original text. Mr B. S. Easton (*Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1913, pp. 57 f.), after a penetrating analysis of the Beelzebub section in the Synoptic tradition, decides that Luke's version "represents practically a transcript of Q," and that Q at this point preserves in the main sayings which at some time or other were really uttered by Jesus. Finally, in the *Irish Theological Quarterly* (April, 123-143), Rev. F. E. Figtot contends that Luke i. 34-35 is not an interpolation.

JAMES MOFFATT.

## REVIEWS

*The Value and Destiny of the Individual.* The Gifford Lectures for 1912, delivered in Edinburgh University.—By B. Bosanquet, LL.D., D.C.L., Fellow of the British Academy.—Macmillan & Co., Ltd., St Martin's Street, London, 1913.

THE *principle* of Individuality and Value set forth in Mr Bosanquet's first course of Gifford Lectures is applied in this second course, and we are given a profoundly interesting account of the finite self from its first appearance to its final destiny.

The argument of the whole book is summarised in a masterly way in the first lecture, and is shown to fall into three main parts, each of which, in turn, is exhaustively treated in the rest of the volume. We are first told how and when finite selves emerge, and, having emerged, how they mould and are moulded by the Universe. Then their fortune is described as full of hazard and hardship; for, owing to their finite-infinite nature, they are doomed and privileged to the enterprise of "overcoming an insuperable antithesis." Finally, it is shown how, in the degree in which they come to know themselves as they are, they become "united to" or "absorbed in" the Absolute and attain "security and stability."

The main themes, and the order in which they are expounded, correspond to Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts*, with its threefold division into *Das Abstrakte Recht*, *Die Moralität*, and *Die Sittlichkeit*. And although it is not a commentary but the most significant result of an independent speculative effort which Mr Bosanquet offers to us, these two great books illumine each other. The reader who would master either will do well to read both, and he will find their differences even more suggestive than the truths which are common to them—and which are not only held by all thinkers of this school, but are suffusing the general thought and practice of our times to a degree that is more easy to overlook than to overestimate.

Mr Bosanquet "approaches the study of finite self-conscious creatures prepared to find in them the fragments of a vast continuance." "The finite is intelligible only through the infinite" (p. 11). He exhibits "the perils and troubles of the finite self as essential elements of the whole in



which its value consists" (p. 327). In this respect his method and his problem are the same as Hegel's, and they are so different from those of other schools—from Formal Intellectualism and Voluntarism (p. 99)—as to be virtually their opposites. Instead of bridging a gap between the finite self and the outer order of physical and social facts, Mr Bosanquet has to show how the self diverges and attains a relative independence. Instead of bringing together, aggregating, relating, he has to dissociate at first, and unify only after giving to dissociation its full scope. "Dissociation and deformation, rather than unification and transformation, are the keys to the study of the finite" (p. 11). It does not matter whether we begin with the whole or with the parts, provided that the parts are recognised as parts and the whole is held as concrete. But, owing to an invincible tendency on our part to make for ourselves a false claim to absolute independence and self-existence, it is better for philosophy to follow the first of these methods.

Mr Bosanquet is, I believe, further impelled to adopt this method by the errors into which the opposite way of approaching the problems of the finite self have led modern ethical and philosophical thought. And, on the other hand, his recoil from the same schools has caused him to give a fuller portrayal of "the hindrances, the causes of friction and collision," the hazards and hardships, the pain and evil, the contradictions and even the transience and relative unreality of finite selves, than upon their "at-homeness in the whole, the strength and vitality, which the very perils of the finite presuppose, and the fuller types of experience so persistently reveal" (p. 327). No one can lay against Mr Bosanquet the usual charge of "easy optimism" which has been the daily bread of the critics of Spiritual Realism. The shadow of doubt will fall rather upon the reality and the value of the individuality which he preserves for man, and, in consequence, upon his view of God and of the Absolute.

Perhaps there is nothing in the whole volume so suggestive of the resolute continuity of Mr Bosanquet's manner of thinking as the way in which he enters upon his enterprise. He begins with what seem to be more or less casual notes to two points discussed in his previous course of lectures: in the first he repeats in a decisive way his rejection of all the dualistic theories of the relation of mind and externality; and in the second he discusses the meaning of Appearance. But these two notes open up the problems, and even suggest the main lines of the solutions with which the book as a whole is engaged. To accept these notes is virtually to accept the dominant principles of the entire system.

In his *Principle of Individuality and Value* Mr Bosanquet dealt with the *relation* of mind and body, and spoke of his theory as "akin to Parallelism." His first note in the present volume brings an unqualified denial of both the need and the possibility of establishing relations. Parallelism, Interaction, and Epiphenomenalism are unambiguously rejected. These theories imply two distinct sets of entities and a connection between them. They reduplicate in one medium what has already taken place in

another; and the reduplication is meaningless, and incapable, even if it had any use or meaning, of theoretical justification. As against this view, the continuity of externality and mind is unconditionally affirmed. It is maintained that neuroses pass into and complete themselves as psychoses, and that "spatial changes into non-spatial togetherness" (p. 3). We are entitled to ask when and how, but not to ask whether, this transition takes place: and the question of relations or no relations between the two series cannot arise. We have empirical evidence that the transition does take place. "It plainly must happen, and the only necessary precaution is to make no superfluous assumptions in explaining it" (p. 4).

This is the theme of the first part of the book. We are there told how finite individuality arises, an individuality which is in principle positively free; and free, not by excluding and not in spite of, but by comprehending and in virtue of the world which furnishes it with all its contents and which nevertheless it completes and creates. I shall return to this matter.

In his note on "*Appearance*," still more difficult issues are raised. Mr Bosanquet indicates two different, and apparently inconsistent, ways in which the term is currently used: it denotes what is opposed to reality as false or illusory; and it denotes that in, or as, which reality stands out or becomes obvious. Mr Bosanquet adopts neither, except in so far as he adopts both, of these views. Appearance is more than illusion and less than reality, and partakes of the nature of both. It is not a part of reality, not a genuine part, for it is a part misinterpreted, through being isolated and taken as if it were a self-existent whole. And, to complete the confusion, it *necessarily* appears, and is necessarily so taken by us (*cf.* pp. 13-15). "Finite minds and objects, though appearances, are not illusions. But for and as finite minds they are always in so far illusory, as it is impossible but that they should have ascribed to them and ascribe to themselves a false character of self-existence" (p. 14).

The importance of this seemingly ambiguous nature attributed to Appearance is manifest when we find that the finite world as a whole, including both our minds and their objects, is a world of appearances (*ibid.*). It would seem that both our own minds and that which we know necessarily conspire together to falsify the facts; and yet the facts are not falsified, for it is their nature to "ascribe to themselves a false character."

Further, while Mr Bosanquet identifies finite objects and minds with appearance and imperfection, he identifies Reality with the Absolute and with perfection. The former exist, but are not real: existence means successive appearance in space and time. Reality, on the other hand, is not mere existence, but it includes existence; it is not imperfect, but it contains imperfection. "The perfect and the imperfect have their being through one another: reality without existence would not be itself. You cannot have a perfection which is the perfection of nothing; nor a something conditioned within a perfect system, which is perfect apart from the inconclusive system that conditions it" (p. 15).

There can be no difficulty in accepting this last statement. But I am



afraid that Mr Bosanquet, like Mr Bradley, will find many of his disciples say, on hearing their doctrine of appearance, "This is an hard saying; who can hear it?" They would admit that, "a perfection, which is the perfection of nothing" is inconceivable, but they might ask whether a perfection whose whole contents as known to them are appearances, and therefore imperfect, is not also inconceivable. They will also allow that we must omit most of the context and conditions of the objects we know; but they may ask whether they must also be so little aware of the abstract character of their knowledge as to treat its objects as if they were self-existent, or had no conditions. If it is impossible but that "finite objects and minds should have ascribed to them, and ascribe to themselves, a false character of self-existence," if there is both an epistemological and ontological necessity that they should seem to be wholes, how is that self-transcendence possible upon which Mr Bosanquet relies? And, on the other hand, how can appearances which must appear as self-existent be recognised as appearances, or a reality which contains them be conceived? Verily it is not easy to see that an infinite which is not successive can have its being through the cause of the successive, and an Absolute which is perfect can have its being through and because of the imperfect. And it is no easier to be satisfied with Appearance which seems to be either a real unreality or an unreal reality, or with an Absolute whose whole content is necessarily misinterpreted, and which, apart from that content, is not itself.

It may be worth while asking whether no other alternatives are possible. It may not follow, because we know nothing as it is in the totality of its conditions, that what we do know is appearance and not reality. We seem, at any rate, to be capable of having what we call, not without some justification, false *and* true knowledge of the same things. Though our opinions are different when some of us say that the earth is flat, and others that the earth is round, we are nevertheless occupied by way of cognition with the same object. Can it be that it is reality with which we are dealing even when our opinions are not true, and that, while the products of the process of knowledge may be either true or false, its data and ultimate conditions always lie in some kind of intercourse between real minds and real facts? Or does the universe consist of two kinds of facts: one kind consisting of appearances, successive and existent, and the other kind a reality which contains the first kind but cannot be characterised by any of their qualities? If it is possible, one might prefer to maintain that the only object of knowledge at any time, and however imperfectly it is known, is reality; that the ultimate subject of all predication is the Whole or Absolute; that when we call objects appearances we are not only thinking abstractly but aware of our abstraction, and that appearances are the results and not the data of our imperfect cognitive activity. Incomplete knowledge, recognised as incomplete, may not be the same as false knowledge; and finite facts may not owe their finitude to their unreality. Does "finiteness lie in powerlessness" (p. 56), and is there no getting away from Spinoza? The conception of appearance is vital to

Mr Bosanquet's doctrine; but the use that is made of the conception by other Idealists is, to say the least, more sparing. It is not their instrument of construction, even although they speak of what is "implicit" and what is "explicit," of what is "potential" and what is "actual," and employ the self-contradictory, but not absurd, conception of Evolution.

But I now deal with Mr Bosanquet's development of the two main themes suggested in his "notes," and, first, with his account of the emergence and the moulding of finite selves. We must ascertain, if possible, how "the vice of finiteness" (p. 17) arises, if we are to know how it "can be cured."

To do so we must begin by remembering that the finite self is a fragment, or, to use the phrase of Mr Bradley, that it has "ragged edges," and therefore has been violently torn from a context which, in truth, is its intrinsic character. The common conviction that personality depends on exclusiveness, or that the essence of the self is that it is impervious, and that its self-hood is adequately described in these ways, Mr Bosanquet, so far as I can see, succeeds in refuting. What is real in the case of finite selves, as in all other cases, is universal; or, in other words, they are real, whether as knowing or willing, in virtue of the universe, and in as far as they are not exclusive but inclusive. The self is a focus of the world: its environment is its content, its content is its living experience, and its living experience is its self.

But different selves *are* different centres. Externality, which is the object of finite minds, becomes distinct foci "in which minds appear" (p. 4). In what does this difference consist? Supposing A, B, C, D, being different persons, came to hold the same opinions on all matters, so that "the contents" of their experience could not be distinguished, would their "separate" personalities survive such a complete coincidence? We are told that there is "no rule as to how far persons" can overlap in their contents. And a somewhat startling consequence is drawn by Mr Bosanquet from this fact. It is that "often a little change in quality, it seems, would all but bring them into one. It is impotence, and no mysterious limitation, that keeps them apart" (xxi.). "If it is possible for single minds to cover practically the whole world of experience, it would seem more natural to strike out their formal differences, and let them fall together into one" (p. 55). "If we suppose them perfected without tending to fall into one, the argument would point to a plurality of absolutes of identical content"; and this to Mr Bosanquet "seems absurd" (*ibid.*, footnote). So that "what it comes to is this—what we call individual finite beings are kept apart by differences of quality of feeling, and also by the reciprocal shortcomings of the content of which they are composed" (p. 59). "It would seem futile that a plurality of minds should cover the same ground" (p. 60).

But how does this comport with what we are told next—namely, that "wherever we are strong we come together"? Can it be that we cease to be distinct individuals in the degree in which we come together and are strong? And are our "distinctnesses indifferent to the real spiritual



unities which transcend us at every point"? Is the gradual increase of knowledge whereby, say, a class of children come to give the same answers to the same problems; or scientific men to offer the same solutions to the same physical problems; or good citizens come to give the same services to the State, whether in the way of defending it against its neighbours, or educating their children and obeying its laws, a diminution of their individuality as well as distinctness? What about unanimous resolutions on the part of a senate, or the same passion of patriotism amongst its citizens when the State is in danger? It seems to me that every individual would not only feel himself stronger in virtue of such identity of content and mood, but find that his individuality is not less deep, his convictions and passions not less his own, his world not less focussed in him and by him, although it is also focussed in and by other individuals and he is in full accord with his fellows.

Is it not possible that distinctness, implying limitation and relative exclusion on the one side, and individuality, implying inclusion on the other, are in an inverse relation? A plurality of Absolutes may be absurd: in any case it is not a problem that can arise so long as men are spoken of as finite-infinite. But, on the other hand, even if the "distinctnesses of individuals are precarious and superficial" (p. 58) and tend to disappear as they appropriate the same truth and will the same good and are "absorbed in the Absolute," I am not convinced that their "individuality," their existence as self-conscious foci, also tends to disappear, or that their absorption in the Absolute is their collapsing into Oneness. The principle of individuality *is* Absolute, and the crudest rational being is in principle an individual. Self-consciousness, unless I have totally misread the Spiritual Realism of Hegel, has no absolute "other"; and man does not transcend himself in the course of his progress. He realises himself. The substitution of "self-transcendence" throughout the pages of Mr Bosanquet for the more familiar "self-realisation" of Idealism is significant and of doubtful value; and seems to me to imperil both the reality of finite things and selves and, what is the same thing in the last resort, to delete the content and meaning of the Absolute. Mind, in short, becomes "an empty principle of totality" (p. 95).

But there is another aspect to the doctrine. That unity which was called mind and described as an "empty principle of totality" is active. "The representative centre of any range of experience represents it in a way of its own" (p. 96). Individuals, then, owe their distinctnesses to their own activity. In them appears "the miracle" of consciousness and of will. "An externality which is the object of mind becomes a focus in which mind appears." And once it appears it continues and carries nearer completeness a process by which it is further shaped by the world, and shapes itself. It is forced, and forces itself, onward through the world of claims and counter-claims and the hazards and hardships of the moral life, until at length it "recognises its own genuine nature as a creature which is an eternal Spirit revealing itself in space and time."

Have we in all this no ground for maintaining that individual finite selves owe their individuality to something more positive than their limitations or superficial and evanescent distinctnesses? If so, then we must re-interpret the earlier stages of their career, and find in each of them "the *nisus* to the whole, the *ἔρως* or spirit of union, which is at once logic and love" (p. 9); and recognise the process in which "the world of legal or relational morality, beset by the chances of pleasure and pain, and haunted by the inherent conflict between good and evil" (p. 17), is shattered, as a process which at once identifies finite selves with nature, and God, and deepens their personality or individuality. "The height of individuality is to be looked for in experiences which raise to the acutest pitch the sense and fact of [this] identity" (*Principles*, 271).

Does Mr Bosanquet succeed in maintaining in their integrity *both* of these characteristics of the self of man? Are the two sides of his nature, the finite and infinite, connected by something better than a hyphen, or must the hyphen itself disappear, and finitude, losing its limitations, lapse, be resolved into the Absolute. Does the individuality which is at its highest when its devotion to the highest is most complete, cease to be a distinct individuality? "When freedom and spontaneity reach their climax in religion the self no longer insists on its exclusive claim, and the whole being goes out together into the service which is perfect freedom" (*ibid.*). And it would seem to follow that under no circumstances are men more entitled to say "I am I," and "You are you," "I am not you," and "You are not I," than when their freedom and spontaneity reach their climax. For it is one thing not to have or be a Self, and another thing not to insist upon or care for its exclusive claims. Does Mr Bosanquet observe this distinction? When, or in so far as, the individual comes to know his own true nature, and to recognise that his whole and only interest is the Absolute, does he cease, or tend to cease, to have a nature of *his own*? Is it to his limitation and powerlessness that he owes his being as an individual?

These are crucial questions, to which, if it is possible, a clear answer is desirable. Unfortunately, however, the phrases which Mr Bosanquet uses in this connection are ambiguous. A "transformation," to the nature of which we have no clue, is the condition of the final union of finite selves with the Absolute, and in that transformation it is not clear what it is that is preserved, except a whole, none of whose elements are any longer discernible. Mr Bosanquet resolves the harsh discords of finitude in a higher harmony, and after giving to the hazards and hardships of the moral life their full say, brings "security and stability" to finite selves, and converts the human tragedy into a divine comedy. But the result is "absorption" in the Absolute; and "absorption" is ambiguous. It can mean two directly opposite things. It may mean either that the finite self ceases to be, or that it affirms itself more fully in the object in which it is "absorbed."

And everything turns upon which of these two meanings is adopted. In the one case, finitude becomes in the last resort an "Appearance"



which passes away, and which, if transience implies succession and succession is not a character of the real, never was real; and, on the other hand, the Absolute, Reality, Perfection, known in its true nature when its contents are not falsely known, turns out to be incapable of being characterised except as *not* what we know, but as changeless, static. In the other case, the "absorption" of individual finite selves in the Absolute being a deepening of *their* interest, a growing knowledge of their *true* nature is their progressive self-realisation. For their *true* selves and content lie in the real which they appropriate in their thought and realise in their will.

There are many expressions in Mr Bosanquet's book which favour both of these views. And his rejection of Pampsychicism and his account of the relation of "mechanism to life" and of the whole sphere of the physical to the psychical, would lead us to expect that the features of finitude would be preserved in the Absolute, and that the probabilities of his argument would favour what we call the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

But this expectation is not fulfilled. There is not one feature of finite objects or finite selves of men which must not disappear when we know them *as they are* in their oneness with the Absolute, or as they "ought to be" were that oneness not impossible. Not even in religion are the hurts of life quite healed; for there, "as in morality, good is still loaded with the inherent contrast to evil," and God Himself is impeded with the contrast. The God of Religion is not the Absolute. "Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Lord Omnipotent, Creator, Providence," none of these terms can apply to the Absolute. The Good Will is not the Absolute. It is God, and not the Absolute who has a will for good as against evil, and an interest in finite minds which are engaged in the struggle. The "Universe, or an Absolute which has nothing outside it" (p. 249), must rather be the theatre of good and evil than good and evil itself (p. 250). "The whole considered as a perfection in which the antagonism of good and evil is unnoted, is not what religion means by God, and must rather be taken as the Absolute."

And it is the perfection in which the antagonism of good and evil is unnoted with which the individual, in his pursuit of his ultimate meaning and value, is to be identified. His devotion, even in religion, can only be devotion to his God; but "the God of religion, inherent in the completed experience, is an appearance of reality, as distinct from being the whole and ultimate reality" (p. 255).

If I thought that these consequences were involved in the principles of Idealism I should "cultivate my garden." But I prefer to believe that I have either missed Mr Bosanquet's meaning, or that he has misinterpreted the principles of Idealism.

HENRY JONES.

*The Concept of Sin.*—By F. R. Tennant, D.D., B.Sc.—Cambridge University Press, 1912.

To his previous works, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin* and *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin*, Dr Tennant has now added a third, which reveals the same high intellectual qualities, and constitutes with them a notable trilogy in prose on the great tragedy of human sin. Believing that it is desirable in the interests both of clear thinking and of practical godliness that we should have “a well-defined and clear-cut conception of sin,” the writer seeks to justify the concept of sin with which he himself works, and which he thinks all Christian theologians and moralists would do well to adopt.

The work of definition, however, and above all the task of getting one's definitions accepted, is no easy one; and Dr Tennant is to be congratulated on the skill, the persistence, and the courage with which he faces the problem. For what right, it may be asked, has any man, or any group of men, or any generation of men, to alter the connotation of a word which has been current for millenniums? Words do not obtain a permanent place in the literature of peoples and in popular usage without some justification both in convenience and in truth. The man, therefore, who attempts to restrict and define and stereotype the meaning of so ancient and universally prevalent a concept as that of sin will need to take his courage in both hands and be very patient.

But of course the author is thinking mainly of reasonable men, and in particular of Christian theologians and moralists. It is this audience that he wishes to persuade. Is he likely to have good success? Putting aside for the present all doubts as to the value of a uniform use, whether Dr Tennant's or that of anyone else, the objection meets us on the threshold, that it is too late in the day to attempt to construct a scientific Christian theology without reference to the concepts of other civilised races and religions. The Christian theologian has no exclusive right to the word “sin”; and it is not fair for him to say that what a Hindu, for example, calls “sin” is a complete misnomer. If a Christian thinker cannot find a common element in the conceptions of sin which have maintained themselves for centuries in the vocabulary of cultured races, the more respectful course would seem to be to abandon the use of the word or to limit its significance for Christian theology by means of a qualifying adjunct.

But there is another initial objection which will appear to many much more serious. For nearly nineteen centuries the word has meant something else to many of the most justly honoured of the Christian saints and thinkers. Some of the præ-Augustinian evidence has been given by Dr Tennant in a former work; but in the present volume the ecclesiastical writers are passed over, and the responsibility for the alleged deviation from the correct meaning is fixed upon the Apostle Paul, who made an “unfortunate” mistake, and “doubtless did not think out the consequences of his unhappy application of the term.”



The Christian theologian, having to frame his concept of sin in accordance with some "norm," and not in complete independence of the historic faith, must decide what that norm is; and here Dr Tennant parts company with a large number of theologians ancient and modern. For he finds it expressed in the accounts of our Lord's life and teaching as given in the Gospels (the Fourth Gospel as well as the Synoptic Gospels). But upon whose authority or for what reasons? The Christian Church has been accustomed to regard the New Testament, and not simply the Gospels, as the authoritative sources of her doctrine. Why is not the testimony of the Apostle Paul as valid as that of the Evangelists for the determination of our Lord's teaching? Even if the Synoptists and John give us in all cases the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, an assumption which Dr Tennant has not attempted to make good (and the very words are of some importance when the inquiry is about the precise definition of a concept), it is surely not necessary to conclude that the last word on the subject of sin was spoken by Jesus before His death, or that the Evangelists have recorded it. The Gospels are confessedly incomplete. Why should the earlier uses of the word "sin" be regulative for Christian theology, and the later interpreted by them? Should we not rather say (accepting with Dr Tennant the Christian facts) that the fuller revelation of the meaning and implications of sin could only come after Jesus had died for the sins of men and the Holy Spirit had been given to convince the world in respect of sin? It might very plausibly be maintained that the idea of the solidarity of the old creation in sin, whether it be a revelation, or an inference, or merely an illustration, was extremely unlikely to be held in the Christian community before the Resurrection and the baptism of the Spirit had made the unity of the new creation a reality to faith.

Having selected his "norm" and tested his own concept by it, Dr Tennant proceeds in an interesting way to expound his ideas in the light of modern psychology and ethics, exercising a severe restraint upon himself, as the list of names in the index shows. But one wonders whether he strengthens his position very much by so doing. The terminology of psychologists is as fluctuating or indeterminate as that of the theologians. No one can read modern psychological works without experiencing the difficulty of obtaining anything like a unanimous consensus as to what is to be understood by the "will." The term "instinct," too, is used in different senses even by post-Darwinian writers. Dr Tennant's own usage is not quite clear, for, having sharply separated "instinct" from "impulse," he speaks a little later of animals as "*purely* impulsive"; and in any case it is not the same as that of other recent psychologists who give to the word a much more extended meaning. The reference to the religious, not to say Christian, consciousness is meagre; and into one sentence on page 134 is packed sufficient disputatious material to occupy many pages of discussion. It is so easy to prove what we desire, if we select our definitions. But one cannot help feeling that the writer of this book does violence to the continuity of the mental life by too absolute a severance of

the will from other conative experiences, and also from that principle, or life, or undeveloped selfhood, which only comes to clear consciousness at a later stage, but which exists in germ from the beginning. The same rigidity attaches to the author's conception of the individual in relation to society. Individual responsibility and racial sin were not inconsistent in the mind of the Apostle Paul, though he may not have left us a logical solution of the apparent contrariety, any more than he can be said to have given us a purely intellectual reconciliation of grace and free-will; but he did not fall into the mistake of ruling out one factor in a complex problem in order to obtain an apparent solution. And it would still seem to be premature to appeal to the findings of modern psychology in order to rebuke the Apostle's breadth of outlook, for has not one of our most eminent psychologists recently asked the question, "Is it possible that the phrase 'the soul of a race' is something more than a metaphor?" Many more books will have to be written before the theologians will be willing to lighten the vessel by throwing overboard an apostolic bequest, especially as just now the scientific forecast seems to be "fairer weather ahead."

At the conclusion of the book the concept of sin is "briefly" defined. The definition occupies ten lines, with five more added to prevent misunderstanding. It does not possess any exclusively Christian element, and may prove acceptable to those theists who reject the Christian revelation, as well as to those who are dissatisfied with vaguer customary usages.

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*Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem.*—By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc., Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1912.

To justify his policy of "Delenda est Logica," Dr Schiller has, I think, to make good both these positions: (1) that Logic as now taught is essentially and absolutely formal; (2) that the forms it investigates are useless for the purpose of supporting and explaining the reasoning process. And to arrive at any conclusion on either of these two points, it is necessary to be clear as to the meaning of "form" and "formal."

Mr Alfred Sidgwick has admirably defined Formal Logic as meaning any logic which is "more formal than it need be" (*Use of Words in Reasoning*, p. 8). In reading Dr Schiller's book, by the way, one is constantly tempted to amend this definition to read: "Any Logic which can be represented as more formal than it really is." Dr Schiller's own definition is: "All views . . . which take material truth for granted, and decline to consider how real truth is determined" (p. 6). And a few instances will show to what lengths he goes in attempting to make good the first position above referred to. It is, for example, suggested (p. 26) that Logic attempts to arrive at the real meaning of terms "simply by



staring at the verbal form." Definition is then described as "the exposition of the connotation of a term," and an attempt is made to tie Logic down to Aristotle's idea of a final and absolute definition, and to his whole ontological view of Essence (pp. 67-9)—even to the traditional definition of Man as a "rational animal" (pp. 54, 66). Again (p. 94), it is pointed out that (as everybody admits, and as modern logicians insist) all judgments *claim* truth. And the following remarkable inference as to the position of Logic is offered. "Judgment as such, then, must be proclaimed true and infallible. Whatever is asserted asserts truth, and no matter how assertions clash and vary, they must all pass as formally true, because none of them confesses to an intrinsic doubt of its own truth. . . . From the standpoint of Formal Logic, errors, sarcasms, lies, and jokes become invisible, and cannot be known to exist. They are all happily included in Formal Truth, and the difference between them and what the ordinary man calls true judgments must be regarded as extra-logical and irrelevant to Logic."

The real position of Logic is, of course, wholly different from the grotesque attitude here sketched out for it. Formal logicians—for instance, Dr Venn and Dr Keynes—have insisted on the *dual* reference inherent in Logic: the reference both to the subjective and the objective orders. And the reference to a third aspect—that of the verbal symbol—has been emphasised ever since Aristotle pointed it out. The meaning of the term—the connotation—is conceived as determined by the experts who are in intimate contact with the facts of the particular case; the truth or falsity of the proposition, by actual experience of the Universe of Discourse within which the alleged connection of phenomena takes place. And the most formal and traditional Logic distinguishes, and always has distinguished, between errors arising from faults of form, and those due to mistakes about meaning or material fact. The very claim of the judgment to be true implies a reference to an objective order, and by applying to this the actual truth or falsity of the judgment can be tested. The most formal Logic does, as a matter of fact, discuss the connection between material truth and falsity in the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism (*cf.* Dr Keynes's *Formal Logic*, p. 394): and there seems no valid reason why it should suggest any other test of material truth (when the question is raised) than the "plain man's" appeal to the facts. Nor will the use of such words as "dastardly" (p. 285) compel it to adopt, in consequence, the whole Pragmatist view of the nature of truth.

To illustrate Dr Schiller's second line of attack—the uselessness of the forms on which Logic bases itself—let us take his treatment of the Laws of Thought. His statement that "every mind is expected to admit their *truth*, without inquiring into their *meaning*" (p. 111—italics, Dr Schiller's), does not apply to the logicians, at any rate, who have spent much time and trouble in expounding their meaning and application. But without much success, it would appear. For Dr Schiller says: "That if a thing has once been called A it must for ever remain A and cannot change in any respect"

. . . . "is the sense modern Formalists try to give to the Law of Identity" (p. 115). The Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle are roundly declared to be not merely useless but untrue. We are not to assert that A cannot be at the same time not-A, because it may, unknown to us, have changed into not-A (p. 122): because I may choose to suspend my judgment and to "go on therefore affirming both" (p. 125), and because "it is perfectly easy to cherish contradictions in one's mind, provided that they are kept apart, and not allowed to meet": and finally, it is pointed out that affirmation does *not* exclude denial—on the contrary, "every assertion includes a denial" (p. 123). Similarly, Excluded Middle is untrue, because, as with Contradiction, I may refuse to judge either A or not-A. Not one of these arguments invalidates the use made of the Laws by Formal Logic. It takes them as principles (call them postulates if you will) which underlie the reasoning processes: so that if *while you reason* your concepts or propositions change their meaning, or are self-contradictory, your results will be liable to error. If you simply refuse to judge, to choose between opposite judgments, or to bring your notions together at all, you are refusing even to begin the business of reasoning: and to say that because they do not in that case apply to you, they are untrue, is a surprising *non sequitur*. Still more staggering is the statement that because every assertion includes a denial, therefore "the very Law of Contradiction seems to demand its own abrogation" (p. 123). The assertion of A includes a denial—of what? of itself, as the argument requires? No: but, as we all know, of not-A. The paradox is indeed, as Dr Schiller adds, "well calculated to produce . . . philosophic stupor." One feels inclined to exclaim, with a certain impatient member of one of William James's audiences—"But, doctor, doctor! to be serious a moment!"

Turning now to Syllogism—naturally one of the chief points of the attack on the fortress of Formal Logic—we find, as before, that the logician is expected to confine himself to an absolute and impracticable formalism. He is quaintly depicted as "annoyed" when a fact, used as a premiss, turns out not to be a fact after all: "annoyed with the scientist, and annoyed by the facts, nay, tempted to uphold his deduction against them" (p. 193). And he is represented throughout as cherishing an ideal of reasoning as being compulsory, and even coercive—see, for example, pp. 160, 195, 397—in a sense and to an extent which no logician has ever maintained. But, as before, the main line of attack is an attempt to show that Syllogism, as a form, is impotent.

The first assault is based on the admitted fact that the middle term always *may* be ambiguous (p. 199): from which it is inferred that "no disputant need ever be compelled by the mere form of any syllogism to accept its conclusion" (p. 198). This inference, however, has no terrors for any Logic except one so absolutely formal as to maintain that a verbal symbol can never, under any circumstances or in any context, change its meaning; a position which it is safe to say no human being ever took up. A Logic which merely says to the reasoner that *if* he has well and truly connected



his terms by a middle, and has succeeded in making that middle unambiguous, then the form will, as form, inevitably connect his two terms also—is on safe ground. “No so,” retorts the New Logician. Why not? we ask. “He cannot be compelled to combine the premisses which lead to this particular conclusion.” A little staggered by the resourcefulness of the New Logic, we persist: But suppose them combined—does the conclusion not follow inevitably? And we receive this answer: “It is never necessary to infer, because it is never necessary to think”! (p. 168). At this point, to quote a phrase of Dr Schiller’s, “it [Formal Logic] stops exhausted” (p. 119). If its assailants prefer intellectual suicide rather than yield to reason “upon compulsion,” it can but “comfort itself” with the recollection of that precise gentleman who (according to Sam Weller), devoured three shillings-worth of crumpets, and then—blew out his brains, in order to disprove the validity of that well-known Law of Nature, “Crumpets is unwholesome.”

The sub-title of the work is “A scientific and social problem.” Why social?

Throughout the book, Formal Logic is described as something essentially effete and contemptible: as abstracting from (because incapable of dealing with) meaning, as well as truth (pp. 381–2): as inducing “a sort of mental paralysis” (p. 387), and “putting a premium on senilities” (p. 409). Yet in spite of its impotence, Formal Logic is in the last chapter described as “something to be *feared*” (p. 394). Its belief in the “coerciveness” of the forms of reasoning is taken very literally. It is compared—to its disadvantage, of course,—with the Inquisition. Quite early in the book, in fact, we are told that “the Syllogism has wrought more woe to the freedom of thought than even the Inquisition at its worst” (p. 196): and further on (p. 402) a somewhat callous retort to his heretical victims is suggested for “a clear-headed Inquisitor with a firm grasp of Formal Logic.” A little later (p. 405) we learn that “*Heresy* is another theological crime, fabricated wholly out of Formal Logic”: and that “the threats against heretics, then, of hell-fire and incineration proceed, not from Religion, but from a Formal Logic that cannot allow individual thinking about individual cases.” Again, “Religion has been sacrificed and mangled by theologians who honestly believed the lessons they had all learnt from Formal Logic” (p. 402). Clearly, then, “la Logique c’est l’ennemi.” The only point left unsolved by Dr Schiller in this social problem is “the practical question of what is to be done in consequence”: but this, as he adds, is “a difficulty for the *statesman* and the moralist . . . rather than for us” (p. 409—italics mine). Apparently a short Act suppressing all Chairs of Logic (“to this day hundreds of professors owe their daily bread to Aristotle,” p. 188), and making it penal to reason syllogistically, is what is needed in the author’s view.

Has Dr Schiller then made out his case? It is abundantly clear that by Formal Logic (whatever his original definition) he means the ordinary Logic as now taught in our universities. If space allowed, it could be

shown in further detail that both positions set out at the beginning of this review are untenable: that modern Logic is not taught with the rigid and uncritical formalism which alone would justify the attacks made on it, and that the forms of thought as it actually handles them are practically useful and theoretically valid. Probably most, if not all, teachers of Logic would admit that one of the chief ways in which they can make the subject useful to their more elementary students, is by helping them to apply the principles to concrete examples; and that the principles themselves require very careful interpretation, to which (it should be gratefully admitted) recent criticisms have contributed many useful suggestions, and which can be so conducted as to lead on to the study of philosophy.

The controversy is in fact only the ancient and probably eternal antithesis between abstract and concrete, universal and particular, form and matter, the One and the Many. Both sides are necessary: taken in isolation, neither gives complete significance or truth. The tendency to confine attention unduly to one side or the other is probably a matter of temperament: and a recognition of this fact would check the practice of what Dr Schiller happily calls "all this flinging about of dyslogistic terms" (*Mind*, No. 69, p. 127). In thinking, then, there must be forms: the question will be, firstly, what forms? secondly, what degree of validity shall we ascribe to them?

The recent critics of Logic are not altogether agreed on the first point. Mr Alfred Sidgwick's searching analysis seems to leave us after all in the position of teaching the main outlines of the traditional forms, but with much criticism and modification. Dr Mercier has suggested some new forms, but their value for teaching has yet to be proved. Dr Schiller's writings are, so far, almost purely destructive. His "Psychologic" has yet to be written. We are then still dependent on the traditional forms. These, interpreted as modern Logic interprets them, will give all the certainty we can have or should expect. *In so far* as we have avoided ambiguity in our syllogism (whether of Inference or of Proof—a distinction not ignored by Logic, as Dr Schiller asserts on p. 209), it will furnish a *test* of validity. In inductive reasoning, the logician only asserts that *in so far* as we have succeeded in getting an instance of Difference, we are safe in inferring Causation and therefore Law. Nor is he, by the way, so "childish" as to "imagine that we can, by devising formulas which express no reference to time, *prevent reality from changing*" (p. 326, italics mine). His aim is, once more, to provide a *test* by which to decide how far, at a given moment of development, his thought is in accordance with reality.

In short, the thesis (traversing both of Dr Schiller's positions) might be maintained, that the body of logical doctrine as taught at present, while not impracticably formal, yet gives us an indispensable explanation of the validity of formal reasoning; that it is consequently useful, and therefore, on his own principles, true.

W. E. TANNER.



*Ecce Deus: Studies of Primitive Christianity.*—By Wm. Benjamin Smith.—Watts & Co., 1912.

*Der vorchristliche Jesus.*—By Wm. Benjamin Smith.—Giessen, 1906.

I HAVE always held with Heinrich Ewald that the sphere of a teacher of Old Testament interpretation must be taken to include the Gospel narratives and sayings, and it was not without some indignation that I read one of the reviews of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* in which this seemed, with reference to me, to be denied. The necessity of defending the rights of a widened research has hindered me from contributing much to New Testament inquiry, but I have, in articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, expressed some original opinions on points arising out of the Gospel narratives, and, in other works, on the use of Semitic and other mythology to illustrate the *Vorgeschichte* and *Nachgeschichte* of the traditional life of Jesus, and on the original meaning of certain names in the New Testament, as well as on the amount of solid fact in the conclusions of that protagonist of German radical critics, Professor Arthur Drews. I now turn to the most recent work of an independent scholar, Professor W. B. Smith of New Orleans, while not denying myself the liberty of reference to the same author's earlier work (mentioned above at the end of the book-titles). If Drews may excusably be labelled a dilettante, no one can justifiably apply this designation to William Benjamin Smith.

The most interesting portions of *Ecce Deus*, where all is interesting, are, to me at least, those which have to do with the symbolic interpretation of the Gospels and with important New Testament names. Since Professor Smith refers expressly to me on some of these names, I take the liberty of answering him, so far at least as this can be done in a narrow space and time. My answer is, I venture to hope, not without some originality.

I may suitably begin by quoting, with full assent and consent, the closing words of the elaborate memoir on the origin and meaning of Nazareth in part 2 of *Der vorchristliche Jesus*: "Denn der Jesus Christus des ursprünglichen Christentums war nicht menschlicher, sondern göttlicher Art, der König aller Könige, der Herr aller Herren, der Heiland, der Retter, der schützende Gott" (page 41). Certainly the honour due to the Saviour does not in the least depend on the solution of the Nazareth problem. Nevertheless, the problem in its relation to the Gospel narrative is important. The question is whether "he came to a city called Nazareth" (Matt. ii. 23) is a development out of a divine title "the keeper," or whether we may consider that the reference to "Nazareth" is suggested by a tradition of a certain Jeshua, a gracious and influential but not more than human teacher, a scanty narrative of whose life (or rather of its closing period) has been interwoven with other narratives, some of semi-mythic origin, and some products of the imaginative and the didactic faculties. The second alternative attracted me not very long ago. Since then, however, I have learned to realise how difficult it is to combine a

Galilean with a Judean connection for the early disciples, and, on the other hand, how easily and naturally "Jehoshua," "Joshua," or "Jeshua" may be shown to be a pre-Christian god-name (Jahu-Asshur). It is not necessary here to enter at any length into the famous passages in Epiphanius about the *Νασαραῖοι* or *Ναζαραῖοι* or *Ναζωπαῖοι*, nor perhaps to go outside the traditional Hebrew text of the Old Testament. I agree, indeed, with Professor Smith that (if I rightly understand him) *Νασαραῖοι* and the other forms quoted above have the same origin as *Ναζαρετ*. According to Smith—but again I am not sure that I understand him—*Ναζαρετ* has supplanted *ha-nošer*, which is a descriptive adjective like *ξένιος* in *Ζεὺς ξένιος*, and *Νασαραῖοι* represents the Hebrew *nošerim*, i.e. followers of the deity whose title is "the keeper." Thus, in the traditional account of the gracious acts of a certain great pre-Christian deity this Benefactor of Man would seem to have been called "Jeshua the (divine) keeper."

It now becomes easier to determine more exactly how far I agree with Professor Smith. That the "city called Nazaret" is fictitious, I must no doubt (independently) agree with our author. But that, underlying "Nazaret" and *Ναζωπαῖος*, is an old divine title *ha-nošer*, "the Keeper," I cannot admit. We desiderate a much more significant title than this, and my own experience leads me to expect a title which indicates the central habitation of the deity referred to. With this presupposition the majority of readers will, I think, incline to the view that *Ναζαρετ* means "Galilee," and *Ναζωπαῖος* "Galilean," which implies, of course, that the phrase "a city called Nazaret" is based on a huge misunderstanding or fallacy. It is now time to ask, Can we throw any light on the underlying name (*Našar*)? For a considerable time I have held myself that *Našar* or *Nazar* is an old popular modification of *Rešin* or *Rezon* (many such transpositions occur), which in turn is a shortened form of *Bar-Šin*. And what does *Bar-Šin* mean, in accordance with a "most ingenious hypothesis" (*Ecce Deus*, p. 319), viz. that we must learn the habits of the scribes, and frame our explanations of obscure and disputed names with reference to these habits, or, as one may say, that when an abundantly proved explanation of one proper name is arrived at, we should frame a corresponding explanation of other members of the same group—for we must be sure to arrange our names in groups? Professor Smith, as if addressing a schoolboy, observes upon this, that "in the nature of the case it would require a huge amount of well-sifted evidence to give it standing" (*ibid.*), forgetting how many proofs I have given of the bright light thrown on Hebrew names by the practice of grouping them, and of accepting suggestions from the "N. Arabian theory." One would almost think that *Traditions and Beliefs* and the succeeding books had never come into Professor Smith's hands.

What, then, does *Bar-Šin* mean? It is important, because a number of other names are compounded with *Bar*; one of them, *Bar-Timai*,<sup>1</sup> is briefly discussed by our author (p. 323). As I have shown elsewhere, these names are to be grouped with the names compounded with *Rab*; the

<sup>1</sup> *Bar Timai* = *Arāb Tamlai* = *Arāb Ishmaeli*. Cp. *Bar Tolmai*.



names with Bar and the names with Rab originally began with 'Arāb (Arabia). I cannot pause to show this again at length. Professor Smith well understands this, and on his own account quotes a striking line about the unused shafts in the quiver. I too have many unused shafts, but content myself at present with applying the newer textual methods to Bar-Šin, which will be seen to be equivalent to Arāb-Šoan, *i.e.* Arabia-Ishmael. The Ishmaelites or Jerahmeelites made their way into Galilee and, among other monuments in names, left one which now stands as Chorazīn (Matt. xi. 21, Luke x. 13; but see *Ency. Bib.* for the Greek), but should rather be Borazin (*cf.* Chorashan), *i.e.* Arabia-Šin, and, more important still, underlying Ναζαρετ, Rešinath, which most probably comes from Baršinath.

I was bound to answer the question respecting Bar-Šin, because Professor Smith is in so many things open-minded that he may yet come to see more clearly about Nazareth. The feminine form, Baršinath, is a title of the goddess Ashtart, who was originally one of the divine Company of Three (see *Two Religions*). It is not an uncommon thing in the Old Testament for the name Ashtart to be supplanted by a title of the goddess indicating the region from which the Israelites appear to have derived her cult. Such titles are often only known to us in a mutilated form—take, for instance, *Zonah*, in Jer. v. 7, which is surely a corruption of *Šib'onah*, *i.e.* Ashtart. In like manner, Rešinath is most probably a mutilated title of the same great goddess. When the inclusion of a goddess in the inner council of deity had become repugnant to the most religious Israelites, the title of the goddess had to give way to the imaginary city-name, Nazaret. (The case is similar to that of Jahwè Šeba'oth; see *Traditions and Beliefs*, and, on the other side, Hehn on the Biblical and Babylonian ideas of God.) Thus we get, as the later form of the gracious deity's name, Jehoshua Baršinath.

Another very important name is Iscariot(h), and I gladly express the opinion that here again Professor Smith has set a notable example of thoroughness. On one point we are agreed, viz. that as a place-name "Karioth" is no less imaginary than "Nazaret" (*cp. Ecce Deus*, p. 314). In fact, Iscariot(h), as our author thinks (pp. 104, 306), is "a very thinly disguised form" of the Hebrew word *sikkarti* (Isa. xix. 4), and means "surrenderer." The Judas who is so stigmatised is no mere man, but a personification of the Jewish people. "I suspect," says the author:

"I suspect that the oldest thought was of the surrender of the great Idea of the Jesus, of the Jesus-cult, by the Jews to the heathen. This, in fact, was the *supreme, the astounding, fact of early Christian history, and engaged intensely the minds of men*. It is not strange that it should find such manifold expression by parable and by symbol in the Gospels. The wonder would be if it had not. The story of Judas and his surrender seems to be the most dramatic treatment the great fact has anywhere received. Other less elaborate sketches are found in the parables of Dives and Lazarus, of the Prodigal Son, and of the Rich One who 'with lowering look went away (from Jesus) sorrowful, for he had many possessions' (the Law, the Prophets, the Promises, the Oracles of God)."

I confess that I am not convinced by these and the other arguments here adduced. Judas is, I think, virtually called a traitor in the Gospel narratives. Indeed, there had to be a traitor among the disciples, just as there had to be a Beliar among the highest angels. As for Professor Smith's explanation of Iscariot, I must abide by my former view (*Hibbert Journal*, July 1911, p. 891) that "Iscariot" comes from "Ashḥarti," which is practically equivalent to "Ashhurite" (N. Arabian), a family surname. In fact, a more thorough study of the names and surnames of the early disciples should convince anyone that they were never either opprobrious or nicknames. Professor Smith's counter-criticism of myself seems to me only to show that some of his numerous shafts have blunt points. Neither Professor Smith's innovations nor my own can be met with an expression of "lively interest" in the proofs which the innovator "must have in reserve." The production of the required proofs is, in both cases, not in the uncertain future, but in the past. It is true that, if Professor Smith really means that "Iscariot" was derived from *sikkarti* in Isaiah xix. 4, I desiderate some analogy in some early Jewish or Christian text. Our author's view would be, to me, somewhat easier if Isaiah xix. 4 were currently regarded as a Messianic passage, but it would still be against the analogy of the other names in the Gospel narratives.

It is, no doubt, an "entirely different path of research" (p. 202) into which Professor Smith has been led by "Nazaret" and "Iscariot," and, hard as it may be to keep pace with him, honour obliges us to make the effort. From the names which our unwearyable investigator considers I will select three more for criticism. "Gethsemane," which puzzles most critics, is transparent to Professor Smith. It means "wine-press of oil, or olives." True, this seems very unlikely as a place-name, but why assume topographic accuracy? "The symbolism seems perfectly obvious. The wine-press is that of Isaiah (lxiii. 2)—the wine-press of divine suffering" (p. 295). The whole scene may, of course, be unhistorical. But how exquisitely the Old Testament idea of vengeance on an enemy has been transformed!

The origin of "Gabbatha," as our author thinks, is an insoluble problem. "That [the Evangelist] gave the place any name at all was merely a part of his general scheme of vivid dramatic representation by means of well-imagined details" (p. 298).

And what has our tester of tradition to say of "Golgotha"? Only this—that the search for it has been "quite as futile as for 'Gabbatha.'" There is, therefore, no more reason in the one case than in the other for admitting a "chorographical entity," unless, indeed, we prematurely assume the historical character of the Crucifixion.

It seems clear to me that I ought not to withhold my own very definite view about these three names. A reviewer who is satisfied with picking holes cannot expect to produce as much effect as one who couples his censure with an original attempt to solve some of the problems of his author. So, then, referring for parallels to *Traditions and Beliefs, The*



*Two Religions*, and *The Veil of Hebrew History*, I will venture to say that "Gethsemane" is certainly from "Gilead-Ishmael," while "Gab" in "Gabbatha," like the name of the New Testament prophet Agab(us) and that of the great Babylonian banker Egibi, comes ultimately from "Ah'ab" (*i.e.* Arabian Ashhur), and "Gulgoleth" from Galuth, a form of "Gilead." These names must have been brought by the North Arabians in their great migration, and have been preserved by tradition. As I hope that I have made probable elsewhere, the name Jerusalem itself was brought from North Arabia. The site of the original Jerusalem was in the Arabian Asshur (or Ashhur), near the southern Gilead. The evangelist knew these various names, and arbitrarily affixed them to localities in Jerusalem. No presumption, therefore, in favour of the historicity of the narrative of the Passion can be drawn from any superficial appearance of topographical accuracy.

Let us now pass on to the symbolic interpretation of the Gospels, not of the Johannine Gospel only, but of the Synoptics. Schmiedel and Loisy have done much to establish this interpretation, but Professor Smith is logically more consistent. It does not, however, follow that he must always be able to point out and explain the symbolism, for we know comparatively few details or aspects of the mentality of the evangelists. Professor Smith, therefore, willingly admits that the narrative of the Last Week has "been treated with especial care and delicacy of detail" (p. 141). "But," he adds, "the guidance of ideas has at no point been abandoned; on the contrary, it has been everywhere followed with noteworthy conscientiousness." And yet in the very centre of quasi-historic details there may occur a passage which can only be adequately explained as an example of symbolism—a symbolism which vitiates the claim of the rest of the passage to be regarded as genuinely historical. The passage is Mark xiv. 51, 52 (pp. 109, 112); it is about the young man, who was "wont to follow" with Jesus, who had a linen cloth wrapped about him, and who fled away naked, leaving the linen cloth. I do not know whether our author has any predecessors, but the arguments which he has adduced seem to me decisive. He lays stress on the striking phraseological parallel in Mark xvi. 5, and points out that the "young man clothed in a white robe, sitting on the right" of the open sepulchre, is unquestionably an angel. He also shows from Ezek. ix. 2, 3, 11, x. 2, 6, 7, Dan. x. 5, xii. 6, 7, that "a man clothed in linen" is a technical phrase for a heavenly being, and compares Rev. xix. 14, where the heavenly hosts appear "clothed in fine linen, white and pure."

Can we doubt, then, that the "young man clothed in linen" in the Marcan account of the Trial is a celestial being? We know that "there are celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial" (1 Cor. xv. 40), and in the *Book of Adam and Eve*, translated from the Ethiopic by Malan (p. 12), God says: "I made thee of the light, and I wished to bring out children of light from thee, and like unto thee." The conception is that of luminous matter; but the body of unveiled heavenly light would have been too

dazzling for ordinary human vision. The fine white linen robe was just what was requisite to mitigate the excess of light. But what has this angelic being to do here? The answer is that the Saviour, according to Mark, was a divine manifestation. To have made him, however, go about in a rich white linen robe would have defeated his object, which was at any rate quasi-historical. He determined, therefore, before the difficult Crucifixion scene, to warn the reader that the true divine Jesus could not be arrested and crucified. "He would whisper to his reader: 'Of course the God-Jesus could not be arrested, but only the garment concealing his divinity, the garment of flesh that he has put on in this my symbolic narrative.'" The "young man" is, in fact, very like the Fravashi of the Zoroastrians—the Heavenly Self (p. 113).

This is specially important for the light which it sheds on one of the words from the Cross (Mark xv. 34; Matt. xxvii. 46), which Professor Schmiedel includes among the "pillar-passages," and regards with some confidence as historical: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (pp. 200, 201). And doubtless it does appear strange that the Christ should utter this supremely bitter cry. But we must not infer from this that the utterance is historical. The speaker is not a Divine Being, but simply the veil or garment of flesh which was all that the Roman soldiers could lay their hands upon.

Truly, the symbolism of the Gospels envelops a rich variety of thought. We may, however, appropriately describe these wonderful productions (including Acts) as allegories of the things relating to the God Jesus and the progress of his cult. Professor Smith has only been able to give specimens of the range of the symbolism, but these specimens are thoroughly adequate. I will refer here to two parables and two narratives. It should be mentioned previously, however, that Professor Smith, in an important passage of Part I. (p. 34), rightly criticises Wellhausen's exegesis of Mark iv. 11, 12, 33, 34. That fine critic will not, indeed, deny the obvious sense of these verses, and yet he rejects the contents of the verses, because they are inconsistent with the concept which he has formed of Jesus. Such is not the procedure of our author. The primitive teaching of the cult of Jesus was, from prudential reasons, kept secret, or only expressed in a parabolic or symbolic form unintelligible to outsiders.

What outsider, for instance, would look beyond the most obvious interpretation of the parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke xvii. 32), which Deissmann has so attractively illustrated from the Egyptian ostraka? And yet, when we have grasped Professor Smith's theory, can we fail to be convinced by it? The father is the true God; the return of the prodigal means the conversion of the human race after its long carousal with false religions; the elder brother, the orthodox Jew, so unwilling to share his blessings with his Gentile brother.

Less pleasing is the equally symbolic parable of Dives and Lazarus (Luke xvi. 19-31). While Lazarus is carried to Abraham's bosom, Dives is cast into hell. The "five brethren," like the "five husbands" in John iv. 18,



are, of course, the five nations of Samaria (2 Kings xvii. 25-41). Nor is it only the parables which receive much light. The narratives too are the gainers. It spite of what may be called a rampant sentimentalism, the children who are not to be forbidden to approach Jesus (Mark x. 13-16) are Gentile proselytes, who, in fact, are often compared in Jewish writings to little children. Elsewhere the Gentile peoples are personified as a woman (Luke x. 38-42) called Mary, whose sister Martha represents the Jewish formalists. One may think that the ordinary interpretation is, for us, better worth having. But it still remains to consider whether this may not be due to educational prejudice.

The influence of this most potent factor in our opinions can, in truth, only be slowly neutralised. Unless we have enormous energy, how can we find time for the repeated re-examinations which these important questions demand? But we ought to know by experience that there is within us a hidden source of strength. And if it should happen that the amount of credible matter in the Gospels shrivels up into a narrow compass, we shall do well to be content, for of one thing we may be certain—that no criticism can deprive us of the God who suffers and triumphs both for us and in us. Let us then go on, in the spirit of this grandly daring book, “unhasting, unresting.” Much, as it seems to me, has been definitely ascertained. We ought now to sift the possibly extant traditions of a great Galilean teacher, and see what follows for religion. So shall we be pioneers religiously of a new and happier age.

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*Science and the Human Mind: A Critical and Historical Account of the Development of Natural Knowledge.*—By W. C. D. Whetham, M.A., F.R.S., and C. D. Whetham.—Longmans, 1912.

THIS is in many ways an extraordinary work. In an introduction of some twenty pages we have a disquisition on the origin of natural science, with more than a few hints as to the manner of its growth; a short but interesting statement as to the races of Europe, with a few ethnological generalisations; some references to “creation and culture”; and finally, a brief, philosophic account of “mysticism and dogma” and their connection with national character and temperament. In the concluding chapter, of some forty-four pages, we have a strange sense of motion as we speed from theories of corpuscles and electrons—references to the Greeks jostle notes on the works of Professors Sir J. J. Thompson and Sir J. Larmor—to radio-activity, and, after a moment’s pause, on again to considerations of ether and its power of transmission. We draw a breath and rush on to think of Mendel and his discovery, of Weismann, and of the whole problem raised by the Neo-Vitalists. Still we are only half way through the chapter, which goes on for a moment to discuss experimental psychology before breaking out into a few remarks on intellectualism and crowd-

psychology, with references to elocution, advertisement, and electioneering. Comparative Religion is the title of the next few paragraphs, in which we hear of bull-roarers which are made to "produce" thunder, of primitive life and worship, of Christianity, of the discovery made by the leaders of the Oxford Movement. A little later we find ourselves discussing the theory of scientific knowledge, and, after making a bow to the venerable problem of universals, pass on to the relation between science and philosophy and the position of M. Bergson. A few closing remarks on science and the human mind bring us safely into harbour, after as "choppy" a voyage as could well be imagined.

We have taken into account only the introductory remarks and the concluding chapter. In the corpus of the work we glance at Science in Chaldea, Egypt, Greece, and Mediæval Europe, and after a biographical survey of the discoveries of the men of the Renaissance—a period which apparently only terminates with the French Revolution—we are led to consider the scientific developments of the nineteenth century and the coming of evolution.

The object of this encyclopædic effort is given by the authors in their preface. "Though there are many histories of the different branches of science—and of science itself—a general survey of the progress of natural knowledge in its relation to other fields of human thought seems not previously to have been written. . . ." "We have set out to tell in plain language the story of the separation of science from the associations with theology and philosophy by which, of necessity, its origins were beset. . . ." "Lastly, we have endeavoured to weigh the influence which, in turn, science . . . has had on sociology, on philosophy, and on religion."

Speaking of the work as a whole, one may say that it cannot fail to interest students of the history of science, that many of its later paragraphs are, as we should expect from the authors of *Recent Developments of Physical Science*, really illuminating, and that the questions which should be answered in such a treatise have been seen with exceptional keenness and clearness. For the rest, it is vitiated in many parts by the authors' lack of acquaintance with the nature and scope of philosophy, and by a certain animus against the whole temper of the Middle Ages, which renders a long chapter on the mediæval mind and many references scattered up and down the book highly untrustworthy both in fact and in generalisation. The historical sense, which sees men and problems sympathetically, and in their true chronological and temperamental setting, is often lacking, and a genius like Aristotle, whose physics is of course only an interesting relic, may expect very summary treatment at the hands of Mr and Mrs Whetham. We may add that the biographical method, though admirably adapted to a lengthier discussion of these problems, has many disadvantages in so short an analysis. In fact, we tire of their abbreviated accounts of the life and thought of many individuals. Perhaps they remind us too strongly of the medley of names and dates that used to be called "history."



To begin with, the authors do not seem at home with philosophy, as will be seen occasionally from their *obiter dicta*. After reading that all races, at a certain stage of their development, treat both science and philosophy as branches of religion, we find this astonishing remark: "Philosophy is indeed but the attempt on one side to disentangle and analyse the various elements which are involved in the concepts of religion." On page 150 we read of the "airy realms of philosophy"—the authors are referring to the "confusion" of metaphysics and science in the works of Aristotle!—and a few lines further down we are told that philosophy and religion had by the close of the Renaissance realised that "while still and for ever supreme, each in its own *empyrean space*,<sup>1</sup> they must defer to the superior authority of experience, when they touched the firm ground of natural science." Early in the book we are given to understand that while a subject "is only amenable to speculative treatment and imaginative analysis, the philosophers retain their jurisdiction," and the volume closes with a sally concerning the freedom of science from "the shifting sands of metaphysical systems."

We take it, therefore, that the authors consider philosophy, first as a rational attempt to support religious doctrines or concepts, and secondly as something holding only remote and occasional commerce with experience.

Which philosophy have the authors in mind? They speak of Plato's "metaphysical reconstruction of religion"—the meaning is not obvious—rising to the "highest flights of mysticism." Have they forgotten that Plato gave us an early solution of the theory of knowledge, that he wrote two remarkable works, the *Republic* and the *Laws*, on political philosophy, or that he was the first of Western philosophers to treat what we would now call æsthetics? If we pass to Aristotle, the difficulties are only increased. How do his theories, let us say, of mental abstraction, of active intellect, of 'δύναμις and ἐνέργεια' or 'οὐσία and συμβεβηκός' or 'ἔλη and μορφή,' analyse the various elements involved in the concepts of religion? Or, better still, which is the religion? In the various mediæval philosophies it is equally clear that there are hundreds of questions, such as the unity of forms, the "principium individuationis," and the distinction between *essentia* and *esse*, which cannot even be connected with religious concepts without doing violence to thought or language. We need not mention modern or contemporary thinkers. It is abundantly clear that Mr Bradley's theory of truth or judgment, or Professor James's attitude towards the philosophic categories, cannot be pressed into the scope of religion.

With regard to the other interesting point, as to the aloofness of philosophic thought from experience, we confess even eagerly that some of the wildest and most incoherent notions have been propounded in the name of philosophy. But it is hardly generous of the scientist to mention the fact, seeing that the historical record of his own branch of knowledge

<sup>1</sup> The italics are our own.

contains many an absurd theory, and shows, despite its succession of victories and its general solidarity, a distinct tendency to oscillate between extremes in the domain of theory. Mr Whetham will remember Professor Ostwald's indictment of the mechanical theory, as a tissue of unproven and even gratuitous hypotheses. However, it is wiser to judge both science and philosophy by their best exponents, and in the standard philosophical works we find a constant appeal to experience and observed fact. Besides, the Socratic induction, "*μαιευτικὴ τέχνη*" is a very old method in philosophy. Science and philosophy, in fact, both regard the same world with the same eyes; they only isolate different aspects, or differently weave together those already isolated. This point is insisted upon by Mr Bertrand Russell in his *Problems of Philosophy*. "There is," he says, "no special source of wisdom open to philosophy but not to science, and the results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those obtained by science. The essential characteristic of philosophy, which makes it a study distinct from science, is criticism. It examines critically the principles employed in science and in daily life . . . and it only accepts them when, as a result of a critical inquiry, no reason for rejecting them has appeared."

We submit, then, that the authors, who set out to tell us of the liberation of science from philosophy and theology, have misunderstood at least one of the factors. We are not surprised, therefore, to find a very unconvincing chapter on the "mediæval mind," though its inaccuracies can scarcely be pardoned. We may touch on a few points in passing.

The mediæval period is described as one of gloom and theological prepossession. We hear much of "cast-iron dogma," and of the "tyranny of the Roman school." In the Roman Catholic Church of this and other ages, "no criticism can be tolerated, nor is conscious expansion of thought permissible." To get to the heart of the matter at once, we may ask, "Whence comes this conception of mediæval gloom and stagnation?" No one doubts that things were astir politically. Professor Shotwell in his article on "The Middle Ages" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* says: "The twelfth century stands beside the eighteenth, as one of the greatest creative centuries in human history. The thirteenth like the nineteenth applied these creations to the transformation of society." But if we prescind altogether from politics, and read the philosophy of the period, taking as a guide such an admirable work as M. de Wulf's *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, we find, at least from the beginning of the twelfth century, that men are actively thinking about every manner of philosophic problem. They begin with the question of universals, and are gradually forced to treat metaphysic and psychology. The schools, say of Chartres and Paris, are the scenes of intense discussion, and the century is filled with the names of Abélard, Bernard, and Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert de la Porrée, John of Salisbury, and Alain of Lille. On all sides we find thought and difference; in fact, that vigour of discussion which naturally led in the early thirteenth century to the foundation of Paris, the mother of universities. With the erection of the university we reach the golden



age of mediæval thought, during which almost every question in the domain of pure philosophy was treated with unrivalled dialectical skill. But the period and the princes of the new Aristotelian movement need no word of apology; they stand out as giant figures in the march of Western ideas. Where, in all this, is the gloom and stagnation?

More important, however, is the authors' statement that the period in question is one of "cast-iron dogma, which supplied to all physical and biological questions, as well as to those of metaphysic and theology, an interpretation not to be gainsaid." As this idea runs through the book, like a *leit-motiv*, it is essential that the authors should convince themselves of their mistake. First, the dogmas of the Catholic Church never touched questions of physics and biology: they simply expressed in propositional form the content of the Christian revelation. And apart altogether from scientific questions, it is clear that the Catholic doctrines cannot have answered all the problems in metaphysic and philosophy, seeing that devout men, who all professed the same doctrines and who all gave to them the same meaning, differed even violently on purely philosophical issues. Scholasticism itself is only the name for the essence of many philosophies which differ in a hundred lights and shades. Long before the fifteenth century the keenest distinction was drawn between philosophy and theology. The latter studied the supernatural order, in so far as it is revealed by God, while philosophy confined its attention to the natural order, which it investigated by reason alone. Dogma depended on authority: philosophy on scientific demonstration, in which it was declared, "*locus ab auctoritate est infirmissimus*." But there is no necessity to labour a point which is a commonplace in the history of thought. In a short article on Thomas Aquinas in Mr Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy* we find the following summary: "Philosophy and theology are distinct in object, principle, and method of procedure, but yet related as completive parts each to the other." There is, in fact, in the works of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and of a hundred others, no more confusion between science, philosophy, and dogma than there is in the minds of the editors of, let us say, the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, who welcome articles on every conceivable subject in their desire to strike every chord of knowledge and inquiry.

After dealing with the supposed dullness and fixity of the Middle Ages, the authors draw a contrast between the adaptability and fluidity of the Greek religion, on the one hand, and the constraint and deference to traditional bonds which, on the other, characterise mediæval Christianity. They add: "It is no wonder that in one case we get freedom and breadth of outlook; in the other, narrow, preconceived ideas and rigid dogmatism." The point need only detain us for one moment. The early mediæval philosophers drew deep draughts of Greek philosophy, which they knew, for instance, from the works of St Augustine, and from many translations, including the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, which set the minds of men on fire for three centuries with the question of universals. From the

first, besides this Platonic tradition, they knew some of the works of Aristotle in translation, and others *via* the commentaries of Boethius. In the thirteenth century the leaders of scholasticism were in possession of translations from the Greek and Arabic of nearly all the principal works of Aristotle. In fact, we look for the true continuation of the Aristotelian tradition, not to the fourth century B.C., but to the thirteenth century of our era, which resounds with the philosophies of Greece: St Thomas is "Greek" to the finger-tips. The difference, then, between the philosophic outlook of the greatest of the Greeks and of the mediæval men exists almost exclusively in the imagination of our authors. For the rest, would the authors prefer the religious beliefs of the Greeks to the whole-hearted devotion to the teaching of Christ which characterised nearly all the leading mediæval philosophers? They would have done better to avoid what Lord Acton called "the service of a cause."

The few paragraphs referring to St Thomas Aquinas are weak and often incorrect. The authors mistake the meaning of the term "principium individuationis," and apparently misunderstand his solution of "the universals," which coincides with that of Aristotle. But what can the authors mean by saying that Aquinas set out to interpret "Aristotelian thought in terms of Christian dogma"? How could anyone interpret Aristotle's psychology, or his theory of potentiality and activity, in terms of the Trinity or the Incarnation? We observe, too, that to St Thomas is "chiefly due the obscurantist attitude of Rome" towards science at the Renaissance. In his own day Aquinas was a pioneer who suffered not a little in the cause of the progress of philosophy and—let us not lack historical insight—science. And strangely enough, when, towards the end of the nineteenth century, Pope Leo XIII. and Désiré Mercier, the present Cardinal-Archbishop of Mechlin, wished to found a centre of study and research in philosophy and science, they called their institute at Louvain, "l'École de S. Thomas d'Aquin." At this school, which is well known throughout Continental Europe, the sciences of our own day, our physics, biology, physiology, experimental psychology, and the rest, are fused into one great system with the philosophy of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas.

There are many mistakes in the summaries of the thought and spirit of Duns Scotus and William of Occam; while, from the references to Kant, one might think that Alois Riehl and Windelband had never written their interpretations of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. There are many other corrections to be suggested, particularly in the first half of the book; but we terminate willingly, as there is little pleasure in cataloguing the mistakes of an author who, an undisputed master in his own sphere, has in the volume before us wandered into unfamiliar fields, where the path can only be found by the light of a good knowledge of philosophy and theology.

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*Saint François d'Assise, sa vie et son œuvre.*—With portraits.—By Johannes Joergensen. Traduit du Danois par Teodor de Wyzewa.—1911.

*Life of St Francis of Assisi.*—By Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C.—With portrait and illustrations.—Longmans, 1912.

SOME eighteen years have elapsed since M. Paul Sabatier's *Life of St Francis* delighted the lovers of the Saint of Assisi. Fascinated with the charm of M. Sabatier's style and its many brilliant passages, those outside the Catholic Church were not painfully affected by some of his conclusions, as were many of those within its borders. It was so long since any detailed Life, rich like this one in references to older sources, well known or obscure, had been placed within the reach of the ordinary reader, that it was hailed with enthusiasm; and for many years M. Sabatier has remained unchallenged master of the field. And it was right that this should be so. No unprejudiced student can deny that we owe M. Sabatier a debt of gratitude for his researches into sources, until then little known, as to the facts of St Francis' life, and for presenting them to the world in a garb which so many have contemplated with pleasure and still continue to admire. The picture of the friar-jongleur traversing with his companions the ways and hillsides of Umbria and Tuscany, singing their joyful songs and hymns of praise, regardless of all conventions, is singularly attractive; and it is no exaggeration to say that hundreds have been induced by this book to visit Assisi, to study the frescoes by Giotto and Sassetta, to buy memorials of St Francis, nay, even to worship at his shrine.

M. Sabatier dwells too much, however, on the past glory of Franciscanism, and implies that it has deserved none since its first foundation. "Francis' disciples," he says, "have vied with one another in misunderstanding his thought. . . . Who knows whether this expiring nineteenth century will not arise from its winding-sheet to make the *amende honorable* and bequeath to its successor one manly word of faith?" (p. 186). What, then, of St John Capistran, St Peter of Alcantara, St Elizabeth of Hungary, Dante, the Curé d'Ars, Leo XIII.?

Quite recently there has entered the lists an author of sterner calibre, a hardy Norseman, who has thrown down the gauntlet in vindication of the more real and practical side of the character of St Francis and of his Order. M. Johannes Joergensen, a Dane, once a Protestant poet and novelist, converted to the Catholic faith by the study of St Francis and by long sojourning in Assisi and Rome, gives in his presentment of the Saint a totally different picture from that of M. Sabatier. True, his more austere outlook and less refined diction have not the charm of the Frenchman's exquisitely polished phrases. Nor would M. Joergensen's account, if taken alone, give a perfectly true impression, or, rather, one perfectly satisfying to the Catholic heart. It is, one may say, the reverse of the medal, both sides of which must be seen in order to arrive at a correct judgment. But the matter concerns us more than the manner. For, whereas the

impression left on the mind by M. Sabatier's biography is that Francis had little veneration for ecclesiastical authority and the mandates of the Church, M. Joergensen takes pains to show that this was far from being the case. He fully acknowledges his indebtedness to the laborious research of M. Sabatier, but points out that, since Sabatier wrote, "a number of documents have been brought to light, some of the first importance." He therefore feels that the time has come for a new Life, founded on the latest researches and written from the Catholic point of view by one who has embraced the faith so dear to St Francis. He entitles his book *St François d'Assise, sa vie et son œuvre*, and the sub-title is significant. For the book emphasises the growth and activity of the Franciscan Order throughout the world during seven centuries, and consequently shows that the Franciscan ideal has not been lost. M. Joergensen testifies to the never-dying spirit of St Francis within the Order down to the present day, though at the same time he does not slur over the disputes and differences which took place over the rule under the leadership of Brother Elias, even in the lifetime of Francis. Nevertheless, the flame that the Saint kindled has never been extinguished, and burns still brightly in the rule and practice of all branches of the *Fratres Minores*. The work is made more interesting by a number of portraits of the Saint, reproduced from paintings and frescoes in various parts of Italy. It is also furnished with a good index and an interesting preface by the translator, with an account of M. Joergensen's life and line of thought as an author of poems and romances, and the steps which finally led him to embrace the Catholic faith.

In the most recently published Life, we have at last a truer and more complete picture of St Francis, drawn by one who has passed the greater part of his life in the Capuchin Franciscan Order, in daily communion, so to speak, with the Saint who has been his master and his guide; studying the sources, legends, and histories not as an outsider, but from within. Believing that no one can rightly understand St Francis without a knowledge of the surroundings amid which he lived and worked, Father Cuthbert begins this new Life with a charming description of the country round about Assisi, and of the ways by which it is approached. The book is also enriched by thirteen beautiful and original illustrations of the scenery and haunts in which St Francis passed so much of his life. The reader's mind is thus attuned, as by some overture to a masterpiece of music, to the great theme he is expecting, or adapted (to change the metaphor), like the framework of one of Botticelli's Madonnas, to the ideal figure it is to enshrine. As one reads again the now familiar story of Francis' youth and conversion, and follows the unfolding of his mind and character as told by Father Cuthbert, one feels oneself at once in an atmosphere of peace, whence doubt and scepticism have fled away like the mists from the Umbrian hills and Italian skies after the sun has risen. Take the following passage, which bears upon the oft-repeated charge of pantheism brought against Francis: "Through all this kingdom, as he was coming to know



it, he saw the resplendent figure of the Lord Christ reflected in all: the beggar and the leper were touched with His majesty, and the earth they dwelt on acquired a new sanctity because this glory of the Christ was upon them. And that was the singular thing about Francis' turning towards religion. It did not raise a barrier between him and the earth, but the earth itself became transformed in his sight and gave him a new joy." And again: "The friendly earth had no jar upon his happiness: it, too, was young and free and vital as he. Instinctively he recognised the comradeship of the mountain heights and the deep ravines and the shadowy woods, and of the bare rugged slopes, so strong and bracing, and yet revealing a tenderness where the wild flowers nestle in the rocky soil. And as he went he sang, not in his native tongue, but in the musical language of the Provençal troubadour." How different this from Shelley's longing to be "made one with nature"!

But it is the passages in praise of the Lady Poverty, of whom Father Cuthbert has already written elsewhere with so much poetry and sympathy, being himself one of her devoted followers, that appeal to us the most irresistibly; also the chapter on St Clare, which is full of delicate charm, and shows the virile as well as the pious side of her character, and her great influence on the Order as a whole.

The difficulties and dissensions which arose within the Order during the absence of Francis in the East are fully set forth by Father Cuthbert, and those who caused them are judged by him with admirable fairness. He shows how St Francis at last recognised, though somewhat sorrowfully, that in consequence of the great and growing expansion of the Order some change in its government had become necessary. In his humility he would not trust himself to deal with it, but went in person for counsel to Pope Honorius, who gave Francis his old friend the Bishop of Ostia, then Cardinal Ugolino, to advise him and to be the Protector of his fraternity. The manner in which Father Cuthbert handles this thorny question marks him as an impartial historian. Even the high-handed and much-debated conduct of Brother Elias is treated with broad-mindedness though with justice.

Father Cuthbert dwells at greater length than either of the two other biographers on Francis' insistence that the brethren should earn their bread, or, in default of employment, should beg for it from door to door. This proved a hard trial to the novices and younger brethren, but Francis never imposed any task upon them that he had not performed or was not ready to perform himself, and he "held it as a privilege to live by alms," as being more in conformity with the poverty of Jesus Christ, and as conferring a benefit on the giver as well as on the receiver. Above all, they were on no account to accept money. This, Father Cuthbert shows at some length, was at the very root of the existence of the Order, and a standing protest against the corruption by wealth of the world they had renounced. May we hope that behind the newly awakened modern cult of St Francis, especially outside the Church, there is a hidden feeling that

somewhat of his spirit is what is wanted towards the solution of the present discontent and unrest, and of what are called social problems generally!

A delightful picture is drawn for us in the chapter on the Porziuncula of some of the first brethren of the Order, whose names are so familiar to us in the *Fioretti*. Juniper, Massèò, Giles, Leo, Ruffino—a finished portrait of each one is there; and yet, says Father Cuthbert, “whilst impressing upon all a generic family likeness, life at the Porziuncula left each man himself, fostering in each his own peculiar strength and nobility of spirit, as one cultivates in a fair garden many varieties of flowers. There was no moulding in a rigid groove: but the spirit of the place seemed to delight in the freshness each individual character brought to the riches of the whole, and to treasure it as part of the secret of its joy. Francis had no wish that all the brethren should be of one external pattern. . . . And this largeness of spirit was in truth one of the secrets which gave power and beauty to that Umbrian revival of faith.”

The account of the Fourth Lateran Council deserves close study and attention. The meeting between Francis and Dominic, which is supposed to have then taken place, and the contrasting character and work of each, are drawn with a masterly hand as representing respectively the “spirits of liberty, and of law,” and the striking figure of Innocent III., who convened the Council, stands out in bold relief. M. Sabatier considers that the presence of Francis at Rome during the Lateran Council is possible, but he says: “It has left no trace in the earliest biographies.” Father Cuthbert, on the other hand, tells us that it was here “the destiny of the fraternity was being shaped, not merely by the inspiration of Francis, but by its alliance with the world—forces upon which the Catholic world was being carried forward in the hot rush of a fully awakened life.”

Into the intricacies of the various rules of the Order the general reader scarcely needs to enter—they are for the theologian; but the touching account of the happenings at Mount Alvernia and the last days of St Francis will be valued by every unprejudiced reader of this book. The book is pervaded by the spirit of truth, peace, and tenderness so conspicuous in St Francis and inherited by so many of his disciples. And its style leaves nothing to be desired, not even by those who have been hitherto enchanted by that of Sabatier. A full index is provided, and the appendices give a complete list of all the sources from which the writer’s knowledge of St Francis and the Three Orders is derived.

E. KISLINGBURY.

CRAWLEY, SUSSEX.

*The Canon Law in Mediæval England.*—By Arthur Ogle, M.A.—  
Murray, 1912.

MR OGLE here reopens a famous controversy between Stubbs and Maitland. He demands our verdict for the former; but it is only too evident that he has not really understood the latter. Yet Maitland was a very clear



writer, and had taken great pains to purge this question of its irrelevant accretions. But Mr Ogle starts at a disadvantage which is not of his own making. Maitland's book has been quoted, certainly not always legitimately, in favour of Welsh Disestablishment; and though Mr Ogle begs the reader, as early as p. 17, to "be pleased to dismiss from his mind 'Disestablishment and Disendowment' and all connected with it," yet on p. 51 the fatal "Mr Ellis J. Griffith, K.C., M.P.," emerges again as inexorably as King Charles's head. It would be unjust, however, to lay too much stress on this; Mr Ogle has struggled manfully against a temptation which will be underestimated only by those who have no serious political or religious convictions. But his second disadvantage is of his own making. His adversary is one of the clearest of thinkers and writers; but this counterblast is often most diffuse and rhetorical just where the closest thought and the most definite expressions are needed; we can almost see Mr Ogle lashing his own flanks to bring himself up to arguing point. The reader may wonder how far the author understands his own drift; but meanwhile the tone grows warmer and warmer. There is much noise of conflict, a great deal of dust, and at last a breathless and perspiring Mr Ogle emerges with the news that Maitland has been demolished during the scrimmage. This will not do in the long-run, though for a time it may flatter many unconscious prejudices only too well; and it is precisely because we ourselves think the present Disestablishment Bill illiberal, and because we have admired Mr Ogle's earlier work, that we wish to insist upon the scientific shortcomings of this present book.

Let us begin by quoting a few words from Stubbs and Maitland, to mark their relative positions. Stubbs wrote: "Attempts to force on the Church and nation the complete Canon Law of the Middle Ages were always unsuccessful. The declaration of the law [in England] still remained chiefly in the mouth of the judge, who declared it out of his own knowledge and experience without reference to an authoritative text." Maitland puts his own contrary position very clearly: "That the English Courts Christian held themselves free to accept or reject, and did in some cases reject, 'the Canon Law of Rome,' . . . seems to me exceedingly dubious." Now, Mr Ogle undertakes to prove the futility of Maitland's objections from Maitland's own chosen witnesses, the mediæval English canon-lawyers William Lyndwood and John of Ayton. He deals with only a few of Maitland's main points, though his book is half as bulky again as the two essays which it attacks. Let us supply here one of Mr Ogle's most significant omissions. Maitland quotes half a dozen passages which would seem sufficient of themselves to show that Lyndwood, unquestionably our most eminent canon-lawyer, had never dreamed of asserting Stubbs's doctrine, nor ever heard it seriously asserted. "The Pope is above the laws," he writes; and, in another place, "He need give no reason but his own will." His Decrees and Decretals are of equal force with the canons of a General Council. Again, "That man is called a heretic who, in contempt of the Roman Church, scorns to keep that

which the Roman Church ordains; likewise he who despises and neglects to keep the Decretals"—that is, even the least authoritative part (if a distinction must be drawn) of Canon Law. Lastly, Archbishop Arundel and the Provincial Council of Canterbury branded as heretics all who should dispute the validity of "the articles determined by the Church, as contained in the Decrees or Decretals or our own Provincial or Synodal constitutions." How, in the face of this, can Mr Ogle hold that Lyndwood believed his own *Provinciale* to possess "a kind and degree of legal authority which the Corpus Juris [*i.e.* Roman Canon Law] had not"? (p. 81). We cannot tell; for, though he constantly quarrels with the term "stark Papalist" which Maitland applies to this attitude of Lyndwood's, yet he makes no direct attempt to meet the documentary evidence, either on these pages or in the many other places where his own argument cries for some such recognition. The one passing allusion which we have noted on p. 183 is that of a man rather fleeing from, than grappling with, the actual evidence. Moreover, he obscures the issue by implying in this context, and still more plainly in others, that Maitland had read his Lyndwood only superficially—an accusation which the ripest of living historians would shrink from making except upon the most definite evidence. For Mr Ogle, however, the only necessary evidence is that Maitland disagrees with him. This is well exemplified by the eight pages from 153 to 161. There he first misunderstands the drift of one of Maitland's phrases, then misquotes it twice with gratuitous and most misleading additions, and finally produces, by way of proof, a home-made summary of Lyndwood's Preface. It will scarcely be believed that Mr Ogle's summary omits precisely the phrase which fully justifies Maitland's interpretation: "et maxime [ad] virorum ecclesiasticorum simplicium profectum." In other words, Maitland is careless and superficial because he has seized upon one most significant sentence which Mr Ogle has inexplicably managed to muddle away. Again, the "stupidity" which he finds in one of Maitland's dicta is simply of his own importation (pp. 52-3). He sneers at the Professor as a man mainly versed in common law, evidently without suspecting that even the average common-lawyer starts on this race with no greater weight of besetting sin than the average country clergyman. All through, indeed, his patronising tone is the more significant because it is apparently unconscious. Yet Mr Ogle's scientific equipment, it must frankly be said, is not such as would warrant this hypercriticism, though he has evidently taken real pains to master the subject. He copies from the introduction to Peckham's letters a blunder about that archbishop's education at Lewes Priory, to which his adversary would never have committed himself (p. 125). He talks about "the gloss upon the Corpus" in a way which suggests very imperfect familiarity with his tools; a suspicion which is confirmed by several of his other references, and by his descriptions of Canon Law on p. 41, and of the Provincial Constitutions on p. 44. He seems quite unable to grasp the fact that the customs peculiar to English Church Law were themselves foreseen and



allowed for in Roman Canon Law ; and here, again, he falls foul of Maitland for presuming to state the real truth. His thinking about Church and State is hopelessly confused ; one is tempted to ask whether he has ever read the *City of God*, or how he would explain the mediæval distinctions between *Ecclesia* and *Respublica*, *vir ecclesiasticus* and *vir secularis*. In short, though Mr Ogle supplies enough material for a brief and modest essay in qualification of some too sweeping sentences in Maitland, yet, on the whole, this book of 48,000 words is even less effectual than Stubbs's rejoinder of a hundred lines. The reader who takes the pains to check references on both sides will probably be confirmed in the general impression that Maitland's thesis is, as a whole, unassailable.

G. G. COULTON.

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*Personality and the Christian Ideal: A Discussion of Personality in the Light of Christianity.*—By John Wright Buckham.—Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1909.—Pp. xvi+263.

MR BUCKHAM, in the first lines of his preface, lays down a fruitful principle. "The paths of philosophy, psychology, ethics, and theology, which have been diverging more and more since the middle of the nineteenth century, are once more converging—at the point of personality." There is a place, therefore, for those who attempt to trace this convergence, and Mr Buckham is to be congratulated upon the success of his attempt. In the survey which he takes, there are included many elements for which room is not always found so far away from California as London is, and the reflection that Mr Buckham is separated from English readers by the solid globe prepares us for a freshness of statement which keeps the reader's interest alive.

"Humanity, in spite of Christian teaching to the contrary, has been too long under subjection to a pseudo-philosophy which makes the physical states, the sensations, the positive and determinant factors in life and selfhood the subordinate if not the slave of sense-experience." Here an important question is suggested. Has the sensationalism of Hume, with its various developments, been a mere wandering after a will-o'-the-wisp? On the contrary, such a philosophy as that which Mr Buckham outlines can never be fully developed apart from the critical method to which Hume gave an impulse. Further, nature is certainly, as Mr Buckham says, inferior to man, as a clue to the knowledge of God. But the wealth of nature and the wealth of consciousness have been understood, as never before, through the modern scientific movement, which, within its own limits, is penetrated with the method of Hume. In fact, there is a danger lest in the renaissance of intuitional philosophy we should omit Hume's services to thought from our total reckoning.

On the other hand, the ultimate effect of the increased knowledge of the external world has been, in many directions, to obscure the more real

and more valuable world of man. Hence it is safer, even from a theoretical standpoint, to insist upon the latter at the cost of the external world, if the choice has to be made. The intuition of God and of man (which in religion is called "faith") has been justly, though inadequately, defended by many thinkers, in the face of a prevailing hostile philosophy. Now, however, we can regard every increase in our knowledge of nature as an indirect exaltation of man. And here Mr Buckham's theory that the self or person treats the physiological mechanism as an instrument, rightly emphasises (even if it exaggerates somewhat) the consequences of certain recent discoveries. "To hold to one's integrity through all brain ailments and bodily ills, to say to oneself, *I, the Self, am above sickness, disease, death*, is to win the victory over the world, the flesh, and the devil; and also, as Christian Science has seen, to do the very best thing to bring brain and body back to a normal condition." Such a book as this makes for the belief that the twentieth century will see a theology in which, once more, man will find intellectual satisfaction, and peace for his restless will.

FRANK GRANGER.

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
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